sir julliat corbett

THE

NAVAL REVIEW

THE NAVAL SOCIETY (Founded m rgra.)

For Private Circulation.

among its Members.

FEBRUARY, 1923.

Cobyrightcd undo- Act of q r r .

CONTENTS.

PAGE HON . EDITOR'S NOTES.

A STUDY OF WAR-IV. By Admiral Sir R . N. Custance, G.C.D., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.C.L. - I

THE LATE SIR JULIAN CORBETT - - - - '4

OUTLINES OF HISTORY-V. TRADE ROUTES, Part 3. By Captain W. H. C. S. Thring, C.B.E., R.A.N. 22

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED AT SEA FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE XVIIITH CENTURY. By Sir Reginald Acland, K.C., Judge Advocate of the Fleet - - - - - - - - 41

H.M.S. CANOPUS, .AUGUST, 1914, TO MARCH, 1916-1. - - - - - - - I43

THE TIGRIS ABOVE B.~GHD.~D. By LieUt-come. A. S. Elwell-Sutton, R.N., B.A., F.R.G.S. - 153

CORRESPONDENCE - - - - - - - I77 Speed of Battleships. Gliding Flight over the Sea.

HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.

Costs in the printing trade having come down and become more or less stabilised, it was determined to secure a new printing contract. Out of nine tenders sent out, Messrs. C. Knight and Co. were again the successful competitors. A considerable economy over rates that have recently been paid has resulted.

Opportunity has in consequence been taken to revert to the quality of the cover and paper used in Vol. III., and to adopt a solid instead of a leaded type, which is better for reading. A new form of wrapper will also be used which it is hoped will better preserve the covers.

It has been decided to cease numbering the numbers and to withdraw the restriction as to binding, so that members can have their numbers bound where most convenient and in what style they please, but Messrs. C. Knight & Co., 227, Tooley Street, London, S.E. I ,

will still continue to undertake the work. A title page and contents list of the previous year's volume will be enclosed with the February number for binding purposes.

The February number will also always contain a Bankers' Standing Order Form, a copy of the Objects and Regulations of the Society, and the Annual State- ment of Accounts.

The latter shows that although k 7 5 13s. was owing on 31st December, we have been able to invest another k150, which is satisfactory in view of the fact that 107 members have been retired, of whom 27 have so far resigned. It is estimated we shall actually start the year with about 1,300, which is amply sufficient under present conditions, but it is requested that no opportunity should be lost of enlisting new members.

Accompanying this number is Addendum A of the Subject Index, containing the contents of Vol. X.

I find it impossible to comply, for the reasons stated in the February number, Vol. X., with my promise to produce a list of books for reading; instead, I propose to append to the list of Naval and Military books

the titles of any which I notice of an historical, scientific or general interest which may be appreciated by individual members.

The Society has three sets of Vols. I . to X., with the Index, for disposal, for A 3 15s., or A 3 5s. for Vols. I . to IX., plus postage.

Lieut.-Com. C. A. Petrie, having to leave for South Africa on the 26th, I have, with the authority of the , Saval Committee of the Sundays River Valley, taken over the issue of the options remaining in his hands, the period for which has been extended to 30th June, 1923. I shall be glad to give all the information I can about the Settlement, and anyone thinking of taking an option should apply to me.

W. H. HENDERSON, Hon. Editor.

January 22nd, 1923.

A S T U D Y OF WAR.-IV.

BY ADMIRAL SIR R . N. CUSTANCE, G.C. B ., K.C.M .G., C.V.O., D.C.L.

W e kazw seen lhat the decisive act in war i s the battle, and the decisive factor the arnzed force; also that the reciprocal nationul object is security, and the reciprocal mili tary a i m i s to destroy or to neutralize and to weaken the oppos ing armed force.

VIII.

T O WEAKEN THE OPPOSING L ~ R M E D FORCE AND TO STRENGTHEN ONE'S OU~N.

WE have now to consider the contributory or secondary military aim which seeks to weaken the armed force of its opponent and to strengthen its own by impairing or increasing, as the case may be, the material resources and moral support upon which those forces depend.'

The resources on which any armed sea, land or air force depends are man power, accumulated wealth and capacity to supply food, clothing, weapons, ammunition and all the appliances required by an armed force, including instruments of war, whether ships, land craft or aircraft and instruments for transport.

By man power is meant the numerical strength, knowledge, skill, energy, courage and endurance of the nation and its allies, including not only their armed forces but their unarmed populations which support and minister to the wants of their armed forces. Hence man power has physical, intellectual, and moral sides. Physically and intellectually it changes slowly and is more or less stabilised at any particular time, but morally it is liable to great fluctuations. The moral stability of man power depends mainly on faith that the war is fought for a just cause, that is to say, that the national object is more right than that of the opponent. 'I'he better cause tends gradually to under- mine the worse. I-Ience the effort each side makes to prove that its own cause is the more just. Numbers not being the sole measure of man power its real value is not easy to appreciate at any particular time, which partly accounts for the errors in judging relative strengths at the opening of every war, as for

1 Cf 111. above.

2 NAVAL REVIEW.

instance by Xerxes before his expedition into Hellas in 480 B.C.,' and by the current opinion of the Russian strength at the opening of the great German W a r .

During peace the nation supports itself by productive work and may also accumulate wealth in various forms. But during war this is sometimes no longer the case, as nearly all work done by the armed forces, or for them, whether at home or abroad, is either destructive or unproductive. At home those who are transferred from the productive work of peace to the destructive or unproductive work of war have to be supported, and work done abroad has to be paid for. Hence wealth accuniulated in the past is usually needed during war to supplement the returns from such productive work as is still done. Nations possessed of such wealth can use it for that purpose, as did Athens during the Peloponesian War,z and Great Britain during the wars with France 1793-1815, and with Germany 1914-18. Nations with little or no such wealth have to make good the deficiency from outside sources, such as sub- sidies or loans from allies, or by plunder from enemies. Thus during the Ionian W a r 412-04 B.C., the Lacedaemonian Fleet was maintained by Persian wealth, and after being twice destroyed in battle was rebuilt by Lysander with the financial aid of Cyrus the p ~ u n g e r . ~ Similarly during the French wars of 1793-1815 the Continental Allies of Great Britain were financed by her, while the French armies overran and plundered the Continental States to supply their own wants. The same phenomena were seen during the German W a r 1914-1918.

The natiorial capacity to supply food, clothing, weapons, equipment and instruments of locomotion varies greatly. Agricultural and undeveloped countries usually have a surplus of food and natural products but a deficiency of manufactured articles, as for example, Russia. \lThereas the reverse is often the case with industrialised and highly developed countries amply provided with machinery and skilled labour to use it, as for example, Great Britain. Hence an interchange takes place constantly during peace and, when possible, during war, but somewhat changed in character to meet the changed demand.

It will be seen that the resources are partly internal and partly external. Whatever be their origin, any deficiency tends to lower the strength and moral of the armed force, as its materiel map be incomplete and ill-found and its personnel ill- fed, and badly clothed, armed and equipped. Furthermore, the unarmed population may also suffer privation from want of food and deficiency of clothing which may impair their moral and

1 Herodotus VII., 101, e t sep. 2 Thucydides I I . , 13, 124; VIII., 15. 3 War at Sea," p. 105, by the author.

A STUDY OF WAR.-IV. 3 - indirectly react on that of the armed force. Similarly, any addition tends to raise the strength and moral of the armed force. Hence the contributory or secondary military aim of each side is to prepare victory by impairing enemy resources and increasing its own. T o this end, while the primary aims are in the balance, each side may try to act by land, air and sea.

On land, each side may overrun enemy territory, while its own is kept inviolate ; destroy or convert to its own use the communications and the means of production of that territory, levy contributions there, plunder the country and press the population into its service, or, as in past ages, enslave it, or, a s is threatened in future years, bomb and poison the inhabitants of its cities. As, for example, in 1796, after putting the Pied- montese army out of action and driving back the Austrian, Napoleon overran Northern, Italy with the avowed object of supporting his army.I Again, during the American Civil War, Sherman, after sending back Thomas to Nashville to neutralise the Confederate Army in Alabama under Hood, marched through Georgia to the sea and thence north through the Caro- linas, destroying the railways, living on the country, and seriously impairing the Confederate resources and moral. The German invasion of Belgium, Northern France and Roumania will be fresh in the mind. The occupation of the capital indirectly weakens the armed force, since the national life becomes disorganised to an extent which increases with its complexity. For this reason the occupation of London would probably be more serious than that of any other capital. But even in that case, as a military aim, it would probably be secondary to the destruction of the armed force. For example, the occupation of Athens was less important than the Persian defeat at Salamis; of Vienna, needed to be supplemented by the French victory at Austerlitz; of Moscow, resulted in the disastrous French retreat. Berlin was occupied after and not before the destruction of the Prussian army at Jena. When the Germans advanced into France in 1914 their primary aim was the destruction of the Allied armies and not the occupation of Paris which would have followed as a consequence of the victory which was denied them.

At sea, each side may try to stop the enemy sea-borne trade and military transports and to prevent its own being stopped, thus cutting off enemy supplies and reinforcements from oversea while itself continuing to receive them ; also, to seize'enemy maritime bases of supply and intelligence while preserving its own intact.

Trade is stopped by exercising the right of maritime capture, which means : -

1 Correspondence de Napoleon, 91.

4 NAVAL REVIEW.

I . Enemy capture, that is the right to capture and confiscate enemy merchant ships and enemy cargoes or board such ships on all occasions when met with on the high seas or in the waters of a belligerent; and

2 . Neutral capture, that is, the right to capture and confiscate, or otherwise penalise, neutral merchant ships if they offend against neutrality.

The justification for enemy capture is that all merchant ships are potential instruments of war as armed ships or as military transports, supply ships, despatch boats, and mine sweepers, and that the threat of capture stops or reduces the enemy sea-borne trade and thus cuts off his supplies; and for neutral capture is that " supplying the enemy, with what better enables him to carry on the war, is a departure from neutrality." For these reasons maritime capture has for several generations been recognised by the law of nations as a legitimate operation of war, and is claimed and exercised now as a means directly or indirectly to wealten the enemy's armed force and to shorten the war. , Attempts to weaken the right of capture have been made at intervals. The principal argument used has been that ships and cargoes are private property and that their capture is a hard- ship on private individuals. The argument is fallacious, since for several generations both ships and cargoes have been in- sured, with the result that the losses and the cost of insurance are borne not by private owners but by the consumers, who pay increased prices to cover them.

Again, exception has been taken to the right to capture property on the ground that a different practice is followed on land. The most important difference is that the military commander is a law to himself, whereas the proceedings of the naval commander are reviewed by a prize court. The former acts outside the law, the latter under the law. The proceedings before the British Prize Court may be usefully compared with those followed by Napoleon's marshals or the German generals.

That maritime capture is humane when carried out under the rules recognised by international law is evident from the procedure established under them and by the practice of the past. The duty of the captor was then to bring in, for adjudication by a prize court, any merchant ships he detained. If the ship captured was an enemy, the rule was not always observed. Whether the ship was brought in or not the safety of the personnel was always secured. In the recent war the British destroyed ships in the Baltic after removing and providing for the security of the personnel. The Germans also destroyed ships at sea, but they deliberately risked and sacrificed the lives of both crew and passengers, thus making- war a t sea inhumane. Their aim was to make war at sea as ruthless, brutal and lawless

as it too often has been on land, and by the terror created to prevent ships putting to sea. In this they failed.

Since no two wars are waged under the same geographical, political, economic and military conditions, the practical application of the principle of maritime capture varies in each. This is especially so in the case of neutral capture. Many disputes arise about the rules relating to blockades, contraband, con- 23

- -argument . It is sufficient to note that the interest of the belli-- 'v gerents is regulated and the inconvenience and loss to neutrals /O J . c O

in some respects mitigated. The details of these disputes are political and economic rather than military, and lie outside our argument. It is sufficient to note that the interest of the belligerent is usually complete stoppage of enemy trade, while that of the neutral may seem to be the uninterrupted continuance of his own trade. LJsually each side is held back from making extreme demands by action already taken in the past or possibly required in the future when the parts are reversed. illoreover, the political object of the war, the many-sided friction in the political and international machines, the relative strength not only of the belligerents but of the neutrals and the progress of the war all tend to influence the relations between belligerents and neutrals and the action respectively taken by them. In fact, the stoppage of neutral trade with a belligerent has always been dependent upon action taken by the belligerents and either accepted or tolerated by neutrals, or so much opposed by them that thev have ultimately joined in the war, as did the United States in the years 1812 and 1917.

To prevent trade being stopped the reciprocal action required

I . By the navy to destroy or to neutralise the opposing armed ships.

2 . Bv insurance to transfer the losses due to capture from private owners of ships and cargoes through the underwriters to the consumers who pay prices increased by the ~remiums.

The navy and insurance supplement each other. The more successful the navy, the fewer are the losses by capture, the lower the premiums and the less the stoppage to trade, and vice versa".

The system enabled the sea-borne trade to continue during the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. The recent German war introduced some changes. The Government then shared the war risks for the first time and undertook 80 per cent. of them, leaving the remainder to the underwriters. Wi th this help, the navy insurance svstem fulfilled its mission during the first complete year when the average monthly war losses were 55,ooo gross tons and, with graduallv increasing difficulty during the second complete year, when those losses were 89,000

b NAVAL REVIEW.

gross tons. But the war losses of shipping were not the chief difficulty during these two years. Shortage of supplies raised prices. Decreasing efficiency of shipping due to war delays, increasing Government demands for tonnage, cessation in ship building, resulted in an inadequate tonnage which raised freights and prices. As a consequence, the Government were forced to exercise a gradually increasing control over supplies and shipping.l

In the third year of the war losses of Allied and neutral shipping gradually rose from 165,677 gross tons in August, 1916, to 866,610 gross tons in April, 1917, after which they gradually fell and continued to do so, reaching 113,054 gross tons in October, 1918. T o meet these losses ship building was largely developed, especially in the United States, with the result that by the second quarter of 1918 the losses were more than balanced by the new tonnage launched, and continued to be so to an increasing degree. The broad fact is that during the third year the navy failed to neutralize the German submarine action, which began to be intensive in February, 1917, but finally succeeded in doing so. The naval action requlred to prevent trade being stopped is now to be examined.

The navy acts by watching the enemy armed ships at their points of departure, intercepting them on the ocean and fore- stalling them at their destination. T o illustrate this, it is proposed to sketch the second Civil W a r between the Royalists and the English Commonwealth after the execution of Charles I. in January, 1648-9, and the informal war of reprisals between England and France which developed during that civil war. The operations were conducted by land and sea.

On land, the armies on either side were not unequal, but those of the Royalists were divided between Ireland and Scot- land, and were thus at a disadvantage. The reciprocal military aim was to destroy the opposing army. Of the operations, it is sufficient to sap that Cromwell landed at Dublin in August, 1649, and left in the following May, having in the interval so far destroyed the Irish army that the threatened invasion of England became impossible, but the operations did not end until May, 1652. I n June, 1650, Cromwell moved to Scotland and, after protracted movements, destroyed the Scottish army at Worcester in September, 1651, but the final conquest of Scotland was not completed until the following February.

At sea, the armed forces were on the one side the Common- wealth Navy, and on the other side seven English ships of war which hadgassed over to the Royalists in May, 1648, privateers bearing Royalist letters of marque and ultimately French ships of war and privateess, of which some bore letters of marque from Charles 11. The Commonwealth was much the stronger

1 Allied Shipping Control. Salter.

A STUDY OF WAR.-IV. 7

side. Its military aim was to destroy or neutralize the armed ships opposed to it, whereas that of the Royalists was to evade battle, and to plunder English trade in order to finance themselves and impair the resources of the Commonwealth. The aim was in the one case primary, in the other secondary.

The operations may be said to have begun in January, 1648- g, when Prince Rupert put to sea from Helvoetchuys with the seven revolted ships and another. H e arrived at Kinsale early in February.' From that base his ships were detached and made numerous captures of merchant ships until the middle of May,2 when the Commonwealth " Generals at sea " began a close watch, and by the threat of battle confined his ships to port. This was continued until late in October or early in November, when a gale of wind dispersing the watching squsd- ron, he put to sea with seven ships to evade the threat of Crom- well's advancing army. Transferring his base to Lisbon, he was left free for about three months and made several captures.

On 10th-20th March, 1649-50, General Robert Blake, with twelve ships, arrived3 off the entrance to the Tagus. His instructions, dated 17th-27th J a n ~ a r y , ~ were to seize or destroy the revolted and other ships operating under or with Prince Rupert, but to avoid conflict with foreign states unless they first became the assailants. His position was difficult seeing that, although the Thirty Years' W a r had been brought to a close recently by the Peace of Westphalia, France was still at war with Spain and was supporting Portugal in her struggle for independence from Spain. Also, not one of the Continental States had recognised, and all were hostile to the regicide Commonwealth. Blake attempted but failed to establish diplomatic relations with the King of P ~ r t u g a l . ~ H e was refused permission to use Oeiras Bay, the,inner anchorage, except in bad weather, and was compelled to anchor in Cascaes Bay, the exposed outer a n ~ h o r a g e . ~ Unable to attack Rupert's ships owing to the opposition of the King of Portugal, Blake remained to watch them, and to fight them if opportunity offered. In the middle of May the outward bound Brazil merchant fleet left the Tagus. Blake, empowered by his instructions, commandeered nine English merchant ships forming part of that fleet. Ten days later Colonel Edward Popham joined v,ith eight ships,? and brought instructions8 dated 20th-30th April and 25th April-5th May, ordering explicitly reprisals against

1 Welbeck I., 519. 2 I,evbourne-Popham, 13, 17.

3 Welbeck I., 519. 4 Thurloe I., 134. 5 Leybourne-Popham papers, p. 66. 6 Welbeck I., 520. 7 Levbourne-Popham, 66. 8 Thurloe I., 142, 144. V17elbeck I., 527.

8 S.4V.4L REVIEW.

Portuguese ships and goods, if the free use of Oeiras Bay and other Portuguese ports was denied to English ships, and inl- plicitly a commercial blockade of Lisbon in addition to the military watch on the revolted ships. Reprisals were also ordered against the ships and goods of France. These instructions were acted upon and a complete rupture with Portugal followed. Supplies could no longer be obtained locally, which increased Blake's difficulties.

With a mixed force of French, Portuguese and revolted ships superior in number to the watching squadron, Rupert tried to put to sea on July 26th-August jth, and again on September 7th-17th, but in each case after a skirmish he refused battle and returned into port. Seven days after the second attempt the homeward bound Brazil fleet was intercepted off the Tagus by Blake, who destroyed the flagship, captured seven ships and withdrew with them to the Bay of Cadiz, leaving open the port of Lisb0n.l During the last four months' stay off the Tagus the watching squadron had remained generally at anchor in Cascaes Bay, with single ships under way as required, and detachments to obtain supplies from time to time at Cadiz, or Vigo, upwards of two hundred sea miles away. Under Portuguese pressure2-the outcome of the English reprisals- Rupert sailed on October 12th-~2nd with six revolted ships, and fourteen days later was off the port of Malaga, where he attaclied English merchant ships. This infringement of Spanish sovereignty caused the King of Spain presently to forbid hirn the use of Spanish ports.' Blake had the news on October 28th- November 7th, left Cadiz at once in pursuit, and between 3rd-13th and 5-1 5th November destroyed off Cartagena four of the revolted ships4 who had parted company with their Admiral. Rupert, with only two ships and a prize, reached Toulon some days later and remained there until May 7th-17th, 1651.~ Blake pursued as far as the Balearic Islands, or perhaps Sardinia, but was back a t Cartagena by December 5th-15th."

That Rupert had left Lisbon was known in London by November 2nd-lath, on which date the Council of State issued instructions to Blake directing him to return to England and informing him that Captain William Penn was named to corn. mand a squadron to intercept another Portuguese fleet from Brazil and to prevent Rupert doing further m i ~ c h i e f . ~ That Blake was already in pursuit was known by December 13th-

1 Welbrck I., 531, 536. 2 ?Varburton III., 313. Welbeck I. , 542.

Welbeck I., 538, 539, 540, 543. 5 Penn I. , 338. 6 Welbeck I . , 543, 545. 7 Tliurloe T., 166.

A STUDY OF WAR.-IV. 9

~ 3 r d . ' News of his success arrived by December 24th-January 3rd, 16.50-I,~ when orders were issued desiring him to remain abroad as long as the public service required and directing him to give such orders to Penn as were necessary. On that date Blake was at Cadiz on his way to England, which he reached in early F e b r ~ a r y , ~ and thus these orders were of no effect and probably did not reach him.

During these same two years, 1649-50, the Royalist privateers were sailing from ports occupied by the Royalists in Ireland, Scotland, the Scilly Islands, Jersey and Isle of Man; also from ports in France, especially Dunkirk and Ostend. These ports of exit were so numerous and widespread that it was impossible to watch the privateers as was done in the case of Rupert's squadron. I t was difficult to meet them on the open sea, but they might be forestalled at their destination, which was the merchant ship they wished to capture. This was done. The practice began by placing armed ships as escorts alongside ships carrying troops, ammunition, Government stores, and was gradually extended to ordinary traders, the merchant in that case being charged convoy money until Octo- ber, 1649, when the charge was r e m ~ v e d . ~

During the same two years the French were seizing English ships and goods. No redress being obtainable through the ordinary channels, the Commonwealth towards the end of the year 1649 began to grant letters of reprisal to private owners to recover their losses by seizing French ships and goods. These were followed in April, 1650, by instructions to English ships of war to seize French ships of war and merchant ships.5 'Thus it came about that during that year both English and French trade was being captured by both ships of war and privateers. Furthermore, the sea was not clear of pirates, especially in the Mediterranean, where the Barbary corsairs were active. More- over, French and English goods on neutral ships were liable to seizure under the law of reprisals, and thus Dutch ships, the great neutral carriers, were often detained and their cargoes seized. T o neutralize the attacking ships, and prevent the trade being stopped became a pressing problem. Accordingly, on October ~1st-November ~ o t h , 1650, or about the date when Rupert's sortie from Cadiz was known in LondonG and Penn was nominated to relieve Blake, Parliament ordered a standing convoy service,' added fifteen per cent. to the customs to cover the expense and directed the Navy Commissioners-not the

1 Dom. Cal., 4 6 8 2 Thurloe I., 168. 3 Dom. Cnl., 6, 44. 4 Dom. Cnl., 349. 5 Thurloe I.. 144. = Cf P. 7 Dom. Cnl., 1,651, p. 404.

I 0 NAVAL REVIEW.

Generals at sea-to control it. Thus, the convoy system of escorts was not then recognised to be part of the general operations against the enemy's armed ships. Six weeks later and before Blake's success off Cartagena was known Captain Edward Hall was nominated to command a squadron for convoy service in the Mediterranean.'

On December 20th-joth, or about the time when Blake reached Cadiz on his way home, Penn left Falmouth with five ships having sailed2 from Spithead three weeks earlier and been detained by contrary winds. His instructions were to intercept the Brazil fleet at the Azores, and then to ploceed to Vigo on the coast of G a l i ~ i a . ~ H e reached those islands on January 17th-27th and was presently joined by three more ships. Three weeks later he learned that the Brazil fleet had passed. Where- upon he started in pursuit and on February ~1st-March 3rd met off Lisbon the Assurance, Captain Benjamin Blake, with information that despatches were awaiting him at Vigo. A week later he anchored off Cadiz, where he met Captain Hall with seven ships of war, escorting the Mediterranean convoy, and on March 12th-~2nd received the missing despatches-possibly dated two months earlier4-which instructed him to pursue Rupert. Since leaving Falmouth he had captured eleven prizes of which six were Dutch.

On March 29th-April Sth, 1651, Penn put to sea from Cadiz with eight ships in pursuit of Rupert, passed along the coast of Spain, through the Balearic Islands, called off Cagliari in Sardinia, and made Galita Island off the coast of Tunis on May I ~ t h - ~ 1 s t . H e proposed to pass thence east of Sardinia and to go off Toulon, but a week later abandoned that idea and decided to seek intelligence at Leghorn. Arriving there on May 25th- June 4th, he learned that Rupert had left Toulon with five ships on May 7th-17th, and was reported to havi: gone to the eastward. On May 27th-June 6th Penn left Leghorn and ten days later was off Trapani in Sicily. For nearly seven weeks he cruised in the waters between Sicily and Tunis. Not having any news of the chase, he then passed through Malta to Mes- sina, where, on July 29th-August Sth, he learned that Rupert had been capturing ships off Cadiz. Penn at once decided to leave Sicilian waters for Gibraltar, where he arrived on Sep- tember 9th-~gth, having called at Cagliari, Formentera and Alicante on his way. Six days later a captured 1,ubecker reported that Rupert had been at the Azores5

1 Dom. Cal., 466. 2 Penn I., 319. 3 Welbeck II., 70. 4 Dom. Cnl., p. 7. 5 Cf Nelson and Villeneuve in 1805

A STUDY OF WAR.-IV. I 1

In December Penn detached three ships to search the Azores, but remained himself, with five, in the Straits of Gibraltar until January, when he sailed with those ships for England, arriving in the Downs on April 1s t - r~ th , 1652. Since leaving England he had captured thirtv-six prizes, of which several were Dutch.

Through an error in judgment on his part, entirely pardon- able, Penn had failed to make contact. Probably the threat of his squadron, coupled with the King of Spain's refusal to allow the use of his ports in Spain, Italy, Sardinia and Sicily, had forced Rupert to leave the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Penn claimed that his presence in that sea had confined French ships of war in port and that he had captured six French merchant ships.l

Rupert's subsequent movements had little effect on the war. Early in 1652 he passed from the Azores to the Cape de Verdes, thence in the summer of that year to the West Indies, his force gradually withering away and finally disappearing on his arrival at Nantes in March, 1G53.

During the year 1651 the convoy system was well established, and the Royalist privateers were checked by the capture of their bases at the Scilly Islands, Jersey and Isle of Man, also by the Royalist defeat in Ireland and Scotland.

w h e n the year 1652 opened Rupert's force had been driven out of European waters by a superior concentration which was then no longer needed. The Royalist privateers had been neutralized by the convoy svstem and the capture of their bases. The Royalist-Commonwealth war was practically a t an end. Rut the war of reprisals between France and England continued, France and Spain were at war and the Barbary corsairs were active. Both Dutch and English merchant ships were sailing in convoys under armed escorts.

The second Civil War , 1649-51, illustrated the military watch on the principal enemy armed force at its port of departure with a view to bringing it to battle when opportunity offered, and the impossibility of watching all armed ships which threatened to stop the trade. Further, it supplied some explicit evidence of the difficulty of intercepting them on the high seas and im- plied it by introducing the convoy system which forestalled them at their destination, the merchant ship.

The recent German War, 1914-18, presented the same phenomena in principle although far different in details. Blake's watch off Lisbon had its counterpart in the Rritish watch in the Yorth Sea. The German detachments abroad at the outbreak of war consisted of ten effective ships of war and four armed merchant ships. The force opposed to them by the combined British, French, Japanese, Russian and Italian navies was so greatly superior that all were either destroyed or driven into port during

1 Penn's Journal.

I 2 NAVAL REVIEW.

the first seven months. Henceforth occasional surface ships got to sea and made a small number of captures. The submarines became the real danger, as they were found to be even more difficult to intercept in the British seas than the surface ships on the ocean. The convoy system was introduced and applied, as in the Civil War , quite early for Government transports and much later for merchant ships, that is to say, in May, 1917, when the shipping losses were a t the highest.l Its success was complete and was furthered by the introduction of new instruments to locate and new weapons to destroy submarines when submerged, and by the addition of aircraft to the armed escorts in Home waters. Its justification remains always the same.2 The armed escort is placed alongside the convoy, because the enemy armed force is most likely to be nlet there. It secures the convoy by destroying or neutralizing the enemy when he appears, that is, by battle or the threat of battle. This is the guiding principle for the escort commander. No fixed rules are admissible. The outstanding example is the battle of Portland on February 18th-28th, 165 1-2, . in which Martin 'Tromp with 70 ships of-war and a large convoy met the Generals a; sea- Blake, Deane and hilonck-with the same number. Leaving his convoy to windward, Tromp bore down and fought a delaying action. After inflicting much loss on the English and suffering some loss himself, he broke off the action, rejoined his convoy and continued his course up Channel, followed by the Generals at sea. The destruction of the Emden by the Sydney during the German W a r is another example. That ship, one of three escorting the Australasian convoy of military transports, was detached some fifty miles for the purpose. As a military aim secondary to the destruction of the enemy armed force, the overseas bases of supply were captured by the stronger navy in the German W a r as they were in the Civil War .

It is to be noted that all secondary military aims, whether to stop sea-borne trade or prevent it being stopped, or to capture oversea bases or territory, mean dispersion of force against which the primary aim to destroy the enemy armed ships is constantly re-acting to bring about concentration. Thus in the Civil W a r Rupert's squadron forced a Commonwealth concentration of twenty ships off 1,isbon during the summer of 1650 and seriously reduced the numbers available for other services, since the ships in commission at that time numbered about 72, of which 28 were armed merchant ships.3 Again, the small armed escort of the Civil W a r grew into the massed fleet of the first Dutch War . Also, in the German W a r Von Spee's concentration in the Pacific threatened at first the Entente

1 Cf 6 above. 2 '< The military reasons for convoy are believed to be as valid now as ever they

were." Naval Policy, p. 216. 1907. 3 Dom. Cal., 1649-50, p. 464.

A STUDY OF WAR.-IV. I 3

detachments in Australasian and Malayan waters, and later those on the coast of America and in the Atlantic. Each of those detachments had to be made strong enough to meet him. Cradock was not strong enough and was dest~oyed, but Von Spee himself presently suffered the same fate from a superior concentration.

It will be seen that the enemy resources are impaired in different ways, on land by overrunning territory and at sea by stopping trade and military transports and by capturing oversea bases. This does not mean that the military aim is different by land and sea. O n the contrary i t is the same, because the overrunning of territory, the stoppage of trade and military transports and the capture of oversea bases are means to a n end, that is, means to wealien the enemy armed forces and to prc- pare their destruction, which is the military aim. Furthermore, it does not follow that the overrun territory must be annexed, nor the trade stopped permanently, nor the captured bases retained, although such might be, and in the past often has been, the national object, a s the result of the achievement of the military aim. T o overrun territory is a military measure; to annex it is a political act.

T H E L A T E SIII. J U L I A N C O R B E T T .

SIR JULIAN CORBETT'S death is a very serious blow to naval history, and, as history is the raw material out of which a knowledge of the principles of strategy and tactics is built up, so the study of those arts will suffer.

Corbett's work began rather more than a quarter of a century ago with a small volume on Monk for the " Men of Action " Series in 1889. This he followed in 1890 by another on " Drake," a book which, under the spell cast by the Eliza- bethans, led him into a more extended study; in 1898 he produced his " Drake and the Tudor Navy." Before writing this he had read largely, both in civil history and military science, and, as he says in his preface, his object was to give a general view of the circumstances under which England became a controlling force in the European system by virtue of her power upon the sea. The book is a remarkable one, and quickly ran into a second edition-a tribute unusual to a work of so special- ised a character. The story is of peculiar interest to-day, for the changes in technique, the transition from galley warfare to sail warfare, and the shifting of the maritime balance of power, have their counterparts in the transition in the character of vessels that is taking place now. As the men of the sixteenth century found it hard to see where things would end, whether the galley would survive, so we as in glass darkly are trying to foresee whether the battle ship will do so. Corbett pointed dut rhat maritime warfare fallls into three periods, 'I' each sharply characterised by a generic difference in the ' capital ship '-as in the seventeenth century it was happily called- the ship, that is, which formed the backbone of a fighting fleet, and which had a place in the fighting line. The first period is that of the galley, beginning in prehistoric times and culminating in the year 1571, at the Battle of Lepanto; the second is that of the ' great ship ' or ' ship-of-the-line,' which was established in 1588 with the campaign of the Great Armada, and reached its highest development at Trafalgar; the third is that in which we now (1898) live, the period of the battleship." Following this, Corbett made the acute remark that these divisions not only lie within certain defined chronological limits, but are rooted in the essentials of sea warfare. " The essence of naval strategy is sea endurance, by which is meant the degree of a fleet's capability of keeping the sea." In that sentence he puts his finger upon the crucial problem of to-

THE LATE SIR JUL1.W CORBETT. I5

day. " It is the solution of this problem that is the eternal preoccupation of the naval art." Recent changes in material have affected the power of the ship to keep the sea-fuel, supplies, submarines,-and the solution of the problem introduced by the changed material is our preoccupation to#-day.

All this may seem obvious to us now. But it was not so obvious 25 years ago, and a writer who could so succinctly define the pivotal influences, and with such accuracy that the definition becomes applicable to conditions of which none at that time dreamt, is entitled to our admiration : and that admiration is surely heightened when we reflect that he was a landsman. Does not this fact lend countenance to the assers tion that a study of history assists one to unravel the problems of strategy ?

Corbett next turned his attention to the period following Drake, and in his " Successors of Drake " produced another volume of interest and importance. It is of peculiar interest, as we see in it the decline into which the navy and the naval art may fall. But it shows more. It makes clear that great lesson of the interdependence between navy and army. It illustrates the supreme importance of bases. It shows Spain, shattered by the Elizabethans but not robbed of all vitality, resurrecting her navy, and England, for want of an insight into the true nature of war, losing the command of the sea Drake had won for her. " The end of the war," he wrote, " saw Spain more powerful on the sea than when she began. W e had taught her the lesson of naval power, and she had learnt it according to her lights. W e had not learnt ours. It is doubtful whether we have learnt it yet. W e know what Nelson did at Trafalgar, and forget that its real importance was what it afterwards enabled Wellington to do."

. Very broadly, that sentence compresses the idea that ran through much of Corbett's theory of sea warfare. The value of sea power, he maintains a few lines lower on the same page, lies in its influence on the operations of armies. This idea he carried further in his next book, " England in the Mediter- ranean," in which he linked up the operations of the fleet up the Straits with Marlborough's armies in a masterly manner. This book is one deserving the most careful reading. The story of the events that led up to the campaign of 1704, and of the campaign itself, had never been told in a manner which expressed truly the strategy of William 111. and Marlborough.

