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Operational Decision Making Support -

Operational Concept Description

Liam Porter (Thales) , Maxime Tardif (Thales), Maurice Audet (Thales)

Prepared by:

Thales Canada, Land & Joint Systems Division 1405, boul. Du Parc-Technologique, 2nd Floor Québec, QC G1P 4P5

Contract number: W7701-054996/008/QCL

Contract Scientific Authority: Micheline Bélanger, 418-844-4000 Ext. 4734Technical Authority: Normand Pageau, 418-844-4000 Ext. 4674

Defence R&D Canada – ValcartierContract Report

DRDC Valcartier CR 2009-125March 2009

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and thecontents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description Contract Number: W7701-054996/008/QCL

Prepared by

Thales Canada, Land & Joint Systems Division

1405, boul. Du Parc-Technologique, 2nd Floor Québec, QC G1P 4P5

For

Recherche et Développement pour la Défense Canada/Defence Research and Development Canada (RDDC/DRDC)

2459, boul Pie XI Nord,

Val-Bélair, QC G3J 1X5

Authors: Liam Porter (Thales) Scientific Authority: Micheline Bélanger (DRDC/RDDC)

Maxime Tardif (Thales) Technical Authority: Normand Pageau (DRDC/RDDC)

Maurice Audet (Thales)

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2009 The scien tific o r techn ical v alidity o f th is Contract Repor t is en tirely the resp onsibility o f th e Co ntractor an d th e contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada

Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description

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Revision History

Date Version Description Author

2008-03-31 1.0 Initial Version Gino Pelletier / Dominic Côté

2008-06-12 1.1 Second Version Gino Pelletier / Dominic Côté

2008-06-16 1.2 Modifications related to discussion s between Maxim e, Liam and Micheline

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-09 1.3 Restructure document and appl y fe w modifications related to discussion with Normand

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-11 1.4 Apply Lia m’s com ments about Dynamic Link Management section

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-16 1.5 Integrate first draft of risk management section (Mauric e Audet). Add Link with Execution Management Tool. Integrate Liam ’s comments on other sections

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-18 1.6 Liam’s com ments related to “Links with Ex ecution Man agement Tool”section. Link Management reviewed according to meeting (Maxime, Dominic, Normand)

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-19 1.7 Second draft of risk management section (Maurice Audet)

Maxime Tardif

2008-07-22 1.8 Integrate Interface description (section 10)

Maxime Tardif

2008-08-28 1.9 Change COA Anal ysis and Decisio n Matrix according to comm ent fro m Liam. Remove use case property for risk management (Textual description already provide this information)

Maxime Tardif


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Date Version Description Author

2008-09-08 1.10 Integrate Risk Manage ment update. Integrate record of deci sions for the risk management

Maxime Tardif / Maurice Audet

2008-09-12 1.11 Review criteria m anagement and Links with Execution Managem ent Tool

Guy Gosselin

2008-09-15 1.12 Integrate Risk m anagement update (Maurice)

Maxime Tardif / Maurice Audet

2008-09-15 1.13 Integrate Pl an Manage ment update (Marco)

Maxime Tardif / Marco Savard

2008-12-15 1.14 Update Link management section and Risk Section

Dominic Côté

2009-01-26 1.15 Document split into 2 docum ents: One for arc hitecture and one for use cases

Maxime Tardif

2009-03-17 1.16 Review b y Maurice Au det on behalf of Liam Porter done in order to incorporate comm ents m ade by Micheline Bélanger

Maurice Audet

2009-03-23 1.17 Review by Liam Porter to incorporate additional comments

Liam Porter

2009-03-25 1.18 Review b y Liam Porter and Maxim e Tardif to incorporate additiona l comments

Liam Porter

Maxime Tardif

2009-03-30 1.19 Quality Assurance Review Nathalie Lizotte

2009-03-31 1.20 Quality Assurance Review Nathalie Lizotte


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ABSTRACT

Defence R&D Can ada –Val cartier (DR DC Valcartier) in itiated sev eral research activities ai med at investigating and developing approaches and concepts to support operational decision-making wi thin the context of the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP)i, ii. This effort focuses on building on this previous work to develop tools to enable a more effective, adaptive and time-constrained planning process. In particular, tools were developed and refined for the dynamic link management between CFOPP elements, Center of Gra vity Analys is, Decisive Point Analysis, Criteria Management, Plan Management, Risk Management and to establish links with the Execution Management Tool. A computer-based system called “Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS)” was used as an experimental framework to implement mock-ups to demonstrate a poss ible operationalisation of t hese approaches. COPlanS has been developed at DRDC Valcartier to support the CFOPP. COPlanS is an integrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid a nd workflow management tool s ai med at sup porting a di stributed t eam i nvolved i n t he planning of military operations.

This document develops these various approaches, supported by a review of related concepts and use cases. Mock-ups ha ve bee n i mplemented i nto C OPlanS t o de monstrate t he integration a nd t he vi sualization of these different concepts, to improve effective, adaptive, and time-sensitive planning within the CFOPP.

RÉSUMÉ

Le centre R & D pour la défense Canada – Valcartier (RDDC Valcartier) a en trepris plusieurs activités de recherche, visant le développement d’approches et de concepts pour améliorer l’aide au décideur, dans le contexte du processus de planification opérationelle des Forces Canadiennes (PPOFC) iii, iv. Dans le but de continuer cet effort, cette étude vise à développer le s outils nécessaires afin d’ établir un processus de planification plus efficace et flexible, compte tenue d’un e planification en tem ps de crise. En particulier, des outils ont été développés pour effectuer l’analyse des liens possibles entre les éléments de planification du PPOFC, l’analyse des centres de gravités, l’analyse des points décisifs, la gestion des critères, la gestion des p lans, la g estion du risq ue pour établir les liens a vec l’ou til d e g estion d’exécution. Le systè me numérique automatisé appelé “Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS)”, a servi en ta nt que base ex périmentale afi n d’i mplementer des pr ototypes et ai nsi dém ontrer l ’opérationalisation de ses approches. COPlanS a été mis au point au RDDC Valcartier p our traiter le PPOFC. C OPlanS intègre une série flex ible d e co mposantes d e p lanification, d’aide à la d écision et d ’outils d e g estion d es pro cessus métiers, vi sant l a pl anification e n col laboration des o pérations m ilitaires avec des membres d’é quipes dispersées.

Ce rapp ort co ntient pl usieurs sug gestions d’approches, a ppuyées pa r u ne re vue des conce pts et de s cas d’utilisation. Des prototypes d'interface utilisateur ou “Mock-ups“ ont été développés, afin de permettre la visualisation et l’in tegration des d ivers concep ts et ainsi démontrer un pr ocessus de pl anification plus efficace et flexible dans le cadre de planification en mode de crise.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CANADA C OM h as id entified effective a daptive planning a s one of the mission critical deficiencies. Effective adaptive planning might be seen as the ability to conduct a ti mely and flexible planning process and to d evelop options for employing joint capabilities across the sea, air, lan d and cyb er spectrums. The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP) is the current structured way used by CANADA COM to p erform military planning and problem so lving. A larg e portion of th is p rocess deals with brainstorming, holistic situation understanding and high level planningv

In order t o e nhance operational l evel pl anning an d deci sion-making, at t his l evel of com mand, DR DC Valcartier in itiated sev eral stu dies to inv estigate an d d evelop new ap proaches and con cepts to sup port operational decision-making within the context of th e CFOPP vi vii. Thales Canada Inc. prepared a report, focusing o n building on t his p revious work, t o develop an d i mplement t ools, usi ng a c omputer based prototype to enable a more effective, adaptive and time-constrained planning process. In responding to the objective of t his effo rt, t he a pproaches a nd pl anning co ncepts we re de veloped a nd r efined i nto s pecific tools for the dynamic l ink management between CFOPP elements. These tools were a Center of Gravity Analysis, a Decisive Point Analysis, a Criteria Mana gement, a Pl an Management, a R isk Management, to establish link s with th e Ex ecution Man agement To ol. In this do cument, p roposed concepts are reviewed and the n, presented a s use c ases fo r t he purposes of o perationalizing t hem. The c omputer-based sy stem called “Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS)” was used as an experimental framework to demonstrate t he oper ationalisation o f t hese appr oaches a nd c oncepts. COPlanS has been developed at DRDC Valcartier to support the CFOPP. COPlanS is an i ntegrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid and workflow management t ools ai med at su pporting a di stributed t eam, i nvolved in t he planning o f military o perations. It is ex pected that these proposed too ls will facilitate th e d evelopment, the consideration and the review of any decision, at any time, while including its merits and justification.

Using C OPlanS as a n e xperimental fra mework, t hese concepts have bee n s uccessfully re fined and implemented into several mock-ups to outline in greater detail possible, future enhancements, to improve current operational planning processes. Once validated by the military community, the implementation of these concepts, in to a fu lly operational p lanning and decision-making too l, will en able g reater flex ibility and adaptability to the p lanners and commanders, at the operational level in supporting time-constrained operational p lanning. An initial v alidation o f th ese t ools was cond ucted in Oct ober 2 008. Based on a Vancouver 2010 Olympic scenario, the implementation of these tools int o COPlanS was successfully used to demonstrate time-constrained planning concepts.

Thales Canada, Land and Joint System s D ivision. (20 09). Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description. W7701-054996/008/QCL DRDC Valcartier.


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SOMMAIRE

Une lacune critique de l a mission opérationnelle relevée par COM Canada (Commandement Canada) est celle de l’adaptation efficace de planification. L'adaptation efficace de planification pourrait être considérée comme la capacité de mener une rapide et souple processus de planification et d'élaborer des options pour l'emploi conjoint des capacité s, à trav ers les spectres m aritime, de l' air, de la terre et le cyberespace. Le processus de planification opérationnelle des For ces C anadiennes (PPOFC ) est la manière structurée utilisée p ar COM Can ada p our effectuer la p lanification m ilitaire et la réso lution d e problèmes operationelle. Une grande partie de ce processus traite de la recherche d'idées, de la compréhension et la situation globale de planification de haut niveau. viii

En vue d' améliorer la plani fication au niveau opérationnel et l a pri se de déci sions à ce ni veau de commandement, RDDC Valcartier a l ancé plusieurs études afin d'examiner et de dé velopper de nouvelles approches et de concepts opérationnels pour appuyer la prise de décisions dans le contexte du PPOFC ix, x. Dans un effort pour développer une adaptation plus efficace du processus de planification dans le cadre d’une pl anification en t emps de cri se ; Thal es C anada Inc. a po ursuit une en quête qui a po rté sur l e développement et l’i mplémentation des o utils d e p lanification en u tilsant u n système n umérique automatisé. A fin d e répondre au x besoins d e cet ef fort, d es outils ont été d éveloppés po ur effectu er l’analyse des liens possi bles entre les élé ments de planification du P POFC, l ’analyse des ce ntres de gravités, l’analyse des points decisifs, la gestion des critères, la gestion des plans, la gestion du risque et pour établir les liens avec l’outil de gestion d’exécution.. Dans ce document, les concepts et les approches proposés sont examinés et présentés comme des cas d'utilisation. Ensuite, le système appelé «Collaborative Planning System Op erations (COPlan S)" a été u tilisé en tan t qu e cad re d’expérimentation afin d e démontrer la mise en œuvre de ces approches et ces concepts. COPlanS a été développé à RDDC Valcartier pour effectuer le PPOFC. C OPlanS intègre une série flexible de com posantes de planification, d’aide à la décision et d’outils de gestion d es processus m étiers v isant la planification, en co llaboration av ec les membres d’équipes dispersées d`opérations militaires.. En t emps de cri se, i l est prévu que ces a pproches structurées proposées faciliteron t la rév ision d 'une décision à tou t m oment, y co mpris ses m érites et sa justification.

Utilisant COPlan S co mme cadre d’expérimentation, ces co ncepts on t été affin és et i mplémentés en plusieurs modules (mock-up), afin d'exposer plus en détail les outils possibles pour améliorer les processus de p lanification op érationnelle ; considérant la co ntrainte d e temps. Une fo is validée par la co mmunauté militaire, la mise en œu vre de ces con cepts d ans un outil o pérationel d e p lanification et d e prise d e décisions p ermettra u ne p lus g rande flex ibilité et ad aptabilité au x planificateurs et au x co mmandants au niveau opérationnel. Une valid ation in itiale a été p ortée lo rs de la démonstration d e JC DS 21 en octobre 2008. Selon un scénario des Olympiques de Vancouver en 2010, l’implémention des outils dans COPlanS ont été démontrés avec succès dans un cadre de planification avec une contrainte de temps.

Thales Canada, Land and Joint System s D ivision. (20 08). Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description. W7701-054996/008/QCL DRDC Valcartier.


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Table of Contents Table of Contents........................................................................................................................................... 7 Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ 9 Table of Tables ............................................................................................................................................ 11 1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 12

1.1 Standards .................................................................................................................... 14 1.1.1 Use case diagram.................................................................................................................. 14 1.1.2 Activity diagram................................................................................................................... 15

2 Dynamic Link Management .............................................................................................................. 16 2.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 16 2.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 16

2.2.1 Element linking..................................................................................................................... 20 2.2.2 Single Element Links View.................................................................................................. 23 2.2.3 Links View ........................................................................................................................... 24

3 Center of Gravity Analysis ................................................................................................................. 25 3.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 25 3.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 25

4 Decisive Point Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 28 4.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 28 4.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 28

5 Criteria Management......................................................................................................................... 30 5.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 30 5.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 30

5.2.1 Search & Retrieve Criteria Capability .................................................................................. 30 5.2.2 Validation Criteria Capability............................................................................................... 34

6 Decision-Matrix Management........................................................................................................... 37 6.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 37 6.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 37

7 Plan Management .............................................................................................................................. 39 7.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 39 7.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 39

8 Risk Management .............................................................................................................................. 42 8.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 42 8.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 42


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8.2.1 Use Case 1 - Identify relevant threats ................................................................................... 42 8.2.2 Use Case 2 - Assess initial risk............................................................................................. 46 8.2.3 Use Case 3 - Identify relevant risk controls.......................................................................... 48 8.2.4 Use Case 4 - Assess residual risk.......................................................................................... 51 8.2.5 Use Case 5 - Conduct “what if” analysis .............................................................................. 52 8.2.6 Use Case 6 - Use the risk management knowledge base ...................................................... 53 8.2.7 Example scenario.................................................................................................................. 55

9 Links with Execution Management Tool .......................................................................................... 68 9.1 Description.................................................................................................................. 68 9.2 Use Cases..................................................................................................................... 68

9.2.1 Plan synchronization............................................................................................................. 68 9.2.2 Documents sharing ............................................................................................................... 69 9.2.3 Geo-reference reusing........................................................................................................... 69

10 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 70 11 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 71 Annex A – Risk Management Process ........................................................................................................ 73

Management of Risk Information ....................................................................................................... 77 Annex B - References .................................................................................................................................. 84


