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The 'Captive States' of Southern Africaand China: The PRC and Botswana,

Lesotho and Swaziland

IAN TAYLOR

INTRODUCTION

During the apartheid era, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) weredescribed as 'captive states' within southern Africa.1 This term was utilisedbecause of the three states' subordinate relationship with the regional giantof South Africa. This position was due to their land-locked geographicalposition; their almost total economic dependence upon Pretoria; and SouthAfrica's overpowering military muscle(and willingness to use it).2 For BLS,South Africa was truly the hegemon and thus the three countries hadessentially to tailor their foreign policies accordingly. Though BLS were notnecessarily totally acquiescent to South Africa, the environment in whichthey operated and the general unwillingness to antagonise Pretoria limitedBeijing's manoeuvrability in the three countries under review. As Beijing'sprimary aim in southern Africa was to prevent the development ofsuperpower hegemony in the region and at the same time posture itself as aconcerned member of the Third World, South Africa's overarching presenceas well as local policy shifts stymied to a large degree any Chinese attemptat developing deep and long-lasting linkages with BLS - with the possibleexception of Botswana.

BOTSWANA

Botswana became independent as a republic on 30 September 1966 after ademocratic pre-independence election which the moderate Seretse Khamawon. Formerly the British protectorate of Bechuanaland, the country atindependence was economically largely dependent upon cattle ranching, theexport of beef and remittances of wages sent back home by migrant workersin South Africa. This situation, however, changed after independence as

Ian Taylor, University of Stellenbosch

Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.35, No.2 (July 1997), pp.75-95PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

76 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

discoveries of nickel, copper, coal and especially diamonds, and a generallygood rainfall, drove a remarkable increase in overall gross national product,allowing Botswana to achieve a growth rate of eight per cent and one of thehighest per capita incomes in Black Africa.3 Botswana, however, remaineddependent to a large extent on South African largesse, and this wasproblematic for Gaborone.4 As Seretse Khama put it at a banquet in Beijing,'our geographical position in the area is such that our survival as a nationdepends almost entirely on our neighbours whose policies are diametricallyantithetical to our [own]'.3 Botswana pursued a moderate foreign policyafter independence and for years attempted to keep out of the racial conflictin southern Africa.6 Botswana was politically stable, enjoying a functioningdemocracy - a rarity in Africa - whilst being proclaimed as the 'bestmanaged economy in Africa'.7

Initial Botswanan Exclusion of the PRC

However, Botswana was a victim of its geographical location and wasinevitably caught up in the southern African maelstrom - a 'hostage to highpolitics'.8 As a result; as the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) southernAfrican policy developed in the 1970s and the crisis in the region andsuperpower involvement deepened, Botswana offered increasingopportunities for the development of linkages between Gaborone andBeijing. In essence, China pursued a policy of offering an alternative tochoosing between 'Boer and bear'. That is, between accommodation withthe 'devil' of South Africa, and the 'demon' of the Soviet Union.9

Initially, however, Beijing found itself shut out of Gaborone by theRepublic of China on Taiwan (ROC). Although delegations from Botswanahad visited Beijing in 1965, 1966 and 1967, Botswana established relationswith Taipei and not Beijing on 30 December 1966. Surrounded by violentlyanti-Communist, White-ruled states on three sides - Rhodesia, South Africaand South West Africa (Namibia) - Gaborone simply could not afford to,and did not wish to, antagonise either Pretoria or Salisbury by engaging inlinks with Communist states at independence. A visit to Taipei by theBotswanan Vice President and Gaborone's commitment to 'the Republic ofChina's rightful position in the United Nations',10 only served to underlinethe PRC's exclusion from the country. Links between the ROC andBotswana were further strengthened by the visit to Gaborone in 1969, of theTaiwanese Vice Foreign Minister, Yang Hsi-K'un."

Rapprochement with the PRC

However, circumstances unrelated to Beijing's foreign policy effortsresulted in a gradual rapprochement with the PRC. This stemmed fromBotswana's position in the southern African region and the growing conflict

THE 'CAPTIVE STATES" OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CHINA 77

in Rhodesia. Despite only providing humanitarian assistance toZimbabwean refugees, growing armed incursions by Rhodesian forces intoBotswana in search of Zimbabwean nationalists and the deepening of thearmed conflict meant that Gaborone's security situation became precarious.As a result, Botswana aimed to lessen dependence on the minority-ruledcountries and sought political support from fellow majority-ruled states -particularly Zambia, Botswana's only Black-ruled neighbour.12 This wassymbolised by the construction of the 'BotsZam' road to by-pass transportlinks via Rhodesia. Botswana also aimed to de-link itself from the SouthAfrican Rand as a measure of autonomy vis-a-vis Pretoria. This it achievedin 1974."

This development led to a number of consequences for Botswana'sforeign policy regarding the Communist states. Zambia had already anestablished pattern of relations with a number of non-capitalist nations. Asa result, Botswana was drawn into a more accommodating posture towardsthe non-capitalist powers. This was initially symbolised by theestablishment of relations between Botswana and Yugoslavia in September1970.14 This, however, did not indicate a shift leftwards by Gaborone. Everpragmatic, Khama also established relations with Japan and WestGermany.15

Nevertheless, when the 'two Chinas' issue was debated in the UnitedNations General Assembly in October 1971, Botswana joined Zambia invoting for the admission of the PRC. The anomaly of a ROC-recognisingstate such as Botswana voting in favour of the PRC's seating indicated theprecarious situation Gaborone felt itself in at the time due to Rhodesianactivity - stimulating a desire by Botswana to acquire as many African andnon-African allies as possible. Botswana's policy regarding the 'twoChinas' question was confused, and reflected uncertainty towards an issueof little relevance to African politics. This was symbolised by Botswanavoting against Taipei and yet agreeing to a technical co-operation agreementin April 1972.'6 The PRC was quick to recognise an apparent turnaround inBotswana's attitude vis-a-vis Beijing, and sent a high-level telegram toSeretse Khama in September 1972, congratulating Botswana on its sixthanniversary of independence.17 In essence, the PRC was tentatively testingthe ground for reaction. Botswana was apparently amenable to PRCapproaches, and in 1975 established relations with Beijing.18 As a result,Taipei severed relations with Gaborone. Although this was a diplomaticcoup for Beijing, it was far more linked to Botswana's own political anddiplomatic position vis-a-vis the white-ruled states than to a re-orientationof Gaborone's ideological position or, indeed, Beijing's own efforts.19

Botswana pursued a policy of outreach to its Black African neighbours, andBeijing was essentially part of the baggage that came with this


diversification. Gaborone's foreign policy was aimed at being independentand attempted to avoid superpower machinations in the region. As aconsequence, the PRC was especially keen to foster amicable relations withthe country.

