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L ev erty , Lynn H o llin g tw o rth

THE SPANISH QUESTION IN MEXICO: LAZARO CARDENAS AND THE SPANISH REPUBLICANS

The American Unfveralty PH.D, 1983

Universify Microfilms

Internationa! 3ooN.Ro#d.Ai***0.,«4*io6

Copyright 1983

by

Leverty, Lynn Hollingsworth

All Rights Reserved

THE SPANISH QUESTION IN MEXICO: LAZARO CARDENAS

AND THE SPANISH REPUBLICANS

byLynn Hollingsworth Leverty

submitted to the

Faculty o f the College of Public and In te rna tiona l A ffa irsof the American University

in P a rt ia l F u lf illm en t ofThe Requirements of the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

In terna tional Relations

Dean o f the Coll e g /

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman:

1983The American University Washington, DC 20016

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSI'PY LIBRARf

THE SPANISH QUESTION IN MEXICO: LAZARO CARDENAS

AND THE SPANISH REPUBLICANS

BY

Lynn Hollingsworth Leverty

ABSTRACT

This d is s e r ta t io n describes Mexico's re la t io n sh ip with

the Second Spanish Republic and analyzes President LSzaro Cdrdenas'

Influence on th is po licy . C&rdenas In s t i tu t io n a l iz e d the foreign

policy of the Mexican Revolution during his s ix -y ear term (1934-

1940) and used th is policy to e s ta b l ish c lose p o l i t i c a l and personal

t i e s with the Republic. These t i e s f lourished u n t i l h is death In

1970. His successors continued to support the Republic with no

dev ia tion from the path charted by Cârdenas.

In 1931 Mexican President Pascual O rtiz Rubio warmly

heralded the b i r th o f the Second Spanish Republic. When the Spanish

Civil War began in 1936, President Cârdenas pledged Mexico's o f f i ­

c ia l support fo r the Republic. He Immediately shipped food and wea­

pons to Spain, and ordered Mexico's rep resen ta tives In the League of

Nations to defend the Republic aga inst the Nonintervention Pact of

the g rea t powers.

The Civil War ended in 1939. Cârdenas Immediately announced

th a t Spanish refugees would be welcomed In Mexico. The Mexican

11

government worked with other nations to a s s i s t the refugees who

poured In to France from Spain and helped many to emigrate to

Mexico. This Immigration continued throughout the 1940's and

brought many ta len ted new residents to Mexico.

Mexico allowed the exiles to se t up an organ ization which

f in a l ly evolved in to a government-1n-ex1le which was formed in

Mexico City In 1945, President Avila Camacho recognized the

government-in-ex11e as the true government of Spain, and h is

successors continued to maintain th is re la tio n sh ip un til 1 9 77 -

two years a f t e r Franco's death.

Mexico's refusal to recognize Francisco Franco was an

extraordinary episode In her diplomatic h is to ry , and can be traced ,

a t le a s t to a g rea t extent, to the continuing influence o f LSzaro

Cârdenas. Cârdenas believed strongly th a t the Republic was the

legally e lec ted government of Spain and th a t Franco had been imposed

with the ass is tance of foreign governments. For th i s reason, he

continued to support the Republic and to qu ie tly urge his successors

to continue to recognize the government-in-ex11e. For Cârdenas,

Mexico's policy toward Spain was an ideal example o f the foreign

policy o f the Revolution.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ 11

Chapter

I. MEXICO AND THE SPANISH REPUBLIC .............................................. 1

Early Relations between Mexico and theSpanish Republic ............................................................... 1

Birth o f the Spanish Republic ...................................... 5Development o f the Republican Government

In S p a i n .................................................................................... 7Reaction In Mexico ............................................................... 8Reaction 1n M ex ico ..................................................................12Cârdenas' Relations with Spain ...................................... 13Events In Spain ..................................................................14Mexico and the Popular Front Victory ......................... 15The Popular Front Government .......................................... 16In terna tional Responses to the Spanish

Civil W a r .............................................................................. 18

I I . THE CIVIL WAR .............................................................................. 22

Mexico's Early Support fo r the Republic ................. 22In te rna tiona l Reaction to Mexico's Aid to

S p a i n ...................................................................................... 24Reaction a t Home......................................................................28Continued Support fo r the Republic ............................. 30Mexico Welcomes Spanish Refugees .................................. 34Diplomatic Support fo r the Republic ......................... 37Continued Support o f the Republic ............................. 40The Rebels as B e l l i g e r e n t s .................................................43Controversy Over Diplomatic Asylum .............................. 44

1v

I I I . DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC.................................................................. 48

End o f the War .................................................................................46Care o f the R e fu g e e s ........................................................................ 53Emigration ......................................................................................... 54Refugees to M ex ico .............................................................................57Selec tion o f Refugees ............................................................... 59C itizensh ip 1n Mexico ................................................... . . . 62In te rn a tio n a l E ffo r ts ............................................................... 63The End o f Mexico's R ela tions 1n France ......................... 66

IV. ACCEPTANCE OF THE REFUGEES IN MEXICO...........................................69

Early S e t t l e m e n t .................................................................................69P o l i t ic a l A c t i v i t y ...................................... 76Early Moves Toward a Government-1n-Exil e ......................... 79San Francisco C o n fe re n c e .............................. * .............................82Formation o f the Government-in-Exlle .................................. 85

V. MEXICAN-SPANISH RELATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II ................... 88

Mexico and th e United N a t i o n s ...................................................89Government-1n-ExIle ...................... ‘ ................................... 94Events in M e x ic o ........................................................................... 96Spain's R ela tions with Other N a t i o n s .................................... 100Mexico and the Government-In-Exile . . . . ..................... 102R ela tions between Mexico and Spain ...................................... 105The Continuing Role o f LSzaro Cârdenas ............................. 108

VI. RESTORATION OF RELATIONS................................................................... I l l

P res iden t Luis Echeverrla ....................................................... I l lU noffic ia l T ies between Spain and Mexico ......................... 113Republican Exiles ........................................................................ 113Changing R ela tions between Mexico and Spain ................. 115R esto ra tion of Diplomatic R ela tions ................................. 118Renewal o f Diplomatic R ela tions . . . . . . . . . . . 122

VII. LAZARO CARDENAS AND THE SPANISH REPUBLIC ............................. 125

The Presidency o f LSzaro Cârdenas ..................................... 125Cârdenas* Foreign Policy ...................................................... 128Lâzaro Cârdenas and Spain ...................................................... 131Spanish Refugees in Mexico ...................................................... 134Cârdenas' P o lic ie s A fter R etir ing from the

Pres 1 dency ..................................................................................135C o n c lu s io n ........................................................................................ 136

APPENDIX............................................................................................................ 141

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................... 152

v1

CHAPTER I

MEXICO AND THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

President Lâzaro Cârdenas, Inaugurated on Ju ly 1, 1934,

Inherited a troubled re la t io n sh ip with Republican Spain. After

the b i r th o f the Second Spanish Republic In April 1931, Mexico

rushed to be the f i r s t nation to recognize the new Spanish govern­

ment. By mutual agreement, the lega tions of both nations were

elevated to embassies and ambassadors were exchanged 1n la t e May.

However, by 1934 re la t io n s between the two nations had cooled,

p rim arily due to s h i f t s within the Spanish government. Cârdenas

continued to have c lose re la t io n s with a number o f Spanish o f f i ­

c i a l s , but diplomatic r e la t io n s between Mexico and Spain were not

cord ial again u n ti l j u s t before the outbreak o f the Spanish Civil

War. Once the Civil War began, Mexico pledged Immediate diplomatic

and material support to the Republican government.

Early Relations between Mexico and the Second Spanish Republic

In 1931, when Mexico entered a c lose re la t io n sh ip with

the Second Spanish Republic th a t would l a s t more than 40 y ears ,

the social and economic conditions In the two coun tr ies were

s im ila r In many aspec ts . Both suffered from a lack of national

unity and b i t t e r c o n f l ic ts between a n t i c l e r ic a l s and C atho lics ,

were economically underdeveloped, and had a huge ru ra l landless

1

c la s s who were generally I l l i t e r a t e and dominated by local leaders.

Mexico, however, was on the way—often slowly and v io len tly —toward

solving these problems, while Spain was Just beginning the struggle

to move In to the twentieth century.

Mexico stood a t a crossroads In 1931—the long v io lent

years of the Revolution were over and the government, although

s t i l l dominated by a strongman,^ was beginning to s ta b i l i z e .

Mexican c i t iz e n s were looking to the government to see whether

the reforms which had been promised in the 1917 Constitution

would ac tu a lly be carried out. Some refonns had been In i t ia te d

during the turbulen t 1920's while ex-Revolut1onary generals

jock led fo r p o l i t ic a l leadership. Over 1,000 ru ra l schools were

b u i l t , acres o f land d istribu ted to the landless, and. In a clumsy,

o f ten v ind icative way, the separation of the church and s ta te

continued. In 1928 a national p o l i t ica l party, e l Partldo Naclonal

Revoluclonarlo (PNR), had been founded to In s t i tu t io n a l iz e the

Revolution, to ensure I t s control by the leaders of the Revolution,

and to guarantee th a t the reforms promised In the Constitution

would be carr ied out by subsequent governments. However,

Ex-president Ellas Plutarco Calles, although o f f ic ia l ly r e t i r e d In 1928, continued to Intervene as he f e l t necessary In the a f f a i r s o f the Mexican government. Known as the " jefe maximo" of the Revolution, h is successors, Emilio Portes G il , Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodriguez, served only as long as they did not oppose the wishes of Calles. In f a c t , Ortiz Rubio was helped to res ign by Calles when he t r ied to remove a number o f C a ll ls tas from o f f ic e . Calles was f in a l ly sent Into exile In April 1936 by Rodriguez' successor. President Lâzaro CSrdenas and did not return to Mexico for a decade, Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton, M ifflin, and Company, 1970), pp. 381-4Ûli JesQs Silva Herzog, Una Vida en la Vida de México, 2nd ed.(México: S iglo velntiuno ed ito res , s . a . , 19^5), p. 159.

3

thousands o f peons s t i l l remained landless and w ithout schools or

health care ; transporta tion remained inadequate; and, few persons

d i r e c t ly p a r t ic ip a te d in the government.

In foreign a f f a i r s , Mexico was beginning to emerge from

her long withdrawal and develop a fo reign policy r e f l e c t in g her

Revolutionary goals. Although not a member of the League of2

Nations u n t i l November 1931, Mexican diplomats had begun to play

a ro le In a number of in te rna tiona l conferences and were working

with the United S ta tes and o th er a ffec ted nations to s e t t l e

d isputes a r is in g from the Revolution. In 1930, Mexico's Foreign

M inister , Genaro Estrada, announced what has become known as the

"Estrada Doctrine"^ building on Mexico's long and b i t t e r experience

with foreign intervention. In th is d o c tr in e , Mexico renounced the

use of diplomatic recognition as a tool f o r governments to use In

expressing approval or disapproval o f o th er governments and

Thomas Powell quotes an a r t i c l e In the B u l le t in of the Foreign M inistry (Mexico) which s ta te s t h a t Spain played an Instrumental ro le In helping Mexico to jo in the League o f Nations, Thomas G. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War (Albuquerque: University o f New Mexico Press , 1981), p. 38.

^The Estrada doctrine s ta te s th a t Mexico w il l not withhold recognition o f ex is tin g governments on p o l i t i c a l grounds. According to the d o c tr in e , Mexico maintains diplomatic r e l a t io n s w ith a l l nations without regard to t h e i r In ternal p o l i t i c s (as long, obviously, as th a t nation maintains r e la t io n s with Mexico). The purpose o f the doctrine was to stop nations from using diplom atic recognition as a tool to force policy changes w ith in another government—a problem Mexico had encountered many tim es, César Sepûlveda, La teo r ia y la p réc tica del reconoclmlento de qobiernos (México: Universidad Naclonal Autonoma de México, Facultaoad de Derecho, 1974), pp. 75-80; E.M. Bouchard and Phoebe Morrison, "Recognition and Nonrecognition," American Journal o f In te rn a tio n a l Law 36 (January 1942):108-111.

4

In s is te d th a t ex is tin g governments should be recognized by o ther

na tions. Mexico a lso began to see h e rs e lf as a revolutionary

example th a t o ther nations should follow. The number o f Mexican

embassies and lega tions Increased around the world, and most o f

the fu tu re leaders o f Mexico represented th e i r country abroad

a t one time or another.

O ff ic ia l t i e s with Spain had reached a low point In early

1931—prim arily due to the Spanish claims a r is in g from the Revolu­

t io n . Many Spaniards had accumulated g rea t wealth and property

during the 19th century . Including vast amounts o f rea l e s ta te

In Mexico C ity , la rge haciendas, and businesses. Much o f th is

property had been damaged or destroyed during the years of the

c o n f l i c t ,4 and the two governments had been unable to s a t i s f a c ­

to r i l y resolve the re su l t in g claims. The Spanish colony In

Mexico generally was not supportive of the Revolution and con­

tinued to support openly opponents of the Mexican government.^

Despite o f f i c i a l coolness, t i e s between many Mexican

and Spanish In te l le c tu a ls were c lose in the 1920's. Liberal

Spanish w r i te r s , such as RamÔn Valle InclSn, v i s i te d Mexico to

examine f i r s t -h a n d the r e s u l t s of the Revolution.® Mexican

scholars often trave led to Spain, where many formed re la tio n sh ip s

*Ed1th O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub lishers , iSTeT, pp. 6 , 12, 93-4, 176-7.

®J. H. Plenn, Mexico Marches ( Ind ianapo lis : Bobbs, M e rr i l l , 1939), pp. 68-9.

®Robert Nunez y Dominguez, Como v1 la repQblica espahola (México: n. p . , 1933), pp. 58-9.

with Spanish p o l i t i c ia n s and In te l le c tu a ls who were l a t e r to lead

the Second Spanish Republic. JesQs Silva Herzog, a leading Mexican

economist and w r i te r who supported the Republic, became a fr ien d

of the fu tu re Spanish ambassador to Mexico, Ju l io Alvarez del Vayo,

during a v i s i t to Spain during th is period ,^ These re la t io n sh ip s

were Invaluable In helping Mexico and Spain re s to re f r ie n d ly d ip lo ­

matic re la t io n s in 1931,

B irth of the Spanish Republic

The abdication of the king and the b ir th o f the Second

Spanish Republic were met with immediate o f f ic ia l support In Mexico.

President Pascual O rtiz Rubio quickly dispatched his M in ister to

Madrid, Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, to pay a v i s i t to th e new

Spanish P residen t, Niceto AlcalS Zamora. Gonzalez Martinez o fferedg

Mexico's best wishes and o f f ic ia l support to the Republic.

The new Spanish government was recognized formally by

Mexico on May 14. By mutual agreement, the legations o f both na tions

were elevated to embassies, and ambassadors were exchanged In l a t e

May. Both ambassadors were persons of respec t in t h e i r home

coun tries . Mexican Ambassador Alberto J . Pani was a former

Secretary of Foreign Relations under President Obregôn, and

^Jullo Alvarez del Vayo, Give He Combat: The Memoirs of Ju l io Alvarez del Vayo, tran s . Donald D. Walsh (Boston: L i t t l e ,Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 204-6.

®"Poder Ejecutivo: Secre tarla de Relaclones E x te r lo res ," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, é d . , Hëxico y La Repûbllcana Espaflola: Antologla de Documentos. 1931-1977 (México; Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, 1978), p. 19.

6

Spanish Ambassador Ju l io Alvarez del Vayo was a prominent morber

o f the S o c ia l i s t party and a j o u r n a l i s t . Rani's statement upon

presenting h is c re d en tia ls to the Spanish government summarized

the Mexican government's des ire fo r a c lose re la t io n sh ip . He

saluted Spain "with sympathy Inspired by the present s im ila r i ty

of p o l i t i c a l and social a sp ira t io n s and enthusiasm on the p o s s ib i l i ty

of e ffe c t iv e cooperation between the new democracy of the peninsulan

and the young nations o f America."

Alvarez del Vayo was welcomed warmly by Mexican o f f i c i a l s

in Vera Cruz in l a t e May. A fter a slow journey to Mexico City

during which he v is i te d many c i t i e s and towns, the Spanish ambas­

sador quickly became a popular f ig u re in Mexico. The Embassy of

Spain became a gathering place fo r many Mexican le a d e rs . Including

diplomats Genaro Estrada and Daniel Coslo V illegas , economist and

h is to r ia n JesQs S ilva Herzog, and labor leader Vicente Lombardo

Toledano. Alvarez del Vayo a lso became the f r ien d of the M inister

of War and fu tu re p res id en t , Lâzaro Cârdenas, and o f ex-presiden t

Plutarco Ellas C alles . He did not l im i t h is fr iendsh ips to the

national leaders o f Mexico; he a lso trave led frequently through

the country, ta lk in g to municipal leaders and peasants. In an

attempt to gain f i r s th a n d knowledge of the Mexican Revolution

which could be useful to Spain.*®

®"D1scurso del Sr. Ing. Alberto J . Pani," quoted In Centro Republicano EspaPiol de México, é d . , México y la RepQblica Espahola, pp. 19-20.

*®Alvarez del Vayo, Give He Combat, pp. 204-6.

Development o f the Republican Government In Spain

The loose c o a l i t io n , which announced the formation of a

new government In Spain on April 14, 1931, was made up primarily

o f members of the republican p a r t ie s and moderate s o c ia l i s t s .

Many o f these men had signed the Pact o f San SebastUn In August

1930. The Pact ca lled fo r a republic along the l ines o f the

European model In which p o l i t ic a l and re l ig io u s l ib e r ty would be

guaranteed. According to the Pact, a Constituent Cortes, or

parliam ent, would be e lec ted to w rite a new co n s t i tu t io n for a

democratic Spain.**

The e lec tio n s fo r the Constituent Cortes were held on

June 28, 1931, and re su lted in a parliament which was f a i r ly

rep re sen ta tiv e of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum In Spain. The l e f t i s t

p a r t i e s , including the S o c ia l is ts and the Left Republicans, held

about 250 s e a ts . The c e n t r i s t Radical Party , led by long-time

republican Alejandro Lerroux, held about 100 s e a ts , and the con­

se rv a t iv e p a r t ie s about 80. Included In the conservative wing

were the ag ra r ian s , conservative republicans, and Catholic

Basques.*^

The d ra f t in g of the co n s t i tu t io n was en trusted to a

committee o f the Cortes led by two men: one a moderate s o c ia l i s t

and the o ther a former M inister o f Public Works under King Alfonso

G a b r i e l Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939 (Princeton; Princeton University P ress , 1965), p. 26; Antonio Ramos-Ollveira, H is to ria de Espaha. 6 vols. (México: Companis General de Ediclones, S.A., 1952), 3:10,

*^ Jack son , The S p an ish R ep u b lic and C i v i l War, p. 41.

8

XIII. After the d r a f t was completed in early August, the e n t i re

Cortes worked on th e final version u n t i l I t was completed In

early December. The f in ished c o n s t i tu t io n provided for a govern­

ment based on the European unicameral parliam ent, with an Indepen­

dent ju d ic ia ry and a p res iden t e lec ted fo r a s ix -year term. The

president was given the au tho ri ty to appoint and remove the prime

m in ister , veto l e g i s la t io n , and d isso lve the Cortes twice during

his term. The c o n s t i tu t io n a lso Included provisions authorizing

leg is la t io n to separa te the s ta te from the Catholic church,

in i t i a t in g a secu la r education system, e s tab lish ing lim ited

regional autonomy, and providing fo r land reform.

Reaction In Mexico

The s im i la r i ty of th e Mexican and Spanish con stitu t ion s

helped to cement re la t io n s between th e two co un tr ies . Mexican

leaders believed th a t Spain, fo r the f i r s t time since Mexican

Independence, was In te re s ted in Mexico, and the Mexican government

sent de ta iled Information to Spain on her experience In carrying

out reforms embodied In the 1917 c o n s t i tu t io n . I n te l le c tu a ls ,

such as Coslo V illegas , went to Madrid to teach In the un ivers ity

and to advise the Spanish government. Unfortunately, many of the

Mexicans, including Coslo V illegas , returned to Mexico saying13th a t “the Spanish a re b e t te r i n te l le c tu a l s than rev o lu tion a ries ."

TTCoslo V illegas , Memories, p . 145.

Despite en thus ias tic government support, not a l l res iden ts

o f Mexico were delighted with the Spanish Republic. Conservatives

and members of the Spanish colony opposed the po lic ies of the new

Spanish government. Mexican conservatives preferred the Catholic

and r ig id ly h ierarch ica l s tru c tu re of royal Spain and hoped to see

th is p o l i t ic a l and social regime restored In Mexico. Many members

of the Spanish colony In Mexico also feared th a t the Republic

would not a s s i s t them In pressing for resolution of th e i r claims

against the Mexican government.**

Mexico watched Spain closely and worried th a t the Republic

would not achieve I t s goals. Unlike Mexico, where the p o l i t ic s

o f personality had stunted the development of p a r t ie s , the

Republican government had been formed by representatives of a

broad spectrum of p o l i t ic a l p a r t ie s . Support fo r the Individual

programs of the Republic was tenuous, even among members of the

government, and the p o l i t ic a l held divergent views on the best

way to Implement those po lic ies held In common. There a lso was

widespread opposition to the Republic in rural areas and among

wealthy conservatives. Mexicans who were fam ilia r with Spain

feared th a t the Republican government would f a l l prey to the

opposition. Remembering the fa te of Madero and o ther leaders of

the Mexican Revolution, Silva Herzog to ld Ambassador Alvarez del

Vayo th a t governments which "are so decent, so humanitarian, and

**Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 49-52; El Naclonal. 15 ApfTl Ï93T:

10

legal" do not l a s t long and are "quickly taken over by more

ru th le s s opponents."

Although Mexican fears la te r proved to be va lid , the

Spanish government made s ign if ican t progress toward achieving

the goals s e t out In the Constitution during 1932 and early 1933.

By e a r ly 1933, about ten thousand new primary schools had been

b u i l t In a cooperative e f fo r t between the national government and

municipal a u th o r i t ie s . Separation of church and s ta te was a more

complicated question, but a divorce law was enacted and the

cernet a r i e s were secularized. The government also managed to reduce

th e number o f m ili ta ry o ff ice rs and c iv i l servants who had long

cu t down on governmental efficiency and had Increased the national

budget. A s ta tu te fo r autonomy of Catalonia was enacted, and the

Cortes passed an agrarian reform law which authorized the expropria­

t io n o f m ill io n s of acres of land and provided fo r both Individual

and c o l le c t iv e use of the expropriated land.

As Silva Herzog and others predicted , the p o l i t ic a l and

economic problems of the Republic Increased over time. The generally

moderate p o l ic ie s of the government often pleased no one. The

long-awaited agrarian reform law, when enacted, proved to be an

e x ce llen t example of th is widespread d is s a t is fa c t io n . Due to the

In t r ic a c ie s of the law, only about 10,000 fam ilies actually

received land , leaving many families no b e t te r o f f than they had

*^s"lTva H erzog, Una v id a en la v id a de M êxico . p . 166 .

11

been before 1931. A number of la rge e s ta te s , as well as sm aller

holdings which were supposed to be exempt from exprop ria tion ,

were sold a t auction for a f rac tio n of t h e i r va lue , thus i r r i t a t i n g

wealthy farmers and impoverishing small farmers. In some a reas ,

anarchists active ly worked against the government's land reform

program In the b e lie f th a t such reforms would rob peasants of

th e i r revolutionary fervor.*®

As a r e s u l t of the constant a g ita t io n by the more rad ical

conservatives and lib e ra l groups and the violence which often

accompanied th is a g ita t io n , the country became more conservative.

In the Constituent Cortes, the co a l i t io n between the moderate

Radical party members and the s o c ia l i s t and republican p a r t ie s

broke down In the face of increasing conservative opposition to

the government, and the Radical party moved into ac t iv e opposition

to the government. President Azaha was forced to c a l l e lec tio ns

fo r a Constituent Cortes fo r November 1933.

The polic ies of the Cortes became more conservative

as a re su l t of the November e lec tio ns , A small group of conser­

vative parties won the la rg es t number of s e a t s , followed c lose ly

by the Radical party , which reta ined about 100 s e a ts . Several

of the l e f t i s t Republican parties lo s t almost a l l of th e i r s e a ts ,

and s o c ia l i s t representation was halved.*^

^Jackson, The Spanish Republic and Civil War, p. 85; Ramos-Ollveira, H istoria de Èspaha, 3:43-51^

*^Jackson, The Spanish R ep u b lic and C i v i l War, p. 119 .

12

Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radical Party , became the

new prime m in is te r and formed a cab inet composed only of fellow

Radicals. Under t h e i r d irec tio n many of the laws o f the Republic

were suspended. Including the agrarian reform a c t , church schools

were allowed to operate openly, and expansion o f the government

education program slowed to a crawl.

Reaction In Mexico

The c iv i l s t r i f e In Spain and the re su l t in g s h i f t toward

conservatism caused re la t io n s between Mexico and Spain to cool by

1934. I ro n ic a l ly , as Spain began to reverse the programs o f the

Republic, Mexico e lec ted President Lâzaro Cârdenas, who planned

to carry out many of the reforms o f the Mexican Revolution which

had ex is ted la rg e ly on paper fo r more than a decade. As th e i r

p o l ic ie s diverged, the two governments became suspicious o f each

o ther and began to c r i t i c i z e each o th e r 's p o l ic ie s .

Cârdenas was Inaugurated In Ju ly 1934. He se lec ted as

members o f h is cabinet some o f the most rad ica l Mexican p o l i t i ­

c ian s , Including the former governor o f Tabasco, Tomâs Garrldo

Cânabal, and Narclso Bassols, a s o c i a l i s t . These men and

th e i r colleagues took the 1917 C onstitu tion se r iou s ly and

under Cârdenas leadersh ip began to a cce le ra te the d is t r ib u t io n

o f land and the construction of schools, c l i n i c s , roads, and

c ap ita l development p ro jec ts such as I r r ig a t io n dams. Peasants

were encouraged to organize unions, and a new a g r ic u l tu ra l bank

was e s tab lished to give them c re d i t fo r equipment. I r r ig a t io n ,

13

and s im ila r improvements. Trade unions a lso were organized on a

more ex tensive scale under the leadership o f Vicente Lombardo

Toledano, a f r ien d of the President.

CSrdenas* Relations with Spain

Presiden t CSrdenas took a personal In te r e s t In the Spanish

Republic, although he did not overlook the growing d if fe ren c e s In

policy between the governments o f Mexico and Spain. He had

s trong ly supported the Republic during i t s early years and had

e s tab lished a personal re la t io n sh ip with Ambassador Alvarez del

Vayo. When Alvarez del Vayo returned to Spain a f t e r the 1933

e le c t io n s . Cârdenas continued to correspond with the former ambas­

sador. Alvarez del Vayo la t e r c red ited P res iden t Cârdenas with

saving him from a r re s t In 1934; he believed th a t the telegram which

Cârdenas sen t to his fr ien d Inv iting him to the Inauguration In

Mexico City convinced the Spanish a u th o r i t ie s t h a t an a r r e s t could18have In te rn a t io n a l repercussions. Throughout h is a d m in is tra t io n ,

Cârdenas and Alvarez del Vayo continued to correspond on m atters

o f I n t e r e s t to both, especially ru ra l development.

The Mexican President was not impressed w ith Alvarez del

Vayo's successor, Emillano Ig le s ia s , who was le s s committed to the

o r ig in a l p o l ic ie s of the Spanish Republic than h is predecessor.

Ig le s ia s was t re a te d o f f ic ia l ly as any o ther member o f the

*®Alvarez del Vayo, Give Me Combat, p. 209.

14

diplomatic corps, but he was unable to form close fr iendsh ips

with members o f the Mexican government. Rather, he made fr iends

with some conservatives and members o f the Spanish colony, whichI Qdid not endear him to the President.

Events In Spain

While Cârdenas was In s t i tu t io n a l iz in g the programs of the

Mexican Revolution, Spain was experiencing p o l i t ic a l and social

unres t. The Spanish government faced an a rch is t u p r is in g s , general

s t r i k e s , and Increased pressure from conservatives to re s to re peace

and t r a n q u i l i ty . This pressure caused frequent changes In the

cabinet as the government t r i e d to balance these co n fl ic t in g

demands. By 1935 governmental policy was becoming increasing ly

reactionary ; land reform and expansion o f the public educational

system were ha lted e n t i r e ly , Church p roperties were re tu rned , and

increasing concessions were made to the opponents of the Republic.

When the government f in a l ly found i t s e l f unable to form any

policy consensus, e lec t io n s were ca lled fo r February 1936.

