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Divine Self-Limitation in Swinburne's Doctrine of

Omniscience

Avery Fouts

Religious Studies / Volume 29 / Issue 01 / March 1993, pp 21 - 26

DOI: 10.1017/S0034412500022010, Published online: 24 October 2008

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0034412500022010

How to cite this article: Avery Fouts (1993). Divine Self-Limitation in Swinburne's Doctrine of Omniscience.Religious Studies, 29, pp 21-26 doi:10.1017/S0034412500022010

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Rel. Stud 29, pp. 21-26 . Copy right

©

1993 Cambridge University Press

AVERY FOUTS

DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION IN

SWINBURNE S DOCTRINE OF

OMNISCIENCE

In his book,

The oherence

of Theism,

1

Ric har d Sw inburn e seeks to co nstruct

a coherent doctrine of God. As

a

pa rt of this endeav our he examines the idea

of omniscience in cha pte r 10. O ne of Sw inburne s conclusions is th at God as

an omniscient being must engage in cognitive self-limitation in order to

preserve the freedom of both divine and human future actions. In this paper,

I want to look at his a rgument as it is presented in this chapter. I will

conclude th at S winburne s position on divine cognitive self-limitation results

in an internal contrad iction.

Swinburne rejects the Thom istic doctrine of God as a timeless entity

because it is clearly non sense to suggest th at yesterday , to day and to-

morrow could be simultaneous with each other (pp.

220-1 ,

page references

are to the reprinted edition, 1986). M oreover, Sw inburn e finds a timeless

God incom patible with m uch of theistic doctrine. F or exam ple, talk of Go d s

warnings and Go d s forgiveness w ith ou t his do ing these things at times

before or after o the r times (often, times on the hu m an scale of time) seems

inco here nt (p. 221). For these reasons, Sw inburn e retains the notion of God

as a person existing in t ime (p. 174).

Swinburne thinks th a t in norm al use, propositions about a nam ed future

time (including claims about any future free actions)

are

t rue

or

false

-

timelessly (p. 175). And as an initial, working definition, Sw inburne defines

an omniscient person as a person who at a particular time knows of every

true proposition tha t it is true (p. 162). M oreover, Sw inburn e thinks tha t the

notion of a person who knows all true propositions is coherent. He says that

it

is

coherent to suppose that there

is

an omniscient

person.

There would be no reason

why it

is

incoherent to suppose that a spirit, omnipresent and creator of the universe,

is omniscient. Such a spirit, if asked, could give you the answer to any question, if

he chose to do

so.

The state of the universe in the past and future would be so clearly

known to him

—

maybe its whole history could be seen by him at glance and be held

in his mind - that he would not need to conduct an investigation to find out how

things had been years ago or would be in years to come (p. 166).

Swinburne asks whether the existence of a temporal God who knows all true

1

Richard Swinburne, Th e oherence

of

Theism (Oxford: Claren don Press, 1977; reprinte d (as paper -

back),

1986).

http://journals.cambridge.org/http://journals.cambridge.org/


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22 AVERY FOUTS

propositions at any partic ular time, including future-tensed propositions, is

compatible with human and divine freedom. Concerning human freedom,

Sw inburn e argues th at the tru th values of future-tensed propositions abou t

future free hum an actions cannot be known until the respective action occurs.

Fo r exa mp le, if Jone s possesses real freedom either to get married or not to

get married

at

t

27

, Swinburne would argue that the truth value of Jones will

get married at t

2 7

cann ot be known until t

27

. For Swinburne, it is of logical

necessity,

if P is

omniscient

at t, he

believes

at t all

true propositions

(p.

169).

2

And if

is a free agent at t

x

and P is a person at t with beliefs about

everything describable by

a

true proposition,

P

will be in danger of having

one of his beliefs made false by the action of

at t

x

(p. 170). Thus, if God

foreknows Jon es will

get

married

at

t

27

, Jo ne s will

get

m arried

at t

27

. If

Jones decided

not to get

married

at t

27

,

Go d s foreknowledge would

be

rendered incorrect.