Not only, however, does Corbett in this book impress the lesson of the liaison between army and navy; he brings out the realisation, that followed the entrance of the English Navy into the Mediterranean, of the strategic importance of the Straits of Gibraltar in war with France and Spain : and, what is more, reminds us that strategical truths concerning the importance of

I 6 NAVAL REVIEW.

certain commanding positions are not necessarily plain to men at the time. " Blake," he says, " had demonstrated the surpass- ing importance of Gibraltar and the inherent weakness of the French position. His action had brought naked to the surface the cardinal fact that the two seats of her naval energy were separated widely and by a narrow defile. It was clear that the prompt seizure or even the threat to seize this defile must place in English hands the initiative in any naval war with her old enemy." But this truth was not clearly recognised at once. " The great facts of strategy have always grown slowly to axio- matic solidity, rather by repeated example than sudden pre-

zcept." And this is a fact we do well to grasp; a iesson we do well to learn. Even a Cromwell or a Blake does not suddenly formulate in his mind a clear appreciation of a great strategic situation. The essence dawns upon him as the result of experience. It is more than probable that the problems of strategy that are obscure to us to-day will appear as clear as crystal to our successors; they will wonder why there should have been controversies on battleships, submarines and aircraft, and will be astonished that our policy delayed so long in trans- lating season into correct action. Books such as those of Corbett are stimulants : they prevent us from imagining that a knowledge of strategy is a concomitant of an extra stripe upon the sleeve, or of an extensive knowledge of ballistics or other applied sciences. They demonstrate no less the need for study, than the very gradual growth of knowledge that results from it ; and emphasize the catastrophies that result from the belief that there are short cuts to knowledge, or any other path than hard and sustained reading and thinking.

Corbett's next work of importance was his " England in the Seven Years' W a r " (1907). He had then been lecturer on History to the W a r College for some time, and, as he has often . said to the present writer, had derived great advantage from personal intercourse with a number of naval officers. Wi th his increased experience he was developing new ideas; and in his preface he wrote that the value of the war is high as an example of the strategical use of the fleet and the practice of amphibious operations. " For a right consideration of the war the army must be regarded primarily as forming an integral part of the maritime force with which it was carried on." A critique of the book in the Spectator said : " Mr. Corbett, so far as we lrnow, is the first to take a comprehensive view of the war, and to disentangle the harmonious purpose running through Eng- land's efforts. The importance of this broad method to the student of history or of strategy can hardlv be exaggerated; for nothing is so essential to an understanding of success or failure in war as the correlation of all the elements brought into play during a campaign. Too many naval and military his-

THE LATE SIR JULIAN CORBETT. I 7

torians are apt to forget that the Army and Navy are not the end of a nation's existence, but literally the ' services ' whereby she attains one of her ends. If Mr. Corbett had done nothing else in these volumes, his ample recognition of this truth would have entitled him to the gratitude of all men of affairs and historical students."

It was in this book that Corbett first formulated in writing his views of the function of the fleet. " The function of the fleet, the object for which it was always employed, has been threefold; firstly, to support or obstruct diplomatic effort; secondly, to protect or destroy commerce; and thirdly, to further or hinder military operations ashore.'' The command of the sea, he argued, is a means to an end : and this is constantly lost sight of in naval policy. " W e forget what hap- pended in the old wars; we blind ourselves by looking only on the dramatic moments of naval history ; we come unconsciously to assume that the defeat of the enemy's fleets solves all problems, and that we are always free and able to apply this apparently simple solution. Thus, until quite recent years, naval thought had tended to confine itself to the perfection of the weapon and to neglect the art of using it. Or, in other words, it had come to feel its sole concern was fighting, and had forgotten the art of making war."

S o Corbett wrote in 1907. The criticism was just, and even if all the views he expressed did not command the approval of many great authorities, there were few who disagreed that the art of making war had been neglected in the concentration upon producing more powerful instruments.

The book created a great impression, as the extract from the critique, quoted earlier, shows. It raised Corbett's position as a thinker. It received praise from all parts of the world. Three years later it was followed by his " Campaign of Trafal- gar," a masterly study which threw an entirely new light upon the operations which led up to the battle. This is not the occasion upon which to discuss the views he held upon the manner in which the battle was fought, to uphold or contest his opinions. It is, however, pertinent to say that he made men think more about the tactics of Trafalgar than they had thought before. His earlier books upon Fighting Instructions, produced by the Navy Records Society in 1905 and 1908, had paved the way for a study of the development of the tactical thought which culminated at Trafalgar. His books indeed furnish a great deal of the material for a history of tactics. Those on the Drake and post-Drake period give us the beginnings, the dis- cussions on Malaga and the Appendix in " England in the Vediterranean " afford the late 17th Century views, the Navy Records volumes trace the developments from Instructions, through Signals, to Trafalgar, and the " Campaign of Tra-

I 8 NAVAL REVIEW.

falgar " brings the record to its final point in sailing tactics. T h e only g a p of importance is in the Dutch Wars , and that is not a complete gap, for' the instructions, the short sketch of Monk, and the notes on the Dartmouth Drawings all deal with it.

During the period in which he was working a t the W a r College Corbett came into close touch with Lord Fisher, who invited his criticism on many of his schemes. Much correspondence passed between them; and Lord Fisher suggested to him that he should write a text book on Strategy. This proposal he adopted, but with diffidence, and wrote " Some Prin- ciples of Maritime Strategy."

It is interesting to read that book to-day. It was written in 191 I , by a layman, without any experience of war except such a s he had distilled from a study of the wars of the past, and from writings on war. I t would be remarkable if there were nothing in it from which any one dissented. But it will be found that the principles he enunciated were borne out in a remarkable degree in the late war. Speaking of co-ordination of naval and military effort, he said : " I t may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's territory or land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy fleets." W h a t the primary object for us islanders, was not, in Corbett's philosophy of war, a thing to be defined with the same inflexibility a s it can be defined in continental warfare; it is instructive to consider that opinion in relation to the strategical situation in those early days of 1914 when the Expeditionary Force was hastening to reach the battlefields in Flanders.

In his Principles, Corbett made the first clear written definition of the functions of the several elements of a fleet. Postulating that the object of naval warfare is to control communications (which is not the same thing a s the primary military object of a fleet in war) he said that " the fundamental re- quirement is the means of exercising that control." Battleships alone cannot exercise control ; specialisation has rendered them unfit, and too costly ever t o be numerous enough. Numbers are needed for this etercise, and those numbers are furnished by what we now call " cruisers." Which brought him to the conclusion : " On cruisers depends our exercise of control : on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. . . . . T h e true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. T h e doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces a s the paramount object here reasserts itself, and

T H E LATE SIR JULIAN CORBETT. '9

reasserts itself so strongly as to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the command depends on the battle-fleet."

It has been said that Corbett's doctrine of war placed the destruction of the enemy forces in the background. The above quotation shows that the doctrine of destroying the enemy was by no means absent from his mind. The difficulty that history showed so frequently to exist was that of inequality in the opposing fleets. The following deduction is an accurate fore- cast of the policy adopted by the High Seas Fleet.

" The normal condition is that if we desire a decision it is because we have definite hopes of success, and consequently the enemy will probably seek to avoid m e on our terms. In practice this means that if we have perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his main fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more favourable opportunity. And what will be the result ? He remains on the defensive, and theoretically all the ensuing period of inaction tends to fall into his scale. Without stirring from port his fleet is doing its work. The more closely he induces us to concentrate our cruiser1 force in face of his battle-fleet the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids." With the exception that the enemy could not free the sea for the circulation of his own trade, except in the Baltic, this is a picture of what happened three years later.

This book on strategy illustrates the value of a study of history. Its writer, as we have remarked before, was not a seaman, had no technical knowledge or experience : yet by study of the history of war rendered himself capable of formulating views on, and forecasting events in, war and strategy. This is a remarkable tribute to history as a study for officers. There is, of course, nothing new in this fact, nothing that has not been known to every great commander and thinker. What it does is merely to confirm their views. Count Schlieffen, the designer of the German war plan, wrote, many years ago : " Before every one who wishes to become a Commander-in-Chief there lies a book entitled ' The History of War. ' It is not always, I must admit, very amusing. It involves the toiling through a mass of by no means exciting details. But by their means we arrive at facts, often soul-stirring facts, and at the root of it lies the perception of how everything has happened, how it was bound to happen, and how it will happen again."

It is to this perception that Corbett's studies led him, and to this that the fruit of his studies leads those who read them intelligently. And his works have the advantage of bellng eminently readable ; the reproach, levelled by Von Schlieffen,

1 The word " cruiser " can justifiably be extended to those vessels of the flotilla engaged upon the defence of trade and communications.

2 0 NAV.4L REVIEW.

that the History of W a r " is not always very amusing" is mitigated in the case of Corbett's books. " Amusing," perhaps, in its common connotation, is not a quality one seeks in History, except for those to whom the unravelling of a complicated tangle of situations is an amusement-as fortunately it is to some people. This amusement Corbett's books freely afford ; and they do so largely because they furnish what naval histories hitherto have not furnished-sufficient material upon which to form a judgment. W e are shown the situations as a whole-not the mere minor strategical situations at sea. Diplomacy, armies, navies, commerce, neutrals, allies, all pull their respective strings, and we see how many interests there: are in war tending to deflect the course of operations from the straight line of the theoretically best. War , he was fond of saying, is never conducted upon a clean slate. Maxims admirable in themselves, are generally very difficult to put into operation in their perfection in practice. If it is to the advantage of one combatant to concentrate at the vital point, it is not im- probable that it will be to the advantage of his enemy to bring about dispersion ; and that he will take measures that will force dispersion on the would-be concentrator. I t is easy to say that the concentration of force should be proceeded with, and that no deflection from " the true course " of strategy should be made. But concentration may become over-concentration, as Kempenfelt once pointed out. This characteristic of refusing to be hag-ridden by phrases was characteristic of Corbett's analytical mind. While recognising to the full the truth of those generalisations into which the principles of war are, for convenience, compressed, he always urged that they needed intelligent translation : and the more one studies history the more fully does one appreciate the danger, to which in several places he alludes, of accepting at6 pied d e la lettre these aphorisms, interpreting them blindly. Criticism of a commander based solely on the purely theoretical and academic charge that he vio- lated such and such a principle of war-and such criticisms are, as all readers of history know well, only too common-was nauseous to him. typical expression of his views occurs in his remarks on the doctrine of concentration of eff0rt.l " It is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main purpose. W e have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion, no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. So vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount consideration. Even in the best days of our Dutch Wars, when the whole plan was

1 '[Some principles of Maritime Strategy," page 162.

THE LATE SIR JULIAN CORBETT. 2 1

based on ignoring the enemy's commerce a s our objective, we found ourselves a t times forced to protect our own trade with seriously disturbing results." In these sentences he sets doctrine above dogma, illustrates his opinion from experience, and foretells accurately what was to happen in the troubled times of the late war.

Besides writing the series of histories to which allusio? has been made, Corbett edited important works for the Navy R e - cords Society-works involving much difficult research, needing great knowledge and scholarship for their production. T h e volumes of " Fighting Instructions " and " Signals and In- structions " afforded the first insight we have had into the development of tactics, and threw a new light upon the " Fight- ing Instructions." These books deserve the closest study by students of tactics. Much that was not understood before their appearance was rendered plain, and much inaccurate condemn- ation of Instructions, based upon ignorance, was dispelled. Not the least valuable parts of the work are the admirable comments with which Corbett introduced each phase of development in that interesting story of the growth of tactical ideas.

Corbett's work was very fully appreciated by foreign students. I-Iis book on strategy was applauded, even thouqn all his views were not accepted to the full. T h e " Rivista Marittima" considered that it approached the subject of strategy from a higher standpoint than Mahan's " Naval Strat-gy," treating the problen~s from a broader and less national point of view. H i s history of the late war, so far a s it has been reviewed in foreign periodicals, has received high praise both from our late enemies and allies. Captain Chack, in the " Revue Mari- time " for November, writes that " T h e profound regret that his loss causes affects not only the British Navy, of which he was the great historian. All, throughout the whole world, who interest themselves in historical research in general and maritime research in particular will be sorrowfully affected by the disappearance of this great annalist." Those British naval officers who have read his works, and still more those who have been privileged to know him personally, will recognise how much he did for the advancement of the study of war, how greatly he added to the linowledge of our countrymen of what the Navy means to the nation, and how great is the loss of this great exponent of its history.

O U T L I N E S O F HISTORY.-V. T R A D E ROUTES.-PART 3.

By c.4pT-41~ W. H. C. S. THRING, C.B.E., E .N

IN the 16th century England began, for the first time, to take an important part in the maritime commerce of the world. I propose to turn now from the general history of the trade routes to an examination of the factors which led to the acquisition by English sailors of that supremacy at sea which passed in succession from the Cretans to the Phcenicians, the Carthaginians, the sailors employed by Rome, the Saracens, the Venetians and other Italian states, the Turks, Portuguese, Spaniards and Dutch. W e may justly claim to be heirs to this high estate.

In the first stage of the growth of English seafaring, which lasted until the end of the Wars of the Roses, small individual efforts gradually evolved the Guild system. The conditions of the times did not make for large combined developments of foreign commerce. Before the close of this period the Govern- ment had begun to interest itself in the commerce of the country and a sturdy race of seamen existed, ready to take advantage of the opportunities which were soon to come. The increase in shipping may be judged from the facts that in 1400 English merchandise was for the most part carried in foreign ships, but bv 1500 more than half the cloth and three-quarters of other wares were carried in English ships.

In the Wars of the Roses the feudal system in England exhausted itself, and for purposes of war it came to an end. *4fter that time rulers had to pay their armies; wealthy merchants and bankers, from whom the king had to borrow money to pay his troops, were able to control to a large extent the policy of the country, for they became strong enough to refuse to supply funds if the conditions they required were not accepted. Thus the long series of land u7ars waged for com- mercially unimportant issues, in which the country had been almost continually engaged, came to an end.

The Tudors had the genius to realise the new conditions under which a king should rule ; they saw that their own welfare must depend on that of the people, and that warlike adventure without regard for commerce was ruinous both for the monarch and for his subjects. Their policy, initiated by Henry VII. and fully developed in the reign of Elizabeth, quiclily carried England to the front rank of maritime powers.

OUTLINES OF HISTORY .-V. 23

Reduced to its simplest terms, this policy was to spend no money outside the country but to sell to the foreigner and so get his money. T h e country must be self-supporting and supply all wants. In France and Holland a similar policy ruled, but England also believed in shipping as a source of profit, and most careful laws and regulations were adopted to encourage English seafarers to carry all English goods and also to carry for foreigners, for in this way foreign money could be earned by English labour.

As the colonies and plantations developed their raw material was brought to England to be manufactured. The colonies were not allowed to manufacture for themselves but had to buy all their made goods from England; these and the colonial raw material might only be carried in English ships.

The reign of Henry VII., who invaded England in 1485, and who, after the defeat and death of Richard 111. at Bosworth Field, was crowned King of England, covered that amazing period in the world's history during which the Spaniards finally conquered the Moors in Spain, Columbus discovered the West Indies (and believed he had got to China), Vasco da Gama rounded South Africa and opened the sea route to the East, and Tohn Cabot set foot in North America. In this reign, too, printing became common, opening the way for the spread of knowledge.

Henry VII. may have been a miser but he certainly was a very able man ; his acts show that he understood the foundations on which prosperity could be built. When he came to the throne the navy was dead. He at once arranged for the building in England of ships which would be at least equal to those built anywhere. His ships were the first to be fitted with port- holes for heavy guns and were the true forerunners of the wooden walls of later days.

The key to the history of the 16th century is to be found in the change of trade routes brought about by the discovery of the sea route to the East. The Venetians, the Hansa League and the merchants of South Germany sought by every means to preserve their old supremacy. Their commerce was being destroyed by the Turks, the Dutch and the English. They soon obtained a grip on Spanish finances for they supplied Spain with war stores, manufactured goods, and naval stores from the Baltic. Soon they began to work the Spanish silver mines in South America. They do not appear to have talten active steps against Portugal, who refused to give them the monopoly of the on-carriage of eastern goods from Lisbon, probably because they hoped to get the control of this trade through Spaitt.

24 NAVAL REVIEW.

The German financiers had two powerful weapons, their financial grip on Spain and religious animositics. Both of these they used. They first moved against the Turks, their efforts culminating in the illusive victory of Lepanto. Then they moved against the Dutch and English, but the Armada disaster ended all chance of success.

England fought Spain in the 16th century, the Dutch in the 17th and the French in the 18th, emerging the sea carriers for the world. Under the Tudors England had developed into a nation with definite aims which were shared by her rulers; in this England was ahead of her rivals. The French suffered from oppression, monarchial wars and revolution ; they did not shake off the personal rule of their monarchs until 1789, ,xnd then went to such excesses that they destroyed the best elements in the nation. Italy and Germany were divided; the Dutch suffered from corruption ; Spain was torn by the Inquisition and by expelling the Jews and Moors lost their workers. The Jews1 formed the mercantile class in Spain and the Moors were the agricultural workers ; the Spaniards themselves never succeeded in filling the vacant places. England's insular position gave her protection, she had a comparatively good political constitution and her merchants developed trade on broad lines.

The English system of trade, begun under Henry VII., was continued in its general principles throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, until England was established as mistress of the seas and her commanding position made it unnecessary to maintain the old restrictions, which the vast increase in British manufactures brought about by the industrial revolution at the end of the 18th century, made irksome.

'

In order to make clearer the working of the English trade system I propose to quote from " The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Con;sidered," by Joshua Gee, London, 1731, 3rd Edition, a book which gives a clear picture of the conditions of that time. Mr. Gee surveys the history of commerce and the trade of each nation ; he gives also his views on the policy which England should pursue to further her own interests. His statements are borne out by other authorities.

He tells us that the trade and navigation of England was much the same from the time of William the Conquerer until the days of Queen Elizabeth, and consisted in the export of raw materials, chiefly tin, lead, wool, some leather and iron, in sufficient quantities to purchase such foreign commodities as were wanted. Edward 111. was the first prince to take any notice of trade; by prohibiting the export of wool in 1338 he encouraged

1 These "Jews " were probably, like the commercial Jews of other parts of Europe, descendants of Phcenician and Carthaginian colonists who had adopted the Jewish religion, and had become known as Jews in order to escape frclm persecution by the Romans.

OUT1,INES OF HISTORY .-V. 25

the home manufacture and supplied a home market by enacting that no subject should wear any foreign cloth. Under Queen Elizabeth many and great advantages were added to trade. The East India Company opened the trade with the East; by treaty with the Duke of Muscovy the Archangel trade was developed; and plantations in America gradually supplied sugar and tobacco, not only for England but in sufficient quantities to supplant the Portuguese in the supply to the north of Europe. King Charles I. permitted the French to fish from Newfound- land.; Charles 11. and James were fond of French commodities, to the detriment of English manufacturers. Queen Mary and William established the manufacture of glass, silk, straw hats, . paper and linen, all of which had previously come from France. In their time also copper and brass manufactures were begun as well as sail cloth, sword blades, scissors and toys of steel; salt works were opened, and so many of the imports of France were decreased.

Reduced to its simplest form, Mr. Gee takes the amount of bullion received from abroad as the gain in trade, the " Balance in Favour." A country should produce or import raw materials, manufacture them, and sell the balance not required in the country abroad. The import of luxuries which must be paid for by exports or by bullion is a loss, the import of necessities which must be paid for by exports is an equality system and no gain. When foreign countries pay for work done-as for produce or for manufactured goods, or for goods sold to them at a higher price than that at which they were bought-then there is a balance in favour. H e very definitely laps down that " the merchant . . . . may get a great deal of riches by 'importing foreign commodities for luxury and excess, when at the same time the nation is consuming its substance and running into poverty."

Of all shipping enterprises the slave trade and the timber trade between America and Portugal seem to have been the most profitable. England was still drawing her supply of timber from the Baltic, a deplorable arrangement when it could be equally cheaply and well supplied from the Plantations and carried in British ships.

Trade with Portugal, Spain and the Plantations showed a balance in our favour, whilst that with France, Holland, Russia, Germany, Denmark and Sweden was against us. It is interesting to look more closely into the reasons for this.

Trade with France. " France, above all other nations, is the worst for England

to trade with, it wants . . . . verv little either for luxurp or convenience . . . . political and frugal measures must make her the richest nation in Europe."

26 NAVAL REVIEW.

Mr. Gee quotes some remarks of M. Colbert at a debate at which Louis XIV. was present. He said : " The most speedy way of increasing the riches of the kingdom was the finding out of manufactures for employing the poor and setting idle neople to work. That as flax, silk and wool were the most useful we should as much as possible produce those commodities in the country. As manufactures came to be made, and worn at the Court, the English nation would fall into the habit of wearing them . . . ." Accordingly, this task was undertaken; the French King himself would wear nothing but what was made in France.

The East India Company imported most of the muslins to Europe, where they became very popular, particularly in France. The French King grew uneasy and by four edicts, issued from 1709 to 1714, he at last brought the people to wear cambrics.

After the peace (1713) nothing would satisfy the English but to follow French fashions, muslins were thrust out of wear and expensive French lawns and cambrics came into general use.

The Spaniards wore sober dress and bought English cloth until the Bourbon prince came to the throne. He introduced French fashions and the nation followed until the balance of trade was turned against England.

Smuggling from France to England was great and was encouraged by the French King. Mr. Gee suggests that rum, which could be bought cheaply from the British West Indies, ought to take the place of French brandy.

Flanders and Germany. Mr. Gee considered that the imports from Flanders were

perhaps five times as valuable as our exports to that country. From Germany we imported vast quantities of linen; they

took tobacco and sugar from us but had established their own manufactures, so that the balance of trade was against us.

Sweden. Two-thirds of the iron ore used in England came from Swe-

den, besides copper, wood, etc., and they took but small quantities of our exports. In 1703 Sweden absolutely refused to let us have pitch and tar except in their own vessels and at their own price. The Government therefore encouraged production in the Plantations, " and we now (1731) get enough thence."

Russia. From Russia we imported hemp, flax, linen cloth and Yarn,

leather, tallow, furs, iron, potash, etc., to an immense value. Having no other market from which we could buy hemp in qu;intities, we had to pay any price they asked.

OUTLINES OF HISTORY .-V. 27

From this summary it would seem that our commerce was in a bad way, but on the whole we were gaining, as there were some sources of great profit. Of these Mr. Gee finds Ireland to be one of the most important. T o Ireland we exported almost all the manufactured goods that were used there except some coarse linens and coarse woollen cloth. From Ireland we took woollen yarn, linen yarn and great quantities of wool in the fleece, all for manufacture in England. " But what makes Ireland so very profitable to England is that it is thought that near one-third part of the Rents of the Whole belong to English Noblemen and Gentlemen that dwell here, besides the very large sums that are spent for the Education of their youth by the great number of Nobility and Gentry who resort to the English Court. . . . . There may be added to these the Sums of Money that are paid to Persons that have Places and Pensions out of the Irish revenues. . . . . They have an extraordinary Trade for their Hides, Tallow, Reef, Butter, etc., to Hol- land, Flanders, France, Portugal and Spain, which enables them to make large remittances to keep their balance with us."

The Plantations. " Compare how this nation has increased in riches in I jo

years. London then made a small figure compared with Bruges, Antwerp, and other Hansa towns, as well as the great cities of the Mediterranean.

" Not one-quarter of the productions of the Plantations re- dounds to their own profit. The remainder comes to England where they sell their goods, buy their requirements, educate their children and spend their money when they return. AIso the interest on mortgages on the planter's estates is paid to England."

New England gave poor opportunities for agriculture compared with the rich southern Plantations, but it proved one of the most valuable possessions nevertheless. Numbers of ships were built in New England and sold in the Mediterranean. The timber trade to Portugal led 'to a great increase in British shipping " by means of which we have crept into all the corners of Europe and become the carriers of the Mediterranean as well as between the Mediterranean, Holland, Hamburg and the Bal- tic . . . . and this is the reason why the Dutch have so exceedingly sunk."

A picture is given of how this commerce grew. Young Englishmen bought cargoes of goods and took them to New England, where they sold at a profit which they invested in the construction of ships; in these they sailed to Portugal with a cargo of lumber, or took it to the Mediterranean. After dis- posing of their cargo, again a t a profit, they plied from port to port in the Mediterranean until they got good offers for their

28 NAVAL REVIEW.

ships which they then sold and, returning to England, did the same thing again. " By this means multitudes of seamen are brought up " evidently to the great advantage of England.

The Plantations thus benefited the mother country in many ways. The slave trade to them was profitable, they supplied more tobacco and sugar than was wanted in England and the surplus was sold in Europe; they formed profitable markets for English manufactured goods and most of their money came to England. Above all, they greatly increased the volume of commerce carried in British ships.

Of the East India trade Mr. Gee says : " W e send great quantities of bullion there and purchase at very low prices the products of India and China which are brought home in our navigation, out of which we supply ourselves with muslins, calicoes and other cotton cloths, as also coffee, tea and raw silk, and, it is supposed, sell to foreigners as much of the said commodities as repay for all the bullion shipped out and leave us besides a very considerable balance upon that trade." H e thinks the Company should issue licences to private merchants to trade to China, particularly to the northern ports, as the China trade might be greatly increased and silk, etc., bought nearer to the provinces which produce the raw materials. Licences of this sort had already been issued for the coasting trade of India.

Mr. Gee considered that the great increase of our treasure proceeds " chiefly from the labour of negroes in the Planta- tions," that, in fact, our wealth, like that of Greece and other early powers, was founded on slave labour; he considered that our commerce, manufactures and shipping were lesser adjuncts. H e therefore devotes his suggestions to means whereby the Plantations may be developed to supply all the raw materials which could be manufactured in England, slave labour being used in the production ; to the improvement of industrial conditions, and to the winning of markets. Holland, like the Hansa towns and Phcenicia of old, was thriving on commerce alone, France was advancing to wealth on her agriculture and indus- tries; as yet the revolution in industry, which the introduction of machinery was to bring about, was not in sight; the days when England was to combine the commercial qualities which had given power to the Dutch with the industrial system which was the backbone of France, to add to them a great colonial empire all depending on sea communications, and to rise to greater power than either of her rivals, could not be foreseen at that time.

This glimpse of British commerce of the period when the great struggles against powerful rivals were far from ended,

OUTLINES OF HISTORY.-V. 29

and when success was still doubtful, may help the reader to a clearer understanding of the wars with which the 16 th~ 17th and 18th centuries were filled. Economical influences pIayed a greater part both in causing wars and in bringing success or failure, than is sometimes realised. On the othel nand, the results of wars greatly affected commerce. Of this I have not attempted to deal in this article, not because 1 do not realise its importance, but because the wars and their results are so much better known than the economical side of the history. In the Seven Years' W a r the Navy most completely fulfilled its rBle from a commercial point of view. I t drew but little on the man power and the factories of the country, yet it formed a shield behind which commerce and industry could continue un- abated, whilst it drove our greatest rivals from the more important sea routes.

CONDUCT OF T H E C H A N N E L FLEE?' IN 1779 AGAINST SUPERIOR FORCE.

DURING the critical years of the W a r of American Independence the Fleets of France and Spain in European waters were greatly superior in number to that of Great Britain. In face of these superior forces the British Chann,el Fleet had to protect the United Kingdom against invasion, and also to safeguard the arrival and departure of the great convoys which maintained our communications with the outer world and with our forces in America, at Gibraltar, and in the East and West Indies.

Our fleets on foreign stations were maintained at a bare equality with those of France; this left us with a fleet in the Channel of about thirty-five sail of the line, confronting a French fleet of about thirty at Brest, and a Spanish fleet of about thirty-six at Cadiz.

Three times the Combined Fleet of France and Spain appeared in the Channel with a superiority of about two to one. On each occasioil it failed to achieve any material result, either against the British Fleet, or against the convoys whose movements the latter covered.

Three times the British Fleet succeeded in throwing supplies into Gibraltar in face of the superior fleet blockading it.

The paper which follows deals with the first and most dangerous of the three incursions of the Combined Fleet into the Channel, that of 1779. Its object is to show how the existence of a hostile fleet which retains its freedom of action and striking power, even if greatly inferior in number and handled with the utmost caution, may cause the breakdown of a deliberately planned operation.

Incidentally, the quotations given from the letters of Kempenfelt, the Captain of the Fleet, to Sir Charles Middleton,'

1 bIiddl,eton was Co,ntro:l'er. till 1795, and later, as Lord Barham, First Lord during the Trafalgar Campaign. Bes,ides this connfection with th'e later war it is not likely that Kernpenfelt's opinions were also those of Howe.

NOTE :-Authorities used.--Barhlam papers, Val. I. Colomb's Naval War- fare, ch. viii Laird Clowes' History of the Royal Navy, ch. xxi., by Mahan. Histoire de la Marin~e Fraslca,isse, Chevalier. Journal of Sir Charl,es Hardy, amnd I n and Out Le:~,ers, Record Ofice. Barrow's Li fe of Howme.

Ha'rdy's journal gives ma more than the b~ald facts, and csompar,es very unfavonrably with that of Jerxris. The volunt,e,er referr,ed to in Section I was Sir Benjamin TIiompslon, Count Von Rumford: an experimenter in gunpowder (see Dictionary of Ziationnl Biography). The writ,er saw sNomme rather scurrilo,ns 1,etters of his from the Victory several years a g o ; the extract giv,en is one of the only notes he mad'e. As f a r as he knomws tbey harme n.ever be,en published.

CONDUCT OF THE CHANNEL FLEET I N 1779. 3'

then Controller of the Navy, indicate the influence of the events of 1779 on the naval adopted during the Napoleonic Wars.

On March 18111, 1779, Admiral the Hon. Augustus Keppel, Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, struck his flag and came on shore, in protest against his treatment by the Admiralty. The majority of the flag officers on the active list supported his action, and declined to serve. Lord Howe, for example, said in the House of Coinmons that " it would not be prudent to trust the little reputation he had earned by forty years service, his personal honour, and everything else, which he held dear, in the hands of nlen who had neither the ability to act on their own judgment, nor the integrity and good sense to follow the advice of others, who might know more of the matter " (Barrow, P- '24).

In consequence, the command was given to Admiral Sir Charles Hardy, the Governor of Greenwich Hospital. His last sea service had been as second in command to Hawlte, 20

years before. He was 63, and old for his age ; he had, in fact, but I4 months to llve. His feelings towards the Government seem to have differed only in degree from those of his brother officers, for it was written of him by one who served in his flagship as a volunteer1 and he " evidently meant to take as small a share of responsibility upon himself as possible, to procrastinate as long as he could, and when he was obliged to act, to make ministers responsible for the consequences if he failed."

His First Captain was Richard Kempenfelt. Though 16 years junior to his Admiral he was only two years younger ;%ut he was still at the height of his powers, and, next to Lord Howe, he was probably the most capable and clear-headed officer of his day.

Under these circumstances the impatience of the criticisms upon Sir Charles Hardy in Kempenfelt's letters to Sir Charles Middleton is not difficult to understand. Though nothing can excuse his private comments, there is no reason to doubt his public loyalty to his Admiral, or to suspect that they were on bad terms with one another. In fact Kempenfelt himself declares : " I have not, nor never had, any variance with him (Sir Charles Hardy); he is good-natured, honest, has many private virtues which I esteem him for; but as an officer, you know my opinion " (Barham Papers, I . 298).

1 Count von Rumford.

2 I t was probably lack of influence, due to his Swedish ancestry, which prevented Kempenfelt from becoming ,a Captain at the early age then common.

Hardy. Born 1716, Post Captain 1741, Rear Admiral 1756. Howe. Barn 1726, Post Captain 1746, Rear Admiral 1770. Kcm,penftlt. Born 1718, Post C~aptain 1757, Rear Admiral 1780.

32 NAVAL REVIEW.

Such was the state of affairs in the British Fleet. The character of the Ccinmandei-in-Chief, and the general bitter- ness both against Sandwich, the First Lord, and against the corrupt administration of Lord North, intensified by the recent court martial upon Keppel, were alike unfavourable to anything but a policy of caution.

11. On April ~ z t h , 1779, about three weeks after Hardy had

hoisted his flag in the Victory, Spain made a secret alliance with France, and the British Fleet lost the bare superiority in numbers it had hitherto possessed.

The plan agreed upon between France and Spain was to send a Combined Fleet to seize the roadstead of St. Helen's, and from that point of vantage to land a force of fifty thousand men in England. The fleets were to assemble off Cizarga Island, 20 miles west oi Corunna, and proceed to St. Helen's. The troops were to e~nbark at Havre and St. Malo, and occupy the Isle of Wight as a base for further operations on the main- land.

In order to forestall the appearance Af a British Fleet off Ushant, the French Fleet under d'orvilliers was hurried to sea from Brest on June 4th. On June I ~ t h it reached the rendezvous at Cizarga Island. Here, however, d'orvilliers had to wait six weeks for the Spaniards, due it is said to Spanish pride being hurt at serving under a French Coininander-in-Chief. Whatever the reason, the delay was disastrous to the Allied plan of campaign, for the French Fleet had gone to sea ill-prepared for a long cruise, and at the critical moment its ships were short of victuals and water, and many of its men were down with smallpox and scurvy.

111. On June 16th Sir Charles Hardy left St. Ilelen's with about

thirty sail of the line to take up the watch upon the French Fleet in Brest. H e had orders to return to the Lizard if the French Fleet escaped and his intelligence was not certain enough to enabie him to follow it ; he was to regard the protection of Great Brltain and Ireland as his principal object.

On the same day Great Britain declared war on Spain, and warning was sent to Hardy that the Spanish Fleet was said to be preparing for sea, with directions that if he got certain intelligence that the French and Spanish Fleets had joined and considered them too strong to fight, he was to return to Torbay or Spithead and await orders.

On June zznd, shortly after reaching Ushant, Hardy got news froill a ship he spoke, that the French Fleet had sailed 18 days before; on the zjth, lacking further intelligence, he returned to the Lizard.

CONDUCT OF THE CHANNEL FLEET I N 1779. 33

On July and, \vhen off the Lizard, Hardy got intelligence from a Genoese ship that she had seen a French Fleet off Finis- terre on June 10th. This was the day before d'Orvilliers reached his rendezvous off Cizarga Island.

" My situation is extremely disagreeable," wrote ICempenfelt to Middleton (Hnrham Papers, I .292) ; " 1 would give all the little I am worth to be out of it. Does the people at home think the nation in no danger? Where is Lord Howe at this alarming pcriod? I can't say more, you'll divine the rest. I can foresee no prospect at present.

