Download pdf - Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An Intergovernmental Nightmare

Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An Intergovernmental NightmareAuthor(s): Richard T. SylvesSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1984), pp. 393-401Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/975990 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 21:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wiley and American Society for Public Administration are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Public Administration Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.72.154 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 21:02:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aspa

http://www.jstor.org/stable/975990?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


PROFITABILITY GUARDIANS AND SERVICE ADVOCATES 393

28. Ibid., p. 58. 29. Ibid., p. 59. 30. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Should Amtrak's High-

ly. . . ," op. cit., p. 18. 31. Musolf, op. cit., p. 60. 32. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Amtrak's Subsidy

Needs. . . ," op. cit., pp. 31-32. 33. Musolf, op. cit., p. 60. 34. Congressional Budget Office, op. cit., p. 28. 35. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Should Amtrak Develop

High-Speed....," op. cit., p. 21. 36. U.S. Department of Transportation, "Final Report to Congress

on the Amtrak Route System" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1979), DOT, p. 3-8.

37. Idem. 38. Congressional Budget Office, op. cit., p. 45.

39. Musolf, op. cit., p. 62. A significant example of such judgment and training for services and profit occurred in 1983. Amtrak negotiated new labor agreements that required an eight hour day for eight hours pay. This increased productivity and, according to OMB, set an important precedent for the entire railroad industry. In addition to phasing out the inefficient rules noted previously, Amtrak also took over the train and engineer crews that were supplied by Conrail.

40. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 14.

41. Musolf, op. cit., p. 62. 42. Interviews. Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department

of Transportation, Congressional Budget Office, Senate Budget Committee, and Amtrak, all in Washington, D.C., 1981, 1983.

43. Musolf, op. cit., p. 64.

Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An lntergovernmental Nightmare Richard T. Sylves, University of Delaware

Despite all that was learned from the Three Mile Island unit #2 reactor accident in 1979, U.S. off-site nuclear power emergency response planning remains in a stage of virtual adolescence. The issue itself continues to be either hotly contested in some areas or it smolders beneath the surface in other areas threatening highly volatile re-ignition. While the locations affected by this policy problem may seem limited in geographic area, millions of people, 39 state governments, and hundreds of local jurisdictions are affected.' The problems of nuclear power emergency planning are re-encountered over and over again, albeit under varied conditions, as utilities seek operating licenses for new atomic power plants or as utilities are asked to demonstrate that plans for their already licensed reactor units are satisfactory and operational.

This study assesses the progress of nuclear power off- site emergency planning in the United States. A central contention is that off-site nuclear accident planning is fundamentally a challenge of intergovernmental relations. In a theoretical sense, the fight is between those interests who would make off-site planning conform to an "inclusive authority" model and those that would have it reflect an "overlapping authority" model. As Deil Wright explains, in the "inclusive authority" model states and localities "would be mere minions of the national government with insignificant or incidental

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1984

* Great uncertainty currently prevails in the matter of off-site emergency response planning around U.S. civilian nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency share in review and approval of off-site emergency plans prepared by state and local governments in the emergency planning zone of nuclear power plants. This study examines why off-site nuclear accident planning has been a low federal priority, why the problem is intergovernmentally complex, and why this sub-policy issue remains controversial. The study uses the "inclusive authority" and "overlapping authority" models of Deil S. Wright to explain why off-site planning is ardu- ous and vulnerable to possible federal preemptive action.

impact on . . . public policy."2 In the "overlapping authority" model, bargaining is necessary because sub- stantial areas of governmental operations involve national, state, and local units simultaneously.3 Areas of autonomy or "single jurisdiction independence are comparatively small, and the power and influence available to any one jurisdiction is substantially limited."4

Richard T. Sylves is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delaware. He has been a staff researcher for the Senate Finance Committee of the New York State Legislature. He holds a doctorate from the University of Illinois at Urbana, is a member of ASPA's Section on Natural Resources and Environmental Administration, and publishes research in energy and environmental policy.



394 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

Why Nuclear Power Emergency Planning Has Been a Low Priority

Many histories of U.S. civilian nuclear power reflect government and nuclear industry confidence that the many safeguards and redundancies built into nuclear power plants would make the possibility of an accident with off-site consequences astronomically low.5 As a result of this belief and a relatively long record of reactor operation with no accident producing significant off-site damage or lethal radioactivity releases in the United States, national policy makers were not seriously concerned that a need existed to plan for off-site accident contingencies. Like many sub-policy issues, nuclear power emergency response planning was only interesting to national policy makers when it was topical. Unfortunately, it took the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to make it topical.

Until the accident, nuclear regulatory authorities were largely indifferent about the need to develop sound and operational emergency plans for off-site areas.6 Nuclear utility executives seemed to share this indifference. Pre- occupied with the immensely complex problems of sit- ing, building, and safely operating nuclear generating stations, these utility executives had little appreciation of the problems of surrounding communities likely to be put at risk in the event of a catastrophe at the plant. More compelling were such problems as where to store high level nuclear waste or how to finance construction of the facility when the costs of capital were oppres- sively high. Compounding these problems for utility executives were increasingly intransigent or unrespon- sive state utility commissions which blocked rate increase requests or imposed, where possible, restrictions on the nuclear facility itself. The burgeoning body of regulations imposed by the Atomic Energy Commission until 1974, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 1975, forced almost continuous change in plant operation and management. These regulatory requirements escalated the cost of nuclear plant operation, as the nuclear utilities were forced to reengineer their atomic power stations. For utility executives, these problems easily eclipsed the significance of off-site emergency response planning.