The general turmoil and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Spanish

government f a c i l i t a t e d c o a l i t io n build ing among the p a r t ie s o f

the l e f t . Despite the ex ile o f a number of lead e rs , including

s o c i a l i s t Indalecio P r ie to , and the j a i l in g of o thers such as

Francisco Largo Caballero, a s o c i a l i s t trade union lead er , the

*® P ow ell , M exico and t h e S p an ish C i v i l War, p . 5 3 .

15

l e f t began building a new c o a l i t io n In 1935. The growth of fascism

and the support o f the Spanish Ccunmunlst Party helped leaders of

the republican and s o c i a l i s t p a r t ie s to form quickly the Popular

Front C oalition following the model o f the French. The Popular

Front Pact was signed In January 1936 by members o f the republican,

s o c i a l i s t , Catalan, and Communist p a r t ie s . Despite wide variations

in philosophy and goals , the Popular Front was able to agree on

a program which was based on a re tu rn to the polic ies of the f i r s t

two years o f the Republic, Including land reform, and amnesty for

a l l p o l i t i c a l p r isoners .

The February e le c t io n re su l ted In a c lear victory for the

Popular Front, which benefited not only from th e i r own success

In c o a l i t io n bu ild ing , but a lso from the lack of consensus among

the p a r t ie s on the r ig h t . The p a r t ie s o f the Popular Front won

a m ajority o f sea ts In the Cortes, and Manuel Azaha became prime

m in is te r fo r the second time.

Mexico and the Popular Front Victory

The new Spanish government moved quickly to restore friendly

re la t io n s with Mexico, and the Mexican government responded warmly

to th i s overtu re . When the new Spanish ambassador, Félix Gordôn

Ordâs, a rr ived In Mexico In June 1936, he was happily received by

President CSrdenas, who s ta te d :

I share your Excellency's ideas about the mutual his­to r ic a l destiny th a t unites Mexico and Spain . . . the p a ra l le l extends to a common social task th a t should be Immediately and e ffec t iv e ly accomplished . . . p lease t e l l your government.

16

Mr. Ambassador, t h a t Mexico understands and appreciates i t s demonstrations o f in te rn a t io n a l c o rd ia l i ty , and th a t we w ill now and in the fu tu re work to achieve in both coun tr ies a unity of ob jec tives and action th a t will serve our two peoples, who have joined together permanently to seek the same so lu t io n to our social p r o b le m s .20

CSrdenas did not send a new ambassador to Spain a f t e r the Popular

Front v ic to ry . The Mexican ambassador in Madrid, General Manuel

Pérez Trevifio, had been se n t to Spain in 1935 and remained there

u n t i l he was replaced in 1937.

The Popular Front Government

The Popular Front government moved quickly to reverse the

trends o f the past several y ea rs . P o l i t ic a l prisoners were given

amnesty, i n t i t l a l steps were taken toward renewed land reform, and

the autonomy o f Catalonia was re s to re d . However, the government

again became the victim o f the c o n f l i c t between r is in g expectations

of the peasants and fears o f the conservatives. Civil disturbances

increased as followers o f the s o c i a l i s t s and anarch is ts paraded

and marched on churches and prisons. Some members of the fa r

r ig h t r e t a l i a te d by forming squads th a t drove through working

c la ss neighborhoods f i r in g randomly a t re s id en ts .

Despite government e f f o r t s to f u l f i l l campaign promises

and un ite Spain, widespread soc ia l unres t continued throughout

the spring of 1936. The most conservative groups, bolstered by

events in Europe such as the r i s e of H i t le r and Mussolini, t r ie d

^ " ib id . , p. 55.

17

to undermine the government through fe a r . In addition to the

death squads which drove through poor neighborhoods, e d i to r ia l s

and le a f le t s were d is tr ib u ted which prophesized the economic and

social collapse of Spain. Manbers of the radical l e f t , including

the Communists and a number of s o c ia l i s t s , also backed away from

supporting the Popular Front government and planned to use the

increasing demands from workers and peasants to so l id i fy support

fo r a re tu rn to the most radical goals of the Republic.

In March, three generals, led by Emilio Mola Vidal, the

l a s t Director o f Security under the monarchy, began to p lo t a

coup d 'é t a t . By the end of June the plans fo r the coup were well

organized, and commanding generals had been appointed for each

d i s t r i c t , including Morrocco. Several c iv i l ia n s , such as José

Calvo Sotelo, former Minister of Finance during the monarchy, and

José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son o f the d ic ta to r of Spain

from 1923 to 1930, also partic ipa ted in planning the uprising

which was scheduled fo r la te Ju ly .

Spurred by the July 12 murder of Calvo Sotelo, the leaders

of the uprising n o tif ied th e i r followers to f in ish preparations,

and the coup began on the afternoon of Ju ly 17. Although the

leaders of the Popular Front government received a number of

warnings from the m ili ta ry and members o f the government who were

close to the leaders of the re v o l t , the timing o f the coup took

them by su rp rise . Nevertheless, the Republic managed to hold

major portions o f Spain, including Madrid, Catalonia, much of

18

the southern Basque region, A s tu rias , and most of the eastern

p a r t of the nation. The Insurgents c o n tro l led Morocco, C&diz,

and G alic ia , as well as most o f the m il i ta ry supplies and manu­

fac tu ring s i t e s . Civil war followed, as the government and the21insurgents fought fo r control o f the nation .

In te rna tiona l Response to the Spanish Civil War

The in i t i a l in te rna tiona l response to the c iv i l war in

Spain was mixed. Germany quickly contacted the insurgents and

promised them diplomatic and m aterial support. In England and

France, government reaction was mixed, although French S o c ia l is t

Prime M inister Leon Blum responded favorably to the Republic's

appeal fo r a ss is tance . However, w ithin two weeks o f the upris ing ,

Blum proposed th a t France, B rita in , Russia, P ortuga l, Germany,

and I ta ly sign an agreement not to in tervene in any way in the

Spanish c iv i l war. The French prime m in is te r rea l ized th a t H it le r

was moving into the Rhineland and th a t in te rn a t io n a l p a r t ic ip a tio n

in th e Spanish war could p re c ip i ta te a major European war. Accord­

ing to the French government, the b e s t so lu tion to the d i f f i c u l t

problem was an in te rnational pact which obligated the European

powers to stay out of the war in Spain.

As Blum planned, on September 9 each of the nations signed

th e agreement, which became known as the Nonintervention Pact. All

the s ig n a to r ie s , except Portugal which had not named a representative,

agreed not to award any a id , m il i ta ry supp lies , or diplomatic

------------- 71-------------------J a c k so n , The Span ish R e p u b lic and C i v i l War, p . 223.

19

22support to e i th e r s ide . However, a t l e a s t two o f the s igna to ry

nations did not honor t h e i r agreement. During August and e a r ly

September, Germany and I ta ly provided the insurgen ts w ith a i rp la n e s ,

guns, ammunition, two submarines, armored c a r s , a r t i l l e r y , a n t i ­

a i r c r a f t guns, and personnel. This a id continued a f t e r the23September agreement and throughout th e war.

On October 7, the Russian government declared i t s in te n t io n

to break the agreement because o th er nations were not adhering to

the Pact. Soon a f t e r , Soviet t ru c k s , a i rp la n e s , tan k s , and advisory

personnel began arr iv ing in Spain,

In the Americas, only Mexico promised strong support fo r the

Republican government. Although not a member o f the Nonintervention

Pact, the United S tates decided to adhere to th e s p i r i t o f the

agreement and remain n e u tra l . A number o f o th e r n a t io n s , including

Argentina and Chile, sympathized with the in su rg e n ts , although they

did not provide them with a id . Mexico stood alone in supplying

aid and diplomatic support f o r the l o y a l i s t Republican government.

President Cfirdenas explained th a t "the government o f

Mexico is obligated to the Republican government o f Spain, le g a l ly

constitu ted and presided over by Manuel Azaha . . . our re spon si­

b i l i t y is to serve Spain . . . moreover, the Republican government

Z^Ibid ., p. 314.

Z^Ibid ., pp. 262-75.

2*Ib id ., pp. 315-16.

20

of Spain is sympathetic to the revolu tionary government o f Mexico.

President Azaha represen ts the desire fo r moral and economic f r e e ­

dom of the Spanish people. Today Spain i s embroiled in a d i f f i c u l t25and bloody f ig h t , caused by the priv ileged c la s s ."

The Mexican p res iden t announced on August 18 th a t Mexico

would supply as many arms as possib le and, what was perhaps more

s ig n i f ic a n t , would support the Spanish Republic in the League o f26Nations and o ther In te rna tiona l forums. Mexican diplomats in

Europe prepared to work together to promote in te rn a tiona l support

fo r Republican Spain.

Cdrdenas planned to base Mexico's support fo r Spain In

the League o f Nations on the s im ila r support given Ethiopia a f t e r

the I t a l ia n Invasion. In 1935, he worked to use the League

machinery to punish I ta ly . When the League did impose sanctions

aga inst I t a ly , Mexico p a r t ic ip a te d in the Committee o f Coordination,

which prohib ited sending munitions and war material to I ta ly .

The sanctions then imposed by the League were generally in e f fe c t iv e

because many members continued normal trad ing re la t io n s with I ta ly .

Even Mexico eventually terminated her san c tions , although Mexico

did continue to refuse to recognize Victor Emmanuel II as the

emperor o f Ethiopia and fought to keep Ethiopia from being

^^"Apunte de Lâzaro CSrdenas," quoted In Centro Republicano Espahol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica EspaFiola, p. 24.

^^"Carta a LSzaro CSrdenas a Félix GordÔn OrdSs," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espaflola, p. 24.

21

27expelled by the League. The Mexican government hoped t h a t more

effec tivesanctlons now could be imposed aga in s t the insurgents in

Spain and the nations which supported them.

CSrdenas also feared th a t i f the League f a i l e d to a c t

decisively in the case o f Spain, the Spanish C iv il War would lead

to a war that could engulf most o f the world. He believed th a t

I f Germany and I ta ly continued to be able to invade sm aller nations

a t w i l l , with l i t t l e o r no response from the major powers, i t would28be impossible to stop them a t a la te r da te .

Sociedad Mexicana de Geograffa y E s ta d is t ic a , Accidn y pensamiento de LSzaro CSrdenas (México: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografla y E stad istica , 19^3), p. 80.

^^Elena VSzquez Gfimez, e d . , E p is to la rio de LSzaro CSrdenas 2 vols. (México: sig lo veintiuno e d ito re s , 1974), 1:290-308.

CHAPTER II THE CIVIL WAR

Mexico's immediate support fo r the Republican government

in Spain was followed fay material and e sp ec ia l ly diplomatic

a ss is ta n c e . Throughout the long years o f the Civil War, President

CSrdenas continued to t ry to improve the Spanish government's

po s ition in the League o f Nations and with the nations o f the

Americas. Mexico was unable to send large shipments o f weapons,

but some arms were se n t , as well as food and o ther sup p lies .

Spanish refugees were inv ited to Mexico. Despite frequent changes

in the Republican government, r e la t io n s between the two countries

remained f r ie n d ly fo r the duration of the war.

Mexico's Early Support fo r the Republic

Mexico a c tu a l ly responded to Spain 's request fo r a ss is tan ce

before the Civil War began. In June 1936, r e a l iz in g th a t an

uprising ag a in s t the Republic was possib le before the end of the

y e a r , the leaders o f the government sen t appeals to th e i r a l l i e s

fo r pledges of arms and o ther supp lies . The Mexican government

responded favorably on June 29, but could not promise to de liv er

th e arms quickly or in su b s ta n t ia l numbers. Mexico was not an

arms producer, but President CSrdenas planned to buy weapons on

22

23

the In te rn a tio n a l market to supplement what could be supplied

from domestic s to c k s .^

A month a f t e r the up ris ing occurred, CSrdenas announced

th a t 20,000 r i f l e s and 20 m ill ion rounds of ammunition were being

se n t to Vera Cruz where they would be loaded on a waiting Spanish2

sh ip , the Magallanes. CSrdenas a lso s ta ted th a t he had authorize

the Mexican ambassador in France, Colonel Adalberto Tejada, to3

purchase arms and supp lies in France fo r the Spanish Republic.

Because o f the policy o f th e European powers to avoid selling

arms to e i th e r s id e in the Spanish war. Colonel Tejada was able

to purchase only small amounts o f m il i ta ry equipment. However,

o f f i c i a l s o f th e Mexican government s ta ted th a t "the government

o f Mexico i s morally and p o l i t i c a l l y ob ligated to aid the Republi­

can government o f Spain which is le g a l ly constitu ted and led by

P res iden t Manuel Azaha" and continued to ac tive ly pursue arms

purchases wherever p o ss ib le .*

Although Mexico was unable to provide the Republican

government with the war m ateria l t h a t i t needed, Mexico's support

provided a needed psychological boost since most nations refused

Mexico, Archivo H is to r ico de la Secretaria de Relaciones E x te r io re s , "La S e c re ta r ia de Relaciones Exteriores a Manuel Azafia," 30 June 1936 (h e re a f te r c i te d as Archivo].

^Archive, "Convend6n e n tre la Secretaria de Hacienda y C redito PQblica y Espaha," n .d .

^"Apunte de LSzaro CSrdenas," quoted in Centro Republicano Espahol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espafiola, p. 24.

* Ib id . , p. 24.

24

to s e l l weapons to th e Republicans. In f a c t , Mexico was the f i r s t

nation to s e l l arms d i r e c t ly to Azalia's governmenti the Soviet

Union jo ined her two months l a t e r . However, while the Soviet

Union required Spain to pay f o r the arms in gold, a t the exchange

r a te s e t by the Russians, Mexico accepted payment in Spanish

currency a t the p rev a iling in te rn a t io n a l exchange rate.®

In terna tiona l Reaction to Mexico's Aid to Spain

The Mexican government was c r i t ic iz e d in te rn a t io n a l ly fo r

her ro le in supplying weapons to the Spanish Republic. On November

7, 1936,Daniel Cosfo V illegas , Mexican consular o f f i c i a l in

Portugal, informed the Mexican Foreign Ministry th a t re la t io n s

between Mexico and Portugal "while never e n th u s ia s t ic , are now,

because of in to le ran ce in Europe, very de lica te ."® Cosio V illegas

s ta te d th a t the newspapers frequently published a r t i c l e s c r i t i c a l

of Mexico, and th a t t h i s c r i t ic i s m , coupled with public opinion,

made Mexico's p o s i t io n in Portugal very weak. In February 1937,

CosTo V illegas again wrote to inform the Foreign M inistry th a t the

s i tu a t io n had not improved, and suggested tha t i t would be best

to ask the English o r French embassies to arrange for the evacu­

a tion of Spanish refugees in Portugal and to p ro tec t than when

®Lois E. Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans {Berkeley: U niversity of C alifo rn ia P ress , 195&), p. 190.

®Archivo, "Daniel CosTo Villegas a Eduardo Hay," I I I 516 (46-0) 9731 No. 10. 7 November 1936.

25

necessary. He believed th a t t h e i r a sso c ia tio n with the Mexican

consulate might fu r th e r complicate t h e i r tenuous s i tu a t io n in

PortugalJThe government of Chile was equally d isturbed by the arms

s a le , and Mexican Ambassador Ramôn P. de Negri, who was l a t e r to

serve as ambassador to Spain, wrote th a t the Chilean government

saw the sa le o f arms to the Azaha government as a "serv ice to the

Soviets,"® De Negri warned th a t a rupture in diplomatic re la t io n s

between Mexico and Chile was possib le due to the strong fee lings

provoked by the Spanish c r i s i s . In response, the Mexican Foreign

M in is te r , Eduardo Hay, advised the ambassador to remain calm and

avoid doing anything rash th a t would force o vert f r i c t io n betweenq

the two na tions. Although re la t io n s were decidedly cool through­

out the duration of the war in Spain, diplom atic t i e s were never

severed.

Ambassador Narciso Bassols in London was more philosophical

about the English government's concerned reaction to the arms s a le .

He reported th a t , while the government was continuing i t s course

o f o f f i c i a l n e u t r a l i ty , there was widespread sympathy in England

fo r the Republicans and th a t England had no in ten tion o f public ly

^Archive, "Daniel CosTo Villegas a Eduardo Hay," I I I 1510 (46) "37/1", 10 February 1937.

®Archivo, "de Negri a la Secre tar ia de Relaciones E x te rio res ," I I 1/146 (46) 9624, 2 September 1936.

^Archivo, "Eduardo Hay a Amb. de Negri 8829, 25 September1936 .

26

c r i t ic iz in g Mexico fo r her support fo r them. However, he did

request that the Mexican government c la r i f y two aspects of Mexico's

policy toward the c iv i l war; nonintervention and aid to the

Republican government. Bassols commented th a t the English govern­

ment saw these two policies as being mutually exclusive and

diplomatically confusing,*® In response to th i s request and sim ilar

accusations of incongruence in policy, in la te 1936 the Mexican

Foreign Ministry prepared a speech on the Mexican position, which

was presented by Ambassador Bassols in the League of Nations.

In the speech, Bassols s ta ted th a t Mexico was following

the in te res ts of c iv i l iz a t io n and maintaining the in teg rity of

the League by ass is t in g a member o f the League against aggression.

He stressed the interdependence among na tions , and the need for

legitim ate governments to help each o ther . The Mexican govern­

ment, Bassols said , was simply adhering to in ternational law and

the Pact of the League by providing m aterial a id to the Republican

government of Spain.**

Reaction in the United States a lso was subdued. The U.S.

Secretary of State s ta ted th a t the United States government was

not going to pro test the sa le of arms to Spain by Mexico.

*®Archivo, "Narciso Bassols a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores," III/146 (46) 9624, no. 16, 8 September 1936.

**"01scurso pronunciado por el C. delgado de México en Ginebra," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, éd ., México y la RepÛblicana EspaMola, pp. 25-26.

27

However, a few weeks l a t e r the two nations agreed th a t Mexico would

not buy weapons In the United S ta tes to be sold in S p a i n . A n

o f f ic ia l in the Mexican Foreign M inistry , Ernesto Hidalgo, reported

to President CSrdenas th a t the United S ta tes press had been

generally favorable to Mexico's support o f the Republican

government.*3

The government o f Uruguay took a d i f f e r e n t stand on the

issue and sent a telegram to Eduardo Hay suggesting mediation by

the American s ta te s to end the war in Spain. The suggestion was

re jected by President CSrdenas on the grounds th a t mediation

could constitu te in terven tion in to the in te rn a l a f f a i r s of Spain

and give defacto recognition to the rebe ls .**

The Spanish rebels sent a formal p ro te s t to the Mexican

government in August 1936 concerning the sa le o f weapons to the

Republic. Miguel Caballanes, leader o f the insurgent Junta de

Defense Nacional, s ta ted th a t the government o f Mexico was

v io la ting the doctrine of nonintervention by aid ing the

"communists" and announced th a t h is government would not recognize

any agreement made between Mexico and the Spanish Republic.*®

— ---------------------

Archivo, "Luis Q uin tan illa a la Sec re ta r ia de Relaciones Exteriores," 29 December 1936.

*^Archivo, "Ernesto Hidalgo a Luis Rodriguez," 4 January1937,

**"Carta de LSzaro CSrdenas a Is id ro Fabela," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaMol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola. pp. 26-27.

*®Archivo, "La Junta de Defensa Nacional a la Sec re ta r ia de Relaciones Exteriores," 29 July 1936.

28

Although the contents of the telegram were not unexpected and

Mexico did not bother to rep ly , the means o f transm itting the

p ro te s t caused consternation in the Spanish Embassy in Mexico City.

The l e t t e r which accompanied the telegram was w ritten on embassy

paper and signed by a minor o f f i c i a l , Ramôn Marla Pujades.*®

On September 3, Spanish Ambassador Félix GordÔn OrdSs announced

th a t Pujades was working without au tho riza tion and requested th a t

he be deported fo r usurping the functions o f the Embassy of

S p a i n . A f t e r a sh o rt in v e s t ig a t io n , the Mexican governmer

complied and deported Pujades on December 30, 1936.

Reaction a t Home

The Mexican people were generally ap a th e t ic about the

Spanish Civil War. Few were in te re s te d in foreign a f f a i r s ,

e sp ec ia l ly in events th a t had l i t t l e or no e f f e c t on th e i r d a ily

l iv e s . Some members o f the government, leaders of the labor unions,

and many in te l le c tu a l s supported Cfirdenas' p o s i t io n , however, and

understood the re la t io n sh ip he had drawn between events In Spain

and possib le in te rn a tio n a l repercussions. Yet, many Mexican

c i t iz e n s who were in te re s te d in Spain sided with the insurgen ts .

This group included most businessmen, leaders o f the Catholic

*®Archivo, "La Junta de Defensa Nacional a Eduardo Hay,"22 August 1936.

*^Arch1vo, "Félix Gordôn OrdSs a Eduardo Hay," 2 September1936 .

29

church, and p o l i t ic a l moderates and conservatives who opposed

CSrdenas' " so c ia l is t" p o l ic ie s and s t i l l p re fe rred the t r a d i t io n a l

church and business-oriented prerevolu tionary government o f

Porfirio Dfaz.

The most ac tive supporters of the government's policy

toward Spain were members o f the government and leaders o f the

trade unions. Members of the PNR supported th is policy in

e d ito r ia ls and in lec tu re s a t u n iv e rs i t ie s and soc ia l gatherings.

The trade unions, led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano and his newly-

formed Confederacifin Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), organized

r a l l i e s and raised money from members and o ther c o n tr ib u to rs .

They also c ircu la ted propaganda through the labor p re s s , rad io ,

and special education programs. Most o f the p r iv a te funds for18Spain raised in Mexico were c o llec ted by the CTM.

The Spanish Ambassador in Mexico, Fé lix Gordôn Ordaz, was

invited to give lec tu res and p resen ta tions on the Spanish Civil

War; he traveled throughout Mexico pleading fo r support. V is it ing

Spanish Republicans also were invited by the government to

publicly present the case fo r Spain.

The Catholic church in Mexico supported Franco, as did the

Catholic church throughout th e world. However, the Church leaders

in Mexico did not follow the lead o f the Pope who supported the

------------ TB-----Archivo, "Sindicato de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de la Nacional Puerlo rt, S.A. a Félix Gordôn Ordaz ( s i c ) , " 6 January 1937.

30

armed rebe llion as means to stop "the destruction of c iv ilization ."*®

Mexican bishops did in s t ru c t th e i r p r ies ts to o ffe r prayers for

peace and l ib e r ty in Spain, and sent a message of sympathy and

support fo r the Spanish clergy in 1937.

Continued Support fo r the Republic

Despite in te rnational c r i t ic ism and tenuous support a t

home, the Mexican government continued to support the Republic.

In February 1937, the Republicans asked fo r food and gasoline ,

which were to be exchanged for crude o il th a t the Spanish govern­

ment purchased before the war and was no longer able to re fine

because the re f in e r ie s were in the hands of the insurgents.

Mexico immediately sent 15,000 sacks of chick peas and lim ited

amounts of o ther food, including sugar and f lo u r . Although Mexico

agreed in p rincip le to exchange the crude o i l fo r gasoline, th is

exchange was impossible because the B ritish re f ine ry in Tampico

refused to supply the Loyalists on the grounds of the Nonlnter- ?ovention Pact.

In March, the Mexican government sent a large shipment of

arms worth $1,791,166 to the Republican government. Part of the

shipment orig inated in Mexico and part was bought in Czechoslovakia

*®Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, p. 111.

^®Archivo, "La Secre taria de Relaciones Exteriores a de Negri," I I I 1510 (46) 37/1, 16 February 1937; "Valencia a la Secre­ta r ia de Relaciones E xteriores," I I I 1510 (46) 37 /lb , 5 February 1937.

31

with Republican funds through Mexican contacts. The arms included

r i f l e s , ammunition, grenades, machine guns, and a few large

a r t i l l e r y p ieces . Several hundred thousand kilos of Mexican21sugar accompanied the weapons.

On September 1, 1937, President CSrdenas told the Mexican

Congress th a t Mexico had sold more than eight million pesos worth22o f arms to Spain in the p ast year. He noted that Mexico had

c le a r ly defined h e r pos it ion in the League of Nations and r e i t e r ­

a ted her b e l i e f t h a t a id ing the legitim ate, elected government of

Spain conformed to c u rre n t in te rnational law and the tenets of

the Pact o f th e League. Reaction to the speech was generally

favorab le . Deputy José CantQ Estrada stated that Mexico's

po licy toward Spain was " insp ired by a lofty sense o f humanity"

and o th e r deputies a lso spoke in favor of the President's

a c t io n s .

CSrdenas* agreement not to s e l l arms purchased in the

United S ta te s to Spain e l i c i t e d a negative response in a t le a s t

21Archivo, "de Negri a la Secretaria de Relaciones

E x te r io re s ." I l l 1510 (46) 37/1, 7 March 1937.

^^Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 190; "Tercer informe de gobierno de L&zaro Cfirdenas," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, éd ., Mëxico y la Repûblica Espahola, pp. 39-40.

^^"Contestaciôn de diputado José Cantû Estrada al te rce r informe de gobierno de Lâzaro Cârdenas," quoted in Centro Repübli- cano Espafiol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola, p. 40,

32

one Instance. Soon a f t e r the agreement was announced the head

of the Mexican Air Force, General Roberto F ierra V illa lobos ,

reported ly resigned when CSrdenas refused to ship a load o f

previously-purchased United S tates planes to the Republican 24government.

A fter 1937 Mexican arms shipments to Spain slowed because

o f th e Mexican agreement with the United S ta tes and the embargo

imposed by the nations of western Europe. This embargo closed

many arms markets to the Mexican government and forced o f f i c i a l s

to obtain weapons in eas te rn Europe and elsewhere in Latin America,

but when the Republican government bought arms in Bolivia they

were shipped to Spain through Vera Cruz. Mexico a lso acted as an

intermediary in several small shipments which o rig ina ted in25easte rn Europe, e sp ec ia lly Czechoslovakia.

Although the CSrdenas government put no impediments in

the way of Mexican c i t iz e n s who wished to volunteer fo r se rv ice

in Spain, no more than 200 Mexicans ac tu a lly served in the

Republican Amy during the war. Most of these men became o f f ic e rs

in the In terna tional Brigades: units composed of in te rn a tio n a l

volunteers from Europe and the Americas th a t played a decisive

^*New York Times. 4 June 1937, p. 11, co l. 4; Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 195.

^®"Carta de Lâzaro Cfirdenas a Is id ro Fabela," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola. pp. 50-51.

33

ro le in several major b a t t l e s , including the defense o f Madrid.^®

Some Mexicans who wished to volunteer to a id the Republican army

were discouraged by the cost o f t ran sp o r ta t io n to Spain. In

August 1936 a group of Mexican c i t iz e n s organized under the name

"legiôn Mexicana" applied to the Spanish Embassy fo r t ra n sp o r t .

When the Spanish government asked Mexico fo r i t s consent the

response was cool and the embassy re lu c ta n t ly withdrew Spanish

support fo r the p ro je c t . The men were forced to make th e i r own

is 28

27way to Spain. There I s a lso evidence th a t a fiew Mexicans served

with the rebel fo rces .

Experts d i f f e r on the un its in which Mexican volunteers served. Verle B. Johnston, Legions o f Babel : the In te rna tiona l Brigades In the Spanish Civil War [U niversity Park. Pennsylvania: S ta te University T r e s s , 1965), pp. 28-32, s ta te s th a t most sources in d ic a te th a t the Mexican so ld ie rs served in the In te rna tio na l Brigades. Thomas Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 103- 109, be lieves th a t most published information is inaccura te ( inc lud­ing the memoirs o f Spanish Ambassador Fëlix Gordôn Ordfis) and th a t most Mexicans served in the regu lar Spanish u n i ts . An a r t i c l e pub­lished in Excelsior on 3 August 1937 s ta te s th a t several Mexican cadets who d eser ted th e i r un its and t r i e d to go to Spain to f ig h t with the Republicans were court m artia led and dishonorably d i s ­charged fo r deserting . Several o f the cadets did f ig h t in Spain, but a t t h e i r own expense.

^^Archivo, "La embajador de Mëxico a Eduardo Hay," I I 1/764 / I , 13 August 1936.

^®In a l e t t e r w rit ten on 13 August 1936, de Pujades w rites as a rep re sen ta t iv e of La Junta de Defensa Nacional housed in the Spanish Embassy. He warned Eduardo Hay th a t the insurgents would consider any serv ice by Mexican c i t iz e n s on behalf o f the Republi­can government to be a "d isgrace". He a lso warned th a t the Junta "would find i t d i f f i c u l t " not to "contain the eagerness" o f Mexicans who want to serve with the in su rgen ts ' fo rces . Archivo, de Pujades a Eduardo Hay," 13 August 1936; E xce ls io r , 29 Ju ly 1936.