But an

incorrect foreknowledge

is an

obvious con tra-

diction . S win burne s fear here is not so much tha t G od will fail to be future

omniscient, but that humans will not be free.

T he conc ern is all the mo re acute w ith rega rd to divine freedom. If God s

freedom be preserved, not only can God not be future omniscient, but God

can no t even justifiably predict divine future actions. In chap ter 8, Sw inburne

defines a perfectly free person as a person w ho is no t influenced in his choices

by

any

causal factors

(p.

145). Moreover,

he

says that

no

one

can be

justified in holding beliefs about the future actions of a perfectly free agent

(p.

172). If I unde rstand Swinburne at this point, even though hum ans are

not ab le to know the future, hum ans might be able justifiably to predict w hat

future human actions might occur because there is a causal connection with

the present; but, since there is no causal connection from the present

to

the

actions of a perfectly free agen t, to say tha t God can even justifiably predict

future divine actions (without knowing them) implies that there is

a

causal

connection from the future action to the present

belief.

But this implies

backward causation which

for

Sw inburne

is

incoh erent (p. 172).

3

Swinburne implies that if the Thomistic doctrine of God were coherent

it

would resolve the problem of divine and hu m an freedom because there

would be n o question of God first believing something and then , later, there

occurring that which makes his belief true or false (p. 173). But given, on

the one hand, the incoherence of the Thomistic doctrine of God and, on the

2

For Swinburne, knowing x entails believing x. Mo reov er, he uses belie ve to refer to both those

propositions which we are ordinarily said to believe and also those propositions about the truth of which

we are convinced or hav e no dou bt (see p. 169 n. 9). Thu s, as far as

I

can tell, God s beliefs, as one who

knows all true propo sitions, are the same as God s knowledge.

3

This seems immediately problematic. True, God is not necessarily influenced by causal factors as

hum ans a re, bu t is not God causally effected by God s own na ture and will? And if

so,

it seems that even

if God does no t know tru e future-tensed propositions, justifiable predictions could be m ade by God about

God s own future actions without threaten ing God s freedom. Moreov er, since for Swinburne G od acts

without influence from non-rational factors (pp. 146-8), it seems all the more likely that, given the nature

of God and God s purposes, given

a

particular state of affairs

in

the world, and given standard canons

of rational behav iour, God s actions could be sometimes justifiably predicted.



4/7


DIVINE SELF-LIMITA TION 23

other ha nd , the problem of reconciling a tem poral Go d s future omniscience

with free actions, Swinburne argues that theists should modify their defini-

tion of omniscience. His modified version is:

A person P is omniscient at a time t if and only if he knows of every true proposition

about t or an earlier time that it is true and also he knows of every true proposition

abou t a time later th an t, such tha t w hat it reports is physically necessitated by some

cause at t or earlier, that it is true (p. 175).

This modified definition of omniscience is a result of divine self-limitation.

God limits God so that only those true propositions about physically necessi-

tated future occurrences are acceptable for God to know. Knowledge of the

latter does not impinge on freedom and contingency. Swinburne says:

T ha t G od is omniscient only in the atten uat ed sense would of course - given tha t he

is perfectly free and omnipotent — have resulted from his own choice. In choosing to

preserve his own freedom (and to give other s freedom ), he limits his own kno wled ge

of wh at is to come. H e con tinually limits himself in this way by not c urtailin g his or

men s future freedom (p. 176).

For a person would not be less worthy of worship if he voluntarily limited his

knowledge in order to allow himself and some of his creature s to determ ine their own

destiny (p. 178).

Yet to maintain his freedom, he limits his knowledge of his own future choices

(p . 178).

(Swinburne defines future omniscience as comprised of true propositions

concerning both human and divine actions. For the sake of clarity, I will

discuss human and divine actions individually. Also, I will assume that

Swinburne is right in saying that a future-tensed proposition can be true and

as long as God does not know it the event to which the proposition refers

remains undetermined.)