Nuclear power emergency planning has few strident advocates. Ironically, many proponents and opponents of nuclear power agree, for different reasons, that off- site evacuation planning is unnecessary. Many nuclear proponents believe that an emergency response plan for a nuclear plant accident will never have to be put into effect because the probability of an accident is so low. They think that such planning needlessly alarms the public, and that the potential for other types of technological disasters is much greater. Correspondingly, many segments of the anti-nuclear power community reason that a full-scale evacuation of the population around most nuclear power plants is totally infeasible. They conclude that the existence of off-site plans means little. A number of these critics argue that in the event of

a genuine nuclear accident, the public will ignore the specific plan instructions anyway.7 Some allege that nuclear emergency response plans are palliatives intended to build public confidence in nuclear power without actually furnishing the promised security.8

Orphaned by the mainstream of both the pro-nuclear power and anti-nuclear power movements, nuclear power emergency response planning has long been a responsibility reluctantly assumed first, by the Atomic Energy Commission, and since 1975, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. However, disaster response planning is clearly something which has been alien to AEC and NRC program missions. Civil defense authorities are more accustomed to the problems of emergency planning and preparedness. Consequently, the short history of federal nuclear emergency response planning discussed below portrays an uneasy marriage of nuclear regulators and civil defense planners.

The Early History of Off-Site Nuclear Accident Planning

Emergency response planning in U.S. civilian nuclear power was officially recognized as a public problem in 1973 when the Federal Preparedness Agency issued a report entitled, "Peacetime Nuclear Emergency.'"' More than a year later, the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC) published guidelines which were intended to assist state officials responsible for preparing nuclear power emergency plans. The "review and concurrence" program which evolved from this effort, however, was inadequate in a number of respects. For example, it did little to compel states to take action or assume responsibility in this matter. The program also foundered because NRC officials had little experience in this emergency planning area and only marginal interest. Consequently, at the time of the 1979 TMI accident, only 11 of 43 states with nuclear facilities had emergency response plans that met NRC specifications.'"

Even approved plans contained major deficiencies. In some states evacuation planning zones (EPZs) around nuclear power plants mysteriously excluded large population centers. In other cases, the radius of the circle encompassing an evacuation planning zone extended only to the boundary of a large town or city. l Such practices apparently facilitated paperwork in plan preparation, but did little to address the problem meaning- fully or forthrightly.

Congressional hearings in May 1979 disclosed that the NRC regulations then in effect, "encouraged" states with nuclear facilities to prepare and submit radiological emergency response plans. Submission of these plans for NRC review and concurrence was strictly voluntary for each state. No penalties were imposed upon states that did not submit plans, or upon states that did not have approved plans."2

Why were federally approved off-site emergency response plans not an absolute requirement in NRC licensing actions? One answer can be found in the shared suspicions of NRC officials and key members of




NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 395

Congress. They had serious reservations about what state and local governments would do if given genuine authority to regulate this dimension of nuclear power. They feared that if state and local emergency plans were obligatory in NRC licensing actions, anti-nuclear gov- ernors, anti-nuclear state legislatures, anti-nuclear local government officials, or anti-nuclear administrative units, possibly including some state utility commissions, might use this planning power to block proposed nuclear projects or to force the delicensing of operating nuclear plants by simply refusing to prepare essential emergency plans for these facilities. A constellation of state and local political and administrative actors might be able to delay or completely block nuclear projects or nuclear plant operation by electing not to prepare or maintain emergency plans or preparedness levels.'3

Many nuclear proponents believe that an emergency response plan for a nuclear plant accident will never have to be put into effect because the probability of an accident is so low . . . planning needlessly alarms the public, and that the potential for other types of technological disasters is much greater.

Unwilling to tolerate this overlap of authority between levels of government, officials at NRC drafted a rule which declared that a utility's own off-site emergency plan could be considered sufficient to outweigh deficiencies in state or local government plans. ' This loophole led to distortion in the off-site emergency planning process. State officials logically concluded that their emergency plans were both non-essential and superfluous.

Correspondingly, nuclear utilities had to assume an additional burden for which they were ill-equipped and ill-prepared. The NRC required electric utilities with nuclear plants or projects to formulate off-site, as well as on-site emergency response plans. The utilities had for many years prepared on-site plans. These specified the actions which the utilities would take on the grounds of the nuclear generating station in the event of a reactor accident. NRC's rules for off-site planning now meant that the utility would have to prepare elaborate scenarios of action which would be directed to the emergency planning zone outside the plant fence. At this writing, the standard emergency planning zone of U.S. civilian nuclear power plants is the area within a circle of ten mile radius with the nuclear plant at the origin of the circle.