Khama 's Visit to Beijing

In July 1976, the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, visited the PRC.At an official banquet, Hua Guofeng congratulated Botswana on its policyof non-alignment and 'contributing to promoting the cause of unity of theThird World countries and peoples against imperialism and hegemonism'.20

Taking up the theme that the international situation was 'excellent', Huasaw the African countries (including Botswana) as resisting a whole pot-pourri of evils including 'imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, big-power hegemonism, White racism and Zionism'.21 Hua's linking ofhegemonism to the wider struggle against the minority regimes in southernAfrica is illuminating in that, according to Beijing, Moscow's prime aim inaiding the various liberation movements in the region was hegemonistic andaimed at gaining control of the strategically important Cape sea-route.22

Khama's response, however, was more circumscribed, and avoidedHua's anti-hegemonistic utterances. Whilst castigating the West for sellingnuclear reactors to Pretoria, Khama avoided referring to Moscow's role inthe region and thus side-stepped the Sino-Soviet rivalry that had bedevilledrelations with other southern African states.23 In Seretse Khama, the PRCwas dealing with a shrewd pragmatist who, by force of circumstance andunder the shadow of the South African hegemon, was compelled to balanceGaborone's foreign policy and moderate Botswana's policies. As a result,Khama would not voluntarily involve Botswana in the disputes betweenMoscow and Beijing. Unlike Kaunda, or perhaps Nyerere, Khama was amore calculated and cautious national leader. Beijing's relationship withBotswana under Khama was therefore necessarily more circumscribed andless prone to lofty ideological outbursts. Whilst Gaborone was unwilling tobe drawn into the anti-Soviet rhetoric of Beijing, its stand against SouthAfrican hegemonism and its independent policy regarding bothsuperpowers, made Botswana an attractive state for China to court.

Beijing-Gaborone Ties in the 1970s

The PRC was quick to capitalise on the visit to Beijing by Khama, and inSeptember 1976 sent a delegation headed by the Minister of Commerce,Fan Zi-yu, to attend Botswana's tenth anniversary celebrations.24 Inaddition, Beijing became prominent in defending Botswana againstincursions at the United Nations, for example, supporting the May 1977Security Council adoption of two resolutions in support of Botswana

THE 'CAPTIVE STATES' OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CHINA 79

against South African and Rhodesian encroachment. Beijing took theopportunity to introduce anti-Soviet rhetoric into the debate, criticising the'social-imperialists' for 'working hand in glove with the Vorster regime'.25

Anti-superpower feeling in Africa at the time was high - as the BotswananForeign Minister said, Africans 'opposed the Superpowers for turningAfrica into a place where to seek hegemony'.26 Quett Masire, the successorin 1980 to Khama as Botswana's President, was even more explicit when hetold Chinese reporters that 'the factors of instability [in Africa] are really thetwo big Superpowers because there is a new scramble for Africa, each onetrying to build its sphere of influence in Africa'.27 This statement was areplication of Beijing's own- posture and neatly complimented Beijing'sposition.

In essence, since the early 1970s Gaborone's foreign policy was toattempt to disengage itself steadily from the shackles of Pretoria, and oneavenue through which Botswana pursued this was to assert its Africanidentity through hostility to both superpowers and to identify itself with thenon-aligned states of the Third World.28 In many ways, Botswana'sindependent foreign policy was a precursor to that of Beijing's. Similar tothe PRC, and recognising its own vulnerability, Botswana attempted tomanipulate the international system in order to maximise its ownmanoeuvrability.29 The PRC was therefore a useful ally by which Gaboronecould strive for an assertion of its own international identity and,conversely, Botswana was a state at the centre of the regional crisis throughwhich Beijing could project its agenda vis-a-vis southern Africa andsuperpower expansionism. Gaborone-Beijing relations, then, were inessence compatible, and the concern with which the PRC regarded itsrelations with Botswana was underscored in 1986 by the visit of no less thanVice-Premier Li Peng to Gaborone,30 reciprocated by a visit to China by theBotswanan Foreign Minister in 1988.31 Whilst Sino-Botswanan tiesremained quiet in the early 1980s, as a permanent member of the UnitedNations Security Council the PRC was particularly useful to Botswana fromthe mid-1980s onwards as South Africa pursued an aggressive militarycourse against its neighbours.32 For example, Beijing strongly condemnedSouth Africa's attack on Gaborone in March 1988.33

Post-Tiananmen Relations

Beijing's rhetorical and practical commitments to southern Africa resultedin a groundswell of support for the PRC at the time of the TiananmenSquare massacre. Botswana's reaction was markedly similar to othersouthern African states and was evident during the Chinese ForeignMinister's visit to six southern African countries in July 1989. The 4 June'incident' re-focused Beijing's concentration on the Third World as a


support constituency to withstand critical international opinion andpropelled Beijing to seek out and reaffirm its linkages in Africa. As QianQichen said, 'China will ... strengthen and enhance its solidarity and co-operation with African ... countries and actively expand political,economic, trade, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges withthem'.34 For its part, Botswana hoped that China 'could remove the difficultelements as soon as possible'.35 Tiananmen Square actually served tostrengthen Sino-Botswana ties, as evidenced when Botswana opened itsfirst embassy in Asia in Beijing in 1991.36

Economic Linkages

Like PRC policy elsewhere, after the beginning of the modernisationprogramme launched in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, Beijing rigorouslyattempted to develop trade linkages with Botswana.37 This was firstsignalled by the visit of Quett Masire to Beijing in June 1980 to 'exchangeexperience in economic construction'.38 As one of Africa's few economicsuccess stories, Gaborone was of particular importance to Beijing as theBotswanan model of development may have been instructive for the PRC'sown economic construction. As it was, the Vice-Premier of the PRC StateCouncil, Ji Penfei, was eager to inform the Botswana delegation of thechanges in the PRC's domestic situation since the visit of Khama in 1976,and the 'principles and policies for China's modernisation programme'.39

This was later followed up in December 1980, when a Botswanandelegation arrived to discuss developing agricultural and economicconstruction between Gaborone and Beijing.40 It is evident that Beijing didindeed see Botswana as an 'exemplary model in the development ofnational economy'.41 In a laudatory article describing the economicachievements made in Botswana, Beijing made it clear that Gaborone'ssuccess was based on 'the principle of "democracy, development, self-reliance and unity'".42 Apart from democracy, this echoed the PRC's ownperceived path to development. The theme of learning from Botswana'sdevelopment record was reiterated by Xi Zhongxun, secretary to the CPCCentral Committee, who asserted that, 'China could do well in learningfrom Botswana's own experience in sticking to a policy of expanding theeconomy and improving living standards'.43

Thus Botswana's independent foreign policy and its developmentalexperience was remarkably similar to the PRC's aspirations. As Li Xiannianremarked to Masire, when it came to foreign policy, 'we [the PRC] shareidentical views in this field'.44 Certainly, Botswana echoed the PRC's ownanti-hegemonic posture vis-a-vis the superpowers in southern Africa,accusing both major powers of pursuing a 'competition ... for worlddomination'.45 Sino-Botswanan trade linkages were strengthened in 1984


when a Botswanan trade delegation visited China to attend the Guangzhouexport commodities fair.46 As the Botswanan Vice-President said, Gaborone'welcomed China to invest in Botswana and jointly develop projects tomutual benefit'.''7 During Li Peng's 1986 visit, Botswana and the PRC dreweconomically closer when both granted each other most favoured nationstatus.48 This resulted in a doubling of Sino-Botswanan trade.