34

Mexico Welcomes Spanish Refugees

In addition to m il i ta ry a id , Mexico accepted two groups

o f Spanish refugees during the war. The rebels con tro lled major

areas of Spain by 1937, Including Cfidiz, S e v il le , Toledo, and

Bajadoz. In the Republican-held areas supp lies were o ften short ,

and c iv i l ia n s were pressed in to se rv ice as s o ld ie r s , nurses, or

support personnel. Because o f the constant th re a t of danger, the

Spanish government decided to evacuate severa l thousand orphans

and children whose parents were involved in the war to fr iend ly

nations such as Russia and Mexico. Of th e s e , about 450 were

taken to Mexico. They were housed in a converted monastery in2Q

Morelia fo r the duration of the war.

The response of the Mexican people to th is f i r s t group of

refugees was supportive, but there were major d ifferences of

opinion concerning the way in which the ch ild ren should be reared

during th e i r stay in Mexico. Many members o f the old Spanish

colony in Mexico, who otherwise did not support th e Republic,

wanted to adopt the children and rear them according to th e i r

national heritage. Mexican supporters o f the Republic a lso wanted

to take the children in to th e i r homes so th a t they could be

reared in a family sympathetic to the Idea ls fo r which th e i r

parents were figh ting or had d ied. However, fo r a number of

New York Times. 31 October 1939; "Los nifios espafiol e s ," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 32-34.

35

reasons, Including the f a c t th a t I t was impossible to determine

whether or not some of th e children were a c tu a l ly orphans and

the d i f f ic u l ty in determining which homes would be b es t fo r the

children, the Mexican government decided to keep the ch ildren in

a group. They were housed in Morelia in a home s ta f fe d by

Mexican teachers and counselors. According to P a t r ic ia Fagen,

they were "educated in the ideals fo r which th e i r parents were3Dfighting and in a completely Mexican environment." By 1943,

most of the children had e i th e r graduated from the school, or

were reunited with th e i r fam ilie s , and the home was c losed.

In July 1938 President Cfirdenas signed the decree31establishing La Casa de Espafia. This decree allowed Spanish

in te l le c tu a ls , who were no longer able to work in t h e i r own country

due to the disruptions o f the war, to emigrate to Mexico. La

Casa de Espafia was funded e n t i r e ly by the Mexican government and

designed to be a temporary home f o r eminent Spanish scholars who

supported the Republic and had already been moved from the war

zone to Valencia by the Spanish government fo r p ro tec tion .

In a mutually advantageous plan, Daniel Cosio Villegas

and Wenceslao Roces, the Subsecretary of Education in the

Republican government, arranged fo r these scholars to come to

30cans in

Patr ic ia W. Fagen, Exiles and C itizens : Spanish Republi- Mexico (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1973), p. 27.

®*Cos1o Villegas, Memories, pp. 178-79.

36

Mexico as "cu ltu ra l ambassadors" o f Spain. Unlike the treatm ent

accorded most ambassadors, Mexico agreed to pay fo r t h e i r t r a n s ­

po rta t ion and upkeep. The Mexico government re ta ined the r ig h t to

determine how long the "ambassadors" would remain in Mexico. In

re tu rn fo r a place to work, the scholars were obliged to teach a t

Mexican u n iv e rs i t ie s and to give specia l lec tu res and c lasses a t

La Casa de Espafia, which was e s tab lish ed in Mexico C ity . In a l l ,

approximately 35 Spaniards came to Mexico under th is arrangement

during the Civil War.^^

In 1940, when i t became evident th a t the new head of the

Spanish government. General Francisco Franco, would not be e a s i ly

unseated, the c h a r te r o f La Casa de Espafia was rev ised . Renamed

El Colegio de Mëxico, i t was removed from governmental co n tro l .

A s tru c tu red teaching s t a f f o f Mexican and Spanish scholars was

hired to provide regu la r c la sses and a degree program. The co llege

was able to r e c r u i t outstanding in te l le c tu a l s from Mexico, Spain,

and Hispanic America; i t has since become one of the most

respected u n iv e rs i t ie s in Hispanic America.

When the Republican government disbanded the In terna tional

Brigades in l a t e 1938, Cfirdenas again agreed to accept a group of

refugees from the war. In an o f f i c i a l statement published in

E xce ls io r , a government spokesman s ta te d th a t Mexico would accept

those In te rna tiona l Brigade members no longer welcome in th e i r

S ^ Ib id ., pp. 169-178.

37

homelands "in accordance with the v i ta l i n t e r e s t s of the Spanish

people and to demonstrate before the League and the world Mexico's33support fo r the Republic." Domestic p ressure , however, forced

the government to consider the former Brigade members on a case-by-

case b a s is , and a number o f app lican ts were denied admission to

Mexico.®*

President Cfirdenas was known fo r h is open po licy toward

p o l i t i c a l refugees. According to the Mexican p re s id e n t , p o l i t i ­

cal asylum was a basic human r ig h t th a t must be re sp ec ted , d e sp ite

c o n f l ic t in g ideologies. His in s is ten ce on the r ig h t o f p o l i t i ­

cal asylum, and the subsequent admittance o f the Spanish refugees

and Leon Trotsky, caused a number o f c o n f l ic t s w ith in the govern­

ment, even among Cfirdenas* supporte rs . Narciso Bassols refused

the ambassadorship to Spain as a r e s u l t o f Cfirdenas welcoming

Trotsky.®®

Diplomatic Support fo r the Republic

Mexico ac tive ly supported the Spanish Republic in the

League of Nations. She had only joined the League in 1931, but

her ambassadors quickly became known as outspoken proponents o f

the organization and i t s goals . For th i s reason, Cfirdenas

expected the League to support the Spanish Republic. For th i s

®®Excelsior, 17 January 1939.

®*Excelsior. 31 January 1939.

®®Powell, Mexico and the Spanish C iv il War, p. 162.

38

purpose, two o f Mexico's most ab le and respected diplomats, Is id ro

Fabela and Narciso Bassols, were sent to Geneva as ambassadors to

the League during the Spanish War.®®

In one of the early debates on the Spanish war in the

General Assembly, Bassols denounced the rebe llion of the Spanish

generals, the armed intervention of I ta ly and Germany, and the

"legal monstrosity" of the Nonintervention Pact. He ca lled on the

League to uphold Spain 's r ig h t to buy and import arms to save her-37s e l f from in ternational agression. He s ta ted th a t Mexico's

position was based on the b e l ie f th a t the Spanish Republican govern­

ment was the legal representation of the Spanish people as expressed

in the e lec tions o f 1936. For th is reason, Mexico re jected the

nonintervention policy o f the Great Powers as being a denial of

leg itim ate means o f defense to a leg a lly constitu ted government

confronted with a m il i ta ry upris ing . Bassols argued th a t , according

to prevailing law and custom, Spain should be ab le to buy weapons

Narciso Bassols, former Secretary of the Treasury fo r CSrdenas, served as Ambassador to Great B rita in from 1935-1937, and as delegate to the League o f Nations in 1937, His re la tionsh ip with Cfirdenas was tenuous—he had been removed from the cabinet and sent to Europe because of his close re la tio nsh ip with North American lawyers who represented in te re s ts contrary to Mexico's, but he was well known and respected in Mexico. Bassols was a s o c ia l i s t with close t ie s to the s o c ia l i s t s and communists in Republican Spain. Isidro Fabela was Mexico's delegate to the International Court of Labor and the League of Nations from 1937- 1940, and gradually took over the post o f defending Spain in the League.

®^"Discurso pronunciado por el C. delegado de Mëxico en Ginebra," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 25-26.

39

and su p p lies needed to d e fea t the In su rgen ts . I f , fo r some reason,

i t was necessary to a c t a g a in s t In te rn a tio n a l custom, the action

should be th a t o f the League r a th e r than of a group o f nations*18ac tin g independently.

Such a c t iv e support o f the Spanish Republic caused several

na tions to accuse Mexico of in te rv e n t io n in Spanish a f f a i r s .

However, Cfirdenas defended Mexico's support of the Republic in the

League in a l e t t e r to Fabela in e a r ly 1937. The Mexican president

wrote t h a t Mexican a id to the Republic d id not con trad ic t the

p r in c ip le o f non in te rven tion , because to deny a id was, in fac t ,

i n d i r e c t a id to the re b e ls . Mexico's support o f the Republic was

" the lo g ica l r e s u l t o f the c o r r e c t In te rp re ta t io n of the doctrine

o f nonintervention."®®

In e a r ly March, Cfirdenas se n t a personal note to the

S ecre ta ry General o f the League s t r e s s in g Mexico's support for the

League and in te rn a t io n a l peace. The note strong ly denounced the

non in te rven tion po licy taken by several n a tio n s , e spec ia lly in the

face o f documented German and I t a l i a n a id to the Insurgents.

Cfirdenas s ta te d th a t the lack o f cooperation with the legally

c o n s t i tu te d a u th o r i t i e s in Spain was c ru e l ly prolonging the war

and increas ing the p o s s ib i l i ty o f a la rg e r in te rn a tio n a l co n fl ic t .

®*Ibid., pp. 25-26.

39"Carta de LSzaro Cfirdenas a Is id ro Fabela," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la RepQfalica Espafiola, pp. 27-28.

40

He reminded the Secretary General th a t A r t ic le X of the Pact o f

the League made a c le a r de lin ea tio n between a cons titu t iona l

government t h a t was le g a l ly e n t i t l e d to receive a id and arms

and agressors who were due nothing.*®

When the League refused to a c t , Bassols ca lled fo r an

overhaul o f the organization o f the League to re s to re i t s in teg ­

r i t y and Independence. He s ta te d in a speech to the General

Assembly th a t

the powerlessness of the League of Nations to perform i t s primary and most dec is ive ta sk —which is of su s ta in ­ing the in te g r i ty and enjoyment of t h e i r independence by the S ta te s composing i t , has led a l l o f us to recognize the need of rev is in g e x is t in g machinery; fo r whatever the causes o f f a i lu r e may have been, i t would be absurd to expect th a t i f we keep the same fac to r in play, r e s u l t s would tomorrow or the day a f t e r , in the face of a new c o n f l i c t , be any d i f f e r e n t to what they were b e fo re ,41

The request to overhaul the League was p o l i t e ly ignored by the

o ther member nations o f the League.

Continued Support of the Republic

Despite unen thusiastic in te rn a tio n a l response, Mexico

continued her uns tin tin g support of Spain in the League of Nations.

*®"Nota d ir ig id a a la Sociedad de la s Naciones con motivo del caso de Espafia," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y Repûblica Espafiola. pp. 28-29.

**Mêxico, S ec re ta r ia de Relaciones E x te r io res , The Mexican Government in the Presence o f Social and Economic Problems (Mëxico: La S ec re ta r ia de Relaciones E x te r io re s , 1936], p. 20.

41

In response to a B ritish In i t i a t iv e to extend the Nonintervention

Pact to non-European s ta te s . CSrdenas sent a l e t t e r to the Secre­

ta ry of the League asking for cooperation with the legal au thori­

t i e s In Spain. He wrote

Mexico cannot admit tha t while she is being asked to lend her ass is tance In solving world problems, an attempt should be made to reduce the scope of her peacemaking action and to circumscribe European problems by a method which. I f successfu l, would undermine what Is l e f t of the foundations on which the League Is b u i l t , *2

On March 30. Mexico sen t a note to a l l the countries with

which she had re la t io n s , urging the termination of the Noninter­

vention Pact and requesting in ternational support fo r the Spanish

Republican government. Few nations responded favorably; only

Cuba and Guatemala agreed to send what aid they could. The

remaining nations were In d iffe ren t or h os ti le to Mexico's

request.

On the same day, Isid ro Fabela delivered a diplomatic

note to the Secretary General of the League which s ta ted th a t

"the government o f Mexico considers I t a duty, th a t I t may not

sh irk , to contribute by a l l means In i t s power to world peace,

and espec ia lly to work for the termination of the armed c o n f l ic t

4^Norman J . Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy In the Spanish Civil S t r i f e (New York: Yhe MacMillan Co., 1939), pp. 625-^6 .

^ V c h iv o , "The Mexican Note." I l l 1510 (46) "36'74050.30 March 1937.

4 2

t h a t has fo r th e l a s t eight months a ffected the Spanish

Republic . .

On September 20, 1937, Ambassador Fabela addressed the

General Assembly on behalf of the Republic. He again s t re s se d the

leg a l re s p o n s ib i l i ty o f the League to a s s i s t Republican Spain

and decried th e policy of nonintervention which he s ta te d was

a id in g th e insurgents because the s ig na to r ies who signed the

Pact refused to acknowledge the fac t th a t Germany and I t a ly (who

had a lso signed the Pact) were ac tive ly a s s is t in g the Insurgen ts .

Fabela s ta ted th a t , according to the governments of Spain and

Mexico, the "only e ffec tiv e nonintervention In th i s case Is4Bth e nonintervention o f the League of Nations."

In October Fabela went to Prague as the Mexican represen ta­

t i v e to the Council o f the In terna tional Labor Organization. While

In Prague, he met with the delegate from Czechoslovakia In an

a ttem pt to change the Czech government's recent decision not to

s e l l arms to the Spanish Republic. The rep resen ta tiv e from France

a ls o a ttended the meeting between Mexico and Czechoslovakia.

Although the diplomats were unable to make a commitment on behalf

o f t h e i r governments, the French delegate agreed to con tac t

^^Archlvo, " Is id ro Fabela a la Socledad de la Naclones,"I I I 1510 (46) "36"/4050, no. 262, n .d .

^®"D1scurso pronunclado por el Lie. Is id ro Fabela en la se s lo n p lenaria de la XVIII asamblea de la Liga celebrado en Ginebra del 20 de septlembre de 1937," quoted In Centro Republlcano Espahol de México, é d . , Hëxico y la RepOblIca Espaflola. pp. 42-44.

43

French Prime Minister Leon Blum to suggest th a t France 's policy

toward Spain be revised and to urge cooperation with the government

of Czechoslovakia. The Czech represen ta tive a lso agreed to ask

his government to modify I ts policy and to send weapons to

Republican Spain.

By la te 1937, I t was obvious th a t Mexico was unsuccessful

In her attempts to terminate the Nonintervention Pact and convince

members o f the League o f Nations to support the Spanish Republic.

As the war progressed, the Republican government became Increas­

ingly Iso la ted . In l a t e 1937, France closed her Spanish border

fo r the fina l time to arms shipments to the Republic. In terna­

tional pressure on Spain became so strong by e a r ly 1938 th a t the

Loyalist government f in a l ly decided to dismantle the In terna tional

Brigades and send the volunteers home, so th a t the government

could not be accused o f promoting foreign In terven tion . However,

ne ither of these actions terminated the massive shipments of

personnel, weapons, and supplies from Germany and I ta ly th a t

continued to pour Into Spain to help the rebe ls .

The Rebels as Belligerents

General Franco and o ther rebel leaders wrote the Secretary

General o f the League and a number of nations requesting the

"Carta de Fabela a Cârdenas," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, éd., Mëxico y la RepOblIca EspaRola, pp. 46-48,

44

s ta tu s of b e l l ig e re n t In November 1936. Mexico Immediately opposed

the granting o f such s t a tu s , which would have given the Insurgent

forces c e r ta in r ig h ts under In te rna tiona l law. Including the

r ig h t to buy arms. In Ju ly 1937 the Nonintervention Committee

approved a proposal under which be lligerency would have been

recognized by a l l p a r t ie s o f the Nonintervention Pact. This pro­

posal e l i c i t e d vehement denunciations from Ambassador Fabela.*^

I t was never accepted by the League because I t required the

approval o f both p a r t ie s Involved In the Spanish war.

At the Eighth Conference of American S ta te s In 1938, Cuba

proposed th a t the conference o f f e r I t s e l f as a mediator in the

Spanish c o n f l ic t . Mexico had e a r l i e r re jec ted a s im ila r . I f less

formal proposal, made by Uruguay. However, the Mexican represen­

ta t iv e voted a ff irm a tiv e ly a t the conference on the Cuban propo­

s a l , adding a rese rva tio n th a t I f the proposal was approved I t

would not s ig n ify th a t Mexico recognized the b e l l ig e re n t s ta tu s

of the rebels.^® Although the reso lu tio n was adopted, the confer­

ence was not ab le to a c t as a mediator In the war because of

the Spanish government's re luc tance to accept mediation.

Controversy over Diplomatic Asylum

Despite the generally exce llen t re la t io n s between Mexico

Is id ro Fabela, Cartas a1 President CSrdenas (Mexico: n .p . , 1937), p. 42.

*®Padelford, In te rna tiona l Law and Diplomacy, pp. 116-117.

45

and Spain during the war, a disagreement over diplomatic asylum

caused a s t r a in In the re la tions between the two cou n tr ies . In

accordance with In ternational custom and the 1928 Pan American

Treaty, Mexico and fourteen other countries gave asylum to hun­

dreds of Spaniards in t h e i r embassies in Spain. Most of these

asylees were conservatives who had not supported the Republic

and feared th a t they would be Imprisoned by the Republican govern­

ment for th e i r views. A fter the f i r s t months of the war, the

number of asylees grew so large tha t several nations rented addi­

tional buildings to house those persons who requested asylum.

The Spanish government Insisted th a t , in the case of

a m ili ta ry uprising , the r ight o f asylum did not apply and

requested th a t a l l the asylees be turned over to Spanish a u th o r i­ng

t i e s . Because Spain was not a signatory to a t re a ty guarantee­

ing diplomatic asylum, she refused to recognize the righ t o f

foreign nations to p ro tec t opponents of the government. In addi­

t io n , many of the nations that provided asylum supported the

Insurgents. Alvarez del Vayo s ta te s th a t some of these nations

may have abused the p rinc ip le of asylum by allowing the asy lees

In th e i r embassies to p a r t ic ip a te in Spanish politics.®®

*^Arch1vo, Eduardo Hay al Departamento DIplomStlco de EspaMa," I 11/576 (46-0)/9751, 2 October 1936; Daniel CosTo Villegas a la Secre tarla de Relaciones Exterlores," I I I 516 (46-Q)/9751, no. 10, 7 November 1936; "Departamento Diplomâtico de Espafia a la Secre tarla de Relaciones E xterlo res ," III/576 (46-0) 9751, no. 0350, n .d .

®®Alvarez del Vayo, Give Me Combat, p. 240.

46

After protracted correspondence between Mexico and Spain,

the Spanish government p a r t ia l ly yielded in March 1937 and l e t

Mexico evacuate to France asylees housed In the embassies' compounds.

This evacuation was arranged by a number o f persons. Including

the Mexican ambassadors 1n Madrid and Argentina and the Mexican

legation In Paris . The asylees were accompanied to th e i r ship

fo r France by the Mexican ambassador and h is assistant.® ^ Most

of the asylees who were members o f the Spanish m il i ta ry were

allowed to leave the country, but four rebel o ff ice rs were detained

a t the port. The Mexican ambassador quickly put them under his

protection and took them back to Madrid, where they were forcedC O

to remain fo r several months.

On April 30, Spain again refused to allow these men, who

now wished to go to Mexico, to leave the country. Meanwhile,

Mexico had closed a l l but one small building In I t s o f f ic ia l com­

plex in Madrid and the Mexican ambassador had followed the Repub­

lican government to Valencia where a temporary embassy had been

established . For th is reason, i t was d i f f i c u l t fo r Mexico to feed

and house the asylees in Madrid and to provide secu rity fo r them.

®^"As11ado espaholes en la embajada de México en Madrid," quoted In Centro Republlcano Espahol de México, é d . , Hëxico y la Republics Espahola, p. 27.

®^Arch1vo, "Embajador de Negri a la Secretarla de Relaciones Exterlores," 13 March 1937.

®®Arch1vo, "Embajador de Negri a la Secretarla de Relaciones Exterlores," I I I 576 (46-0)/9751, no. 0603. 7 August 1937.

47

F ina lly , on August 7, 1937, the Spanish government gave Mexico

and the o ther nations s t i l l providing diplomatic asylum five to

ten days to evacuate to France o r North Africa a l l remaining

persons housed In t h e i r embassies. Mexico was able to Include

the four m il i ta ry o f f ic e rs In the evacuees.®*

A fter th i s f in a l group l e f t Spain, each o f the embassies

and lega tions was forced to c lose I t s f a c i l i t i e s fo r housing

asy lees . All complied because the s i tu a t io n was too chaotic to

provide se c u r i ty fo r any asy lees . Most o f the governments had

already closed th e i r embassies and only a few had followed the

government to Valencia.

Mexican diplomats In Madrid a lso were d isturbed by the ongoing t e r r o r In Madrid during the early months o f the war. Pro­government death squads roamed the s t r e e t s , often a ttack ing persons they suspected o f being aga inst the government. Although the Republican government did not condone the violence and k i l l in g s , many diplomats. Including those from Mexico, believed th a t i t did l i t t l e to stop i t . The " te r ro r" was one of the primary reasons why almost 14,000 asylees were housed In embassies and legations In ea r ly 1937. The Mexican government chose not to publicly rebuke the Spanish government, but did p r iv a te ly urge the Repub­licans to curb the v io lence , Archlvo, "de Negri a la Secre tarla de Relaciones E x te r lo res ," 1 February 1937; "de Negri a la S ec re ta r la de Relaciones E x te rlo res ," 22 January 1937.

CHAPTER III

DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

Mexico's support fo r the Republican government In Spain

did not end with the Civil War. In the years th a t followed the

war, Mexico accepted thousands o f Spanish refugees and worked

to p ro tec t those refugees s t i l l In Europe. Not a l l of Mexico's

e f fo r ts were successfu l, but P residen t CSrdenas and his successor,

Manuel Avila Camacho, t r i e d to ensure t h a t as many Spaniards as

possible escaped from being sent back to Spain fo r t r i a l and

Imprisonment o r death, Mexico continued to p ro tec t the Spanish

refugees In France u n til diplom atic re la t io n s were severed between

the two nations In November 1942.

End of the War

The Spanish Republican government f e l l to the Insurgents In

early 1939—less than th ree years a f t e r the beginning o f the c iv i l

war. Although Mexico had become embroiled In an In terna tional

controversy over her expropria tion of fo re ign o i l p ro p ert ies ,^

^In March 1938, CSrdenas expelled the fo reign o i l companies operating in Mexico and seized t h e i r p ro p e r t ie s . This bold move followed years o f e sca la t in g c o n f l ic ts between Mexican workers, the Mexican government, and the o i l companies. In r e t a l i a t i o n , the expropriated companies organized a boycott o f Mexican o i l , which forced the Mexican government to s e l l I t s petroleum to countries such as Germany and I t a ly to keep the Mexican economy a f lo a t , LSzaro CSrdenas, Obras: Apuntes 1913-1940, 3 v o ls . (Mëxico üniversldad Naclonal AutÔnoma de étëxico, 1972), 1:382.

4 8

49

CSrdenas Ins truc ted h is government to a s s i s t the Republican govern­

ment and to provide a id fo r the Spanish refugees f lee ing Into

France.^

Only Mexico and the Soviet Union gave support to the combat

forces o f the Republican government during the l a s t months o f the

war. However, a number of tech n ica lly neutral nations were w il l in g

to a s s i s t Mexico and France (which re lu c ta n t ly became the host

nation) In caring fo r the refugees who a rr ived d a lly from Spain

In l a t e 1938 and e a r ly 1939. R e lie f groups from the United S ta te s ,

Sweden, and B rita in worked to provide basic n e c e ss i t ie s fo r the

homeless Spaniards, while th e i r governments began to look fo r long­

term arrangements fo r those refugees who f e l t th a t they could not

re tu rn sa fe ly to Spain. By la t e spring 500,000 Spanish refugees

were crowded In to southern France.

In recognition of Mexico's c lo se t i e s with Republican Spain,

P resident CSrdenas had announced during the f a l l o f 1938 th a t any

Spanish national who could no longer l iv e In Spain would be granted

a home In Mexico.^ Howe\

Mexico u n t i l l a t e spring.

a home In Mexico.^ However, no groups o f refugees emigrated to

5"Carta de LSzaro CSrdenas al Coronel Adalberto Tejada

(Embajador de Mëxico en EspaFia)," quoted In Centro Republicano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Hëxico y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 54.

®"Poder E jecutivo, S ecre ta r la de Gobernaclën, tab las d ife re n c la le s para 1939," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la RepQblIca EspaRola. p. 52.

50

In te rna tio na l r e l i e f e ffo r ts were made more d i f f i c u l t

because o f th e fac tional d ivisions within the Republican govern­

ment. The leaders o f the government could not agree on the way

in which the war should be ended. President AzaRa and his follow­

e rs wanted to surrender Immediately in order to prevent additional

lo s s of l i f e and property. Prime Minister Juan Negrfn and his

supporters In s is te d th a t the Loyalist forces continue to f ig h t

u n t i l th e rebe ls agreed to th ree guarantees: Independence for

Spain and freedom from foreign Influence, the r ig h t of the Spanish

people to pursue th e i r own destiny , and th a t the end o f the war

would bring a new era o f reconcilia tion . Former Defense M inister

Indalecio P r ie to , whose pessim istic views had a lien a ted some

members o f th e government, had already l e f t the cabinet and was

t r a v e l in g in Hispanic America to raise funds and support fo r the

Republic.* President CSrdenas met with Prieto both o f f i c i a l l y and

Inform ally on February 20 and 21 to discuss the war and Mexico'sc

e f f o r t s to a s s i s t the Spanish refugees.

During the f i r s t week In February 1939 the Constituent

Cortes met f o r the l a s t time on Spanish so il a t e l C a s t i l lo de

Figueres to analyze th e i r position and to plan f o r the next few

months. Following the meeting, Azaha, President of the Cortes,

*Josê Marla del Valle , Las instltuclones de la reoObllca espahola en e x i l lo (P a r is : ruedo Ibêrico, 19^6}, pp. 9-13.

®Cfirdenas, Obras. 1:412.

51

Diego Martinez Barrio, and several other government o f f i c i a l s

crossed in to France. Negrfn and his followers jo ined the group

a few days l a t e r , and the reunited government met b r ie f ly In

Toulouse u n t i l February 10. Negrfn, Foreign M inister Alvarez del

Vayo (former ambassador to Mexico), and most o f the others then

returned to Spain to continue the war. Despite Negrfn*s In s is ­

tence, AzaRa refused to return to Spain. On February 27, 1939,

he resigned as President of the Republic.®

President AzaRa's resignation created a momentary dilemma

fo r the Mexican government, because i t s ambassador had been accre­

d ited to AzaRa's government. The Mexican Foreign Ministry solved

th is problem by announcing th a t I t would keep a rep resen ta tive In

Spain as long as "representative au th o ri t ie s" o f the Republic

ex is ted . However, Ambassador Adalberto Tejada was ca lled home to

report on the s i tu a t io n .^ He l e f t Spain on March 8 , taking with

him the embassy archives and records.

The c iv i l war ended in March 1939 when Prime Minister

Negrfn and most of the remaining members of the government crossed

Into France with thousands of other refugees. On April 1, the

members of the Spanish Embassy in Mexico asked for p o l i t ic a l

asylum, which was Immediately granted. On April 16, the embassy

®del Valle. U s Instltuc lones de la reoObllca espaRola en e x i l l o . p. 15.

^Archlvo, "Memoranda de la Secretarla de Relaciones E x te rlo r­e s ," 16 April 1939; El Naclonal. 1 March 1939.

52

o f f i c i a l s announced th a t the Spanish embassy would be put under

the ca re o f the Cuban ambassador. Diplomatic re la t io n s between

Mexico and Spain were severed, not to be resumed In any form un til

1945.®

The Mexican government did not recognize o f f i c i a l l y any of

the Republican leaders as rep resen ta t iv es o f the Spanish refugees.

Members o f the Spanish Cortes who escaped to France had decided

th a t Prime M inister Negrfn would have to continue to represent

the Spanish Republic because th e re was no c o n s t i tu t io n a l body to

accept h is res igna tion o r choose another leader. Negrfn accepted

th is re s p o n s ib i l i ty and announced th a t the mission of his govern­

ment was th ree fo ld ; to keep a l iv e the philosophy o f the Republic,g

to help the refugees, and to r e e s ta b l ish the Republic In Spain.

Mexican o f f i c i a l s In France maintained fr ien d ly re la t io n s with

Negrfn, but chose to remain nonpartisan , because of growing p o l i t i ­

cal and t a c t i c a l s p l i t s between the Republican leaders .

CSrdenas personally supported the p os ition o f h is fr iend

former ambassador to Mexico Alvarez del Vayo and o f Negrfn, who

had preferred to f ig h t u n t i l the l a s t moment. In a l e t t e r to

Alvarez del Vayo, the Mexican P residen t s ta te d h is apprecia tion

fo r t h e i r "courage and loyal p a r t ic ip a t io n u n ti l the u ltim ate

®E1 Universal, 5 April 1939; E xce ls io r , 25 Ju ly 1939.

®del V a l le .Las In s t l tu c lo n es de la republics esoaRola en e x i l l o , p. 16.