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Table of Figures Figure 1 – Links between operation level – Operation Creation .................................................................. 20 Figure 2 – Links between operation level - Modification............................................................................. 21 Figure 3 – Links between planning elements within the same operation ..................................................... 22 Figure 4 – Link to element type.................................................................................................................... 23 Figure 5 – Single Element Links View......................................................................................................... 24 Figure 6 – Centre of Gravity Analysis – Activity Diagram.......................................................................... 27 Figure 7 – Decisive Point Analysis – Activity Diagram............................................................................... 29 Figure 8 – Search Criteria – Use Case Diagram........................................................................................... 31 Figure 9 – COA Viability – Activity Diagram ............................................................................................. 34 Figure 10 – Descriptive Analysis – Activity Diagram ................................................................................. 38 Figure 11 – Numerical Analysis – Activity Diagram................................................................................... 38 Figure 12 – Plan Management – Activity Diagram...................................................................................... 40 Figure 13 – Identify Threats – Use Case Diagram ....................................................................................... 44 Figure 14 – Initial Risk Display Example .................................................................................................... 47 Figure 15 – Assess Initial Risk – Use Case Diagram ................................................................................... 48 Figure 16 – Identify Risk Controls – Use Case Diagram ............................................................................. 51 Figure 17 – Assess Residual Risk – Use Case Diagram............................................................................... 52 Figure 18 – Conduct “What if” Analysis – Use Case Diagram.................................................................... 53 Figure 19 – Use the Risk Management Knowledge Base (KB) – Use Case Diagram.................................. 54 Figure 20 – Risk Management Process – Conceptual Model ....................................................................... 56 Figure 21 – Identify the threat events ........................................................................................................... 57 Figure 22 – Link each threat-event to applicable COAs............................................................................... 58 Figure 23 – Link each Threat-event to applicable Mission Objective.......................................................... 59 Figure 24 – For each Threat-event, determine possible causes .................................................................... 60 Figure 25 – Determine the initial risk of each COA..................................................................................... 61 Figure 26 – Determine the mitigating controls and the residual risk for each COA..................................... 63 Figure 27 – Non-availability of aerial surveillance ...................................................................................... 64 Figure 28 – Loss of life / serious injuries to non-combatants....................................................................... 65 Figure 29 – Execution Management – Activity Diagram............................................................................. 69 Figure 30 – Risk Management process for CF Operations........................................................................... 73 Figure 31 – Continuous application of Risk Management ........................................................................... 74 Figure 32 – Initiation Stage of CF OPP........................................................................................................ 75 Figure 33 – Orientation Stage of CF OPP .................................................................................................... 76 Figure 34 – COA Development Stage of CF OPP........................................................................................ 77 Figure 35 – Risk Management Worksheet ................................................................................................... 80


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Figure 36 – Risk Score Matrix ..................................................................................................................... 82 Figure 37 – Risk Score Matrix - Example .................................................................................................... 83


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Table of Tables Table 1 – Common planning elements relationships.................................................................................... 17 Table 2 – Factors used in COA Analysis for Expeditionary Operations ...................................................... 32 Table 3 – Factors Used in COA Analysis for Domestic Operations ............................................................ 33 Table 4 – COA Viability criteria .................................................................................................................. 34 Table 5 – Information Elements for Risk Management (step 2 & 3) ........................................................... 44 Table 6 – Possible summarized information table for Risk Management by COA (step 3-6)...................... 47 Table 7 – Criteria for Effective Controls ...................................................................................................... 48 Table 8 – Situation example ......................................................................................................................... 50 Table 9 – Possible Causes related to E1 - Example...................................................................................... 60 Table 10 – Possible Causes related to E2 - Example.................................................................................... 60 Table 11 – Risk Management Matrix - Example.......................................................................................... 66 Table 12 – Risk Management in CF-OPP .................................................................................................... 75 Table 13 – Risk Assessment Matrix ............................................................................................................. 78 Table 14 – Risk Severity Categories ............................................................................................................ 78 Table 15 – Risk Probability Categories ........................................................................................................ 79


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1 Introduction The objective of t his w ork i s t o de velop a c omputer base d prototype su pporting t ime-constrained operational planning process. Building upon previous workxi xii that investigated concepts for sup porting the d ecision making and th e operational p lanning process, th e C OPLanS framework will b e used t o implement these related concepts as a means to meet the objectives of this work. Specifically, the COPlanS implementation will operationalize the following concepts:

• Dynamic link management of planning elements;

• Center of Gravity analysis tool;

• Decisive Point analysis tool;

• Criteria management tool;

• Decision-Matrix Management tool;

• Plan (including OPLAN, CONPLAN, Branch plan and sequel plans) management;

• Risk management tool; and

• Links with Execution Management.

The dem onstration of all n ew con cepts id entified abo ve will b e leveraged on DRDC COPlan S (Collaborative Op erations Pl anning System). COPlan S is a com puter-based system developed at DRDC Valcartier to su pport th e Can adian Fo rces Op erational Pl anning Process (C FOPP). It i s an i ntegrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid and workflow management tools, aimed at supporting a distributed team involved in the planning of military operations.

The CFOPP includes five main stagesxiii:

• The Initiation stage results in the activation of the planning staff and the commander’s guidelines about the kind of planning process to achieve;

• The Orientation stage results in the development of t he commander’s planning guidance. At this stage, the commander orients his/her staff towards the determination of the nature of the problem and the confirmation of the results to be achieved;

• The C ourse of Act ion (C OA) Development st age res ults i n t he pro duction of t he C ONOPS (CONcept of OPerationS), that identifies the commander’s line of actions, in order to accomplish his/her mission. It presents the COA that will be implemented;

• The Plan Development st age res ults i n a set of o rders, based on t he commander’s decision, t o provide subordinate and supporting units with all necessary information to initiate the planning or the execution of operations; and

• The Plan Review stage results in a regular review of the plan to evaluate its viability. The review period of the plan depends on the evolution of the situation, on the type of operation and on the environment.

The CFOPP has been developed to cover two categories of planning: Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning. xiv

• Deliberate planning consists o f i nitiating and developing p lans in an ticipation of a k nown or anticipated future event or ci rcumstance that Cana da will or m ight face. It is not subject to the immediate pressures of time or prevailing threats; and

• Crisis actio n planning con sists o f i nitiating and developing plans i n respo nse t o a current or developing crisis. It requires an expeditious co-ordination and approval.

JCDS 21 TDP is intended to demonstrate advanced concepts and technologies to support real-time course of act ions planning, decision a nalysis an d e xecution management. Furt hermore, a ne w project cal led


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“Decision Support for Immediate Contingency Operations” has been approved and will look at the decision support concepts and technologies that will be relevant for the time-constrained planning required; when an unexpected event necessitates the immediate intervention of 1Cdn Air Div/CFACC. Accordingly, this work provides the level of effort required to demonstrate concepts that can support time-constraint planning for an organisation working at the operational level, mainly CANADA COM and CFACC.xv

This document will p ropose a basis to DRDC for add ing and enhancing the operational decision making (DM) su pport fu nctionality, cu rrently fo und in COPlanS. It is assu med th at th e reader h as prev ious knowledge a nd understanding of C OPlanS’ feat ures a nd of t he framework used, t o build i ts c onstituent components. This document will primarily serve to illustrate and describe a specific selection of functional concepts that have been explored in the context of the existing contract. As well, eac h of these sele cted functional concepts will b e further represented through a series of use cases. Ea ch approach identified is intended to be validated with the scientific authority. Therefore, the sections in t his document describe the targeted functional concepts, approaches and use cases in more detail:

• Dynamic Li nk M anagement. In sect ion 2, the dy namic l ink management ap proach i s examined and described. Due to its dependencies with other tasks, it was add ressed first and it investigates an efficient way to create and manage different types of links between all information elements produced by the staff whil e executing the CFOPP. Th e CFOPP ele ments requ ire a lin k enforcement co ncept to create in tegrity b etween elem ents. Th is app roach allo ws lin king an y element with any other element. It also identifies useful mechanisms for the dynamic management of t hese links, and proposes efficient t ools to pr ovide different vie ws of these li nks, associated information as well the li nked elem ents. These c oncepts have bee n im plemented a nd are demonstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Centre of Gra vity (COG) A nalysis. I n se ction 3, a C entre of Gravity anal ysis ap proach i s presented. This approach will facilitate the brainstorming related to the identification of the COGs, the critical cap abilities, the critical req uirements, the critical v ulnerabilities, and their associated Decisive Points. This analysis considers additional concepts like effects and their relationships to capabilities and centers of gravity. The approach permits the planners to work concurrently on the friendly COG analysis as well as the a dversary COG an alysis. Lin ks to th e COG an alysis th at would have been developed at a hi gher level of pl anning (ex. strategic) are also possible. These concepts have bee n i mplemented as a C entre of Gravity Anal ysis T ool an d a re demonstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Decisive Point Analysis . In Section 4, Decisive Point Analysis ap proach i s de scribed. Thi s approach allows sequencing of Decisive Points (DP) identified in COG Analysis from Own Force COG (to protect) to the Adversary Force COG (to at tack). The seq uencing i s done on l ines of operation, representing a functional view (I.e. Combat units, Logistics…). An environmental view is also available to v isualize lin es of operation, acc ording t o a nother perspective i .e. based o n military forces (Air , La nd, Navy, Joint and Information Op erations). Also, th e Decisive Po int Analysis al lows de fining r elationships b etween D Ps l ocated o n di fferent l ines of operat ion. During the analysis, phases of the operation are defined with objectives. The objectives may be related to one or many lines of operation by phase. Moreover, for each phase, a pre-condition may be established. Th ese pre-conditions, also named pauses, define prerequisites before initiating a subsequent phase. Finally, Decisive Point Analysis allows sketching branch plans i.e. a “Plan B” to execute, if specific condit ions are prese nt. In t he same way , sequel pl ans can b e defined t o illustrate the transition to another operation or shortcut, the current operation, according to specific transition conditions. These concepts have been implemented as a Decisive Point Analysis Tool and are demonstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Criteria Management. In section 5, the Criteria management approach is described. This approach allows t he planners t o r etrieve a nd m anage cri teria. T his i s d one using a sea rch a nd a reuse functionality that is a pplied to the Transition conditions (including criteria for success); and the criteria use d to e valuate and com pare Courses of Action (C OAs). A second approach considered is to allow planners to validate specific aspects of planning such as the viability of COAs, Centres of Gravity and the coherence of the set of COA evaluation criteria.


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These concepts ha ve been i mplemented a s a C riteria M anagement To ol an d are de monstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Decision-Matrix M anagement. In sect ion 6, t he d ecision-matrix management app roach i s described. During the COA Analysis, the decision-matrixes are tightly coupled to CFOPP doctrine in the evaluation of COAs and must provide the flexibility to use numerical as well as d escriptive analytical approaches. The planner can develop different views to support the operational decision, support requirements fo r C ommanders a nd hi s operational st aff, w hen co nsidering t he C OAs during t he decision briefing. Th ese c oncepts h ave been im plemented as a Decision-Matrix Management Tool and are demonstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Plan Management. In sect ion 7, the plan management approach is described in detail. A plan is developed t o address s pecific un foreseen operational i ssues re ferred t o as an O perational Pl an (OPLAN). A plan can also b e d eveloped an d prepared to estab lish p riorities, organ izations, responsibilities, p olicies, etc. Ano ther pu rpose o f a plan cou ld be to ad dress po tential an d predictable c ontingencies i n res ponse to a fo reseeable operational issues , re ferred to as Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). Both types of plans are developed, using the CFOPP. Planning considerations an d other planning el ements fr om these plans are often similar especially when they are a pplied within a n operational ec helon. The Pl an M anagement t ool offers t he o ption t o greatly reduce planning t ime by reusing common planning elements dur ing the creat ion o f new OPLANs and CONPLANs. This concept has been implemented as a Pl an Management Tool and is demonstrated within the COPlanS framework;

• Risk Management. In section 8, the risk management tool is described in detail. The purpose of risk m anagement f or C F o perations i s t o effectively ide ntify, analyze, evaluate a nd control all types of risk. Its key aim is to ens ure that significant risks are ide ntified an d t hat a ppropriate action is taken to minimize these risks, balanced against operational objectives. Risk management functions must be incorporated into the CF OPP in order to support decision makers at all lev els. The ri sk m anagement proce ss i tself co mprises 1 4 st eps, or ganized i nto fi ve phases. The ri sk management concept proposes methods to establish a logical link between threats, causes, events and risks. This concept has been implemented as a Plan Management Tool and is demonstrated within the COPlanS framework; and

• Links with Execution Management. In secti on 9, a n approach to link the Operational plan to th e execution management tool is proposed. Plans are developed and presented to the Commander for approval based on a recommended course of action (COA). A plan is executed as an order. The JCDS environment provides a computer based system that is charged with the monitoring and the management of on -going operations and the related orders. Since a pl an must be con verted to an order, to perform th e ex ecution of m onitoring task s; th e ab ility to seamlessly ex change t he planning information into the execution management tool, must also exist. This concept has been implemented an d is demonstrated with in th e COPlan S framework. Using the JCDS communication facility, COPlan S’ p lans an d EMPA’s orders can b e synchronized. In th e sam e way, C OPlanS pr oduces documents rel ated t o developed pl ans w here they can be s hared a nd retrieved from the JCDS document repository.

1.1 Standards This document ad opts several UM L diagrams t o de pict co ncepts g raphically. M ainly, U se C ase an d Activity diagrams are u sed to su pport concepts. Fo llowing the UML stan dard, different kinds of entities and links are used in those diagrams (Use Cases or Activities).

1.1.1 Use case diagram Use case diagram depicts normal capabilities performed in a specific context.


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Semantics Actors model entities external to the subject. When an external entity interacts with the subject, it plays the role of a specific actor. Use cases are capabilities performed by actors. A use case may include or precede other use cases. Use cases may interact with information.

Notation

• An actor is represen ted by a “stick man” icon, with the name of the act or in the vicinity (usually above or below the icon);

• Use cases are represented by rectangles with round corners;

• Information is represented by rectangles; and

• Links can be stereotyped i.e. they may represent common behaviour. Stereotypes are represented between double quotes (eg. “flow”). Hereafter, a list of stereotypes used in this document:

• Flow: Information consumed (retrieved), or produced (created/modified);

• Include: Specified activity or use case;

1.1.2 Activity diagram Activity diagrams depict the normal flow of actions. Activities are linked in sequence of execution.

Notation

• The starting point of the activity flow is represented by a black point;

• The ending point of the activity flow is represented by a circle with a point inside.

• Activities are represented by a rectangle with round corners;

• Decision points representing different alternative flows based on a specific condition, are depicted by a diamond;

• Joint/Synchronization po ints, u sed to join many altern ative flo ws t o co ntinue in a co mmon activity, are depicted by a thick bar;

• Events are represented by a pentagon;

• Information is represented by a rectangle; and

• Like use cases, links can also be stereotyped.


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2 Dynamic Link Management

2.1 Description Arguably, e xperienced pla nners ha ve a greater ability t o successfully pl an i n a cri sis situation when deliberate planning, by usi ng t he ful l C FOPP, m ay not be p ossible. I deally, t ime-constrained pl anning should be successful with a tailored approach, using the CFOPP. It is imperative to examine approaches to allow a pl anner of any ex perience l evel t o rapidly consi der t he ope rational pr oblem, by drawi ng o n the collective ex perience of t he pl anning t eam and by d rawing on previous pl ans, dealing with si milar operational problem s. The method proposed is to adopt a dynam ic link m echanism betwee n pla nning elements to enable a m ore rapid a nd e ffective planning cycle. Furt hermore, planners should be a ble to establish dependencies and validate these links very quickly, in a co llaborative environment. To establish and m aintain relatio nal in tegrity b etween its v arious co nstituent planning elem ents1, a dynamic l ink management mechanism is very much compatible with the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP). Without the establishment of appropriate links, it wo uld be difficult to ascertain and assess th e impact that one planning ele ment may have on one or more other planning el ements, i n a c ollaborative environment, thus wasting the t ime and ef fort of the planning staffs. I n the context of t ime-constrained planning, the benefits achieved in identifying the links and recognizing the dependencies; will resu lt in a more solid pla n that will take sha pe more rapidly th an traditional methods. The type of links e xamined in the study includes:

• Links supporting or refuting the existence of an element (existence dependency);

• Links indicating an influence between elements (influence dependency);

• Links representing a sequencing of elements in time (temporal dependency); and

• Links representing a refinement of an object (relational dependency).