Swinburne is not explicit about the nature of this choice to engage in

cognitive self-limitation. So, let s assume for the sake of the discussion th at

there was a specific time when G od limited Go d s know ledge an d that God

foreknew all true propositions before that specific time. Concerning human

action, it seems that future human action would still be determined after the

self-limitation. In other words, if Jo n e s will get ma rried at t

2 7

were

ever

foreknown as true, and thus determine d to happ en, Go d s self-limitation

could do nothing to a/zdetermine it. If it were ever determined, it could not

become undeterm ined since, by Sw inburn e s own admission, th e idea of

backwa rd cau sation is inco here nt. If God foreknows at t Jone s will get

married at t

27

, and if God engages in self-limitation at t

3

, one would have

to maintain both that Jones must still get married at t

27

so th at God s

omniscience at t will not be falsified and th at G od s self-limitation rend ers

Jon es will

not

get married at t

2 7

as a real possibility.

Concerning future divine action, the problem is more severe. God could



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24 AVERY FOUTS

never

freely

become future ignorant after ever being future omniscient since

future omniscience determines all subsequent divine actions.

It is clear from the foregoing that at any time there is a free human or

divine action, God could never have been future omniscient up to that point.

Freedom is not just a m atter of Go d s not know ing the future, but rather a

ma tter of God s never knowing the future up to the time of any particular free

action . In o ther w ords, it is not a m att er of God simply perm itting free actions

at any p art icu lar time irrespective of Go d s decisions throug ho ut the ever-

lasting past. Since all true propositions are timelessly true, God could never

have been omniscient of all true propositions. On this basis, Swinburne must

say that God has been everlastingly self-limited

so

tha t there has been

no

particular time that true future-tensed propositions were ever known. That

is,

God can know that future omniscience would render the future deter-

mined without actually knowing any particular true future-tensed propo-

sitions. God has thus chosen

at

each mo me nt of everlasting time not

to be

future omniscient thereby preserving future free actions. I think something

like this

is

w ha t S win burne means. But while this position seems coherent

with regard to hu m an actions, it seems incohere nt with regard to divine

actions.

The coherence of everlasting, cognitive self-limitation toward future hu-

m an actions rests on the fact tha t it is a cond itional necessity tha t God engage

in such limitation. That is,

on

the condition

of

hu m an freedom, God has

never been future omniscient up to the time of free hum an action, and at

each moment of everlasting time, God has had to engage in cognitive self-

limitation. But God could actually have chosen to be future omniscient at

any one of those moments, even though it would have been at the expense

of hu m an freedom.

The coherence of everlasting, cognitive self-limitation breaks down when

divine action enters the picture.

It

may seem that future omniscience with

regard to divine actions is also

a

conditional necessity. That is, God chooses

at each moment of everlasting time not to know future divine actions as

if,

as in the case of hu m an actions, God actually could choose to be future

om niscient. But, in Go d s case, God is necessarily free; God is not free because

God

chooses

not to be future omniscient. Th at is tan tam ou nt to saying th at

God is free because God freely chooses not to know the future. Swinbu rne

himself defines a pers on al ground of be ing as inclusive of being eterna lly

perfectly free (p. 224). In ch ap ter 14, he a rgues for th e coherence of Go d s

being

necessarily

a person al ground of bein g . He argues that it is necessary

on, what

he

calls, criteria [A ], [B], [C ],

[D] and [E] (p.

269).

For our

purposes here, we need only look at criteria [A], [B] and [D ].

Criterion [A]:

A proposition is necessary if and only if it is analytic (p. 235).

Criterion [B]:



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DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION 25

A proposition is necessary if and only if it is incoherent to suppose that

the individuals

in

fact p icked ou t

by

the referring expressions

in

th e

sentence which expresses it do not h ave the p roperties a n d /o r relations

claimed by the proposition (p. 236).

Criterion [D]:

A proposition p is necessary if and only if it is true, b ut the t ru th of w ha t

it states

is

not (was not,

or

will not be) de pen den t on a ny thin g,

the

description of which is not entailed by

p

(p. 250).