" All seems to depend on the abilities with which this Fleet is conducted ; let that be well considered."

On receiving Hardy's dispatch of the 2 jth, the Admiralty wrote to him that he was not to return into port unless absolutely necessary. On July 3rd, however, a westerly gale got up, which drove the Channel Fleet into Torbay, where it anchored on' the 6th. Water was already short, and the ships were ordered to complete with all despatch.

On July 8th the Admiralty instructed Hardy to carry out his original orders, and to keep so far to the westward as to prevent the fleet being driven into port again.

Hardy left Torbay on the 14th and reached Ushant on the ~ 1 s t . Here he got intelligence from ships he spoke, that the Spanish ships from C'orunna had joined d'Orvilliers, and that the Cadiz Fleer was at sea. Hardy accordingly returned towards the Lizard, but in consequence of westerly winds made Plymouth instead, where he awaited further orders.

On the 28th the Admiralty repeated their orders of the Sth, and on the 29th issued the following revised instructions.

The enemy were believed to intend the invasion of England, and an attack upon the Leeward Islands and East India convoys, shortly expected in the Channel. Hardy was to proceed as far to the westward as he judged necessary, and to make the best use possible of the ships at his disposal to prevent the enemy carrying his designs into execution ; and not to leave his station while his provisions and water would allow him to keep the sea. The choice of position was left to I-Iardy. In acknowledging these orders Hardy proposed to cruise from 10 to 2 0 leagues 1V.S.W. of Scilly, as being the best station for meeting the incoming trade, and the enemy " if t h e y at tempt to come into the Channel." The words in italics, underlined by Hardy, suggest that he still did not expect them to appear. The Leeward Islands convoy was sighted on July 3oth, and seen up Channel in safety, and on August st, a convoy from Cork, but there was still no news of the enemy.

W e have three letters written by Kempenfelt to Middleton during this anxious time. The first gives Kempenfelt's own plan for dealing with the enemy, a plan he has able to execute

34 NAVAL REVIEW.

himself in 1781 ; the other two express his view of Hardy (Barham Papers, I .292-294).

. July 27th.-" Much, I may say almost all, depends upon this fleet ; 'tis an inferior against a superior fleet; therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or, if such opportunities don't offer, to be ever near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting to execute anything but at risk and hazard; to comnla~ld their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing LUL being on guard against your attack.

" Have the rilinistry sought for a head capable of such management and dexterity, or do they think that ships are sufficient of ~heniselves, without wisdom to direct or order their operations? S o much indifference at so dangerous a crisis is astonishing and alarming. Adieu, the cutter is going."

August 6th.-" I have scarce time to write to you; a perpetual hurry prevails here, which, from the natural consequence of hurry, produces nothing to the purpose.

" In confidence, I must inform you the confused conduct here is such that I tremble for the event. There is no forethought, therefore n o eveats provided against; we are every day, from morning till night, plagued and puzzled in minutiae, whilst essentials are totally neglected. An odd obstinacy and wa of r negativing everything proposed, makes all advice use ess. There is a fund of good-nature in the man, but not one grain of the Commander-in-Chief ."

August 9th.-" . . . . It is with the greatest difficulty I can ever prevail upon hinl to rnanceuvre the Fleet; he is always (so) impatient and in (such) a hurry to get to the westward, to the northward, or the southward, that he won't lose time to form a line."

Thus did the state of affairs strike Kernpenfelt. The event showed that he had correctly estimated the effect of the British Fleet upon the mind of the enemy. Hardy may have been as impatient and inaccessible to advice as Kernpenfelt saw him, but none the less his cautious policy succeeded.

IV. The Spanish division from Ferrol joined d'orvilliers on

July znd, t h e e weeks after the latter had reached the rendezvous; three weeks later, on July 23rd, the main body under Cordova arrived from Cadiz. There was more delay while the French signal boolts were translated and distributed to the Spanish ships, and it was not until August 7th that the Com- bined Fleet made Ushant. Here d'orvilliers had hoped to fill up his depleted ships with provisions, but he only got a small supply.

C O N D U C T O F T H E C H A N N E L F L E E T IN 1779. 35

Writing to the n'Iinister of Marine on August znd, d'orviliiers had stated his intentions as follows (Chevalier, p. 165) :- .

" W e shall search for the enemy along the coast as far as St. Helen's Road, and then, if I find the roads empty, or am able to take possession of them, I shall send word to M. de Vaux at Havre, in accordance with your instructions, and inform llini what steps I shall take to ensure the safety of his passage, which will depend on the main force of the English Fleet; that is to say, I shall dispose, on the one hand, the Combined Fleet to contain the enemy, and I shall detach, on the other, a light squadron and a sufficient force of ships of the line and frigates, or I shall propose to M. de Cordova to carry out that duty, in order that the army may have a clear and safe passage.

" I anticipate that then, either by the battle i shall force upon the enemy, or by his retreat into harbour, I shall be certain of his situation and of the success of the operation."

Before proceeding with this plan d'orvilliers proposed to anchor in Torbay and take in the provisions he had demanded from Brest. On August 14t11, the Combined Fleet reached the Lizard, and on the I jth, the Eddystone, without encountering a single British vessel. French frigates anchored in Cawsand . Bay and captured several privateers and coasting vessels.

On August 16th the Ardent, 64, coming out of Torbay to join the Channel Fleet, mistook the Combined Fleet for her own, steered to close it and was captured. The Marlborough, coming from Spithead, avoided capture, and carried the first news of the Combined Fleet's appearance to the British Fleet. X sloop she had in company took the same news to Plymouth.

On the same day, August 16th, d'orvilliers received new orders from the Minlster of Marine. H e was now to blockade the English Flee: in Plymouth, and detach two divisions, one to St. Malo, and the other to Havre, to escort the transports to a point on the Cornish Coast, near Falmouth, where the landing was to be made. D'Orvilliers replied that a sheltered anchorage was absolutely necessary for his fleet to receive provisions and ride out the autumn gales, and that Falmouth was too dangerous a roadstead. Meanwhile, he continued his passage towards Torbay.

The wind had now shifted to the eastward, and the Com- bined Fleet had to beat up Channel against it. By the 17th the fleet had worked up as far as Torbay, but the east wind was increasing to such an extent as to make tile anchorage unsafe. The wind continued fresh from the east for several days and drove the Combined Fleet down Channel.

On August zznd, the Spanish ships transferred some of their provisions and water to the French ships most short of them.

36 NAVAL IIEVIEW.

This step completed the victuals of the Combined Fleet as a whole up till September 30th.

Hardy was now over ~ o o miles to leeward. The easterly gale put it out of his power to interfere directly with the Allied operations, but as long as ~t held, the Combined Fleet could neither proceed with its plan of campaign, nor take in the provisions and water requlred to enable it to maintain its position in the Channel and await a better opportunity.

v. On Augilst ~ z t h , when the Combined Fleet entered the

Channel, the British Fleet was 34 miles S.S.E. of Scilly, working to the westward against a steady westerly blow; on the 15th it had reached a position 47 miles mT.b S. of Scilly, with plenty of sea-room, and well to windward of any landfall the enemy might make, so long as the wind held westerly.

On August 17th, when the British Fleet was 66 miles S.75'T/V. of Scilly-, the west wind dropped, and light easterly airs set in. At 3 p.m. the Southampton joined with the news that the Combined Fleet was in the Channel. At j p.m. the Marl- borough arrived with the same intelligence, and the signal was made to prepare for action. The news was confirmed by the Jupiter which joined on the ~ 1 s t .

On the 21st the easterly wind freshened, and by the 25th Sir Charles Hardy had been driven beyond the S.W. limit of his station, about IOO miles S.W. of Scilly. None the less, the discovery that he was at sea, and in a position to regain the Channel as soon as the wind veered to the westward, completely paralysed the operations of the enemy.

VI . The news that the British Fleet was off' Scilly, and not, as

d'orvilliers had hoped, in harbour, reached the Combined Fleet on August 25th. Upon this a council of war was assembled, which decided unanimously that, in view of the increase of dlsease in the French ships and the shortage of provisions and water, the Combined Fleet sl~ould either seek the British Fleet in the Channel Soundings or wait for it there. The council further decided that it would be necessary in any case to terminate the cruise on September Bth, and that then, conformably to the orders received by the Spanish Admiral, the Allies should separate as soon as convenient.

Thus ended the Allied attempt to carry out an invasion of England. As long as the British Fleet retained its freedom of action, the conditions laid down by d'orvilliers as essential to the success of the operation could not be fulfilled. Before he could proceed with it, he must bring the British Fleet to action or drive it into port; without provisions he could not remain in the Channel; with :in easterly wind he could not find shelter

CONDUCT OF T H E CHANNEL FLEET IN 1779. 3 7

to re-victual; with a westerly wind he could not attempt to re-victual without tlie fear of the interference of the British Fleet.

VII. Meanwhile Sir Charles Hardy, with about 40 sail of the line

in company, was endeavouring.to beat up Channel against the easterly wind. On August 26th the wind veered to the southward, and by the 29th the Channel Fleet had reached a position 22 miles South of Scilly. The wind had dropped and become variable in direction, and the weather was growing from hazy to thick and very thick.

At 5 p.m. on August 29th the Cumberland made the signal for a fleet to windward. She had counted 28 large ships to the S.E. which she was certain was part of the Combined Fleet. At 9.20 p.m. a ship to ~vinaward made the signal for the enemy's fleet being on the starboard taclr---that is, steering about E.N.E.

During the night the wind was light and variable. At daybreak there was nothing in sight, but at I p.m. 1 1 sail were ssen to the S.E. At 6 p.m. Hardy sent the Apollo ahead to examine them. Midnight brought a light westerly wind and a thick fog. At I a.m. on the 31st, Hardy brought his fleet to on the starboard lack (heading about South). At 4 a.m. he found that the Apollo had parted company. At 4.15, however, the Duke made a signal for a fleet to the South West. Hardy at once made sail to the southward and sighted 60 large ships to the W.S.W. At 5 a.m. he bore away to the eastward. At 7 a.m. Land's End bore N.N.E. 21 miles. During the day the wind veered from W.S.W. to N., and later to N.N.E., putting Hardy to uindward. At 5.30 p.m. 38 sail were still visible to the westward, but only from the masthead. At 5 a.m. 'on September st, a few ships were visible from aloft. At I I a.m., on the west going stream making-, Hardy anchored his fleet off Rame Head to widen his distance from the enemy, and when he weighed again in the evening they were out of sight. On September 3rd the Channel Fleet anchored at Spithead, where it remained at short notice, completing with water, which was very low. It sailed again on October 7th to cover the arrival of the East India convoy, which had taken refuge in the Shannon.

VIII. On August 31st the Combined Fleet got touch with the

British Fleet, and made sail in chase. Next morning, Sep- tember st, d'orvilliers found the British fleet several miles to the north-eastward of him and to windward; they easily out- sailed the Combined Fleet, and on the and he abandoned the chase. Shortly afterwards he received orders to return to Brest, where the Combined Fleet anchored on September 14th.

38 NAVAL REVIEW.

Spain recalled her vessels from Northern waters; the project of a descent upon England was provisionally abandoned; and

I the plan adopted by the Allies for 1780 was to blockade Gibraltar, to keep in America and Asia forces sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take the ofiensive in the West Indies.

D'Orvilliers resigned his post and was never employed again. His chief of Staff defended his apparent lack of energy on the ground thac when tlie chase was abandoned the British Fleet was 18 to 20 miles to windward and in a position to enter Plymouth, and that the state of the French ships did not admit of a blocliade.

It is difficult to resist the conviction that the French Admiral was no more anxious to fight than Sir Charles Hardy; that he had no confidence in the new plan of operations or in his Allies; and that he was more than doubtful of the spirit in his own ships, short of victuals arid cumbered with sick. A bolder policy than Sir Charles I-Iardy's might possibly have achieved a great success; the Admiralty, on August 14th, gave him full authority to fight. W e have to remember, however, that the French Fleet under d'orvilliers had had rather the better of the battle against an equivalent British Fleet off Ushant in July, 1778, and that the Brilish Admiral could hardly have known how serious its condition was on the present occasion.

IX. Kempenfelt's reflections on the events first described are

expressed in a series of letters to Middleton (Barham Papers, I , 296, 298, and 303).

'September jth.--" W e don't seem to have considered sufficiently a certain facl, that the comparative force of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. The fleet that sails fastest has much the advmtage, as they can engage or not as they please, and sc have it always in their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack. I think I may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line, coppered, would be sufficient to hazard and tease this great, unwieldy, combined armada, so as to prevent their effecting anything; hanging continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation from night, gale, or fog; to dart upon the separated, to cut off any convoys of provisions coming to them ; and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige their whole fleet to accompany the transports, and even then it would be impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet."

Such an opportunity came to Kempenfelt himself two years later, when, with twelve sail of the line against nineteen, he captured a convoy under the escort of de Guichen.

CONDUCT OF THE CHANNEL FLEET I N 1779. 39

September 1 9 t h . ~ " If a continuance of strong westerly winds should prevent our fleets going out, I suppose a strong squadron mill be sent the first opportunity to the westward, 011 account of our home-bound West India trade . . . .

" When ships are not fitting for sea, they should be at sea, then order and discipline gain ground, and the men keep their health better In short cruises than in port . . . .

" There is a languor and inertia hangs upon us which must be shaken off before we can act with vigour. If a proper spirit could be raised, and close attention paid to everything this winter that could add force to the fleet, it might next spring appear for~uidable.

" P.S.--I have mentioned that ships not a-fitting for sea should be at sea during the winter; but to save the masts and ships from injury as much as possible when it comes to blow hard westerly, they should bear up for Torbay or some port.

" A pro$os.--A few batteries well placed at Torbay might prevent an enemy's fleet from making use of it."

November 16th.-" But suppose the enemy should put to sea with their fleet-a thing niuch to be wished for by us. Let us act wiser, and keep ours in port; leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales. They'll do more in favour of you than your fleet can . . . .

" If the wind comes to the eastward we shall proceed westward to our station, and if it should continue a stiff and long- winded gale, we may be drove IOO or 150 leagues to the westward, and perhaps not able to recover the Channel for six weeks or two months; a pretty situation for the fleet to be in to protect this island ! and how much such a ciscumstance would forward the early equipment of the fleet for spring service ! The fleet left Spithead with only two months' provisions. I leave it to you to judge of the prudence of risking their being drove out of the Channel so victualled.

" In fine, Sir, I don't suppose any person acquainted with naval affairs but sees the necessity of immediately taking in hand to prepare the fleet for the next campaign, to endeavour of having the advantage ol being the first in the field.

" Let us keep a strong squadron to the westward ready to attend the motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay ready to act as intelligence may direct."

X. I n Kempenfelt's view then, the improvement of the mobility

and striking power of the ships we already had available, was a greater object than increasing our numbers.

What we wanted was better discipline, better training, and a real effort during the winter to repair, copper and equip the fleet for service in the spring of 1780. T o effect this he held that

4O NAVAL REVIEW.

a compromise was necessary; the fleet should be kept at sea, at any rate away from its home ports, but on the other hand it must not be exposed to the long winter gales without due cause. Such was the policy adopted by Howe in 179.2.

In later years Jervis, Cornwallis and Nelson showed that with improved discipline and training it was quite possible to maintain a fleet at sea for months on end. Some of the earlier difficulties had probably been removed by improvement in hygiene, and better organisation of supply. Many officers, however, held the view that the policy of Jervis wore out our ships more rapidly than the skill of their men could remedy.

Dependence on fuel and the need for continuous high speed to meet the submarine menace place a modern fleet under conditions not unlike those which the seamen of Kempenfelt's time had to meet, except that where they thought in weeks, we have to think in days. Mobility nowadays depends on the supply of fuel, and striking force on the supply of ammunition, while discipline and training remain the p,aramount factors in securing freedom from breakdown, econpmy in fuel and profitable use of ammunition. Without real mobility and striking power, speed on trial and weight of broadside are broken reeds; with these qualities in 3 superior degree, a fleet inferior in numbers may baffle or even defeat an opponent who is obliged to fight with one eye on his nearest base of supply.

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED A T SEA FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES T O T H E END OF

T H E XVIIIth CENTURY. A LECTURE DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARIES' COURSE AT

PORTSMOUTH ON NOVEMBER ~ R D , 1922, BY

SIR REGINALD ~ ~ C L A N D , K.C., JUDGE ADVOCATE OF THE FLEET.

(A11 rights reserved.)

THE punishments inflicted at sea during the period I have taken have been authorised either by custom, by ordinances made by the commanders of different expeditions, or by legislation. I propose to deal with the subject by telling you first what punishments were thus authorised and then to pass on to the,punishments actually inflicted. The time a t my disposal will not enable me to do more than give you a sketch which I hope I may some day have the opportunity of filling in.

The custom of the sea during the medieval times must be sought in the old so-called Sea Laws, some of which are to be found in the Black Rook of Admiralty, a manuscript " drawn up for the use of the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty In England," which was most learnedly edited during the last century by the late Sir Travers Twiss and published with appendices in four volumes by the Treashry.

Before calling your attention to those parts of these old sea laws which deal with our subject, I must say a few words about them. The earliest were in existence by the middle of the XIth century. They were not laws in the sense in which we now understand that expression, enacted by legislative authority, but were rather collections of usages of the sea recognised as having the force of customary law either by the judgments of Maritime Courts or by resolutions of merchants and ship masters. They deal with almost every side of maritime commerce and contain much which has to do with offences which may be committed by the officers and crews of ships, and pre- scribe penalties for them. Though in many respects similar to each other, they were not of universal application, but applied to particular trades or to ships sailing from particular ports. They have been the foundation on which modern maritime law has been built.

The offences created by them may be grouped under the following heads :-Quarrelling, striking by the master or mariner,

42 NAVAL REVIEW.

desertion and absence without leave, negligence of the " pilot " and sleeping on watch ; theft is dealt with in many of the codes, and there are a certain number of miscellaneous offences, some of which I will mention, which owe their proscription to the circumstances of the times.

I deal with the last first, for as the centuries passed they disappeared.

By Henry V.'s ordinances,' if a man touched the Sacrament he was to be hanged and drawn. If he pillaged the Church, he was to suffer death ; if he took a woman or churchman prisoner, he was to be imprisoned during the King's will.

By the Assizes of Jerusalem,' the carrying of forbidden goods to the Saracens was prohibited. The forbidden goods being such things as might be useful in war. If they were of the value of one mark, the offender was to have everything he possessed confiscated and he was to be hanged.

Perhaps the most curious is the prohibition contained in S. CXXV. of the Customs of the Sea.3 You will doubtless remember that in old days voyages were interrupted during the winter season which began about the middle of November and ended towards the end of February. It was accordingly provided that a mariner ought not to " undress himself" if he is not in a port for wintering. By which I understand he was not to get out of his sea-going clothes. If he did so, " for each time he ought to be plunged in the sea with a rope, from -the yard-arm three times, and after three times offending he ought to lose his salary and the goods he has in the ship."

I now pass to the consideration of the punishments for those offences which throughout the ages have been considered to be offences at sea and are still so considered.

First, of quarrelling. You will readily understand that in the old days when navigation was a much more hazardous thing than it is nowadays, and the ships very small, even one quarrelsome man on board might endanger the success of the whole adventure, and therefore one finds that in the customs which regulated the two great centres of trade, the Baltic and the ~ed i te r ranean , careful provision is made against this.

By one code4 a quarrelsome man was fined at the discretion of the Admiral, if blood was drawn he had to pay 10s. to the Admiral, while if he killed his opponent he was to be hanged.

Even giving the lie to a mess mate was punished by a fine of 4d., while if he did so to the Captain he had to pay 8d., and the Captain himself had to pay the same amount if he gave the lie to a man.5

For quarrelling as for blasphemy and thieving, the Master could discharge a sailor summarily, but a curious custom existed both in the Baltic and Mediterranean which is thus stated in the Sea Laws of Oleron : 6 " If a contention arises in a ship between

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED .4T SEA. 43

mariners, the Master ought to take away the tablecloth before the mariners three times, before he orders them to go out of the ship " ; if the mariner is ready to make satisfaction to the others and the Master will not take him back, the mariner can follow the ship to the port of discharge and get all his wages for the whole voyage, and if the Master has not shipped as good a man in his place and the ship or merchandize is damaged he (the Master) has to pay all the damages " if he has the where- withal."

It is supposed that by " taking away the tablecloth " is meant refusing the men their food. This provision appears in five of the codes collected by Sir Travers Twiss.

Striking-the outcome of quarrelling-was severely dealt with. If a man committed mayhem-that is, deprived another of any of his limbs used for offence or defence, he was to be put in prison until he had made satisfaction to the person injured, pay IOO shillings to the King and lose the hand wherewith he " stroke " unless a jury found that he did it in self-defence.?

If a mariner smote the Master he was by the Laws of Olerons to pay 5 shillings or lose his fist at the choice of the mariner; but this rather small fine was raised to IOO shillings in other codes .'

The Master was forbidden to beat the mariners, but if he did the Laws of Orelon lay down that the mariner ought to " abide the first buffet be it with the fist or flat of his hand," but if he smite any more the mariner may defend himself.1°

This is elaborated in t h e Customs of the Seal1 and the Sea Laws of Trani,12 which last, after saying that the Master should not beat his men, state the rule as follows : That the man should " escape and pass from the bow to the chain of the rowers, and ought to say ' In the name of the Lord do not touch me ' three times. If the Master should pass the chain in order to beat him he map defend himself, and ' if he kills the Master he is not to be banished.' "

Theft was severely punished. If a man stole goods of the value of 21d . l~ or a boat or an anchor above that value or a buoy he might be hanged.14 while by the Customs of the Seal5 it is said that if a man steals goods or ship's apparel or effects he was to lose his wages, any goods he had on board, be put in irons and kept there throughout the voyage and afterwards be given in custody of the civil authorities to be dealt with.

So much for the punishments for offences against the internal order of the ship. I turn now to those which more directly affected the success of the voyage.

Sleeping ashore without leave was punishable both by the Mediterranean and Baltic laws. By one1= for every night a man was absent he had to serve one day and lose as much pay as the Master thought right. In some of the Baltic laws" the

44 NAVAL REVIEW.

fine was fixed, and varied from " two groats of Tours " to " 12 pennies Flemish which shall be at the free disposal of the Master and crew." It is worth noticing that by the Osterlings Sea Laws18 the Master and crew, not the Master alone, were the people to give leave.

I t is perhaps remarkable that it is only in one of the Sea Laws that I find any penalty attached to sleeping on watch.

In the " Customs of the Sea1"lg which has been said to contain the Common Law of all the commercial powers of Europe, are to be found the following curious provisions :

A man who slept on watch while-the ship was under way at sea was deprived of his wine during the whole day ; if he did so in a fr;endly harbour or roadstead he was to have no wine or " accompaniment " (i.e., cheese, onions, sardines or other fish) with his bread. In enemy waters, if he was a mariner of the forecastle, he u7as to be deprived of his wine and " accompaniment " during the whole day and further was to be beaten naked by all the crew and be ducked three times from the yard arm. The managing owner was to decide which of the two last punishments was to be inflicted.

If he was a mariner of the poop he was to lose his wine and all food except bread and to have " a pail of water thrown over his head downwards."

I do not myself understand why a mariner of the forecastle incurred a more severe penalty than his brother of the poop, unless it be that the man on watch on the forecastle would be responsible for looking after the cables.

If mariners slept on watch more than three times they incurred further penalties. They were to forfeit all their wages, and if they had already received 'them they were to repay them and be ducked in the sea. In this case the managing owner and the majority of the crew were to decide on the punishment to be inflicted because the offenders " have imperilled and exposed to risk themselves and all those on board the vessel."

Lastly, with regard to careless navigation, the penalties were drastic and might, at all events in the earliest times, be promptly inflicted.

In old days the " pilot " was in a position similar to the Navigator of to-day, and if he had continually before his mind the penalties which he might incur by neglect his lot cannot have been a very happy one.

" It is established for a custom of the sea," state the Laws of Oleronlzo " that if a ship is lost by the default of the lodeman (i.e., pilot) the mariners may if they please bring the lodeman to the.windlass or any other place and cut off his head without the mariners being bound to answer before any judge because the lodeman has committed high treason against his under- taking of the pilotage."

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED A T SEA. 45

This was modified as time went on, for it was held that before the mariners cut off the pilot's head enquiry ought to be made whether he could pay the damage caused by his n e g l i g e n ~ e . ~ ~

According to the Customs pf the Sea,22 the decision as to whether the pilot's head was to be cut off was to rest with the " mate and the merchants and all the ship's company," for the following excellent reasons. The managing owners " might well wish that some against whom they had a spite should lose their heads and in order that the wages which they had pro- mised and ought to pay should remain in their hands, for there are managing owners of ships or vessels that are destitute of sense as well as other persons, and, still more, there are many managing owners of ships or vessels that do not know when they should go forward and when backward nor what the sea is and what it is not, and therefore it would be an evil that a man should be put to death at the caprice or the judgment of the managing owner of the ship or vessel."

It would appear =at in those days there were pilots willing to betray their trust and wreck their vessels in collusion with wreckers on shore. Accordingly, the following appears In one of the copies of the Sea Laws of Oleron : 23 ' I Of false and dis- loyal traitorous pilots the judgment is such that they ought to suffer martyrdom cruelly and there ought gibbets to be made very high on the very spot where they set the said shyp or well near it and thereon the accused pilots ought to finish shamefully theyr daies and the said gibbets ought to be left on the said spot in perpetual memorie and to serve as a landmark to other vessels that shall come there."

The customs having had their origin in trading rather than fighting ships, the offences were looked on as offences against the adventure rather than as offences against the State. One does not find disobedience as such punishable, and one finds that the crew as a whole in some cases had a voice in deciding the punishment proper to be inflicted, and even, as in the case of negligent pilots who wrecked the ship, were the persons who were to carry out the death penalty.

One curi&s fact about these old customs is the mildness of some of the punishments and the excuses which were accepted for some offences which nowadays would be severely punished. Desertion, for instance, was punished by loss of wages or a fine,24 unless he deserted with the Master's money, in which case he " merited the gallows,"" while deprivation of a man's grog and its accompaniment does not seem a severe penalty for sleeping on watch.

Even a man who deserted the ship could offer an excuse which seems ludricrous in our day. In both the Mediterraneanzs and the a man was entitled to leave the ship " to take a wife or to go on a pilgrimage or to fulfil a vow which he has

46 NAVAL REVIEW.

made before he engaged himself." The learned editor of the Black Book of the Aamiralty says of the privilege of leaving the ship in these circumstances : " This privilege was one of public policy . . . . Rut the mar!ner could only avail himself of this privilege ' before the vessel commenced her voyage, he could not quit the vessel on such an excuse during her voyage.' " This is not absolutely correct, for in the Sea Laws of TraniZ8 (a Mediterranean code) the mariner might leave the vessel if he was promoted to master or mate or if " during the present voyage he shall have made a vow to g o to St . James, or to the Holy Sepulchre or to Rome."

S o far I have called your attention to punishments which according to many documents which have survived could properly be inflicted according to the Custom of the Sea, a custom which continued in theory, at all events, to regulate the punishments long after they were inflicted in accordance with definite regulations made by lawful authority.

The earliest of these regulations extant, as far as I am aware, is the ordinance made by Richard I . in 1190. You will find them in the 4th volume of Monson's Naval Tracts,29 published by the Navy Records Society. Monson, writing in the first half of the 17th century, says : " In some points they have continued in being ever since but not with the vigour and severity as in times past." I quote them in full, as they well illustrate the barbarity of the times.

I. Whosover shall kill any man on shipboard shall be bound to the back of the party killed and thrown into the sea with him.

11. If one shouId be killed on land the party should be bound in like manner and buried alive with him killed.

111. Whosoever shall draw a knife or weapon with intent to draw blood or by other means should draw blood shall lose his hand.

IV. Whosoever shall strike one without drawing blood with his hand or otherwise shall be ducked three times at the yard arm.

V. Whosoever reviles or curses another for so often as he hath reviled shall pay so many ounces of silver.

VI. Whosoever steals shall have his head shorn and boiling pitch poured on it, and feathers strewed on the same whereby he may be known; and at the first landing place where he shall come, there to be towed ashore.

This idea of marking an offender survived for nearly six centuries, for I find the following provision in the Regulations and Instructions relating to His h'lajesty's Service at Sea established by His h'lajestp in Council and printed in 1745 : " If any shall be heard to swear, curse, or blaspheme the name of God the Captain is strictly required to punish them for every

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED .4T SW. 47

offence by causing them to wear a wooden collar or some other shameful Badge of Distinction for so long time as he shall judge proper." It was repeated in 1790 in identical terms and does not disappear till the revision in 1806. From all one has heard of the language used in the old days at sea one would imagine that most of the ship's company ought to have been going about with wooden collars or some other shameful badge of distinction.

By the end of the XVIth century we arrive a t the time when the discipline on board the ships in the service of the King was becoming more and more regulated by ordinances made for a particular expedition by the authority of the Admiral or General at Sea.

Speaking quite 'generally, it may b e ,said that the only punishment specially mentioned in these old ordinances was that of death. In cases in which the supreme penalty was not enjoined directions are given that offenders are to be " severely punished, or " extremely punished," or punished, " as the nature of the offence deserves," and the actual punishment to be inflicted was left to the discretion, I had almost said to the imagination, of the Captains, who were to inflict the punishments according to the laws and customs of the sea.

There have happily survived in the Record Office two sets of ships' orders based on ordinances such. as I have referred to, those of the Red Lion in 162617~' and of the Constant Reforma- tion31 in 1638. The punishments prescribed in the former were confinement in the bilbows for not attending prayers twice a day " unless hindered by sickness or some other lawful cause," for absenting himself from his watch, for " smoking between the decks or in private cabins but only aloft and that sparingly," being drunk and misbehaving, for playing cards or dice if he was not I ' a gentleman or an officer," for a quartermaster who did not see the fire out at night before setting the watch, and for leave breaking.

A man who refused to obey his officer or dared to strike in the ship " but these that are authorized thereunto," or provoked another was to be ducked at the yard arm three times, to be towed ashore at the boat's stern and then discharged with the loss of the voyage. If he struck an officer he was to be tried for his life bv 12 men.

Any person who found anything in the ship and did not give it to the boatswain but concealed it was to be ducked at the yard arm, as was any man that presumed to go into the hold " but those that are appointed."

One clause which reproduces the laws of Trani, which I have already quoted, runs as follows : " Whosoever sleepeth on his watch shall have three buckets of water poured on his head and into his sleeves, his arms being held above his head."

48 NAVAL KEVIEUr.

Whoever stole either by breaking open chests or from hammocks was to be brought to the mast and there made fast and stripped naked and every man in the ship was to give him hve lashes with a three-stringed whip upon his bare back and he was to be towed ashore with the loss of his voyage.

This last punishment seems to be an echo of some of those inflicted in the middle ages by which the sufferers were afforded the opportunity, if I may use a colloquialism, of " getting a bit of their own back."

It appears in another form in running the gauntlet or 4 I gantlope," which survived in the Navy certainly till the end of the XVIIIth century, and was also used in trading ships, for I have found a record of its infliction in 1769 in the log of the Deptford, an East 'Indianman, of which my great grandfather was fourth mate.

It was thus inflicted. The crew were drawn up in two lines and armed with nettles. The culprit was slowly marched or drawn on a barrel between the two lines, preceded by the Master a t Arms with a drawn cutlass pointed towards him to prevent his going too fast, and followed by a ship's corporal with his cutlass pointed to the offender's back to prevent his going too slow. H e was marched round as many times as his offence deserved. Each member of the crew gave one or more blows as the delinquent went by. It was a summary punishment, and I have only found one case (in 1743) in which a Court Martial awarded this sentence. The usual sentence passed by a Court Martial for theft being a flogging more or less severe.

The orders of the Captain of the Constant Reformation are similar, not the same, and the differences have an interest. There is no mention of ducking at the yard arm, though the punishment for sleeping on watch is the same. The Captain of the Red Lion seems to have been less particular than his brother Captain about blasphemy, cursing and swearing, for he only prescribed one knock with the boatswain's,whistle on the offender's forehead, while the latter awarded three knocks with the bowl of the boatswain's whistle ; both were agreed, however, that if the prescribed punishment did not reform the man he was to have more severe punishment.

The Captain of the latter ship seems to have been more careful about sanitary matters, for he provided that no man was to "presume to piss in the hold or between the decks or do any other slovenly act upon pain of having his nose drawn thro' it, nor piss over the poop upon pain of being punished there- for."

The same provision against stealing is made in both sets of orders except that in the later orders it is not laid down that the whole ship's company is to take a hand in the punishment.

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED .4T SEA. 49

In the clause prohibiting striking there is in each case the reservation in favour of " those that are authorized thereunto," and that from this time onward blows were recognised as part of the method by which discipline was maintained is exempli- fied by the case of William Hatton, a boatswain tried in I709 for killing Grainger, a sailor. H e was acquitted on the ground that the blow was given in the course of his " duty in turning the ship's company on deck, Grainger being in a very lowe condition by the scurvy and almost to a ~ k e l l i t o n . " ~ ~

W e have now reached about the middle of the seventeenth century, from which time the punishments which might be inflicted depended on legislation passed either by the Common- wealth in the reign of Charles 11. or George 11. This legislation to some extent, but not to the same extent as at present, regulated the punishments which might be inflicted. In the Commonwealth Articles of W a r there were twenty-two offences for which the penalty of death might be inflicted, in eleven of which it was obligatory. By the Statute of 1661 there were twenty offences for which capital punishment might be inflicted, for nine of which there was no alternative, while by the Act of George 11. there were twenty-three capital offences, for nine of which there was no alternative whatever.

It would be wearisome to go through all the offences for which a sentence of death might be passed, but there are one or two to which I should like to call your attention. Under both the Commonwealth Articles of W a r and those of Charles 11. any officer who through cowardice, negligence or disaffection withdrew from the fight or did not do his utmost to take or destroy every vessel which it was his duty to take or destroy was to suffer death or such other fiunishment as the Court thought fit to impose, but under the Act of George 11. there was no alternative to death. It was under the clause in the latter Act that Admiral Ryng was condemned to death and shot, and it is indicative of the brutal severity of the punishments of the latter half of the 18th century that the Admiral was shot notwithstanding the unanimous finding of the fact that the Admiral was not guilty of cowardice or disaffection and of their earnest appeal for mercy. It took 20 years before Parliament was induced to empower a Court to pass a less sentence in such a case.