Unit: US$ 1 million

Exports to BotswanaImports from Botswana

Exports to BotswanaImports from Botswana

TABLE 1SINO-BOTSWANAN TRADE RELATIONS

198320.1

798996.3

19840.10.1

199043

1985230.2

199192

19862

79921.55

79S7116

799521.5

19882846

19942.70.7

Sources: Figures adapted from the CIA's China: International Trade, Fourth Quarter (1980-87),cited in China Facts and Figures (Gulf Breeze: Florida, various years); and China'sCustoms Statistics Yearbook (Hong Kong, various years).

Beijing was eager to continue commercial linkages with one of thestrongest economies in Africa and so sent a trade mission to participate inthe 1988 Gaborone International Trade Fair.49 This resulted in a largeincrease in imports from Botswana, though this has subsequently declined.Likewise, Botswana was keen to attract Chinese commerce. Perhapsdisappointed by Chinese responses in 1991, Masire appealed for Chinesehelp in the industrial development of Botswana whilst at the same time thePRC's role in Botswana was positively appraised by the Botswanan press.50

Later, the Botswanan ambassador to the PRC repeated that, Botswanawanted 'to encourage Chinese firms to explore prospects of investing inBotswana'.51 One such way that this was fulfilled was the tendering ofcontracts by Chinese companies for work in Botswana, which were secondonly to Zimbabwe in the amount contracted, reaching US$9.49 million in1993.52 Despite criticism over alleged Chinese work practices and theundercutting of local business by PRC companies,53 Botswana has beeneager to attract Chinese investment and capital, and, though the level ofcommercial intercourse is perhaps disappointing to date, the trade hasserved to further strengthen Sino-Botswanan relations.

Aid to Botswana

Although Beijing's aid to Botswana has been relatively modest, it has beenconsistent and has served its purpose. That is, it has enabled Beijing to


retain an ongoing presence in Botswana at little cost to itself. In March 1976Gaborone and Beijing signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation, and later Botswana was granted an interest-free US$16.6 millionloan for development projects, repayable over a period of 20 years.54 PRCaid to Botswana may be divided into three areas: agricultural, medical andtechnical.

According to President Masire, one of Botswana's development aimswas to achieve self-sufficiency in food and this had been greatly helped bythe PRC.55 In 1977 a PRC agricultural team established itself at a state-owned farm and conducted experiments in the growing of rice in southernAfrican conditions. From a 1.23 hectare field, the PRC agronomists hadmanaged to produce 8,000 kg of rice. The PRC also donated US$100,000 topurchase seed and cover costs for Botswana, and built a rice processingfactory.56 As a result, Sino-Botswanan agricultural co-operation becamerelatively close and, later, Botswana requested help in developing itsirrigation scheme.57 On the medical front, Beijing and Gaborone engaged ina scheme whereby a Chinese medical team was sent to Botswana to workalongside indigenous medical staff.58 This scheme provided for a team of12-17 medical doctors to work in Botswanan hospitals for two years.59

The PRC's main contribution to Botswana's development, however, wasthe renewal and development of Botswana's rail lines.60 Under a protocolsigned in 1982, the Beijing government helped Botswana to renew a 120-kilometre stretch of line from Gaborone to the South African border." Thisaid programme involved 12,000 tons of rail equipment and US$20.76million.62 Whilst work was progressing on this project, the BotswananMinister of Works, Colin Blackbeard, visited the PRC to discuss furtherfuture rail co-operation.63 The fruits of this visit were unveiled a month laterwhen the PRC announced that it was to help Botswana renew the rail linefrom Francistown to the Zimbabwean border.64 Following the TiananmenSquare massacre, as noted, Beijing attempted to strengthen ties with theThird World. In Botswana's case this led to a commitment to help constructa modern railway costing US$14.6 million. The Beijing government agreedto provide steel rails and other components worth US$5.4 million plus thetechnical assistance and personnel to finish the project.65 This project isongoing and the fourth phase commenced in 1993.66 It was an astute moveby the PRC to involve itself in this project, lauded by the BotswananPresident as 'Botswana's life-line', and brought back memories of theTanZam project.67 Whilst PRC aid to Botswana has been modest it hasmanaged to maintain a Chinese presence in Botswana, which hascomplimented the PRC's other policies towards Gaborone and allowedBeijing to enjoy cordial relations with Botswana at relatively little actualcost.


Sino-Botswanan Relations: An Overview

In essence, the PRC's policy towards Botswana has been successful. Withinthe limits imposed by the geographical distance between the two countriesand the limited capabilities that the PRC has been able to exercise in theregion, Sino-Botswanan relations have been mutually satisfactory.68 Whilstduring the apartheid era Beijing was constrained from becoming activelyinvolved, the PRC's rhetorical support and limited aid programme appearedto have satisfied Gaborone. By appealing to Botswana's own independentanti-hegemonic foreign policy agenda, Beijing was able to capitalise onexisting linkages and project Beijing's presence into Botswana out ofproportion to its actual commitments. Commercial linkages increasinglyplayed an important role in this projection of PRC influence, going hand-in-hand with Beijing's rhetorical warning against 'the control of world affairsby a single country or a group of countries'." For a country such asBotswana under the omnipresent shadow of its larger neighbour, Beijing'sposition regarding the development of an 'independent foreign policy' hascoincided with Gaborone's own agenda. This has facilitated a relationshipof enduring strength and mutual benefit, and, from the point of view ofBeijing, developed an amicable relationship which has been relatively cost-effective. With President Masire proclaiming China 'one of the best friendsof Botswana', Sino-Botswanan interaction is likely to continue.

LESOTHO

Because of its landlocked geographical position,70 surrounded by SouthAfrica, Lesotho was perhaps more than any other country in the regionextremely vulnerable to Pretoria's machinations.71 As one source put it,Lesotho was caught 'between dependence and destabilisation'.72

Historically, there had been long-standing tension between the Basotho andthe Afrikaners, and the exposed kingdom has had to look elsewhere forsupport and protection from White South Africa. Indeed, that was the raisond'etre for Basutoland's inclusion into the British Empire. Economically,Lesotho was and remains almost totally dependent on South Africa.73

Lesotho's economic history vis-a-vis South Africa has been described asdeveloping from a 'granary to labour reserve',74 and has created a'syndrome of non-development'."