The congressional hearings of May 1979 made it em- barrassingly obvious that utility officials were indepen- dently preparing their off-site plans without adequate consultation with state and local officials. At the hearings, state and local officials testified that they had no knowledge of, or familiarity with, the utility's off-site plan, even though these plans invariably denoted the emergency actions that were to be taken by these very


same state and local officials.'5 Because electric utility companies operating nuclear

power plants were not the parties held accountable for off-site emergency response actions, utility officials had little incentive to devise operational plans. No doubt, utility officials recognized that it did not make much sense to ask state and local authorities to assume these new burdens, particularly when they promised to be ex- pensive and controversial for all involved parties. To some extent, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 insulated nuclear electric utilities from assuming the full liability for claims in the event of widespread damage produced from a nuclear plant catastrophe. While nuclear utilities could escape a share of the economic accountability in an accident with off-site damage, as private firms, they could escape nearly all of the political accountability in an accident.'6 As a regulated firm, however, the utility would have to make some political or administrative accounting.

Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, state governments were given few incentives by the national government to undertake the regulation of nuclear power emergency planning. In the mid-1970s each state could apply for a one-time-only $250,000 non-matching federal grant that was intended to subsidize the cost of preparing basic emergency response plans for all types of disasters. By 1975, 22 states had at least one nuclear power plant licensed to operate and another dozen states had their first nuclear power plant(s) under construction. ' 7

Presumably, states with civilian nuclear power plants could use some of the grant money to build a disaster planning capability for nuclear facilities. In so much as state utility commissions regulate many aspects of electric utilities, it is conceivable that state officials could have anticipated new state responsibilities in this area. Nevertheless, Pollock reveals that few states used any of this money to pay for nuclear power emergency planning.'8 State officials probably reasoned that this was a federal responsibility or the job of the utility itself. This one-time grant was administered by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. When eligibility for funding expired in 1976, Congress terminated the program.

At this writing, no federal program exists to help state governments, local governments, or electric utilities defray the costs of devising, maintaining, or revising off-site emergency response plans. Yet, NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) con- tinue to issue a steady stream of memoranda, guidelines, directives, and regulations which often require costly changes in off-site nuclear plans. FEMA does provide subnational governments with financial assistance in preparing civil defense units and facilities in the event of a nuclear bomb attack.'9

The Rise of a Nuclear Accident Planning Constituency

In spite of the aforementioned widespread indifference or opposition to nuclear power emergency plan-




ning, there are those who earnestly insist that public preparedness for atomic generating station accidents is vital. During NRC oversight hearings held by his congressional subcommittee in 1979, Representative Toby Moffett (D-Conn.) caustically referred to NRC emergency planning as a policy of "malign neglect."20 Con- vened in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, the Moffett hearings may have sensationalized the matter in order to draw attention to the problem. In 1980, Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.) conducted hearings in New York City on nuclear power evacuation planning. Holtzman asserted that emergency planning regulations were not tough enough, were unrealistic, particularly as applied to an evacuation of New York City, and were likely to give the public a "false sense of security.""

In the Moffett hearings, Ralph Nader castigated the NRC for failing to consider the suitability of a proposed reactor site in terms of the feasibility of public evacuation. He disclosed that in 1979 the NRC, with a full-time staff totaling 2,500, had only three employees assigned to off-site emergency planning duties.22 Only days before the inception of the TMI accident, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a highly critical report which concluded that "areas around nuclear facilities should be better prepared for emergencies. "23

No single incident in the history of commercial nuclear power has done more to spotlight the need for effective emergency response planning and crisis reloca- tion than the reactor accident at Metropolitan Edison's TMI Unit #2 nuclear station over the weeks of late March and early April, 1979.24

The Post-Three Mile Island Federal Response

As a result of numerous congressional investigations, as well as the issuance of the Kemeny Commission Report addressing the TMI accident in detail, a new emergency preparedness rule took effect November 3, 1980. Utilities with nuclear power plants were to submit upgraded emergency plans, they were directed to prepare emergency procedures necessary to activate the plans, and they were to supply evidence that the administrative and physical means were set forth for alerting and instructing the public within a 10-mile emergency planning zone. Each of these requirements was to have a time deadline, and the NRC sought to accomplish all three steps by February 1, 1982.25

Under a Memorandum of Understanding dated November 4, 1980, the NRC and FEMA agreed that NRC would determine the adequacy of nuclear utility emergency plans, on-site and off-site, while FEMA would assess the appropriateness of state and local government off-site emergency plans. Under the agreement, NRC reviews the FEMA findings and determinations in order to judge the overall status of emergency preparedness. FEMA can provide expert witnesses in NRC's licensing process.26

FEMA's involvement in nuclear power emergency planning stems directly from the TMI episode. As a result of the chaos and public controversy produced in part by the NRC's mismanagement of emergency re-

sponse operations at Three Mile Island, President Carter relieved the commission of primary responsibility for off-site emergency planning and preparedness. Carter assigned the newly created and reorganized Federal Emergency Management Agency authority over "off-site" nuclear power emergency planning and preparedness.27 FEMA issues guidelines and sets out criteria to be used by state and local emergency planning authorities. With the aid of regional assistance com- mittees, FEMA reviews and judges the adequacy of state and local nuclear power emergency response plans.28 The NRC, however, retains the power to review emergency response plans as they are submitted, and the NRC can appraise plan implementation at each site. NRC certifies both licensee and official off-site (state and local) emergency preparedness at each atomic facility. That is, NRC passes judgment on the adequacy of the plant operator's (i.e., public utility) off-site plan and tions occupy the plant's emergency planning zone (EPZ).