Under the Commonwealth Articles death was a permissible punishment for what in modern language is described a s " designedly by negligence or other default " stranding or losing his ship. A sentence of death could not be passed under the Act of Charles II., but the old penalty was restored by the Act of George II., and I expect it will be news to most naval officers of to-day that even up to 1860 capital punishment might be inflicted for this offence.

50 NAVAL REVIEW.

Imprisonment is mentioned as a possible punishment for bad steering in the Articles of 1652, cashiering for demanding a reward for convoying a ship. Fine, imprisonment or other punishment might, by the Act of 1661, be inflicted for cursing, 'drunkenness or other action in derogation of God's honour and the corruption of good manners and for the wasteful expenditure of ammunition. I have already read to you the Article from the Instructions of 1745, which lays down the punishment to be inflicted on a man for swearing; I only need add that a commissioned officer could do so for a shilling a time and warrant officer for sixpence. If an officer was drunk he lost two days' pay. Even ashore a sailor could not swear in safety and peace, for a Statute of George II.33 provided that he was to be fined a shilling for each oath and if he could not pay he was to be put in the stocks for one hour or for two hours for any number of oaths.

One picturesque punishment must be mentioned. I t appears in Clause 32 of the 1652 Articles and Clause 30 of the Articles of 1661. By them any Provost Marshal belonging to the fleet who refused to receive and keep a prisoner in his charge or dismissed him without orders was liable to be sentenced to the punishment which should have been inflicted on the prisoner. I t is impossible not to feel some regret that this method of securing the due punishment of someone or another for an offence which had been committed had disappeared in 1749.

With the exception of the death penalty and the very few other punishments specially mentioned, the actual sentence to be awarded was left under both Acts entirely to the discretion of the Court, which was supposed to and generally did award punishments according to the Custom of the Sea, though, as you will see when I pass to the punishments actually inflicted, the captains of the different vessels did not feel themselves bound by any such limitation.

U p to this point I have dealt only with what may be considered to be laws which, depending in the earliest times either upon custom or the decisions of the Maritime Courts, and later upon ordinances made by duly constituted authority, upon Acts of Parliament or upon Regulations made by the authority of the Admiralty, authorised the infliction of certain penalties which may be summed up as follows : Fines, imprisonment, ducking at the yard arm, confinement in bilboes, cashiering and dismissal from H.M's service, corporal punishment and death, together with certain fanciful punishments which I have mentioned.

But apart from these formal regulations there are other sources of information as to the punishments permitted in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, three of which I will bring to your notice.

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED AT SEA. 5'

The " Book of Orders for the W a r both by land and sea, written by Thomas Audley at the Command of King Henry VIII.," preserved in the Harleian Collection of Manuscripts in the British Museum, contains the following drastic " Orders to be used in the Kings Majesty's Navy by the Sea.'134 The first provides that they are to be put on the mainmast " to be read as occasion shall serve," an interesting anticipation of Art. 729 of the K.R. & A.I. The following punishments are then prescribed. For killing another on board the murderer is to be bound to the dead man and thrown into the sea and a piece of ordnance shot off. A man who drew a weapon on the Captain or on anyone else so as to cause tumult or the likelihood of murder or bloodshed was to lose his right hand. A thief was to be three times dipped from the bowsprit and two fathoms deep in the sea and at the next port towed ashore at a boat's stern and left there with a can of beer and a loaf of bread and banished from the King's ships for ever.

Four punishments are provided for a man who sleeps " his watch four times." The first time he is to have a bucket of water poured on his head. The second he is to be tied up by the hands and two buckets of water poured into his sleeves. The third he is to be bound to the mast with gun chambers tied to his arms for as long as the Captain thinks fit. The fourth punishment is worth quoting verbatim : " The fourth time and last punishment, being taken asleep, he shall be hanged on the bowsprit end of the ship in a basket, with a can of beer and a loaf of bread and a sharp knife, there to hang till he starve or cut himself into the sea."

Desertion is made felony, which means that the punishment was death.

The next of these old books is " Boteler's Dialogical Dis- course on Marine Affairs." It was probably written about 1630, and is in the form of a dialogue between an Admiral and a Captain. It is supposed to have been prepared for the instruction of the gentleman Captains who, without knowledge of the sea, were about this time introduced into the Service. For many years it seems to have circulated in manuscript, of which one copy is being preserved in the British Museum. It was printed in 1685 with a delightful dedication to Samuel Pepys which ends with " I hope the benefit will be to the reader as well as to the Bookseller, who is your most Hum%le Servant Moses Pitt,"

The Admiral asks the Captain what are the usual and customary punishments at sea and receives the following answer : " As for the punishment at the Capstan itt is when a Capstan's barre being thrust through the hole of the barrel1 the offender's armes are extended to full the length and soe made fast unto the barre crostwise. Haveing sometimes a basket of bullets or

52 NAVAL REVIEW.

some other like weight hanging upon his neck. In which posture he continues until1 he be made either to confesse some plotte or cryme or that he have received suche condigne suffer- inge as he is suffered to undergoe by the censure of the Captaine.

" The punishment of the bilboes is when a delinquent is put in yrons or in a kind of stocks used for that purpose ye which are more or less heavy and pinchynge as the Qualitye of the offence is proved against the delinquent.

" The duckinge at the maine yaide arme is when a malefactor by havinge a Rope fastened under his armes and about his middle and under his breech is thus hoysed up to the end of the yarde from whence he is againe violently let fall into the Sea, sometimes twise sometimes three several1 tymes one after the other and if the offence be very fowle he is also drawn under the very keele of the Shippe the wch is called Keele rakinge and whilst he is thus under water a great gunne is given ffyre unto, right over his head, ye wch is done as well to astonish him the more wth the thunder thereof, wch much troubles him, as to give warneinge unto all others to looke out and beware of his harms."

" And those are the common and usual ways of inflictions of punishments upon delinquents att Sea, the wch also in capital causes as murthers mutinies and the like, are so transcended, that where there is other whiles a Duckinge a t the maine yarde end, there is hanging to death executed in the same place. But this is never done but by some special1 commission or att the least by a Martial1 Courte. As for all petty Pilferinges and commissions of yt kind Thes are generally punished with ye whippe the offender being to yt purpose bound fast to the Capstan-and the waggery and idlesse of shyppe boyes are paid by the Boateswayne with the rodd and commonly this execution is done upon the Mondayes morning and is so frequently in ose that some meere sea men and saylors doe believe in good earnest that they shall never have a fayer wind ontill the poore Boyes be duly brought to ye chest, yt is whipped evy mondy morninge."

Having some reason for thinking that the printed copy in the Admiralty Library from which I took the above extract was not complete, I examined the manuscript35 itself and found a passage inserted in a later but ancient handwriting opposite the passage I have quoted. It is not in the printed copy. It begins : " The executions and capital1 punishments I find to be thus in Queene Elisabeths tyme aborde her own ships." The writer then sets out substantially the disciplinary orders contained in Audley's book with the following additions : " If anve one did mutinye about his allowede proportion of victuals he-is to be layde in the bilboes during the Captaines pleasure," and '' If anpe one practysed to steal awaye any of her Majestys

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED AT SEA. 53

shyppes the Captain is to cause him to be hanged by the heeles until his braines are beaten oute against the shyppes sides and then to be cutt downe and lett fall intoe the sea."

M o n s ~ n ~ ~ gives a list similar to that of Boteler in one of his Naval Tracts. " The Captain," he says, " may punish according to the offence committed, viz., by putting one in bilboes during pleasure, duck them at the yard arm, or haul them from yard arm to yard arm under the ship's keel, or spread them at the capstan and whip them there at the capstan or main mast, hang weights about their neck till their hearts and back be ready to break, or to gag and scrape their tongues for blasphemy and swearing, being sufficient to tame the most rude and savage people in the world." Warwick in his orders in 1644 prescribed punishing blasphemy by boring the offender's tongue with a red-hot iron.

S o far I have spoken of the punishments which were authorised either by direct enactment or by custom, but a s all those who have anything to do with the administration of the Naval Discipline Act know well, the fact that a penalty may be, does not mean that it is habitually, inflicted. Indeed, notwithstanding the number of offences for which a capital sentence might have been passed under the Commonwealth Articles, Clowes in his History of the Royal Navy37 says there is no known instance up to the Restoration of a death sentence being actually carried out. As to the accuracy of this statement I am unable to express an opinion.

After the Restoration there are means of knowing exactly what punishments were awarded, for the minutes of Courts Martial and other records are in existence.

Now it seems to me that there are two stages in the period under review : during the first the sentences of Courts Martial were comparatively lenient, during the second, which extended rather beyond the end of the XVIIIth century, they were severe to extreme brutality; while with regard to the summary punishments inflicted by captains during the first period, the punishments such as ducking were inflicted and also others, greatly resented as you will hear, which were intended to satisfy their cruel sense of humour. By degrees these old-fashioned and fanciful punishments seem to have disappeared and order was maintained by incessant flogging.

First as to punishments inflicted by Courts Martial. Those on officers were almost invariably either death, imprisonment, dismissal from the Service or from his employmerit, with or without the addition of being rendered incapable of serving His Majesty again, fine or loss of pay or some other punishment, generally fanciful, considered suitable for the special circumstances of the case.

54 NAVAL REVIEW.

The terms of imprisonment were sometimes fol life and there are instances of 15, 7 and 5 years. One captain found guilty of cowardice was fortunate in getting off with a fine of L300, 12

months' imprisonment and being rendered unfit for further employment, while a master who wanted to haul down his flag in action was found guilty under the 10th Article of W a r and imprisoned for life in the Marshalsea, the Court recording its opinion that it had only passed this lenient sentence because the prisoner had given good advice to the captain earlier in the action. The fines and losses of pay call for no special attention, but some of the sentences on officers, which show an attempt to make the punishment fit the crime in a way which would do credit to Sullivan's Mikado or show a poor sense of humour, must be mentioned.

The boatswains of the Ipswich and the Boyne had a quarrel. The boatswain of the Boyne was found to be the guilty party and was sentenced " t o be carried round the fleet with his hands tied to the mast, the Provost Marshal to publicly proclaim his offence, and he afterwards to beg the boatswain's of the Ipswich pardon publicly on his knees on board that ship and the B ~ y n e . " ~ ~

The most extraordinary instance of perverted humour which I have found is the case of Capt. Harris. H e had in 167516 been to Tangier and had, it was said, misbehaved himself by submitting to some insult offered by an Ostend ship. This having been discovered, the Mayor of Falmouth was instructed to examine the officers of the ship and on receipt of the deposi- tions Capt. Harris was ordered round to the Thames where he was tried by Court Martial and condemned to death.

Orders were sent for his execution on February 14th, on which day Pepys wrote to Captain Gunman, of the Anne Yacht at Greenwich, with instructions that he was to supply the Admiralty Marshal with a " competent number of small shot for the doing thereof." H e is " t o cause as much appearance of reality to be expressed in this matter " as he can, but just before " the act of execution should be done " there was to be produced " Their Lordships' warrant for the forebearance thereof.'' Pepys had sent the draft of this warrant to the Secre- tary of State for the King's approval on February 12th. The whole thing was an elaborate piece of make-believe by everybody except the prisoner.39

Punishments were often designed to bring the offender into contempt. Let two examples suffice. In 1667 several commanders of ships and others were tried for cowardice on the 26th July when the Dutch raided the Thames. One captain was shot, three others were to be carried on board the Victory Prize, " and there to have a wooden sword broken over their heads and be tied up and so continue all the time of the punishment of the others,

PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED A T SEA. 5 5

and then to be towed ashore at the stern of a boat to Deptford with a drum beating in the boat's head and thereafter to be incapable of ever bearing command or charge in any of His Majesty's ships."

The boatswain of one of the ships was to be carried alongside each ship in the road with his mouth gagged, his body, with his hands tied behind him, fastened to the boat's mast, his faults written on paper on his breast, the same to be read at each ship's side, and then to be cashiered. Then follows a quaint touch of mercy. But " in regard of his great family, his salary and pay for himself and his servants was to be reserved to him."40

This is not the only case I have found in which a man's family affairs were allowed to mitigate a sentence. In the Diary of Henry Teonge, who was chaplain in several ships from 1675 to 1679, it is recorded under date September 28th, 1675, that " one of our men viz. Skinner a knowne cuckold . . . . had his leggs tyd together his hands tyd to a great rope and stood on the syd of the ship " ready to be ducked three times for going ashore without leave, " but he looking very pittifully and also by the gentlemen's intreatys to the Captaine for him, who alleged that he had injurys enough already, as having a wife a whore and a schold to injure him at home, ergo he had the more need to be pittyed abroade, was spared."

The punishment of contumeliously exhibiting an vffender was common. In 1697 Lieut. W m . Goad for breach of the and Article, which prohibits drunkenness, swearing, etc., was sentenced to lose all his pay and be rendered incapable of serving His Majesty. The sentence continues, " he to be carried in a boat from ship to ship with an halter about his neck and the Pro- vost Martial after beat of drum at a small distance from each ship's side to read his crime to the respective ship's companies of all His Majesty's ships in pay at Spithead and in Portsmouth Harbour, they being called on deck for that purpose and afterwards to be put ashore on the Point at P o r t s m o ~ t h . " ~ ~

I have only found one case in which a seaman was sentenced to one of these fancy punishments. In I705 James Dove, a mariner, was found guilty of abusing his Captain and calling him a coward, "but as he had received some punishment already and had not yet recovered from his wounds lately received in the engagement with five French men of war, he was adjudged to ask Captain Culliford's pardon on his knees before the Court and on board the Nottingham publicly before the ship's com-

Possibly the Court thought he had some justification for his remarks.

Turning now to the punishments inflicted by Courts Martial on men, I find on examination of all the Minutes of Courts Martial preserved in the Record Office on officers and men between 1700 and 1746 (about 1,000 in number) that 342 ratings

56 NAVAL REVIEW.

were tried, 74 were acquitted, while of the 268 sentences only seven, viz., the case just mentioned, the case of the man sentenced to run the gauntlet already referred to, and five others were for a punishment other than death or flogging. I leave the latter for the moment as I shall deal with the subject of corporal punishment separately.

The sentences of death are very numerous for there was no alternative a t this time in the case of desertion, which was common. But it may be doubted whether all the sentences or indeed most of them were carried out. In the Memoirs of Lord Torrington, edited by Sir John Laughton and published by the Camden Society in 1889, I found under the date December loth, 1703, a passage which, after stating that the Admiral held a Court Martial, proceeds : " Where two seamen were condemned to die for desertion, but considering the great loss that lately hapened to the Queen in her saylors and believing this might be an object for compassion, at this time he wrote to pray for their pardon, which was granted them."

This " great loss in her saylors " had another extraordinary result. Where more than one man was condemned to death the condemned sometimes threw dice to decide which should be hung. Mr. Pocock, who u7as chaplain in the Ranelagh at the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 records in his diary that there were excesses on shore by the marines, who were punished, . " one of which was hanged after he had threw the dice with a Dutchman, who hove 10 and the Dutchman 9.'' Sir John Idaughton, in a note, says this was not unusual43 and refers to a Court Martial on three men for desertion. I have found the original Minutes in the Record Office. The Court Martial was held on March and, 1698!9. Benbow was President. The three men were sentenced " t o be hanged by the neck till they were dead dead dead. But in regard to the want of men it is further the opinion of the Court Martial that they heave a die and one only to suffer death the other two to be whipped from ship to ship with a halter about their neck." The sentence ends, " And the die being hove it fell upon George Danbe," which suggests that this gamble for death was actually carried out before the Court.

1 pass now to the punishments inflicted by the Captain on his own authority, again omitting flogging for the moment. These punishments were varied and unpleasant and many of them had no warrant by the ancient custom of the sea. Duck- ing at the yard arm was common, and it is not without interest to note that this punishment was inflicted in the French Navy also. In the narrative of the loss of the Wager, the author, who in 1741 was carried to Europe as a prisoner of war in a French ship which was convoying a fleet of merchant vessels, states that the Captain of the ship in which he was, being very angry with


the Commander of one of the vessels which was continually breaking away, made him come on board and ducked him at the yard arm, a proceedirig which the author seems to think would lead to a duel at home, as the Merchant Captain was a gentleman of good family in the South of France.44

Time will not permit me to give you a list even of the punishments inflicted, but I give you a sample culled from Ball's manuscript narrative of an expedition along the coast of " Port- ingale" in 1 6 2 7 . ~ ~ For capsizing the Captain's toasted cheese in the cook room the offender had to stand by the main mast while the others were at supper with a piece of toasted cheese all " smeered and greased in ashes and one tinkling with a frying pan and pair of tongs making tinker's music all the time he was so shamefully to stand " ; tale bearing was punished by the man being stood for " some certain time " against the main mast " with his tongue tied all the length out of his mouth and one anointing it with tar." If " any ordinary man that was not an officer or commander" struck another who did not resist, but " a s it were taking advantage of the law (as indeed there ought not to be a blow given in the ship by any of the vulgar) " and complaining to the Captain, he had " both his hands seized across at the wrists and so hoisted up by one of the forebraces and there hang by the arms to his great pain and douleur certain long time according to our Captain's humour."

This punishment of hanging up in the rigging seems to have long survived, for in 1797 the men of the Marlborough asserted that two quartermasters were hung up in the rigging with their hammocks on their shoulders for an hour and a half in cold weather.

Teonge records4= that two men were punished for s'tealing a piece of beef by having a piece of raw beef tied round their necks, "bobbing before them like the knott of a cravatt and the rest of the crew cam one by one and rubd them over the mouth with the raw beife and in this posture they stood 2 howers."

Instances of these fanciful but cruel punishments might be given to any extent, but enough has been said to show you the kinds of punishment inflicted by Commanders two and a half centuries ago.

I turn now to deal with the last part of my subject, viz., corporal punishment. It is difficult for us nowadays to understand how such punishments could have been tolerated, and one is inclined to wonder not that there were mutinies but that there were so few, in view of the frightful suffering which must have been inflicted in the name of discipline.

' I Starting " seems to have been a common form of punishment in the XVIIIth century after it came to be recognised that the officers might beat the men. I t was a beating inflicted bv the boatswain's mates with ropes ends or rattans for some real

58 NAVAL REVIEW.

or imaginary offence committed in the presence of the Captain or other officer, and this form of personal violence seems also to have been used to urge the men on to greater exertions in their work and to have been applied indiscriminately.

" Gagging " appears to have been practiced also. The man was placed in irons, his hands tied behind his back and a bolt forced into his rnouih and well secured behind his head. He remained in this position until the Captain thought fit to release him or he was nearly exhausted.

Cruel as these punishments were they were mild compared to the terrible floggings round the fleet which reached their height at the end of the XVIIIth century.

There can be no doubt whatever that this punishment was allowed by the Custom of the Sea, and that Captains could inflict it at will. But it is curious to note that which seems to me to be true, that up to about the middle of the XVIIIth century the floggings, severe as they seem to us now, were as nothing compared to those inflicted at the end of that century and beginning of the XIXth. S o many of the sentences take the form of so many lashes along each ship in such and such a port or harbour that it is impossible in these cases to say what was the total number of lashes. There are many others, however, in which the full number is given and, judging from them, I am inclined to think that 150 lashes is not far off the maximum ordinarily inflicted up to about 1745. The punishment was sometimes, however, aggravated by washing the man's back with salt water after the conclusion of the p u n i ~ h m e n t , ~ ~ though possibly this drastic treatment was intended to assist his re- covery.

But by the middle of the XVIIIth century the era of the brutal ferocity in these punishments had begun. In 1744, within a period of two months, fourteen mariners were tried. Two were sentenced to death, the sentences on the others were three of goo lashes, one of 500, two of 400, one of 300, two of 150 and one of roo lashes alongside each ship in Antigua. The remaining two were leniently dealt with. In some of these cases the sentences were undoubtedly illegal in that the prescribed punishment was only death, and I cannot escape from the conclusion that they were intended to result in death.

In order to make some comparison with the sentences passed at a later date, I analysed the sentences for about three months in the pear 1800. Between February 5th and May 16th in that year, 34 seamen and marines were tried bp Court Martial. Two men were acquitted. The sentences on the remaining 32 were as follows. There were two sentences of 500, seven of 300, six of 200, two of 150, seven of 100, one of 60 and seven of 50 lashes. In one case 500 lashes was followed by two years' solitary confinement and the same addition was made to a sen-


tence of 300, while six months' solitary confinement was added to a sentence of 200 lashes. Some of these sentences were inflicted for what would not now be considered serious offences. The man who received a sentence of 200 lashes and six months' solitary confinement had presented a petition to be transferred to another ship and had complained-probably rightly-of ill- treatment by the officers, while another who had, as is unusual to find in these old Courts Martial, a most excellent character given him, received zoo lashes because he had left a prisoner of whom he was in charge for one minute to get him a drink of water.

Sometimes terrible floggings were awarded for what was probably no offence at all. In 1744 a man who had been boxing with another and had had the n~isfortune to injure him so that he died received IOO lashes, while there is recorded in the 21st V O I . ~ ~ of the Naval Chronicle the case of a man tried in 1809 tor murder. H e was acquitted of the charge on the ground that the men were sky-larking and was.awarded 200 lashes round the fleet a s " an admonition against sky-larking " in future.

These floggings were administered with a show of humanity. A surgeon accompanied the wretched victim who was being flogged round the fleet and could stop the punishment when so much of it as he could stand had been given to him; he was then taken back to his ship to recover sufficiently to receive the remainder. The curious will find an account of the carrying out of a punishment of 500 lashes, 350 of which were inflicted at one time, at p. 163 of the 9th Vol. of the Naval Chronicle, and a general description of the infliction of corporal punishment in an extract from a contemporary account of life in the Xavy at page 28 of the 5th Vol. of Clowes' History of the Royal Navy.

The floggings inflicted at the whim of the Captain are less horrible only because the number of lashes was less. In some ships flogging was incessant, not seldom inflicted with the utmost levity, as the following story shows. " Admiral Paken- ham on landing once at Portsmouth boasted to a friend that he had left his whole crew the happiest fellows on earth. Being asked ' Why ? ' he answered ' I have flogged seventeen and they are happy it is over, and all the rest are happy that they have escaped. " '49

On some ships flogging was often inflicted for the slightest cause. The crew of the Nymphe during the Portsmouth mutiny complained that one of the number had received three dozen for " silent contempt " in smiling after a beating by a boatswain's mate, while it is recorded that during 1793 in the Riinerva " when any was heard to swear their names were put on a list and at seven the next morning they were punished, though not severely, few getting more than seven or eight

60 NAVAL REVIEW.

lashes . . . . Though the punishment was light, it dis- pleased the men very much "" and nearly caused a mutiny, and the Captain was thereafter forbidden by the Admiral (Rear- Admiral Cornwallis) to flog without his permission. This particular punishment was probably not unlawful or contrary to the Act which forbids swearing and the lashes did not exceed the numbers authorised by the Regulations. Rut they often did so, for two, three or four dozen were common, though a Regulation which appears in the 1745 edition and was continued till 1806 laid down that the Captain was not to " inflict any punishment on a seaman beyond twelve lashes on his bare back with a cat-of-nine-tails according to the ancient practice of the Sea." If he thought the offence deserved more he was to apply for a Court hgartial.

Rut the regulation was not observed. I have in my possession the printed record of a Court Martial on a Lieut. who degraded a midshipman, sent him to serve before the mast and then gave him fifty-five lashes. On his trial by Court Martial he asserted that the regulation was habitually disre- garded.

It is said that the boatswain's mates were " drilled to flog effectively, by being made to practice on a cask, under the superintendence of the boat~wain,"~' and in the case of a severe . punishment the man who began was certainly relieved as he got tired after inflicting half-a-dozen or more lashes. Moreover the Captain saw to it that the lashes were properly laid on. In the defence to which I have alluded Lieut. Low says : " It was incumbent on the prosecutor to prove that the four dozen and odd inflicted were cruelly given or attended with more severity than the offence deserved. I can, however, prove that W m . Tohnson, a raw boatswain's mate, notwithstanding my repeated cautions, inflicted a greater part of the punishment in a most trifling way until, at last, I told him it could answer no purpose to trifle so, as it only obliged me to give a greater number of lashes."

One of the matters which strikes any one who makes a serious study of the subject I have dealt with is the fact that throughout the whole period the men seem to have accepted as a regular incident of the sea service the severe punishments permitted bv law or custom and reserved their complaints for those which were authorised by neither. Ball, in his narrative from which I have quoted, gives his account of the unauthorised punishments " for malefactors and offenders never before invented," and ends his recital with the following outburst : " But this punishment and tyrannv used u5to men for any offence I hold not fitting to be executed in a ship, excepting those that are commanders purpose to break men's arms laming them and have no benefit nor use of the labours for which men go to sea and venture their

P U N I S H M E N T S INFLICTED A T SE.4. 6 I

lives. Neither would I myself nor would any true bred seaman that had charge of a ship and sole commander of men execute and use this unlawful punishment. Although it was (the first time as ever I know since my going to sea) put into execution aboard the Hector and by such an eminent gentleman as our Captain Sir Francis Stewart the devisor thereof ."

Monson notices the same characteristic of the men when he writes :53 " A seaman is willing to give or receive punishment deservedly according to the Custom of the Sea, but not otherwise in the fury of dissolute, blasphemous, swearing Com- manders," and I remember reading the minutes of a Court Martial held quite early in the XIXth century where a Captain was tried for cruelty to his crew. The chief complaint made against him was no t that rattens were carried by the boatswain's mates for " starting " the crew, but that they were rather thicker and two or three inches longer than usual.

It is sometimes suggested that such a survey as I have made of conditions which have long ceased to exist is a profitless exercise, but I do not think that this is true, for it is impossible to understand the present without some knowledge of the past, and I am convinced that, quite apart from any antiquarian interest the account may have, the time spent on this account of the punishments inflicted in the " good old days " will not have been spent in vain if it leads to some consideration of the question what punishments are really essential in order to maintain true discipline in a naval force.

No doubt punishments on shore in old days were far more severe than they are to-day, and therefore the cruelty, even the brutality, of the old punishments did not strike onlooliers in those days in the same way as they strike us who regard them from the standpoint of a more humane age. Moreover, those who suffered were different in character from those who are subject to discipline to-day. They were without education, brought up in undesirable surroundings, often criminal and brutal, incapable of understanding any rule but that of the strong arm.

It may seem almost an impertinence for a civilian to express to such an audience as I am addressing my opinion on what punishments are necessary, but I may, I hope, venture in conclusion to say this much without offence.

First, that all punishment which deprives a man of liberty or life is an evil, not so much, or even principally; because of its effect on the offenders, serious though it may be, as because it deprives the State temporarily or permanently of the services of one upon whose training much time, pains and money have been spent. But it is a necessary evil, and being so, it should be confined to the narrowest possible limits.

62 NAVAL REVIEW.

Second, that though it may seem that those responsible for the conduct of a disciplined force are the persons who ought to decide the question what punishments are necessary, the ultimate decision must rest, not with them, but with the civilians. This seeming paradox is true because, at all events in a free country like ours in which the armed forces of the State are normally recruited by volunteers, no system of discipline and no punishments intended to maintain it can endure unless they commend themselves to enlightened public opinion. By which I mean not the opinion of unthinking humanitarians but the opinion of those who realise that some, even on occasion very severe, punishment is necessary to maintain in a naval force that discipline and habit of unhesitating obedience on which may depend the safety of the individual, of the ship and even of the State itself.

That the infliction of the brutal punishments comnlon at the end of the XVIIIth century became impossible was due to the steady pressure of public opinion outside as well as inside the Service, and that little or no complaint is ever heard to-day seems to me-one outside the Service with ample opportunity for forming an opinion-to arise from the fact that the great powers conferred on Courts Martial and the Commanders of ships are usually exercised with wisdom and tact.

NOTES.

B.B.-Blackbook of Admiralty. Edited with Appendices by Sir Travers Tniss, in four volumes.

P.R.0.-Public Record Office. S.P. Dom.-State Papers, Domestic. N.R.S.-Navy Records Society. B.M.-British Museum.

1 B.B., I., p. 459. 2 S. 5. B.B., IV., p. 511. 3 B.B., III . , p. 233 4 B.B., I., p., 230. 5 Oleron, XII. B.B., I., p. 105. Roole d'olayron, XII . B.B., II . , p. 447. Judgments of the Sea, XTI. B.B., III., p. 19. Gotland, 26 B.B., IV., p. 83. Bruges, 26. B.B., IV., 317. Flanders. B.B., IV., p. 431. 6 5 15, B.B., II., p. 231. See Judgments of the Sea, XII., above. Gomtland, 28 B.B., IV., p. 87. Rruges, 28, id., 319. Flanders, IY., id., p. 433. B.B., p. 107, J XIV. 7 De Officio Admiralitatis, XLVII. B.B., I., p. 240. 8 § XII., B.B., I . , p. 105. 9 Judgments of the Sea, XII. B.B., III . , p. 19. Gotland, 26, B.B., IV., p. 83. Flanders, 12 id., p. 431. 10 B.B., I., p. 105. Roole d'elayron, B. II . , p. 447. Judgments of the Sen, XII . B.B., I I I . , p. 229. 11 5 CXX., B.B., III . , p. 229. 12 J XXVIII., B.B., IV., p. 541. 13 De Officio Admiralitatis, IV., B.B., I. p. 223. 14 Oleron, 11.- B.R., I., p. 45. 1 5 § CXXII., B.B., I I I . , p. 229. 16 Amalphitan Table, 56. B.B:, IV., p. 41 17 Gotland, 4. B.B., IV., p. 57. Wisbuy, IV., id., p. 266. Lubeck, IV., id., p. 291. '8 J IX., B.B., IV., p. 365. 19 J CCVI., B.B., III., p. 439. 2 0 J XXXIV., B.B., I., p. 129. 2 1 Roole d'olayron, XXIII. B.B., 11. p. 456. 22 J CCV., B.B., III., p. 434-5. 23 Roole d'olayron. B.B., II . , p. 469. 24 See Customs of the Sea, CXIII. B.B., III . , p. 223. Assizes of Jerusalem, 4. B.B., IV., p. 509. Amalphitan Table, 2, id., p. 4. 25 Gotland, 62, id., p. 123. Wisbuy, LXI., id., p. 282. Dantzig, 62, id., p. 355. 26 Customs of the Sea, CXI. B.B., III . , p. 221. 27 Gotland, 64. B.B., IV., p. 125. Dantzic,

PUN'ISHMENTS INFLICTED .4T SE.4. 63

62, id., p. 355. Wisbuy, LXIII., id., p. 283. 2 8 5 XI., B.B., IV., p. 531. 2 9 p. 130. 3 0 P.R.O. S.P. Dom. Car. I., 56, fol. 101. They were made in pursuance of Warwick's orders for the expedition to Rh6, which are set out in full as an appendix to Ball's Narrative. 31 P.R.O. S.P. Dom. Car I., 407, fol. 32. 3 2 P .R .0 Admiralty, In Letters 5267. 3 3 19 Geo., II., c. 21, $5 1-6. 3 4 B.M., Harl. MSS , 309, fol. so. They are now printed in " Select Naval Documents," by Hodges & Hughes, Cambridge University Press, 1922. 3 3 B.M., Harl. MSS., 1341. 3 6 N.R.S., Vol. XLIII. , p. 436. " 701. II . , p. 103. 33 P.R.O., Ad., In Letters 5267. fi N.R.S., Vol. XXXVI., p. 168. 40 P.R.O. S.P. Dom. Car II., 222, fol. 132. 41 P.R.O., Ad., I n Letters 5259. 4 2 P.R.O., Ad., In Letters 5266. 43 Oliver Cromwell took the same step in 1647, when three men condemned to death for mutiny were "ordered . . . . to throw dice for their lives, and he who lost was instantly shot." Oliver Cromwell, by John Morley, p. 237. 44 Wreck of the Wager, p. 162. 4 5 P.R.O. S.P. Dom. Car I. 80, fol. 7. 46 The Diary of Henry Teonge, now first published from the original MS., J,ondon, 1825, p. 18. 4 7 Teonge's Diary, p. 254. 48 Naval Chronicle, Vol. 21, p. 84. 49 Naval Chronicle, Vol. 24, p. 289. 50 A Mariner of England, by Wm. Richardson. Edited by Lieut.Co1. Erskine Childers, p. 105. " The defence of Lieut. J. McArthur, Low, Portsmouth, 1816. 52 Clomes' History of the Royal Navy, Vol. 5 , p. z8n. " N.R.S., Vol. XXIII., p. 435.

DECOY SHIPS.

AN early instance may be added to those printed in THE NAVAL REVIEW for November, 1922; it will be found in Sir Julian Corbett's " The Successors of Drake " (rgoo), page 283. Corbett quotes from draft instructions in Cecil's handwriting in the Hat-

. field MSS. The date is August, 1699. " . . . . George Fenner, you are a wise man and have experience how to use stratagems. It will not be amiss, if you think good, to lay a bait for them in this sort : that some league before you some bark may be sent and take in her ordnance, as she were no man of war, which peradventure may entice the baggages from the shore to come off and take her."

The use of false flags as a means to deceive or entrap an enemy is touched on by Mr. W. G. Perrin, the Admiralty Librarian, in Chapter VII . of his " British Flags " (1922), and he states that publicists are by no means unanimous upon the subject. H e cites Halleck's " International Law," and the reference is worth exploring further. Halleck was an American : and it is to be observed that the United States Navy made use of the decoy stratagem, in the capture of the Confederate vessel Savannah on June 3rd, 1861, by the U.S. brig Perry. " . . . As her guns were run back, her port holes closed, and the vessel otherwise purposely disguised, she 'was mistaken for a merchantman . . ." (History of the Confederate States Navy ; by J. Thomas Scharf, 2nd edn., 1894, p. 70).