As a consequence of Lesotho's vagaries, Maseru-Beijing ties have beenone of the PRC's more complicated and unstable relationships in Africa, withlinks between Maseru, Beijing and Taipei going through a number of radicalchanges. This has meant that Beijing's ties with Maseru have been relativelyweak and under-developed in comparison with other states in the region.


Indeed, until the 1980s Taipei had extremely close links with Lesotho and thiseffectively shut out Beijing from active involvement in the country.76 As aresult, despite Beijing's efforts to the contrary and Lesotho's apparentidentification with the PRC's anti-hegemonic rhetorical posturing, Beijing hasin contrast to its linkages with Botswana performed a marginal role in Lesotho.

Early Linkages

In 1966, the former British colony of Basutoland became independent underChief Leabua Jonathan, who had won power after winning barely 40 percent of the votes cast. Upon independence, Jonathan's party - theBasotholand National Party (BNP) had to confront the militant BasothoCongress Party (BCP) and the power-seeking King Moshoeshoe II, whilstat the same time balancing relations with Pretoria. Until 1971 this wastranslated in Lesotho's foreign policy by a determination to maintain cordialrelations with South Africa, justified by Jonathan as a 'realistic' policy.77 Asa consequence, like Gaborone Maseru was initially hostile to Communismand promised Pretoria its assistance in eradicating Communism fromLesotho.78 Indeed, in this period Maseru accused the PRC of promotingsubversion in the country.79 Lesotho had established relations with Taipeitwo weeks after achieving independence,80 and this had been cemented bythe visit of Jonathan to Taipei a month later. A number of technicalagreements were signed between the two nations, and links were furtherstrengthened with Jonathan's second visit in 1969.81 At the same time, theROC's Foreign Minister was a frequent visitor to Lesotho.82

Radicalisation of Maseru's Stance vis-a-vis Pretoria

However, Jonathan's conciliatory approach vis-a-vis Pretoria was deeplyunpopular domestically and resulted in the BNP losing the 1970 election tothe more militant BCP. Jonathan's reaction was to abort the result - anaction satisfactory to Pretoria, who feared a BCP-led Lesotho government.83

Nevertheless, Jonathan began gradually to distance himself from SouthAfrica in a similar fashion to Botswana, though Maseru's manoeuvrabilitywas far more circumscribed.84 Jonathan's aim was to lessen dependence onPretoria and establish closer links with Black Africa north of the Zambeziand with the non-aligned world.85 This was symbolically heralded byMaseru developing links with India.86 Beijing reacted to this development inLesotho's foreign policy by sending a high-level telegram to Jonathancongratulating Lesotho on its independence anniversary.87

Visit to Beijing, 1975

As a result of Maseru attempting to 'break Pretoria's stranglehold',88 in 1975Lesotho's Foreign Minister, J.R.L. Kotsokane, visited Beijing, provoking


speculation that Maseru was about to follow Botswana and switch ties fromTaipei. This was part of Maseru's wider attempt to diversify linkages forLesotho in an attempt to gain international support against Pretoria.Kotsokane echoed Beijing's own views when he asserted that Maseru,'condemned those countries in the world that think that, because of theirmilitary power, or because of their economic power or because of theirgeographical size, they have the right to dominate the destiny of otherpeoples'.89 This was a replication of Beijing's own anti-hegemonic posture.The PRC's Third World credentials were by this point well established inAfrica, and this stance - though largely rhetorical - enabled Beijing topresent itself as a trusted friend of African nations. This view was supportedby Kotsokane's speech at a banquet in Beijing during his visit, when helinked Lesotho and the PRC together and argued that, 'as members of theThird World with [China], we believe that we all have a role to play ininsuring that the small countries of the world are protected from dominationfrom either Superpower' .90

This rhetoric dovetailed with the PRC's own Third World anti-hegemonic agenda. However, after strong criticism of the trip byconservatives within Jonathan's own party," there was no change in policyby Lesotho vis-a-vis Taiwan and ties with the ROC remained strong (thoughTaipei cancelled a visit by two investment groups to Lesotho).92 The PRC,however, remained interested in Lesotho, periodically quoting Jonathan inits official press - a sign of approval from Beijing.93 This was particularlyso when Jonathan echoed Beijing's own view that 'the Superpowers [were]seeking gains out of the strife in Africa'.94

At this time, Lesotho had experienced numerous attacks by the Pretoria-sponsored Lesotho Liberation Army, which aimed to destabilise Lesothoand Jonathan's regime and introduce a more amenable attitude towardsSouth Africa.95 Pretoria also began to raid Maseru in seek-and-destroymissions against suspected ANC bases in Lesotho. This destabilisationpolicy by Pretoria, however, failed to prevent Maseru from diversifying itsrelations with other, notably Communist, powers.

Establishment of Sino-Lesotho Relations

In 1983 Jonathan visited the PRC on a 'friendship visit'.56 This visit washoped by China to develop a 'new stage' in Sino-Lesotho relations and theestablishment of bilateral relations.97 Beijing took the opportunity toreaffirm China's anti-hegemonic posture, asserting that each country should'treat each other on an equal footing in international affairs', and that thePRC was opposed to 'the big bullying the small'.98 The visit was significantin that, during it, Lesotho and the PRC announced that they had alreadyestablished diplomatic relations (in Mozambique) on 30 April 1983."


Maseru gave the necessary commitment to the 'one China' policy,100 andrelations with the ROC were broken as of 14 May.101 In return, an economicand technical co-operation agreement was signed.102 Jonathan was then senton a tour of Shanghai to witness aspects of the 'socialist modernisation'programme.103

Like Botswana, Lesotho's establishment of relations with Beijing sprangfrom domestic circumstances and its position towards South Africa, notfrom any particular efforts by the PRC. Jonathan felt that a switch to Beijingwould keep in line with other front-line states. Like Botswana,rapprochement with Beijing was more an assertion of independence andmanoeuvrability towards Pretoria rather than of any ideological affinity.104

As Jonathan said, 'in spite of being surrounded by a powerful andinfluential neighbour who is hysterical about the socialist countries, wehave not, and we will not, let her determine who our friends should be'.105

This fact was reinforced by the obvious fragility of the relationship asdomestic change within Maseru resulted in the swapping of ties betweenTaipei and Beijing on a number of occasions. In addition, Maseru'smanoeuvrability remained prescribed by Pretoria.106 South Africa continuedto launch military raids against Lesotho, and Maseru's vulnerability wasillustrated by the fact that it was compelled by South Africa to deport 24ANC members as a precursor to normalisation of Lesotho-South Africanrelations. However, Jonathan remained defiant, and one way that thisdefiance was expressed was by retaining ties with the Communist powers.Thus, in September 1985, King Moshoeshoe II visited the PRC. This wasportrayed by Beijing as a vindication of its anti-hegemonic posture, withPresident Li Xiannian asserting that the 'Five Principles of PeacefulCoexistence should be the supreme norms governing internationalrelations'.107 This stance was repeated by Beijing throughout the visit andwas echoed by Moshoeshoe II, who 'strongly supported China's advocacythat all countries, big or small, should be treated equally'.108 The PRCenunciated a political rhetoric that was highly attractive to states such asLesotho, effectively at the mercy of a large hegemon within the southernAfrican sub-system. The rhetorical and political support that the PRCoffered to Lesotho in this period thus enabled Beijing to play a role, albeitof a highly limited nature, in Maseru's defiant attitude towards Pretoria.