2.2 Use Cases Operational Pl anning el ements can be rel ated t ogether i n di fferent ways. M odifications of a ny of t hese elements may affect the planning staff’s analysis and recommendations. As such, the very effect a planner wants to achieve in the planning process is to draw collectively on the cognitive reasoning of the planning staff when considering eac h pl anning el ement. B y est ablishing a re lative l inkage bet ween planning elements, the planners can e nsure as m any co nsiderations are factored into developing a n overall p lan. Because elements influence others, it is im portant to monitor and re view dependent elements in orde r to ascertain whether their very existence, importance, sequencing or essence, have been affected. Depending on the nature of each element, some of them may be associated to one anothe r in a trivial manner. Others may depen d on t he sem antic m eaning o f t he planning el ements. For example, decisive p oints m ay be considered as a group of tas ks or effects required to achieve a ce rtain goal or objective. Th is case allo ws the relationship between decisive points and tasks to be r elatively trivial. In anot her case, an assum ption describing the potential position of the adversary or threat could be easily associated with a task to verify or refute t his a ssumption. A nother ass umption co uld describe t he m orale o f t he a dversary t roops w hich cannot easily be dete rmined or verified by a specific ta sk. In t hese c ases, di rect rel ationships between assumptions and tasks are not easily established. Due to the fact that a general rule cannot be established to automatically associate all or even most planning elements, i t rem ains t hat s ome pl anning el ement rel ationships co uld n onetheless be c onsidered as a standing pattern because they can be established in almost any plan. The relation ships b etween planning elem ents are not limited to ele ments with in a sin gle p lan. Some elements are linke d to elements of the higher plan. F or exam ple, r ules of en gagement defi ned at t he strategic level must also be cascaded and considered at the operational level.

1 Elements of the Operational Design are described in greater detail in the US DOD under FM-3, Operations, June 2001


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The following table describes the most common relationships between planning elements. Some elements (target) may be linked (source) to elements of the higher plan or the same plan (current plan). Different link types exist between planning elements:

• Copied and linked: An exact copy of the element is made. The copy element is linked to the original one;

• Influenced by and linked: User-defined link defined between two planning elements.

Table 1 – Common planning elements relationships

Source Target

Element (higher plan) Element (current plan) Element

Link type

Facts & Assumptions Facts Copied and linked (OPP rule: Facts and assumptions are considered facts in subordinate plans)

Facts & Assumptions Other Orientation stage elements

Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis)

Facts & Assumptions Other COA Development stage elements


End State End State Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis)

Transition Condition Transition Condition Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis)

End state Other Orientation stage elements


Transition Condition Other Orientation stage elements


CCIRs, PIRs, EEFIs & FFIRs

Other Orientation stage elements


CCIRs, PIRs, EEFIs & FFIRs

Other COA Development stage elements


Constraints & Restraints

Constraints & Restraints

Copied and linked (OPP rule: constraint an restraints are flow down from higher plan)


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Source Target


Link type

Constraints & Restraints • AOO Situation (Geospacial)

• Time & Space • Resources &

Capabilities (Own Forces)

• Freedom of movement (Logistics)

• ROEs (Imposed from strategic)

• C2 • Political

Considerations • Conflict

Termination • Risks • Tasks • After action

review


Strengths (being Critical Capability (CC) or Critical Requirement (CR))

Centre of Gravity Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)

Weaknesses (being Critical Vulnerability (CV))

Centre of Gravity Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)

Critical Capability (CC) Critical Requirement (CR)

Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)

Critical Requirement (CR)

Critical Vulnerability (CV)

Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)

Critical Vulnerability (CV)

Decisive Point (DP) Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)

Centre of Gravity Centre of Gravity Influenced by and linked (enhances COG analysis)


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Source Target


Link type

Objectives Objectives Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis)

Tasks Assigned Tasks Copied and linked (OPP rule: Tasks are assigned by the higher headquarter.)

Tasks (Assigned & Implied)

• Risks • Objectives • Phases


Command & Control structures

• C2 • Tasks


Forces Capabilities & required groupings

• C2 • Tasks


Proposed timelines • Other COA Development stage elements

• Phases

Influenced by and linked (Support DP analysis)

Battlespace Effects Other COA Development stage elements

Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis and DP analysis)

Decisive Points (DP), Centre of Gravity (CoG), Objectives & Tasks

• Line of Operations

• Phases

Influenced by and linked (enhances planning analysis and DP analysis)

COAs • Tasks • Decisive Points

(DP) • Objectives • Phases • Line of

Operations

Influenced by and linked (enhances COA development and DP analysis)

Decisive Points Decisive Points Copied and linked (enhances COG and DP analysis)


2.2.1 Element linking When a new plan is c reated, some elements from the related higher plan should be inherited. In fact, a copy with a link to the source is created in the new plan. Afterwards, an authorized staff officer can review the copied links and clean them up in the operational plan. Each tim e a “ copied and linked” elem ent is created at the highe r leve l, a clean-up can be done in the operational level plan.

act Links

Sub

uni

tH

ighe

r pl

an

Higher Unit User

Create elements (ex.Constraint 1 & 2)

Cons traint 1 Constraint 2

Create plan (sub-plan)

Copy and link parentelements

Copy of Constraint 1


Clean-up elements(remov e constraint 2)

Del ete

Ste p 3

Create & link

Create & link

Ste p 2

Step 1

Figure 1 – Links between operation level – Operation Creation

When a m odification is m ade on an elem ent of a higher pl an, i ts l inked o perational planning el ements should indicate that the source has changed and should be reviewed by the staff planners.

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act Modify parent plan

Hig

her

plan

Sub

uni

t

Higher Unit User

Cons traint 1

Modify element (ex.Constraint)


Sub-uni t User

Linked element indicatesrelation has been modified

Element is rev iewed

«flow»

Figure 2 – Links between operation level - Modification

In t he sam e way , pl anning e lements of t he sam e pl an can be l inked t ogether. When sou rce el ements change, the linked element should indicate that an associated element has therefore changed. It may impact the element in some ways. Thus, it should be reviewed by the staff planner.

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act Modify same plan

Risk 1

Task 1

Us er 1

Use r 2

Element is modified (ex.Risk)

Linked element indicatesrelation has been modified

Element is rev iewed«flow»

Figure 3 – Links between planning elements within the same operation

When planning elements of an operation are being defined and analysed, the links to other elements are not necessarily possible yet. Often, particularly during the orientation stage, the staff planner defines an element and knows this will be linked to an element that may not yet be defined. In this case, the user may identify or “pre-link” an element to an element type; to indicate that this element should be considered, when those other elements will be further instantiated. The system will propose natural links with element types as defined in the Figure 1 – Common planning element relationships. But, the system allows the staff planner to link to any elements type. For example, the staff planner is defining a risk related to the mission. He supposes that this risk should be mitigated by one or many tasks. He does not know exactly which tasks, but he is confident tasks shall address this risk. In this case, he links the risk to the tasks type. When he or someone else defines tasks, an indicator shows that this risk should be addressed by tasks; the staff planner who is creating the task, can then associate it to this risk.

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act Element type links

Us er 1

Risk 1

Create an element(ex.Risk)

Link element to anelement type (ex. Tasks)

Tasks Type

Use r 2

Define TasksIndicator elements should

be linked to this type ofelement

Link an element (ex. Taskto Risk)

Tas k 1

Link type remov ed

The system proposes intuitiv e re lationships

with element types to the user

Step 4

Ste p 2

Step 1

Ste p 3

Del ete

«flow»

Figure 4 – Link to element type

2.2.2 Single Element Links View Planners creat e vari ous l inks bet ween pl anning el ements with in th e op erational p lans. When th e staff planner modifies elements, he may want to know what this implies directly and indirectly on other items of the plan and on i ts sub-plans. For this, the planner submits a req uest about links related to h is element. The system returns all elements linked directly to it. Also, the planner may navigate through indirect linked elements. In other words, the planner may consult planning elements linked to those linked elements. For example: A risk is linked to a task to mitigate this risk. This task is related to a specific decisive point, which is related to a specific transition condition (success criteria). In this case, the planner may analyse all impacts affected by the c hanges of t his ri sk; i.e. from the ris k itself up to any im pacts on the t ransition condition.

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act Element Links View

Us er 1

Request Links related toan element

System returns elementrelations

Browse elements throughtrelations

«flow»

Figure 5 – Single Element Links View

2.2.3 Links View When a p lanner con siders a mature o perational p lan, he may wish to verify th at all i dentified p lanning elements have been c onsidered. The links view prov ides a matrix o f all lin ks b etween elem ents. This matrix sho ws also elements lin ked to elemen t typ es (elements to co nsider wh en th ese k inds of elemen ts will be defined). In this way, the planner may easily identify planning element to address further and make a decision to finalize or to further refine the plan.

Page 24


Page 25

3 Center of Gravity Analysis

3.1 Description In t he process of cam paign desi gn, o perational pl anners pay at tention t o i dentify candi dates f or t he adversary and own forces Centre o f Gravity. Dr J oe St range authored an approach to understand and to analyse the relationships between centers of gravity and their critical vulnerabilities. Strange identified the critical factors used to establish a “sensible hierarchy with logical relationships” xvi. These factors consist of the rel ationship bet ween C OGs, C Cs, C Rs and C Vs S everal step s th at are id entified in d etermining th e adversary’s and the own force’s COGs. The essence i s to focus on defeating the adversary’s COG while protecting t he own force’s COG. Arguably, com manders and pl anners may debat e t he sel ection. So, consideration of many COG candidates must be avai lable to the planners, during the orientation stage and even, they may be revisited during the COA development stage. At the strategic and operational levels, the COGs are related and have dependencies with each other. For example, the determination of an own force COG, at the strategic level, will have identified critical factors (CCs, CRs,CVs), that are then, flowed down in the form o f constraints and restrain ts to the operational level. Consequently, this influences operational level planners in their identification of the operational level COGs, and the relevant CVs,CRs and CCs. The addition of DPs provides the planner with an initial sense of the possible resources and sequencing that are required to pro tect on e’s own COG and to d efeat t he adv ersary’s COG. Th is will be add ressed in more detail later in this document, in the section on the DP Analysis tool. The center of gravity analysis display is a tool, located in the orientation stage, to create and visualize links between COGs, CRs, CCs, CVs and DPs. COG an alysis allows visualization of own force and adversary force elements. The Own Force COG an alysis manages items having the Own Force affiliation. If an object is created in the Own Force screen, th e affiliation will be set to Own. The adversary COG analysis does the same for adversary objects.

3.2 Use Cases The Centre of Gravity (COG) Analysis is performed to define COGs, to be at tacked and protected. T he planners desire only one COG to protect and only one to attack; when finalizing the plan. However, at the early st age of t he planning p rocess, m any C OG can didates m ay be i dentified a nd c onsidered i n t he orientation stage. The COGs are bounded by an End State, according to Transition Conditions. During th is an alysis, p lanners d efine C ritical Ca pabilities (CC), Crit ical Req uirements (CR), Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) and Decisiv e Po ints (DP). Plann ers will relate th ese ele ments to eith er frien dly o r adversary forces. In fact, th ey will co nsider th at all CCs a nd CRs id entified are designated as streng ths while CVs are designated as weaknesses. Though all CCs, CRs and C Vs are st rengths or weaknesses, planners have to consider that not all strengths and weaknesses are necessarily CCs, CRs or CVs. Planners may consider an adversary CV as a High Value Target (HVT); i.e. th e critical v ulnerability is a target that, if attacked, will yield greater benefits to the friendly by its defeat than the resources applied to defeat i t. C onversely for friendly C Vs, planners m ay consider so me to b e Sh ield CV i.e. subj ect to protection against adversary attacks as these are related to the friendly COG.

Decisive points ha ve no s uch al legiance. Pl anners de fined t hem to p rotect an d at tack critical vulnerabilities. Gu ided b y th e Strang e an alysisxvii method, pl anners de fine an d creat e l inks bet ween elements of the COG Analysis. Planners perform this analysis by sketch ing elements related to friend and adversary COGs in a common view. In fact, the system shall provide the capability to display many COGs in the same view, but allows the capability to filter graphical analysis elements on desired COG candidates.


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Mainly, links between elements are:

• COGs affect CCs;

• CCs affect CRs and depend on COGs;

• CRs affect CVs and depend on CCs; and

• CVs affect DPs and depend on CRs.

When an element is d eleted, affected and dependant links are also delet ed. But, t he attached elem ent still exists.

When the Adversary and Friendly COGs are chosen to be the COGs to be attacked (Adversary), and to be protected (Friendly); the system provides the capability to select them with their related DPs to be used to sketch COAs of the plan. T o select a COG, it m ust be considered as valid (see 5.2.2.2 COG Validation section). Final COGs are not necessarily selected du ring the COG Analysis. They may be selected later during the Decisive Point Analysis.


act COG Analysis

Ene

my

CO

G c

andi

date

s -

Str

ange

Ana

lysi

s

Ow

n C

OG

can

dida

tes

- Str

ange

Ana

lysi

s

Define End State Define TransitionConditions

Define Own Centre ofGrav ity candidates

Define Decisiv e Points

Identify High ValueTargets

Define Enemy Centre ofGrav ity candidates

Define CriticalCapabilities - Friend

Define CriticalRequirements - Friend

Define CriticalVulnaribilities - Friend

Define CriticalCapabilities - Enemy

Define CriticalRequirements - Enemy

Define CriticalVulnaribilities - Enemy

Identify Shield CVs

Validate COG candidates

Elect Own & Enemy COGsDecisiv e Point Analysis

Valid

Rede fine or discard COG

Elect COGs immediatly

When COGs not elected

Yes

No

Elect COGs later

Figure 6 – Centre of Gravity Analysis – Activity Diagram

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4 Decisive Point Analysis

4.1 Description In the campaign design, the DP (Decisiv e Point) Analysis step is in itiated by the operational p lanners to begin i dentifying t he res ources (com mand and c ontrol an d, hi erarchical gro upings), t asks (assi gned or implied), effects (direct or in-direct), phases (sequencing), functional and environmental lines of operations (time and space) required to defeat the adversary’s COG while protecting one’s own. This is also a key step within the COA development stage that begins to orient the planners, toward the identification of possible permutations. These permutations c ould al so l ead t o t he co nsideration o f c ontingencies refe rred t o as branch plans and sequel plans. Indicators will need to be identified which will form the basis of a decision point leading t o the e xecution of a branch or sequel plan. Decisive Po int and decision points are c oncepts very o ften co nfused. A de cisive poi nt i s a geog raphical l ocation, an event , a sy stem, a funct ion or a condition, which leads to the defeat of adversary center of gravity or; it is defined to protect our own force centre of gravi ty. Decisi on points are defined as a poi nt in sp ace and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a friendly course of action.xviii This analysis will form the basis for building COAs, for further consideration.