General Halleck says of himself that " During the war between the United States and Mexico, the author, while serving on the staff of the Commander of the Pacific Squadron, and as Secretary of the State of California, was often required to give opinions on questions of international law growing out of the operations of the war." His notes he published in 1861, and the first edition of his book follows very closely Emer de Vattel's " Law of Nations " (published in 1758). Vattel had written : L i . . . Deceptions practised on an enemy either by words

or actions, but without perfidy-snares laid for him consistent with the rights of war-are stratagems, the use of which has always been acknowledged as lawful . . . . In the use of stratagems, we should respect not only the faith due to an enemy, but also the rights of humanity, and carefully avoid doing things the introduction of which would be pernicious to mankind. Since the commencement of hostilities between

DECOY SHIPS. 65

France and England, an English frigate is said to have appeared off Calais, and made signals of distress, with a view of decoying out some vessel, and actually seized a boat and some sailors who generously came to her assistance. If the fact be true, that unworthy stratagem deserves a severe punishment. It tends to damp a benevolent charity, which should be held so sacred in the eyes of mankind, and which is so laudable even between enemies. Besides, making signals of distress is asking assistance, and, by that very action, promising perfect security to those who give the friendly succour. Therefore the action attributed to that frigate implies an odious perfidy." ("The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the conduct and affairs of Nations and Sovereigns." From the French of Monsieur de Vattlel, 4th edn., corrected. London, 1811. Book III., Ch. X., 178.)

Halleck follows Vattel, pruning down his text. The new edition of Halleck, " revised with notes and cases by Sir Sher- ston Raker " (1878), preserves Halleck's text but adds, in a footnote : " No trace can be found of this occurrence : Vattel merely tells us that ' it is said ' to have happened "-a cautionary note which is omitted from the third edition (18g3), " thoroughly revised and in many parts rewritten." The footnote in the second edition contained, however, another example, which is embodied in the text of the 1893 edition by Sir Sherston Baker. This is the case of H.M.S. Hussar (Captain J. M. Russell) in action with the French decoy Sybille (Captain le Comte de Krergarou de Soemaria) in 1783, and the subject of an affidavit made before the (colonial) mayor of New York, 13th February, I 783.

The case will be found in Sir Sherston Baker's " Halleck's International Law " (1893), Vol. I , page 568; and as, until the late war, it was the authority upon which international lawyers relied, it is worthy of further consideration. In the first place, " Captain J. M. Russell " is Thomas Macnamara Russell, who died an Admiral in 1824 and of whom there is a notice in the Dictionary of National Biography. ,-2 memoir of him in the haval Chronicle, Vol. 17, pp. 441-463, contains his letter of proceedings to the Commander-in-Chief, North America Squadron, reporting the action between the Hussar 2nd the Sybille.

Hussar, off Sandy Hook, 6th Feb., 1783. Sir,-

On the zznd of last month, in a fresh gale and hazy weather, lat. 36O 201, in soundings, I chased a sail standing to the westward, with the starboard tacks on board, wind N.N.W. O h my approach, she displayed an English Ensign reversed in her main shrouds, and English colours over French at the ensign staff. Having likewise discovered

66 NAVAL REVIEW.

that she was under very good jurymasts, had some shot- holes in her quarter, and not supposing that French tactics contained a ruse de guerre of so black a tint, I took her to be what her colours intimated-a distressed prize to some of His Majesty's ships : every hostile idea vanished ; my mind was employed in devising means to succour and protect her; I declined the privilege of my supposed rank, and stood under his lee to hail. At that moment (by a pre-concerted and rapid movement) he put up his helm, aimed at laying me athwart hawse, carrying away my bowsprit, raking, and then boarding me. ! felt the error of my credulity ; ordered our helm hard-a-weather-shivered, and shortened the after- sails. The Hussar obeyed it-saved me from the murdering reflection of a surprise-baffled in part the enemy's intention, and received only a half-raking fire; which, however, tore me to pieces forward, and killed me two men. By this time both ships were by the lee forward, and almost aboard each other. I called aloud, to stand by to board him. It had the desired effect-he put up his helm-wore off-the Hussar closed him-and a fair engagement commenced before the wind. H e yawed frequently; the Hussar kept as close and as parallel to him as possible : in about forty minutes his situation appeared disagreeable to him; his fire grew less frequent, and soon after contemptible. At the hour's end his fire ceased; and, under cover of our smoke, he extended his distance, put his helm a-starboard, got his larboard tacks on board, and fled to windward. T o avoid a raking, to jam him up against the wind, and bring our larboard guns to play (two of the other side having been rendered unserviceable) I followed his motions, exchansed a few shot with him on that side; but, to my great mortifica- tion, found my foremast and bowsprit tottering, and no head sail to govern the ship by, as you will see by my enclosed defects. However, we chased and refitted as well a s we could, and found we gained on the enemy, it having fallen less wind.

The haze dispersed, and a large ship, which we first took for an enemy, but afterwards found to be the Centurion, appeared to windward, and astern withal ;-and, to leeward, a sloop, which by signal I knew to be ours. After about two hours' chase, the Hussar got up abreast of the enemy, gave him one broadside, which he returned with two guns, and struck his colours : the Centurion, then about long random shot astern, and the Terrier sloop about four or five miles leeward, under a pressure of sail, which does honour to Captain Morris.

The prize is la Sybille, a French frigate of 38 guns (twelve of which he hove overboard when he first fled) and

DECOY SHIPS. 67

350 men, commanded by Monsieur le Comte de Krergarou de Soemaria.

In justice even to the Captain of the Sybille, it must be owned that all his evolutions (as far as my little ability enables me to judge) were masterly; and, in one instance, bordering on a noble enthusiastic rashness. Nor did he fly, until the men in his magazine were breast high in water, and all his powder drowned, by some low shot which he received early in the action. I t is, therefore, Sir, with great pain and reluctance, that I inform you that this officer (commanding a ship of more than double the Hussar's force, in perfect order of battle; for, under the then circumstances of wind and sea, he derived great and obvious advantages from being under jury-masts)-an officer of family and long rank, adorned with military honours, conferred by his sovereign, for former brilliant services, has sullied his reputation, and, in the eye of Europe, disgraced the French flag, by descending to fight me for above thirty minu tes , under the ENGLISH COLOURS, and SIGNAL O F DIS- TRESS, above described: for which act of base treachery and flagrant violation of the law of nations, I have confined him as a State prisoner, until, through your mediation, justice and the King's service are satisfied.

I am ashamed of the excessive length of this letcer, but thought the subject matter of the last paragraph constituted the necessity of the minute detail. . . . .

I am, Sir, with great respect, Your most obedient humble Servant,

T. M. RUSSELL. Rear-Admiral, Digby, &c., &c., &c.

The Memoir in the Naval Chronicle states that the Captain of the Sybille delivered his sword to Captain Russell, who cut short his speech, saying the Hussar had not had fair play " but Almighty God has saved her from the most foul snare of the most perfidious enemy.'' Russell added that he received his sword " with the most inexpressible contempt," and, s t~cking its point in the deck, he bent it double and snapped it.

During the confinement of the French officers on board the Hussar, words were exchanged, hinting at " a lpersonal account " after the war. " After the conclusion of peace," continues the Memoir, " Captain Russell, having been informed that Count Krergarou had been tried, and shameful ly acquitted, obtained leave from the Admiralty to go to France." Admiral Arbuthnot crossed with him, and on learning the reason of the journey, was instrumental 'in inducing Russell to give up his plan and return to England.

68 NAVAL REVIEW.

An unusual circumstance attached to the incident is that Russell took a Lieutenant, Master, Pilot, and two Master's Mates from the Hussar with him, and all swore an affidavit before the Mayor of New York, on February 13th, 1783, that the matters set forth in his letter of proceedings of February 6th were true.

T H E MARITIME RIGHTS O F BELLIGERENT POWERS.

LITTLE has been heard on the subject of international maritime law since the Peace Conference at Paris, but the catchword " Freedom of the Seas " is still a powerful shibboleth and there are indications that the committee of the League of Nations is only waiting an opportunity to bring up the Hague Conven- tions, etc., for revision.

At the time when war with Germany was coming nearer and nearer and strenuous efforts were being made to prepare for the inevitable clash, the Declaration of London received the approval of the Admiralty and British naval delegates. Per- haps the strategical aspects of trade and commerce had been insufficiently studied. In any case, the bitter experience of the war has remedied that defect, and the necessity of upholding maritime belligerent rights is now more generally appreciated.

Previous to the Declaration of Paris, in 1856, this country claimed and exercised the full belligerent right of stopping all trade with the enemy, no matter under what flag it sailed. By that Declaration, we practically limited interference with neutral ships to contraband and blockade ; but the absence of any exact definition of contraband and the different views of blockade taken by the various Powers left the question in a vague and undecided state.

The London Co~iference of 1908 was initiated in order to arrive at some agreement as to the rules which should guide the proposed International Prize Court. It resulted in the Declara- tion of London, which was an attempt to codify the customs of maritime war so far as neutrals were concerned. By introducing a definite list of contraband articles under the headings " absolute " and " conditional " and a free list that could not be declared contraband) and by renouncing the doctrine of Con- tinuous Voyage in the case of conditional contraband and blockade, it greatly limited the application of the principles of contraband and blockade previously in force.

The Declarations of Paris and London both aimed a t facili- tating trade between belligerents and neutrals, and as this country put in force the provisions of the Declaration of London, ~vith certain modifications, on the outbreak of war, an examina-

70 NAVAL REVIEW.

tion of its practical working under the stress of war should be instructive, and should also indicate the extent to which the application of the principles of contraband and blockade have been modified by modern conditions. With recent experience fresh in our mind, it is not necessary to point out the fact that the prevention of enemy trade is one of the primary objects of maritime war. At the same time it is well to remember that different conceptions of war have existed and have been responsible for serious errors of policy and strategy. At the beginning of the late war, the prevention of German trade was the only purely naval means by which pressure could be applied to Germany, and until Britain raised 'a large army it was her primary means of offence.

Not only must any agreement to abolish restrictions on belligerent trade react unfairly on the nations that trust to naval rather than military power, but it must infallibly break down when put to the test. It is unreasonable to suppose that a strong naval power engaged in a life-and-death struggle is not going to use its Navy against maritime trade if the ability of its opponent to carry on the war depends on the continuance of oversea supplies. W e know how, on our side, the Declaration of London and various Orders-in-Council were torn to shreds by the hard logic of events and how the possibility of ending the war by submarine attack caused Germany to renounce the rules of civilised war.

The rapidity with which the German mercantile flag disappeared from the sea1 during the first few months of hostilities was satisfactory so far a s it went, but Germany continued to carry on a considerable trade in neutral ships, partly direct and partly through neutral ports. The description of the blockade given in the Appendix shows how very gradually this was reduced.

Even before the war, about 25 per cent. of German foreign trade was carried under the flags of the Powers that were subsequently neutral, and German trade statistics show that that proportion was capable of carrying Germany's oversea iood supplies and a large proportion of the raw material required for military purposes, provided all non-essential trade were ex- cluded. S o long as this neutral shipping was allowed to pass, Germany experienced little difficulty in the supply and re- victualment of her people. In addition to the normal proportion carried in neutral ships, additional neutral tonnage and new construction will always gravitate into the service of belliger-

1 Trade continued, however, under the German Flag in the Baltic throughout the war, and at one period German ships passed freely along the Dutch coast between the Rhine and the Bight, but the latter was eventually stopped by the action of the Harwich Force in July, 19x7.

THE MARITIME RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENT POWERS. 7I

ents, so that the Declaration of London and similar instruments would merely result in the eventual replacement of belligerent by neutral shipping.

Besides the transference of belligerent trade to neutral ships there is the question of carrying it on circuitously through neutral ports. Before the war, over 2 0 per cent. of Germany's total sea-borne trade passed up the Rhine through the neutral port of R ~ t t e r d a m . ~ Also as the Allies were unable to extend their control to the Baltic, Swedish and Danish ports were used on a large scale as entrep8ts for German trade. If it had not been for the enforcement of the doctrine of Continuous Voyage and other measures, Germany would have been able to get all her essential supplies through neutral ports, thus completely outflanking the Allies naval power. Any attempt to limit the enforcement of blockade and capture of contraband to ships proceeding direct to belligerent ports, may not only give an un- fair advantage to a favourably situated belligerent, but it may render the old-established right of blockade and seizure of contraband practically worthless. The doctrine of Continuous Voyage and adjudication according to final destination, is the re fore an essential corollary of the doctrine of contraband and blockade. The relative urgency of this question of final destination must vary, of course, with each particular war, but it is not confined to Europe. If the U.S.A. were fighting Mexico, for example, and the immunity of neutral ships trading through neutral ports were established, Great Britain would be entitled to supply Mexico with all the munitions and material of war required, through the neutral ports of Guatemala.

PROPOSED BRITISH POLICY. It is clear that Great Britain should refuse to bind herself

to any limitation of belligerent rights, but the lessons of the war should be examined in order to devise measures for the elimination of unnecessary friction between belligerents and neutrals. Sir Edward Grey,2 in his instructions to the British delegates at the London Conference, said : " What the commerce of the world desires above all is certainty." It was just this lack of certainty which was partly responsible for friction with neutrals. Numerous Orders-in-Council3 followed one another closely ; and these, combined with the initial attempts to reconcile the actual requirements of war with the rules laid down in the Orders-in-Council adopting the modified Declaration of London, were responsible for confusion and uncertainty in the

1 Deduced from the Jahresbericht fiir der Rhein Schiffahrt, 19x0. 2 Correspondence and Documents respecting the International Naval Con-

ference held in London, 1909, Cd., 4554, p. 23. "he fact that these orders were not necessarily binding on the Prize Courts

added to the uncertainty of the situation (vide Kim and Zamora in Lloyds' reports of Prize Cases)

72 NAVAL REVIE\%.-.

minds of neutral merchants' as to what they could or could not do.

Similar difficulties will always be met if a country binds itself to, a codified system of law in peace time. Weapons develop so rapidly and different wars vary so greatly, that the efficacy of international law can only be preserved by holding fast to a few elementary principles whilst retaining elasticity in their actual application. The result of the pre-war attempt to embody the rules of maritime war in a rigid code should be a sufficient warning for all time. If in 1909 we willingly re- nounced rights, which quite independently of the illegal submarine war, were essential to the exercise of British sea power six years later, what guarantee is there that a new post-war code may not include the abandonment of some other rights essential to our future salvation ? Such mistakes are inevitable once legislation departs from the broad principles governing the doctrine of contraband, blockade, etc., and binds itself to a rigid code.

Although before the war, the necessity of maintaining intact the weapon of bloclrade was recognised by Great Rritain,"he claim to apply the doctrine of Continuous Voyage to blockade was abandoned on the grounds3 that it had not been previously applied by British Prize Courts, thus illustrating the danger of the " code and agreement system " as opposed to the application of general principles. If it be admitted-and it was admitted-that a belligerent has the right to enforce's blockade, it was illogical to abandon a rule which safeguarded a blockade from indirect infringement.

It is suggested that the only satisfactory solution is a return to the old system which consisted in claiming certain specific rights, namely : search, seizure for adjudication, blockade, etc. -and leaving the Admiralty Court to base its judgment on wide principles and established precedents. This system is re- commended as being more adaptable to varying conditions and' more likely to elicit an intelligible and consistent policy. It presumably would have been followed in 1914, if the Declara- tions of Paris and London and the Hague Conventions had been non-existent.

Lord Stowell expressed this idea when he said in the Atlanta4 (6 C. Rob. 440, I . E.P.C. 607) : " All law is resolvable

1 The 6ear o f estranging American opinion was partly responsible for the slow and roundabout methods of buiiding up the blockade, but there is reason to beli,eve that a stronger and more consiste~lt policy, based on the same principles as th.e Northern States adopted in the Civil War, would have b,e.en more satis- f a c t ~ r y in this respect.

2 Ibid, p. 25.

"bid, p. 27. The reason why Britain had no~t previously applied this do,ctrine was because the geographical situation of her enemies had not dmemanded imt. Also, the claim to capture a l l enemy trade, no matter under what flag, rend,ered i~t unneoessary. This illustrat'es th,e fallacy of being guided only by precedents.

4 hIemorandum for H.M. Procurator-G,eneral on Contraband Trade and Continuous Voyager, by Dr. A. Pearce Higgins.

THE MARITIME RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENT POWERS. 73

into general principles. The cases which may arise under new combinations of circumstances, leading to an extended application of principles, ancient and recognised by just corollaries, may be infinite; but so long as the continuity of the original and established principles is preserved pure and unbroken, the practice is not new nor is it justly chargeable with being an in- novation on the ancient Law, when in fact the Court does nothing more than apply old principles to new circumstances.''

If these arguments are correct, Great Britain should refuse to bind herself to any hard-and-fast code governing the conduct of naval war, but should endeavour to withdraw from the De- claration of Paris, denounce the Hague Conventions1 and declare her intention of being guided in the future by certain recognised principles and rights, the interpretation of which will be left to the judgment of the Prize Courts.

If the purport of the foregoing is accepted in principle, it will be necessary to define the British claims with greater exact- ness. This exposition should be drawn on broad lines covering only the salient points and avoiding anything in the shape of an elaborate code. The actual draft would have to be prepared by counsel in close consultatio,n with a competent Naval Staff. The following outline is suggested as embodying the main points :-

Great Britain claims the following fundamental rights :- ( I ) A belligerent has the right to bring every possible pres-

sure to bear on an enemy, consistent with due regard for innocent inter-neutral trade and in accordance with those dictates of humanity which modern opinion regards as imperative.

(2) A belligerent has the right to prevent oversea supplies reaching the enemy, which may assist him in the prose- cution of the war, and to attack his credit and resources by the restriction of his exports.

(3) The Government of a neutral state must refrain from assisting belligerents or shielding them from the pressure of their enemy's hostility; but it is not incumbent on such Government to prevent its subjects from trading in contraband. The responsibility rests with the belligerents concerned.

Great Britain claims to enforce these rights in accordance with the following general methods and principles :-

(a) They must be exercised in such a manner, and only in such a manner, as to secure the safety of the lives and property of neutrals, subject in the case of property to interim seizure for adjudication before a proper court.

1 According to the terms of the Hague Conventions they may be denounced by any of the contracting parties, subject to one year's notice.

NAVAL REVIEW.

Corollary to (a ) :-A submarine can only become a legitimate weapon against commerce provided that it places in safety all persons and relevant papers before destroying a prize. Ship's boats cannot be considered a place of safety.

( b ) The right1 of visit and search is an essential preliminary in order to ascertain the true nature of the vessel and cargo. When sea conditions render such visit or search impracticable, a vessel may be conducted into harbour for the purpose.

(c) Enemy subjects capable of bearing arpls, suspected of espionage or other unneutral service, may be arrested on the high seas. Neutral subjects may be similarly dealt with for suspected espionage or unneutral service ; but information of any such action must be conveyed as soon as possible to their Minister and they must be brought to trial before a competent court. Enemy mails and correspondence are also liable to seizure in a neutral ship.

(d ) Any articles may be declared contraband which assist or support the enemy directly or indirectly in the prosecu- tion of the war.

Corollary to (d ) :-Not only does the nature of modern war prevent any clear distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, but the attempt to differentiate between the two, introduces an endless source of friction between belligerents and neutral traders. Belligerents must publish their list of contraband as soon after the commencement of hostilities as possible. Any list of contraband articles issued in peace time must be regarded as provisional, for its extent must depend partly on the nature and scope of the war.

( e ) The restriction on enemy commerce may be further enforced by a blockade, i.e., an absolute restriction of all maritime tiade with the whole or any portion of his coast, duly promulgated to neutrals. A blockade must be initiated as a distinct operation of war, and it must be maintained by a sufficient force.

(f) The capture of goods whether by right of blockade or contraband is governed by the ultimate destination of the goods concerned, as accepted in what is known as the doctrine of Continuous Voyage.

1 '' That right (of search) must be exercised . . . . for otherwise you do not know whether you have the right to seize. From the right of search has, therefore, developed the duty 20 search; and it is the omission to recognise th's duty that has plunged the German Admiralty into its piratical career."-The Neutral Merchant and Contraband of War and Blockade, Sir Francis Piggolt 191.5, P. 37.

TIIE MARITIME RIGHTS OF BELLIGEKENT POWERS. 7 5

Corollary t o (f) :-The difficulty of producing definite evidence as to the ultimate enemy destination of goods consigned to neutrals was a serious cause of friction in the late war; but if belligerent maritime rights are to be preserved, means must be found to check imports in excess of a neutral's domestic requirements. New conditions arising from increased facilities of transport must be met by new methods, such as those built up during the late war ( v ide Appendix for description of blockade), and maritime powers should organise, in peace time, systems of control which would eliminate as far as possible the element of doubt and suspicion and would facilitate the passage of bond fide inter-neutral trade.

Governments should view favourably any efforts on the part of their merchants to safeguard and accelerate bonii fide neutral trade; while remaining neutral, they should not hinder in any way, but rather encourage, the organisation of guilds to inspect, load and guarantee such goods as may be intended for use and consumption only in their own country.

Governments should also undertake, and specially provide for, the compilation and publication of trade statistics by which the domestic requirements of neutrals can be measured and supplied by rationing. Intelligence is at the basis of acceler- ated passage of neutral goods and statistics are an essential part of the machinery of acceleration.

APPENDIX. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLOCKADE.

See Table attached. NOTE :-This appendix is included in order to enforce the lesson

that instead of binding herself to any hard-and-fast code of international maritime law, this country should p5epare in peace time different methods of blockade, suitable to the conditions of different wars, in con- formity with the general principles laid down under the heading, " Definition of Belligerent Rights and their Practical Application."

The mere fact of promulgating a clear and logical policy to neutrals will do much to remove friction and distrust.

First S t a g e : Up t o A u g u s t aoth, 1914. British vessels on the way to the North Sea or Baltic were

warned not to continue their voyages and to seek safety in a British port. This warning was reinforced by the refusal of Government insurance.

In the case of neutral vessels, goods shipped before war broke out could not be seized as contraband, but we were able

76 NAVAL REVIEW.

to use the right of pre-emption to take over a large amount of perishable goods which would otherwise have reached the enemy.

Enemy shipping came to a standstill. A large proportion was captured by the Allies or was laid up in neutral ports. Second Stage : August 20th to November, 1914.

On August 20th an Order in Council put into force most of the rules contained in the Declaration of London, with the important exception that the doctrine of Continuous Voyage was made applicable to conditional a s well a s to absolute contraband. The Admiralty issued orders on the same day that, as the Ger- man Government were controlling foodstuffs, they were to be treated in a similar manner to absolute contraband. In view of the fact that practically all German trade had been diverted through neutral channels, it would have been impossible under the Declaration of London to have seized anything but absolute contraband.

The contraband lists were extended by successive proclamations; iron ore, copper, and rubber being declared conditional contraband on September 1st.

On October zgth, Art. 57 of the Declaration of London was abrogated. This enabled us to seize ships of enemy ownership whatever flag they flew.

These measures were at first executed largely by the traditional method of naval search ; that is to say, the decision to send a vessel in for adjudication by the Prize Court generally rested with the Commanding Officer of the boarding vessel, guided by the instructions in the Naval Prize Manual.

Neutral shippers took steps to defeat this method of search by consigning goods to an apparently neutral destination, so that there was nothing to indicate that the destination of the articles mentioned in the manifest was other than the neutral country for which the ship was bound. There was no alternative under the old methods but to send in all such cargoes for adjudication, a measure which caused grave inconvenience to legitimate neutral trade and supply.

The first step was to obtain guarantees in the case of each cargo from the neutral government concerned that the goods were not to be re-exported. T o do this it was necessary to wire the contents of the manifest to the Admiralty, to whom the decision as to whether a ship should be released was thus transferred. By November, 1914, when this procedure became a regular practice, a radical change had therefore taken place in the functions of the fleet, since the responsibility for seizing ships and cargoes had been transferred from officers at sea to committees sitting in London. An additional reason for this procedure was the difficulty and danger involved in even the

THE MARITIME RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENT POWERS. 7 7

most superficial search of a modern ship at sea, subject to attack by submarines.

This was a departure from the traditional customs of maritime war, but it was thoroughly justified by the new conditions, and made for the convenience both of the belligerent and of the legitimate neutral trader. .

Third Stage: November, 1914, to March r ~ t h , 1915. The examination system developed rapidly. It was soon

found that, except in the case of Norway, the guarantees given by neutral governments in Europe against re-export were worthless, either from weakness or complicity. Our blockade, instead of being directed simply to prevent the passage of contraband from overseas, had to be used with the wider object of backing up our diplomatic pressure on the Scandinavian neutrals. This necessitated a greater degree of control being executed by the British Government and an organisation was developed to deal with it, including the W a r Trade Intelligence Department.

In such cases as came before them, the Prize Court had little difficulty in brushing aside the pretences of neutral destination based on the literal reading of the Declaration of London, and showing that the goods were in fact destined for the German Government. In other words, modern developments transferred the doctrine of Continuous Voyage into a doctrine of ' Ultimate Destination.

On the naval side, regular examination stations had been developed in the Downs, at Falmouth and Kirkwall, at which all shipping was forced to call. In the case of the Downs, this call was enforced by making use of the presence of British and German minefields in the Narrow Seas. Elsewhere the work was performed by cruiser squadrons. On November 4th an agreement was made with the llnited Steamship Company of Denmark, in return for facilities for rapid handling, that their ships would voluntarily call for examination. This was the first of many similar agreements with shipping lines, merchants and associations, in which we granted increased facilities for rapid handling to traffic which was submitted to our supervision.

On December rzth, the Netherlands Oversea Trust was formed to take charge of all contraband entering Holland; all contraband not consigned to the Trust or the Dutch Government itself being liable to seizure. Though hampered at first by lack of supervising staff, the Netherland Oversea Trust may be said to have reconciled the rights of belligerents and neutrals with a considerable degree of success. Had all the neutrals been able or willing to follow the example of Holland the problem of the blockade would have been greatly simplified.

78 NAVAL REVIEW.

On November r3th, as a result of all copper shipments being held up at Gibraltar, Italy decreed that goods arriving at an Italian port consigned " to order " or to a destination in Italy were not to be re-exported. This order enabled Allied sea power to control the imports to Switzerland at Gibraltar and Port Said.

Although the three Scandinavian countries had given guarantees not to re-export various kinds of contraband, their prohibiton lists were not identical, and by the liberal granting of exemptions for export to one another, a brisk trade in contraband was still kept up. Norway appears to have meant well by us, but Denmark through weakness and Sweden through a preference for Germany, made a satisfactory arrangement impossible. More pressure had therefore to be applied to them. In the case of Denmark this led to the conclusion of a series of private agreements with manufacturers.

No attempts had yet been made by us to control the export from European neutral countries adjacent to Germany of their own products, in regard to which the direct use of sea power was inapplicable.

Fourth Stage: March rrth, 1915, to February rst, 1917. Under the Declaration of London, the technicalities involved

in declaring a blockade had rendered it impossible of application, except perhaps against Great Britain. As the best means of avoiding this tangle, the Order in Council of March r ~ t h , 1915, set up a system tantamount to a blockade, which enabled us to seize all goods of German origin, and to exert more pressure on neutrals, such as Sweden and Denmark, who were acting as bases of supply to the enemy, by seizing all German imports instead of contraband only.

In the summer of 1915, we extended our supervision of neutral sKipping by.the municipal act of refusing facilities for bunker coal to ships which did not accept our arrangement. By October, 1915, this system was in full operation.

Our next step was the development of agreements with neutral merchants or associations of merchants, both as regards re-export and export of their own produce. Our power to have these agreements carried out depended mainly on our maritime rights, but to a great extent on the control of our exports, principally coal. W e also used the power to 9urchase goods.

In the case of Holland, the arrangement with the N.O.T. was extended, and from July 2oth, 1915, they took charge of all overseas trade. Agreements in regard to the export of agricultural produce, fish and glycerine followed. In the case of Den- mark, an agreement was signed on November rgth, 1915, with the Merchants' Guild of Copenhagen and the Chamber of Manu- facturers. Other agreements followed, including some with the

THE MARITIME RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENT POWERS. 79

Danish Government and the Governments of Iceland and Green- land. In the case of Sweden, negotiations.with the Governmmt broke down in October, 1915, and we were forced to rely entirely on the use of our maritime rights. The situation was complicated by the question of transit to Russia.

In the case of Norway, a large number of agreements were signed with the various Trades Associations and Shipping Lines, and an understanding was come to with the Governmelit Food Commission.

In the case of Switzerland, an organisation similar to the N .O.T., the S .S.S. (Soci6t6 de Surveillance Suisse), was formed on November 17th~ 1915, but constant pressure was necessary to prevent leakage through the German speaking cantons.

In the case of the U.S.A., a series of agreements were made with trade associations to prevent the re-export of prcducts of the British Empire to suspicious destinations, and agreements Were made with the meat packers and other trades as regards exports to Scandinavia. On April 13th~ 1916, a system of Letters of Assurance was instituted to minimise the delays of approved cargoes.

In addition to these agreements, we were able to exercise a great degree of control over trade throughout the world by means of jute, its products being used to pack or cover the majority of goods for transport.

This stage involved little change in our means of executing our maritime rights, except in so far as the conclusion of agreements enabled us to exercise them more effectively with regard to our object and with less inconvenience to neutrals. It may be observed that it was necessarily to our own advantage to facilitate all trade which was not to the advantage of Germany.

The final step was to institute a system of rationing imports. In view of the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the destination of any particular cargo, it was fairer to the neutrals and more satisfactory to us to allow a definite quantity to enter. This was, in fact, the logical consequence of our previous measures.

The rationing agreement with the N.O.T. came into force on November 5th, 1915, that with the Danish associations on Feb- ruary zgth, 1916, and that with the Norwegian Food Commis- sion on April 7th, 1916. Sweden refused to furnish statistics, but the system was applied to her, and was in general operation by the end of 1916.

Our blockade could now be described as effective up to the limit of the pressure which it had been held desirable to put upon the neutrals.

It should be noted that our agreements were working- well whenever we were able to make them directly with individuals or associations as in Norway. A large organisation such as the

80 NAVAL IIEVIEW.

N.O.T. necessarily suffered from leakage, while no Government agreement was satisfactory.

Under the Order in Council of July 7th) 1916, we abrogated ' the Declaration of London and resumed our traditional maritime rights. This did not affect what we were doing, but is important as a matter of principle.

Fifth Stage: February rst, 1917, to August zgth, 1917. The declaration of the Unrestricted Submarine Campaign

did not affect the principles of our blockade, but led to important modifications in practice. The ports of examination had to be transferred outside the war zone, namely, to Halifax, Kingston (Jamaica), Sierre Leone, and elsewhere. The development of the Convoy System somewhat facilitated our control of neutral shipping. The shortage of shipping, however, hampered us in carrying out the agreements and supplying Scandinavia with coal. A series of measures became necessary to prevent neutrals (with the exception of Norway) from laying up their shipping.

Dutch shipping in Allied waters was seized by right of angary in March, 1917. In June a shipping agreement was concluded with Denmark, and in November with Norway, whose shipping had, however, been to a great extent at our disposal previous to the agreement. Under these agreements we undertook to supply coal in return for the use of shipping. In April, after pressure had been applied for several months, Sweden released British shipping from the Baltic through the Kogrund Channel.

Final Stage: August zgth, 1917, to the end. On August 29th, 1917, the U.S. W a r Trade Board prohibited

the export of all goods except under licence. This action cut off practically all imports to Scandinavia at the fountain head, and the use of naval force to exercise our maritime rights became largely superfluous. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron was finally withdrawn on January 3oth, 1918. The U.S.A. action, which, it should be noted, was purely municipal in appearance, forced Holland and Denmark to consume all, or practically all, their own home products, and led to a series of agreements with Norway (30th April, 1918), Sweden (29th May, 1g18), and Den- mark (18th September, 1918), under which they handed over a proportion of shipping for our use, and limited their exp3rts to Germany to a definite schedule, in return for rations.

Imports to Germany were now reduced to the lowest limits possible.

: i DEVELOPME~T OF THE HLUCKADE.

. .

I BRITISH MEASURES. r AGREEMENTS WITN NEUTRALS AND TJ-s A.

I - . - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - .

r - -

FEAR I Rincioal Orders in Council. I Contraband Proclamations. I Ewnomic Measures. I Blockade Mearurc.. Holland. Denmark. Sweden. 1 R'urway. 1- Switzerland. 1 U.S.A.

'

1914.

8/11. Copper held up at Gibraltar.

Igrg.

1211 r . Gwt. under- 1311 I . Italian Govt, undertook to stop re- took to stop re-exprt. export.

41s.

I -11 Agr. with Copper Trade.

.- l- - Govt. Insurance refused for Search at Sea, voyages to Scandinavia.

2013. Ueclaratiun of London rndhed .

zglro. Enemy devtinatlon defined.

Character of ship determined by ownership, nut flag.

I I 13. Reprisals Order. r 113. Woo1 (A).

2119% Copper, Iron Ore. Kubber, (c).

29/10. Copper, Iron Ore, Kubber, (A).

23/12.

-;7 to -(xo. Bunker coal. Restrictions put into force.

-- -- 2018. All foodstuffs for Gm- many to be treated as cuntra- band. rglrz.

Re-insurance of ships liable 2/10. Dover Area proclaimed 4/11 &rot with United Govt. undertook to to capture by Allies, dangerous. Steamship Co. stop re-cxport. illegal. 211 r . Northern area proclaimed (Not done).

dangerous. -111. Search in Harbour in I l l 2 Agr. with Chr, of

force,

-15. All supplies held up. Russian transit stopped.

1415, Ag. with N.A. line.

Others followed.

1212 to 2917. Agr. covering" re-export of imports from Brit. Empm.

1 (Ships' Black List). 116. Use of Consular Carts. 20/7. N.O.TmS put in charge Negotiations wm- 3 I 18. Cotton Agr. of ail oversea import;, 19/11. Agr. with Mer- menced.

chants' Guild and Chr. 2715-

zo/t(. Cotton. (A).

1615. Iceland Agr.

3015. Coal Agc.

rlrz. Parcel Mails searched.

2611. Camem Agr.

714. Fmd Commiu- sion understanding.

2914. Cotton liatio~i A~T.

1314. Use of letters of Assurance

511 I. Rationing Agr.

2315. Firms' Black Lim.

Jute Control established.

1616. Agricultural Praucts 1 AF.

of Manufacturers.

2g12. ration in^ Agr.

1 z ~ / n . Financial Ducumnts (A).

29/10. Negotiations broke down.

-110. Rationing in gent. use. -13. S.S.S.f in fuIi operdhn.

I

26(8. Fkb Agr.

Other private Agrs. followed.

r ~ J 4 . Meat Packers' Agr 2$/7. Xugrund Channel closed.

I 711 I. S.S.S.? formed.

--- ~o /r & 16;~. Extensions of Reprisals

Order. Imports held up.

.-----

217.

Ports of Examination transferred outside War Zone.