Therefore, NRC and FEMA both address the problem of off-site planning. In the case of testing emergency plans which are already in effect, NRC and FEMA have a dual oversight function. FEMA evaluates the performance of state and local authorities in the test exercise. The NRC evaluates the plant operator's (the utility's) performance in the text exercise. When state and local emergency preparedness is considered during NRC permitting and licensing proceedings, the NRC is free to ponder the findings and recommendations of FEMA regarding local governmental preparedness. If FEMA determines that local preparedness is unsatisfac- tory, the NRC is not compelled to delicense an operating nuclear power plant. However, as of April 1, 1981, utilities seeking a full power operating license for new nuclear plants will not be issued such a license until emergency preparedness is deemed acceptable by both the NRC and FEMA.29

Thus, for new nuclear generating units, NRC and FEMA share authority in the determination of emergency preparedness. However, for existing nuclear units licensed to operate before April 1, 1981, the NRC is free to follow or to disregard FEMA evaluations and recommendations pertaining to state and local emergency plans. This awkward relationship has caused administrative friction if not enmity, between NRC and FEMA officials.

The Magnitude of the Nuclear Power Emergency Planning Task

Table 1 displays information about nuclear power plant reactors licensed to operate in 1982. As the table indicates, 27 states have within their borders at least one licensed civilian nuclear power plant. Because some of the sites contain more than one operating reactor, the number of reactors (74) exceeds the number of sites (52). For each of these 52 sites there must be a "host" state emergency plan. Therefore, since each respective plant site must have its own state emergency plan, some states





TABLE 1 State and Local Nuclear Power Off-Site Emergency Plans Necessary for

Licensed and Operating U.S. Nuclear Power Plants as of September 30, 1982*

No. of No. of No. of Local Plans No. of Local Plans Row

States with Licensed Nuclear Sites Host State Inside No. of Adjacent Outside Host State Plan Nuclear Power Plants (Reactors) Plans Host State State Plans (by State) (by State) Totals

1. Alabama 2 (5) 2 10 3(FL,GA,TN) 1 (GA) 16

2. Arkansas 1 (2) 1 4 0 0 5

3. California 2 (2) 2 3 0 0 5

4. Colorado I (1) 1 6 0 0 7

5. Connecticut 2 (3) 2 29 5 (MA, 2-NY, 2-RI) 0 36

6. Florida 3 (4) 3 6 0 0 9

7. Georgia 1(2) 1 4 0 0 5

8. Illinois 4 (7) 4 8 3 (IA, IN, WI) 3 (2-IA, WI) 18

9. Iowa 1(1) 1 2 0 0 3

10. Maine 1 (1) 1 20 2 (MA, NH) 0 23

11. Maryland 1 (2) 1 3 1 (VA, & DC) 0 5

12. Massachusetts 2 (2) 2 26 5 (CT, NH, NY, RI, VT) 6 (VT) 39

13. Michigan 3 (4) 3 6 4 (IL, 2-IN, WI) 0 13

14. Minnesota 2 (3) 2 4 1 (WI) 1 (WI) 8

15. Mississippi 1 (1) 1 1 1 (LA) 1 (LA) 4

16. Nebraska 2 (2) 2 1 3 (2-IA, MO) 3 (2-IA, MO) 9

17. New Jersey 2 (3) 2 31 5 (DE, MD, NY, 2-PA) 2 (DE) 40

18. New York 4 (5) 4 7 2 (CT, PA) 0 13

19. North Carolina 2 (3) 2 8 1(SC) 0 11

20. Ohio 1 (1) 1 2 1 (MI) 2 (OH, WV) 6

21. Oregon 1(1) 1 1 1 (WA) I (WA) 4

22. Pennsylvania 3 (4)** 3 8 6 (DE, 2-MD, NJ, OH, WV) 2 (MD) 19

23. South Carolina 3 (4) 3 2 3 (GA, 2-NC) 0 8

24. Tennessee 1 (2) 1 5 2 (AL, GA) 0 8

25. Vermont 1 (1) 1 6 3 (MA, NH,NY) 12 (7-MA, 5-NH) 22

26. Virginia 2 (4) 2 11 2 (MD, NC) 0 15

27. Wisconsin 3 (4) 3 5 2 (IA, MN) 2 (IA, MN) 12

Totals 52 (74) 52 219 56 (27 single states) 36 (14 single states) 363

*Source: NRC-FEMA Joint Quarterly Report to Congress on Emergency Preparedness, July 1, 1982 to September 30, 1982.