53

moment In the defense of the Republican cause." In the same

l e t t e r CSrdenas r e i t e r a te d his fears t h a t the Republican defeat

could lead to a second world war and blamed the nations which

remained neutral as Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia were

Invaded and conquered.^®

Care o f the Refugees

Mexican o f f i c i a l s in France i n i t i a l l y concentrated on

a ss is t in g the Republican leaders and the French government to find

food and s h e l te r fo r the Spanish refugees. As i t became c lea r

that the Spaniards would not f ind permanent homes quickly, the

Mexican government s h i f te d I t s a t te n t io n to In terim arrangements

that would get the refugees out o f the camps and allow them to

live more normal l iv e s . By the f a l l o f 1939 Mexico had estab lished

centers fo r the refugees around Bordeaux and M arse illes .

In early 1941, th e Mexican government responded to pleas

for additional housing and rented two chateaus In France which

were used to house refugees In t r a n s i t to other nations and a lso

served as an o f f ic e where Mexican o f f ic ia l s could process v isas

and provide o ther good o f f ic e s f o r the refugees. The centers

remained open un til the f a l l of 1942 when World War II forced the

Mexican government to c lo se them.

"Carta de LSzaro CSrdenas a J u l io Alvarez del Vayo," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, éd . , México v la ReoObllca EspaRola. p. 56.

l^MauricIo Fresco, La emigracifin republicans espaRola: uma v ic to r ia de México (Mëxico: Editeras asociados, 1950), pp. 41-58.

54

Republican leaders a lso took re s p o n s ib i l i ty fo r a s s i s t in g

the refugees. An organization had been founded In 1937, el Servi-

d o de Emigracldn de la s Republlcanos EspaRoles (SERE), which

worked with the French government and o ther nations to provide

housing and food fo r the Spaniards who were f lee in g Spain. In

1939 the SERE had to expand I t s a c t i v i t i e s tenfo ld to cope with

the number o f refugees who l e f t Spain a t the end o f the war. In

addition to helping to provide n e c e s s i t ie s , the SERE a lso began

to compile o f f ic ia l papers and background Information on the

Spaniards In France to a s s i s t t h e i r eventual emigration to o ther

nations.

Emigration

In January 1939 President CSrdenas e laborated on h is s t a t e ­

ment made In the f a l l o f 1938 and declared th a t I t was Mexico's

In tention to admit an unlim ited number o f refugees to Mexico I f the

Republican r e l i e f organizations would pay th e i r t ra n sp o r t costs12and co n tr ib u te to the rese tt lem en t expenses. On April 13, the

Mexican President wrote a l e t t e r to Alvarez del Vayo and o ffered

a "modest, bu t sympathetic home" fo r the refugees who had been13"temporarily displaced from t h e i r country ." He a lso offered

IZperë Foix, CSrdenas (México: E d ito ria l T r i l l a s , 1971), p. 246.

l®"Carta de LSzaro CSrdenas a Ju l io Alvarez del Vayo," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la RepOblIca EspaRola. p. 56.

55

homes to Alvarez del Vayo and Negrfn. Neither accepted the

o f fe r .

Although the acceptance o f Spanish refugees was popular

with strong supporters of the Spanish Republic, immediate p ro te s ts

came from o th er groups who believed th a t the Immigrants would

compete with them fo r a lready scarce jobs and social se rv ice s .

They a lso argued th a t there were too many s o c i a l i s t s and communists

In the e x i le group who might undermine the Mexican government.

Representatives o f the government rep l ied th a t preference would

be given to those refugees who possessed needed s k i l l s and would

be able to support themselves with a minimum of a id . President

Cfirdenas a lso reminded the Mexican people th a t Chapter I I I ,

A r t ic le 33, o f the C onstitu tion forbade foreigners from p a r t i c i ­

pating d i re c t ly In Mexican p o l i t ic s .^ *

The Mexican presiden t In an Interview published In El

Naclonal th a t any anti-Spanish sentiment was " a r t i f i c i a l " —created

by those who wanted to upset the na tion . Mexico needed more

s k i l le d workers, he believed, and th is j u s t i f i e d h is open-door

policy . No Mexican workers would be displaced by the Spaniards,

^*"E1 Présidente y los cuestlones ac tua les : al caso de los refugiados," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mexico y la RepQblIca EspaRol, p. 62; Gerald E. F itzg e ra ld , é d . , The C onstitu tions of Latin America (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968), p. 158.

56

who would be useful in f i l l i n g Jobs and acce le ra ting Mexico's

economic development.^®

These sentiments were repeated In September 1939 during

the President's annual address to Congress. CSrdenas s ta te d th a t

the Spanish refugees were con tr ibu ting to the Mexican na tion , and

tha t they were able to a ss im ila te e a s i ly into the national c u l tu re .

He assured the deputies th a t the open door policy would not be

extended to other nations whose I n te r e s t s did not correspond

to Mexico's. The Mexican presiden t again blamed any anti-Spanish

agitation on opposition p a rt ie s th a t wished to c re a te chaos and

undermine his government.*®

In May, CSrdenas formed a specia l In te rm in is té r ie l Commit­

tee composed of the heads of the government agencies th a t would be

Involved In helping the refugees. He d irec ted th i s committee to

develop a program fo r the t r a n s fe r of refugees to Mexico and to

devise the regulations th a t would govern th e i r l iv e s .

In addition to the aid extended to the refugees In general,

the Mexican government extended specia l a t te n t io n to former

*®"E1 présidente y las cuestlones a c tu a le s—El Naclonal" quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxico v la ReoObllca EspaRol. pp. 61-2.

*®"Qu1nto informe de goblerno de LSzaro CSrdenas," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y la RepOblIca EspaRol. pp. 62-3.

*^"As11ados p o l i t ico s espaRoles recentemente llegados a Mëxico," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . ,Mëxico v la RepCblIca EspaRola. pp. 63; El Naclonal, 20, 24 May;6, 12, 14, 17 J u n e 'ïm .

57

Presiden t AzaRa. whose health was f a l l in g rap id ly . On June 26,

1939, the Germans occupied the beach suburb of Bordeaux where

AzaRa had made his home. The Mexican government quickly moved

AzaRa by ambulance to Montauban and were prepared to o f fe r him

asylum In the Mexican consulate In Vichy. When the French govern­

ment denied the request to move the former p res iden t to Vichy, a

diplom atic guard was placed in h is room and funds were provided

fo r his board and medical care u n ti l his death November 3. AzaRa's

casket was draped with a Mexican f lag during the funeral and h is18widow was immediately flown to refuge In Mexico.

Refugees to Mexico

Despite the Mexican o f f e r o f h o s p i ta l i ty , r e la t iv e ly few

of the Spanish refugees In France were able to ge t to Mexico.

This was due prim arily to the lack o f t ran sp o rta t io n and the lack

of agreement among the Republican leaders . The philosophical

and s t r a te g ic d ifferences th a t had divided the Republic through­

out I t s ex is tence were exacerbated In France. The followers of

Negrtn and P rie to both claimed th a t t h e i r lead er should control

the government funds th a t had been taken out o f Spain and the

leaders themselves could not agree on a way to finance the t r a n s ­

po rta t ion and rese tt lem en t o f the refugees who wished to leave

France. Negrtn and P rie to each had h is own refugee assoc ia tio n

and claimed I t to be the so le leg it im ate agency ac ting on behalf

*®Isabel Palencia , Smoldering Freedom (New York: Longmans and Green, 1945), pp. 230, 237-39.

58

o f the Spanish refugees.

At the end o f the war Negrtn had been l e f t in control of

the remaining funds o f the Republican government and he immediately

put these funds in to the a lready estab lished SERE. He began work­

ing with th e Mexican ambassador In France, Narclso Bassols, to

care fo r th e refugees and to begin t h e i r evacuation to other

c o u n tr ie s . For a t im e, the SERE continued to be the only active

Spanish agency a c t in g on beha lf o f the refugees. However, in

March 1939 P r ie to managed to "capture" part of the Spanish t r e a ­

su re which Negrtn had sen t to Mexico fo r safekeeping. Negrfn

had arranged with P res iden t CSrdenas to ship the treasure , mainly

jew els and a r t o b je c ts , to Tampico, where I t was to be held un til

he or h is r e p re se n ta t iv e could c o l le c t i t . No one knows exactly

how P r ie to , who had been s e n t to Hispanic America by the Republi­

can government before th e end of the war and was trave lling In

Mexico a t th e tim e, managed to learn about the treasure and per­

suade CSrdenas to tu rn I t over to him. However, Prieto did19rece ive the t re a su re and used I t to s e t up his own organization.

A fte r 1940, P r i e to 's group, el Junto de Auxillo a los Refugiados

EspaRoles (JARE), took over the major responsib ili ty fo r the care

and t r a n s p o r ta t io n o f the refugees. The differences between^the

two groups ( the SERE and the J/UIE) were never resolved.

José Fuentes Mares, H lstorfa de una confllc to : el tesoro del "Vita" (Madrid: CVS Ediclones, 1975), pp. 177-191.

59

Transportation from France to the United States and His­

panic America was scarce because of the war. Few nations were

In te res t ing In transporting large groups of refugees; fo r p o l i t i ­

cal and economic reasons they f e l t th is would be unwise. Mexico

was able to work out arrangements with several nations th a t agreed

to consider the refugees as expatria tes and charge them only h a lf ­

fa re . In re tu rn , Mexico guaranteed to f i l l a l l the th ird c lass

space availab le on the ships. The Spanish Republicans paid t h e i r

own fa re s .

Despite these d i f f i c u l t i e s , four ships carrying large groups

of Spanish refugees did cross the A tlantic In 1939. Many other

persons made t h e i r way to Mexico Individually o r In small groups.

During th is period, the SERE provided the bulk o f the funds fo r

the refugees; by December approximately 3285 men, women, and

children had arrived In Mexico. By July 1, 1940 th is number had

grown t o 8,628, a number slowly augmented by those who came 20Individually . After 1940 the growing In ten s ity of the wa

Europe fu r th e r Impeded the a rr iva l of large groups.

Selection of Refugees

Selection of the refugees to go to Mexico was d i f f i c u l t .

Most Indicated a des ire to leave France, and Mexico was a p referred

14 June 1939.^®New Yoi^ Times, 4 May 1939, p. 15, column 2; El Naclonal,

60

destina tion . The crowded and chaotic conditions In the camps also

affected the se lec tio n s , because few of the refugees had id en ti ty

papers and communication was lim ited . The SERE t r ie d to provide

documentation fo r the Republicans and compiled l i s t s which gave

the age, occupation, marital s t a tu s , and p o l i t ic a l a f f i l i a t io n

of each person. After the l i s t s were compiled, the SERE made

the orig inal se lec tio n s , which were then turned over to Mexican

o f f ic ia l s fo r f in a l se lec tion .

Despite the announced open door policy , the Mexican govern­

ment required th a t preference be given to those refugees who had

s k i l l s needed In Mexico. The preferred l i s t Included professors

and teachers, sk i l le d Industr ia l workers, and those with established21business s k i l l s such as accounting.

The se lec tion of these f i r s t groups of refugees aroused

controversy among the refugees and In Mexico. Mexican o f f ic ia l s

In s is ted th a t a l l the p o l i t ic a l groups th a t had been a part of

the Republic be represented In the groups which arrived In Mexico,

but many refugees contended th a t the communists and supporters of22Negrin received p refe ren tia l treatment. In 1940, when the JARE

"Politico migratorla de la Secre tarla de Gobernaclôn refer- ente a los refugiados espaRoles," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la RepOblIca EspaRola, p. 63.

^^"Qulnto Informe de goblerno de LSzaro CSrdenas," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la RepQblIca, pp. 62-3; "Informe de goblerno de Manuel Avlla Camacho," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la RepOblIca EspaRola, p. 89.

61

began to se lec t and transport refugees, sim ilar complaints were

heard about favoritism toward p ro -P rie to factions. All of these

complaints probably had some fac tual base, but because persons who

were members o f a l l the Spanish p o l i t i c a l parties did come to

Mexico during the f i r s t few years . I t I s unlikely tha t the se lec ­

tion process was greatly biased.

The French government cooperated with the former leaders

of the Republic and with Mexican o f f i c i a l s by allowing the refugees

to leave France with a minimum o f documentation, exempting them

from the usual emigration tax and from placing the bond usually

required to prevent re p a tr ia t io n . The fees fo r ex it visas were 23also waived.

On September 21, 1939, Mexico announced th a t the Spanish

immigration would be temporarily suspended due to the outbreak

of the world war in Europe.^* Other fac to rs contributing to

th is suspension may have been the upcoming presidential e lec tion

in Mexico and the lack o f Republican funds to pay fo r the t ran s ­

portation and care o f the refugees. The war also caused the

Mexican governemnt to emphasize the protection of the refugees

In France as much or more than transporting them to Mexico.

However, th is suspension was indeed temporary, and In December

the fourth boatload of refugees arrived via New York,

------------ jn------------Fresco, La emigracifin republicans espaRola, pp. 145-146.

^*Isabel Palencia, Smouldering Freedom (London: Victor Gallanz, 1949), pp. 145-146, 176.

62

Citizenship in Mexico

In order to f a c i l i t a t e the refugee’s a ss im ila tio n in to

Mexican society President C&rdenas Issued a decree January 23,

1940, enabling the Spaniards to become Mexican c i t iz e n s by a

special procedure designed to reduce expenses, d i f f i c u l t i e s , and

delays. Unlike the normal n a tu ra l iz a t io n procedure. In which

applicants for c i t iz e n sh ip were required to complete a minimum

residency requirement o f two years before beginning the ap p lica ­

tion process, the Spanish refugees became e l i g ib le fo r c i t i z e n ­

ship p ra c t ic a l ly a t th e moment of a r r i v a l . In o rder to obtain

n a tu ra liza tion papers they simply had to prove th a t they were

Spanish c i t iz e n s and th a t a Mexican residence had been estab lished ,

In respect fo r Spanish custom and because I t was hoped th a t the

s itu a t io n would be temporary, the refugees were not required to25renounce c it izen sh ip in t h e i r country o f o r ig in .

Several months a f t e r th i s decree was announced, the govern­

ment Issued a l i s t o f ac tions for which any n a tu ra l iz a t io n would

be annulled. These Included a c ts ag a in s t the se cu r i ty o f Mexico,

acts on behalf of a foreign country th a t were Incompatible with

Mexican c i t izensh ip and contrary to th e In te re s t s o f Mexico,

maintenance of re la t io n s with non-Mexican a u th o r i t i e s , groups o r .

In s t i tu t io n s o f a p o l i t i c a l o r public ch a rac te r , and entrance

Into national assoc ia tions which d i r e c t ly o r In d ire c t ly were

2®Piar1o Q flc la l CXVIII:9 (23 January 1940); 2.

63

OClinked with a foreign s t a t e o r dependent on i t .

Most o f the refugees took advantage o f the o f fe r o f

c i t iz e n sh ip , because I t regu la rized th e i r s ta tu s and removed any

trave l o r work r e s t r i c t io n s normally Imposed on noncitizens.

Although, In the s t r i c t e s t sense, the provisions fo r annulIment

could have been applied aga in s t much o f the refugees ' a c t i v i t i e s

ag a in s t the Franco regime, the Mexican government did not consider

p a r t ic ip a t io n In p o l i t i c a l groups formed by the refugees to be

against the se c u r i ty o f Mexico. No ac tion was ever taken a g a in s t

the refugees who continued to work fo r the r e s to ra t io n o f the

Republic. Only one documented case of the provisions o f the

annulIment decree being enforced aga inst a Spanish refugee was

presented , and th e person Involved was reported by the Mexican27government to be working d i r e c t ly fo r a foreign government.

In te rna tiona l E fforts

The f a l l o f France In June 1940 made the p l ig h t o f the

refugees In th a t country more c r i t i c a l , and Mexico Increased her

e f f o r t s to o f f e r asylum and Improve the housing and support

f a c i l i t i e s in France. The Mexican mission to the Vichy regime

and the Mexican consulates in the occupied zone o f France

represented the Spanish Republican I n te r e s t in France. These

2®P1ar1o O flcla l CXXII:5 (6 September 1940): 1-3.

®^Ib1d., pp. 1-36; E xce ls io r . 31 August 1940.

64

missions espec ia lly t r ie d to keep th e Vichy government from

turning former leaders of the Republic over to the Spanish 28government.

On June 23, Licenclado de Rodriguez, th e Mexican m in is te r

to the Vichy government, was In s tru c te d to inform th e French

government th a t Mexico was disposed to give h o s p i t a l i ty to "allOQ

the Spanish refugees of both sexes In France." This In s truc tion

had a t r ip l e purpose: to provide add itional p ro tec tio n fo r the

refugees, to give as many as were ab le to come to Mexico a safe

home, and to provide Mexico with a s k i l l e d , well educated work

force a t l i t t l e cost to the Mexican people. Many o f the refugees

were s t i l l ab le to pay th e i r own way to Mexico, and simply needed

the o f f ic ia l sanction to do so before they were sen t back to Spain

or engulfed In the war which was sweeping Europe. Mexico also

requested o f f i c i a l ly th a t a l l Spaniards In France be put under

o f f ic ia l Mexican protection.®®

Under the guidance o f General Francisco A guilar, Mexican

Consul General In M arse illes , and a rep re se n ta t iv e o f the Vichy

government, an agreement concerning the s ta tu s o f the Spanish

Luis Rodriguez, B a lle t de sangre (Mëxico: Ediclones de Nigromante, 1942), p. 69; "P o l i t lc a de proteclôn a los repub llca­nos espaRoles," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, éd . , Mëxico y la Repûblica EspaRola, pp. 85-6.

Z^Ibid., p. 69.

30*Rodr1guez, B allet de sangre , pp. 233-38.

65

refugees was f in a lized . In an exchange o f l e t t e r s on August 22

and 23, the two governments agreed th a t Mexico would provide pro­

tec tion fo r the Spanish refugees while they remained In France.

Under the terms o f the agreement, France was prohibited from

ex trad iting the refugees to Spain simply because they had supported

the Republican government during the Civil War.®*

E ar l ie r In the year, Mexico had hosted the Pan American

Assembly fo r Aid to the Spanish refugees, which was designed to

f a c i l i t a t e coordination of the work of r e l i e f agencies throughout

America. In th is conference, delegations from the United S ta te s ,

Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Chile, and Puerto Rico agreed on four goals:

aiding the refugees s t i l l l iv ing In the camps In France and North

Africa; bringing them to America when possib le ; helping the

refugees already In Hispanic America and the United S ta tes ; and,32providing a unified American res is tance to Franco.

Later In 1940 the Mexican government managed to Include

the p ligh t o f the Spanish refugees In the agenda of the meeting of

the Foreign Ministers of the American Republicans In Havana. At

31del V a lle ,Las Instltuc lones de la reoObllca espaflola en e x i l l o , p. 15; "En defensa de la refugiados en F rancia ,” quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la RepQblIca EspaRola, p. 98; Fresco, La emigraclôn repûblicaha espaRola7 PpT 39-53.

32"El programa de ayuda de la Conferencla Panamericana," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxico, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûbllcana EspaRola, p. 57; Excelsior, 15-20 February 1940; Fresco, La em1grac1?n republlcana espaRola. pp. 39-53.

66

th e same time, according to Excelsior. Mexican o f f ic ia l s t r ie d to

persuade th e United S tates to provide ships for the transport of

th e refugees . The request for transport was denied, but the Mexican

proposal to e s ta b l is h a network o f committees to deal with the

Spanish refugees was sent by the Foreign Ministers to the Pan

American Union fo r fu r th e r study.

Despite these setbacks, in July 1940, Mexico received

another shipload o f refugees. These refugees received a much

warmer welcome than the e a r l i e r groups who had been greeted with

apprehension. By mid-1940 the early groups had proved to the

Mexican people th a t they were not p o lit ica l extremists or an

economic burden to the nation. This shipload of refugees also had

been se lec ted more ca re fu l ly than e a r l ie r groups; they were ready

to e s ta b l is h permanent homes in Mexico.

The End o f Mexico's Role in France

In l a t e 1940 the Vichy government in France began to put

o b s tru c tio n s in the way o f Spanish emigration. Despite the

August agreement, the government, in many cases, refused to grant

e x i t perm its to Spanish refugees. In response to pressure from

th e German government and Franco, the Vichy government In March

1941 issued a decree which s ta ted tha t no Spanish male of m il i ta ry

age (18-48) would be allowed to leave the country. The immigration

o f former Spanish government o f f ic ia l s was delayed a lso because

^ E x c e l s io r , 22 July 1940.

67

of an informal agreement between the Vichy government and Franco

which required these men to remain in France.

Mexico's new president, former Secretary of National

Defense, Manuel Avila Camacho, sent a telegram to the Vichy govern­

ment reminding them of th e August agreements and pledging to

a s s i s t France In taking care o f the remaining Spanish refugees.

He re i te ra te d his support for former president CSrdenas' p o l ic ie s

and sa id th a t his government also wanted to p ro tec t those who

"were able to leave the prisons or concentration camps and o thers

who had escaped ce rta in death which would be th e i r f a te i f they35were ex trad ited from France to Spain."

Despite these impediments, some organized emigrations did

cross the A tlan tic to Mexico in l a t e 1941. At le a s t th ree large

groups, as well as numerous individuals and small groups, a rrived

in Mexico. They joined o ther Spanish refugees who had already

established schools, c l in ic s , small businesses, and p o l i t i c a l

a ssoc ia tions .

Relations between Mexico and France over refugee problems

became increasingly tense in 1942, a f te r Mexico entered the war

on the side o f the A ll ie s , although Mexican a u th o r i t ie s continued

^T resco , La emigracidn republicans espafiola, p. 51; Excelsior, 25 March 1941.

^^"Politica de protecciôn a los republicanos espafioles," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaFiol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 85-6.

68

to t ry to Improve the conditions under which many o f the refugees

in France s t i l l l iv e d . Mass emigrations became impossible, how­

ever, due to French r e s t r i c t i o n s . General Aguilar was reca lled to

Mexico in l a t e June 1942 fo r ta lk s with the Foreign M inister.

The Mexican government in s is te d th a t i t had no in te n t io n o f breaking3fir e la t io n s with the French government, but re la t io n s between the

two countries were f in a l ly broken on November 9 , 1942. This

cessation o f r e la t io n s , and the occupation o f non-Vichy France

two days l a t e r , meant the end of mass emigration and o f Mexican

p ro tec tion o f the Spanish refugees in France. Before the Mexican

mission was c losed, the Mexican government arranged fo r Sweden

to p ro tec t the Spanish Republicans who remained in France.

^®New York Times, 4 August 1942; El Univers_al, 30 June, 24 Ju ly 1942.

CHAPTER IV ACCEPTANCE OF THE REFUGEES IN MEXICO

President CSrdenas' retirem ent from the presidency in 1940

did not a l t e r Mexico's policy toward Spain. Despite the lack o f

transporta tion and o ther complications caused by the war in Europe,

several thousand refugees came to Mexico from 1939-1942 when the

German takeover o f France made fu r th e r emigration d i f f i c u l t .

Many of the Spanish refugees in Mexico a f te r 1940 benefited

from the emphasis o f the new President, Manuel Avila Camacho,

on economic development. This emphasis, coupled with increased

wartime demand fo r raw m ateria ls and consumer goods, gave many

refugees opportun ities to use th e i r technical and managerial

s k i l l s in a wide v a r ie ty o f businesses and development p ro je c ts .

Mexican leaders continued to believe th a t General Franco

would be deposed in Spain a t the end of the war. For th i s reason,

the refugees ' formation of a government-in-exile was supported in

Mexico, and members o f the Mexican government w il l in g ly p a r t i c i ­

pated in the ceremonies t h a t accompanied the inauguration of the

government.

Early Settlement

C&rdenas and h is In te rm in is té r ie l Committee, which was

69

70

appointed to organize the Spanish immigration and se ttlem ent in

Mexico, o r ig in a l ly devised a d e ta i le d plan fo r the Spanish refugees.

While on the sh ip to Mexico each refugee was b rie fed by a Mexican

o f f ic ia l and to ld o f h is /h e r r ig h ts and d u tie s as a re s id en t of

Mexico. Each Spaniard received a c a re fu l ly prepared packet o f

information on Mexico—i t s people, language, c u s tm s , and geo­

graphy. A l e t t e r from th e Mexican government was included in

the packet, s ta t in g th a t the f i r s t ob liga tion o f the refugees was

to understand and conform to Mexican c u l tu re . The refugees a lso

were to ld th a t they were expected to work honorably, obey a l l

laws, avoid involvement in foreign p o l i t ic a l p a r t i e s , and to

fo rg e t the "e rro rs o f the p as t ."^ They were reminded th a t th e i r

behavior in Mexico would determine, a t le a s t in p a r t , how many

more Spanish refugees would be admitted to Mexico in the coming

years . By issu ing these warnings. P resident CSrdenas hoped to

a l l e v ia te po ten tia l problems which might make the Spaniards unwel­

come guests and jeopardize fu tu re a ss is ta n ce to Republican Spain.

Under the o r ig in a l plan devised by the In te rm in is té r ie l

Committee appointed by President CSrdenas, the m ajority o f the

Spanish refugees were leg a lly required to s e t t l e in underpopulated

regions o f the country where they could farm, e s ta b l ish small

businesses, and a id in th e development o f t h e i r newly-adopted

^Fresco, La emigracidn republicana espahola , pp. 47-8.

71

2country. O ff ic ia ls o f the committee met each group as i t arrived

in Mexico and, a f t e r a short processing period , assigned them

to a p a r t ic u la r d e s t in a tio n . Twelve a g r ic u l tu ra l colonies in

Chihuahua, Baja C a lifo rn ia , MIchoacSn, and the coastal a reas were

created e sp ec ia l ly fo r the refugees. On the whole, however, these

colonies were f a i lu r e s , ch ie f ly because few o f the refugees had

a g r ic u l tu ra l experience. The Iso la ted loca tion o f the s e t t l e ­

ments and competition with the poorly paid Mexican campesinos

helped to make these colonies u n a tt rac t iv e to most o f the3

Spaniards.

The in d u s tr ia l and commercial e n te rp r ise s estab lished by

the refugees were more successful than th e i r farming communities.

A number o f s e l f -h e lp organizations were s e t up soon a f t e r the

refugees a rr ived to a s s i s t them In f inding jobs o r beginning new

businesses. The JARE, as required under i t s agreement with the

Mexican government, a lso continued to d isburse funds to refugees

in need o f f inanc ia l a ss is ta n ce or a cap ita l loan.* The indus­

t r i a l boom in Mexico caused by the world war o f ten produced

--------------- 5---------------------"Asilados p o l i t ic o s espafioles reclentemente llegados al

p a ls ," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 63-4; Revista Poblacién, é d . , El immigrante espahoi, 3rd ed. (Mexico: n . p . , 1942), pp. 1-12,"5^2; E xcels io r. 17. 20.' 30 Ju ly 1939.

^E1 Universal 22 June 1939; Fagen, Exiles and C itizens, p. 53; Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 262.

*"As1stencia y ayuda a los emigrados," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mêxico y la Repûblica Espafiol, pp. 104-5.

72

employment and business op po rtun ities fo r refugees with technical

and managerial s k i l l s . ^

More than f i f t y publishing houses were founded by the

Spanish refugees , including E d ito r ia l SSneca (founded with the

help of th e SERE), E d ito r ia l Arcos, and Ediciones Minerva.

Although the m ajority o f books p rin ted by these houses were in

Spanish, a few sp e c ia liz ed in o ther languages such as English,

French, and Catalan. Each pub lisher tended to sp e c ia l iz e in one

o r two a re a s , such as basic t e x t books, c la s s ic a l l i t e r a tu r e ,

p o l i t i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c analyses, o r economics. Many were q u i te

su c c e ss fu l , and by 1950 hundreds o f o r ig in a l volumes had been

published by the Spanish refugees .^

Spanish authors and sc h o la rs , such as Ja v ie r Marquez

and Vicente Kerrero, a lso jo ined w ith t h e i r Mexican colleagues

to ed it books o f sociology, economics, philosophy, and science,

which were published by the Mexican pub lisher el Fondo de

Culture EconCmica and the Spanish publish ing houses. In add ition ,

th e refugees helped to t r a n s la te well known European l i t e r a t u r e ,

including the works o f Balzac, Durkhelm, Kant, Marx. Rousseau,

Fresco reports th a t Spanish engineer Pable SeguT used Mexican cap ita l to bu ild a fac to ry to produce kitchen stoves. Within a few years h is fac to ry produced about 30,000 stoves a y e a r which reduced Mexico's need to Import United S ta te s ' products by about 60 percent, Fresco, La emigraciôn republicana espafiola, p. 169.

®Ib1d., p. 92.