Overthrow ofLeabua Jonathan

However, Jonathan's campaign of withstanding South Africa's hegemonyquickened the end of his rule. In 1986 Pretoria began an economic blockadeagainst Lesotho after Jonathan refused to sign a military pact with SouthAfrica and expel any ANC cadres living in Lesotho. On 20 December 1985a South African commando invaded Maseru, killing nine, and blockaded


Lesotho's border on 1 January.109 A bloodless coup on 20 January endedJonathan's rule and Lesotho's ten-year campaign of defiance againstPretoria.110 Although the coup had a number of other factors, Beijing clearlysaw that the 'Pretoria blockade provoke[d] the coup'."1 The chairman ofLesotho's Military Council, Justin Lekhanya, assured the PRC ambassadorthat Sino-Lesotho relations would remain strong,112 though Lekhanyaexplicitly aimed to normalise ties with Pretoria and abandon what wasperceived as Jonathan's confrontational tactics vis-a-vis South Africa. AsLekhanya said, 'we can choose friends: we cannot choose neighbours'.113

This led observers to question whether Lekhanya was 'knuckling under toSouth African demands'."4 This became particularly apparent with thesigning of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty in late 1986, which exacteda heavy political price on Maseru.115 More explicit was the security pact withPretoria in late March 1986 whereby Lesotho essentially undertook not tosupport the ANC.116 In essence, Lesotho's foreign policy went from anassertive to a submissive role after the coup."7 Initially, however, the couphad little direct effect on Sino-Lesotho ties, and the Lesotho Queen visitedChina in September 1987.118

Aid to Lesotho

Beijing's aid to Lesotho has in essence been desultory. There can be nodoubt that this is a result of the fact that relations with Maseru have been sounstable and that, with the hegemon of Pretoria overshadowing Lesotho,serious aid investment by Beijing was viewed as pointless as a tool to gaininfluence in the country. Indeed, a search of all sources has discovered onlythree specific aid contributions by Beijing. In May 1983, the PRC signed aneconomic and technical agreement with Lesotho and this was followed inOctober of the same year by the arrival of PRC agro-technicians to helpexpand a state vegetable farm near Maseru. During the serious drought inthe region in 1984, Beijing extended US$75,000 of aid to Lesotho topurchase food.119 Four years later, the PRC presented a two-wheeledwalking tractor to the Queen.120 This aid record shows that Beijing wascognisant of the limitations that Lesotho's position vis-a-vis Pretoria putupon it. As a result, the PRC has had minimal developmental aidinvolvement in Lesotho.

Sino-Lesotho Trade

Similarly, trade between Lesotho and China has been negligible. In 1985 thePRC Minister for Metallurgical Industry paid a five-day visit to Lesotho,and the possibility of developing Sino-Lesotho trade was mooted.121

However, the realities of Lesotho's economic position, and its previouslynoted almost total dependence on South Africa, meant that such optimism


was never realised. Even after Tiananmen, when Beijing began a concertedeffort to strengthen ties with African countries, Lesotho remained largelyinconsequential to Beijing's commercial interests in southern Africa andimports from Lesotho were practically non-existent. This is borne out byexamining the trade statistics.

TABLE 2SINO-LESOTHO TRADE RELATIONS

Unit: US$ 1 million1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Exports to Lesotho 0.7 - 0.3 0.5 5.5 1.5 1.4Imports from Lesotho 0.2 - 0.7 0.4 0.4

Sources: Figures adapted from sources cited in note 1.

Post-Tiananmen Square Relations

Like most African countries, Lesotho was remarkably forgiving of theincidents of June 1989. In July 1989, as part of Qian Qichen's tour of sixstates in the region, Maseru was visited.122 Hoping for improved relations,Lekhanya made no mention of the events the previous month in Beijing.123

However, relations between Beijing and Maseru were not to remain stable.On 8 April 1990 the PRC severed links with Maseru after Lesotho resumedrelations with the ROC.124 This may be recognised as a radical departure inLesotho's foreign policy towards Beijing. The reasons behind thisdiplomatic switch centred around the financial inducements offered byTaipei in exchange for political recognition, and not the events of June1989. Essentially, Taipei was accused of 'cheque book diplomacy' inwooing Lesotho back. That this accusation could be made indicates thatPRC aid commitments to Lesotho did not match the expectations in Maseru.For a poverty-stricken state such as Lesotho, financial inducements were astrong incentive for shifting diplomatic recognition. The shift in relationswas also no doubt influenced by the greater South African influence inLesotho following the 1986 coup.125 It was only in 1994 that Maserurestored links with Beijing and broke with Taipei after elections in whichpro-Taipei congressmen lost to pro-Beijing delegates.126 With KingMoshoeshoe II expressing the desire to develop friendly ties and SouthAfrica now normalising its ties with China, an era of stability in Sino-Lesotho relations may have been arrived at.

Sino-Lesotho Ties: An Overview

Lesotho has been problematic for PRC policy in that its geographicalvulnerability and internal tensions meant that no coherent policy could be


developed towards Maseru. Though Lesotho was attracted to Beijing'srhetoric of the equality of states in the international system, the reality of thesouthern African regional sub-system and Lesotho's chequered relationswith Pretoria meant that linkages between Beijing and Maseru were alwayssusceptible to the disruptive influences and actions of the regional hegemon,to a far greater extent than that found in Botswana. As a result, Sino-Lesotho ties have been unremarkable and plagued with instability.Recognising Taipei in 1966, then switching to Beijing in 1985, thenswitching back to Taipei in 1990 and finally resuming links with Beijing in1994, have meant that Lesotho has been an essentially unreliable partnerand this has had a direct negative effect on the strength of Beijing's ties withMaseru. With a China-recognising democratic South Africa in place,however, it is possible that Maseru's links with Beijing have finallystabilised and may develop in future.

SWAZILAND

Like both Botswana and Lesotho, Swaziland is almost totally dependent onSouth Africa.127 However, whilst Lesotho's policy towards Pretoria underJonathan was confrontational, Swaziland's was moderately critical.128

Severely constrained by the regional structural linkages and the dominanceof the South African hegemon,129 Mbabane pursued a pro-Western foreignpolicy which has excluded the PRC from any involvement. Because of this,Swaziland has in essence been largely an irrelevance to Beijing. Contactbetween the two has been negligible, and as a result treatment of the countryin this article will necessarily be brief.