2615. Brit. Shipping released

39/12 ~~ycerine Agr.

- -13. Dutch Shipping %zed. 1613 Jute Agr. 1712. Greenland Ape.

2016. Shipping Agr.

1119. Fkh Ag.

11x1. Breadstuffs Agr.

-12. Cattle B Milk hgr.

2r)/8. control. of U.S.A.

1 exports.

2918. War Trade Board took control of all exports.

614 U.S.A. entered war.

Convoy aystem developed.

1 3014. U.S.A. Agr. I 1

918. Copper Agr.

619. Fish Agr.

6/10. Grain Agr.

-14. products. m m -14. Consuming nearly all 2915. USA. M. home prducts.

M O S ~ neutral shipping under AUid Control. 18/51 U.S.k Ag.

(A) Absolute, f S.S. b e: Societe , e x , - - - A : d h - b

, I C N n T - N e t k ~ r l

5/11. Fish Agr.

2818. Copper Agr.

-

T H E FIENDS O F T H E AIR. THE INFLUENCE OF AIRCRAFT ON IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

" They hunt the doves from their cotes, And chase the martin from its hole. Loudly roaring above, gibbering below, They are the owls which hoot over the city."

-Front a Baby lon ian Cuneiform Table t .

Many centuries before the Christian era, some long-forgotten Sumerian magician wrote the lines which head this introduction, and the owls which hooted over the city were the fiends of the air. On December 17th) 1903, near Kill Devil Hill, Kitty Hawk, N.C., Orville Wright, in a power-driven aeroplane, flew for twelve seconds and thereby set out on the conquest of these fiends, a conquest which has been so rapid that, before the next sixteen years had passed by, the Atlantic was spanned in one flight, and further still, to-day it is possible seriously to consider the influence of aircraft upon such a vital and immense problem as that of imperial defence. This is mentioned here, for, when we consider the possibilities of aircraft, we must always bear in mind that to-day rhe aeroplane is only twenty years old, and that, if in the future anything like the present progress is maintained, iall rational sp<culatioas may become possible, consequently none should lightly be set aside. This fact alone opens up so immense a field before us that, in order to maintain logical sequence of thought, it is our intention in this paper to avoid the ever-changing- details of the subject and to concentrate, as far as it is within our powers to do so, on a few outstanding problems. In order to accomplish this, it is first of all necessary clearly to outline what we mean by imperial defence; this we will do in Part I., in which we will also consider the limitations of aircraft and their influence durinq the Great War . Having thus arrived at a solid basis of facts, in Part IT. we will examine the possible strategical and tactical uses of aircraft, and lastly, in Part ITT ., the foundations of the organisation and administration which, we believe, are capable of purting this strategy and tactics into force.

82 NAVAL REVIEW.

I . T h e Foundat ion of Imperial Policy. The purpose of imperial defence is to secure the internal

and external policy of our empire. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to realise its object; in other words, what is it we are called upon to protect ? For, unless we clearly understand the nature of this objective, we shall not be in a position to safeguard it.

The underlying desire of every nation is prosperous racial survival, and to all individual and family requirements must be added the need of co-operation between individuals and families as well as the self-sacrifice of these for the common or co- operative good. For the nation to survive we require :-

(i.) Competition leading to commercial prosperity. (ii.) Self-sacrifice leading to ethical superiority.

(iii.) Co-operation leading to political stability. (iv.) Military defence leading to national security. I t is most important that the meaning of the first three of

these factors be grasped, for on them depends the nature of the fourth.

By comm~ercial prosperity, we mean (the accumulation of national capital as well as the general welfare of the people. This capital is obtained by barter in all its forms, first, within the frontiers of the empire, and secondly, without. So intimate is the relationship of commercial prosperity between nations, that the destruction of the wealth of even a hostile nation frequently leads to a reciprocal debility in those nations which destroyed i t ; consequently, wars which aim at commercial destruction, direct or indirect, are uneconomical in nature and, if they cannot be altogether avoided, then, so far as it is compatible with victory, the means of waging them should be such as to entail the least possible loss.

By ethical superiority we mean, not only the sacrifice of life for an ideal, but equally the maintenance of that ideal by equity and honourable behaviour. As commercial prosperity is the material capital of a nation, so is honour its moral capital, a capital which is worth fighting for, even if all material prosperity is thereby jeopardised, and a capital which may, in its turn, be squandered by a victor should he, in the winning of a war, degrade the accepted standards of civilisation of his day. T o win a war dishonourably, whatever may be the material advantages accruing, is to lose it ethically, and of all losses moral loss is most disastrous as it is the most difficult to make good.

By political stability we mean a condition of honourable prosperity within the empire and of equitable behaviour to all

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. 83

in the policy of the national government, which should first aim at the peaceful maintenance of law and order, and if this be not feasible, then secondly, its maintenance by force.

Bearing the above factors in mind, we ultimately see that, behind the policy of the government and the law of the land, stand the military forces of the empire, the purposes of which are, first, to protect the will of the majority against the actions of the minority, and secondly, to support the foreign policy of the nation during peace time by stiffening diplomatic action and during war by defeating the enemy without loss of national honour and with the least loss of national wealth. Conse- quently, when we consider the future part that aircraft may play in our plan of imperial defence, we must never forget : that to destroy the commerce of our enemy is to impoverish our eventual markets ; that to act unchivalrously is to degrade ourselves in the eyes of civilisation, and that to act impolitically is to isolate ourselves by losing our friends both subject and alien. It is not always possible to make all these factors coincide, but the more nearly they do coincide the more economical will be the action of our aircraft in the three great problems which we will now consider.

2 . The Problems of Imperial Defence. (i.) The Greai War Problem.-The problems of imperial

defence may be divided into three categories-great wars, small wars and internal security-the objectives of which are, the maintenance of policy and the maintenance of law. Each of these problems is different in nature; thus, a great war is a contest between highly civilised and similarly equipped opponents in which tactical values are of the greatest importance, whilst a small war is normally the pursuit of an ill-equipped enemy by a well-equipped antagonist, in which rapidity of movement is the predominant factor and in which physical geography plays the leading part. In the maintenance of law and order the limiting factor is the law of the land, for whilst rioters and rebels are at liberty to break it, seeing that tney have cast the law aside, the forces of the Crown are not similarly placed, for, as their object is to reinstate the law, their actions must be within the law until such time as the rebellion develops into a small war, when the maintenance of the law is replaced bv its enforcement. The mere proclaiming of martial law in a disturbed district in no way entitles the defence forces to cease regarding the insurgents as citizens-a rebel, however hostile, is not an alien.

From the purely military aspect, a great war is the simplest to visualise. Its object is to enforce or resist a policy, either by tactical action, economic pressure or moral attack. The first is normally the duty of the army and the second the navy;

84 NAVAL REVIEW.

the third, as we believe the future will show, is the domain of the air force which, nevertheless, must co-operate with the soldier on land and the sailor at sea. W e are faced, therefore, with three main air force problems in a great war : a military problem, a naval problem and an air force problem; the first two of which are mainly connected with information and protection, the maintenance of the freedom of military and naval movement on land and sea, and the third with the freedom of action of the air force itself by first gaining command of the air, and secondly, by independently attacking the hostile policy of the enemy, not by tactical action directed against his army and navy, but by a moral attack on the people which these defence forces are protecting.

A question which is frequently discussed is that of the feasibility of replacing both the army and navy by an air force. This supposition is, so we believe, a misconception of the objective of war, which is not to kill soldiers and sink ships, but to change the policy which these soldiers and ships are protecting. If, in the event of war, an air force can change this policy with less physical destruction than has been possible to attain by armies and navies in the past, and this may be the case, then the air force will not absorb the military purpose of navies and armies which in nature is tactical, but will instead establish a new conception of war, a conception in which naval and military forces will have either no place at all or one which is subordinate to their present purpose, and by subordinate we mean the occupation of land and sea after a moral victory has been won on land by aircraft. This problem, which is one of the . most vital problems of the day, will be discussed more fully in section 6 of this paper.

(ii.) The Small War Problem.-Turning now to the problem of small wars, as the conditions under which these wars are normally waged differ considerably from those of great wars, consequently the employment of aircraft must also differ. Whilst a great war is a struggle between organised forces raised by civilised nations possessing an intricate political system and an elaborate social organisation which is easily deranged by nervous shock, a small war is generally waged against congeries of tribes or a loosely organised community united by ties of blood rather than by the political and social bonds of civilisation. The organisation of such a society, like the organism of the lower animals, is controlled by a series of nervous ganglia rather than by a centralised brain, consequently the moral targets are small and numerous in place of being large and few as in the case of a civilised power. On these facts we may build the following theory, namely, that in small wars against uncivilised nations, the form of warfare to be adopted must tone tvith the shade of culture existing in the

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. @I

land; by which is meant that, agalnst people possessing a low civilisation, war must be more brutal in type (not necessarily in execution) than against a highly civilised nation, consequently physical blows are normally more likely to prove effective ihbn nervous shocks. If this theory be correct, then war on land will predominate over war in the air (moral warfare), as later will be explained.

(iii.) T h e Internal Securi ty Problem.-The maintenance of law and order, whether in a civilised or uncivilised country, is guaranteed by a state of peacefulness, consequently, when force has to be employed, its object is to prevent violence, first, by the moral threat of its application, and secondly, when this has proved useless, by the least possible expenditure of violence compatible with the re-establishment of quietude. In nature, this problem is a police and not a military problem, and as mankind lives on the land his activities must be controlled on the land by a suggestice and persuasive application of force rather than by physical injury and moral shock. If this theory be correct, then it follows that though aircraft may prove of the utmost assistance to the soldier in maintaining order on land, it is unlikely of itself to guarantee this state, because of certain inherent limitations which we will now enquire into.

3. T h e Tactical Limitations of Aircraft . Aircraft are of two types-the lighter and the heavier than

air machines. As our space is limited, we will examine the former in but the briefest manner, because we are of opinion that the main purpose of the airship in future warfare will be the carriage of supplies rather than offensive action, though it map assist this action by long-range reconnaissance. The airship is virtually the tramp steamer of the air, and there is no reason why vessels should not be built which could circumnavigate the globe or carry a hundred tons and upwards for distances ranging over thousands of miles. Compared to the aeroplane the airship is a slow-moving craft with a lower ceiling on account of the dangers of rising above the hail line; it is conspicuous even at high altitudes, readily picked up by searchlights and easily held within their rays. It is easily attackable, it cannot be armoured, it requires a large personnel to maintain it, an expensive housing and mooring system,' and it is a gluttonous consumer of gas.2 Its one and predominant characteristic is that it can remain motionless in the air without the expenditure of energy.

The chief characteristic of the aeroplane is speed of locomotion in three dimensions. This speed to-day is well over 150

1 This especially applies to conditions of war, and employment in uncivilired lands.

2 During the recent war, the German airships alone required 5,650,000 c~lbic feet of gas daily.

86 NAVAL REVIEW.

miles a n hour, when diving 300 miles an hour, and, further, many aeroplanes can climb at a 1,000 feet the minute. When in movement, a n aeroplane can proceed straight from point to point, motion in the air encountering no physical obstruction a s on land and sea. I t s predominant limitation is that it cannot remain motionless in the air, to which may be added that the ceiling of a useful war machine is unlikely to exceed 30,000 feet.

O n the above characteristic and limitation we may deduce the elements of its tactical nature-a high offensive power and limited means of direct protection, that is, protection by armour. T h e greater its radius of action the less offensive it becomes on account of petrol replacing armament, and the more it is protected by armour the less will be its range of action on account of steel replacing petrol; these are reciprocal difficulties which, though they can be modified, are, so far a s can be judged to- day, radical in nature.

Bearing in mind its three dimensional power of movement and that the air presents to it no physical obstacle to mobility, the size of an air force is, in theory, unlimited, but in practice this is not true, for, a s aeroplanes cannot remain motionless In the air, the factor which limits the numbers which can usefufly be employed is landing ground, which becomes more and more difficult to find a s aeroplanes increase in size. Tactically, one of the most important characteristics of the aeroplane is its power of observation; on a clear day at 15,000 feet altitudes the area of sight is no less than IOO miles in diameter.

Besides its predominant limitation, the following are of secondary impor'tance : it becomes readily i" bogged " in a ground mist, sense of direction is frequently lost in cloud and fog, landing at night and in foggy weather on unprepared landing grounds is dangerous, and further, though an aeroplane is not tied down to definite tracks of country, a s wheeled vehicles are, or to definite expanses of water, a s ships are, it is t o a very considerable extent tied down to its landing grounds. In the recent wars no great difficulty was experienced in providing these on account of its static nature, nevertheless, during the last eighteen months of the war in France, the average wastage in aeroplanes was between 50 and 80 per cent. per month. Of these casualties but one-quarter was due to hostile action, the greater number resulting from crashes on landing.' Wi l l the next war be in nature similar to the last ? T h e answer is doubtful. Wil l crashes be less frequent ? This is also doubtful in,spite of improvements to be expected. Con- sequently, a s belligerents may have to replace their entire equipment of machines once every two months, either an

1 "The Air Force." By Air Commodore H. R. Brooke Popham, C.B., C.M.G.. D.S.O., A.F.C. Journal R.U.S.I., February, 1920.


immense number of reserve machines will have to .be maintained during peace time, or co-operation with the present-day slow-moving land forces abandoned, or, perhaps, a plan evolved which will decide the war within four weeks of its outbreak. Such a plan opens up an interesting field of speculation which we will examine later; meanwhile, having diagnosed the limitations of aircraft, we will turn to the recent war and attempt, from the part aircraft played in it, to discover future tendencies.

4. The Influence of Aircraft during 1914-1921. The Great ViTar of 1914-1918 may be divided into two main

strategical operations-naval and military-in each of which aircraft played a subordinate part, but a part so full of promise that, if the war had lasted another twelve months, a third division would have had to have been added, namely, the strare- gical use of an independent air force. The reasons for this subordination were simple in nature, namely, the air force was in its infancy and the military and naval forces were in old age, that is, they were completing a tactical cycle, progress of a type having reached its zenith in enormous masses of infantry on land and enormous battleships at sea. Tactics were, in fact, controlled not by a cunning use of brain and weapon but by a theory of Gargantuan brute force, a Saurian condition of warfare which we believe is now in its decline.

On land the general nature of the war was static in character, the reason for this being that the masses of men formed very vulnerable targets and were, on account of their supply system, completely shackled to roads and railways. How then was the war on land won ? First, it was won b y physical, moral and economic exhaustion, and secondly, by the introduction of a new form of mobility--cross-country movement-which tactically , found its origin in the tank.

At sea, the nature of the great war was equally static in character, the reason being that the superior fleet was impotent " t o dig " its enemy out of harbour or to effect a close blockade. At sea the war was won by exhaustion, for though the submarine had introduced a new means of movement, on the surface it was outmatched by surface craft.

In August, 1914, the aeroplanes then in use were, as one German writer describes, little better than " flying wire entangle- ments." At sea they were little used and on land their duty was almost entirely connected with observation and reconnaissance. Space does not permit of us tracing their subsequent evolution, so in place we will examine the stage this evolution had reached towards the close of hostilities.

At sea, the excellent use made by the Germans of their airships for purposes of reconnaissance soon made it very clear

88 NAVAL REVIEW.

that a fleet at sea unsupported by aircraft was virtually a blind force, and, a s a German writer says :-

" The fact that the English avoided coming into contact with the German fleet as much as possible can be ascribed not so much to our submarines as to the fact that they could not shake off our aerial reconnaissance . . . . airships were of outstanding importance for all offensive operations undertaken by the High Seas Fleet.'jl W h y ? Because reconnaissance nearly always favours the

strategical defensive however tactically offensive an operation may be in character.

The vital necessity for observation at sea resulted in the building of aeroplane carriers and of aircraft being carried on various types of warships. Offensively, except for attack on submarines, aircraft were little used; bombing was inaccurate and the torpedo-carrying aeroplane had only just come into use when hostilities ended. In other directions, aircraft were extensively employed such as for patrol work, convoy work, ranging guns, " spotting " submarines and the location and marking of mine field^.^

On land the evolution was much more rapid, and it may be examined under the headings of military co-operation and aerial action, which became more and more separated as the war proceeded.

The co-operative duties of aircraft may be placed in three main categories-reconnaissance, command, and offensive action. On the initiation of trench warfare, all the reconnaissance and screening duties were taken over from the cavalry by aircraft; by degrees artillery was more and more commanded from the air and the attacking infantry depended more and more on the close support of low-flying and in some cases

' partially armoured aeroplanes. During the whole of the war photography by day, and eventually by night also, proved of the greatest importance, so much so that aerial photographs frequently replaced written reports, and without them it is very doubtful whether the war would have ended when it did. Aerial photography favours the stronger side because it deals not so much with the actual position of the enemy as with the permanent features of the theatre of war which the stronger side can more readily exploit.

The offensive action of aircraft, other than that of close support to infantry, may be examined under the headings of combat and attack, the first relating to air fighting proper and the second to the attack of ground targets from the air. These

1 "The German Air Force in the Great War." Neumann, pp. 107 and 109. See aiso "Our Air Force." Mitchell, p. 97.

2 For a fuller account see "Aerial Co-operation with the Navy." By Squadron-Leader C. H. K. Ellmonds, D.S.O., O.B.E., Royal Air Force. Journal R.U.S.I., May, 1921.


types of offensive action are closely related, for, unless superiority in the air is gained, attact, except by night time, is a very hazardous operation.

~ o v e m e n t is the foundation of both land and air tactics, but with this difference : that whilst on land movement is two- dimensional, in the air it is three. This means that, whilst on land positions can frequently be discovered which preclude flank attacks, no such position is possible in the air, for not only is the battle area illimitable in extent, but each side has an attackable " top " and " bottom " as well as an attackable front, rear and flanks. This power of being able to attack within a hollow cube in six directions in place of over a square area in four and normally only three and frequently only one, leads to a condition which would appear to be permanent in nature, namely, that air battles will be of short duration when compared to battles on land or sea; this was certainly the case during the recent war. If this contention be correct, and if, a s must follow, the power of three-dimensional movement in war will require a three-dimensional tactics, superiority in tactical skill will, as the final stages of the war were beginning to show, become of supreme importance, and once these tactics are evolved speed of movement will become their mainspring. It will no longer be line and column meeting line and column as on land and sea, but cube and cone meeting cube and cone ; formation:; will be superimposed upon formations and the position of safety will not necessarily be, as on land, behind a protective screen, but more often in the centre of a protective body. During the recent war this position was sometimes assumed by the land attacking machines, which were of two main types according to the nature of the target to be attacked.

If the target were a body of troops, the machine gun was normally used; if a material object, such as an ammunition depbt, railhead, hutments or town, then the bomb. In both of these types of attack it is not means of offence which deserve our attention so much as the power of being able to make free use of these means due to the ability possessed by aircraft of being able to pass over the hostile land forces and attack them and their depbts, etc., in rear. This power must either result in the abolition of land armies or, what is more likely, in a radical change in their constitution. At sea, this power is not so great, as ships are self-contained and consequently are in no way so closely tied to their bases or controlled by their communications as are armies to-day.

If, in a great war on land, the vulnerability o'f armies to air attack is chiefly due to the fact that their strategical movement is governed by fixed lines of communication-roads, canals, rivers and railways-then in a small war against an uncivilised enemy no such limiting factor normally exists, consequently it

go NAVAL REVIEW.

would be a faulty judgment to base the aircraft operations ot this type of warfare on the experiences of a great war. T o prove, though acknowledgedly on a limited series of facts, that this is so, all that is necessary is to turn to the military operations which have recently taken place in Mesopotamia, Wazir- istan and Somaliland.

In considering these operations it is only fair to state that, generally speaking, aeroplanes were used on, what has been called, " the penny packet system," that is, in place of being concentrated on tactical objects, they were dispersed over strategical areas and yet expected to gain tactical results. Neverthe- less, the actual results gained are of sufficient interest to warrant speculation.

In Mesopotamia, reconnaissance work was difficult on account of the nomadic habits of the Arabs, the continual obliteration of tracks and roads and the general difficulties of observation. Offensive result against determined tribes was indifferent and against a faint-hearted enemy transitory. Pursuit, map-making, intercommunication and the transportation of supplies proved most useful. In Waziristan the demoralising effect of the aeroplane was disappointing, on account of the difficulty of killing the enemy, that is, of effecting an ocular demonstration of power by brute force, one of the few things the hill tribes really understand. Villages offered poor targets, and both tactical reconnaissance and night flying were most difficult. In Somaliland, aircraft operations were much more successful, apparently because the air force was given definite tactical objectives to operate against.

In all these small war operations, the limitations which to us appear to be the most permanent are : the transitory influence of aircraft attack, due mainly to the shortness of time the aeroplane can remain in the a i r ; its lack of power to occupy a disturbed district ; the difficulty of providing it with landing grounds and the danger of indiscriminate slaughter of friend and foe, of women and children as well as armed men. Such slaughter is an action which does not harmonise with British traditions, and which ethically has again and again been proved to be unsound.

Having now examined a few of the influences of aircraft during the period 1914-1921, we will sum up our facts and pro- pound a general theory. In civilised warfare the object to attain is normally political in nature, and its basis is the moral of the nation. This moral is protected by military forces, the movements of which are to-day governed by fixed communications. These communications and the moral of the natton can be seriously deranged by aircraft attack, so seriously that complete supremacy in the air may of itself be able to accomplish victory. In uncivilised warfare, complete supremacy, so far,

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. 9 I

has not accomplished victory, because the objective is In nature . a social rather than a political one, based on individual likes rather than on any collective national intention. Further, whereas in civilised warfare many physical aircraft objectives, all closely connected nervously, exist, in uncivilised warfare objectives are scattered, consequently effort in attacking them is frequently squandered. Finally, in war, an air force possesses practically no administrative power, that is, though it can readily kill, terrorise and threaten, it cannot so easily pacify, control and persuade.

5 . T h e Strategical Problems of Imperial Defence. Strategy, in its politkal meaning, may be defined as the

science of maintaining policy by military force. Policy, depending as it does on the economic and ethical conditions of the people who formulate it, is, consequently, changeful in nature, and strategy, unless it can keep pace with the changes in policy, will in itself become unethical and uneconomic. To- day, the Empire is loaded with an immense debt accumulated during the recent war, and is suffering from acute nervous un- rest which in itself is not altogether an unhealthy condition, but which at any moment may become so by resulting in a nervous breakdown which may lead to revolution. Outwardly, the te- lationship of the Empire to foreign powers is uncertain, for 'to- day no balance of power exists between the nations of the civilised world. From this state, if past history is to be relied on, we can, however, with some certainty predict that, until the balance of power is re-established, and until one or more de- mented nations again attempt to upset it by grasping at world dominion, as Philip II., Napoleon I . and William 11. did, a great war, in any way comparable to the recent war, is unlikely, for it must be remembered that great wars nearly always origin- ate from trade competition between powerful naval or military nations. Our immediate strateqical problem is, therefore, not a great war, and, though another great war will undoubtedly one day be fought, as the balance of power will in all probability have to be re-established before its outbreak, we mav with some assurance predict that the next great war will not take place fdr at least 50 years.' Our immediate strategical problems are,

1 Two uncertain quantities in the maintenance of peace have, however, arisen since 1914. The first is, the League of Nations, which is an international mar- like irritant, just as its predecessor, the Holy Alliance, was. The second is, scientific warfare; at any moment any civilized nation may discovpr a new weapon of war which will supplv it with so great a military superiority over its neighbours that it may, if of a vindictive nature, risk a war on this superiority alone. Of the two, the first is the most dangerous, for the institution of an international police force, a body of condotiere, is not only a. return to the dark ages, but a standicg insult to all free peoples. The meddlings of the Inquisition should have taught us this lesson.

92 NAVAL REVIEW.

therefore, those of small wars and internal security, warfare and peace maintenance, which will normally take place in militarily and politically backward lands. Both these problems are problems of movement and particularly movement in roadless and railless countries.

In examining this problem, it may simplify our ideas if we look upon movement from its dimensional aspect, thus :-

(a) One-dimensional movement-road, rail and river movement.

(b) .Two-dimensional movement-sea and cross-country land movement.

(c) Three-dimensional movement-air movement.' The first includes the normal method of movement of an

army and the second of a fleet, the third includes both the dimensions of the first and second, but with this important difference, that On the actual surface of the land or sea aircraft are not a useful means of movement.

Bearing in mind these three dimensions of movement, our future strategical problems are closely connected with the protection of our land roads, sea roads and air roads, in order that trade may prosper and, in the event of it being threatened, may be secured by force. If we can guarantee a high condition of prosperity, we shall simultaneously attain to a high state of contentedness, which will mean that our policy will possess a sound economic and ethical foundation. W e mention this here as it is important to realise that policy is a s dependent on strategy or vice versa^.

As the powers of aircraft include the dimensions of movement made use of by armies and fleets, it stands to reason that,

, of the three defence forces, the air force is the only one which can closely and continually co-operate with the other two. On account of this ability to co-operate, that is, to move with armies and navies and yet independently of them, we are faced by the following portentious strategical problem : may not this power of aerial co-operation become so perfect that, in place of aircraft co-operating with navies and armies, these forces will instead co-operate with aircraft, and that possibly at some date in the future the utility of armies and navies will be reduced to zero, aircraft entirely replacing them ?

W e have already examined the past history of this problem under the headings of Great Wars, Small Wars and Internal Security. Bearing in mind what the experiences of the past have been, we will now consider the possible future influence which aircraft may bring to bear on these three questions.

1 The submarine possesses a three dimensional power of movement just as a man does when he goes upstairs or down a well, but this power is not generally useful.

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. !>3

6 . The Future Tactical Problem of a Great PVar.

The view frequently held that, because the last great war was a slow and ponderous operation of millions, the next great war will be similar to it in nature, is not one whlch we hold, for we believe that the next war will in nature be mobile and in duration short. W e have not space here to enter into our reasons for these assumptions, but we hope that they will become apparent as we proceed.

The aircraft problems of the next great war may be divided under the headings of independent and co-operative action, the second being divided into co-operation with navy, army and coast defence. W e will now consider these two problems i n turn.

(i.) Independent Action of Aircraft.-In section 2, we stated that the object of a military operation was to maintain, enforce or safeguard a policy and, consequently, if persuasion could be rendered effective it would prove a more economical means than manslaughter. W e have also pointed out that the policy of a nation depends on the will of the people, and the question we intend now to examine is the following : Can a hostile nation be forced to change its will by means of an independent aerial attack ?

That such an attack is possible was visibly demonstrated during the recent war. At first, being in nature a novelty, it was dubbed immoral. Is this assertion, however, true ? Only so far as all warfare may be classed as immoral, in which case the less the ethical and economic damage done during a war the more moral will the waging of it become. This leads us to the following question : TjLTill aerial warfare in the future, should it supersede land warfare, do more damage than results from land warfare as to-day conceived and accepted ? W e believe that it will if the object is to obliterate towns and cities bv means of high explosive bombs. W e believe that it will not, if the nerves of the people are attacked by an offensive directed against their bodies by means of non-lethal gases.

Gas warfare has almost universally been classed as barbarous, again because it is a novelty and not because it is so in fact. Up to the present, in spite of lethal gases having mainly been used, gas has proved itself to be the most humane of all weapons. During the recent war the total American casualties were 274,217, of which 74,779, or 27.3 per cent., were due to gas. Of these only 1.87 per cent. died, whilst of the remaining 199,438, due to bullet and shell fire, 23.4 per cent. died. The report on these casualties concludes as follows : -

94 NAVA4L REVIEW.

" In other words, gas is twelve times a s humane a s bullets and high explosive^."^

This conclusion is irrefutable, consequently the immorality of gas warfare must be sought elsewhere.

As it cannot be more immoral to gas a town than to bom- bard it, does the immorality of a gas attack lie in the fact that, whilst in a bombardment the slaughter of women and children is but a n unfortunate incident, in an aerial attack on a town their terrorisation becomes the main object ? W e believe this to be the popular conception, simply because the people have not yet grasped the fact that when nations g o to war t he entire population of each country concerned i s ranged against the other. Mr. F . W. 1,anchester clearly pointed this out a s long. ago a s 191 j, when he wrote :-

" I t is futile to attempt to disguise the self-evident fact that a serious attack on the capital city of a n enemy, containing in its heart the administrative centre both of his Army and Navy, in addition to the headquarters of his Govern- ment, cannot be regarded other than a s a legitimate act of war. No international agreement or convention can make it otherwise. . . . . There is really no escape from this. Unquestionably, the destruction of a capital city such a s London, with the administrative centres aforesaid, would be a military achievement of the first order of magnitude; it would be, from a n enemy standpoint, an achievement of far greater potential value than any ordinary success or victory in the field of battle."'

W e agree with this statement, but we believe that destruction can be avoided bv the use of a non-lethal gas, the " political " danger of which is that it can incapacitate and terrorise without killing. A dead man says nothing, but a wounded or panic- stricken man will exaggerate the danger and spread the wildest rumours, and further, the terror of such individuals is highly contagious. W e believe that, in future warfare, great cities such a s London, will be attacked from the air and that a fleet of 500 aeroplanes each carrying joo ten-pound bombs of, let us suppose, mustard gas, might cause 200,000 minor casualties and throw into panic r,ooo,ooo people within a few minutes of their

1 At the meeting of the British Association of 1919, General Hartley said :- "The death-rate among gas casualties was much lower than that among casualties of other causes. and not only was the death-rate lower, but a much smaller proportion of the injured suffered anv permanent disability. There is no comparison between the permanent damage caused by gas, and the suffering caused to those who were maimed and blinded by shell and rifle fire. I t is now generally admitted that in the later stages of the war many military objects could be attained with less suffering by using gas than by any other means."

2 "Aircraft and Warfare." Lanchester, p. 192.


arrival.' Any attempt to picture such a catastrophe as this, should it occur in the east end of London, beggars the imagination, in spite of the fact that the killed might not number one per cent. of the injured. If a future great war can be won at the cost of two or three thousands of the enemy's men, women and children killed, in place of over ~,ooo,ooo men and incidentally several thousands of women and children, as was the case in France during the recent war, surely an aerial attack is a more humane method than the existing type; further, the material damage done will be insignificant when compared to the damage effected during the recent war, the cost of which is estimated in thousands of millions sterling.

How can we frustrate such an attack ? W e can plan our cities so that they may withstand i t ; we can locate arsenals, aeronautical workshops, etc., as far as possible, out of range of hostile attack; but our only certain defence is to be found in the Lex Talonis-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. W e must be prepared to hit back so that, in the words of Shakes- peare, we may " outface the brow of bragging horror."

Will such preparation enable us to rely on our future air force alone and so permit us to disband our army and scrap our fleet ? In our opinion, it will not and for the following reasons : The purposes of an army is not only to wage a great war but to maintain law and order and, as we have already explained, law and order is maintained on the earth; the expanse of the air is so unlimited that no nation can make certain, however larpe be its air force, of being able to concentrate it at the decisive spot at the correct moment. If air supremacy is not at once won, or the hostile people immedia,tely terrorised into submission, the nation which can simultaneously with its air attack throttle its enemy's sea communications and overrun his territories will bring a greater moral and physical pressure to bear than the nation which cannot. In our opinion, navies and armies will continue, but will change in order to secure themselves against aircraft and in order to co-operate with aircraft; this brings us to the coboperative action of aircraft with the navy and army.

(ii.) Aircraft Co-operatiom with the Navy.-In the past it has been said that " sea power is world power " ; but the future, we believe, will prove that sea power in order to attain world power must be based on air power, and that, until seaplanes and flying

1 Major Lefebure, in hi9 book, "The Riddle of the Rhine," writes :-"The load of the aeroplane is always important, and the essential is to carry, weight for weight, the matrrial which will produce the most effect. There is no doubt what this will be when the persistent lethal compound arrives, and mustard gas would probably have been superior to explosives for use by German aircraft on British cities." H e further points out how mustard gas would have haunted a city for dayq, pp. 226-227. L ~ w i s i t e , a poisonous persistent gas, can be manufactured in Germany or the U.S.A. by thousands of tons monthly.

96 NAVAL REVIEW.

boats can on the surface ride out a gale, the seaplane carrier1 will become as important a warship as the battleship or submarine. These carriers, besides being mother ships to their flying children, will undoubtedly be used as directional wireless stations and, as they will offer a large target to surface attack, they most probably will become submersibles.

The type of aircraft which future naval warfare will require may be divided into three categories :-

(a) Machines to be used against hostile aircraft. (b) Machines for reconnaissance and observation. (c) Machines to be used against hostile warships. (d) Machines to protect warships against aerial attack. Space does not permit of our examining the probable tactics

of these various types, but we are of opinion that two different machines will be used for attacking warships : bombing machines to attack the deck, either by means of explosives and adhesive toxic smoke bombs or by drenching it with a persistent gas, and torpedo-carrying aeroplanes to attack the hull. Though the first aerial torpedo was patented in 1897, up to the present this weapon has not proved a great success ; besides it is unlikely that one machine could be equipped with more than one or two torpedoes. Further, recent trials carried out by the American Navy2 in bombing old German battleships have rather accentuated difficulties than otherwise. Consequently, it is quite possible that the most effective means of attack may be found in the operation of D.C.B's by aircraft.

The machines used, in order to protect warships from aerial attack, will probably be armoured ~ n d equipped with fro111 8 to 12 .5 inch machine guns which, when firing simultaneously, will be able to deliver a " broadside " of about 5,000 bullets the minute, whilst other machines will be employed in protecting the ships by means of smoke clouds.

However cursory has been our examination of the possible development of aircraft in naval warfare of the future, sufficient has been said, not only to emphasise the importance of this arm, but to accentuate the necessity of thinking in terms of aerial warfare every time we are called upon to think out a future naval problem, for, it is our opinion, that the aeroplane will not only modify naval tactics but naval strategy and construction as weI1. W e may expect, therefore, in the future to see aircraft-carriers picketing our naval frontiers; we rnav expect to see our warships protecting themselves by super-decks and multiple hulls and equipped with their own anti-aircraft

1 A certain number of machines will undoubtedly be carried on most of the larger warships, but their presence there is an encumbrance.

2 See the Times, July 23rd, 1921, and August zz~ld , 1921. Major Neumann on p. 242 of "The German Air Force in the Great War," writes :-"The ships presented a most enticing target (for bombs) but one which was exceedingly difficult to hit. Their zigzag course made it almost impossible . . . . "

THE FIENDS OF THE .4IR. 97 \

fighting machines, and, further still, we may expect to see our future naval bases and dockyards selected not only from the point of view of their maritime utility, but also from that of anti-aircraft defence, positional as well as local, and by the former we mean so placed that their distance from hostile aircraft bases will render an attack on them either hazardous or impossible. We will now consider our next problem.