The DP Analysis screen is a tool located in the C OA Development stage. This tool allows th e planner to graphically manage t he se quencing of D Ps, t he relation bet ween DP and l ine o f operations, a nd t he influence between DPs.

This display will h elp the planner to connect decisive points to a sp ecific line of operation and to manage decisive po ints in ti me. W e can see th is d isplay lik e a k ind of tab le. Th e ro ws represent th e lin e o f operations and th e columns represent the units of time inside the phase s. Each DP associated to a line of operation is represented by a blue rectangle. The blue color indicates that this screen manages Own Force DPs.

4.2 Use Cases Decisive Point Analysis allows sequencing of Decisive Points (DP) identified in COG Analysis from Own Force C OG (t o p rotect) t o t he A dversary For ce C OG (t o at tack). Th e seque ncing i s do ne on l ines of operation representing a functional view (I.e. Combat units, Logistics…). An environmental view is also available to visualize lines of operation, according to another perspective i.e. based on military forces (Air, Land, Navy, Joint and Information Operations). Also, the Decisive Point Analysis allows defining relationships between DPs located on different lines of operation. During the analysis, phases of the operation are defined with objectives. The objectives may be related to one or many l ines of operation by phase. Phases correspond to t ime synchronization between lines of operation and DPs. Moreover, for each phas e, a pre -condition may be established. These pre-conditions, also named pauses, define prerequisites before in itiating a su bsequent phase. For examp le, a combat phase must start before hurricane season, otherwise wait until the fall. When a n el ement i s del eted; affect an d dependant l inks are al so deleted, but t he at tached el ement st ill exists. Also, on a line of operation, the previous DP is automatically linked to the next DP. Each DP represents a milestone that must be achieved. To reach them, the analysis supports the creation of tasks, which can be associated to DPs. Finally, Decisiv e Po int An alysis allo ws sk etching branch plans, i.e. a “Plan B” , to ex ecute, if sp ecific conditions are present. In the same way, seq uel plans can be defined to illustrate the transition to another operation or shortcut the c urrent op eration, according to specific tran sition conditions. At appropriate decision points, under specific conditions, branch and sequels plans are launched. During a Decisive Point Analysis leading up to the decision briefing, many possibilities can be sketched to determine which COGs (own and adversary) should be selected. In the sam e way, many possibilities for the sa me s elected COGs set can be sketched (different seque ncing, t asks, ph ases…).


Furthermore, much Decisive Point Analysis can b e sketched. At the end, the commander will select th e best combination with which to continue the planning process (Develop COAs etc).

act Decisive Point Analysis

Dec

isiv

e P

oint

Ana

lysi

s

COG Analysis

Define Lines of Operation(Functional)

Sequence Decisiv ePoints

Sequence on a functional line of

operation

Identi fy related env ironmenta l lines of

operation

Identify Friend & EnemyCOG

Make influence linksbetween DPs

Identify Phases

Define Objectives

Define Pauses

Identify Tasks

Define Branch PlansEstablis h condition for Branch plans (De cision

Point)

Define alte rnate paths

Define Sequel PlansIdentify Trans ition

Conditions (De cision Point)

Define Sequel paths

COGs are elected

Sketch other possibil ities ?

Continue OPP

Choose the campaignplan

No

Yes

Yes

No

Figure 7 – Decisive Point Analysis – Activity Diagram

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5 Criteria Management

5.1 Description The importance of criteria man agement in ti me-sensitive planning, u sing the CFOPP is ev ident. Cri teria management relates to the evaluation of the success of an operation (transition conditions including criteria for success) or relates to the appropriate criteria, when considering the choice of certain COAs over others. These criteria can be set by a Co mmander and his planners, early on in the planning process. So, the valid COAs are examined against a set of c riteria that is weighted, according to the operational end state and the transition conditions. This will remove potential subjective evaluation towards a particular solution during the COA evaluation process, by engaging the staff in an objective assess ment of the COAs . Therefore, the criteria for comparison must be set according to guidelines and intent of the Commander.

To support time-sensitive planning, a lib rary of criteria sets that are relev ant doctrinally or relevant given past si milar o perations s hould be m ade a vailable t o t he pl anners. T he vary ing t ypes of operations fo r Domestic or Expeditionary will require their unique sets of evaluation criteria. Usi ng a lib rary of criteria sets, a C ommander and his p lanning staff should be ab le to more quickly identify the appropriate set o f criteria to apply for the operation being planned.

This approac h should also a llow the pla nners to retrieve and m anage criteria dyna mically because of changing situations (e.g. a UN m andated operation moves from peace s upport to peac e making) and/or a change t o th e mission. Th is can be don e usin g a search, a reu se fu nctionality app lied to th e Tran sition conditions (including criteria for success) and using also t he criteria to evaluate and compare Courses of Action (COAs).

A sec ond considere d a pproach is t o allow planne rs to validate specifi c aspects of plan ning su ch as the viability of COAs, Centres of Gravity and the coherence of the set of COA evaluation criteria. CF planning doctrine preaches a viability guideline to ensu re the results of the COG Analysis. The COA Analysis will yield realistic options to consider for the plan. As such, viability tests are imposed to ensure that the COAs are tested (Suitable, Feasible, Acceptable, Exclusive, Complete) and the COGs are also tested (targetability and defeatability).

5.2 Use Cases As indicated previously, the criteria management concept groups several independent capabilities related to management of variou s k inds of criteria. Two high level cap abilities h ave been iden tified t o m anage criteria. The first group of capabilities is the functionality to search and reuse criteria previously defined in other pl ans. Those pl ans may be rel ated t o pa st si milar si tuations or may be devel oped as co ntingency plans (CONPLAN). Searching and reusing functionality is applied to the following kinds of criteria:

• Transition Conditions (including criteria of success); and • Criteria to evaluate and compare COAs.

The second set o f capabilities g roups’ functionalities related to criteria, to validate specific aspect o f the planning:

• Criteria to validate the viability of COAs; • Criteria to validate Centres of Gravity (CoG); and • Validation of the coherence of the set of COA evaluation criteria.

5.2.1 Search & Retrieve Criteria Capability Planning i s es sentially based o n a pplied doctrine an d ex perience of pl anners. T he doctrine guides t he planning p rocess i n a com mon way t o u nify t he u nderstanding of el ements t hat makes u p or i nfluences decisions related to the plan. Experience allows the planner to produce a plan while drawing upon similar planning situations in the past.


Experience may be appl ied individually in making decisions, based on successes a nd failures, in previous challenges. Experience may also be applied collectively. Planning decisions consider experience related to what was going well and poorly, in the execution of past operations. In th is way, when a new situation happens and requi res a plan to counter or take adva ntage of, pla nners may consider successful decisions made by others, facing similar situations. Some plans are developed to solve a specific operational problem. Often, time to analyse and sketch a plan is too short to make the best deci sion for the si tuation. In this case, planners may develop contingency plans (CONPLAN) well in advance. CONPLANs are developed in an unstressed environment to counter a possible future situation. Considering past p lans an d co ntingency p lans, th e system p rovides the cap ability to search similar situations and allows copying various relevant planning elements to the new plan, to be used as a st arting point. To determine which criteria to copy and modify (change the weight and threshold), the user m ay consult the After Action Review (AAR) related to those criteria. The After Action Review allows planners to capture the initial criteria, after that the order (plan) has been executed. With th is capability, the p lanner may evaluate if a criteri on has been too heavily weigh ted or under estimated based on the results of the review. The user may also indicate which criteria would have been considered during the evaluation.

act Criteria

OP

P fo

r P

lan

2O

PP

for

Pla

n 1

Plan cel l 1

Plan c ell 2

Define criteria

Op ce llPlan 1

Dev elop plan Define situation (operationtype/location)

Execute Order (plan)

After Action Rev iew

Create new plan Search existing criteria inold plans based on the

situation of the new plan

Consult After ActionRev iew

Copy existing criteria

Pla n 2

Rev iew Criteria

«Include»

Step 4

«flow»

Ste p 2

Ste p 3

«flow»

«flow» «flow»

Step 1

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

«flow» «flow»

«flow»

Figure 8 – Search Criteria – Use Case Diagram

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5.2.1.1 Evaluation Criteria COPlanS use a set of criteria to evaluate and com pare COAs of a plan. Those criteria are de fined according to the nature and the location of the operation. Each criterion has a specific weight and threshold to evaluate and com pare COAs . Consi dering that a plan m ay have sim ilarities wit h ot hers (o peration type/location), th e syste m may retriev e ex isting ev aluation criteria and co py th em o ver to ev aluate it s COAs. Using the search capability, the user requests search ing of criteria, b ased on similar operation categories (Domestic, Expeditionary), operation types (Disaster assistance, High intensity war figh ting…) and/or on location (Afghanistan, Bosnia…). The search on old plans and contingency plans is performed. The user may consult the After Action Review information of the retrieved criteria to select those to copy. When criteria are copie d, their weights are adjusted, according to their define d importance in the source plans. For e xample: an old plan contains many criteria. Some of them (criteria 1 and 2) have respectively 10% and 40% for weight of importance. If only these 2 criteria are copie d to th e new plan, their weights are adjusted to 20% a nd 80%, to res pect the same relative degree of i mportance. This is als o applicable when criteria are copied from different plans. The sea rch c riteria may also com e from th e doct rine. According to t he o peration categ ory (Do mestic, Expeditionary) and type (Disaster assistan ce, High intensity war fi ghting…), some criteria are su ggested for the evaluation. The following tables (Table 6 and Table 7) provide evaluation criteria to use, according to the nature of the operation.

Table 2 – Factors used in COA Analysis for Expeditionary Operations

Types of operation

Disaster

Assistance Sp or Non-Combat Evacuation

Low intensity

Humanitarian Assistance Sp (Permissive)

Low Intensity

Peace Sp under NATO or UN (Ch VI) (Non-Permissive)

Med Intensity

Peace Making under NATO or UN (Ch VII)

High Intensity

War Fighting or Counter-Insurgency (NATO or other multi-lateral alliance)

C2 C2 C2 C2 C2

Cooperation Cooperation Freedom of Action Freedom of Action

Freedom of Action

Host Nation Sp Host Nation Sp Unity of Effort Unity of Effort Unity of Effort

Sustainment Sustainment Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability

Time and Space Time and Space

Host Nation Sp Host Nation Sp Lethality (Direct)

ROE ROE Force Protection

Sustainment Sustainment Sustainment

Coercion Coercion Surprise

Deterrence Deterrence Deception

Time and Space Use of Force Synchronization

Time and Space Deterrence

Concentration of Force

Time and Space

Factors (Criteria)

Transition to Peace


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Types of operation

Disaster

Assistance Sp or Non-Combat Evacuation

Low intensity

Humanitarian Assistance Sp (Permissive)

Low Intensity

Peace Sp under NATO or UN (Ch VI) (Non-Permissive)

Med Intensity

Peace Making under NATO or UN (Ch VII)

High Intensity

War Fighting or Counter-Insurgency (NATO or other multi-lateral alliance)

Psychological Effect (Indirect)

Table 3 – Factors Used in COA Analysis for Domestic Operations

Types of Operation

Disaster Assistance Sp or SAR

Humanitarian Assistance Sp

Aid to the Civil Power

Support to Law Enforcement

Martial Law under Emergency Measures Act

C2 C2 C2 C2 C2

Cooperation Cooperation ROE ROE ROE

Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability

Public Support Public Support Public Support Public Support Force Protection

Factors (Criteria)

Public Support

xix

5.2.1.2 Transition Conditions Similarly to Evaluation criteria, condition transitions can be cop ied from existing and contingency plans to the new one. The searching request is based on the same elements i.e. category and type of operations and on the location. In the same way, the After Action Review can be consulted on Transition Conditions. After Action Review, fo r tran sition cond itions, allows feedback on those criteri a, after ex ecution of th e mission. Those comments may describe criteria which would or would not have been considered. The transition conditions or criteria of success can be copied between plans, because many similar missions may evaluate similar elements to be considered as a success.

5.2.1.3 Commander’s Critical Information Request Commander’s Critical Information Requests (CCIRs) are no t really a set of criteria. They are most related to elements or speci fic questions that need to be ad dressed to support the commander’s decision making. Because re quests may be similar for eac h mission, ha ving a sim ilar s ituation, the system provi des the capability to copy existing CCIRs of another mission in the new one. This avoids having users to overlook relevant requests to address. Th e search is made on similar ele ment as ev aluation criteria and transition conditions.


5.2.2 Validation Criteria Capability During the execution of the CF-OPP, several options are analysed and compared to decide the scenario to perform, to achieve the mission. Before performing comparison of different options, each option must be evaluated to determine its viability, according to a set of pre-defined conditions.

5.2.2.1 COA Viability Course of Actions (COAs) is the set of possible scenarios to execute, in order to achieve a mission. One of those defined options will be selected to become the plan and, eventually, the order to execute, in order to accomplish the mission. When C OAs are sketche d, t hey must be eva luated indivi dually to ve rify their viability before being c ompared together. If a COA do es not respect all the viability criteria, it should be corrected to become compliant with the viability criteria.

act COA Viability

COA is sketched

COA v iability is ev aluated COA is viable

COA is compared toothers

COA is modified

Yes

No

Figure 9 – COA Viability – Activity Diagram

To consider a COA to be viable, it must comply with all following criteria:

Table 4 – COA Viability criteria

Criteria Description

Suitable The COA acco mplishes th e mission an d its essen tial ta sks, regarding th e co mmander guidance and the expected end state. The mission defeats the adversary centre of gravity.

Feasible The COA proposes available resources to sustain the mission.

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Criteria Description

Acceptable The C OA propos es usage of res ources e fficiently, rega rding its limita tion, i ncluding in respect to doctrine, policies, regulations, legislation and guidelines.

Exclusive The COA has a different main effort than others. Thus its own strengths and weaknesses.

The COA answers the following questions:

What The COA proposes a clear scenario to achieve the mission.

Who The COA proposes resources to perform tasks.

When The COA proposes timeline to perform tasks.

Why The COA exposes its strengths and weaknesses to accomplish the mission.

Where The COA identifies specific locations where tasks will be performed.

Complete

How The COA explains how it should be conducted to achieve the mission. xx

5.2.2.2 COG Validation A Centre of Gravity (COG) is a kind of objective with our efforts should converge, to attack or protect. For each operation, only one COG is us ually defined to a ttack and one to protect. Duri ng the COG a nalysis, many COG ca ndidates can be stated. T o determine which COG to elect, it must minimally be compliant with the following criteria:

• Defeatability: Its destruction or neutralization will inevitably lead to the defeat of the adversary (or th e nullification of the adversary's ab ility to p revent th e jo int force fro m attaining its objectives); and

• Targetability: It is a syste m, target set or capability that can be successf ully engage d, eithe r directly or indirectly, with operational level military power.

5.2.2.3 Evaluation Criteria Validation Evaluation c riteria are us ed t o e valuate a nd com pare C OAs. Eac h m ission m ay have a different se t of criteria to elect the best COA to ach ieve the mission. So me of available evaluation criteria in the system may have cl osely related meanings. For example: si mplicity an d com plexity. In spite of t hey have opposite m eaning, bot h e valuate sim ilar aspect of a C OA. When a user esta blishes weights for e ach criterion, this may cause the user to i nadvertently assign the double of the desired weight for an aspect of the evaluation. In the case of simplicity/complexity, he may assign 10% of evaluation importance for the simplicity criterion and 10% for the complexity. In f act, this means 20% of im portance for this as pect of the evaluation. To av oid overweighting of some cri teria, t he sy stem may seek to validate th at criteria are ge nuinely independent of one a nother. For this, the administrator user associates evaluation criteria to others being co-dependent. In th is way, th e syste m may n otify u sers wh en th ey define a set of eval uation criteria containi ng co-dependencies. This concept can be extended to other criteria properties to validate the coherence of the family of criteria.