Swinburne argues

on

these ground s tha t the p roposition

I f

there

be a

Personal Ground of Being, this Personal Ground of Being is not eternally

perfectly free is incohere nt. O n cr iteria [A] and [B], freedom is necessarily

a predicate of G od , or Personal Grou nd of Being . O n criterion [D ], God s

freedom

is

necessary

in

the sense th at

it

does not d epend

on

anything

including G od s own choices. (C riterion [A]

is

logical necessity for Swin-

burne, and criterion [D]

is

ontolog ical necessity.) So, Sw inburn e himself

supports the predication of God as necessarily free.

Given Sw inbu rne s position tha t future omniscience of all true propo sitions

is not compatible with freedom,

it

must be conc luded that G od necessarily

does not know the future. The necessity arises not because God is everlast-

ingly ignorant

of

the future, bu t ra the r because there

is no

moment

of

everlasting time at which God could do otherwise. For Sw inburn e to say tha t

God could do otherwise is to make freedom an accidental property of God

rath er tha n a n essential one . God s know ledge is necessarily limited by Go d s

essential freedom.

Moreover, Swinburne says

a

perfectly free person

is a

person who ca n

only perform an action if he believes that there is no overriding reason for

refraining from doing i t (p. 159; see also chap ter 8 ). Assuming tha t

a

free

God

is

more rational tha n

a

determined God,

in

every logically possible

situation there would always be an overriding reason to refrain from fore-

knowing all true propositions.

I t

seems to me that this in itself would make

the refraining

a

necessity. Swinburne himself says there is

a

logical limit on

God s freedom — tha t is, God will never do

an

action

if

he acknowledges

overriding reasons for refraining from doin g it (p. 148). But to speak in such

a way presupposes, as Swinburne does, that God has the power to become

future omniscient even th oug h God never does so because of this logical lim it.

But

if

God

is

necessarily free, God does not possess the pow er

to

become

future omniscient. Swinburne s definition of om nipo tenc e is:

A person P is omnipotent

at a

time

t

if and only if he is able to bring about the

existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the

occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he

does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x

(p . 160).

Given this definition, God does not possess the power

to

become future



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2 6 A V E R Y F O U T S

omniscient since a persona l gro und of being lacking eterna lly perfect freedom

is not only n ot a logically con tingent state of affairs bu t, on the ab ove criteria,

is neither logically nor ontologically possible at all. Again, it is a necessity

that God not know the future because God does not possess the power to do

so.

If my arg um en t be correct, there is no point in talking of a cho ice as if

God had an alternative. Since God can never choose future omniscience,

God does not choose not to be future om niscient. M oreov er, if future knowl-

edge is of one piece comprised of knowledge both of divine and human free

actions, it follows that God is necessarily limited of both types of knowledge.

Swinburne thinks it is coherent to suppose that God can be both omni-

scient in the sense of knowing all true propositions and perfectly free. He says

that an om niscient person if asked, could give you the answer to any

question,

if he chose to do so (emphasis mine; see above quotation from p.

166).

It seems to me that Swinburne wants to retain in his doctrine of God

the notion that God is capable of knowing all true propositions. This much of

the classical Thomistic God Swinburne wants to preserve. In other words,

self-limitation mean s more th an G od m erely creating a world with free

actions as opposed to creating a world where all actions are determined.

Since an omniscient person who knows all propositions is coherent for

Swinburne, he retains the notion that God is able to be such a person but

chooses not to be such a person for the sake of freedom. But, again, if my

arg um ent be correct, on Sw inburn e s own groun ds, it is not coherent to

suppose that a perfectly free Go d can be omn iscient. Sw inbu rne s God simply

cannot know the future.

In sum m ary, given Sw inburn e s position th at future omniscience of all true

propositions is incompatible with free acts, future omniscience never has

occurred and, more impo rtantly, can never occur. Th us, talk of ch oic e and

a self-limiting G od becomes highly prob lem atic. S win burne s God seems to

be a God for whom future omniscience is neither a logical nor an ontological

possibility.

4

Department of Religion,

Claremont Graduate School,

Claremont,

California

Thanks are due to Stephen T.

Davis,

John Hick and Keith Ward for reading drafts of this paper