73

and Stendahl, In to Spanish fo r Mexican readers . For many of the

most noted scholars among the refugees, these t ra n s la t io n s

provided much needed income during th e i r f i r s t days in Mexico

before they could e s tab l ish permanent careers in t h e i r new home.

Among the t r a n s la to r s were scholars such as Pedro Bosch Gimpera,

Francisco Giner de los Rios, and Luis Jimenez de AsQa.^

Industr ies e s tab lish ed by the Spaniards included canneries,

t e x t i l e shops, and s tee l foundries. A number o f p res t ig iou s

lab o ra to r ie s were founded in conjunction with medical schools or

drug companies which f a c i l i t a t e d the development o f new medicines,

the study o f t ro p ic a l d iseases , and n u tr i t io n research . Commer­

c ia l lab o ra to r ie s a s s is te d in the production o f aluminum and

mineral e x tra c t io n . Small businesses, including re s ta u ra n ts , film

production s tu d io s , and r e t a i l shops^ flourished in the refugeeQ

committee. In accordance with Mexico's i n te r e s t 1n build ing ht

in f r a s t ru c tu re , refugees a lso founded firms such as la CompaFfia

Constructora de A guilar, \ canals throughout Mexico.'

Constructora de A guilar, which b u i l t r a i l ro a d s , roads, and9

I b id . , p. 94; José Luis AbellSn, e d . , El e x i l io espafiol de 1939, vol. 1: La emigraciôn republicana de 1939; vol. 2: Guerra y P o j i t i c a ; vol. 3: f e v i s t a s . Pensamiento. tducacifin; vol.Culture V L i te r a tu r e ; vol. 5: Arte v C lencia; voT. 6: Cataluna. Euzkadi, G alic ia ^"vols. (Madrid; Taurus Ediciones, 1976), 3:21-280.

ÛFresco, La emigraciôn republicana espafiola. pp. 168-9.

^Armando R. PareyÔn Azpeita, C&rdenas ante e l mundo; defensa de la repûblica espafiola. e t io p ia , f in la n J la . A frica , luchas populares de aSlT (Mëxico: La Prensa, D ivision Comercial, 1973), p. 16Ô.-----------------

74

Many of the refugees were teachers and professors who

chose to continue th e ir profession in Mexico. The professors were

wen organized in "La Union de Profesores Uni vers i t a r los Espafioles

en el Extranjero" which was formed in Paris in 1939. This group,

whose governing board was l a te r moved to Mexico City to f a c i l i t a t e

communication among the professors throughout the Americas, helped

to coordinate the exiled professors ' professional work. The

"union" a lso held conferences on a varie ty o f education Issues

and helped to create and sustain amicable re la tion s w ith indigenous

scho lars . Many o f the more than th ree hundred professors who came

to Mexico from Spain taught in Mexico's leading u n iv e r s i t ie s , while

o thers continued research in terrupted by the war.^^ Although the

l i s t of ac tiv e Spanish professors i s too lengthy to enumerate,

teachers such as Juan Comas, José Ignacio Montecedo, and Rafael

Altamira y Crevea, were known around the world.

A number of professors and teachers also estab lished schools

fo r the young refugees who had f led Spain with th e i r fam ilies .

In cooperation with the Mexican Secretary o f Public Education, La

Academia Hispana-Mexicana was begun in September 1939 to provide

secondary education for 850 students. Soon a f t e r . El Colegio

Madrid, El In s t i tu te Luis Vives, and la Fundaclôn Cervantes

(with schools in Tampico, TorreÔn, Côrdoba, Veracruz, and

253-8.^®Ibid., p. 65; AbellSn, e d . , Guerra y P o l f t ic a , pp. 229-30,

75

Texcoco) began providing in s truc tio n to young Spaniards and

Mexicans. These schools were Intended not only to educate the

young refugees and employ Spanish teachers , but a lso to keep

a live the t rad i t io n s of Spanish education and c u l tu re .

The two hundred and twenty-five doctors who sought refuge

in Mexico began private p rac tices and c l in ic s to serve fellow

refugees and Mexicans and taught In most o f the n a t io n 's medical

schools. Although most o f the doctors s e t t l e d In urban a re a s ,

a number worked with the Mexican government to provide health

care In rural areas. Spanish nurses a lso worked in ru ra l areas

such as Oaxaca a t the Cultural Missions founded a f t e r the Mexican

Revolution. These women worked with Mexican volunteers to provide

basic medical care. They a lso taught home nursing and simple

f i r s t aid as a means of making the local re s id en ts more

se l f - su f f ic ie n t .^ ^

In 1941, President Avila Camacho Imposed more rigorous

re s t r ic t io n s on the refugees to be admitted to Mexico. Recogniz­

ing the f a c t tha t the war in Europe made i t d i f f i c u l t to enforce

a complicated se lec tion process, admittance was l im ited to those

refugees who could meet ce r ta in e a s i ly determined c r i t e r i a .

Persons with close family t i e s , prominent s c i e n t i s t s and

l^de Palencia, Smoldering Freedom; p. 162; Fresco, La emigraciôn republicana espafiola, p. 144.

^^Ib id ., pp. 122-5; Lini M. de V ries , Please God. Take Care of the Mule; Personal Adventure in Mexico (Mëxico: E d ito r ia l Minutiae Mexicana, 1972), pp. 79-88.

76

In te l le c tu a ls , recognized a r t i s t s , those in s ig n if ic a n t danger

of losing th e i r l iv e s , and those whose s k i l l s were g rea tly needed

were allowed to en te r Mexico. No one whose profession could con­

s t i t u t e unfair competition with Mexican nationals was to be

allowed to en ter the country. This category included doctors,13lawyers, pharmacists, and w ri te rs .

These r e s t r i c t io n s , coupled with the lack of transporta ­

tion and the d i f f i c u l t i e s in arranging papers and v isa s , reduced

the number of Spanish refugees entering Mexico. Marry Spaniards

who had escaped to o ther nations in Europe, North Africa, or the

Americas and hoped to eventually r e s e t t l e in Mexico were forced

to remain where they were un til l a te in the war. A fter the war

most of the re s t r ic t io n s were l i f t e d and large numbers of

refugees again arrived in Mexico. Many of these refugees arrived

from Santo Domingo, where many Spanish professionals had lived

during the war.

P o li t ic a l A c tiv it ie s of the Refugees

The p o l i t ic a l a c t iv i t i e s of the refugees were limited

during the war due to the distance separating them, the d i f f i c u l ­

t ie s In communication, and the r e s t r ic t io n s imposed by th e i r

countries o f refuge. Many of the leaders of the Spanish Republic

"Acuerdo que rég ira la p o l l t ic a en favor de los refugla- dos espafioles," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, éd ., Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 86-8; "Informe de gobierno de Manuel Avila Camacho," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mêxico, é d . , Mëxico v la Repûblica Espafiola. p. 89.

77

had made th e i r home In Mexico, Including P r ie to and Martinez

Barrio; s t i l l others remained in France o r had temporary homes

in Santo Domingo or other nations in Hispanic America. Former

Prime Minister Negrin had se t t le d in London, and the B r i t ish

government was re luctan t to allow him to leave and ree n te r th e

country a t w ill .

Despite th i s fragmentation, many refugees did continue

th e i r pa rt ic ipa tion in p o l i t ic a l pa rties or groups, and additional

associations were formed with the goal o f keeping the Spanish

Republic a l i v e . T h e Mexican government maintained u n o ff ic ia l

contact with many of these groups In order to f a c i l i t a t e the

immigration and successful settlem ent of the refugees. However,

the Mexican o f f ic ia l s t r ie d to avoid showing favorit ism to any of

the groups, although th is was not always possib le .

One of the most publicized and acrimonious disputes

between the Mexican government and a refugee group concerned

the JARE. Throughout 1940 the JARE, e sp ec ia lly i t s leader P r ie to ,

was openly accused by o ther refugees of mismanaging funds.

Although Prie to emphatically denied these accusations, in January

1941 President Avila Camacho ordered th a t the JARE form a

lim ited l i a b i l i t y company to be administered by a mixed commis­

sion comprised of representatives o f JARE and rep resen ta tives from

^*de Palencia, Smoldering Freedom, p. 162; Fagen, Exiles and C itizen s , pp. 81-144; AbellSn, ed ., Guerra y P o l l t ic a , pp. 179- 203.

78

the Mexican m in is tr ies of Foreign Relations and Interior.^® This

arrangement was intended not only to ensure th a t the funds were

being d is tr ib u ted equitab ly , but also to eliminate the potential

problems of a foreign business operating on Mexican s o i l .

When the JARE did not carry out Avila Camacho's in s tru c ­

t io n s , he issued a second decree on November 27, 1 9 4 2 . In

th is decree he re i te ra te d his order to form a lim ited l i a b i l i t y

company, ordering th a t the mixed commission be formed immediately.

Prieto appealed to the courts to rescind th is order, but his

s u i t was refused, and the mixed commission was created . The com­

mission quickly se t up the lim ited l i a b i l i t y company which was

named el Federacidn de Organismes de Ayuda a la Republicana

Espafiola (FOARE). After investiga ting the administration o f the

JARE's funds, the commission c r i t ic iz e d i t s leaders fo r mismanage­

ment, The commission also declared th a t no fu r th e r mass expedi­

tions to Mexico would be undertaken, because the JARE did not

have su f f ic ie n t funds to pay the refugees' transporta tion cos ts .

Following th is inves tiga tio n , the Mexican government r e s t r ic te d

the amount of money th a t could be sent out o f Mexico for

maintenance of Spanish refugees in other nations,

I Spiario O ficial CXXXIV:32 (8 February 1941): 1-3; "Acuerdo que rég ira la p o l l t ic a en favor de los refugiados espafioles," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de México, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiol. pp. 86-8,

IGp ia r io O ficial CXXXV:25 (11 December 1942); 1-3.

^^"Poder e jecu tivo : Secretarfa de GobernaclÔn," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mëxico, é d . , Mêxico y la Repûblica Espafiola. pp. 96-7.

79

Although th e re were no fu r th e r mass imnlgratlons a f te r

1942, refugees continued to en te r Mexico. Mexican visas were

Issued to seven hundred refugees in North Africa in April 1943,

however, wartime t rav e l r e s t r i c t io n s kept many o f the Spaniards

from reaching Mexico. A fte r the war immigration to Mexico

increased , reaching a peak in 1947 and continuing several years

t h e r e a f t e r from Santo Domingo and o ther nations where the Spanish18refugees had sought refuge during the war.

Early Moves Toward a Government-In-Exile

In 1943, many o f the refugee leaders began to consider the

formation o f some type o f organization which could be ready to

take over the government o f Spain when Franco was deposed as they

a n t ic ip a te d a t th e end o f the war. Martinez Barrio, as the former

P residen t o f the C ortes , took the lead in trying to reconcile the

refugee fa c t io n s In support o f such an organization. These

e f f o r t s were g enera lly unsuccessful, since the organizations

envisioned by the two primary leaders , Negrin and P rie to , were

ra d ic a l ly d i f f e r e n t . Negrin proposed an umbrella group composed

o f a l l the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s th a t had partic ipa ted In supporting

the Spanish Republic. P r ie to favored a government of s o c ia l is t s19and t h e i r philosophical a l l i e s .

— “ —■ • -.-g--------------El Nacional. 6 January 1944; "Tercer informe de Manuel

Avila Camacho," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaFiol de Mêxico, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espahola, p. 106.

l^del V alle . Las in s t i tu c io n e s de la repûblica espaflola en e x IH o , pp. 72-91; Fagen, Exiles and Citizens, p. 280; AbellSn,éd., Guerra y p o l i t i c a , pp. 204-7.

80

The Mexican government was unreceptlve when Martinez Barrio

proposed th a t a meeting o f the Spanish Cortes be held in Mexico

City to resolve the differences among the refugee groups. No

o f f ic ia l reason was given fo r th is objection, but the f a c t that

the war would prevent many deputies from attending and the lack

of agreement among the refugees on the u t i l i t y o f such a meeting20were ce r ta in ly fac to rs .

Many of the refugee groups, including the Catalans,

believed th a t the formation of a committee to represent the

in te re s ts o f the refugees was preferable to an o f f ic ia l meeting

o f the Cortes. As an interim measure, la Junta Espafiola de

Liberaciân (JEL) was formed in November 1943 with the backing

of Prie to and Martinez Barrio , but not o f Negrin, the communists,

the Basques, the Catalans, o r the Galicians. The Junta sought

to pressure governments to break re la tions with Franco and to

aid the underground opposition to the government in Spain.

Mexico did not in h ib i t the formation or the work o f the JEL,

and Mexican o f f i c i a l s often attended banquets and other functions21given by the group and met with JEL leaders.

Martinez Barrio and his supporters continued to advocate

a meeting of the Cortes in Mexico. In la te 1944, Avila Camacho

s ta ted th a t he had no objection to the meeting being held in

^^ExcelsiOT\ 10 May 1945.

^^AbellSn, e d . , Guerra y P o l i t ic a , pp. 145-152; Fagen, Exiles and C itizens , p. 28Ï.

81

Mexico C ity . In December, the former President of the Cortes

announced th a t the f i r s t meeting o f the Cortes since 1939 would

be held in Mexico City in January.

On January 10, 1945, the much-discussed meeting of the

Cortes was held. Because a quorum was not present (only 72 of

the 474 members attended) l i t t l e could be accomplished. Negrin

and h is followers boycotted the meeting because he was not con-23su ited before the f in a l arrangements had been m ad e .^ The

convocation o f the Cortes was generally believed to be counter­

productive; i t merely served to underscore the d ifferences among

the refugee leaders and did l i t t l e to strengthen t i e s among the

Spaniards in e x i le .

Leaders o f the refugee community did use the meeting o f

the Cortes to discuss the fu tu re o f Spain with Mexican o f f i c i a l s .

Ex-president CSrdenas met several times with his old fr iend

J u l io Alvarez del Vayo to discuss the possib le re s to ra t io n o f a

Republican government in Spain. Although CSrdenas had purpose­

f u l ly remained in the background on foreign policy issu e s , he

did maintain his t i e s with h is Republican fr iends and was

---------------Novedades, 16 November 1944; New York Times. 11 November

1944.

^^A Spanish Republican who p a r t ic ip a te d in several stages o f the formation o f the government-in-exile s ta te s th a t Negrin was not informed o f the meeting o f the Cortes u n t i l ten hours before the meeting and th a t he would have been unable to a ttend had he wished to do so. She a lso s t a te s th a t Negrin opposed allowing the Cortes to meet u n t i l the end o f the war when Franco's f a te would be c le a re r , de Palencia , Smoldering Freedom, pp. 69-71.

82

eager to p rivate ly discuss the chances for forming a government-

in -ex ile and the eventual overthrow of Franco in Spain.

Alvarez del Vayo met with the former president again on

January 28 when they were joined by Indalecio P rie to . In th is

meeting Cêrdenas expressed h is wish th a t the former leaders o f

the Spanish Republic could un ite and take " in te l l ig e n t action"gc

so th a t they could win sympathy and aid from the A llies .

Despite th is plea, the Spanish refugees continued to bicker. On

January 29, the "negrin is tas" held a meeting in Mexico City to

demonstrate th e i r support f o r Negrln's boycott o f the meeting of

the Cortes. Licenclado Fernando Laras AlemSn, governor of the

Federal D is t r ic t , spoke to the meeting, thus demonstrating Mexico's

nonpartisan support o f the Spanish Republic. He s ta ted th a t

Mexico continued to believe in the res to ra tion of democracy in

Spain, adding th a t h is country 's support fo r the Spanish refugees26as the "incarnation o f the tru e Spain" would never waiver.

San Francisco Conference

The opening o f the San Francisco Conference to form the

United Nations organization in 1945 caused the refugees to post­

pone discussion on the c reation of a government-in-exile. Republi­

can leaders were inv ited to the Conference as o f f ic ia l observers,

^*Cârdenas, Obras, 2:142-6.

Z^ibid ., pp. 142-6.

2^51 Nacional, 30 January 1945.

83

and th e Mexican government o ffered to work with the Spaniards

to d r a f t a proposal to be submitted to the Conference. The

refugees hoped to prevent the Franco government from being

accepted as a member of the United Nations and to gain support

for t h e i r cause. For the f i r s t time since the end o f the

Civil War, Negrin l e f t London fo r Mexico City to work with

Prie to and the o ther ex iled leaders o f the Republic.

As p a r t of the Spanish refugees ' campaign ag a in s t the

government in Spain, a conference was held in Mexico City on March

20-21, 1945. Menders o f the leading refugee groups a ttended ,

as well as a number o f Mexican o f f i c i a l s associated with the

FOARE. One o f the reso lu tio ns adopted a t the conference d irec ted

the FOARE to present a document a t the San Francisco Conference.

This document, which was w rit ten by the refugees a ttend ing the

conference in Mexico C ity, described the regime of t e r r o r imposed

by Franco and suggested th a t the member s ta te s o f the soon-to-be-

created United Nations: 1} send a commission o f j u r i s t s to Spain

to examine the s i tu a t io n ; 2) press fo r aid fo r the people o f Spain,

cessation of executions, and the re lease o f a l l p o l i t i c a l p riso ne rs ;

and, 3) break a l l commercial and diplomatic r e la t io n s with the 28Franco regime.

27Fuentes Mares, H is to ria de un c o n f l i c to . p. 192; del Valle, Las in s t i tu c io n e s de la repûblica espafiola en e x i l i o , pp. 91-108.

go"Informe sobre la s ituac iôn de t e r r o r en Espaîia, envi ado

por la FOARE a San Francisco, EE.UÜ,," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mêxico, é d . , Mêxico y la Repûblica Espafiola. p. 113.

84

In accordance with th is re so lu tio n , on May 10 the JEL

c ircu la ted a p e t i t io n a t the San Francisco Conference which was

w rit ten by P r ie to , Alvarez del Vayo, and former ambassador to

Mexico Félix Gordén OrdSs. This p e t i t io n declared th a t "the moral

repudiation o f the Franco government by the United Nations is29necessary so th a t the government w ill f a l l without v io lence ."

On the same day, Alvarez del Vayo met with the ch ie f o f the Soviet

delegation and Negrin a rr ived in San Francisco to jo in in the

s tru g g le . Martinez Barrio remained in Mexico C ity, where he

consulted with Mexican o f f i c i a l s concerning the f a te o f Spain30and the Spanish e x i le s .

Mexican delegate Luis Q uin tan illa and France's Joseph

Paul Boncour launched a f ron ta l a ttack on Franco on June 19.

As a r e s u l t o f th e i r impassioned speeches and o f the groundwork

la id by the e x i le s and t h e i r supporte rs , the San Francisco General

Assembly adopted an agreement not to admit Spain to the United

Nations.

A fter the conference in San Francisco, the Spanish Republi­

cans returned to Mexico to discuss th e i r fu tu re with the Mexican

government. CSrdenas met with Alvarez del Vayo and Juan Negrin

2*Excelsior\ 10 May 1945.

30Fuentes Mares, H isto ria de un c o n f l ic to . p. 193.

3 1 lb id . , pp. 193-4.

85

to discuss the possible reorganization o f the Republican govern­

ment. The former president s trongly supported the c rea tio n o f

a government-In-exile which could form th e bas is f o r a govern­

ment in Spain when the leader o f the Insurgen ts , Francisco Franco,32was removed from o ff ice , CSrdenas and most o th er Mexican

o f f ic ia l s believed th a t General Franco would be among the European

leaders a ss is te d by the German and I t a l ia n governments who would

be removed from power by the A llies a t the end of the world war.

Formation of the Government-in-Exile

On August 1, 1945, Negrin, Alvarez del Vayo, and CSrdenas

met again In Mexico City. They discussed the ro le o f a government-

in -ex ile and the support which such a government could expect to

receive in Europe and the Americas. CSrdenas a lso met separa te ly

with the former Republican general, Jose Majia, who had come to33Mexico to p a r t ic ip a te in the formation o f the e x i le government.

After th i s meeting on August 1, Negrin s ta te d In a speech

a t the Mexican Palace of Fine Arts th a t the time had come to

es tab lish a Spanish government which would be recognized by a l l

nations.^* Following his formal request, Mexican a u th o r i t ie s gave

e x i l io , p. 113.

^^CSrdenas, Obras, 2:180.

S^ib ld ., 2:183.

3*del Valle . Las In s ti tu c io n es de la repûb lica espafiola en

86

permission fo r a meeting o f the Cortes to be held on August 17

in one o f the government build ings in Mexico City. The building

was temporarily declared to be the property o f Spain, and Mexican

troops were ordered to provide an e sco r t fo r the Spanish

d ign ita r ie s .^®

Several prominent Mexican o f f i c i a l s attended th is meeting

o f the Cortes, including ex-presiden t CSrdenas, a personal repre­

se n ta t iv e o f President Avila Camacho, and rep resen ta tives o f the

army and the navy. Martinez Barrio took the p res id en tia l oath of

o f f ic e and the next day named a cab inet under the leadersh ip of

José G ira l , Negrin and P rie to both supported the new government,

which was recognized immediately by Mexico. However, ne ither

Negrin and h is wing o f the s o c i a l i s t p a r ty , nor the communists36p a r t ic ip a te d In the new government.

Before retu rn ing to t h e i r homes in Europe, Alvarez del

Vayo and Negrin met once again with former p res iden t CSrdenas.

President Avila Camacho a lso met b r ie f ly with the Republican37leaders and CSrdenas.

Martinez Barrio was inv ited to a ttend the opening o f the

Mexican Congress on September 1, 1945, as the rep resen ta t ive of

®®E1 U niversal. 18 August 1945,

^®E1 Universal, 18, 27, 28 August 1945; de Palencia , Smolder­ing Freedom, p. 7^.

^^CSrdenas, Obras, 2:186-7.

87

38o f th e government o f Spain. About a month la te r , the building

and the arch ives o f th e Spanish embassy were turned over to the

governm ent-in-exile . In November, a th i rd meeting of the Cortes

approved Martinez B a r r io 's choice of Oosê Giral to lead the govern­

ment. G i r a l ' s government was recognized only by Mexico, Venezuela,

Guatemala, and Panama. Mexico continued to represent the Spanish

Republic in co u n tr ie s where the government-1 n-exile could not or

did not e s ta b l i s h diplomatic missions. Mexico also se t up a sys­

tem by which Spanish refugees in Mexico whose family and friends

were imprisoned by Franco could o f f ic ia l ly plead fo r th e ir re lease .

These p leas f o r clemency were sent to Spain through nations that39maintained r e la t io n s with Franco's government.

On October 29, 1945, a banquet was held in Mexico City by

the governm ent-in-exile and the Mexican government to honor the

Spanish refugees . At th i s d inner, Mexican Foreign Minister

Francisco C a s t i l lo Najera s ta te d tha t

th e re a re no d ifferences between us, and as Intimates o f Spain we ought to t ry to in te rac t with sincere f r a t e r n i t y and friend ly understanding. The people of Mexico f e e l , as blood bro thers, the unjust agression o f which Spain has been a victim; we , . .see the Spanish tragedy as a rep e tit io n of the sad events which have punctuated the Mexican history . . .40

^®£1 U niversa l. 31 August 1945.

^®Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 289.

*^"Oel d iscu rso del Secre tarla de Relaciones Exteriores de Mêxico, Dr. Gra. Francisco C as til lo Najera, en el homenaje a Mêxico y a la Repûblica Espafiola el dia 28 de octubre de 1945," quoted in Centro Republicano Espafiol de Mêxico, é d . , Mëxico y la Repûblica Espafiola. p. 117.

CHAPTER VMEXIC0-5PANISH RELATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

Mexico remained s tead fas t in her support of the Spanish

government-in-exile in the three decades following World War I I .

Although the Spanish ex iles moved th e ir government to France in

1946, successive Mexican presidents maintained close t ie s with

the e x ile s and refused to recognize the government of Francisco

Franco. Informal re la tio n s did gradually develop between Mexico

and Spain, but the Mexican government made no move toward d ip lo ­

matic recognition of the Spanish government.

Mexico i t s e l f changed rad ica lly between 1945 and 1970.

The government's Increasing emphasis on economic development and

building the national in f ra s tru c tu re helped to modernize the

country. However, the s p l i t between rich and poor continued to

grow, land d is tr ib u t io n almost ceased, and outbreaks of h o s t i l i t y

aga inst the government became more frequent. Former president

Lëzaro CSrdenas continued to be actively involved with develop­

ment p ro jec ts and, as the years passed, he also became Increasingly

outspoken about world events.

88

89

Mexico and the United Nations

The Mexican government s trong ly supported the United Nations

and was an ac tiv e p a r t ic ip a n t In i t s d e l ib e ra t io n s . At the In te r -

American Conference on the Problems of Peace and War, held in

Mexico in e a r ly 1945 before the San Francisco Conference, Mexico

had proposed two amendments to the d r a f t United Nations Charter.

One would have required member s ta te s to incorporate in te rna tio na l

laws in to t h e i r national legal system; a second would have e lim i­

nated most r e s t r i c t io n s on the UN's competence In In te rna tiona l

c o n tro v e rs ie s .1

The second proposed amendment grew d i r e c t ly out o f Mexico's

experience in the League o f Nations p r io r to World War I I , when

the League refused to a s s i s t nations such as Spain on the grounds

th a t a c iv i l war was a domestic issue . The Mexican government

believed th a t the United Nations o r the Permanent Court o f In te r ­

national J u s t ic e should have the re s p o n s ib i l i ty to mediate in

"any d ispu te , o r in any s i tu a t io n which may lead to in te rna tio na l2

f r i c t io n or give r i s e to a d ispu te ." Mexican delegates a lso

supported broad powers fo r the General Assembly, g rea te r i n t e r ­

national p ro tec tion of human r ig h t s , and reduced veto power fo r

the g rea t powers.^ In the Mexican view, these proposals, i f

^Jorge Castafieda, Mexico and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 43-5.

^ I b id . , p. 45.

^ I b id , , pp. 45-6.

90

accepted, would have strengthened the new In ternational organi­

zation as well as ro le of the sm aller nations in i t .

Although Mexico's suggestions were not accepted a t the

San Francisco Conference where o th e r na tions p referred to l im it

the power o f the United Nations, the Mexican government planned

to be an ac tive p a r t ic ip a n t in the new organization and i t s a f f i l ­

ia te organizations. P residen t Avila Camacho accepted an in v i ta ­

tion fo r Mexico to hold one o f the nonpermanent sea ts on the

Security Council fo r i t s f i r s t session in 1946—a sea t which he

said Mexico planned to use to p ro te c t the in te re s ts o f smaller

nations.

When the i n i t i a l sess ion o f the Security Council convened

in February 1946, Roberto CÔrdova, the Mexican de legate , announced

tha t h is country would support any i n i t i a t i v e to discuss the

"Franco problem."* This announcement d id not e l i c i t any action

until A pril , when th e Polish de lega te proposed th a t the Security

Council c a l l members of the United Nations to break diplomatic

re la tion s with the government in Spain in accordance with the

s p i r i t of the San Francisco Conference. Rafael de la Colina,

the Mexican a l te rn a te , spoke s tro n g ly in favor o f the Polish pro­

posal, and the Council members agreed to order a report on the

current s i tu a t io n in Spain.®

*Smith. Mexico and th e Spanish Republicans, p. 292; Excelsio r. 9 April 1946; El Popular. 19 April 1946.

®Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 293; United Nations, Security Council. 1st Session. O ff ic ia l Records of the

91

A fter several months o f In v e s t ig a t io n , the committee, which

consisted of represen ta tives from A u s tra l ia , B ra z i l , France, China,

and Poland, found Franco to be a po ten tia l t h r e a t to In te rn a tiona l

peace and recommended th a t the m atter be placed before the General

Assembly fo r consideration. The committee a lso recommended th a t

a l l United Nations members break diplomatic re la t io n s with Spain

i f Franco was s t i l l In power when the General Assembly considered

the Spanish s i tu a t io n . This reso lu tio n was put to a vote, but

fa i led to pass.®

Following the Security Council 's vote, Poland, Yugoslavia,

and Hungary o f f ic i a l ly recognized th e Spanish government-1n-ex11e,

and In October Republican rep resen ta tiv es were received In the

United Nations Educational, S c ie n t i f ic , and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO). ̂ In a f in a l gesture o f support fo r the Spanish Republic,

the General Assembly approved a reso lu tio n on December 12, 1946,

which: 1) barred N ationa lis t Spain from membership In the I n te r ­

national organizations o f the United Nations; 2) c a l le d on the

Security Council to consider measures to remedy the s i tu a t io n In

Spain; and , 3} recommended th a t a l l members o f the United Nations

withdraw m inisters and ambassadors from Madrid, Mexico supported

General Assembly. 17 April 1946, p. 167; "Relaciones de los miembros de las Naclones Unldas con Espafia," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxlco y la RepOblIca EspaFiola, pp. 134-65; "La euest1 on de Espaîia," quoted 1n Centro Republlcano Espafiol de México, é d . , Mëxlco y la RepQblIca Espaflola, p .226.