(iii.) Aircraft Co-operation with the Army.-At present we . do not possess a tactical theory of aerial warfare. Our outlook during the recent war (and to a very great extent to-day) was a Homeric one. Hero met hero in hand-to-hand fight, and victories were based on individual contests. From this primitive type of warfare we may expect in the future to see evolve an elaborate tactics, for in the next great war capture of the air will become of supreme importance, because of all tactical "positions " the air is the one which commands all others. Once this supreme point of vantage is gained, the next tactical operation will be to deliver an aerial attack on the land forces, not only on their bodies-their men, horses and guns, but on their brains-their command headquarters; on their nerves- their system of communications ; on their arterial system-their roads and railways; and on their internal organs-their bases, supply depbts, chemical and engineering works and workshops.

The body of the army will be attacked by low-flying armoured aeroplanes mounting twelve to twenty-four machine guns firing from 7,000 to 14,000 rounds per minute. Let us picture to ourselves twelve of these machines suddenly attacking a division of infantry in column of maq-ch, a solid column twelve miles in length. In ten minutes this mass of men and horses will be traversed from van to rear and quite possibly 250,000 rounds will be fired into it-the effect will be para1vsinp.l

The directive and internal organs of the armv will be attacked, and here we will quote from Mr. Lanchester rather than set forth our own views :

" DepBts of every kind in the rear of the enemy's lines," he writes, " would cease to exist; rolling stock and mechan- ical transport would be destroyed; no bridge would be allowed to stand for 24 hours; railway junctions would be 1 In an article entit1ed:"A Summary of the Campaign in Italy, and an

Acccunt of the Battle of Vitrorio Venmeto," published in " The Army Quarterly," Vol. III., No. I , Major-General the Hon J. F. Gathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. writes :-"On these two days (October 29th and 3oth, 1918) the Conegliano- Pordonone road was black with columns of all arms hurrying eastwards. On to these the few British squadrons poured 30,000 rounds of S.A.A. and 34 tons of bombs from low altitude. Subsequent examination of the road almost forced the observer to the conclusion that this form of warfare should be forbidden in the future."

Quite possibly it will be found that persistent gases sprinkled from aeroplanes will be more effective than machine-gun bullets. These chemicals can either be sprinkled on the enemy or on ground it is desired to deny to the enemy.

96 NAVAL REVIEW.

boats can on the surface ride out a gale, the seaplane carrier1 will become as important a warship as the battleship or submarine. These carriers, besides being mother ships to their flying children, will undoubtedly be used as directional wireless stations and, as they will offer a large target to surface attack, they most probably will become submersibles.

The type of aircraft which future naval warfare will require may be divided into three categories :-

(a ) Machines to be used against hostile aircraft. (b) Machines for reconnaissance and observation. (G) Machines to be used against hostile warships. (d) Machines to protect warships against aerial attack. Space does not permit of our examining the probable tactics

of these various types, but we are of opinion that two different machines will be used for attacking warships : bombing machines to attack the deck, either by means of explosives and adhesive toxic smoke bombs or by drenching it with a persistent gas, and torpedo-carrying aeroplanes to attack the hull. Though the first aerial torpedo was patented in 1897, up to the present this weapon has not proved a great success ; besides it is unlikely that one machine could be equipped with more than one or two torpedoes. Further, recent trials carried out by the American NavyZ in bombing old German battleships have rather accentuated difficulties than otherwise. Consequently, it is quite possible that the most effective means of attack may be found in the operation of D.C.B's by aircraft.

The machines used, in order to protect warships from aerial attack, will probably be armoured iand equipped with froin 8 to 12 .5 inch machine guns which, when firing simultaneously, will be able to deliver a " broadside " of about 5,000 bullets the minute, whilst other machines will be employed in protecting the ships by means of smoke clouds.

However cursory has been our examination of the possible development of aircraft in naval warfare of the future, sufficient has been said, not only to emphasise the importance of this arm, but to accentuate the necessity of thinking in terms of aerial warfare every time we are called upon to think out a future naval problem, for, it is our opinion, that the aeroplane will not only modify naval tactics but naval strategy and construction as weI1. W e may expect, therefore, in the future to see aircraft-carriers picketing our naval frontiers; we ~nnv cx- pect to see our warships protecting themselves by super-deck~ and multiple l~ulls and equipped with their own anti-aircraft . .-

1 A certain number of machines will undoubtedly be carried on most of the larger warships, but their presence there is an encumbrance.

2 See the Times, July 23rd, 1921, and August ~ 2 n d ~ 1921. Major Xeumann on p. 242 of "The German Air Force in the Great War," writes :-"The ships presented a most enticing target (for bombs) but one which was exceedingly difficult to hit. Their zigzag course made it almost impossible . . . . "


fighting machines, and, further still, we may expect to see our future naval bases and dockyards selected not only from the point of view of their maritime utility, but also from that of anti-aircraft defence, positional as well as local, and by the former we mean so placed that their distance from hostile aircraft bases will render an attack on them either hazardous or impossible. W e will now consider our next problem.

(iii.) Aircraft Co-ofleration with the Army.-At present we do not possess a tactical theory of aerial warfare. Our outlook during the recent war (and to a very great extent to-day) was a Homeric one. Hero met hero in hand-to-hand fight, and victories were based on individual contests. From this primitive type of warfare we may expect in the future to see evolve an elaborate tactics, for in the next great war capture of the air will become of supreme importance, because of all tact~cal " positions " the air is the one which commands all others. Once this supreme point of vantage is gained, the next tactical operation will be to deliver an aerial attack on the land forces, not only on their bodies-their men, horses and guns, but on their brains-their command headquarters; on their nerves- their system of communications; on their arterial system-their roads and railways; and on their internal organs-their bases, supply depbts, chemical and engineering works and workshops.

The body of the army will be attacked by low-flying armoured aeroplanes mounting twelve to twenty-four machine guns firing from 7,000 to 14,000 rounds per minute. Let us picture to ourselves twelve of these machines suddenly attacking a division of infantry in column of maqch, a solid column twelve miles in length. I n ten minutes this mass of men and horses will be traversed from van to rear and quite possibly 250,000 rounds will be fired into it-the effect will be para1ysinp.l

The directive and internal organs of the army will be attacked, and here we will quote from Mr. Lanchester rather than set forth our own views :

" DepGts of every kind in the rear of the enemy's lines,'' he writes, " would cease to exist ; rolling stock and mechan- ical transport would be destroyed; no bridge would be allowed to stand for 24 hours; railwav junctions would be 1 In an article entit1ed:"A Summary of the Campaign in Italy, and an

Account of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto," published in " The Army Quarterly," Vol. III . , No. I, Major-General the Hon J. F. Gathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. writes :-"On these two days (October 29th and loth, 1918) the Conegliano- Pordonone road was black with columns of all arms hurrying eastwards. O n to these the few British squadrons poured 30,000 rounds of S.A.A. and 34 tons of bombs from low altitude. Subsequent examination of the road almost forced the observer to the conclusion that this form of warfare should be forbidden in the future."

Quite possibly it will be found that persistent gases sprinkled from aeroplanes will be more effective than machine-gun bullets. These chemicals can either be sprinkled on the enemy or on ground it is desired to deny to the enemy.

98 NAVAL REVIEW.

subject to continuous bombardment . . . . In this manner a virtually impassable zone would be created in the rear of the enemy's defences, a zone varying, perhaps, from IOO to 200 miles in width . . . Not only will the defence be slowly strangled from the uncertainty and lack of supplies of all kinds, but ultimately retreat will become impossible. The defending force will find itself literally in a state of siege under the worst possible conditions. . . . Thus, in the extended employment of aircraft, we have the means at hand of compelling a bloodless victory."l What is the answer to this problem ? The first answer is-

air supremacy; the second, that we must radically change the organisation of our army by overcoming its present weaknesses and, if possible, simultaneously accentuate the weaknesses of the aeroplane.

The main weaknesses of present-day armies are : the enormous target they offer; the vulnerability of men and horses to bullets and the fact that, for rapid movement and supply, they are tied down to fixed communications. These weaknesses can be overcome by the tank and cross-country tractor which will enable the following changes to be effected : reduction of target by ability to move across country and, if necessary, under cover of darkness and smoke clouds, in place of along roads ; protection by bullet proof armour; freedom from fixed communications including bridges, for future tanks and cross-country tractors will be able to cross water.

What influence will a tank capable of moving roo miles in 24 hours across country have on the aeroplane ? It will force it to carry cannon in place of machine guns and so will reduce the number of projectiles an aeroplane can fire per second, in other words, it will lower the hitting power of aircraft. Granted , that the aeroplanes can still destrov the country in rear of the tanks, nevertheless, machines with a radius of action of 1,000 milesZ will for ten days be independent of their bases. In ten days they can sweep from the Seine to the Vistula, they can destroy aerodromes, workshops and factories and, even if the enemy places these and his entire government a hundred feet under ground, tanks will be able to bolt them in or to scour them out by means of gas, lethal or non-lethal. Further than this, tanks, moving at loo miles a day and possessing a radius of action of 1,000 miles, can ultimately more than keep up with aircraft. The tank, in fact, is the tortoise, and the aeroplane is

1 "Aircraft and Warfare." Lanchester, pp. 187-188

2 I t is reported in the daily Press that our new experimental tanks have a radius of action of some 300 miles. Considering that the tank is only six years old, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this radius can be treliled. In 1908, five years after the i~ltroriuction of the first aeroplane, IOO miles appeared a great distance for an aeroplane to fly, yet, eleven years later, in 1919, a journey of over 1,800 miles was made across the Atlantic, in one flight. As above, so below.

T H E FIENDS OF T H E AIR. 99

the hare of future warfare, and the main anti-aircraft defence of the tank is its power of accentuating the gravity limitations of the aeroplane by forcing it to increase the weight of its armament.

(iv.) Aircraft Co-operation in Coast Defence.-From the above we may deduce one of the few permanent rules in war, namely, that there is an answer to every difficulty. Aircraft will not abolish armies but will compel them to evolve. Air- craft, by compelling a nation to mechanicalise its army, will bring the army into far closer touch with the navy than is possible to-day. Thus, in the future we may expect to see in- vasions carried out by surface craft and submarines which, steaming not towards some defended port in the enemy's land but to any suitable point on his coast, will, when a few miles distant from the shore, " spew out " on to the beach not armed men, as legend affirms did the sea serpents of antiquity, but armoured tanks.

What defence ,is possible against such an invasion-the tanks " gibbering below " and the aeroplanes " loud roaring above ? " The answer is that, in the future, mobile coast defence must supplement if not replace the present methods which are static in' nature, such as fixed guns, permanent mine-fields and booms,' for will these be found at the points selected for the invasion ?

What may we then expect the future to reveal ? Coast defence aircraft, torpedo aircraft, bombing2 and mine laying machines speeding at 150 miles the hour towards the point of attack as the advanced guard of the repelling force. And whilst the hostile fleet is launching its tanks and is defending itself by splash barrages, smoke clouds, heavy machine gun fire and 16-inch shrapnel, we may well suppose that on sea our own fleet-battleships, submarines, coastal and explosive motor boats,3 will be hastening to the scene of action; and that, on land, guns of the " Big Bertha " type mounted on tracks will be moving along the coast preceded by a tank force to attack in flank such of the enemy's machines which may have landed.

The possibility of such an action is undoubted, and, if we enquire into the reason for it, it is this. Present-day armies cannot survive an air attack, therefore they must and will be mechanicalised. Once armoured and propelled by petrol they will become naval " projectiles " which, when landed, must be

1 On May ~ q t h , 1918, the Italians crossed the Pola boom by means of a motor-boat fitted with tracks.

2 Gas bombs will most likely he extensively used. Persistent chemicals (liquid and solid) could be sprinkled on the landing parties. Though these chemicals will not float for long, they will float long enough to smear small boats attempting to reach the land.

3 As used by the Germans against H.M.S. Erebus in 1917.

I00 NAVAL REVIEWV'.

defeated by their like; and their bases and communications- the ships which carried them-must be attacked by weapons of a mobile nature and not warded off by a static resistance. Of all means of attack aircraft are the most mobile and, like a swarm of hornets, they will hold a fleet until it is met by its like. 7. The Future Tactical Problems of Small Wars.

W e have already shown that the problem of the use of aircraft in small wars constitutes an entirely different problem from that which a great war presents. Moral attack is localised, on account of the loose system of government which exists in most uncivilised lands, and on account of these lands possessing a very rudimentary nervous system-lack of newspapers, tele- phones, telegraphs, railways, postal service, etc., all of which link individuals into one corporate nervous organisation. Physical attack is rendered difficult on account of natural obstacles-mountains, forests and deserts-and on account of paucity of fixed communications-roads and railways. -

~ e a r i n g these two means of attack in mind, if-we examine the small wars of the past, we shall find that their outstanding difficulties have been :-

(i.) Reconnaissance, due to lack of maps and definite or fixed objectives.

(ii.) Movement, due to lack of roads and innumerable physical obstacles.

(iii.) Protection, especially of lines of supply. (iv.) Offensive power, development of, due to the mobility

of the enemy. (v.) Supply, due to a lack of communications. W; will now examine these difficulties and see whether air-

craft cannot modify them. (i.) Reconnaissance.-In mountainous regions and over vast

expanses of desert land tactical reconnaissance by aeroplane presents many difficulties. Known towns and villages may be visited, but villages amongst mountains are difficult to locate and in desert countries may be inhabited one day and abandoned the next. It is, therefore? probable that one of the main intelligence duties of aircraft wlll be that of photography, for the past has shown that no less than roo square miles of country can be photographed by a flight of from four to six aeroplanes in one day.l Such work as this must be of the utmost value to the troops engaged.

(ii.) Movement.-Aircraft, being able to dispense with roads and to fly over physical obstacles, may, in certain cases, be able to transport small garrisons from point to point, but, until they

1 " The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars." Borton. Journal of the R.U.S.I., May, 1920, P. 3'3.

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. I 01

can land on very restricted areas of ground, this will not generally be possible. Their main duty in this respect $11 be to transport staff officers from place to place, either fo)r the purpose of controlling military operations or for that of parleying wlth the enemy or with neutral and friendly tribes.

(iii.) Protection.-For protective work aircraft will undoubtedly be of the utmost use; not only can they protect the troops on*the ground by co-operating with them, ranging their guns and reporting concentrations of the enemy, but they can protect our own communications and attack the enemy's as they did those of the Turkish army during the final operations in Palestine in 1918.

(iv.)-Offensive Power.-Their offensive power, though local, is great. At Kabul, in May, 1919, the single attack of one machine caused extensive damages to the arsenal, which formed, however, a tactical objective not frequently met with in small wars. For attacks on villages and positions out of reach of the troops, they are the only means possible; further, they can frequently attack the economic resources of the enemy, his wells, crops and herds, and so on occasion force him to surrender.

(v.) Supply.-lie believe, however, that the greatest of the many uses to which aircraft will be put in future small wars is that of supply work, which is, at present, the pivotal difficulty in these operations. At the siege of Kut and in the final advance on Aleppo supplies were sent by air. In the autumn of 1917 the German naval airship, L. 59, loaded with supplies and so constructed that her frame and covering could be made use of by troops, sailed from Bulgaria to German East Africa and though, through an error, her journey was made in vain, she nevertheless covered a distance of 4,500 miles in 96 hours. Bearing in mind that an aeroplane carrying three tons can feed a battalion for one d'ay and that an airship carrying 60 tons can feed a battalion for three weeks, the possibility of overcoming the age-long difficulty of supply in small wars becomes manifest, a difficulty which faces us to-day in a more acute form than it faced Alexander 2,300 years ago.

As in great wars, so in small wars, the (at present) greatest hindrance to the full use of aircraft lies not in the difficulty they experience in co-operating with the troops, but in the difficulty the troops experience in co-operating with them. They can move swiftly and bomb accurately, for rifle fire is normally the only anti-aircraft defence they have to overcome; they can destroy wells and pipe lines and can cause local panics, but a s their crews can seldom occupy the positions attacked their influence is transitory. Surely this is not the fault of the aeroplane but of the soldier with his speed of two and a half miles an hour and fifteen miles a day. If he will abandon his legs

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and take to tracks he can move at an average speed of ten miles an hour and one hundred miles a day. In one day he will then accomplish what he can seldom accomplish now in ten days and, by doing so, he will not only accentuate his own importance but he will enhance, out of all present recognition, the influence of aircraft on the problems of small wars. Air force and land force are not antagonistic, they are complimentary, and will become more and more so as their characteristics con- form to each other's requirements. For one to blame the other is but the kettle calling the pot black. T o these two forces must we ultimately add sea force, aeroplane carriers picketing the seas and rivers we control and ever ready to launch into the air machines which will fly inland and assist our land forces should these be within their reach. Thus, we finally see that in a small war as in a great war the old saying " unity is strength " equally applies. There is but one objective-the defeat of the enemy; there is but one force-the united three forces, which will compel him to our will. " Tria juncta in uno " is the motto we should strive to live up to.

8. T h e Future Tactical Problems of Internal Security. The object of internal security is to maintain law and order,

consequently, as we have already stated, the means to be employed in upholding the law should result, when enforced, in the least possible bloodshed and disturbance. In civilised countries this is fully recognised but, when considering the less civilised lands, we are over apt to suppose that their treatment in the event of a disturbance is entirely different. This is not the case, for though, being less cultured, they may be more susceptible to brute force than to moral persuasion, this in no way exonerates us from adopting the latter means before attempting the former.

Though internal security is a problem which embraces all parts of the Empire, in this section we intend to examine it only so far a s it affects our more unstable eastern possessions.

Normally, this work: is carried out by a police force, a force which is of the people it controls, and which moves amongst them and which maintains a state of peacefulness more by organising harmony and suggesting the folly of discord than by open or violent compulsion. The strength of the police force lies not in its armament but in the "human touch" it maintains with the people generally, both with those who conduct themselves peacefully and those who do not, on its ubiquity and constant presence are based its power.

In its essential nature, military force is the antithesis of police force, consequently, in application, when it is necessary to reinforce the police, it is equally necessary to reduce the soldier to the footing of an armed constable before employing

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. 1°3

him as a fighting man, and it must be remembered that a constable is not a fighting man but a man who prevents others fighting. Like the Grecian heralds, the police do not apply the sword but, when two swords are drawn, they strike them apart.

The question now arises, realising what police work entails, is it possible for an air force to police a country, and if the answer is in the negative, then of what assistance is such a force to the existing police and military garrisons ?

T o begin with, we believe that the very nature of aircraft is such as to preclude the first suggestion, because mankind lives on the earth and not in the air, consequently, in the air " human touch " is lacking. For example, we cannot say : " Mosul is a turbulent city; very well then, send fifty bombing machines there and blot it out, obliterate it like Carthage, man, woman and child." W e cannot do this a s it is really too easy to be practical; further, we cannot do it a s we are no longer living in the days of Nebuchadnezzar or Ghengis Khan, and further still, because the British Empire has not been built upon obliteration but upon pacification. And yet it is obliteration which air force officers are so frequently recommending. Thus, an eminent air officer says :-

" One object must be selected-preferably the most inacessible village of the most prominent tribe which it is desired to punish . . . . the attack with bombs and machine guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, inhabitants, crops and cattle." In fact, an Assyrian scourge is to descend upon the land

which completely puts to blush' the German atrocities of 1914. For unimaginative people it is so easy to be brutal in the air, for they are out of touch with the burning homesteads, the terror-stricken women and the maimed children below them. W e do not believe that our airmen realise this, for otherwise they could not suggest it. Would this Air Force officer walk into an oriental harem and rip the women and children up with a kukri ? H e would not, and yet he suggests burning them alive or blowing them to pieces. W h y does he do so ? The answer is because he ta!ks as one in the air and not as one on the earth, he talks like " an owl hooting over the city."

Is, then, the air force useless in maintaining law and order ? Far from it, if it be used as every police force should be used, namely, to pacify and not to obliterate. In the air it is a constant reminder that force can be applied, but we consider that it is not in this direction that its main usefulness is to be sought, but rather in its ability to transport political authorities to and from dissatisfied areas so that they may gain " touch " with the causes of dissatisfaction and nip them in the bud. An action very similar to the one suggested here was carried out

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during the final stages of the recent Somaliland operations. Within forty-eight hours of the fall of the Mullah's strong- hold the Governor of Somaliland travelled 300 miles in one day and visited the local chiefs, with the most satisfactory results. Had he been able to do so before the outbreak, it is quite conceivable that this particular small war would not have taken place. Further uses naturally suggest themselves, such as the transportation of small parties of policemen, the withdrawal of loyal subjects from dangerous areas, the observation of disturbed localities and the breaking up of hostile meetings by non-lethal gas bombs containing chemicals which cause the . excited mob to weep, laugh, sneeze, or be afllicted with a colic.

W e cannot here enter upon the question of the most suitable organisation for aircraft to adopt for police work, but in the next section we shall deal with commercial flying, which should suggest a basis for such an organisatlon.

PART 111 .-ORGANI SATION AND ADMINISTRATION. 9. T h e Relationship of Commercial and Military F ly ing .

Before examining the changes necessary in the organisation of imperial defence which the ever-increasing influence of aircraft will demand, it is important that we should enquire into the possibilities of civil flying, for on the skeleton of the civil organisation will be built up the muscles of future military aeronautics.

The first question to ask ourselves is this : Is civil flying a practical proposition ? And the second : If it is a practical proposition, what is likely to be its evolution ? That it is a practical proposition is undoubted, not only because it is already in existence, but because the aeroplane is to-day the speediest of all means of locomotion, and is unlikely to have any corn- petitors at any time in the future. This fact alone, whatever the cost of the speed may entail, definitely guarantees the continuance of its commercial existence. The second question is one of reliability and cost. Is the aeroplane likely to become sufficiently reliable to warrant a rapid evolution, and will its cost per ton per mile be sufficiently low to warrant its general adoption ? As regards its reliability, there can be little doubt that this is quite as much a ground question as an air question, and we shall discuss this later; as to its cost, it will visibly not pay to use aeroplanes for transporting bricks or coal, but in a world so busy as this world is to-day, a world which is ever seeking to prolong life by making more use of time, there can be no doubt that once the full meaning of saving time and the economy resulting in saving it is realised, the cost difficulty will solve itself by demand increasing supply and supply cheapening the transportation of commodities.

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W e do not propose here to do more than mention a few of the uses to which civil flying may be put, such as the carriage of mails, passengers and urgently needed goods, survey work, the observation of fisheries, forests, wrecks, icebergs, etc., etc. ; in place, we intend to examine its requirements as they affect the Empire, for on these, to a very great extent, will our military organisation be founded.

Our starting point is England, the heart of the Empire, a country not well suited to a rapid evolution of aerial transport on account of its limited size, but nevertheless a land which must form one of the most important future aerial termini in the world, as London still remains its greatest clearing house. iZs long as this condition endures, the importance of rapid means of movement between London and all European ports is too obvious to require accentuation.

The airways which will eventually lead to and from London may be divided into two categories-trunk airways and local airways. The most important of the former, so far as the Empire is concerned, are the following :- (i.) London t o Cairo 23 hrs. 8 mins. by a i r 4 days by laud and sea (ii.) ,, t o Vancouver 68 ., 24 ,, , , ,, 10 o r 11 ,, ,, , , ,, iii.) , t o Calcutta 58 ,, 48 ,, ,, ,, 16 ,. ,, ,, ,, ,,

(iv.) ,, t o Cape Town 69 ,, 8 ,, ,, ,, 17 ,, ,, ,, ,, ., (v.) ,, t o Sydney 112 ,, 48 ,, ,, ,, 30 (about) ,, ,, ,,

Except for the airway to Canada, most of the remainder pass over French territory alone, or from Marseilles a flying machine vi8 Malta can make Cairo and from Cairo it can proceed direct across British territory to Cape Town and Calcutta (except for a small break across Arabia), and, except for a halt a t Java, direct to Australia and thence viii Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands to New Zealand. From this it will be seen that, after London, Cairo is likely to become the most important air centre in the Empire.

This linking up of the Empire, which brings one of its most distant territories-Australia-within five days of London, is not only of enormous commercial and political importance but, as we shall see later, of a strategical importance which is all but incalculable, compared to which the cost appears an insignificant item.'

The efficient establishment of such a system depends not only on the reliability of the machines used but on the com- pleteness of the ground organisation-the marking of the airways and the provision of landing grounds, both on earth and water, equipped with workshops, stores and resting accommo-

1 Quoted from "Aerial Transport." G. Holt Thomas, p. 209. 2 For a ~o,ooo mile airway worked in 20 stages of three machines each, Mr.

Holt Thomas gives the cost at between &~OO,OOO and ~800 ,ooo for the aeroplanes, and between Ezoo,ooo and 'A600,ooo for the aerodromes. See the Observer, August rqth, 1921.

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dation for passengers. As, in the past, the resting places on the old caravan routes gave rise to villages, and the watering and coaling stations of railways to townships, so in the future may we see yet another step taken in the progress of civilisation; we may see, and probably shall before another generation is past, cities arise out of far scattered landing grounds, caravanserais begotten, by locomotion th'rough the air, centres more cosmopolitan than our great ports, centres at which commodities will be bartered and ideas exchanged, and the general education of mankind amplified. Truly has Mr. Holt Thomas said that, through the quickening of communications by means of aircraft, the nations of the world will be brought into hourly touch with each other, will grow to understand each other and, understanding, will be less likely to fly at each others throats than they are to-day. In his opinion, the aeroplane will prove an instrument for the maintenance of peace,l and we agree with him if only because, when we enquire into the history of the road, the railway and the steamship, we find that they have proved instruments of peace, for, from tribes of uncivilized bar- barians whose daily occupation was warfare, has every increase in the civil means of locomotion raised us stage by stage to what we are. Still imperfect, still somewhat barbarous, but seldom armed to the teeth when we leave the front doors of our houses. Movement is the foundation of general knowledge, and general knowledge is an antidote to war, for it teaches us that there is but one human race on earth possessing many peculiarities which, when unrealised, through difficulty of contact, frequently lead us into trouble and strife.

10. The Future Orgnnisat ion of Aircraft. If we examine the history of armies, we shall find that their

evolution is closely connected, as it must be, with the progress of civil means of movement, and as these means change so must their organisation be transformed in order to keep pace with these changes. W e have dealt with, all but too briefly, the question of civil flying, but we hope sufficiently in order to accentuate this fact-that necessity alone will assure it eventually being established, not only between England and the Dominions, but between England and many foreign countries as well. If we, as a nation, do not grasp the importance of civil flying in the future, and if we do not initiate an efficient aerial service backed by British gold, there can be little doubt that some other nation will do this for us, and the result will be that the next war will find us bankrupt in the air.

There can be no continuity of evolution without demand, for demand is the incentive of supply and the most efficient supplv

1 1 "Arrial Transport." Holt Thomas, pp. 167-168.

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is obtained through competition. T o create a general demand for civil aerial traffic is to lay the foundations of aerial strategy and, without these foundations, no great military progress can be expected. Once aircraft are a commercial asset then strategy is assured, for not only will competition improve the equipment but also the organisation and the personnel without which it will not be possible to effect a rapid expansion of military flying from its peace basis on the outbreak of war.

As air fleets nlust be homogeneous in nature, in order to facilitate movement and tactics, it is important that the closest touch be maintained between the military and civil services. For though the machines made use of in war must differ from those used in chi1 flying, it should be remembered that, f ~ r such an operation as the paralysing of a nation's will by an air attack, civil machines could easily be employed, for all that is required is the transport of a certain tonnage of gas bombs from one point to an0ther.l Again, with a little alteration, these machines would prove most useful for carrying soldiers and supplies, in fact, as useful in the air as commercial lorries and motor omnibuses proved during the recent war on land.

Granted that a military air force can only successfully ex- pand on the outbreak of war if a thoroughly efficient civil organisation is at the time in existence, it must not be forgotten that this expansion equally depends for its success on the then existing air force being of a sufficient strength and efficiency to take advantage of the civil organisation. Here the questlon of cost presents itself to us : how are we, in these days of financial stringency, going to maintain an extensive air force as well as a navy and army costing well over twice what these forces cost before the war? In our own opinion, before considering the question of cost, it is necessary to make sure of our premises. At present we are over apt to look upon the air force as an adjunct to our pre-war defence forces and not as a definite part of our defence organisation, and until we do so we shall not grasp the fact that, as we cannot maintain three supreme forces, we

1 Whatever may, in the future, be decided on as regards the disarmament of nations, one fact is certain, namely, that the more accepted means of waging war are restricted, the more wlll nations be impelled to rely on chemical and aerlal warfare. There is no possibility of abolishing the use of poison gas unless all organic chemical works be destroyed; so also is there no possibility of abolishing aerial warfare unless all civil aircraft be forbidden. Lord Grey, no militarist by predilections, fully realised this when, on October loth, 1918, at a public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations, he said :-"You cannot limit the amount of merchant ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments, fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons of war become the things which you use in commerce--ships, aeroplanes, chemicals of all kinds." The more nations are forced to disarm, the more certain is it that the civilian populations themselves will become the main targets in the next great war; such is the irony of interfering'with the age-old institutions of human kind. "Plus Ca change plus c'est la mCme chose ! "

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must adjust their differences so that no one force maintains units the work of which can be better carried out by the others. It is, therefore, we believe, that only by a drastic removal of naval and military weeds will the ground be cleared for air force expansion and the money obtained to pay for it. W e must examine what are the duties of the navy and army and compare each of these with the known powers of present-day aircraft, and then, if we are of opinion that any one duty can be better carried out by aircraft, this duty should be relegated to the air force, such a comparison as this being made on the introduction of every important aerial improvement. If this be done, our future air force organisation will be built up on factors of eficiency and not pn hypothetical suppositions which must more or less be the case if the air force is compelled to struggle for its existence against its deeper rooted competitors and only assume such duties which to them are in nature absolutely impossible. T o build an air force upon the impossibilities of sea and land warfare in place of upon the purposes of war is to produce a monstrosity-an uneconomical organisation which can possess no relationship to warfare as a whole.

Turning now to the external organisation, the probability is that, if civil flying becomes remunerative, spheres of commercial aerial influence will be created by the aeroplane; these spheres being trade centres are likely to encircle the more prosperous areas of the world. As great wars take place between prosperous nations and mainly arise out of trade competition between them, on the outbreak of war these centres will become points of strategical importance, in fact they will become the aerial bases in the next great war. It is, therefore, of supreme importance to us that these aerial trade centres, and as far as possible the airways connecting them, should be on British soil, for otherwise, in the event of war, their strategical possibilities will be lost to us. Turning now to a map of the British Empire, let us examine the five trunk airways already mentioned in section g, assuming that no single flight should exceed 500 to 600 miles in length.

(i.) London to Vancouver.-Two airways lead to Canada, the first across the Atlantic from Valentia Island to St. Johns in Newfoundland, and the second from the Shetlands, vid Ice- land and Greenland, to Labrador. The first is an airship route and is all red ; the second, in the event of a war with the United States, could be used by aeroplanes but only with Danish con- sent.

(ii.) London to Cairo.-Two airways lead to Cairo, the first viii France, Italy, Greece, Crete to Alexandria, and the second via" France, Algiers, Tunis, Malta, and thence by airship to Cairo. In the second case, the only foreign territory traversed is French.


The remaining three airways we will consider as starting from Cairo.

(iii.) Cairo to Calcutta.-Two airways lead to India, an all- red airship route from Cairo vid Suakim, Aden, Socotra to Bombay, and an aeroplane route from Cairo1 via^ Basra, Bah- rein Island, to Gwadar in southern Baluchistan; except for the passage over northern Arabia this airway is an all-red one.

(iv.) Cairo to Cape Town.-This airway is all-red, and from Fashoda a branch line can be run westwards to Nigeria, The Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and thence to Bathurst, crossing French territory.

(v.) Cairo to Sydney.-By aeroplane from India vi& Burma, Penang to Singapore, thence viii Java and Kupang to Port Darwin, or direct through the Java Sea by airship to the same destination, or, if the East Indies are to be avoided, by airship from Colombo vi& the Cocos Tslands to Perth.

In considering these airways from their strategical aspect, certain important factors, which must influence the future organisation of the air force, become apparent. The first is, that an organisation entirely based on the aeroplane is not yet possible, and consequently, if the complete strategical influence of flight is our aim, the airship must have a place, and a very important position, in our organisation. The second is, that the most important outside influence on our eventual organisation will be French; the third, that we must keep a footing in Palestine and Mesopotamia in order to maintain connection with India and thence with Australia and New Zealand; and, in order to consolidate this airway, we should obtain definite rlghts to fly over Northern Arabia in the event of war; the fourth is, that the most out-of-the-way islands may rise into supreme aerial importance-thus, the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia form'a group of aerial o u t ~ o s t s to Queensland; Fanning Island threatens the Hawaiian group; the Falkland Islands are well placed on the flank of Drake Strait and Mag- ellan's Strait, and St. Helena, Mauritius and the Seychelles renew much of the past importance they held in sailing ship days. These facts are mentioned here not only to accentuate the influence of aircraft on imperial defence, and the influence of geography on aircraft, but to emphasise the fact that the external organisation of our air force is a problem which lies, to a certain extent, outside military influence, in fact, here is presented to us a nc7e problem in imperial defence .which demands liberty of thought in its solution and harmony of action in the application of the solution to imperial naval and military requirements. These two questions, both of which are administrative in nature, we will consider in the remaining two sections of this paper.

1 Cairo, vib Amman and Rnmadi to Baghdad, takes 56 hours.

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I I . T h e Fu ture Adrnin,istmtion of Aircraft. The tactical employment of a weapon or service is a matter

of common-sense. Certain values are known and others can be discovered by trial and experiment. When these are set together a tactical theory may be evolved upon which the organisation of the arm may be based. S o far, we have only dealt with matkriel and men collectively, and our difficulties have not been very great, but, when we turn to the third problem-the administration of the organisation-we are at once confronted - v a whole host of personal factors. First of all, an organisation itself is nearly always considered from its individual standpoint; and secondly, its chiefs, being human, fight for the maintenance of its individuality in order to maintain their own liberty of action. The question now arises, how far is the liberty of action of our Royal Air Force compatible with the economic defence of the Empire ?