**Omits both Three Mile Island reactor units.

must prepare multiple plans, one for each nuclear plant site within its jurisdiction. Table 1 also reveals that municipal governments, usually county governments, which occupy the EPZ of each plant, must also prepare off-site plans. For local governments inside the EPZs of atomic plants located in their states, a total 219 local government emergency plans must be prepared.

When the EPZ of a nuclear power plant overlaps the borders of one or more states, those adjacent states within territory inside the EPZ must also prepare emergency plans. Table 1 discloses that 27 states fall into the "adjacent-state" category and among them, a total of 56 plans must be put together, submitted, and approved. Similarly, local governments of adjacent states, which also happen to occupy territory within an EPZ, must also prepare off-site plans, unless the adjacent state plan overlaying the local government is deemed sufficient. Local governments of 14 different states have produced a total of 36 plans. All of this means that a total of 108 state off-site plans must be compiled and another 255 local government plans created, simply to meet the off-site planning requirements of the ten-mile rule for the nation's licensed and operating nuclear


power plants. Table 2 arrays the same kind of information, but it

refers to nuclear power plant reactor projects in some stage of construction. Based upon an NRC-FEMA report issued October 22, 1982, 64 reactors were being built at 40 different sites around the U.S. There has been significant attrition in these numbers since 1982 as a result of project cancellations, and in one case, a utility bond default. By March 31, 1984, about 57 reactor units were under construction distributed over 35 sites. Table 2 shows that these sites were distributed over 22 states. In addition, 101 local government plans must be prepared in these states along with some 35 host state plans, before these new reactor units receive NRC full power operating licenses. Moreover, 21 states adjacent to these facilities must prepare one or more off-site plans. Nineteen local governments of these adjacent states must also furnish off-site plans.

Tables 1 and 2 do not depict the status of each off-site plan, but they do underscore the number of governments engaged in off-site planning under the 10-mile EPZ rule. In one extreme case, Yankee Atomic Elec- tric's Rowe Generating Station has an EPZ which




TABLE 2 State and Local Nuclear Power Off-Site Emergency Plans Necessary for Not Yet Licensed U.S. Nuclear Power Plants as of March 31, 1984*

No.of No.of States with as Yet Unlicensed No. of Local Plans No. of Local Plans Row Unlicensed Nuclear Project Host State Inside No. of Adjacent Outside Host State Plan Nuclear Projects Sites (Reactors) Plans Host State State Plans (by State) (by State) Totals

1. Alabama 1 (2) 1 1 2(GA, TN) 0 4 2. Arizona 1 (3) 1 1 0 0 2 3. California 2 (4) 2 6 0 0 8 4. Connecticut 1(1) 1 11 2(NY, RI) 0 14 5. Florida 1 (1) 1 2 0 0 3 6. Georgia 1 (2) 1 1 1 (SC) 2(SC) 5 7. Illinois 4 (7) 4 7 3 (2-IN, WI) 0 14 8. Kansas 1 (1) 1 2 0 0 3 9. Louisiana 2 (2) 2 7 1 (MS) 0 10

10. Michigan 2 (3) 2 5 1 (OH) 0 8 11. Mississippi 2 (3) 2 2 3 (LA, MS, TN) 3 (LA, MS, TN) 10 12. Missouri 1(1) 1 4 0 0 5 13. New Hampshire 1 (2) 1 16 3 (MA, ME, NH) 8 (MA) 28 14. New Jersey 1 (1) 1 2 3 (DE, MD, PA) 2 (DE) 8 15. New York 2 (2) 2 2 1 (CT) 0 5 16. North Carolina 2(3) 2 9 1 (SC) 0 12 17. Ohio 1(2) 1 3 1 (PA) 0 5 18. Pennsylvania 3 (5)** 3 6 5 (DE, MD, NJ, OH, WV) 2 (OH, WV) 16 19. South Carolina 2 (3) 2 6 1 (NC) 2 (NC) 11 20. Tennessee 1 (2) 1 4 1 (GA) 0 6 21. Texas 2 (4) 2 3 0 0 5 22. Washington 1 (3)*** 1 1 1 (OR) 0 3 Totals 35 (57) 35 101 30 (21 single states) 19 (9 single states) 183

*Source: NRC-FEMA Joint Quarterly Report to Congress on Emergency Preparedness, July 1, 1982 to September 30, 1982; updates to March 31, 1984 by U.S. Energy Information Administration phone contact, Roger Dietrich. Cancellation of Marble Hill #1 and #2 dropped State of Indiana from listing as of January, 1984.

**Omits both damaged and undamaged Three Mile Island reactors. ***Despite Washington Public Power Supply System bond default, 3 Richland reactors retained on list as status of projects remains

undecided.

envelops portions of five separate states. Moreover, the Massachusetts-based facility affects 11 in-state townships and another six Vermont townships.

The more plans required for any single nuclear plant, the more complicated the task of promoting the formulation of plans by local governments. In addition, consensus and coordination become more difficult to achieve as the number of affected states and local governments multiplies.