®Un1ted Nations, Security Council, 1 s t Session, O ff ic ia l Records, 17 April 1946, pp. 441-46.

^Francisco G ira l , La repûblica en e x i l io (Mëxlco: n .p . , n .d . ) , p. 164.

92

gthe reso lu tion .

Mexico hoped th a t the United Nations' recognition o f the

government-ln-exlle and I t s censures of the Franco regime would

force Franco to s tep down and allow free e lections In Spain. In

la te December 1946, Mexico's new pres iden t, Miguel AlemSn, s ta ted

th a t the acceptance o f Republican Spain In UNESCO showed th a t the

Republic was not forgotten during the reconstruction of the world

(following the war). He expressed the hope th a t the Republic

would soon be able to " l ib e ra te I t s e l f from the past which pre­

vented I t s normal development."^

Despite I n i t i a l success. In ternational supporters of the

Spanish Republic began to experience d i f f i c u l t i e s In the United

Nations In 1947. During a Security Council debate In the f a l l of

1947, the Polish delegate proposed tha t the Council determine

whether or not members of the United Nations had complied with

Part 2 of the December 12 reso lu tion . I f they had not, he suggested

th a t the UN should take Immediate action . Mexico supported the

Polish proposal, which was Intended not only to demonstrate tha t

the member nations were not In compliance with the reso lu tion , but

a lso to h ighlight Spain 's continued th rea t to In ternational peace.

^United Nations, General Assembly, 1st Session, O fficial Records of the General Assembly, n .d . , pp. 1198-222.

^"El goblerno de la repûblica espahola rec lb ld io y aclamado por la UNESCO," quoted In Centro Republlcano Espahol de Mëxlco, é d . , Mëxlco y la Repûblica Espaflola, p. 385.

Debate sobre la s relaciones de los Estados Miembros de las Naclones Unldas con Espafia," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de

93

The response of the Security Council to the proposed re so lu ­

t io n was cool, and when i t became obvious t h a t the members were not

w i l l in g to support the Polish proposal, Mexico jo ined with Cuba,

Guatemala, Panama, and Uruguay to suggest t h a t the General Assembly

simply reaffirm the December 12 re so lu tio n . This suggestion f a i l e d

to arouse any In te re s t , and In December 1947, the General Assembly

voted only to express I t s confidence th a t the Security Council

would a c t on the Spanish questions i f events w arranted. Mexico

voted aff irm ative ly .^^

As Cold War Issues began to dominate the United Nations

debate, the "problem" of Franco ra is e d le s s i n t e r e s t . Many members

viewed Spain as a valuable a l ly In the f ig h t a g a in s t communism and

p re fe rred to ignore the o r ig in and ac tions o f the government. This

mood culminated In a reversal fo r th e Spanish Republic on November

4, 1950, when the General Assembly voted to revoke th e recommenda­

t io n th a t member nations withdraw t h e i r d ip lom atic r e p re se n ta t iv e s

from Madrid. This reso lu tion a lso removed th e r e s t r i c t i o n s which

barred Spain from becoming a member o f the United N ations ' i n t e r ­

national organizations. Only Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay, and the12Soviet Union voted against the re so lu tio n .

Mëxlco, é d . , Mëxlco y la Repûblica EspaRola, pp. 288-9; United Nations, General Assembly, 5th Session, O ff ic ia l Records of the General Assembly, 4 November 1950, n .p . AbellAn, é d . , Guerra y P o l i t i c a . p. 2327

^^"Resoluclôn en su to ta l Id a d ," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxlco y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 291; C h ris t ian Science Monitor, 28 September 1949; 2.

IZunited Nations, General Assembly, 5th Sess ion , O ff ic ia l Records o f the General Assembly, 4 November 1950, n .p .

94

The Mexican government strongly disagreed with the emphasis

on Cold War Issues In the United Nations, and refused to a lign with

e i th e r the United S ta tes or the Soviet Union In UN debates. P resi­

dent Alonjn and his successors believed th a t the unequal d is t r ib u ­

tion of resources and power among nations was a f a r g rea ter th rea t

to world peace than was communism, and continued to press the UN

to examine ways In which poverty could be a l lev ia te d .

This Mexican b e l ie f was s ta ted by ex-president CSrdenas,

who declared publicly tha t the smaller nations were the victims of

the Cold War, which he thought lim ited th e i r sovereignty, sustained

d ic ta to r s , and negated personal l ib e r ty . CSrdenas was especia lly

disheartened to f ind th a t the western nations had abandoned13Republican Spain In the name of peace and democracy.

Government-1n-Exi 1 e

Spanish e x i le Prime M inister José Giral moved the head­

quarters of the government-1n-ex11e from Mexico to Paris In

February 1946.^^ This move, which was made to f a c i l i t a t e contact

with Spain, was made with the fu l l support of the Mexican govern­

ment. The refugees hoped th a t th e i r proximity to Spain in France

would ease the t ra n s i t io n to a democratic regime when Franco was

Leonel DurSn, U zaro Cérdenas; Idearlo P o lit ico (México: Ediclones Era, 1972), p. 301.

^^del Valle, Las Ins tl tuc lones de la repûblica espaflola en e x i l i o . p. 147; G ira l . La repûblica en e x i l i o . P. 162.

95

deposed. The move d id not le s se n , however, th e In ternal problems

o f the Republican government. Despite severa l cab inet changes

during 1946, which were designed to broaden refugee support for the

governm ent-ln -ex lle , Giral was forced to res ign in January 1947,

when the s o c i a l i s t s and a n a rc h is ts l e f t the government. The new

government, formed under the leadersh ip o f s o c i a l i s t Rudolfo Llopis,

was Immediately recognized by Mexico.^® Mexicans continued to

support the governm ent-ln-exlle through succeeding governments as

when the Llopis government f e l l in the summer o f 1947 and a new

government was formed under Alvaro de AlbGrnoz.

The In te rn a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the re fug ees ' government were

f u r th e r exacerbated In 1948 when Indalecio P r ie to and the Spanish

monarchists signed a pact th a t proposed to rep lace Franco with the

h e i r to th e Spanish th rone , Juan de Borb6n. The republican parties

and most o f the o th e r refugees refused to re sp ec t the pact, which

was superceded when Franco and Juan de BorbÔn signed an agreement

l a t e r In the same month.

During the remainder o f th e 1940' s the Republican cause

continued to s u f f e r se tbacks. The governm ent-in-exlle lo s t in te r ­

na tional support when both Venezuela and Panama recognized Franco.

France opened her border with Spain, and the United S ta tes sent

^®del V alle , Las In s t l tu c lo n e s de la repûb lica espaflola en e x i l i o . pp. 224-31.

^®Ib1d.,pp. 283-8.

96

$100 m illion in foreign a id In a move th a t most observers con­

sidered to be the f i r s t s te p toward diplomatic recognition .^^

Events in Mexico

As time went by and memories of the Spanish Civil War faded,

some Mexicans began to urge normalization o f re la t io n s with Spain.

Mexico stood almost alone In maintaining her support fo r the

Increasingly impotent Spanish governm ent-ln-exlle, and many business­

men came to be lieve th a t t h i s foreign policy was anachronistic and

did nothing to help Mexico o r Spain. As e a r ly as 1948, President

Alemén f e l t obliged to publish a s ta ta r e n t r e i t e r a t in g Mexico's

support fo r the Republic. In an a r t i c l e published in Nueva Espafia

1n February 1948, he wrote th a t he did not be lieve th a t "circum­

stances j u s t i f i e d a change in Mexico's conduct," despite pressure

from the Mexican Chamber o f Commerce. The Mexican president

s ta te d , however, t h a t . In most c ase s , no b a r r i e r ex is ted to pre­

vent p riva te r e l a t io n s —both commercial and t o u r i s t —between 18Mexico and Spain.

President AlemSn's statem ent re f le c te d more than o f f ic ia l

sentiment. Immediately a f t e r the C ivil War Mexico had stopped

a l l trade with Spain. This trade resumed In d i re c t ly during World

^ ^ I r a l , La repOblIca en e x i l i o , p. 166; AbellSn, ed . .Guerra y p o l i t ic a

La repubi, p . iSŸ .

"El Sr. P résidente de los Estados Unldos de Mexico reaflrme que México no reconocera al goblerno f ran q u ls ta ," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxlco y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 387.

97

War I I . when Mexico shipped goods meant fo r Spain through Cuba

and Portugal. In 1947 private trade t i e s were formalized In

a commercial agreement between El Banco Naclonal de Mëxlco and

El Banco Exterior de EspaRa. This agreement f a c i l i t a t e d the

exchange of c re d i t and the t ra n s fe r of funds between the two

banks. Shipping service and d i re c t telephone and a i r serv ice19also were resumed In 1947.

For the most p a r t , the Spanish ex iles In Mexico supported

these measures because they made I t possible to send money to

re la t iv e s and friends In Spain and to receive news without having

to use the services of a th ird nation. A formal trade agreement

was signed by the national banks, El Banco de Mëxlco and El

In s t l tu to EspaRol de Moneda Extranjero, In March 1951. This

fu r th e r f a c i l i t a t e d the t ra n s fe r of funds and trade between the 20two nations.

In March 1951, delegates from Spain were Invited to the

quadracentennlal ce lebra tion of the founding of Mexico's National

University (UNAM). Although smne of the refugee groups and

th e i r Mexican friends protested th is In v i ta t io n , the Spanish

v is i to r s were generally welcomed. Many Mexicans hoped they would

be the precursors of a reestablishment of diplomatic re la tions

l*P11ar SSnchez Godoy, "Comercio e x te r io r hispano-mexicano," Revista de Comercio Exterior (July 1951): 35-8.

^^Ib ld ., pp. 35-8.

98

with Spain.

As a secondary re s u l t of th is growing closeness between

Mexico and Spain, the a c t iv i t ie s of Franco's unofficial represen­

t a t i v e In Mexico City became more overt. El Oflclna de Espafia,

which was opened In Mexico City In the la te 1940's , encouraged

public debate on the establishment of diplomatic re la tions with

Spain. By 1952, newspapers such as Excelsior regu larly prin ted

l e t t e r s and essays exploring and/or urging the renewal of d ip lo­

matic r e l a t io n s . In the spring of 1952, a lengthy l e t t e r from

a correspondent In Madrid urging the reestablishment of o f f ic ia l

t i e s was published in Excelsior, provoking a stream of favorable22and unfavorable responses. However, Mexican o f f i c i a l s continued

to rea ff irm Mexico's commitment to the Spanish Republic and the

government-1n-exile .

Ex-president Cërdenas publicly supported h is successor 's

po licy toward Spain, s ta t in g frequently tha t he was proud tha t

Mexico remained fa i th fu l to her t ra d i t io n . He a lso retained his

personal t i e s with Republican friends, often writing them and

exchanging v i s i t s . In a l e t t e r to Luis Q uintanilla , Mexican

Ambassador to the Organization of American S ta tes , Cërdenas wrote

th a t Mexico could not recognize Spain because of the government's

spurious o r ig in s . He then quoted the ambassador o f B razil, who

^^Smlth. Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 300.

^^Excelslor. 7 December 1971.

99

had s ta ted tha t "Franco is not e te rn a l ; Spain i s , " voicing the

opinion th a t when Franco l e f t o ff ice Mexico could re s to re re la tions

with Spain.

In recognition of Mexico's support for the Spanish Republic,

members of the ex ile community held a number of receptions to honor

key Mexican supporters. In 1957, Cërdenas was the special guest

a t an event held in the Spanish Embassy In Mexico City. A year

l a t e r , the former ambassador to the League of Nations, Is id ro

Fabela, was honored a t a s im ila r reception. On the occasion,

Fabela spoke a t length about the re la tionsh ip between Mexico and

th e Spanish Republic and emphasized the legal and moral Imperatives

to support the Republic u n t i l the current government In Spain was

removed from power. He s ta te d tha t the three most fundamental

reasons fo r supporting the Republic were th a t : 1) the Republic

represented the h is to r ica l consensus of the Spanish people; 2)

the Franco government was put Into power by foreign governments

and continued In power through force; and, 3) the Spanish

Republic deserved moral reparation before the world fo r the t r e a t ­

ment I t received during the Civil War.^*

"Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Luis G. Q u in tan i l la ," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , Mëxlco v la RepOblIca EspaRola. p. 70.

^^"Dlscurso pronunclado con motivo de la condecoraciën otor- gada al 1lu s t re In tern ac io nalls ta mexicano Lie. Is id ro Fabela del 26 de Ju lio de 1958 en la embajada de EspaRa en Mëxlco," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, é d . , Mëxlco y la Repûblica EspaRola, pp. 387-90.

100

Contacts between Mexico and Spain Increased throughout the

1950's desp ite Mexico's refusal to renew diplomatic t i e s . Agree­

ments concerning mail delivery and tourism promoted communication

and t ra v e l , and thousands o f Mexicans and Spaniards took advantage

of the improved p o l i t ic a l climate to v i s i t each o thers ' homes.

The ex iles generally continued to support these agreements. In a

few cases, where there was l i t t l e danger of a r r e s t , some were able

to v i s i t t h e i r re la t iv e s and friends In Spain.

An agreement between Mexico and Spain concerning the Spanish

e x i le s ' documentation a lso f a c i l i t a t e d these v i s i t s . Under th is

agreement, Spain o f f i c i a l l y recognized the signature of the Mexican

foreign m in ister and the Spanish consul on passports and visas as

being leg itim ate documentation to en te r Spain. The signature of25a represen ta tive of Franco on the visa was not required.

Spain 's Relations with Other Nations

Despite Mexico's disapproval, Spain 's In ternational re la tions

improved s ig n if ic an t ly In the early 1950's , and by 1953 Spain was

considered to be a fu l ly accepted member of the world community

by most nations. Developments In the United Nations c lea r ly demon­

s t ra te d Spain 's growing importance and p res t ige . As a r e s u l t of

the November 1950 vote In which the General Assembly reversed I t s

decision to urge member nations to sever diplomatic and commercial

------------------Interview with Jav ie r Malagôn Barcelô, Washington, D.C.,

September 21, 1982.

101

re la t io n s with Spain, France and other Western European nations

opened th e i r borders to Increased trade and Immigration. Thousands

of Spanish workers began to move north In search of the employment

th a t was s t i l l unavailable a t home.

Spain f i n a l ly sought admission to the United Nations Educa­

t io n a l , S c ie n t i f ic , and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) In 1952.

UNESCO considered th is request and voted 12-5 In favor o f admit­

ting Spain. Mexican delegate Ernesto Padlllo Nervo spoke vehemently

against the admission o f Spain; but In November the Seventh General

Conference of UNESCO approved the admission of Spain by a vote

of 44 to 4, w ith seven absten tions . Mexico voted a g a in s t admit­

t ing Spain. On December 18, Spain 's membership in UNESCO was

formally approved by the General Assembly, along with t h a t o f 19gg

o ther nations.

Spain sought admission as a fu l l member of the United

Nations in 1955. In January o f th a t year she was given a sea t

as a permanent observer. Because none o f the major powers opposed

seating Spain a s an observer, she was accepted as a f u l l member

on December 18, 1955. Mexico and fou rt other nations absta ined 27from voting.

^®Un1ted Nations, Economic and Social Council, 14th Session, O ffic ia l Records, 21 May 1952, pp. 15-17,

^^"Dlscursos de General Cërdenas," quoted In Centro Republl­cano EspaRol de México, éd .. México y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 70; Abellën, éd ., Guerra y P o l i t i c a . p. 233.

102

Mexico and th e Government-in-Exile

Supported by Mexico and a few other nations, the Spanish

government-ln-exlle continued to be ac tive in the 1950's, although

the lack of funds and disagreements between e x ile leaders continued

to present problems. The growing In ternational acceptance of Spain,

however, gave the ex iles a focal point of res is tance which helped

to unify t h e i r fac tions .

A new government was formed under former ambassador to

Mexico, Félix Gordôn Ordaz, In August 1951. The f i r s t goal of

the new government was to organize action against the admission

of Spain to UNESCO. In la te 1951, GordÔn Ordaz signed a declara­

tion which was sent to the President o f the Sixth General Assembly,

Mexican delegate Ernesto Padillo Nervo. The declara tion l i s te d

a ll the decisions made by the United Nations concerning Spain and

explained In d e ta i l the e x i le s ' position th a t the admission of

Spain would be contrary to the provisions of the San Francisco

Conference and subsequent United Nations ac tions . Padlllo Nervo

was sympathetic to the statement and c ircu la ted the declaration

among a ll the delegations. The ex iles gained l i t t l e In ternational28support for th e i r position .

Gordôn Ordaz flew to Mexico City In January 1952 to ask

for permission to hold the meeting of the Cortes In Mexico City

to discuss the fu ture of the JARE. Although he met with refugee

p. 332.^®del Valle, Las Instltuc lones de la repûblica en e x i l io .

103

leaders and with o f f ic ia l s o f the Mexican government during his

two weeks v i s i t , h is request fo r a meeting o f the Cortes was re jectedgo

on the grounds th a t the timing was not appropriate . A short

meeting of the deputies of the government-ln-exile was convened In

January In Paris to modify the rules o f the Cortes, but discussion

o f the JARE was postponed. During a fund-raising t r i p to Guatemala

and Cuba in March o f the next year , Gordôn Ordaz returned to Mexico

to ce lebra te the April 14 commemoration of the Republic. Later in

the year he again returned to Mexico, accompanied by Negrtn and

other ex ile leaders , to attend the Inauguration of President

Adolfo Ruiz Cortlnes.^®

When Spain sought admission to the United Nations In 1955,

the government-in-exlle sent telegrams to a l l the delegates and

o f f ic ia l s o f the In ternational organization which s ta ted th a t

Franco's government did not conform to the Ideals s e t fo rth In the

San Francisco Charter, and th a t the government In Spain did not31express the free w ill of the Spanish people. These telegrams

were generally Ignored by the members of the United Nations, and

the e x i le s ' position gained l i t t l e support.

By 1956, the government-ln-exlle had come to re a l iz e th a t

i t could no longer hope to unseat Franco through actions in

in te rnational organizations. The Republican government was

2*Ib1d., p. 321.

SOlbid., pp. 321-3.

S^Ibld ., pp. 324-5.

104

was recognized only by Mexico and Yugoslavia, although France and

several Hispanic American countries to le ra te d the p o l i t i c a l a c t iv i ­

t ie s of the Spanish refugees. For th i s reason, the second govern­

ment formed by Gordôn Ordaz in 1956 decided to focus on three

courses of action: 1) c landestine work w ith in Spain to encourage

opposition to Franco; 2) pub lica tion of Republican w ritings which

expressed the goals of democratic Spain; and 3) aid to the Spaniards32in ex ile and to p o l i t ic a l p risoners In Spain, Menters o f the

exile groups met regu larly with opposition leaders In Spain and

tr ie d to send financial a id to these groups whenever poss ib le .

For the f i r s t time w ritings by opposition leaders were published

in the books and magazines w r i t te n by the Spanish Republican

exiles In Europe and Hispanic America.

These a r t i c l e s , books, and magazines, such as Nueva EspaRa

and EspaRa Peregrlna, w r i t te n by the ex ile s served to support both

international and domestic opposition to Franco, and to provide a

means of communication between the d i f f e r e n t groups of e x i le s .

In addition to th e i r w r i t in g s , the Spanish refugees a lso attended

meetings of In ternational o rgan izations such as the United Nations

and the Organization o f American S ta te s to defend the cause o f the

Spanish Republic. Republican leaders continued to trav e l incessan t­

ly to ra ise funds fo r the support o f the o ld er ex iles and to remind33other nations of the rep ress ive na tu re o f the government in Spain.

S^Ibld., pp. 327-8.

S^lbid ., pp. 331-2.

105

Despite i t s reo rgan iza tion , however, the government-1n-

e x i le continued to be f rac tu red In the 1950's and 1960*s by In te r ­

nal d iv is ions and by the deaths of many of the o r ig in a l leaders

of the Republic. Martinez B arrio , P r ie to , and José Giral died

within months o f each o ther in 1962.

During the l a t e 1950*s and in the 1960's , the ex ile s were

e f fe c t iv e c h ie f ly In keeping the w orld 's a t te n t io n focused on the

p o l ic ie s and c ru e l t ie s o f the Franco government, and In providing

funds to opposition groups in Spain. They re ta ined very l i t t l e

In te rna tio na l p o l i t i c a l power; only Mexico and Yugoslavia remained

firm In t h e i r support o f the governm ent-in-exlle. The Spanish

government did make a few concessions to the ex ile s In 1966. Franco

declared a l im ited amnesty fo r the refugees and con fisca tion of

t h e i r property was term inated. Returning ex ile s s t i l l faced the

p o s s ib i l i ty , however, o f a m il i ta ry or c iv i l t r i a l fo r t h e i r a c t i ­

v i t i e s during the Civil War.

Relations between Mexico and Spain

Successive Mexican governments continued to support the

Spanish Republic and to I n s i s t th a t diplomatic re la t io n s should

never be e s tab lished between Mexico and Spain as long as Franco

remained In power. Each April 14, the anniversary of the founding

o f the Republic, Mexican o f f i c i a l s jo ined the Spanish ex ile s a t

El Centro Republlcano EspaRol fo r a banquet to commemorate the

Republic. During In te rn a tio n a l t r i p s , Mexican p res iden ts met

with ex ile leaders to rea ff irm Mexico's unwavering support.

106

P res id en t Adolfo Lôpez Mateos met with exile leaders In

Venezuela in 1960. There he s ta te d t h a t , "Mexico does not susta in

r e la t io n s w ith Spain because the government was imposed on the

Spanish people by two fo re ign powers; the Nazis and the fa s c is t s .

Since th a t tim e, my country has not maintained re la tions with the

Franco regime,

Lôpez Mateos' successo r . P re s id e n t-e le c t Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

s t a te d , during a luncheon meeting with the press in April 1964,

t h a t Mexico would never consider e s tab l ish in g re la tio ns with Franco

because I t was put In to power by foreign Intervention. The p re s i­

d e n t- e le c t c r i t i c i z e d those na tions which had compromised in te r ­

na tional p r in c ip le s and renewed r e la t io n s with the government in

Spain. However, he a lso expressed the hope th a t cordial c u ltu ra l ,

b u s in ess , and personal r e l a t io n s would continue between the35Mexican and Spanish peoples.

As p re s id e n t , Diaz Ordaz fu r th e r elaborated the govern­

m ent's p o s i t io n during a t r i p to Central America In 1966. At a press

conference in San Jo sé , Costa Rica, he s ta ted th a t the government

in Spain "was born under the in s p i ra t io n of Nazi fascism" and

through fo re ig n in te rv e n t io n th a t Mexico would not support. When

asked to compare the po licy toward Spain with Mexico's policy toward

34"Mensaje de Lôpez Mateos a México: expresa tamblen varies problemas c o n t in e n ta le s ," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y l a Repûblica Espaflola. pp. 390-2.

^®"Entrev1sta de prensa con Dtaz Ordaz, 13 abrll 1969, Mexico, D .F .," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de México, éd ., México y la RepOblIca Espaflola, pp. 393-8,

107

Cuba, the President rep l ied th a t Mexico maintained amicable re la^

t lo n s w ith most nations and th a t the government did not attem pt to

judge o th e r na tions ' p o l i t i c a l philosophies.^®

O ff ic ia l support fo r the Spanish government-ln-exlle a lso

was echoed in 1969 by Dfaz Ordaz* successor, p re s id en t-e lec t Luis

EcheverrTa, when he s ta te d th a t although he expected t i e s with

Spain to Inc rease , he had no In ten tion of e s tab lish in g diplomatic

re la t io n s with F r a n c o . T h e new P re s id e n t 's policy was Implemented

in January 1970 by Antonio C a rri l lo F lo res , EcheverrTa's Secretary

of Foreign R elations, During a t r ip to Europe and Asia, C a r r i l lo

Flores met b r ie f ly with Spanish Chancellor LÔpez Bravo to d iscuss

commercial r e la t io n s between Mexico and Spain. He described the

meeting a s c o rd ia l , but a lso s ta ted th a t he reaffirmed Mexico's

commitment, to th e Spanish Republic and to the policy th a t no

formal r e la t io n s would be estab lished as long as Franco con tro lled38the government.

Many e x ile s and Mexicans took advantage o f the Increased

closeness between Mexico and Spain to r e s ta b l ish th e i r personal

f r ien d sh ip s which had been s tra ined during the previous decades.

Travel r e s t r i c t i o n s fo r Mexicans were eased, and a number o f

36"Exc1tat1va a centroamerica, jun tos valdremos mas que a s i la d o s , d i jo DTaz Ordaz," quoted in Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, é d . , México y la Repûblica EspaRola. pp. 398-9.

^^Fuentes Mares, H isto rla de un c o n f l ic to , pp. 199-200.

"El présente regimen sostendra la misma sltuaciôn dlploma- t1ca respecte a EspaRa," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, é d . , México y l a RepQblIca EspaRola. p. 401.

108

Mexican lead ers . Including fu tu re presiden t José Lôpez P o r t i l l o ,

took th e opportunity to v i s i t Spain as p r iv a te t o u r i s t s .

By 1970, desp ite the constant expression o f support fo r the

Spanish e x ile s and t h e i r cause, i t appeared th a t the Mexican govern­

ment was w aiting fo r Franco to r e t i r e o r d ie and a new, democratic

government to be e s tab lish ed In order to r e s to re diplom atic r e l a ­

t ion s with Spain. P residen t EcheverrTa did not Intend to renew

diplom atic t i e s Immediately, but Mexicans were s in ce re ly In te re s ted

In the eventual r e s to ra t io n o f r e la t io n s .

The Continuing Role o f Lfizaro Cërdenas

Cërdenas gradually became more comfortable with his ro le as

e ld e r statesm an, and. In add ition to maintaining personal t i e s with

the former leaders o f the Spanish Republic, began to speak out on

In te rn a tio n a l Issues which a ffec ted Mexico. During a much-publicized

t r i p to Europe, the Soviet Union, and China In 1958, Cërdenas met

with the p res iden t o f the governm ent-ln-exile, Félix Gordôn Ordës

and members o f h is cab ine t . With them he ta lked of the need fo r

peace and Increased In te rna tion a l p ro tec tion of human r ig h ts ,40Including the r ig h ts o f refugees. Upon h is re tu rn from China

in e a r ly 1959, the former Mexican p res iden t stopped again in France

to meet with Republican l e a d e r s . O n e o f the continuing top ics

^*Los A n g le s Times. 17 October 1977: 1:1-2.

^^Cërdenas, Obras. 3:62.

*l lb1d. , 3:107.

109

of these conversations was the care of the remaining e lderly

refugees in France who had l i t t l e income or family support.

Some Republican leaders were c r i t i c a l of th e fact tha t

Cërdenas had not taken a more ac tive role In Mexican p o lit ic s

a f t e r his retirement from o ff ice . Responding to t h i s c ri t ic ism

in a l e t t e r to his friend Marte Gômez in June 1961, he wrote that

he could not ju s t ify "an i l leg a l in trus ion Into the powers o f the

presidency o f the Republic."*^ He noted, however, th a t Mexico

alone had stood firm in supporting Republican Spain which had

been his policy while president.

During the 1950's and the 19G0's the former president was

Increasingly c r i t ic a l o f the Cold War, which he believed had caused

the world to abandon Republican Spain, overthrow the Arbenz govern­

ment In G u a te m a la ,d e la y development In the Third World, and

f in a l ly , ;u p s e t C astro 's revolution In Cuba.** Cërdenas continued

to approve o f Mexico's support of Cuba and to hope th a t Castro would

not f a l l victim to the fate of the leaders of the Spanish Republic.

*^"Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Marte R. GÔmez," quoted inCentro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, éd ., Mëxlco v la RepûblicaEspaflola. pp. 78-9.

*^Cërdenas not only supported the admission o f Spanish refu­gees Into Mexico, but also strongly supported the admission of refu­gees from Guatemala in 1954 and Cuba in the la te 1950*s. He believed th a t p o l i t ic a l asylum was one of the most basic human righ ts and th a t Mexico should be a leader In accepting any person who would be in danger of losing his l i f e fo r p o l i t ic a l reasons I f forced to return home, Elena Vësquez Gômez, éd ., E p is to la rlo de Lëzaro Cërdenas. 2 vols. (Mëxlco: siglo veintluno edi to r e s , 1974), 2: 91-4, 291.

**"Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Marte R. Gômez," quoted 1nCentro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, éd ., Mëxlco y la RepûblicaEspaflola. pp. 78-9.

no

with other Mexican lead ers , Cërdenas continued to expect

that Franco would r e t i r e o r be deposed so th a t normal re la t io n s

could be reestablished w ith Spain. He o f ten discussed the fu tu re

of Spain with members o f the e x i le community In Mexico who shared

his hope tha t democracy could be res to red a f t e r Franco l e f t the 46government.