• Exhaustive: The set of criteria is exh austive in the sense that the addition of a new criterion would not affect the comparison of 2 COAs; because this set already reflects adequately all the attributes and e ffects tha t a stakehol der (Officer, Commander, etc.) conside red pertinent to th e ev aluation process.

• Cohesive: Th ere m ust b e con sistency between th e global and the local pr eference le vels. For example, consider two options a and b, which are i ndifferent on a gl obal l evel.


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Suppose t hat a' and b' are 2 options o btained by degrading a with resp ect to criterion i and improving b with respect to another criterion j. Then, in a global sense, b' must be at least as good as a'.

• Non-redundant: th e criteria used m ust co ntribute to discriminate bet ween di fferent act ions. Eliminating a criterion should jeopardize one of the above properties.

Moreover, this family of criteria should have other desirable properties like:

• Readability: The number of criteria used must be relatively low.

• Operational: The family of criteria m ust be acce pted by the sta keholders a nd the decision makers.xxi


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6 Decision-Matrix Management

6.1 Description Once a set of recommended COAs have been defined as an output of the COA Analysis, an evaluation of each COA is prese nted to t he Comm ander, duri ng the decision briefing. In prep aration for the dec ision briefing, the staff must prepare a graphic representation that shows the Commander clearly and objectively the co mparison of th e selected COAs. A tech nique t o present th is i nformation for the Co mmander’s consideration is th e Decision Matrix xxii. Th ese matrixes must p rovide th e flexibility to use nu merical as well as descriptive analytical approaches. The planner should be able to use either view or both to support the operational decision support requirements for Commanders and h is operational staff when considering the selection of a COA, during the decision briefing.

War gaming is a technique used to produce products from the CFOPP such as the synchronization matrix, the decision support templates and the high value/high payoff target lists. Th is event will en sure that the recommended COAs act ually wi thstand a s eries o f si mulated, se quential act ions by the ad versary and confirm the own forces actions. Significant factors i dentified during war gaming are used in t he decision matrix. The staff may weigh certain factors that are considered to be more important than others.

The decision matrix can be complex or simple using either a numerical analysis method or a descriptive method. The appropriate method is selected based on the desires and comfort of the commander and the staff. Ov er time, th e planning staff will gen erate a sen se of t he C ommander’s preferences an d use the appropriate view to support the decision briefing. The decision matrix should yield enough information to distinguish bet ween the different C OAs and clearly allow the comm ander t o select the prefe rred COA, which will end up forming the basis of the operational plan.

6.2 Use Cases The descriptive vi ew al lows t he pl anner t o de fine t he a dvantages an d di sadvantages of a cert ain COA against weighed a criteria s et. A numerical view provides th e planner with a calcu lated result th at determines the order from best to worst.

The descriptive an alysis allo ws planners t o elicit a dvantages and disadvantages of each COA, regarding each criterion. Each advantage and disadvantage has its own weight of importance, inside the evaluation of a criterion. Consi dering the weight of importance of ea ch criteri on containing a set of a dvantages and disadvantages, COAs are compared.


act Decision Matrix

«loop»Analyse each COA

«loop»Ev aluate each Criterion

Define Adv antages

Define Disadv antages

Compare COAs

Figure 10 – Descriptive Analysis – Activity Diagram

The numerical analysis allows planners to evaluate, by giving a score on each COA/criterion combo. Some COA/criterion com bo could also be e valuated autom atically by the system. Based on weight of each criterion, COAs are compared.

act Numerical Analysis

«loop»Analyse each COA

«loop»Analyse each criterion

Define COA/Criterionscore

Compare COAs

Figure 11 – Numerical Analysis – Activity Diagram

Some planners prefer to use the descriptive method. Others prefer the numerical method. Decision matrix provides a view on each method. Views are not exclusive, i.e. both views can be used to compare COA.

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7 Plan Management

7.1 Description Planning i s a continuous e ffort i n a n operational l evel headquarters (arguably at an y fo rmation l evel headquarters). Activities and outputs are app licable to each stage of the CF OPP and may vary in nature and detail, depending on t he circumstances, such as time, complexity or shee r size of the problem to be resolved. There is a difference between deliberate and rapid response planning:

“Rapid response planning is the m ethod by which the mission is ide ntified, a solution is selected, a plan is developed, and operational directives are issued (that is a C ampaign Plan or OP O). By contrast, del iberate planning is the method by which a possible or probable mission is identified, a po tential solution is selected, a broad plan is developed, and a plan is produced.” xxiii

The issuing of a Warning Order in anticipation of implementation by the CDS is a result of rapid response planning while del iberate pl anning res ults i n t he p roduction o f a plan t hat w ould be held i n reserve fo r future use (Contingency Plan or CONPLAN). By havi ng an ext ensive a rray of C ONPLANs a vailable, t he o perational com mander w ould be ab le t o expedite the issuing of t imely orders should he act ivate rapid response planning in response to a m ission similar to one already addressed in a C ONPLAN. Deliberate pl anning ca n cha nge t o rapi d res ponse planning at any point in the process. Any time the degree of urgency changes during planning; the staff can go from one process to the other. The operational staff could begin planning, using the deliberate planning method and then, switch to rapid response or cri sis action planning on direction from the G overnment or the CDS, or because of some critical event, such as a request from the UN or NATO. xxiv This section will d efine an ap proach to m anage Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Co ntingency Plan (CONPLAN), which will greatly en hance t he co mmander’s ab ility to tran sition from d eliberate t o time constrained, rapid response planning.

7.2 Use Cases CF-OPP can be performed to prepare a plan to address a s pecific situation to be executed within a specific time period. Th is Operational Plan (OPLAN) “is a co mplete and detailed plan that identified the specific forces, functional support, and resources necessary to implement the plan”xxv.

Plans can als o be prepa red to address a poten tial situation. Often those situations require quick reactions and do no t all ow en ough time to sk etch plans that c onsider all el ements. Due o perational t empo a nd rapidly chan ging situations, decisions i n a cri sis pl anning co ntext a re enabled wi th t he de velopment o f Contingency Pl ans (C ONPLAN). Examples o f co ntingency plans a re Ter rorist attacks, Non-Combat Evacuation plans or Humanitarian Disaster related to environmental conditions… Normally, CONPLANs are de veloped generically. Thi s m eans t hat pot ential t asks are i dentified an d m ay be assi gned t o u nits. Also, the mission analysis cannot be completed in detail compared to an OPLAN because elements of the mission cannot be identified (ex. Location, threat…).

Some CONPLANs can be developed in more detail to prepare for a specific type of event. For exam ple: BC Earthquake, Manitoba Floods, Major Air Disaster...

CONPLANs can be considered as templates for plans. When a specific situation happens, if a CONPLAN exists, a plan is created based on a C ONPLAN. Planners need to add the detailed information to create plan.

CONPLANs can be created to address potentially new t hreats/situations or can be created based on after action reviews of past situations, in order to take full advantage of the strengths and to avoid/mitigate any of the weak nesses of pre vious operat ions.


CONPLANs are defined following the same process as OPLANs, i.e. t hey follow the CF-OPP. T hey are developed in an unstressed context. In fact, the planners are as t ime-constrained to produce the plan. All alternatives may be analysed without t he pressure t hat wo uld be p resent du ring cri sis act ion pl anning. CONPLAN can be created from scratch or by copying from another whole or partial (branch plan, sequel plan or COA) OPLAN or CONPLAN.

act Plan Management

Create d from

OPP

- D

elib

erat

e pl

anni

ngO

PP

- C

ONP

LAN Define CONPLAN

CONPLAN

Situ ati on happens

CONPLAN exists Create plan based onCONPLAN

Detail planCreate plan from scratch(OPLAN)

Approve plan (order)

Plan

Order Execute Order

another CONPLAN

an OPLAN

scratch

«flow»

«flow»

Yes

No

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

Figure 12 – Plan Management – Activity Diagram

Both OPLAN and CONPLAN are developed following CF-OPP. The campaign plan allows grouping tasks under decisive po int with objectives alon g a lin e of o peration a nd al lows c reating branch plans.

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During the COA development and plan development phases, tasks are detailed. Resources, space and time are allocated.

The seq uence of task s in time may b e si mplified by th e use of Gantt ch arts. Acco rding to in formation related to decisive points, grouping a set o f tasks, the Gantt chart will p rovide the capability to filter t asks according t o Line of Operations. In t his way, planners can focus on thei r related tasks with fe wer extraneous objects in the Gantt (tasks relat ed to othe r line of operations). This implies that each task is related to a decisive point.

In the same way, branch plans defined during the decisive point analysis could appear in the Gantt chart by using d ecision p oint co mmutators, rep resenting co nditions fo r tak ing alternative p aths (d o not con fuse decision points wi th deci sive points). I n this manner, planners could use deci sion points to expand and collapse tasks related to decisive points of the branch plan.


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8 Risk Management

8.1 Description The purpose of risk management for CF operations is to effectively identify, analyze, evaluate and control all types of risk. Its key aim is to ensure that significant risks are i dentified and that appropriate action is taken to minimize these risks, balanced against operational objectives. Risk management functions must be incorporated into the CF OPP, in order to support decision makers at all levels.

Risk management is an essential p art o f the CF OPP th at assists d ecision makers in determin ing how to reduce or offset ri sk an d t o make i nformed deci sions t hat wei gh risks agai nst m ission benefits. It i s a methodology that assists in the identification of the optimum course of action (COA) and ensures that the implications o f resi dual risks are u nderstood a nd c ommunicated. R isk m anagement, a com mander’s responsibility wh ich can not be delegated, must b e fu lly in tegrated in to th e planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Risk management consi sts of ri sk asse ssment (t hreat i dentification and assessment) and risk m itigation ( develop controls, m ake deci sions, i mplement cont rols, su pervise and review).

The risk m anagement p rocess itself co mprises 14 steps, organized i nto fiv e ph ases; as illu strated i n th e Annex A – Risk Management Process. The approaches used to incorporate Risk Management as a tool are identified in the following use cases.

8.2 Use Cases

8.2.1 Use Case 1 - Identify relevant threats This use case will begin during the orientation stage and will be based on an initial analysis of the mission (step 1 of the Risk Management process). The use case will include both Risk Management process steps 2 and 3 as follows:

8.2.1.1 Risk Management Step 2 - List Threats Threats (and factors t hat c ould generate t hreats) are i dentified ba sed o n t he m ission a nd ass ociated vulnerabilities. Th e ou tput of th is step is a summary of inh erent threats or adv erse co nditions, which is developed by listing t he t hreats associ ated with eac h p hase of t he operation. It i s im portant t o remain sharply focused on the specific steps in th e operation – limit ing the list to "b ig picture" threats. Friendly centres of gravity must b e carefu lly ex amined for any critical v ulnerability. Th reats may b e track ed on paper or in a computer spreadsheet/database system in order to organize ideas and serve as a rec ord of the analysis for future use (Risk Management Worksheet).

Chapter 5 of the MDA reportxxvi proposes a logical manner to express a cause-effect relationship by using a four-part s tructured “ risk s tatement” w hen id entifying a risk : “As a resu lt of < one or more definite causes>, a n < uncertain event> may occur, whic h would lead to < one or more effects> on a m ission < objective(s)>”

From the preceding, we m ay establish some fundamental observations with regard to the identification of threats and causes:

The occurrence of an uncertain threat event is the basis for risk. The identification and proper linking of threat event information is a crucial aspect of establishing risk levels relative to an operation.

Risk management must support decision making. Some of the most common instances of decision making involve the comparison, the selection and the refinement of COAs. Threat events must therefore be linked down to individual COAs at the very least, and possibly even down to constituent elements such as COA tasks.


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A threat event results in negative effects on an objective. A threat event should therefore also be linked to a mission objective. An objective can be embodied in several aspects of t he operational level campaign design i tself such as C oG, one or m ore DP, (possibly t hrough CC, CR, CV, constraint/restraint, desired end-state). Objectives can be either predefined or dynamically determined at the beginning of the planning cycle.

One possible set o f generic operational plan objectives related to Capabilities might include the following five Land Operational Functions:

• Command (understand, visualize, plan, direct, lead, etc…);

• Sense (reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, target acquisition, etc…);

• Act (Influence by kinetic and non-kinetic means, speed, precision, tempo, cohesion, synchronization of actions, etc.);

• Shield (m aintain m ission legiti macy an d ex ternal supp ort, sup port of th e co alition me mbers, force protection, Opsec, C-Int, etc.); and

• Sustain (logistics, personnel, etc.).

Any newly d efined threat wo uld th erefore b e link ed to one (o r m ore) o f th ese cap abilities, wh ich are considered essential for the operational effectiveness of a force executing any land operation type.

8.2.1.2 Risk Management Step 3 - List Causes The next step i s to make a l ist of the causes associated wit h each threat identified in St ep two. Although a threat may have multiple causes, it is paramount to identify the root cause(s). Risk con trols will generally be much effective when applied to root causes.

Threat events can occur as a result of one or more causes. It is th erefore essen tial to link one or more causes to each threat event. Each cause may have a different probability of occurrence and may result in a different ne gative ef fect (se verity) on t he o bjective. Th is m eans that the ris k anal yst must assign a probability (P) and severity (S) value for each threat – cause pair.


Figure 13 – Identify Threats – Use Case Diagram

Preconditions: Step 1 - Analyze the Mission

The mission is analysed by:

• Reviewing operation plans and orders describing the mission;

• Defining requirements and conditions to accomplish the tasks;

• Constructing a list or chart depicting the major phases of the operation normally in time sequence; and

• Breaking the operation down into "bite-size" chunks.

Trigger: OPP stage II (Orientation) initiated.

8.2.1.3 Observations and comments The risk planner must provide the following information:

Table 5 – Information Elements for Risk Management (step 2 & 3)

Serial Attribute to be created, selected or edited by user details

Step 2 Threat-event-item A na rrative d escription of the u ncertain event that would result in a negative effect of an objective.

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Serial Attribute to be created, selected or edited by user details

Step 2 Mission-objective-item User selects from a li st of p re-defined mission obj ectives upon which th is ev ent will have a negative effect (LINK).

Step 2 COA-item User checks a box next to the one, or more relevant COAs, ind icating th at th is t hreat event will influ ence th e selected COAs (LINK).

Step 3 Event-cause-item For eac h T hreat-event-item, the user will create one or m ore causes. The se are narrative desc riptions a nd ar e l inked bac k to the object threat-event-item (LINK).


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8.2.2 Use Case 2 - Assess initial risk A threat event arising from one cause may result in a different risk level than the same threat event arising from a different cause. This means that the level of risk (effect) should be determined for each threat event – threat cause pair. Steps 4 and 5 described below indicate that the severity and probability of the threat are to be done at the level of the threat ev ent itself. Reco mmendation is to assess sev erity and probability values at th e “threat-cause pair” le vel, and to aggre gate the res ulting risk values up to the “threat” leve l. Th e reason for th is recommendation is so that the mitigation controls may be determined at th e “threat-cause pair” level, and because the risk level of a threat event may be dependent on its cause.