Continuing Problems of Off-Site Nuclear Accident Planning

U.S. radiological emergency response planning since TMI has been confounded by legal, political, and administrative difficulties and deficiencies. Most of these shortcomings can be attributed to three general factors: (1) NRC inexperience and long-standing disinterest in off-site emergency planning, (2) the awkward overlap of NRC and FEMA regulatory authority in off-site planning, (3) the intergovernmental nightmare of coordinat- ing dozens of governments in devising the plan, in pay- ing the costs of emergency preparedness, and in testing

the plans to see if those state or local governments can or will act in accord with the plans. Each of these points can be briefly summarized.

First, the NRC has assigned off-site emergency planning a relatively low priority among its full range of responsibilities. It was not until 1974 that the AEC, NRC's predecessor, issued guidelines to be used by states in the preparation of their radiological emergency response plans. In spite of 1975 revisions in the guidelines which made compliance easier, only four states could demonstrate that they met the conditions set out in the 1975 guidelines by 1978.30 In 1978, a federal inter- organizational committee charged with examining nuclear power emergency response planning concluded that NRC's handling of off-site planning was grossly underfunded and ineffective.3' Because NRC gave little emphasis to off-site planning, utility officials requesting NRC permits and licenses had little reason to attach significance to off-site emergency planning.

Given the administrative history of the NRC, it is clear that off-site emergency planning is a responsibility which falls much outside its domain. Created from the regulatory units of the former Atomic Energy Commis-





sion in 1975, the NRC has been a technoscientific regulatory body responsible for policing the safe operation of civilian nuclear power plants. The NRC has virtually no experience in managing civil defense, evacuation management, disaster relief, and as shown, has a pauc- ity of experience in planning local governmental response to technological emergency situations.

Second, NRC and FEMA roles in off-site emergency activity have been poorly defined and divided. Failure to assign exclusive authority and ultimate accountability to one or the other agency, results in poor interagency coordination between NRC and FEMA. Splitting state- local emergency planning and utility licensee emergency planning, such that FEMA oversees the former and NRC the latter, results in a failure to synchronize off- site and on-site emergency response activities. More- over, this division of labor tends to segregate state and local emergency preparedness evaluation from reactor licensing decisions. Approved licenses do not necessarily embody adequate off-site emergency response plans. Finally, the emergency planning overlap also tends to relegate this type of planning activity to the backwater of each agency's operations.32

The more plans required for any single nuclear plant, the more complicated the task . . . consensus and coordination become more difficult to achieve as the number of affected states and local governments multiplies.

Third, U.S. nuclear accident planning remains a challenge in the sense that a wide assortment of state and local organizations must be orchestrated in the preparation and testing of plans. Nuclear power off-site emergency planning is fundamentally a local responsibility.33 State and local governments, in conjunction with the nuclear electric utility, are expected to draw up off-site emergency plans. Depending on the location of the plant, a wide variety of local entities could be involved. Counties, cities, townships, boroughs, villages, and other sub-divisions, as well as special district governments may be parties at interest. Drawn into this complex sphere is a plethora of public and private professional groups: police, fire, health, transit, schools, rescue units, volunteer organizations, public works, other planning units, housing and sheltering organizations, communications officials, military units, and others. The point is that nuclear power emergency planning is profoundly affected by the political geography which exists within each reactor's EPZ. Moreover, as Dynes and Chenault report in separate studies, jurisdictions well outside the EPZ are also affected by a nuclear accident if evacuees move to those areas expecting emergency and sheltering services. 4

Because off-site plans rest upon local cooperation and local resources, local (and state) governments could decline to cooperate, as a number indeed have. Thus,


recognizing the favorable bargaining position which local government has in the case of new plants seeking NRC license approval, county officials in a number of Missouri counties have forced Union Electric, the utility building the Callaway nuclear station, to reimburse these local governments for more than the cost of nuclear power emergency planning alone.35

To achieve coherence in the substance of each plan, extensive inter-local and state-local coordination are needed. Political and jurisdictional conflicts among localities and between states and their respective local governments, however, often undermine the collective capacity of these governments to plan and respond to nuclear accidents.

Concluding Observations

The drama within off-site nuclear accident planning continues to unfold from one nuclear plant site to the next and from old plants to new plants, such that pres- sure is mounting for some definitive national action. One of two outcomes seems possible.

One outcome might represent a decisive victory for local governments. This would occur if the national government affirmed the right of local governments to decide whether or not, and in what fashion, they would participate in emergency planning necessary to the operation of nuclear power plants. Under this set of circum- stances, local officials could bargain from strength in transactions with utility executives, since they could block formulation of an emergency plan needed by the utility as a prerequisite to plant licensing. This situation is typified by Long Island Light Company's dispute with Suffolk County, New York, over the evacuation plan needed for the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Sta- tion.36

There is, however, much ambiguity associated with this scenario. If local officials, perhaps after a change of political administration, decided to discontinue their contribution to local emergency preparedness, the utility might again find its NRC operating license in peril. In effect, all states and municipalities within the emergency planning zones would have a veto power over nuclear plant operation by virtue of their ability to block the formulation of the necessary off-site plan and by their power to withdraw local cooperation and services necessary to keep an approved off-site plan operational. The more plans required for any single atomic station, the greater the likelihood that one or more governments will refuse to cooperate in formulating and testing an off-site plan. When governments must prepare off-site plans for nuclear reactors located in other states, officials of these governments may be unrespon- sive or hostile. If residents living in jurisdictions within a reactor EPZ are not consumers of the electric power produced by the facility, emergency planning opposition is also probable.