Cërdenas' death in October 1970 was mourned by many Spanish

refugees, as well as by th e Mexican people. They reg re t te d th a t

he had never been able to v i s i t Spain. Speakers de live r ing the

many eulogies a t meetings following his death often mentioned h is

work on behalf o f the Spanish Republic.

Spanish ex iles a ls o honored Cërdenas a f t e r h is death by

founding a school In h is memory in Mexico C ity. Several years l a t e r ,

a monument to the former p resident was b u i l t In th e h ea r t o f the

city by the refugees. This monument contains so i l from each of

the Spanish provinces.

"Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Félix Gordôn Ordës," "Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Juan Rejano," "Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Dolores Rivas Cherif," "Carta de Lëzaro Cërdenas a Jésus Bernëndez GÔmez y Alfonso G orstiza," quoted In Centro Republlcano EspaRol de Mëxlco, éd., México y la RepflbHca Espaflola, pp. 81-2.

CHAPTER VI RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

The 1970's marked a growing divergence between o f f ic ia l

and unoffic ia l Mexican a t t i tu d e toward Spain. O ff ic ia l ly , the

Mexican government under the leadership of President Luis EcheverrTa

followed Cërdenas' policy and continued to support the Republican

government-ln-exlle. U noffic ia lly , except fo r a b r ie f period

during the f a l l of 1975, Mexico and Spain grew c loser as trade

and tourism flourished . Mexico had never expected Franco to remain

1n power so many y ears , but the government leaders believed tha t

I t was necessary to wait fo r Franco's death or resignation before

beginning negotiations to resume diplomatic re la t io n s . Franco's

death in 1975 f in a l ly allowed Mexico and Spain to begin these

negotia tions, which culminated with the establishment o f formal

re la tio n s In March 1977.

President Luis EcheverrTa

Soon a f t e r his e lec tio n , Mexican President Luis EcheverrTa

s ta ted th a t "our re la tio n s with Spain should get b e t te r and more

extensive."^ However, in a press conference s ix days l a t e r , he

^Fuentes Mares, Historia de un c o n f l ic to , p. 210.

I l l

112

ruled out the p o ss ib i l i ty of renewing diplom atic t ie s with Spain

and expressed to ta l s o l id a r i ty with the Spanish Republicans.

Mexico would not break re la t io n s with the governm ent-ln-exlle, he2

sa id , until democracy had been restored In Spain.

EcheverrTa re i te ra te d th i s policy th ree years l a t e r during

an o f f ic ia l t r ip to Paris in the spring of 1973. He made a p a r t i ­

cu la r point of meeting with the leaders of the governm ent-ln-exlle

In Paris , now headed by José Maldonado and Fernando Valera. When

asked about Mexico's re la tio n sh ip with Spain, the Mexican p re s i ­

dent told the press th a t his country had never l o s t I t s f a i th and

love for the Spanish people and th a t the t h i r t y year break 1n

diplomatic re la tions was simply an expression o f Mexico's adherence

to international law and her ha tred of fascism. He described th e

lengthy estrangement as a t r a n s i to ry period, with l i t t l e e f f e c t

on the centuries of close re la t io n s between the two n a tio n s , "a

b r ie f In terrup tion , a small lapse In the r e la t io n s between our

peoples." He also added th a t , "however. I f the re are fu tu re changes3

In Spain we will study them In depth."

Many Spaniards were Incensed by EcheverrTa's statements

and believed that they were an in te rven tion in the in te rn a l a f f a i r s

of Spain. However, th is outcry against Mexico quickly died down

as trade and to u r is t re la t io n s continued to grow s te a d i ly .

^ Ib ld ., p. 211.

^ Ib id ., pp. 212-3.

113

Unofficial Ties between Spain and Mexico

T ouris t o f f ic e s were opened in Madrid and Mexico City in

the ea r ly 1970's to f a c i l i t a t e t rav e l between the two nations.

Regular f l ig h t s were scheduled between the two c a p i ta ls and the

number o f businessmen and to u r i s t s who trave led frequen tly between»Mexico and Spain Increased each year.

Trade a lso f lo u rished In the growing clim ate o f cooperation.

In 1971, Spain 's National I n s t i tu t e o f Foreign Currency and Mexico's

Foreign Trade Bank signed an o f f i c i a l agreement th a t s im p lif ied

payments and encouraged economic transac tions.® By the f i r s t h a lf

o f 1976, trad e between th e two nations to ta le d U.S. $60 m illion

in Spanish exports to Mexico and U.S. $37 m ill io n worth o f Mexican

products sen t to Spain. This represented a steady Increase from a

to ta l o f U.S. $37 m ill ion and U.S. $16 m ill ion respec tive ly In 1974.®

Republican Exiles

The approximately 20,000 Spanish Republican ex ile s In Mexico

remained a symbol o f re s is tan c e to fascism and to Franco, although

most were well ass im ila ted Into Mexican so c ie ty by 1970. They

continued to r e s i s t the establishm ent o f diplomatic t i e s between

Mexico and Franco's government, but most were resigned or even

^Interview with César SepClveda, Mexico C ity , August 1977.

®Spa1n 76, December 1976, n .p.

®Ib1d., n .p .

114

welcomed the gradual rapprochement between the two nations. Some

o f the e x i le s were ab le to use the c lo se r t ie s to v i s i t re la tives

In Spain. O thers, who s t i l l feared fo r th e i r personal safety i f

they re tu rned to Spain, enjoyed the s im plif ied communication, but

waited f o r Franco 's death before returning home.

Meanwhile, the government-in-exlle worked with the r e s i s ­

tance lead e rs w ith in Spain to overthrow Franco. In February 1971,

Prime M in is te r Sânchez-Albornoz resigned and was replaced by

Fernando V alera , a Republican party leader. Valera continued the

same p o l ic ie s as h is predecessors Including the call for f ree

e le c t io n s In Spain and a re tu rn to the republican form of govern­

ment.

At a meeting In May 1971, leaders o f the government-ln-exlle

honored Mexico and her people fo r th e i r fa ith fu lness to the Spanish

Republic. In a re so lu t io n issued to the press, the Republicans

s ta te d th a t such f a i th fu ln e s s should "serve as an example to a ll

o f the democratic governments o f the world.

The governm ent-ln-exlle responded coldly In July 1974

when an a i l i n g Franco tem porarily handed the Spanish government

over to h is appointed successor. Prince Juan Carlos, heir to the

Borbon th rone. The e x i le s announced th a t Juan Carlos did not

pe rson ify na tional re c o n c i l ia t io n or the advent of democracy.

^del V alle , Las in s t l tu c lo n e s de la repûblica espaflola en e x i l i o . p. 360.

115

Only the leaders who supported the goals o f the 1931 C onstitu tion ,

they sa id , would be able to bring Spain to peace, l ib e r ty , and

democracy. The ex ile leaders a lso re i te ra te d th e ir demand th a tQ

Spain have f re e e lec tions to determine the next government.

Changing Relations between Mexico and Spain

The Increasingly friendly re la tions between Mexico and Spain

were suddenly destroyed In September 1975 when Franco's government

executed f iv e men charged with terrorism. President EcheverrTa,

who believed th a t the executed men were actually k il led for opposing

the government. Immediately ordered a l l contact with Spain suspended.

The o f f ice s o f the unoffic ia l represen ta tive of the Spanish govern­

ment, the Spanish to u r i s t agency, and the EFE (Spanish news agency)

were c losed, and the Spanish members of t h e i r s ta f fs expelled from

Mexico. All f l ig h t s between Mexico and Spain were cancelled, and

the o ff ice s o f Iberia A irlines closed as soon as Mexicans In Spain

a rrived home. EcheverrTa also ordered Mexican embassies and consul­

a te s to deny visas to Spaniards, unless they were refugees f lee in gq

Franco, and prohibited Mexicans from v is i t in g Spain.

The Mexican president attempted to broaden his censure of

Spain beyond Mexico. He asked the United Nations to ca ll a special

Security Council meeting, to call for a vote to expel Spain from

the United Nations, and to require a l l UN members to break

®Ib1d., p. 363.

^C hris tian Science Monitor ,31 March 1977.

116

diplomatic re la tio n s with Spain. In his l e t t e r to Secretary

General Kurt Waldheim, EcheverrTa s ta ted th a t the gross and

repeated v io la tions of human r igh ts perpetrated during the Spanish

d ic t a to r 's regime could not be i g n o r e d , O n October 7, he

addressed the General Assembly, and s ta te d th a t the s i tu a t io n in

Spain must be confronted because the denial o f r ig h ts was creating

a climate of "v io lent confrontation" which was contributing to

in te rnational f r i c t io n and constitu ted a danger to in ternational

12p e a c e . T h e Security Council was unresponsive to Echeverrfa's

proposal, burying i t in committee without debate or discussion.

Despite the unresponsiveness of the United Nations,

EcheverrTa received Mexican support fo r h is stand against the

government in Spain. PorfTrio HQfioz Ledo, president of the

executive committee o f the Partido Revolucionario Insti tuc ional

(PRI), declared th a t the P res iden t 's actions were an example of

the continuity between Mexican foreign and domestic policy against13a l l forms of fascism. Fernando Estrada Samano, a member of the

10"Carta de fecha 28 de septiembre de 1975, d ir ig id a al SecretarTo General por el represente de México," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaFlol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espahola, p. 415.

^^"Ni paternalisme ni hegemonfas econômicas en la ONU," quoted in Centro Republicano Espaflol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espahola, pp. 425-30.

^^New York Times. 11 January 1976, 1:12.

Palabras de P o rf ir io Mûfioz Ledo, Présidente de! Comité Ejecutivo Nacional del PRI, durante e1 desayuno o f r e d do por los diputados PRIistas de la XLIX leg is la tu re el Congreso de la Unifin," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espahola, pp. 416-7.

117

Partido de Acclôn Nacional (PAN), Mexico's more conservative

opposition party, praised the appeal to the United Nations as the

proper vehicle fo r consideration of such a denial of human r ig h ts .

He a lso expressed the hope th a t the in ternational organization

would examine the p o ss ib i l i ty of suspending Spain as a member

nation.

In general, in ternational reaction to Echeverrta's policy

was negative. Most nations thought he was overreacting and in te r ­

vening in the internal a f f a i r s o f Spain. Some analysts believed

th a t the Mexican government's strong response to the Spanish

executions was p a rt of the P res iden t 's des ire to gain international

recognition and leadership in the Third World. Spain r e ta l ia te d

by accusing EcheverrTa of " in to le rab le interference" in i t s in te r ­

nal a f f a i r s , noting tha t he was M inister o f the In te rio r in 1968

when a student p ro tes t in Mexico City was crushed, k i l l ing more

than two hundred people.

Franco resolved the c r i s i s by dying in November 1975 a t

the age of 83. Mexico immediately responded by l i f t in g a l l sanc­

tions imposed on Spain in September. Commercial re la tions were

resto red , and the expelled o f f i c i a l s , bankers, and jo u rn a lis ts

"Discurso del S ecre tar io Fernando Estrada Samano," quoted in Centro Republicano Espahol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 421.

^^New York Times, 11 January 1976, 1:12.

118

were allowed to re tu rn . Regular f l ig h t s between the two nations

resumed In December.*^

Restoration o f Diplomatic Relations

In te r e s t in re s to r in g diplomatic r e la t io n s with Spain

grew rapid ly in Mexico a f t e r the death of Franco. At a press

conference in early December, rep o rte rs asked President EcheverrTa

whether o r not Mexico would e s ta b l is h re la t io n s with the govern­

ment o f King Juan Carlos , Franco 's successor and grandson o f

the deposed King Alfonso. EcheverrTa rep l ied th a t he hoped

re la t io n s would be res to red as soon as the Spanish government began

to rees tab lish democracy in Spain. He a lso s ta te d th a t members o f

the Spanish government-in-exile had been consulted about the p o ss ib i­

l i t y o f renewing re la t io n s with Spain and th a t Mexico would remain

fa i th fu l to the Republic u n t i l the " l a s t moment.

Other Mexican o f f i c i a l s echoed the P res iden t. Octavio

San te is , head o f the Federal D i s t r i c t , declared th a t a "new stage

has been opened for th e Spanish people—hope of l ib e r ty andI Q

democracy," Eugenio Mëndez Docurro, Secretary of Communication

Interview with César SepGlveda, Mexico C ity , Mexico, August 1977.

^^"Entrevista de prensa de Luis EcheverrTa Alvarez el 20 de noviembre de 1975," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaFlol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espafiola, pp. 439-41.

^®"Con Franco cae e l ultimo sTmbolo del to ta l i ta r i s m e nazi- f a s c is ta y una etapa del s ig lo XX," quoted in Centro Republicano Espahol de México, é d . . Héxico y la Repûblica EspaRola, p. 442.

119

and Transport, s ta te d th a t the reestablishm ent o f telecommunica­

tions and a i r t r a f f i c seemed to him to be a "step in the e s ta b l is h ­

ment o f diplom atic re la t io n s between two na tions"—a step which

he believed to be desired by the Mexican p e o p l e .

The f i r s t d i r e c t con tact between the governments o f Mexico

and Spain since the end o f the Civil War took place in Paris on

December 15, 1975. The Mexican M inister o f National Patrimony,

Francisco Ja v ie r A lejo , and the Spanish Foreign M in ister , José

Marla de A re ilza , met fo r almost two hours to discuss the resump-20t ion o f r e la t io n s . Although the meeting was amicable, the

conversation revealed p o ten tia l obstac les to the resumption of

o f f i c i a l t i e s . The Spanish leaders ind icated th a t many of

Spain 's sen io r goverment and m il i ta ry leaders were s t i l l b i t t e r

about Mexico's refusa l to recognize Franco and resented Echeverrta 's

reac tion to the September executions. Alejo sa id th a t "Mexico is

very w il l in g to resume commercial r e l a t io n s , but diplomatic t i e s

w ill have to w ait u n t i l th e re i s a c le a r and broad democratic

opening in Spain. Mexico would l ik e to see in Spain an open

s tru g g le between p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , c le a r and open rep resen ta tion

of workers and peasants , and the re lease o f a l l p o l i t i c a l prisoners

from j a i l . "21

"Ambiente propicio en el pueblo de México para e s tab lace r relaciones con EspaFia," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y la Repûblica Espafiola, p. 433.

2^New York Times. 11 January 1976, 1:12.

Z l l b i d . , 1:12.

120

Both EcheverrTa and p re s id en tia l candidate José L6pez

P o r t i l lo reaffirmed A le jo 's p o s i t io n .2% At a luncheon meeting

a t the Spanish Republican Center on January 7$ 1976, L6pez P o r t i l lo

told a group of ex ile s th a t "normalization of re la t io n s with Madrid

can only take place when those Spanish in e x i le can re tu rn home with

d ign ity ." Lôpez P o r t i l lo went on to t e l l h is audience th a t the

forty years of t ra g ic estrangement w ith the Spanish people also

could be concluded only in the context of the p r in c ip le s fo r which

the Republic had been f igh ting .

In h is address to Congress on September 1, 1976, President

EcheverrTa praised the progress toward democracy in Spain, again

s ta ting th a t diplomatic re la t io n s would be res to red when a l l p o l i ­

t ic a l p a rt ie s were allowed re p re se n ta t io n , freedom of the press

was guaranteed, p o l i t ic a l p risoners were f re e d , and a l l e x i le s ,

without d is t in c t io n , were allowed to re tu rn to Spain without

penalty. He added th a t he doubted r e la t io n s could be res to red24during his adm inistration because the time l e f t was sh o r t .

22"Deseo: lucha ab ie r to de pa rtidos en EspaRa," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , México y la RepQblica Espaflola, pp. 443-4.

2^"Pa1abras improvisadas por el l icenc iado José Lépez P o r t i l lo el termino del desayuno en el Centro Republicano EspaRol de México," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, éd . , México y la Repûblica EspaRola. pp. 444-5.

2*"Sexto informe de gobierno de Luis EcheverrTa," quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, é d . , Héxico y la Repûblica EspaRola, pp. 445-6.

121

Although commercial re la tion s continued to improve, and

more Mexicans and Spaniards exchanged v i s i t s each month, the

prospects fo r renewal of formal re la tio n s remained e lusive . In

la t e September, P res iden t-e lec t LQpez P o r t i l lo sen t aides to Spain

to discuss fu tu re r e la t io n s . The resu lts of these ta lk s were not

made public, but a month l a t e r Spanish represen ta tives were

inv ited to Lôpez P o r t i l l o 's inauguration to be held in December.

In la te November and early December 1976, the d irec to r

general of the Mexican I n s t i tu te fo r Foreign Trade, Ju l io Faesler ,

and a rep resen ta tive of P res iden t-e lec t Lôpez P o r t i l lo , Santiago

Roel, made a f if teen -day v i s i t to Spain. They met with the Spanish

M inister of Commerce, José LIado y Fernéndez de U rrutia . Their

ta lks resu lted in a new trade agreement designed to supplement

the 1971 pact and to fu r th e r simplify and encourage trad e . The

new accord, the f i r s t to be signed a t the Spanish Ministry o f

Commerce, was intended to be the i n i t i t a l step in formalizing a

comprehensive trade agreement once diplomatic re la t io n s were2Gresto red .

One of the f i r s t r e su l ts of the trade agreement was a

th i r ty - f iv e member Mexican trade delegation sent to Spain in

December. Delegation members held ta lk s with the major Spanish

2^Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1977.

2^Spain 76, December 1976.

122

co rpora tions and businesses and agreed to plan fo r a large trade

f a i r to be held in Spain in 1977. A number of "Mexican weeks"

designed to d isp lay Mexican culture and economic progress were also

planned. In re tu rn , Spain arranged a show of heavy equipment to

be held in Mexico City.^?

Renewal o f Diplomatic Relations

On March 28, 1977, several rounds of ta lk s between représenta*

t iv e s o f King Juan Carlos and President Lôpez P o r t i l lo ended with

the announcement th a t diplomatic rela tions between Mexico and Spain

would be e s tab l ish ed . At a press conference on the 28th, LÔpez

P o r t i l l o s ta te d th a t the renewal of re la tions was a " r e a l i s t i c and

o b je c tiv e action" with which he was fu lly s a t i s f i e d .2®

Two weeks e a r l i e r relations between Mexico and the Spanish

Republican government-in-exile had been broken. The Mexican P res i­

dent s ta te d in h is announcement of the rupture th a t "for Mexico i t

i s more Important to reestab lish re la tions with the national govern­

ment, than to maintain an ideal which has begun to lose i t s sense

o f o b j e c t iv i ty ." He re i te ra te d Mexico's support for the Republi­

cans. however, charac teriz ing the long re la tionsh ip with the29Republic as period o f loyalty , dignity , and so l id a r i ty . Jose

2 ^ Ib id . , n .p .OQ

"Hemos cumpliado con la h is to r la de ambos paises: Lôpez P o r t i l l o , " quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de México, éd . , Mëxico y la Repûblica EspaRola. pp. 448-50.

OQ"Fue una decisiôn dolorosa, por necesaria, lo de Esparfa,"

quoted in Centro Republicano EspaRol de Mëxico, éd . , Mëxico y la Repûblica EspaRola, pp. 446-8.

123

Maldonado, president of the govermnent-1n-ex11e, expressed the

hope th a t a new regime would be estab lished in Spain through honest

e lec tion s and th a t the Republicans who returned to Spain from

Mexico would look out fo r Mexico's in te re s ts in Spain.

Lôpez P o r t i l lo named former President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

as the f i r s t Mexican ambassador to Madrid in more than th i r ty - f iv e

years. The appointment was met with o f f ic ia l approval, but some

public c r i t ic ism , in Spain. El Pa is . Madrid's l ib e ra l d a ily ,

characterized Dfaz Ordaz as the "most rep ress ive p o l i t ic ia n31Mexico has ever had." Others contended th a t th e man whose

administration began with the suppression o f a railway s t r ik e

and ended with the 1968 student massacre a t T tla l te lu c o was more

representative o f Franco than of the idea ls of freedom and

democracy which Mexico professed to resp ec t . The Spanish govern­

ment ignored th is denunciation of the proposed ambassador and

quickly accepted h is c reden tia ls . However, i l l health forced Diaz

Ordaz to r e t i r e and return to Mexico about a month l a t e r .

Lôpez P o r t i l lo made an o f f ic ia l v i s i t to Spain in October321977 to fu rther cement fr iend ly re la tio n s between Mexico and Spain.

His entourage o f 200 included not only government m in isters and

o ther o f f i c i a l s , but also mariachi bands, a r t i s t s , and dancers who

SOlbid., pp. 446-8.

S^EI Pais (Madrid). 12 April 1977.

^^Los Angeles Times. 17 October 1977, 1:1.

124

en te rta ined the Spanish public . While in Spain, the Mexican

President signed an extensive trad e agreement and opened a Mexican

a r t e x h ib i t in Madrid.

The Spanish Republicans reacted q u ie t ly to the new r e la t io n ­

ship between Mexico and Spain. Most o f the Republicans leaders

had rea lized th a t Mexico would eventually break i t s t i e s with the

government-in-exile a f t e r the death of Franco in order to e s tab l ish

formal r e la t io n s with King Juan Carlos. Although e x i le leaders

were not Included o f f i c i a l l y in the ta lk s between the two govern­

ments, they were consulted by the Mexican government during the

negotia tions with Spain. As promised by Mexico, the Spanish govern­

ment agreed to guarantee the e x i le s ' r ig h t to re tu rn to Spain

without r e p r i s a l s ; many were eager to take advantage o f th is

opportunity .

The re s to ra t io n o f diplomatic t i e s with Spain removed one

small issue from the shoulders o f the Mexican government. Almost

overwhelmed by economic problems and a growing population , most

Mexican leaders were re l ieved to reso lve a tangled re la t io n sh ip

which no one had expected would l a s t fo r more than fo r ty years .

■ 3 0

Interview with Cësar Sepulveda, Mexico C ity , Mexico,August 1977.

CHAPTER VIr

LAZARO CARDENAS AND THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

Lfizaro Cdrdenas played an instrumental role in the develop­

ment of 20th century Mexican foreign policy. His vigorous support

of l ibe ra l governments and his repudiation of in tervention and

in ternational agression provided the foundation for Mexican p o l i ­

c ie s during the succeeding four decades. Even a f te r his r e t i r e ­

ment from the presidency in 1940, CSrdenas remained a symbol o f

the foreign policy o f the Mexican Revolution.

Cërdenas' support for the Spanish Republic from 1934-40

established a re la tionsh ip with Spain th a t las ted u n t i l 1977.

He in i t ia te d Mexico's intense involvement with the Republic and

a policy which has in te res ted and confused scholars fo r many

years . This d is se r ta t io n attempts to provide an i n i t i a l ana ly s is

of both the unique re la tionsh ip between Mexico and Spain and

Cârdenas' ro le in the development and preservation o f th is

re la tionsh ip . Many questions about th is topic remain unanswered

and deserve fu r th e r study.

The Presidency of Lfizaro Cârdenas

Lfizaro C&rdenas was inaugurated a t a c r i t i c a l time in

Mexico's h is to ry . The country was ju s t beginning to s t a b i l i z e

125

126

a f t e r more than two decades o f turmoil, and the new president had

the opportunity to move ahead with the Implementation of the goals

o f the Revolution and to consolidate p o l i t ic a l support for the

government.

As a candidate fo r the presidency, Cârdenas indicated his

in te re s t in bringing the government to the people of Mexico.

Despite his ce r ta in e lec tion as the o f f ic ia l party candidate, he

campaigned throughout the country fo r s ix months. This trave ling

continued a f t e r his inauguration in 1934; Cârdenas ra re ly stayed

in Mexico City and preferred to take h is government to the people,

v is i t in g small v illag es and remote towns with members of the cab i­

ne t. This "road show" served two purposes. I t reminded government

o f f ic ia l s th a t most Mexicans s t i l l l ived in d ire poverty with no

access to the schools, c l in i c s , or roads promised during the

Revolution, and i t demonstrated to the peasants and workers tha t

the government was concerned about th e i r s i tu a t io n .

Unlike many o f predecessors, President Cârdenas believed

th a t the power of national governments should be used to bring

about social ju s t ic e . He wanted to rearrange the social and

economic forces of the nation in accordance with the goals expressed

in the 1917 C onstitu tion . Like most Mexican presiden ts , he did

not h e s i ta te to use a l l of the power a t his disposal to achieve

his purpose: men and women a t every level of government were

expected to be on ca ll night and day to a s s i s t sick v i llag e rs or

others who had appealed to the President fo r assis tance .

127

The P res id en t a ls o did no t h e s i t a t e to forceably expro­

p r i a t e businesses and land which h is predecessors had l e f t in the

hands o f p r iv a te owners. During h is s ix -y e a r term, Cârdenas

expropria ted more than fo r ty - f iv e m il l io n acres of land—twice

as much as the previous p res id en ts o f the Revolution combined.

R ealiz ing the danger to the Mexican economy i f the new land owners

who genera lly received minute pa rce ls o f land were not helped to

modernize production , the government a lso e s tab l ish ed a National

Bank o f E jidal C red it to supply loans fo r seed , machinery, and

to o ls . V il lag ers were a ls o helped to organ ize in to cooperatives

to pool t h e i r t a l e n t s and resources . Many o f these cooperatives

were organized in to l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l groups to maximize th e i r

e f fe c t iv e n e s s .

In ad d it io n to h is famous ex p rop ria tion of the B ritish and

American o i l companies in 1938, Cârdenas a lso expropriated the

National Railways, a sugar r e f in e ry in Morelos, and numerous small

bus inesses . Other businesses were v i r t u a l l y run by th e i r union

employees--Cârdenas encouraged workers to s t r i k e f o r b e tte r working

cond itions and h igher wages, and o f ten used th is as a th rea t to

fo rce owners to comply with l a b o r 's demands. In the spring of

1936 a new labor o rg a n iz a t io n , the Confederaciôn de Trabajadores

Mexicanos (CTM) was formed under the leadersh ip of Vicente Lombardo

Toledano and pa tte rn ed a f t e r the in d u s t r ia l unions in the United

S ta te s . Cârdenas used th i s o rg an iza tion to mobilize support fo r

h is government and to help i t s 450,000 members.

128

Cârdenas a lso used the newly organized peasants and

laborers to form the basis o f a new p o l i t ic a l p a r ty . By 1938,

he had completely reorganized the national p o l i t i c a l party .

The Party o f the Mexican Revolution (PRM), as his new organiza­

tion was named, had rep resen ta tives from four groups—peasants,

lab o r , the m il i ta ry , and the general population. This equal

rep resen ta tion provided a checks and balances system: no one

group was able to dominate national p o l i t i c s . Their leaders were

required to work to g e th e r , which helped to form a stronger

national consensus. He reduced the Influence of professional

p o l i t i c ia n s , and o ff ice -h o ld e rs were no longer required to pay

dues to r e ta in t h e i r jobs .

Cârdenas' Foreign Policy

Cârdenas* personal philosophy of government was tran s la ted

in to his foreign po licy . The world was in chaos in the 1930's.

Many nations were s tru g g lin g with the e ffe c ts of th e worldwide

depression, long-standing disputes such as the c o n f l i c t between

I ta ly and Ethiopia were e rup ting , and Germany and I ta ly were

beginning to prepare fo r war. The new president o f Mexico saw

an opportunity to demonstrate his foreign policy o f the Revolution

which s tressed nonin terven tion , na tional sovereignty , the

equa lity o f n a tio n s , and the peaceful solution o f c o n f l ic t s .

Cârdenas hoped to make Mexico the champion of an in te rna tiona l

policy of social j u s t i c e and democracy, even i f t h i s policy could

be expressed only through such forums as the League o f Nations.

129

International debate, speeches, and diplomatic measures

were the only methods by which Mexico could hope to influence

in te rna tiona l events during Cârdenas adm inistration. Mexico was

s t i l l weak, both economically and p o l i t i c a l ly , and the League of

Nations and other in te rnational meetings were the most e f f ic ie n t

and e ffe c t iv e place fo r him to express Mexico's position on world

events such as the United S ta te s ' occupation of Nicaragua, the

I ta l ia n invasion o f Ethiopia, and the German invasion of Austria .^

When Cârdenas appointed Isidro Fabela as the Mexican

Ambassador to the League o f Nations in 1937, his in s truc tions to

the new ambassador were c h a ra c te r is t ic of h is foreign policy.

Fabela was to ld : 1) Mexico would remain fa i th fu l to the League of

Nations desp ite the League's shortcomings; 2} Mexico intended to

comply with the Pact o f the League even i f other nations did not;

3} the p rincip le of nonintervention must be ina lienab le ; and 4)

Mexico would defend, i f necessary, any nation suffering from ex ter-2

nal agression.