Each threat-cause pair identified in Risk Management process steps 2 and 3 is now assessed for probability of occu rrence and severity. Probability is the esti mate o f th e lik elihood th at a th reat-cause will o ccur (an e vent) a nd cause a n i mpact on t he m ission objective. Som e t hreat-causes occur fre quently; ot hers almost neve r. Severity is the expected c onsequence of an ev ent in term s o f d egree of i njury, prop erty damage, or other m ission-impairing fact ors (s uch as l oss of c ombat p ower). T he se verity val ue m ay be dependent upon the ca use of the threat-event, and is therefore dete rmined at the level of the t hreat-cause pairing as well.

The risk level that is to be assigned to the threat-event is th erefore an aggregation of the ind ividual risk levels arising from each threa t-cause. The maximum threat-cause risk value is “p romoted” to the level of the threat-event.

The result of this initial risk assessment allows prioritization of threats (and their specific causes) based on risk. The number one risk is th e one with the greatest potential impact on the mission. However, the least risky issue may still deserve some attention and, possibly, risk control action. It must be kept in mind that this priority lis ting is i ntended for use as a guide to the relative p riority of the risks inv olved, not as an absolute order to be followed. There may be, for example, something that is not a significant risk but that is extremely simple to control.

8.2.2.1 Risk Management Step 4 – Asses Threat (initial) Severity.

Determine the severity of each th reat-cause in ter ms of its poten tial impact on the mission, expose d personnel, and ex posed equipment. Severity categories are d efined to provide a qu alitative measure of the worst cre dible out come resu lting fr om ext ernal i nfluence (suc h as c ombat o r t errorist act ion; pe rsonnel error; en vironmental condi tions; design inadequacies; procedural defic iencies; or sy stem, subsy stem, or component failure or malfunction).

8.2.2.2 Risk Management Step 5 - Assess Threat (initial) Probability.

Determine the probability that the threat-cause will occur causing an event of the severity assessed in Step 4. Probability may be determined through experienced-based estimates or derived from research, an alysis and evaluation of historical data from similar missi ons and system s. The typical e vent sequence is a complicated p rocess with unclear and co mplex tri ggers. Supporting rationale fo r assig ning a probability should be documented for future reference.

8.2.2.3 Risk Management Step 6 - Complete (initial) Risk Assessment.

Combine sev erity an d probability esti mates to form a risk assessmen t fo r each threat-cause. When combining t he p robability o f o ccurrence with sev erity, Th e Risk Assessment Ma trix is u sed t o assi st in identifying the level of ri sk. Existing databases and/or a panel of personnel experienced with the mission and threats can also be used to help complete the risk assessment.


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8.2.2.4 Output of (initial) Risk Assessment. The outcome of the risk assessment process is a prioritized list o f threats. The highest priority threat is th e most serious one to the mission. T he last is the leas t serious ris k of any conseque nce. The res ults are represented in the Risk Management Worksheet and the Risk Score Matrix.

The Risk Assessment report should be accessible at all times and includes a text/graphical representation of initial risk , sho wing risk levels fo r each Affected Mission Obj ective within each COA, o r t he inv erse (showing the risk level of each COA for each Mission Objective).

Table 6 – Possible summarized information table for Risk Management by COA (step 3-6)

Threat-event-item

(Step 2)

Event-cause-item

(Step 3)

Si (event-cause-item)

(Step 4)

Pi (event-cause-item)

(Step 5)

Ri (event-cause-item)

(Step 6a)

Ri (threat-event-item)

(Step 6b)

E1 C1.1 Si1.1 Pi1.1 Ri1.1

E1 C1.2 Si1.2 Pi1.2 Ri1.2

E1 C1.3 Si1.3 Pi1.3 Ri1.3

E1 Max value from (Ri1.1, Ri1.2, Ri1.3)

Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.

Figure 14 – Initial Risk Display Example

8.2.2.5 Risk Assessment Pitfalls. The following pitfalls should be avoided during the assessment:

• Over optimism: "It can't happe n to us. We're alread y d oing it.” Th is pitfall resu lts from n ot b eing totally honest and not looking for root causes of the threats ;

• Misrepresentation: Individual perspectives may distort data. This can be deliberate or unconscious ;

• Alarmism: "T he sk y is fallin g" ap proach, o r "wo rst case" esti mates are u sed reg ardless of th eir possibility;

• Indiscrimination: All data are given equal weight ;

• Prejudice: Subjectivity and/or hidden agendas are used instead of facts ;

• Inaccuracy: Bad or misunderstood data nullifies accurate risk assessment;

• Enumeration: It is difficult to assign a numerical value to human behaviour;

• Numbers may oversimplify real life situations ;

• It may be difficult to get enough applicable data. This could forces inaccurate estimates;

• Numbers often take the place of reasoned judgment; and

• Risk can be unrealistically traded off against benefit by relying solely on numbers.


Figure 15 – Assess Initial Risk – Use Case Diagram

8.2.3 Use Case 3 - Identify relevant risk controls

8.2.3.1 Risk Management Step 7A - Develop Controls. After eac h threat is assesse d, one or m ore controls are developed, which ei ther el iminate t he t hreat or reduce the risk associated with it. Controls are used to reduce risk levels in line with the commander's risk guidance. Examples of criteria for establishing effective controls are listed in the table below:

Table 7 – Criteria for Effective Controls

Criteria for Effective Controls

Control Criteria Remarks

Suitability Control removes the threat or mitigates (reduces) the residual risk to an acceptable level.

Feasibility Force/Unit has the capability to implement the control.

Acceptability Benefit gained by implementing the control justifies the cost in resources and time.

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Criteria for Effective Controls

Control Criteria Remarks

Explicitness Clearly specifies who, what, where, when, why, and how each control is to be used.

Support Adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a suitable control are available.

Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control are clear, practical, and specific.

Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a control.

Leadership Leaders are ready, willing, and able to enforce standards required to implement a control.

Individual Individual personnel are sufficiently self-disciplined to implement a control.

Some types of controls are:

• Engineering Controls. These controls use engineering methods to reduce risks, such as developing new technologies or design features, selecting better materials, identifying suitable substitute materials or equipment or adapting new technologies to existing systems. Examples of engineering controls that have been em ployed i n t he past i nclude t he de velopment of fi re c ontrol m echanisms for a rmoured vehicles, th e integration of global p ositioning system d ata in to co mmand an d co ntrol su ites an d th e fielding of night vision devices;

• Administrative Controls. These controls involve administrative actions, such as establish ing written policies, programs, instructions, and SOPS, or limiting the ex posure to a threat either by reducing the number of personnel/assets or length of time they are exposed;

• Educational and Trainin g Controls. Th ese con trols are b ased on th e knowledge and sk ills o f th e forces, units and individuals. Effective con trol is implemented through individual, collective and joint training that ensures performance to standard;

• Physical Co ntrols. T hese c ontrols m ay take t he fo rm of ba rriers a nd guards or signs t o warn individuals a nd u nits t hat a t hreat exi sts. Use o f personal prot ective e quipment, fenc es aro und high power high frequency antennas, and special controller or oversight personnel responsible for locating specific threats fall into this category; and

• Operational Contr ols. These co ntrols i nvolve operational act ions s uch as pace o f operations, battlefield co ntrols (areas of op erations and boundaries, direct fire contro l m easures, fire supp ort coordinating.

A control should mitigate the risk of a threat by one or more techniques.

• Avoidance. Ulti mately, risk avo idance may requ ire cancelling t he t ask, m ission or operation. However, this option is rarely exercised because of mission importance. Risk c an be a voided by choosing a different COA, by training to overcome an inadequacy, by inoculating against disease or by using different methods. For instance, it may be p ossible to avoid the specific risks associated with a night o peration by re -scheduling for daytime. Thu nderstorm or su rface-to-air-missile ri sks ca n be avoided by changing the flight route.

• Delay. If there is no tim e deadline or othe r operational benefit to speedy accomplishment of a task, it may be possible to reduce the risk by delaying the task. Over time, the situation may change and the risk may b e el iminated, o r ad ditional risk control options may b ecome av ailable (reso urces become available, new technology be comes available, etc.); reducing the overall risk. For example, a m ission can be postponed until more favourable weather reduces the risk to the force.


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• Transference. R isk may be reduced by t ransferring a m ission, o r som e po rtion of t hat mission, t o another unit or platform that is better positioned, more survivable, or more expendable. Transference decreases the probability or severity of the risk to the total force. For example, the decision to fly an unmanned ae rial vehi cle i nto a hi gh-risk e nvironment i nstead of risking a m anned a ircraft i s risk transference.

• Redundancy. To en sure th e su ccess of crit ical mission’s redundant capab ilities may be assign ed to compensate for po tential losses. For ex ample, tasking a u nit to deploy two aircrafts to attack a si ngle high value target increases the probability of mission success.

8.2.3.2 Observations and comments A risk may be mitigated by the creation of tasks and control measures. As a resu lt of i dentified threats/risks, a goal of risk management is to reduce or mitigate the risks by a number of methods. The CF doctrine in thi s rega rd em phasizes the nee d to id entify th e cau ses of t hreats, a nd t o develop m itigation actions t o re duce ris ks by focusing on t he causes . As a resu lt, m itigating action s can lead to task s and various other control measures that may form part of the COA/Plan. It is essential, in order to discriminate the risk between v arious COA, th at th e mitigating controls that are pl anned within each COA be l inked accordingly (ie: mitigating controls are to be linked to individual COAs that will include them).

It will b e lik ely th at fo r th e sa me th reat-cause, a different mitig ation-control may b e ap plied in each different COAs. It is therefore essential to link mitigating control items not only to a threat-cause pair, but in fact, to a specific threat-cause-COA combination. The table below illustrates a possible situation:

Table 8 – Situation example

Threat Event Cause COA Initial Risk (Ri)

Mitigating control

Residual Risk (Rr)

Second order effect of mitigating control

No CAS

(Close Air Support)

Eqpt failure

1 L Nil L

No CAS Eqpt failure

2 L Nil L

No CAS Eqpt failure

3 L Nil L

No CAS (for op in ten days)

Weather 1 M Use Fd Arty L Causes a higher risk to force protection due to mov of guns prior to start of op (loss of surprise and exposed pers/eqpt)


Weather 2 M Delay until wx clears

L Risk of losing the allocation of CAS from coalition HQ if delay too long (must cfm with Air Component HQ)


Weather 3 M Launch in next 72 hrs (good wx forecast)

L Risk increases to C2 and forces readiness (sacrificing prep time for speed of action and guaranteed air sp)


Figure 16 – Identify Risk Controls – Use Case Diagram

8.2.4 Use Case 4 - Assess residual risk

8.2.4.1 Risk Management Step 7B - Determine Residual Risk.

Once c ontrols are de veloped and a ccepted, the resi dual risk ass ociated with eac h thre at and t he ove rall residual risk for th e m ission is d etermined. Resid ual ri sk is th e risk remain ing after controls have been identified, selected and im plemented for the each t hreat. Typically, cont rols are applied until the level of residual risk matches the commander’s guidance or cannot be further reduced. The residual risk can vary for each threat d epending on th e final assessed probability and sev erity. Ov erall residual mission risk is determined b ased on th e threat h aving th e greatest resi dual risk . Determin ing overall missio n risk by averaging the risks of all threats is not valid. If one threat has high residual risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high. No matter how many moderate or low risk threats are present

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Figure 17 – Assess Residual Risk – Use Case Diagram

8.2.5 Use Case 5 - Conduct “what if” analysis Analyze effect of cha nges in risk guidance, threats and controls and be prepared to develop branch plans. As t he pl anning st aff de velop an d refine t he m ain pl an, t hey al so nee d t o exa mine t he p ossible consequences of potential and actu al ch anges in the situ ation. In th is case, th ere needs to b e a way to employ and adapt the risk management information elements during the “plan war gaming” process and to explore and adjust the previously completed steps of risk analysis / risk management.

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Figure 18 – Conduct “What if” Analysis – Use Case Diagram

Preconditions: initial steps (1 to 7) of Risk Management have been at least partially completed.

Trigger: The COA/Plan must be evaluated against potential and actual changes to the situation

8.2.6 Use Case 6 - Use the risk management knowledge base This use case involves the estab lishment and exp loitation of a R isk Management Knowledge Base (KB) that will include the storage and retrieval of risk-related information elements such as collections of threats-causes, risk assessm ents (th reat sev erity and pro bability), an d possible risk co ntrol measu res. Th is KB must be com posed o f doctrinal/historical i nformation rel ated t o s pecified m ission t ypes a nd o perating environments and conditions. Th ese will co nstitute the initial set o f risk in formation elements that staff planners ca n c onsider i n t heir a nalysis. St aff planners m ust also be a ble to create ne w or m odified in formation elements that result from their analysis and observations. Th is KB must be persistent, dynamic and contextually searchable.

The Risk KB will represent the collective “body of knowledge” at any g iven time. It w ill likely need to support b oth classified and unclassified o perating environments. Th e syste m u sers will h ave man y interactions with this use case as they perform the various steps of Risk Management process.

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Figure 19 – Use the Risk Management Knowledge Base (KB) – Use Case Diagram

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8.2.7 Example scenario This section is used to illustrate concepts related to use cases 1 to 4. To show concepts elaborated in previous sections, it may be useful to show them through a situation. The key elements of the conceptual model include following components:

• Threat: A condition with a po tential to result d iseases, injuries, dies, real damages or degradation of the missionxxvii;

• Event: A threat which appearsxxviii; • Threat-event-item: A pa rticular eve nt which a ppears a nd t hat results to a negative effect on

anything of the mission; • Event-cause-item: A particular cause contributing directly to a threat-event-item; • Mitigating-control-item: A sp ecific m easure app lied on an ev ent-cause-item to red uce eith er its

probability eit her sev erity of a th reat-event-item, th us red ucing t he level o f risk related to th e COA/Plan; and

• Mission-objective-item: A rel evant element of t he mission affected by t he risk of a s et of related threat-event-items. Th e main go al is to b e ab le to lin k th reats to a specific elem ent of the COA/Plan to be able to analyze and depict the global risk in decomposing it to at least one level of detail. This decom position may be done according to particular categories of the m ission or according to more generic categories. For example, we may choose/define a set of risk categories, based on a collection of effects, decisive points, critical capabilities etc.


The following conceptual model is used to support the risk management steps.

Figure 20 – Risk Management Process – Conceptual Model

In the following exam ple, we represe nt a c ase wh ere two COAs are st udied and we use the operational functions of the land operation for mission-objective-items:

• Command;

• Sense;

• Act;

• Shield; and

• Sustain. These fun ctions rep resent th e set o f capab ilities th at must ex ist to ex ecute th e mission su ccessfully whatever the selected COA.

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8.2.7.1 Identify threats

1: identify threat events

Figure 21 – Identify the threat events

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2: Link threat event to applicable COA(s)

Figure 22 – Link each threat-event to applicable COAs

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3: Link threat event to applicable “Mission Objective”

Figure 23 – Link each Threat-event to applicable Mission Objective

Considering an operational environment where t he mission is prepared, and where two particular Threat-event-items may influence the success of the mission:

• Threat-event-item E1: Non-availability of air surveillance aircraft;

o This threat is related to COAs 1 and 2; and

o This threat is related to the mission objective “Sense”.