Nevertheless, allowing this kind of veto power could curtail the exploitation of small rural and suburban jurisdictions by powerful electric utilities using their




reactors to supply power to a mass of rate-payers who live far from the plant and, thus, from the area likely to experience radiation contamination in the event of a mishap. In order to secure the cooperation of all governments within a plant's EPZ, utility officials would have to convince officials of these governments that they had done their utmost to minimize risk to the public, and that they were prepared to sincerely engage in formulation and testing of coordinated on-site and off-site emergency response plans.

A second and very different outcome can also be envi- sioned. The forces of "technocratic pluralism" may tri- umph.3" This means that the national government, perhaps in concert with certain state governments, would preempt local powers that have been used to block or obstruct the construction or operation of utility-owned atomic plants. Local emergency planning entities, and the health and safety organizations they engage, would be enjoined to comply with uniform planning directives. Localities could no longer elect to withhold emergency service activities or resources needed to implement the plan. Under this scenario, there would be the possibility that local governments would be entitled to some com- pensation from the utility for their involuntary par- ticipation.

The underlying objective of this "preemptive" outcome would be to terminate an intolerable condition of overlapping authority which has contributed to regulatory bedlam. Presumably, greater administrative rationality would be achieved in nuclear accident planning such that local governments could no longer exact unfair concessions from utilities as the price of cooperation in emergency planning.

Both outcomes contain unattractive features which make their realization seem remote. Nevertheless, any compromise between these two extremes is likely to per- petuate the current "limbo" status which irresponsibly jeopardizes the public health and safety. For example, proposals to collapse the EPZ's from a 10-mile radius to a two-mile radius of the plant may be administratively expedient but still an abrogation of responsibility if approved.38 The overlap of authority which exists, as well as the extraordinary degree of regulatory inter- dependence it contains, continues to challenge the administration of nuclear power regulation in the United States.

Notes

1. Table 1 in the text shows that 27 states have at least one nuclear power plant licensed to operate, about eight more states have a utility which is building the state's first nuclear plant, and four other states, Delaware, Kentucky, Rhode Island and West Vir- ginia, have no existing or planned nuclear plants, but must prepare off-site emergency plans due to the proximity of nuclear units located in neighboring states.

2. Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, 2nd ed. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1982), 33.

3. Ibid., p. 38. 4. Ibid. 5. Colonnel Oran K. Henderson, director of Pennsylvania's emer-

gency management unit, commenting on the TMI accident said,

"the flaw was the assumption that the possibility of an incident at one of our nuclear power plants was so remote that there was no need to plan for it." Ben A. Franklin, "New Plans for Evacuation of Three Mile Island Tested," The New York times (July 17, 1980), p. 14. A sample of histories could include Daniel Ford, The Cult of the Atom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); David Okrent, Nuclear Reactor Safety (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); and Elizabeth Rolph, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety (Lexington, Mass.: Lexing- ton Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1979).

6. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should be Better Prepared for Emergencies (Washing- ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1979).

7. Ellen Mitchell, "Suffolk Debates LILCO Evacuation Plan," The New York Times (May 24, 1981), Sec. 21, p. 15.

8. Ibid. 9. Richard P. Pollock, "Planning Against a Nuclear Emergency in

Your City," Nation's Cities, 16 (February 1978): 13-16. 10. Dorothy Nelkin, "Some Social and Political Dimensions of

Nuclear Power: Examples from Three Mile Island," American Political Science Review 75 (March 1981): 132-142.

11. Pollock, op. cit., p. 16. 12. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government

Operations, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Sub- committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Powerplants: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 1. Hereafter cited as "Moffett Hearings."

13. See David G. Norrell, "Note: Application of the Preemption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants," Vir- ginia Law Review 62, No. 4 (May 1976): 738-787, see esp. 778-779 regarding congressional intent.

14. "U.S. Tightens Rules for Coping With Nuclear Accidents," Wall Street Journal (July 24, 1980), p. 12. See also, "Playing It Safe," Wall Street Journal (September 26, 1980), p. 50.

15. Moffett Hearings, op. cit., p. 5. 16. See John D. Long and Douglas P. Long, "The Price-Anderson

Act and Nuclear Insurance," The Insurance Law Journal, No. 678 (July 1979): 367-375.

17. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1981 Annual Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 200-208.

18. Pollock, op. cit., p. 16. 19. FEMA provides federal matching funds for the salary and ad-

ministrative expenses of some 2,600 state and local civil defense emergency management offices, with some 6,200 personnel. Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Civil Defense Pro- gram Overview," March 12, 1982, p. 21.