Swazi-ROC Ties Preclude Beijing

Swaziland achieved independence on 6 September 1968 and establishedrelations with the ROC on the same day. Mbabane's decision to engage inrelations with Taipei were conditioned by its relationship with Pretoria priorto independence. However, Swaziland's relations with Taipei haveapparently been mutually satisfactory and ROC aid has been generous.130

Investment on the other hand has been relatively moderate and ROC workpractices have apparently caused concern.131 Judging by the size of theROC's embassy in Mbabane, however, Taipei greatly values Swaziland as astrategic diplomatic ally in the region.132 Indeed, Swazi leaders have beenregular visitors to Taipei - six times between 1969 and 1988.m There was aslight indication of a possible thaw in relations between the PRC andMbabane when the mayor of Beijing met the Swaziland InternationalOlympic Committee member in 1992, though this came to nothing.134 Tradebetween Beijing and Mbabane has existed — though at negligible levels:


exporting US$700,000 worth of goods to Swaziland, and importing US$2.5million in 1992.1" In essence, Beijing has almost been totally absent fromSwaziland. Indeed, an indication of China's exclusion from Swaziland wasillustrated by Mbabane being one of the original 16 countries (later rising to28) promoting the admission to the United Nations of 'the free people of theRepublic of China' in October 1996.136 Thus, like Lesotho, Beijing'spolicies towards Swaziland have largely foundered on the rocks of therealpolitik of the regional sub-system. However, with South Africa nowrecognising China, the possibility that Mbabane may follow Pretoria's leadand switch recognition cannot be precluded, though the ROC will no doubtredouble its efforts in maintaining its links with Swaziland. WhetherTaiwan's 'dollar diplomacy' is sufficient to keep Mbabane within the foldat this point however, is uncertain.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The PRC's relations with the three small states in the southern Africanregional sub-system were in essence dependent on the largesse of theregional hegemon, namely South Africa. This was particularly so in regardto landlocked Lesotho and the vulnerable Swaziland. Though Beijing's anti-hegemonic posturing and rhetorical support for BLS had some effect,particularly in Botswana where a mutually satisfactory relationship wasdeveloped, relations with the three countries have been relatively restricted.Lesotho's highly vulnerable position regarding South Africa and its internalpolitics has meant that its ties with Beijing have been unstable andunpredictable. Swaziland, by contrast, has had virtually no links with thePRC and may concern this study no further. Of the three, Botswana has beenthe most susceptible to Beijing's posturing of its 'independent foreignpolicy', and it is in Gaborone where the PRC may be said to have conducteda relatively successful policy in maintaining linkages.

However, any study of China's relations with either Botswana, Lesothoor Swaziland must be cognisant of the fact that 'close economic ties [with]South Africa ... have inevitably undermined the political independence ofthese countries'"7 and it is apparent that China's success or otherwise indeveloping ties have always had far more to do with the domestic agendasof the respective countries and the response to the regional hegemon thanthey have with any particular policy pursual by Beijing. Whilst bothGaborone's and Maseru's (under Jonathan) foreign policies may have beenamenable to Chinese approaches and the aims of such policies may havecoincided with the PRC's own anti-hegemonic utterances and 'independent'schedule, it is evident that China was always on the periphery and reactiveto internal developments in the respective African countries. With South


Africa a democracy and now pursuing a normalisation of its links withBeijing, the driving force behind China's policies, namely to combatsuperpower encroachment and project itself as a 'concerned' member of theinternational community vis-a-vis racist South Africa, has gone. Whetherthis will adversely affect China's interest in BLS is perhaps too early to say,though whatever the future may hold it is likely to remain reactive todevelopments within the southern African countries and not be proactive orparticularly dynamic. Chinese foreign policy in the region will no doubtincreasingly become dominated by its ties with South Africa and as a resultthe position of BLS in the PRC's international relations is unlikely tochange overtly or to be strengthened in any meaningful way.

NOTES

1. Rok Ajulu and Diana Cammack, 'Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: Captive States', inPhyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War(Harare, 1986), 139-70. Other writers to comment on BLS's limitations in foreign policypursual because of South Africa are Douglas Anglin 'Southern Africa Under Siege:Options for the Front-Line States', Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, 4 (1988),549-65; and David Black et al., Foreign Policy in Small States: Botswana, Lesotho,Swaziland and Southern Africa (Halifax: Canada, 1988).

2. See Valentine Belfiglio, 'South Africa's Relations With Botswana, Lesotho andSwaziland", Journal of Asian and African Studies, 15, 3-4 (1980), 217-28; RolfBodenmüller, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: Their External Relations and PolicyAttitudes Towards South Africa (Pretoria, 1973); and Arnold Isaacs, Dependence RelationsBetween Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa (Leiden:Netherlands, 1982).

3. See Steven Stedman (ed.), Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development(Boulder: Colorado, 1993).

4. See Guy Arnold, 'Botswana: Little Room for Manoeuvre', New African, 241 (Oct. 1987),43-4; Richard Dale, Botswana and Its Southern Neighbour: The Patterns of Linkage andthe Options in Statecraft (Athens: Ohio, 1970); 'Botswana's Foreign Policy: State andNon-State Actors and Small Power Diplomacy', in Louis Picard (ed.), The Evolution ofModern Botswana: Politics and Rural Development in Southern Africa (London, 1985),209-27.

5. New China News Agency, 27 July 1976, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,Daily Report - China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 28 July 1976, A13.

6. 'Botswana: Reluctant Front-Line State', Africa Confidential, 18, 15 (1977), 3-4.7. Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 12 April 1985.8. Richard Dale, 'Botswana as a Hostage to High Politics? Twentieth Century Conflict with

South Africa and Zimbabwe', in Stedman, Botswana: The Political Economy, 163-83.9. James Zaffiro, The US and Botswana, 1966-1989: Foreign Policy in the Shadows of

Boer and Bear, paper to the International Studies Association Annual Convention,London, 26 March-2 April 1989.

10. Free China Weekly (Taipei), 21 July 1968.11. Free China Weekly (Taipei), 5 October 1969.12. See 'Botswana: Defiant Survival', Africa (May 1971), 34-9.13. See H.C.L. Hermans, 'Botswana Develops Its Own Currency and Reserves', African

Development, 10, 9 (1976), 895.14. Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series (hereafter ARB:PSCS), 7,

1-30 (Sept. 1970), 1874. According to this report, 'the new diplomatic link [was] anindirect consequence of the political and economic rapprochement which has been

9 2 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

developing since the start of 1970 between Botswana and Zambia, a country in which theeconomic presence of the Communist world is shared between China (CPR), the SovietUnion and Yugoslavia'.