• Threat-event-item E2: Severe injuries or death of non-combatants resulting from military actions of the Joint Task Force;

o This threat is related to COAs 1 and 2; and

o This threat is related to the mission objective “Sustain” (Local population support to the mission).

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8.2.7.2 Identify causes

4: determine possible causes

Figure 24 – For each Threat-event, determine possible causes

At this stage, possible caus es of eac h thre at are iden tified. Hereafter, a p artial list o f po ssible causes according to our example:

Table 9 – Possible Causes related to E1 - Example

C1.1 Non-availability o f air surv eillance aircraft du e t o broken equipments.

C1.2 Bad weather forecast (1) minimum flight conditions are not met or (2 ) sk y cov er do es no t permit a clear v isibility with th e equipment.

C1.3 Air surveillance aircrafts are used on another high priority task dictated by the higher HQ.

Table 10 – Possible Causes related to E2 - Example

C2.1 Death of a no n-combatant followi ng careful and strict application o f t argeting m easures and r ules of e ngagement by the Joint Task Force.

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C2.2 Death of a n on-combatant fol lowing an improper use of force by one or m ore members of Canadian F orces un der t he Joi nt Task Force command.

C2.3 Death of a n on-combatant fol lowing an improper use of force by o ne or mo re me mbers o f allied fo rces under th e Jo int Task Force command.

8.2.7.3 Determine the initial risk

5: For Each COA, evaluate the risk level for each “Event-Cause” combination (Severity and Probability = Risk)

6: For Each COA, determine the cumulative risk level of each “Threat-event” (use the maximum value from step 5?)

7: For Each COA, record the initial risk level of each “Threat-event”

Figure 25 – Determine the initial risk of each COA

It should be cl ear that each e vent-cause-item may result of a distinct impact (severity) and/ or probability. Thus the lev el of initial risk must be analyzed for each cause, and the level of risk resulting of each event (threat-event-item) will be determined regarding level of risk of each evaluated COAs. In this example, it is possible to conclude to the following points:

• In the case where a sp ecific COA does not depend (or marginally depends) on the availability of air surveillance aircraft, the level of risk related to the threat-event-item E1 whatever the cause is less than the level of risk under the same situation for a COA being strongly dependant to the air surveillance to ensure its success. Thus, it is generally nece ssary to associate a level of risk resulting of various events for each analyzed COA;

• In parallel, it i s possible that the same event (ex: Death of a non -combatant resulting of military action of the Joint Tas k Force “E2”) causes diff erent l evels o f ri sk d epending on t he s pecific cause. Exam ple, lo ss of l ocal p opulation support (negative effect on t he objective t o inc rease

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support of th e po pulation) may b e m ore sev ere if t he event i s a n i mproper use of force (by negligence or related to an attack having been carried out in a to wn). It is p ossible to conclude that the level of risk related to an event may vary according to the cause. It is therefore required to measure the risk resulting from each cause-event combo. The cumulative of risk resulting from a specific eve nt may be based on the m aximum value of each related level of ris k (R.1., R1.2, R1.3…). E x: R1 = M ax(R.1.1, R1.2…R.1.n) where “Rx.y” denotes the resulting risk of the “x” event caused by “y”; and

• It may be of little u se to represent only one value (cumulative) for each level of risk at the COA level or t he m ission. Thi s would not p rovide a g ood u nderstanding a bout t he key components comprising the main part of the risk. It may also be irrelevant to try to represent details of each risk components for a C OA or plan in the context of a briefing to the commander. It should be better to do a cumulative risk assessment based on a pre-established template o f categories (not more that between 5 and 10 to not weigh down a decision aid support system). To accom plish this, we m ay identify a set of categories representing positive values to the mission, and classify negative effects related to threats in those categories. In the conceptual model illustrated above, those categ ories are n amed Missio n-objective-item. To illu strate that, we are cho osing fiv e operational functions of the land operations to represent categories of i nterest (Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain).

o The level of ri sk caused by « E1 » (non-availability of UAV) is lin ked (categorized) to Mission-objective-item « Sense »; and

o The level of risk caused by « E1 » (lost of collateral lives of non-fighters) may be linked to Mission-objective-item « Sustain », because we may talk about the population support to the mission of the Joint Operational Force.

Having i dentified, analyze d and cate gorized threat s and their cause s for eac h COA, it is possible to determine the initial risk before any mitigation controls are ap plied. It cou ld be useful to be able to store this value despite the future level of risk change due to mitigation controls that we may apply to COAs.


8.2.7.4 Determine mitigation controls and residual risk

8: For each COA: determine a set of mitigating actions linked to each “Event-cause”

9: For each COA: determine and record “residual risk” of each “Threat-event”

Figure 26 – Determine the mitigating controls and the residual risk for each COA

The next steps are to develop mitigation controls which will reduce the level of risk that will i mpinge on each COA. In elaborating mitigation cont rols, there is important to address causes of each eve nt (Event-cause-time). Effective mitigation controls are linked to the causes

• For exam ple, to redu ce risk related t o non-availability o f ai r su rveillance aircraft (E1), it is possible to address two of the three identi fied causes, C1.1 – Bad weather forecast, and C1.2 – Defect of equipments.

o To counter C1.1 , the COA may include a d ecision point where the mission will not be launched until weather forecast indicates at least two favorable consecutive days. Th is mitigation c ontrol bec omes “M 1.1.1” a nd re duces t he ri sk R i1.1 i n re ducing t he probability the cause “C1.1” occurs; and

o To c ounter C 1.2, a nd reducing R i1.2, t he C OA c ould i nclude a m itigation c ontrol « M1.2.1 » where enough spare equipment would be made available before the beginning of the mission, to mitigate possible broken equipment, in reducing the probability of the cause C1.2 occurs.

Following the same cognitive pattern, it co uld be possible to determine mitigation controls (“M2.y.z”), to reduce the probability of a member of the CF or allied forces making improper use of force, by (1) ensuring appropriate training and (2) an enforced discipline for the entire Joint Task Force. When m itigation con trols are d eveloped an d id entified, it is p ossible t o determine resid ual lev el of risk based on all mitigation controls “Mx.y.z” that will be applied. Using estab lished link s b etween Mission -objective-item, C OA, Th reat-event-item, Event-ca use-item and Mitigating-control-item; it is possible to illustrate the risk through a graphic like « Mission Decomposition

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Structure – MDS”, as presented in the MDA report (figure 6.10 and 6.11 in the section 6.1.1 of the Joint Risk Management report). The diagram could have the mission as the root and each COA as the first level of branches. Each C OA c ould be decomposed i n t he way t o depict t he l evel of risk cat egorized by objective (Mission-objective-item) and showed a co lor according to the level of the risk (either computed by the system, either defined by the user following a cognitive analysis). After, fo r each Mission-COA-Objective branch, we could find threat-event-items E1, E2…Ex.

COA1

Mission / Op

Command Sense Act Shield Sustain

COA2


Risk level Extreme due to high dependency on aerial surveillance for mission success.

Can be mitigated by (1) delaying until favourable weather, (2) ensuring that equipment spares aval, and (3) guarantee that resource will not be tasked away to higher pri task.

Apply mitigation actions and re-assess risk level to moderate or low

Risk level Low due to very low dependency on aerial surveillance for mission success.

No mitigating action needed.

Non-availability of aerial surveillance for operation (effect on “Sense” capability)

Figure 27 – Non-availability of aerial surveillance

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COA1

Mission / Op


COA2


Loss of life / serious injuries to non-combatants (effect on “Sustain” capability)

Risk level Moderate due to fact that this COA will avoid populated areas, focusing instead on known and likely insurgent rallying points, and will use only well-trained, cohesive teams using precision fires only.

COA heavily dependent on accurate/timely aerial surveillance…

Risk level Extreme due to COA being conducted with new coalition partners that have not yet achieved full cohesion with our forces, in densely populated urban area, with high probability of combat operations.

Possible mitigating actions: additional combined training, conduct ops at a time where local non-combatant population is not likely to be in danger, or warn population to leave area/seek cover…

Figure 28 – Loss of life / serious injuries to non-combatants

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It could be also useful to be able to view and print a table containing that information:

Table 11 – Risk Management Matrix - Example

COA Objective Event Cause Initial Severity

Initial Probability

Initial Risk Mitigation Control

Residual Severity

Residual Probability

Residual Risk

1 Command 1 Sense E1 C1.1 Si1.1 Pi1.1 Ri1.1 M1.1.1 Sr1.1 Pr1.1 Rr1.1 1 Sense E1 C1.2 Si1.2 Pi1.2 Ri1.2 M1.2.1 Sr1.2 Pr1.2 Rr1.2 1 Sense E1 C1.3 Si1.3 Pi1.3 Ri1.3 M1.3.1 Sr1.3 Pr1.3 Rr1.3 1 Act 1 Shield 1 Sustain E2 C2.1 Si2.1 Pi2.1 Ri2.1 M2.1.1 Sr2.1 Pr2.1 Rr2.1 1 Sustain E2 C2.2 Si2.2 Pi2.2 Ri2.2 M2.2.1 Sr2.2 Pr2.2 Rr2.2 1 Sustain E2 C2.3 Si2.3 Pi2.3 Ri2.3 M2.3.1 Sr2.3 Pr2.3 Rr2.3 2 Command 2 Sense E1 C1.1 Si1.1 Pi1.1 Ri1.1 M1.1.1 Sr1.1 Pr1.1 Rr1.1 2 Sense E1 C1.2 Si1.2 Pi1.2 Ri1.2 M1.2.1 Sr1.2 Pr1.2 Rr1.2 2 Sense E1 C1.3 Si1.3 Pi1.3 Ri1.3 M1.3.1 Sr1.3 Pr1.3 Rr1.3 2 Act 2 Shield 2 Sustain E2 C2.1 Si2.1 Pi2.1 Ri2.1 M2.1.1 Sr2.1 Pr2.1 Rr2.1 2 Sustain E2 C2.2 Si2.2 Pi2.2 Ri2.2 M2.2.1 Sr2.2 Pr2.2 Rr2.2 2 Sustain E2 C2.3 Si2.3 Pi2.3 Ri2.3 M2.3.1 Sr2.3 Pr2.3 Rr2.3


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8.2.7.5 Information displays In cha pter 5 o f the MDA reportxxix, the re a re exam ples of displays s uch as “Critical Risk Pat h” a nd “Mission Decomposition Structure”. These are use ful tools to represent risk within a COA in relation to the risks associated to each task. However, a de composition of COA risk down t o individual tasks is probab ly impractical except i n a case of hi ghly t ime-unconstrained planning. In m ost cas es, the i dentification and linking of threats, causes , mitigating contro ls to COAs an d m ission capability ele ments (o bjectives su ch as DP, CC an d more g eneral capability categ ories su ch as th e Lan d Operations Operational Fun ctions (C ommand, Sen se, Act, Sh ield and Sustain); will lik ely b e su fficient for co mmanders and sta ff to und erstand th e m ain risk factors at p lay. Th e additional level of effort required for a more detailed linkage down to tasks, subtasks, and actions is likely too great for the added benefit of su ch a represen tation, and without this add itional linkage. It is not useful to use a Gan tt chart-like “critical risk path” or Hierarchical Task Network diagram such as a “Mission Decomposition Structure”. The use of a dependency graph method such as presented at fig 6.10 of the MDA reportxxx is also beyond the scope for a general staff planning team. However, all the methods proposed could perhaps be supported by specialist staff such as OR sc ientists deployed forw ard, or integrate d via “reach-back” collaborative planning mechanisms. The MDS could also be modified as depicted in the Identify causes section. These m ethods might also be useful in the context of post-operational analysis as a means to build a Risk management knowledge base.


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9 Links with Execution Management Tool

9.1 Description As part of the JCDS Suite of applications, the Execution Management and Plan Adaptation (EMPA) application is the system used t o monitor and manage orders at an o perational l evel. Orders are t he manifestation of t he final approved pl ans and deci sions. Whe n pl ans are devel oped an d pr oduced wi th C OPlanS, t heir exec ution ca n be managed by EMPA. JCDS p rovides an environment t o exchange i nformation between these sy stems. Usi ng t he JCDS co mmunication facility, COPlan S’ plans and EMPA’s orders can be sy nchronized. In th e sam e way, COPlanS produces supporting documents related to developed plans where they can be shared and retrieved from the JCDS document repository. The seamless integration of these applications supports the concept of time-sensitive planning and execution.

COPlanS information is currently consumed by EMPA but it could also be consumed by other systems on the JCDS platform such as the Commander’s Handheld Support System (CHESS) or TRV).

9.2 Use Cases

9.2.1 Plan synchronization Using C OPlanS, th e jo int operational planning cell d evelops plans to d eal with sp ecific op erational situ ations. When the operational plan is approved by the commander, i t is disseminated as an operational order (OpO). The order i s e xecuted by t he operational f orces un der com mand of t he J oint Task Force C ommander (JTFC) a nd monitored by the joint operations centre through the EMPA.

As the curre nt situation evolves over tim e, the conduct of the operation may not confor m to th e ex pectations in which it has been initially planned. In monitoring the execution of the operation guided by the operational order, the operations cell will identify and react to di screpancies. Depending on the scope of change between the plan and evolving op erational situ ation, a d ecision to re-p lan the ope ration m ay have t o be made by t he JTFC u pon recommendation of the joint operations cell. In this case, the joint planning cell is notified to redo the plan partially or entirely. An issued order will not normally be modified. To amend an order, another order must be issued. The Fragmentary Order (FragO) is used to amend an order. A new Operational Order (OpO) could also be i ssued to replace an existing order entirely.

The new order/amendment is executed and monitored and may require another re-planning if the situation changes again. This is done until the operation is executed completely.

Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description sd Execution Management Tool Interaction

EMPACOPlanS

Start P lanning

Dev elop plan according toOPP

Plan

Execute Order

Operational Order (OpO)

New Situation

Start M ission

Monitor Execution

Initial S ituation

Discrepanciesbetween the orderand the situation

Requ irere-pla nning

Repl anni ng request

Replanning

Modifie d Plan

Fragment Order (FragO)

Adapt order executionaccording to the new

situation

Start Re planning

Order Executed

Planning cell

Op Ce ll«flow»

«flow»

«flow»

Approved plan

«flow»

«flow»

Approved Amendment

No

As planned

«flow»

Discrepancies

Yes

«flow»

«flow»

Figure 29 – Execution Management – Activity Diagram

9.2.2 Documents sharing COPlanS produces several documents related to planned operations (ex. briefs). The JCDS environment provides the capability to share documents with other applications. In re-using this JCDS document management capability, COPlanS can send its documents on the JCDS repository.

9.2.3 Geo-reference reusing COPlans may use any WMS server. JCDS provides a WMS server for all JCDS GIS applications. COPlanS may connect to the same GIS ser ver to handle i ts information on c ommon digitized maps and other geo data (such as shapefiles).

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10 Conclusion The objective of this work was to develop a c omputer based prototype supporting a t ime-constrained operational planning process. Building up on previous work that investigated concepts for support to decision making and the operational planning p rocess; this document develops these various approaches, supported by a re view of rel ated doctrinal concepts and use c ases. Mock-ups have been implemented in to COPlanS to d emonstrate the in tegration and the visualization of th ese different concepts to improve effective, adaptive, time-sensitive planning within the CFOPP. Specifically, the following concepts were investigated and implemented:

• Dynamic link management of planning elements;

• Center of Gravity analysis tool;

• Decisive Point analysis tool;

• Criteria management tool;

• Decision-Matrix Management tool;

• Plan (including OPLAN, CONPLAN, Branch plan and sequel plans) management;

• Risk management tool; and

• Links with Execution Management.