20. Moffett Hearings, op. cit., p. 375. 21. David Bird, "Nuclear Unit Holds Workshop on Rules," The

New York Times (July 16, 1980): Sec. IV, p. 18. 22. Moffett Hearings, op. cit., p. 9. As of September 30, 1982, the

NRC had a total of 34 professional staff assigned to emergency preparedness and inspection work. From NRC-FEMA Joint Quarterly Report to Congress on Emergency Preparedness, July 1, 1982 to September 30, 1982, unpublished document mailed to Senator Alan K. Simpson, October 22, 1982, see Table 3, p. 1. Cited hereafter as "NRC-FEMA Joint Report."

23. Moffett Hearings, op. cit., p. 261. 24. Reports indicated that more than 50,000 people voluntarily evac-

uated the area around TMI and plans were in the works during the height of the emergency to evacuate 500,000 people living within a 20-mile radius of the plant. See "Coping Beyond Nuclear Gates," Christian Science Monitor (April 3, 1979): 3. See also, John W. Lathrop, ed., Planning for Rare Events: Nuclear Accident Preparedness and Management, IIASA Pro- ceedings Series (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1981).





25. NRC-FEMA Joint Report, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 26. Ibid. 27. Franklin, op. cit., p. 14. One Senate report castigated the NRC

for not ordering an evacuation of the area around TMI within hours of the accident, rather than waiting two days to issue a call for the evacuation of children and pregnant women. See Robert D. Hershey, "Report Criticizes Evacuation Plan at 3 Mile Island," The New York Times (July 3, 1980): 12.

28. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Annual Report 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 6.

29. Ibid., pp. 97-99. 30. Pollock, op. cit., p. 16. 31. Moffett Hearings, op. cit., p. 8. 32. See Harold E. Collins, "Emergency Response to a Nuclear Facil-

ity Accident: Preplanning and Preparedness by Off-site Organi- zations," in Lathrop, op. cit., pp. 83, 84, and 88.

33. Ronald Perry, The Social Psychology of Civil Defense (Lexing- ton, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1982), 13.

34. See Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster (Colum- bus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1974) and William W. Chenault, Evacuation Planning and the TMI Accident: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. FEMA, 1979).

35. NRC-FEMA Joint Report, op. cit., Part II, Table VII. The localities involved are Callaway, Gasconnade, Osage, and Mont- gomery. All have indicated their requirement for funding of equipment and personnel to Union Electric prior to their approval of local plans. The table referenced above outlines five other similar cases around the U.S. and more cases have been excluded. See "Wright Restates Callaway's Position," Kingdom Daily Sun-Gazette, Fulton, Missouri (June 10, 1982).

36. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 15. 37. Wright, op. cit., p. 15. 38. See Jane Perlez, "Nuke Plant Safety Zone May be Cut," The

Wilmington Sunday News Journal, Delaware (November 5, 1983).

Making Sense of the Federal Budget the Old Fashioned Way- Incrementally Bernard T. Pitsvada, Department of the Army Frank D. Draper, The National Science Foundation

Since Wildavsky and Fenno applied Lindblom's con- cept of pluralistically-based incrementalism to the budgetary process during the 1960s, incrementalism has become the dominant analytical model for describing how budgeting in the federal government really works. ' The caricature of incrementalism that has arisen is that of a decision-making process taken up for the most part with negotiations over increases and decreases to an existing "base," and not with a review of the budget in its entirety. Over the years others have successfully elab- orated and built upon what remains the dominant para- digm in the field of budgetary research.2

The theory has not been without its many critics, however. One challenge that was voiced almost immedi- ately by Natchez and Bupp focused more on specific programs within agencies rather than the "totals."3 Thus, just because budgets appear to be incremental (or decremental) in absolute dollar amounts, does not always mean that base programs are being ignored, or that great changes in the programs are not taking place. Others have accurately pointed out that when annual changes in certain budget requests approach 20 to 30 percent, this strains the traditional definition of incre-

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of the Army or the National Science Foundation.


mentalism.4 Then again, some critics have noted that the "base" has different meanings.5 For example, where the "base" is primarily a sum of transfer pay- ments to individuals and organizations, agencies are probably less protective than when the "base" supports ongoing discretionary programs or operating costs of agencies. There were, also, other voices of concern.6

Recent changes in the scope and nature of federal budgeting have brought the status of incrementalism as an explanatory tool of how resources are allocated into even more serious question. One recent article in the Public Administration Review, for example, noted that changes in the budget process brought about by the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as well as Reagan administration attempts to dictate changes from the "top-down," diminish "the explanatory power of incrementalism" in periods of "budget

Bernard T. Pitsvada is a program director for the Department of the Army in the Pentagon. He received his Ph.D. from the American University, Washington, D.C. in political science and is a lecturer at George Washington University.

Frank D. Draper is a staff associate in budget and planning with the National Science Foundation. He is a former Federal Executive Fel- low in Economic Policy from the Brookings Institution. He holds a Ph.D. in law/economics from the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. In addition, he is a lecturer at the University of Maryland.