15. See ARB: PSCS, 8, 1-30 June 1971, 2146, and ARB: PSCS, 7, 1-31 Aug. 1970, 1851,respectively.

16. China Yearbook 1972-1973 (Taipei, 1973), 387.17. New China News Agency, 29 Sept. 1972, cited in FBIS-CHI, 3 Oct. 1972, A14.18. New China News Agency, 7 Jan. 1975, cited in FBIS-CHI, 8 Jan. 1975, A10.19. According to Philip Morgan, ideology in Botswana was of negligible importance anyway

- see 'Botswana: Development, Democracy and Vulnerability', in Gwendolen Carter andPatrick O'Meara (eds.), Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis (London, 1979), 239-41.

20. New China News Agency, 27 July 1976, cited in FBIS-CHI, 28 July 1976, Al l .21. Ibid.22. Ibid.23. For the text of Seretse Khama's speech, see ibid., A13-17.24. New China News Agency, 5 Oct. 1976, cited in FBIS-CHI, 6 Oct. 1976, A20.25. New China News Agency, 26 May 1977, cited in FBIS-CHI, 27 May 1977, A4.26. Botswanan Foreign Minister at a state banquet in Beijing - see New China News Agency,

17 Aug. 1978, cited in FBIS-CHI, 18 Aug. 1978, A30.27. Reported in Xinhua, 19 Feb. 1981, cited in FBIS-CHI, 20 Feb. 1981, II.28. Sheridan Johns, 'Botswana's Strategy for Development: An Assessment of Dependence in

the Southern African Context', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 11, 3 (1973),214-30.

29. Willie Henderson, 'Independent Botswana: A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Options',African Affairs, 73, 290 (1974), 37-49.

30. Xinhua, 28 Sept. 1986, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 Oct. 1986, II.31. Xinhua, 10 June 1988, cited in FBIS-CHI, 14 June 1988, 19.32. For coverage, see Phylliss Johnson and David Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement:

Southern Africa at War (Harare, 1986).33. Xinhua, 30 March 1988, cited in FBIS-CHI. 30 March 1988, 1.34. Xinhua, 28 July 1989, cited in FBIS-CHI, 28 July 1989, 7.35. Ibid., 6.36. Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), 8 Sept. 1991, cited in FBIS-CHI, 11 Sept. 1991,

12.37. See Barry Naughton, 'The Foreign Policy Implications of China's Economic Development

Strategy', in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1995), 47-69.

38. Xinhua, 24 June 1980, cited in FBIS-CHI, 26 June 1980, 13.39. Xinhua, 25 June 1980, cited in FBIS-CHI, 26 June 1980, 14.40. Xinhua, 12 Dec. 1980, cited in FBIS-CHI, 12 Dec. 1980, 12.41. See article 'Botswana: A Better-Off Society Emerging From Dire Poverty', Xinhua, 28

Sept. 1981, cited in FBIS-CHI, 30 Sept. 1981, II.42. Ibid.43. Xinhua, 9 June 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 12 June 1985, II.44. Xinhua, 14 Nov. 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 15 Nov 1983, II.45. Ibid., 13.46. Xinhua, 21 April 1984, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 May 1984, 12.47. Xinhua, 11 June 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 12 June 1985, 12.48. Xinhua, 29 Sept. 1986, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 Oct. 1986, 12.49. The PRC trade mission was made up of six import and export corporations from Shanghai,

see Xinhua, 31 Aug. 1988, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 Sept. 1988, 18.50. See article 'Chinese invited to invest in Botswana', Daily News (Gaborone), 16Sept. 1991.51. Radio Botswana, 1 April 1992, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 April 1992, 14.52. Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1993/94 (Hong Kong, 1994), 730.53. See article 'Chinese Under Botswana Fire', Sunday Times (London), 18 Aug. 1991; and

The Star (Johannesburg), 11 Nov. 1991.


54. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Trade Series (hereafter ARB: EFTS),15 Nov.-14 Dec. 1978, 4935A.

55. Xinhua, 16 May 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 17 May 1983, II.56. Xinhua, 16 Aug. 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 16 Aug. 1985, II.57. Radio Botswana, 1 April 1992 cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 April 1992, 14.58. Xinhua, 11 June 1980, cited in FBIS-CHI, 11 June 1980, 13.59. Xinhua, 6 April 1989, cited in FBIS-CHI, 7 April 1989, 11.60. For coverage on this subject, see Xinhua, 5 Jan. 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 8 Jan. 1985,

13.61. This project was completed in 1987 - see Xinhua, 16 Sept. 1987, cited in FBIS-CHI, 16

Sept. 1987, 8.62. ARB: EFTS, 15 Sept.-14 Oct. 1984, 7464A.63. Xinhua, 6 Sept. 1986, cited in FBIS-CHI, 11 Sept. 1986, I2.64. Xinhua, 1 Oct. 1986, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 Oct. 1986, I3.65. Xinhua, 20 Sept. 1990, cited in FBIS-CHI, 21 Sept. 1990, 16.66. Xinhua, 3 Feb. 1993, cited in FBIS-CHI, 8 Feb. 1993, 14.67. Xinhua, 23 March 1995, cited in FBIS-CHI, 24 March 1995, 13.68. See comments made by Lt. General Merafhe, Botswanan Minister of Presidential Affairs,

Xinhua, 7 Sept. 1993, cited in FBIS-CHI, 14 Sept. 1993, 13.69. Xinhua, 19 May 1992, cited in FBIS-CHI, 20 May 1992, 13.70. For the peculiarities of Lesotho's position, see Timothy Thahane, 'Lesotho: An Island

Country: The Problems of Being Landlocked', African Review, 4, 2 (1974), 279-90.71. For a discussion of Lesotho's almost total dependence on South Africa, see Guy Arnold,

'Uneasy Relationship With South Africa', African Development, 10, 10 (Oct. 1976),1033-4; and Adrian Clark, 'A Delicate Independence', Africa Report (July-Aug. 1982),43-7.

72. See Simon Baynham and Greg Mills, 'Lesotho: Between Dependence and Destabilisation',World Today, 43, 3 (March 1987), 52-4.

73. James Cobbe, 'Economic Aspects of Lesotho's Relations With South Africa', Journal ofModern African Studies, 26, 1 (1988), 71-89; John Edward Spence, Lesotho: the Politicsof Dependence (London, 1968); and Sandra Wallman, 'A Different Progress: TheModernisation of Dependence in Lesotho', in Sandra Wallman (ed.), Perception ofDevelopment (Cambridge, 1977), 114-18.

74. Colin Murray, 'From Granary to Labour Reserve', South African Labour Bulletin, 6, 4(1980). For a discussion of Lesotho's labour exporting relationship with Pretoria, seeGabriele Winai-Ström, Migration and Development - Dependence on South Africa: AStudy of Lesotho (Trenton: New Jersey, 1986).