President Cârdenas and his represen ta tives in the League

did follow th is philosophy, although Mexico was not able to defend

a l l the nations which suffered from external agression. Mexico

supported the economic sanctions imposed on I ta ly by the League

in 1935 fo r the in v a s io n x f Ethiopia, even though these sanctions

^Leonel DurSn, L5zaro Cârdenas: Ideario P o l i t ic o , pp. 345-63.

^Isidro Fabela, La p o lf tica internacional del Présidente Cârdenas (México: Editorial Jus , 1975), p. 10.

130

Included a prohibition against exporting petroleum and petroleum

products to I ta ly until that nation pulled o u t of North Africa.^

Cârdenas was furious two years la te r when the League recognized

I t a l y 's position in Ethiopia and removed the subject nation from

membership in the League. He in s truc ted Fabela to strongly pro­

t e s t the expulsion of a member and to attempt to persuade other

members tha t I ta ly should continue to be punished fo r i t s

agressive behavior. Mexico was unsuccessful in th is attempt.*

Despite continual f ru s tra t io n with th e League and i t s

refusal to ac t decisively in in te rnational c o n f l i c t s , CSrdenas

in s is ted that Mexico remain an active member o f the international

organization. Mexico needed th is forum to express her interna­

tional philosophy* and, a t times, to warn opponents o f the

Mexican government a t home and abroad about Mexico's determination

to f ig h t intervention and to promote social J u s t ic e .

The Mexican government also was ac tive in o ther interna­

tiona l organizations during the 1930's. Cârdenas used many of

the Pan American meetings as a forum to express Mexico's desire

fo r economic development in .Latin America. He was keenly aware

o f Mexico's need for assistance and t r i e d to Include the topics

of t a r i f f reductions, more l ib e ra l commercial p o l ic ie s , and

^ ib id . , pp. 25-7,

* Ib id ., p. 30.

131

Increased trade on the conference agendas.^

Cârdenas did not neglect the more t r a d i t io n a l diplomatic

re la t io n s , and t r ie d to improve Mexico's e ffec tiv en ess and image

abroad by increasing the number o f embassies and lega tions and

employing more professional s t a f f s . Eduardo Hay, M inister of

Foreign Relations, was in s tru c ted to s t a f f Mexico's embassies

with w ell- tra ined personnel who could explain and adequately

represent the po lic ies o f the Revolution. The p rac t ic e o f appoint­

ing p o l i t ic a l troublemakers to foreign posts was not abandoned,

but these men were supported by b e t te r s ta f fs .® The Mexican p re s i ­

dent took the time to inform o ther n a tion s , e sp ec ia l ly in Hispanic

America, about his foreign policy goals and a c t io n s .^

Lâzaro Cârdenas and Spain

The Republic in Spain occupied a specia l place in

Cârdenas' foreign policy. He was fasc ina ted in the s im i la r i t i e s

^Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development; The Roles of the P riva te and Public Sectors [Cambridge: Harvard Univer­s i ty Press, 1 9 6 3 ) ,p. 72; Carnegie Endowment fo r In te rna tiona l Peace, Division of In ternational Law, e d . . The In te rn a tio n a l Con­ferences o f American S ta tes- F i r s t Supplement 1933-1940 (Washington, D.C. ;Carnegie Endowment fo r In te rna tiona l Peace, 1940), pp. 33-40.

®The p o l i t ic a l appointees occasionally embarrassed the Mexican government. A number o f the s t a f f o f the Mexican Embassy in Madrid wrote a confiden tia l l e t t e r to the Foreign M inistry accusing Ambassador de Negri o f s e l l in g Mexican passports , m a ltrea t­ing se c re ta r ie s , and doing l i t t l e to help Mexicans in Spain.Several months a f t e r his appointment, the ambassador was rec a l led to Mexico, Archivo "Consulado Juan B. Arriaga a la S ec re ta r ta de la Relaciones Exteriores, I I I , 570 (46-0) "36"/4050, n .d .

^Archivo, "Lâzaro Cârdenas a Eduardo Hay," May 1936; Archivo, "The Mexican Note," March 1937.

132

In the Mexican and Spanish c o n s t i tu t io n s , and f l a t te r e d th a t Spain

was in te res ted in Mexico's Revolution. Before assuming the p re s i­

dency, Cârdenas had made friends with several members o f the Repub­

lican government, and he applauded th e i r desire to d is t r ib u te

land, build schools, improve the working conditions fo r labo re rs ,

and reduce the influence of the Catholic church. Although Spain

was entering a more conservative period in 1934, Cârdenas s t i l l

kept his t i e s with the o rig ina l leaders of the Republic and often

discussed the fu tu re o f Spain with his government o f f i c i a l s .

Cârdenas was esp ec ia lly in te res ted in the Republic's plan

for rural development. Much of the land in Spain was marginal a t

best and the number o f peasants who needed land f a r exceeded the

arable land availab le . Mexico suffered from s im ila r problems, and

Cârdenas was eager to see i f the Spanish government could increase

production while d is tr ib u t in g land to the maximum number of people.

Although an agrarian reform law was enacted in Spain, the plan

was never carried to f ru i t io n and Mexico was not able to benefit

from Spain's experience.

After the m ili ta ry rebe llion in July 1936, Cârdenas decided

to aid the Spanish Republic in any way th a t Mexico could. He

rea lized th a t th i s aid would be lim ited to in te rnational diplomacy

and small amounts of arms and food because Mexico was barely able

to feed i t s c i t izens and did not produce weapons. However, in

the context of overall Mexican foreign policy the decision to send

material a ss is tance to Spain was s t r ik in g : Mexico had not sent

133

sim ilar assis tance to any o ther nation since the Revolution.®

Although the amount of m aterial a id t h a t Mexico was able

to send to Spain during the Civil War was q u i te sm all, i t did

represent a genuine e f fo r t on Cârdenas' pa rt . Excess Mexican

weapons were sent immediately in the summer o f 1936, and Mexican

representatives a l l over the world worked to purchase food and

arms fo r the Republicans. Cârdenas did draw th e l in e a t v io la ting

in ternational law or agreements to a s s i s t Spain. His refusal to

ship a irplanes purchased in the United S ta tes to Spain a f t e r the

U.S.-Mexican agreement not to do so caused a r i f t in h is re la tio n s

with the Republican government. The Mexican p res id en t feared jeo­

pardizing his improving re la tio n sh ip with the United States by

v io la ting the agreement.

Cârdenas required the Ministry o f Foreign Relations to

support Spain's in te r e s ts in a l l possib le ways. Mexican embassies

were instructed to help Spaniards whenever p o ss ib le , although as the

Civil War progressed, Mexico's a id became a l i a b i l i t y in nationsg

which sided with the insurgents. The work o f the Mexican

ambassadors to th e League of Nations has been well documented;

Cârdenas did support sending lim ited f in an c ia l aid to other "revolutionary" leaders in Latin America. Some ass is tance was given to César Augusto Sandino during P residen t Portes G i l 's administration, and Cârdenas l a t e r t r ie d to help Sandino when he was imprisoned. However, th is and any s im ila r aid did not match the quantity sent to Republican Spain, Pareyôn Azpeita,Cârdenas ante el mundo, p. 196.

^Archivo, "Martinez de Alva a la S ec re ta r la de Relaciones Exteriores," 6 April 1937.

134

Narciso Bassols, Is idro Fabela, and th e i r colleagues labored

d i l ig e n tly on behalf of the Republican government. Cârdenas a lso

made sure th a t the topic of Spain was included in inter-American

conferences whenver possible . He was determined to demonstrate

Mexico's opposition to the prevailing lack o f in te rna tiona l concern

for the Republic and to foreign in tervention .

Spanish Refugees in Mexico

Although Cârdenas used the foreign policy of the Revolution

to provide the basis fo r h is po lic ies toward Spain, his sympathy

and support fo r the Republic led him into uncharted t e r r i to r y a f te r

the Civil War. Mexico's a ss is tance to the Spanish refugees in

France, and her decision to help thousands of refugees en ter Mexico

was unprecedented. These actions were a d i re c t re f le c t io n of

Cârdenas' in te r e s t in the Republic. Mexico had t ra d i t io n a l ly

respected the r ig h t o f p o l i t ic a l asylum and allowed individuals

and small groups in to Mexico, but mass immigrations had never been

allowed. There i s evidence th a t Cârdenas p riva te ly hoped th a t the

majority of Spanish refugees who wished to emigrate to Mexico

would be allowed to do so; he believed th a t th e i r p o l i t ic a l

philosophies and s k i l l s would aid Mexico's social and economic

development.^® P o l i t ic a l pressure and the lack of funds for t ra n s ­

portation and resettlem ent reduced the number of refugees entering

^®Vasquez Gomez, ed . , E p is to lario de Lâzaro Cârdenas,1 :3 4 7 -8 .

135

Mexico below th i s optimal lev e l . However, the president's deci­

s ion to waive most o f the requirements for c it izensh ip also was

ex trao rd in a ry —the only instance of these requirements being waived

fo r a group o f inm igrants .

By th e end of World War II Cardenas' successors had realized

th a t th e Spanish refugees were an invaluable resource for Mexico,

and thoy continued h is p o l ic ie s . The refugees quickly proved th e i r

worth, and although th e re were iso la ted resettlement problems,

Mexican lea d e rs continued to support Cârdenas' "open-door" policy

fo r refugees who could make t h e i r way to Mexico.

Cârdenas' P o l ic ie s a f t e r R etiring from the Presidency

Cârdenas continued to influence Mexico foreign policy a f te r

r e t i r i n g from the presidency in 1940. He was especially ac tive in

in te rn a t io n a l meetings concerning democracy and peace. In the

e a r ly 196Q's, he organized a Latin American Congress for National

Sovereignty , Economic Emancipation, and Peace which was held in

Mexico C ity .^1 The purposes o f the congress included creating

support fo r Cuba and o th er Hispanic American nations with sim ila r

goals and p o l ic ie s . He partic ipa ted in the World Assembly for

Peace in 1955, the World Congress for General Oisarmnament and

Peace in 1962, and numerous o th er in ternational conferences which

promited non in te rv en tion , the peaceful resolution of c o n fl ic ts ,

and so c ia l j u s t i c e .

Leonel Durân, Lâzaro Cârdenas: Ideario P o li t ico , p. 313.

136

CSrdenas also used h is international image to speak out

against In ternational agression and discrim ination. He pro tested

the United S ta te s ' involvement in Indochina, the refusal o f the

United Nations to admit China as a member, and the Organization

o f American S ta te s ' policy against Cuba. Until his death, the

former Mexican president continued to support the Cuban Revolution.

During a press conference in Boston in 1970, Cârdenas to ld the

press tha the " s o c ia l i s t revolution in Cuba should be respected

as the w ill o f the Cuban people"^^ @nd that o ther nations should

respect Cuba's r igh t to self-determination. During th e same

conversation, he supported the social changes in i t i a te d by the

government in Peru.

Although he remained active and in te res ted in in te rnational

issues a f t e r 1940, CSrdenas was careful not to usurp the power

and influence o f the incumbent Mexican president. This a t ten t io n

to the powers of the presidency allowed him to remain an un offic ia l

advisor to several of his successors.

Conclusion

Lâzaro Cârdenas established a l ibera l t ra d i t io n for Mexican

foreign policy. His policy o f supporting nations which were v ic ­

tims o f in te rnational agression (such as Ethiopia and Spain) has

l^ Ib id . , p. 291.

137

been followed by h is successors, who have provided o f f ic ia l

support to Guatemala In 1954, Cuba In 1962, President Allende

In Chile, and, more recen tly , the Nicaraguan government. Since

1940, Mexico presidents have consis ten tly supported l ib e ra l or

" l e f t i s t " governments—often in contradiction to prevailing13in te rnational opinion.

Mexico's policy toward Spain from 1934-77 is c lea r ly

c h a ra c te r is t ic o f th is l ib e ra l t r a d i t io n , and may, in f a c t , be

the most pronounced m anifestation of th is policy. The refusal

to recognize the government of Francisco Franco, even a f te r Spain

became an accepted member of the United Nations and the world

community, highlighted Mexico's abhorrence of in te rnational in te r ­

vention and her support of governments whose po lic ies centered

on economic and social reforms.^*

This d is se r ta t io n has attempted to define and make a

preliminary analysis o f Mexico's unique re la tionsh ip with Republi­

can Spain. For the fo rty years th a t the Republic ex is ted , e i th e r

^^Examples o f th is support for l ib e ra l governments include a refusal to vote in the Organization of American S tates (GAS) in favor o f condemning the government of Guatemala in 1954, the refusal to vote in favor o f expelling Cuba from the GAS in 1962, the exten­sion of financia l c re d i ts and material a ss is tance to Salvador Allende 's government in Chile, and the current support of the govern­ment o f Nicaragua.

^*Mexico did not support the in tervention of the Organization of American S tates in the Dominican Republic in 1964, the United Nations' actions in Korea in the 19S0's, the United S ta te s ' involve­ment in Indochina, or the United S ta te s ' b i la te ra l actions against C astro 's Cuba, Daniel CosTo V illegas, American Extremes, tran s . Americo Paredes (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), pp. 28-53, 92-119, 141-153.

138

In fac t or in ex ile , the Mexican government was the only nation

th a t provided the Republicans with unwavering support. The dura­

t ion of th i s re la tionsh ip , as well as i t s in ten s ity during the

early years, helped to es tab lish Mexico's policy toward other

nations and her reputation as an in te rna tio na l sponsor of social

ju s t ic e .

At le a s t two important questions remain unanswered and

deserve fu r th e r study. The f i r s t concerns the relationship between

Mexico's policy toward Spain and the Estrada Doctrine. Scholars

disagree on whether o r not Mexico's refusal to recognize

Francisco Franco's government co n s titu tes a v io la t ion of the doc­

t r in e . The second question is whether or not the Mexican govern­

ment ever reg re tted refusing to e s tab l ish re la tions with Franco,

and whether or not such a policy would be implemented today.

I t i s now fashionable in some government c i r c le s in Mexico to

describe her re la tionsh ip with Republican Spain as "u n rea lis tic

and id e a l i s t ic " —too Id e a l i s t i c fo r today 's world.

The re la tionsh ip between the policy toward Spain and the

Estrada doctrine is key to a thorough understanding of the doc­

t r in e and i t s importance in Mexican foreign policy. For many

years Mexico suffered from in te rna tiona l intervention through a

variety of means including m ili ta ry force and refusal of

diplomatic recognition. Genaro E strada 's policy was a reaction

to th is manipulation and is considered to be one of Mexico's

most important contributions to the body of Latin American

in ternational law.

139

César Sepûlveda, former d i re c to r o f Mexico's foreign

serv ice i n s t i tu t e and an in te rn a t io n a l lawyer, be lieves th a t

Mexico violated the Estrada doc tr ine in refusing to recognize

the Franco government.^® He s ta te s th a t Mexico's refusa l

to es tab lish diplomatic r e la t io n s , coupled with the announcement

in Montevideo in 1943 recommending th a t no nation recognize a

government imposed by fo rce , abrogated the s p i r i t o f the Estrada

Doctrine which repudiates the use of diplomatic recognition as

a means of expressing approval o r disapproval fo r a government,^®

Jav ier MalagOn BarcelO, a Spanish Republican e x i le and

scholar, believes tha t Mexico, in refusing to recognize Franco,

adhered to th e Estrada Doctrine. Mexico never withdrew recogni­

tion of the government e lec ted by the Spanish people, he s t a t e s ,

and continued to maintain re la t io n s with the only leg it im ate

government o f Spain. Mexico's re fusa l to e s ta b l ish o f f i c i a l

re la t io n s with the Franco regime was not a sign of d isapproval,

but merely an ind ication th a t a more leg i t im a te government

ex isted .

O fficia l government statements fo r the l a s t fo r ty years

reveal no reg re t or lack o f commitment to Republican Spain.

i n t e r v i e w with César Sepûlveda, Mexico C ity , Mexico, August 1977.

^®Sepûlveda, La te o r ia a la prflctica del reconoclmiento de qobiernos, pp. 75-80.

^^Interview with Jav ie r Malagôn Barcelô, Washington, D.C., September 1982.

140

P riv a te ly , however, th i s policy i s often charac terized as too

i d e a l i s t i c fo r the modern world, and perhaps even detrimental

to Mexico's in te rn a t io n a l re la tions.^® I t would be worthwhile

to explore the depth of th is sentiment—the re s u l ts o f th is

examination could ind ica te changing values in Mexican foreign

policy.

Mexico has maintained an independent and l ib e ra l foreign

policy in the 20th century , and her re la t io n sh ip with Spain is

c e r ta in ly c h a ra c te r i s t i c o f th is po licy . However, the in te n s i ty

and duration of the re la t io n s with Republican Spain w ill remain

a unique chap ter in the h is to ry o f Mexican in te rn a t io n a l a f f a i r s

and Lâzaro CSrdenas.

Interview with César Sepûlveda, Mexico C ity , Mexico, August 1977; interviews with a number o f o f f i c i a l s in the Mexican Foreign M inistry who wish to remain anonymous, August 1977.

APPENDIX

141

Appendix A

Presidents o f Mexico Involved with the Second Spanish Republic

Plutarco E llas Galles 1924-1928

Emilio Portes Gil 1928-1929

Pascual O rtiz Rubio 1929-1932

Abelardo Rodriguez 1932-1934

Lâzaro CSrdenas 1934-1940

Manuel Avila Camacho 1940-1946

Manuel Alem&n 1946-1952

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 1952-1958

Adolfo L6pez Mateos 1958-1964

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 1964-1970

Luis Echeverrta 1970-1976

José L6pez P o r t i l lo 1976-1982

142

A p p en d ix B

Selected Leaders o f th e Second Spanish Republic

J u l io Alvarez del Vayo: S o c ia l i s t , f i r s t ambassador to Mexico,and l a t e r member o f Prime M inister Negrfn's cabinet

Manuel Azafia: founder o f the Left Republican Party, f i r s t Prime M in is te r o f the Republic and l a t e r President o f the Republic

José G ira l : fo llow er o f Azaha, f i r s t President of the government-in - e x i le

Francisco Largo C aballe ro ; S o c ia l i s t , union leader

Alejandro Lerroux: le a d e r of the Radical Party, Prime Ministerof the Republic In 1933-5

Diego Martinez B arrio : lead er of the Republican Union Party,P res iden t o f C ortes , and one o f the leaders in forming the governm ent-in-exile

Juan Negrln: S o c i a l i s t , l a s t Prime M inister of the Republic,and one o f the lead e rs of the Spanish In exile

Id a lec io P r ie to : S o c i a l i s t , member o f several Republican cabinets, and a le a d e r o f th e Spanish in ex ile

José Maria Gil Robles: C atholic lead er , member o f several cabinetsIn the Republic

A ppendix C

143

CHRONOLOGY

1929- O rtlz Rubio inaugurated President o f Mexico

1931April 14-

Hay-June 28- October- December 9<

Second Spanish Republic e s tab lished , king leaves Spain

Mexico and Spain exchange ambassadorse lec t io n s fo r the Spanish Constituent CortesManuel Azafia Prime Ministerpromulgation of the new Spanish C onstitu tion

1932January-September-

September-

Spanish divorce law enactedAbelardo Rodriguez replaces O rtiz Rubio as

P resident of MexicoCatalan autonomy and agrarian reform s t a tu te s

enacted in Spain

1933January-A pril-

November 19*

December-

a n a rch ls ts r io ts in Spainmunicipal e lec tions go against the Azaha

governmentnew conservative Spanish government, Lerroux

prime m in istera n a rch is t r io t s in Catalonia and Aragon

1934 Harch- June 5-11-

Ju ly -

October-

four-week general s t r ik e in Spaincampesinos s t r ik e in Andalusia and Extremadura,

S o c ia l i s t deputies a rre s ted in SpainLâzaro Cârdenas inaugurated as P res iden t of

Mexicos t a t e o f war declared in A stu rias , African

troops and the Foreign Legion ca l le d in

144

1935

A prll-June-

October-

1936January 7- January 15- February-

March-A pril-A pril-

May-June-June-

June 29-

Ju ly 12- Ju ly 17- Ju ly 20- August- August-

September 4- September 9-

September-Deceraber-

October 7-

November 6- November-

republlcan p a r t ie s in Spain announce unityCSrdenas dismisses cab inet and forms c o a l i ­

tion of a n t i - C a l l i s t a sLerroux forced to resign

Cortes dissolved in SpainPopular Front e le c to ra l pact announcedSpanish e le c t io n s . Popular Front v ic to rious

and AzafSa named Prime M inisterSpanish generals begin to plan coup d 'e t a tCSrdenas forces C alles to leave MexicoConfederacifin de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM)

organized in MexicoAzaffa P residen t o f Spains t r ik e s in MadridSpanish ambassador Félix GordÔn OrdSs a rr iv e s

in MexicoMexico agrees to a s s i s t Spanish government

i f neededCalvo Sotelo a ssass ina tedSpanish generals attempt coup. C ivil War beginsnew Spanish government formed under José GiralCSrdenas sends f i r s t weapons to SpainSpanish rebe ls formally p ro te s t Mexican

a ss is ta n ce to the Spanish governmentLargo Caballero government formedNon-Intervention Committee meets in London

Mexican government supports Spain in the League o f Nations

Soviet Union announces w ill send weapons to Spain

Spanish government moves to Valencia Mexican embassy moves to Valencia

145

1937February-Harch-March-

March 30-

May 17- Sutmver- August 7-

September 30-

October-

Mexican food shipment to SpainMexico sends weapons to SpainCSrdenas sends l e t t e r to the Secretary

General of th e League o f Nations denouncing the nonintervention po licy of the League

Mexico sends l e t t e r s to a l l nations urging term ination o f the Non-Intervention Pact and requesting support fo r Spain

Negrtn Prime M inisterch ild ren a r r iv e in Mexico, housed in Moreliaf in a l group of asylees in Mexican embassy in

Spain allowed to leave SpainFabela makes speech in League of Nations

concerning SpainNegrtn government moves to Barcelona

1938March 18- CSrdenas expropria tes the property of the

foreign o i l companiesJu ly- Casa de Espaha e s tab l ish ed in Mexico CitySeptember- Cârdenas announces th a t Spanish refugees

w ill be welcomed in MexicoNovember- In te rna tiona l Brigades leaves Spain

1939January- Cârdenas announces th a t Mexico will admit an

unlimited number of Spanish refugeesFebruary 1- l a s t meeting o f the C onstituen t Cortes in

SpainFebruary 20-21- Cârdenas meets with P r ie to to discuss the

fa te o f the Spanish refugeesFebruary 27- Azana resigns as President o f SpainMarch 5- Negrtn cab inet go to FranceMarch 8- Mexican ambassador Tejada leaves Spain with

embassy documentsMarch 31- meeting o f the Permanent Coirmittee of the

Cortes in P ar is

146

Harch-

Aprll 16-June 26-Aprll-

December-

September 21-

1940January 23-

June-August-

August 22-23-November-December-

P r ie to receives the " t re a su re ” Negrtn sen t to Mexico and se ts up el Junto de Auxilio a lo s Refugiados Espafioles (JARE)

Spanish embassy in Mexico closedAzaha put under Mexican p ro tec tion

Mexico works to help Spanish refugees in Francefour boatloads o f Spanish refugees a r r iv e in

MexicoMexico announces th a t mass emigrations to

Mexico tem porarily suspended

CSrdenas announces specia l c i t iz e n sh ip proce­dures f o r Spanish refugees

Mexico negotia tes with the Vichy government in France to p ro tec t Spanish refugees

Mexican-French agreement f in a l iz e dAzaMa dies in FranceManuel Avila Camacho inaugurated in Mexico

1941January-

March-

Avila Camacho orders the JARE to form a lim ited l i a b i l i t y company

Avila Camacho sends a telegram to France con­cerning Mexico's w illingness to p ro tec t the Spanish refugees

1942 May- July 22-

August 10-

November 9- November 27-

Mexico declares war on the Axis powersPermanent Committee of the Spanish Cortes

meets in Mexico CityPermanent Committee of the Spanish Cortes

meets again in Mexico CityMexico and France break diplomatic re la t io n sJARE again ordered to form a l im ited l i a b i l i t y

company

147

December- Mexico decides to allow no additional mass emigrations o f Spanish refugees to e n te r the country

1943Sutimer-Summer-

November-

Social Security system implemented in MexicoVicente Lombardo Toledano replaced as head of

CTM by Fidel VelSsquezla Junta Espahola de LiberaciÔn (JEL) formed

1944December- Avila Camacho agrees to allow a meeting of

the Spanish Cortes to be held in Mexico City

1945January 10- January 24- March 20-21-

May 10-

June 19-

August 17-

September-

November 9-

Spanish Cortes meets in Mexico Citymeeting o f "neg rin is tas" in Mexico Cityconference in Mexico City to prepare the

document to be presented a t the San Francisco Conference on behalf o f the Spanish Republic

JEL p e t i t io n c irc u la te d a t the San Francisco Conference

Luis Q uin tan illa speaks in favor o f the Repub­l i c a t the San Francisco Conference

Spanish Cortes meets in Mexico City and Spanish government-in-exile formed under the leader­ship of Diego Martinez Barrio and José Giral

Mexico formally recognizes the government-in- in -e x i le

Spanish Cortes meets in Mexico City to recog­nize Giral government

1946February-February-

government-in-exile moved to ParisMexico holds s e a t on the United Nations Security

Council and her delegate announces th a t Mexico would welcome any opportunity to discuss the "Franco problem"

148

Aprll-

October-

December-

December 12-

United Nations Committee formed to study the Spanish s i tu a t io n

Republican government-1n-exile admitted as member o f UNESCO

Miguel AlemSn Inaugurated as President of Mexico

United Nations approves reso lu tion against Franco

1947January-

Summer-

August-

December-

Giral resigns and new government formed under Rudolfo Llopis

Mexico e s ta b l ish e s trad e , shipping se rv ice s , and d i r e c t mail and a i r serv ice with Spain

new government-in-exile formed under Alvaro de Albornoz a f t e r Llopis resigns

General Assembly votes to express confidence that the Security Council will a c t i f s i tu a tio n In Spain warrants

1948February- President AlemSn publishes a r t i c l e in support

o f the Spanish Republic

1950November 4- United Nations General Assembly revokes recom­

mendation th a t member nations withdraw representation from Madrid

1951March-

March-

August-

November-

formal t rad e agreement signed between Mexico and Spain

Spanish delegates inv ited to anniversary celebra tion a t UNAM

new government-in-exile formed under Félix Gorddn OrdSs

Gorddn Ordâs sends dec lara tion aga inst Franco to members of th e United Nations

149

1952

December-

December-

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines Inaugurated as President o f Mexico

Spain admitted as member o f UNESCO

1953Spring - Mexico adopts fu l l suffrage r ig h ts fo r women

1955November-

December-

government-In-exile campaigns aga in s t Spain 's admission to the United Nations

Spain admitted to the United Nations

1956November 14- Juan Negrfn dies in Paris

1957A pril- Cârdenas honored by Spanish Republicans a t

reception in Mexico City

1958 A pril- October-

December-

Is id ro Fabela honored by Spanish RepublicansCSrdenas meets with members o f the government-

in -e x i le in ParisAdolfo L6pez Mateos Inaugurated as President

o f Mexico

1959 Apri1- April 17-

ra i l ro a d s t r i k e in MexicoGordCn OrdSs replaced by General Herrera as

lead er o f the government-in-exile

ISO

1960F a ll- L6pez Mateos meets with ex ile leaders In

Venezuela

1962January- February 11- February 19-

December 23-

Martlnez Barrio dies in ParisIndalecio P rie to dies in Mexico CityLuis Jimënez de Asûa replaces Martinez Barrio

as President of the RepublicOosé Giral dies in Mexico City

1964December- Gustavo Diaz Ordaz inaugurated as President

of Mexico

1966n.d . Franco declares limited amnesty for refugees

1968Ju ly -

December-September-

October-

UNAM studen ts boycott classes

mass student demonstrations put .down by force in Mexico City

1970November 16-

October-December-

Luls Jimënez de As6a dies in Buenos Aires, replaced by José Maldonado as President of the Republic

Cârdenas dies in MexicoLuis Echeverrla inaugurated as President of

Mexico

1971Spring- o f f i c i a l trade agreement between Mexico and

Spain signed

151

Hay- government-in-exile honors Mexico for i t s support of the Republic

1973April- Luis Echeverrla meets with ex ile leaders in

Paris

1975September-

October-

Hovember-December-

contact between Mexico and Spain severed by Echeverrla

Echeverrla condemns Franco's execution of f ive men, uses United Nations as his forum

Franco dies in SpainMexican and Spanish o f f ic ia ls meet in Paris

1976November-

Oecember-December-

new trade agreement signed by Mexico and SpainJosé L6pez P o r t i l lo inaugurated as President of

Mexico

1977Harch-

March-

Mexico breaks diplomatic re la tions with the government-in-exile

Mexico and Spain e s tab lish diplomatic re la tio ns

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