The concepts presented in this study have been successfully implemented into the COPLanS framework as a means of meeting the objectives of this effort. The d emonstration of ev ery concepts identified above were l everaged on DRDC COPlanS (Collaborative Operations Planning System). COPlanS is a c omputer-based system developed at DRDC Valcartier to support the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP). It is an integrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid and workflow management tools aimed at supporting a distributed team involved in the planning of military operations. Th e implementation and demonstration of these new features was successful. Each approach identified was validated by the scientific authority.

Once validated by the military community, the implementation of these concepts, into a fu lly operational planning and decision-making too l, will en able greater flex ibility and ad aptability to th e p lanners an d co mmanders; at the operational lev el, in supp orting tim e-constrained op erational planning. An in itial v alidation of t hese to ols was conducted in October 2008. Based on a Vancouver 2010 Olympic scenario, the implementation of th ese tools into COPlanS was successfully used to demonstrate time-constrained planning concepts.

It is an ticipated that th is stu dy will op en up fu ture i nvestigations and im plementations within th e C OPlanS framework t hat will lead to further im provements, in t he area of op erational p lanning an d supp ort to decision making.


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11 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 1

1Cdn Air Div............................................................................................................................1 Canadian Air Division

A

AAR .............................................................................................................................................. After Action Review

B

BC ....................................................................................................................................................... British Colombia

C

CAS ................................................................................................................................................... Close Air Support

CC ..................................................................................................................................................... Critical Capability

CCIR ........................................................................................................ Commander’s Critical Information Requests

CF......................................................................................................................................................... Canadian Forces

CFACC......................................................................................................Canadian Forces Air Component Command

CFOPP.................................................................................................. Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process

CHESS ............................................................................................................. Commander Handheld Support System

COA ....................................................................................................................................................Course Of Action

COG ...................................................................................................................................................Centre Of Gravity

COM............................................................................................................................................................... Command

CONOPS ................................................................................................................................. CONcept of OPerationS

CONPLAN......................................................................................................................................... Contingency Plan

COPlanS ...................................................................................................... Collabarative Operations Planning System

CR ................................................................................................................................................. Critical Requirement

CV .................................................................................................................................................Critical Vulnerability

D

DM ...................................................................................................................................................... Decision Making

DP................................................................................................................................ Decisive Points, Decisive Points

DRDC....................................................................................................... Defence Reseach and Development Canada

E

EMPA.......................................................................................................Execution Management and Plan Adaptation

F

FCOA ...................................................................................................................................Friendly Cource Of Action

FragO................................................................................................................................................ Fragmentary Order

G

GIS ...............................................................................................................................Geographic Information System

H

HVT................................................................................................................................................... High Value Target


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J

JCDS 21............................................................................................... Joint Command Decision Support 21th Century

JTFC.................................................................................................................................Joint Task Force Commander

K

KB ........................................................................................................................................................Knowledge Base

L

LL.......................................................................................................................................................... Lesson Learned

M

MDA .....................................................................................................MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Limited

MDS .......................................................................................................................... Mission Decomposition Structure

N

NATO....................................................................................................................North Atlantic Threaty Organization

O

OPLAN................................................................................................................................................. Operational Plan

OpO ....................................................................................................................................................Operational Order

OPP ................................................................................................................................. Operational Planning Process

P

PPOFC.................................................................... Processus de Planification Opérationelle des Forces Canadiennes

R

R&D .................................................................................................................................... Research and Development

RDDC........................................................................................... Recherche et Dévelopment pour la Defense Canada

T

TDP .....................................................................................................................Technological Demonstrator Program

TRV.........................................................................................................................................Total Resource Visibility

U

UML...................................................................................................................................Unified Modeling Language

UN............................................................................................................................................................ United Nation

W

WMS .................................................................................................................................................. Web Map Service


Annex A – Risk Management Process

Figure 30 – Risk Management process for CF Operations

From the CF risk management doctrinexxxi:

• “Threat” is defined as a co ndition with th e potential to result in illness, injury, death, property damage, or mission degradation;

• “Cause” is defined as something that produces an effect, result or consequence.;

• “Event” is defined as a threat that occurs; and

• “Risk” is defined as the chance of injury or loss, expressed in terms of probability of occurrence and the severity of its consequences.

From the preceding definitions, it can be seen that a logical link exists between threats, causes, events and risks.

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Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description As illustrated by the following figures, risk management is a continuous element of mission planning and execution and is a component of every stage of the CF OPP.

Figure 31 – Continuous application of Risk Management

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Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description Table 12 – Risk Management in CF-OPP

Page 75

Identify Threats. During the initial assessment of the higher headquarters’ order/plan an initial review of the threats that could be encountered is also conducted. This evaluation examines whether there will be appropriate time to prepare for the mission, conditions of the forces available, availability of strategic lift (if required) and other factors.

Figure 32 – Initiation Stage of CF OPP


Assess Risk. The commander and staff identify potential risks based on staff analysis and make an initial assessment of the risk level (extremely high, high, medium or low) for each risk. The commander also makes an initial assessment of where he might accept greater risk in executing his mission. Alone, the commander must decide of the level of acceptable risk that he is willing to take to succeed. If a commander assesses that the potential risk is too great; he directs the development of additional controls or he modifies, changes, or rejects the mission.

Figure 33 – Orientation Stage of CF OPP

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Risk. Of course, any consideration of COAs needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the level of risk that is acceptable and/or inherent in carrying out the operation. Risk needs to be analyzed in terms of:

(1) The mission itself (benign environment or not, forward presence versus risk of provocation);

(2) Force protection requirements (for example risk of casualties, fratricide, terrorism and risk to own CoG); and

(3) The level of risk that the commander is willing to accept.

Figure 34 – COA Development Stage of CF OPP

Management of Risk Information In the process of conducting risk management in support of and within the OPP, th e CF doctrine manual identifies the requirement to discern and organize a number of risk related information elements. These information elements are created by commander a nd staff anal ysis and sy nthesis of t he mission environment. The C F doctrine manual specifies a Risk Assessment Matrix used to d etermine the level of risk based on threat probability and severity, as well as two meth ods to organize the relevant information elements resulting from the risk a nalysis process. T hese are illustrated and further described below.

Risk Assessment Matrix The Risk Assessment Matrix co mbines severity an d pro bability v alues to fo rm a risk assessm ent for each threat instance. The Risk Assessment Matrix can be use d to evaluate the acceptability of a ri sk, and the level at which the decision on acceptability will be made. The matrix may also be used to prioritize resources, to resolve risks, or to standardize threat notification or response actions. Severity, probability and risk assessment should be recorded to serve as a record of the analysis for future use.

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Operational Decision Making Support - Operational Concept Description Table 13 – Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Definitions:

• E - Ex tremely High Risk : If th ese th reats o ccur during th e m ission, it will most likely fail wit h sev ere consequences to personnel and equipment or operational objective(s). The ability to accomplish the mission will be lost;

• H – Hi gh Risk: If th ese th reats occur during the mission, a sig nificant degradation of capability in terms o f achieving the required opera tional ob jective(s), the inabi lity to acco mplish all parts of the m ission, or the inability to complete the mission to standard; will occur;

• M – Moderate Risk: If th ese threats occur during mission, the expected degradation of mission capability, in terms of achi eving the required operational objective(s), accomplishing all parts of the mission, or completing the mission to standard; will occur. An unlikely probability of catastrophic loss exists; and

• L – Low Risk: Expected losses or effects have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission.

Severity Categories: The following table outlines severity categories:

Table 14 – Risk Severity Categories

Risk Severity Categories Category Definition CATASTROPHIC (I) Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent disability. Loss

of political support or coalition effectiveness. Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property (facility) damage. Severe environmental damage. Mission-critical security failure. Unacceptable collateral damage.

CRITICAL (II) Significantly degraded mission capability, unit readiness, or personal disability. Damage to political support or coalition effectiveness. Extensive damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property or the environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage.

MARGINAL (III) Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor impact on political support of coalition effectiveness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel.

NEGLIGIBLE (IV) Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. No adverse affect on political support or coalition effectiveness. First aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.

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Probability Categories: The following table outlines probability categories for the risk assessment matrix:

Table 15 – Risk Probability Categories

Element Exposed Definition FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur several times over duration of a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation, or over a service life. Individual Occurs very often. Expected to occur several times during mission or operation. All personnel exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation.

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur during a specific mission or

operation. Fleet or inventory of items Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally often). Individual Occurs several times. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation. All personnel exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically Single item Occurs sometime in service life. May occur about as often as not during a specific

mission or operation. Fleet or inventory of items Occurs several times in service life. Individual Occurs over a period of time. May occur during a specific mission or operation, but not

often. All personnel exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not expected to occur during a specific

mission or operation. Fleet or inventory of items Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur sometime in service life, but rarely.

Usually does not occur. Individual Occurs as isolated incident. Remotely possible, but not expected to occur during a

specific mission or operation. All personnel exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated incidents.

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur in service life. Can

assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation. Fleet or inventory of items Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents may occur over service life. Individual Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur during a specific mission or

operation. All personnel exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.

Risk Management Worksheets The Risk Management Worksheet is illu strated below and is u sed to co llect and record the principal in formation elements related to the risk management process during both the planning and execution phases.


Figure 35 – Risk Management Worksheet

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Page 81

Notes:

This worksheet is meant to be the result of an ongoing collaborative analysis, and must be able to dynamically display the “recognized” risk picture for any authorized user.

It may be useful and/or necessary to store and retrieve the information as it existed at various stages of planning and execution (for “lessons learned” and later analysis and review).

Any new i nformation elem ent add ed b y t he user, su ch as: th reat (i ncluding asso ciated sev erity and pro bability values), root cause and/or control information, should be collected and considered for addition to the risk knowledge base (KB).

The threat list is to be derived from human knowledge and experience and should be supported by a fully searchable risk KB containing historical and “standard” information sets, with advanced search parameters based on recognized mission environment attributes.

Not shown on the form, but stipulated in the doctrine, there is the need to also identify the root cause(s) for each of the individual threats. These could also be listed on the worksheet.

The “Initial level of risk” could be determined with the aid of the computer-assisted computations resulting from a determination of threat severity and probability. The system could propose a reasonable value for both severity and probability associated with the particular threat under consideration from its KB. B ut, this must be validated and/or modified by the user.

The “Mitigating Controls” could also be proposed by the risk KB, and/or modified/added by the user.

The “resi dual risk” ele ment can be co mputed by sy stem as a resu lt of t he effe ct of a “cont rol”, a nd/or added/modified by user.

“How to implement?” and “How to supervise?” could be linked to a task or a coordinating instruction element of the COA/Plan.

“Controls effective?” could be linked to an execution phase control measure and to the After-Action-Review (AAR) and Lessons Learned (LL) components of the overall system.

Risk Score Matrix

The Risk Score Matrix is i llustrated below an d is used t o synthesize t he i nformation c ontained i n t he R isk Management Worksheet and to represent an aggregated view of mission/FCOA risk levels. It also serves as a tool to represent the comparison of risk levels between FCOAs under consideration or to illustrate the effect of risk controls on a particular FCOA. Its use is explained in the CF Risk Management for CF Operations manualxxxii.


Figure 36 – Risk Score Matrix

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Figure 37 – Risk Score Matrix - Example

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Annex B - References

i OP Decision Making Support - Preliminary Functional Architecture.doc – Thales 2008 ii 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008 iii OP Decision Making Support - Preliminary Functional Architecture.doc – Thales 2008 iv 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008 v B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CANADACOM CONOPS vi OP Decision Making Support - Preliminary Functional Architecture.doc – Thales 2008 vii 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008 viii B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CANADACOM CONOPS ix OP Decision Making Support - Preliminary Functional Architecture.doc – Thales 2008 x 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008 xi OP Decision Making Support - Preliminary Functional Architecture.doc – Thales 2008 xii 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008 xiii B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, April 2008 xiv B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, April 2008 xv SOW-Investigation of time-constraint operational planning-v1b.pdf xvi Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Dr J. Strange and Col R. Iron, USMC Paper xvii JCDS21Worshop-Feb08-Concepts to support Operational DM-v1-with page numbers.ppt xviii Campaign Design.pdf, page 15 xix 1562C-003.STUDY-DM Rev02, pages 51-52 xx 1562C-003.STUDY-DM Rev02, pages 72-73 xxi The criteria for an advisor tool in Canadian airspace violation situations, page 8 xxii B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, April 2008 xxiii B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, April 2008 xxiv B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, April 2008 xxv SOW-Investigation of time-constraint operational planning-v1b.pdf xxvi 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008, Chapter 5 xxvii B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 xxviii B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 xxix 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008, Chapter 5 xxx 526154_v1_4_JRM-reduced version.pdf - MDA 2008, Figure 6.10 xxxi B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 xxxii B-GJ-005-502/FP-000

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Defence R&D Canada –Valcartier initiated several research activities aimed at investigating and developing approaches and concepts to support operational decision-making within the context of the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP). This effort focuses on building on this previous work to develop tools to enable a more effective, adaptive and time-constrained planning process. In particular, tools were developed and refined for the dynamic link management between CFOPP elements, Center of Gravity Analysis, Decisive Point Analysis, Criteria Management, Plan Management, Risk Management and to establish links with the Execution Management Tool. A computer-based system called “Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS)” was used as an experimental framework to implement mock-ups to demonstrate a possible operationalisation of these approaches. COPlanS has been developed at DRDC Valcartier to support the CFOPP. COPlanS is an integrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid and workflow management tools aimed at supporting a distributed team involved in the planning of military operations. This document develops these various approaches, supported by a review of related concepts and use cases. Mock-ups have been implemented into COPlanS to demonstrate the integration and the visualization of these different concepts, to improve effective, adaptive, and time-sensitive planning within the CFOPP. Le centre R&D pour la défense Canada – Valcartier a entrepris plusieurs activités de recherche, visant le développement d’approches et de concepts pour améliorer l’aide au décideur, dans le contexte du processus de planification opérationelle des Forces Canadiennes (PPOFC). Dans le but de continuer cet effort, cette étude vise à développer les outils nécessaires afin d’établir un processus de planification plus efficace et flexible, compte tenue d’une planification en temps de crise. En particulier, des outils ont été développés pour effectuer l’analyse des liens possibles entre les éléments de planification du PPOFC, l’analyse des centres de gravités, l’analyse des points décisifs, la gestion des critères, la gestion des plans, la gestion du risque pour établir les liens avec l’outil de gestion d’exécution. Le système numérique automatisé appelé “Collaborative Operations Planning System (COPlanS)”, a servi en tant que base expérimentale afin d’implementer des prototypes et ainsi démontrer l’opérationalisation de ses approches. COPlanS a été mis au point au RDDC Valcartier pour traiter le PPOFC. COPlanS intègre une série flexible de composantes de planification, d’aide à la décision et d’outils de gestion des processus métiers, visant la planification en collaboration des opérations militaires avec des membres d’équipes dispersées. Ce rapport contient plusieurs suggestions d’approches, appuyées par une revue des concepts et des cas d’utilisation. Des prototypes d'interface utilisateur ou “Mock-ups“ ont été développés, afin de permettre la visualisation et l’integration des divers concepts et ainsi démontrer un processus de planification plus efficace et flexible dans le cadre de planification en mode de crise.

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