75. Sandra Wallman, 'Conditions of Non-Development: The Case of Lesotho', Journal ofDevelopment Studies, 8, 2 (1972), 251-62.

76. For example, between 1966 and 1982, Leabua Jonathan visited the ROC four times on statevisits and the ROC's Premier paid a state visit to Lesotho in 1980 - Deon Geldenhuys,Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, 1990), 213-16.

77. See Richard Weisfelder, 'Lesotho', in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), SouthernAfrica: Essays in Regional Politics (New York, 1972), 125-40.

78. ARB: PSCS, vol.5, 1-29 Feb. 1968, 974.79. ARB: PSCS, vol.4, 1-28 Feb. 1967, 721.80. Lesotho became independent on 4 October 1966 and established relations with Taipei on

31 October.81. Free China Weekly (Taipei), 31 Aug. 1969, 1.82. Wei Liang Tsai, Peking Versus Taipei in Africa, 1960-1978 (Taipei, 1982), 370.83. John Holm, 'Political Stability in Lesotho', Africa Today, 19, 4 (1972), 3-16.84. David Hirschmann, 'Changes in Lesotho's Policy Towards South Africa', African Affairs,

78, 311 (April 1979), 177-96. See also ARB: PSCS, 10, 1-30 April 1973, 2817.85. Africa Confidential, 14 June 1974, 6-7.86. ARB: PSCS, 8, 1-30 June 1971, 2146.87. New China News Agency, 3 Oct. 1972, cited in FBIS-CHI, 5 Oct. 1972, Al l .

9 4 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

88. Joan Brickhill, 'Lesotho: Breaking Pretoria's Stranglehold', Africa, 71 (July 1977), 33-4.89. New China News Agency, 19 May 1975, cited in FB1S-CHI, 22 May 1975, A26.90. Ibid., A27.91. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-1976, B547.92. Ibid., B549.93. See, for example, New China News Agency, 30 April 1977, cited in FBIS-CHI, 3 May

1977, A21.94. New China News Agency, 27 Sept. 1977, cited in FB1S-CHI, 28 Sept. 1977, A30.95. See article 'Lesotho and South Africa: The Unequal Relationship', ARB: PSCS, 23, 1 (15

Feb. 1986), 7940-42; and Southern Africa Report, 1, 31 (Sept. 1983), 9.96. See coverage in Xinhua, 13 May 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 16 May 1983, II.97. Ibid.98. Ibid., 13.99. Xinhua, 14 May 1983, cited in FB1S-CHI, 16 May 1983, I3.100. Beijing Review (Beijing), 23 May 1983, 7.101. ARB: PSCS, 20(1-31 May 1983), 685. For Chinese commentary on this, see Renmin Ribao

(in Chinese), 15 May 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 18 May 1983, 1.102. Xinhua, 16 May 1983, cited in FB1S-CHI, 16 May 1983, I4.103. Xinhua, 16 May 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 18 May 1983, I1.104. For a prediction of this, see Gerhard Leistner, 'Lesotho and South Africa: Uneasy

Relationship', Africa Institute Bulletin, 23, 16 (1983), 141-4.105. Xinhua, 13 May 1983, cited in FBIS-CHI, 16May 1983, 12.106. Particularly in the economic arena, see Joanmarie Kalter, 'The Economic Squeeze', Africa

Report, 29, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1984), 67-70.107. Xinhua, 31 Aug. 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 6 Sept. 1985, I l .108. Xinhua, 1 Sept. 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 6 Sept. 1985, I2.109. ARB: EFTS, 22, 12 (1-31 Jan. 1986), 8028-9.110. Julian Borger, 'The Price of Dependence', New African (March 1986), 19-20. See also

Gerhard Leistner, 'Lesotho After the Coup', Africa Institute Bulletin, 26, 3 (1986), 33-5.111. Beijing Review (Beijing), 10 Feb. 1986, 11.112. Xinhua, 15 March 1986, cited in FBIS-CHI, 17 March 1986, 14.113. The Courier: Africa-Caribbean; European Community, 115 (May-June 1989), 27.114. Africa News, 26, 3 (10 Feb. 1986), 8-9.115. 'Lesotho's Water Down the SA Drain?' New African, 230 (Nov. 1986), 30-31. For

coverage of the actual project, see 'Lesotho Highland Scheme: A Survey', Financial MailSupplement (Johannesburg), 6 May 1988.

116. ARB: PSCS, 23, 3 (15 April 1988), 7999-8000.117. Mafa Sejanamane, 'Lesotho in Southern Africa: From an Assertive to a Submissive

Foreign Policy', Lesotho Law Journal, 4, 2 (1988), 7-31.118. Xinhua, 1 Sept. 1987, cited in FBIS-CHI, 3 Sept. 1987, 6.119. Xinhua, 17 Oct. 1984, cited in FBIS-CHI, 18 Oct. 1984, I1.120. Xinhua, 10 May 1988, cited in FBIS-CHI, 12 May 1988, 16.121. Xinhua, 29 June 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 3 July 1983, 13.122. See coverage in Xinhua, 28 July 1989, cited in FBIS-CHI, 31 July 1989, 15.123. Xinhua, 29 July 1989, cited in FBIS-CHI, 31 July 1989, 15.124. ARB: PSCS, 27, 4 (1990), 9671. See also Beijing Review (Beijing), 23 April 1990, 4.125. Robert Edgar, 'The Lesotho Coup of 1986', South African Review, 4 (1987), 373-82.126. Agence France-Presse (Johannesburg), 12 Jan. 1994.127. For an introduction to Swaziland's economic and political status, see Christian Potholm,

'Swaziland', in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective:Essays, 141-53.

128. John Daniel, 'A Comparative Analysis of Lesotho and Swaziland's Relations With SouthAfrica', South African Review, 2 (1984), 228-38.

129. Joshua Mugyeny, 'Swaziland: The Vagaries of Geopolitics, Subordination andCollaboration', in Stephen Arnold and Andre Nitecki (eds.), Culture and Development inAfrica (Trenton: New Jersey, 1990), 267-85.


130. Wei Liang Tsai, Peking Versus Taipei, 372-3.131. See article 'They Exploit Us', Times of Swaziland (Mbabane), 13 Sept. 1991.132. Personal observation by author in Mbabane, May 1992.133. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 213-15.134. Xinhua, Domestic Service (in Chinese), 30 Oct. 1992, cited in FBIS-CHI, 2 Nov. 1992, A2.135. China's Latest Economic Statistics (Shenzhen: PRC, 1993).136. Associated Press (New York), 18 Sept. 1996.137. Derrick Chitala, 'The Political Economy of SADCC, in Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala and

Ibbo Mandaza (eds.), SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in SouthernAfrica (London, 1987), 24.