At the beginning of the recent war, the Royal Flying Corps was looked upon as the merest of naval and military adjuncts, because it was very young and because the Navy and Army were very old, so old in fact that they could not appreciate its youthful possibilities. These, however, manifested themselves rapidly, especially on land, until the co-operative necessity of aircraft in every military operation became of paramount Im-

portance. During the war, the soldier and sailor learnt the naval and

military values of aircraft so fully, that generally no room was left over for saitors and soldiers to understand that the aeroplane possessed certain powers as different from those of the sea and land forces as the powers of these forces differed from each other.

From the purely naval and military points of view, there can be no doubt that the present separation of aircraft as integral portions of the navy and army will tend to inefficiency in co- operatibn ; but from the purely aerial point of view, there equally can be no doubt that to abolish the Royal Air Force as an independent service and to re-establish in its place separate naval and military wings would result in such a lack of incentive to evolve that, though co-operation might temporarily be enhanced, within a few years' time this co-operation itself would become moribund, in fact it would become so saturated with the naval and military points of view as to stunt the growth of independent aerial ideas.

The mainspring of evolution is creative energy, that is, individual brain power. It follows, therefore, that, if the air force is to evolve, this power must not be denied to it ; further, i t must be remembered that brain power is mainly generated through friction of thoughts-claims which the navy and army will not

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. I 1 1

accept and which consequently the air force has got to prove by ocular demonstration. If the air force became a part of the navy and army, these claims would not arise, and, not arising, would never be tested o u t ; consequently, evolution would become painfully slow. For co-operative work, adaptive power rather than creative energy is necessary, that is, power to harmonise the limitations of aircraft to the requirements of the navy and army. W e arrive, consequently, at two main problems-aerial evolution and aerial adaption to naval and military requirements. In full three services-an independent air service, to create; a naval air service, and a military air service, to adapt, that is, to co-operate. T h e main administrative problem which faces us in the future is, therefore, the following: Should these three services be administered a s one or a s three separate organisations ? If a s one, we are liable to create a force so separated from the military requirements of sea and earth a s to be of little co-operative value to the services which control these elements; if a s three, then the result will be a dispersion of power, and a subordination of two-thirds of the total air force to purely naval and military necessities and a consequent weakening of the remaining third.' W e believe that there is a practical solution to this difficulty, and this v e will attempt to outline in the final section of this paper.

12. The Future Co-ordination of Imperial Defence.

There can be but one ultimate purpose in imperial policy, namely, imperial preservation, the foundations of which s r e guaranteed by force, the pbwer latent in our naval, military and air services. Complexity means weakness, far as Napoleon truly said : " I t is the simple which succeeds in war." Tb-day we have three separate forces under three separate commanders, with three separate staffs controlling three separate organisations, and yet in war we require unity of command and unity of action. Theoretically, this unity of command is vested in the Cabinet, but so theoretical is Cabinet control that in practice unity of action is non-existent. S o little can the Cabinet, the main duties of which are connected with the routine government of the country during peace time, command in war, that shortly after the termination of the South African war of 1899-1902, a Committee of Imperial Defence was formed to advise the Government. This committee, being advisory in nature, possesses no executive powers ; further, its organisation is unstable, a s its constitution changes with every change of

1 Seeing that the aeroplane is not a weapon but a vehicle, should the army aish to r a se certain special air units of its own and pay for them out of the army estimates, personally we see no objection to such a course. After all, pontoons are a special type of boat, but this does not preclude them forming a part of our military equipment.

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government. Guided by an uncertain policy, it is opposed by the well-established vested interests of two hundred years of naval and military growth, and is confronted by a system of Treasury control which, having scarcely changed since 1689, may literally be denoted as archaic. Even if this committee were composed of Wellingtons and Nelsons and Pitts, it could accomplish little against the ponderous and resilient bureaucracy which encircles it.

In the great wars of the past, wars which involved both the ~ lavy and army, two separate campaigns have normally been waged at one and the same time, namely, a naval and a military campaign; and though the objective of the navy and army is one in nature-the defeat of the enemy-if we examine these great wars we shall find that the actions of navy and army have, when compared with the common objective, been more frequently than not incidental in place of coincidental, and why ? Because the army has been one thing and the navy another thing, and the Cabinet has been nothing at all, naval or military. To-day we have a third thing-the air force, so that our complexities are complete.

W e feel, therefore, that the time has arrived wherein, if efficiency and economy are to be combined, our three defence forces should be brought under the control of one brain. W e suggest, therefore, that it would be wise to enquire into the feasibility of replacing the Committee of Imperial Defence by an Imperial General Staff with financial and strategical powers. There is nothing insuperably difficult in this proposal. Money is money whether spent on the navy, army or air force; and the strare- gical principles of war are identical in all three spheres of action. Tactics vary with conditions, but tactics are not so much the province of the Imperial General Staff as the duty of the general staffs of the services under their control.

The knowledge of grand strategy, or the combined operations of navy, army and air force, is not beyond the powers of man to attain. To-day we may not be in a position to find a body of men possessing the necessary knowledge for this work, but if this be the case, then all the more should we attempt to create such a body and in the shortest possible time, for accepting man as he is, an entire military generation will have to pass by before the Imperial General Staff will be able to make its influence felt.

To-day we possess a naval Staff College at Greenwich and two military Staff Colleges, one at Camberley and one at Qudta, and we have recently opened a similar institution for the Royal Air Force at Andover. Each of these establishments can have but one main object-how to TVin the next war. Each will examine this problem from a different point of view, and so different will


the pictures of the future requirements become that except to their delineators they will be unrecognisable. Each school will produce schemes which do not coincide, and each will produce a highly efficient body of specialists without correlation. W e ask, therefore, is not the most pressing problem in imperial deience the creation of a body of grand strategists, men who simultaneously think in terms of sea, earth and air ? Further, we ask, if this suggestion be considered sound, has not the time arrived wherein to establish a W a r or Imperial Defence College for the creation of these strategists ? W e believe that the time is opportune: the navy is faced by a new problem-the submarine ; the army is faced by a new problem-the tank ; and both navx and army are faced by a new competitor-the air force; and all three by a new weapon-gas. Things new are surging up from workshop and laboratory, let us fearlessly grasp hold of novelties whilst they are yet young and harness them to our purpose, so that, when the rumble of war is once again heard, we may understand what is required of each other, and understanding, strong in the faith that united we are in- vincible, compel victory at the lowest imperial cost.

When we look back, turning over the pages of the history of the British Emnire and nonder over the causes of our numerous wars, two conditions become readily apparent : the first is, that the origins of our great wars have normally arisen from causes outside our political control, and the second that, when war has been declared, it has nearly always opened with a British defeat. As we cannot control the origins of war, we must accept wars a s inevitable occurrences, but we must not suppose, because in the past we have usually ended our wars successfully that our system of imperial defence is impeccable, for in the future we shall be faced by a new problem-the problem of scientific warfare, of cunning, mastering brute force. In the past we have succeeded because, in spite of our indifferent preparation, the initial bruising of our military body mattered little so long as the will of the nation was safeguarded by supremacy at sea. To-day, this supremacy is threatened, and no navy alone can maintain it, for the seas which surround us offer no impediment to flight. When onCe again the nations of the world are strong, at any moment may our will be attacked. There can be no guarantee to secure us against such an eventuality, but there is a guarantee that it may not be worth while attacking us ; not because our will is beneath contempt but because the British Empire is in a position to hit back. I n the future, we dare not depend on ga in ing t ime when once the storm clouds of war burst, wherein to make good our deficiencies of preparation, i n place we must be ready to act

"'4 NAVAL REVIEW.

and to act a t once. The only arm which can so act, which can mobilise and fight within twenty-four hours of an outrage taking place, is the air force. This liberty of immediate action is in fact its supreme duty and, however important co-operation with the navy and army may be, first and foremost must our Royal Air Force be prepared to act alone. The morality of such action is beyond question, for self-preservation is a human right. T o commit felo de se by denying to our air force the power of retaliating against the will of our enemies, is the act of a nation which has become insane.

In this paper we have only'dealt with a few of the problems of aerial imperial defence, though, if space permitted, many others could be included, such as : the influence of anti-aircraft defence, the minor tactics of aircraft ; aerial 1egislHtion ; the details of imperial aerial organisation ; the aerial organisation of the Dominions and the influence of foreign air force evolution on our strategy. W e have not examined these, not because we do not recognise their importance, but because we consider that, at the present moment, what is required is not an elaboration of detail, which may or may not prove correct, but a general manifestation of the probable powers of aircraft, so that the importance of this question may become apparent to all. Even in the problems we have reviewed, we have scarcely accomplished more than rendered visible the outstanding factor which now confronts us, namely, that w e are n o longer a n island and our E m p i r e has n o longer a n y unattackable frontiers either sea or land. This factor, we feel, is not yet appreciated by the nation, nevertheless, it is a factor which must grow and the tendencies of which, to be appreciated fully, must be watched from their inception, for if we do not appreciate their value, there can be no economic preparation for war and consequently no assurance of peace. If aerial unpreparedness confronts us when the next war storm approaches, then, to modernise the words of the ancient seer, we tremblingly shall realise the horror of the words he uttered :-

" Like a storm flood they can pass, No door can shut them out, No bolt can turn them back. They scour from land to land Driving the sailor from his sh ip ; Thep hunt the people from their beds And chase the soldier from his trench. Loudly roaring above, gibbering below, They are the owls which hoot over the Empire."

S o be it, our destiny is in our own hands, and God helps him who helps himself, herein lies sealed the fate of nations. T o our Empire-prosperity, contentment and honour; and to

THE FIENDS OF THE AIR. Z I j

our enemies-the justice of our might. For peace without prosperity is beggary, and peace without contentment is anarchy, and, above all, peace without honour is degradation. And what of the future ? It is dark, but the past is bright enough. For four thousand years the past has reiterated this one great lesson-preparedness for war is the stability of peace.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS.

OUR Hon. Editor invites further contributions on the subject of Confidential Reports and, a t a, time when the Navy is being reduced to a shadow of its late self, it is particularly necessary that the machinery for securing a maximum of efficiency in the officers, especially those destined for higher command, should be overhauled and brought up to date.

The writer finds himself very much in agreement with the author of the previous article on this subject in No. 3, Vol. X., August, 1922, and with the latter's proposals to widen the scope of confidential reports, particularly as an officer approaches the zone where selections for promotion are made.

If the machinery of selection is to operate properly, however, reform must come from the top. It is no use merely adding to the headings of a printed return unless a new spirit is introduced both in rendering the reports and in utilising them as one of the principal means of selecting officers for advancement.

This spirit must be based on a clear appreciation of what are now the true requirements of an officer for higher command.

First and foremost, it must be realised that successful command entails intelligent and intelligible leadership The old, blunt commander who knew what he wanted to do but who (through inability or disinclination) seldom made known his motive or explained his method, is a failure as a leader of a highly intelligent .personnel.

The instinct to act without knowing why and the old discipline of blind obedience are fast losing their hold, but they can be and are being replaced by a much higher and better form ot discipline based on understanding, which is the surest foundation on which to build trust in a commander.

Next it must be realised that loyalty and devotion to duty, alone, are wholly insufficient qualities in an officer as he rises in the Service.

Coupled with them he must possess, amongst other qualities, personality, good judgment, imagination, originality, and initiative, and he must be given opportunities of proving them.

W a r in all its phases is becoming more and more complex. Successful leadership in war is demanding more and more flexibility of mind to cope with the swift developments in weapons and new means of attack and defence.

It cannot be conducted on old stereotyped lines, and, if the highest credit is given to those who have conformed most strictly

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS. "7

to the conventional, the wrong men will be found at the top in the day of battle.

The late war produced many cases where it was necessary to dive down to more junior ranks to find the right kind of leaders.

This was not due to the disabilities of age alone but to a system which has resulted all too often in the advancement of mediocrity and the repression of a less conventional type of officer.

Mediocrity, again and again, has secured a confidential report of the " much to my satisfaction " type. H e has fulfilled what is expected of him and performed his duties loyally and with adequate ability; he has a pleasant personality and is regarded as " safe." A succession of " much to my satisfaction " reports from distinguished officers who have not looked for any higher clualities in a subordinate, have secured his steady advancement by the powers-that-be on the assumption that this is the highest praise which an officer can consistently earn.

His very considerable limitations are not mentioned. H e may have been a worthy watch-keeper, but he may make a hopelessly incompetent Executive Officer; a zealous specialist, but a useless Captain of a ship; a brilliant Commander of a battleship, but an impossible Admiral ; yet he may rise to each of these higher ranks because his seniors were unable to discrim- inate, or failed to record his limitations.

In contrast to this we have a less conventional type, always in hot water as a youngster for an excess of animal spirits, for displaying uncomfortable zeal in suggesting improvements, re- forms, innovations, possessed of a tiresome knowledge of some subject outside the ordinary run of his duties, or a tendency to initiative which is interpreted as undue independence, if not insubordination.

H e probably gets a confidential report of the " not always to my satisfaction " type and only in war is this changed to the " marked initiative and ability and with great gallantry " which show him to be a born leader.

The first type may possess none of the traits for high command, but the system will enable him to drift up to it ; the second type, with proper guidance, encouragement and control, might prove the ideal leader, pet, judged from conventional standards, he receives a less favourable confidential report and only an acci- dent of war enables him to show his worth.

Again, no officer should have his advancement stopped by the fact that he was once reported on unfavourably by a senior, however distinguished.

The best Flag or Commanding Officers are not infallible and the worst subordinate officer may mend his ways and turn his misused energies to better purpose.

I r8 NAVAL REVIEW.

Too often an old-fashioned Captain with somewhat narrow ideas of what becomes a subordinate has marred the latter's chances of advancement for life by branding him in a confidential report with some inherent defect and, in spite of the most eulogistic reports from subsequent and more appreciative seniors, this " black mark " is for ever. held against him.

If confidential reports are to operate fairly, very full consideration should be given by those using them for the selection of officers for advancement to the characteristics or idiosyncrasies of those who wrote them, and these should weigh no less than the substance of the reports themselves.

For instance, certain senior officers are known to be rabid teetotalers, others consider no officer can be fit for Captain's rank who has not had years of experience as executive officer of a big ship, others again have no interests outside the Service while their opposites attach importance to athletic .or social qualities in their officers.

With every desire to be fair and impartial, such personal idiosyncrasies are bound to colour reports.

Then there is the difficult question of officers being shown their confidential reports. It is often the practice to give officers the opportunity of seeing them if they desire to do so. Many do not care to avail themselves of the opportunity, either from diffidence or indifference ; but this is a mistake. Every officer should have to see and sign, as having read, his confidential report. This is the practice ordered by the Regulations in the Army and Royal Air Force, and it must tend to have a salutary effect both on the subject of a report and the nature of ~ t s contents.

A particularly serious defect in the system which obtains at present in the Navy is the fact that commanding officers of H.M. ships never see the confidential reports made on them by the Flag or other officer commanding the fleet or squadron to which the ship belongs.

A Flag Officer may or may not know his Captains intimately but, at any rate, there is more scope for misinterpretation of motives or lack of appreciation of services as between the Admiral commanding a station and the Captain of a ship employed chiefly on detached duties than there can be in the case of a commanding officer reporting on the officers of his own ship.

The Commanding Officer may be made the subject of an unfavourable confidential report which has been based on a misconception of facts, but, being in ignorance of this, he can make no effort to justify himself, nor can he realise that there is any necessity to do so.

Too late, he finds himself shelved, due either to faults which, had he known were the subject of his chief's criticism, he might

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS. I r9

have remedied in himself, or to misrepresentation, doubtless inadvertent, which he has never had the opportunity to answer.

At the very stage in an officer's career, therefore, when he is undergoing the greatest test for selection for higher command, the present system admits of the worst and most unreliable form of confidential report.

There remains the necessity of ensuring that an officer is reported on through every stage of his career.

Officers employed at the Admiralty, standing by ships building or undergoing courses of [instruction, for example, are often most inadequately reported on, yet, on the one hand, their services may have been most valuable and they may have shown considerable initiative and administrative capacity or, in their courses, certain defects, such as inability to express themselves in writing, may have been apparent to the instructors, but may pass unnoticed in ordinary work.

As an instance of this, again at the stage when selection for the most important comands begins to be imminent, Captains undergoing the course at the W a r College have very considerable opportunities of showing whether they possess certain valuable qualifications, such as an aptitude for clear thinking and expression, whether in the form of orders or in the appreciation of a situation.

Those officers who have made a study of their profession and who have acquired a knowledge of war, outside purely technical matters necessary in every-day sea life, will, before the course is ended, be apparent to the Flag Officer in charge, and it is essential that his opinion should carry considerable weight at the Admiralty in the selection of those destined for important staff appointments, directors of Admiralty departments and, in due course, for retention on the Flag list for higher command.

T o summarise, the confidential report system requires radical revision. The form of the reports requires elaborating and those responsible for reading them must be expected to give much fuller information as to those qualities most needed in an officer for the leadership of modern f iersonnel.

At each stage of his carreer they should indicate particularly how he is shaping for the next stage.

That he performs his ordinary duties satisfactorily mav be taken for granted if not stated to the contrary, and thit he merely continues to do so should not, in future, be any recom- mendation for advancement unless'he displays other distinctive qualities to raise him above a standard of mediocrity.

Everv officer should see his report and thereby be enabled to correct faults in his character, or be encouraged to persevere in efforts for which he has been commended.

120 NAVAL REVIEW.

In using the confidential reports, expressions of praise or blame should be tempered by the Admiralty with an impartial knowledge of the characteristics of the officer who made them.

Throughout an officer's career it should be borne in mind by his seniors that service without enterprise or character proves the mediocrity who should not command the eulogy " much to my satisfaction ."

T H E COMPOSITIOI% O F T H E MAIN FLEET I N T H E F U T U R E .

THERE must be many officers like myself who, earnestly trying to discover from the writings of various distinguished men what form our future Navy should take, find themselves involved in a maze of contradictions, irrelevancies and dogmatic assertions. W e have the sayings of midshipmen and old women, but not a carefully reasoned judgment. Each champion of his own pet type triumphantly puts the opposing force into a hopelessly impossible position and sinks it with the assurance that this is only an example of what will happen in the next war.

Job was reproved for being of those who darkened counsel by words without knowledge : I, without knowledge, have written this article to elicit counsel, and to this end have tried to set out where the new fleet will have to operate, what it has to do, and hence what its composition should be.

I have taken the position in ten years' time as being the earliest date a struggle for maritime supremacy would conceiv- ably take place.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION. In order to decide the composition of the fleet ten years hence

it is necessary first to prophesy the international situation at that time, for it is obvious that the position of the probable battleground, especially relative to the coast, will determine the types best suited to attain success. Operations in the Pacific Ocean, for example, will call for a fleet of a composition different €0 that in the North Sea, and a Narrow Seas fleet would be unable to compete with an ocean-going fleet on the latter's ground.

At the present moment the political situation is, as the journalists say, in the melting pot, and the final shape is hard to determine. The future strength of Russia and Germany form the most uncertain factors. Russia's importance will lie not so much in her strength as in her weakness, which will make her the bone over which the dogs will growl if they do not fight. Lacking the revolutionary fervour among the masses which made the French Revolution so formidable, she will be in the weakness of convalescence after the fever of Bolshevism. Ger-

I 2 2 NAVAL REVIEW.

many, on the other hand, will be rapidly gaining strength; yet she will be more of a potential than actual menace. T h e dls- turbing influence in political waters will be Japan, and the cloud on the horizon, now no bigger than a man's hand, is a n alliance between Germany and Japan arising out of the similarity of their aims. Both nations possess a population, vigorous and disciplined, too large for their own territories, but lacking colonies into which they may overflow, and the British Empire contains the Naboth's vineyards which these modern Ahabs covet. T h e natural result of this will be to drive the two nations into each other's arms and compel the other great maritime and colonial empires-Britain, France and America-to combine. I t is doubtful whether these actual combinations will have taken place in ten years' time, but all strategical problems will be based on that assumption. Of these three great natiolns, Great Britain will be the only one to possess an efficient floating force capable of taking the offensive. France will concentrate on underwater craft purely for local defence, and America, though she will possess on paper a magnificent fleet, will find that she cannot get men to man her ships. As her greatest naval writer said, America will never become a great sea power because her people have not ingrained in them that sense of the value of sea power which long centuries of survival only by the sea has given to the British race.

W i t h Japan and Germany a s our enemies, the result of a war where the combatants will be so scattered will depend almost entirely on the sea, and Great Britain, a s always, will have to hear the brunt. H e r economic position will be such a s to enable her to have a fleet sufficient for the work : with her wealth founded on a predominant merchant service and fruitful Dominions and Colonies she will have recovered from her present instability, and could afford to maintain a fleet commen- surate with her dignity : but the history of nations governed by the people is, that the fighting services are neglected until a sugden crisis causes a panic, in which more money is wasted uselessly than if a state of careful preparedness had been maintained, and in all probability the British Navy will be in a dangerously weak and neglected condition.

This agreement, which is now having such a marked effect on world politics, will not survive the ten years : jealousy and fear will first cause evasions and it will then become a dead letter. I t has received general assent at the moment because it is to the advantage of all the naval Powers, none of which can afford to build or maintain the fleet which competition would render necessary. But it must be remembered that armaments depend on policy, and it seems doubtful whether Japan in ten

THE CO&lPOSITION OF THE M.UN FLEET IN THE FUTURE. I23

years' time will be content to rank a poor third among the naval Powers. I t may safely be assumed that this unnatural product, born in Washington, of nations exhausted by the late war, will not long survive its birth but will be strangled by small things : jealousies among the signatories, the unreasoning panics which afflict nations, Japan's ambition, the menace of Germany, even the humiliation of the British Yavy ranking equal only with that of another power, each and all will combine to mike the agreement a dead letter a s soon a s economic conditions are stabilised and competition regains its former power.

T o sum up the political situation in ten years' time : Great Britain, America and France will be bound to each other by agreement, whether written, verbal o r tacitly understood, to defend each other against aggression, and Japan and Germany will be actual or probable partners, with Russia a s the spark to ignite the magazine. Competition in armaments will be pursuing its ruinous course, and, if all the world is a stage, it may be said to be set for another struggle for the empire of the world.

T h e importance of the political situation in determining the battleground, which, in its turn, shows the requirements of strategy, has been explained. T h e functions of the Navy remain nearly unaltered, but the types of ships required to carry out these functions vary with the strategy.

It is clear that in the future the Navy will no longer be the acknowledged first line of defence, but it is evident that in ten vears' time the air will not be the master of the water. T o attain the latter objective, aircraft must have a greater cruising radius and ability to withstand all weathers, and history shows us that peace is not a time of swift development. S o far a s the fighting services are concerned, the next ten years among the nations, exhausted by the late war, will be a period of comparative stagnation and very slow progress.

T h e functions of the Navy in war may be summarised a s (i.) to preserve the trade routes of the Empire so a s to ensure a safe highway for our merchant fleet, which is essential for the existence of the United Kingdom; (ii.) to make possible the transportation of troops all over the world, and to keep intact their lines of communications; (iii.) to prevent the enemy from invading any part of the Empire or supporting any troops that they may land; (iv.) to maintain a blockade of enemy ports so a s to deprive them of their wealth, munitions of war and food. I n peace the chief function of the Navy is to give the necessary backing to diplomatic representations. I t has been

124 N A V A L REVIEW.

stated above that armaments depend on policy, but the converse is equally true, and no strong policy can be carried out which has not the backing of force. Secondary functions in peace are -(i.) to police the world and protect the interests of British subjects ; (ii.) to act a s a stimulus and advertising agent to trade by showing the Flag. The Navy, however, is designed for war, or rather for the prevention of war, and its composition in peace time is important only in so far as it makes obvious to any other Power that it will be impossible to commence a struggle with any chance of success at sea. --.-

Assuming the above premises that Germany and Japan will be our future enemies, a complicated problem arises, for provision will have to be made for both narrow seas and ocean strategy. Germany, however, will not be the predominant sea rival, and her naval forces will mainly consist of aircraft and submarines, the containing of which should be done by France with the assistance of light craft on our part. France, by the composition of her navy, has rendered herself competent to defend herself against any, other than a powerful floating force, and allied with her auxiliary craft an effective blockade of Ger- many should be enforced.

Great Britain's main fleet will be concentrated in the Far East, with the Pacific and Oceania as its drill ground, and bearing in mind the functions of the fleet it will be seen that the chief requirements will be extensive cruising radius and speed. Tlie lines of communications and highways of trade to be guarded, cover almost the entire length of the world, and the geographical position of Japan renders it impossible to maintain a close blockade. The work of the Navy will therefore be largely confined to convoy duties and commerce destroying, with ships of the line based on the strategic centre, to crush the enemy's fleet when it emerges.

At the present time we are faced with an entirely new problem, for whose solution we have no previous experience as a guide, and in default of which we must depend on intelligent anticipation. There is little doubt that eventually the air will conquer the water, but we may safely say that this will not have happened in ten years' time. Aircraft, like torpedo boats at the end of the last century, are suffering at present from the blind enthusiasm of their partisans, who are " to its virtues very kind, to its faults a little blind," and who assume for it in its infancy the powers it map have acquired as a man. There are two types of aircraft with which ships will have to contend, the bomb-dropping and the torpedo-carrier. The first has been

T H E COMPOSITION O F T H E 31.4IN FLEET IN T H E FUTURE. I 2 5

tested on a very slow and unarmed target, with unsatisfactory results; the second was successfwl operating against ships who could not retaliate, but its effect in action against heavy anti- aircraft fire is a matter of doubt. Improvements, though rela- tively small for reasons stated above, will have been made in the next decade, but these will have been met by corresponding advance in anti-aircraft defence. The great weakness of modern machines is their small radius of action and general unweather- liness. Far operating with a fleet in such vast stretches oi water as the Pacific, they must be carried in ships which are particularly susceptible to loss, being by design less heavily armed and presenting a bigger target than the fighting ship proper, the defence of which would prove a source of embarrassment to the fleet. The future fleet will, however, have to contain a great number of aircraft carriers, with three types of machines, bombers, torpedo-carriers and fighters to drive away hostile attacks. In addition, each big ship, as in the late war, will carry its own machines, one for spotting, the other for defence. The influence of aircraft in a fleet action may be summed up as a menace but not an annihilating force, provided that it is coun- tered by a like offensive in the air and a proper development of defence in the ships. Bombing machines especially, being slow, are particularly vulnerable to attack by a fast fighting machine ; and torpedo-carriers, bearing a very limited cargo, have their sting drawn as soon as that is discharged.

Aircraft alone cannot get usurp the functions of the floating force : it cannot by itself guard the trade routes and lines of communication, because to do that implies either preventing the enemy fleet from putting to sea or crushing it when it does appear, and neither function can be performed by the air against a resolute foe. It is also unable to carry out the duties of convoy because this tvould have to be done over vast distances, and the slow speed of merchant ships would force the convoying machines to be continually circling round, it3 order to keep in the air, at a speed which would soon exhaust their resources.

It may be assumed, then, that aircraft will not be a power in themselves but will be, like destroyers and submarines, a factor modifying strategy and tactics, and requiring new measures to deal with them.

FUTURE TYPES. It is necessary, in order to make out the requirements of this

Far Eastern fleet, to visualise the probable course of operations in a war with Japan. Great Britain may be assumed to be superior, and Japan will be forced to adopt the strategy of the weaker Power as carried out since sea power first made history, i .e. , to keep her main forces intact, thus constituting an ever- present menace and deterrant to large military operations.

I 2G NAVAL REVIEW.

and by raids on commerce and detached warships to sap the strength of her superior foe until a favourable opportunity arises to utilise her main force and strike down the enemy's fleet. Great Britain's policy, a s before stated, will be to destroy the enemy or, alternatively, to keep his fleet so bottled-up that it cannot have any material, influence on the situation. T o effect this, four main types will be required-battleships, cruisers, light cruisers and aircraft-carriers.

I . At the present moment the unanimous opinion of the chiefs of the great naval Powers is that the battleship is the keystone of sea power, and developments during the next ten years will modify, not challenge this statement. The present slow type of battleship will not survive, and the future capital ship will be the battle cruiser possessing nearly the hitting power of the battleship with the advantage of speed. The type will be smaller in order to avoid the danger of putting all the eggs in one basket; and since economic conditions will not allow of several gigantic " super-Hoods " being built, with docks of proportionate size, it will be found better to build two medium- sized ships than one giant, on the principle that it is more difficult to sink two targets by lucky shots than one. The combination of hitting power with speed will be effected by cutting away side armour in order to increase deck and underwater protection, and by improvements in propulsion. The rgin. gun fills all requirements so nearly that future ships will still carry It.

2 . The next figure will be the large cruiser, fast and fairly heavily armed, possessing great cruising radius; by its speed and anti-aircraft batteries it will be capable of warding off attacks from the air, and by its armament, 7.5in. guns, it would be superior to ships other than capital ships. This type may best be described as an improved Raleigh class, and its use will be (i.) in action to drive away enemy ligjht forces; (ii.) in blockade routine to patroI danger areas and prevent raids by light forces.

3. The third tvpe is called a light cruiser, and it will be a ;ompromise between the modern light cruiser of the " D " class and flotilla leaders. It will, in fact, combine the duties of destroyer and light cruiser. The destroyer will have ceased to be a part of the main fleet because its limited radius of action will not enable it to act at the long distance from the base which future operations will demand, Its presence will no longer be , vital to the battle fleet as it was in the last war, because the menace of submarines in such a vast area will be negligible compared with those operating in enclosed waters such as the North Sea. The destroyer, similar to the present " W " class, will be part of the battle fleet only for escorting out of harbour, and it will leave the main body at such a distance from the coast

as to be beyond the presumed line of enemy submarine outposts. T o take over the destroyer's function in a fleet action, a type of light cruiser will be evolved which may be taken as being a flotilla leader with far greater fuel capacity and seaworthiness, carrying a slightly heavier armament of 5.gin. or 6in. guns and a greater number of torpedo tubes, the heavier armament being designed against ocean-going submarines carrying the same size of gun. Its speed will be the maximum required for under- taking torpedo attacks on the enemy main fleet, about 32 knots, and it will be a type specially suitable for convoy work, where it may expect to be opposed by long distance submarines carrying the same armament in point of size of gun. The great advantage of this class of ship should lie in the ease.of handling combined with seaworthy qualities, and the ideal to be attained is that of a more heavily armed destroyer with greater radius of action.

4. The fourth type is the aircraft carrier, and here we have no real past experience on which to base a theory for deciding its evolution. With the constructors unable to fix on a settled type, it is hard to determine or predict what form the aircraft carrier will have ten years hence ; but it should be a ship capable of a speed greater than that of the fleet, with an armament sufficiently large, 7.5in. guns, to cope with cruisers and light cruisers and good underwater protection. There will be a scparate carrier for each type of machine-bombing, torpedo and fighting-and they will operate from well in rear of the main fleet. It must be remembered that the function of these carriers is not hghting but solely to bring the aeroplanes to the decisive point : hence their armament is purely defensive, and in all operations they will require a strong force for protection.

SUBMARINES. A fifth type, though not belonging to the fleet proper, might

have a great influence on a fleet action, and that is the submarine. It will not be able to operate with the fleet because a satisfactory submarine cannot and will not be evolved capable of maintaining the speed of the fleet and also possessing quick diving power and general seaworthiness. In any case, its use in action against ships going at high speed, constantly altering course and fitted wif"l the modern underwater protection, would be very small. Its use, besides coast defence, is in a blockade, for reconnaissance close to the enemy's coast, and as outposts flung all round the area of operations to report movements of enemy ships and arrest his commerce. It is conceivable that in a fleet action submarines might get news quickly enough to reach the scene of action from their post, and in that case their function would be to intercept the enemy fleet on lts way to harbour in a crippled condition. The future submarine will

NAVAL REVIEW.

be the ocean-going type, with a large radius of action and an armament of 5.5in. or 6in. guns, which would enable her to take on single ships up to light cruisers.

SUMMARY OF THE TYPES WITH THEIR FUNCTIONS. The composition of the main fleet, with the functions of each

unit, may be surnmarised as follows :- I . The capital ship, approaching more nearly to the Queen

Elizabeth class in size and speed, with vastly improved anti- aircraft and underwater protection, hnd the armour concentrated chiefly on the decks; carrying 15in. guns and a couple of aeroplanes. Her function is that of the foundation of the fleet on which the whole fabric of sea power is built, the most powerful ship afloat, the fear of which keeps the enemy passive in harbour whilst wealth and necessities are taken from him, and under cover of which all operations are undertaken. It will remain at the strategic centre of operations, ready to intercept the enemy forces if they dare to emerge.

2. The cruiser, of the Raleigh type, possessing great powers of endurance and speed, and by its armament of 7.5in. guns a terror to light forces. Its functions will be : in action, to drive away light cruisers and prevent torpedo attacks on the capital ships; in blockade, to intercept raids by light forces on the lines of communications.

3. The light cruiser, larger than the present flotilla leader, with 5.9in. or 6in. guns and more torpedoes, and a large range of action. Its functions will be : in action, to make torpedo attacks on the battle, fleet and check enemy light forces ; in block- eade, to do the convoying work.

4. The aircraft-carrier, of sufficient speed to act under the protection of the battle fleet, and capable of defence against light cruisers. Its fu~c t ion will be to bring aeroplanes to the scene of action or off the coast for a raid.

The question of numbers and relative proportion of one type to another can only be fixed by a knowledge of the enemy's strength. Since the British Navy is designed for a defensive as opposed to an aggressive policy, the size of the fleet will only be large enough to defend the Empire from attack. In battleships and aircraft carriers, which are intended only for action with the main fleet, a marked superiority only is required; but in cruisers and light cruisers, whose function is to guard so many different highways at once, not knowing where a concentrated force of the enemy may suddenly strike, an overwhelming superiority is required. The blockaded fleet has this advantage, that it can select its own time and place for a sudden blow, in expectation of which its rival must disseminate a certain part

of his forces, though not so completely as to lay himself open to being crushed in detail. Since a large portion of the light forces must be continually away, it is necessary that enough are left with the main fleet to be superior at any moment in a fleet action.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. With regard to economic conditions and the ability to pay

for the maintenance of such a fleet, it is difficult, in the present state of financial chaos, to divine the money market ten years hence; but there seems no doubt that we shall be, relative to other countries and especially Japan, in a better financial condition and able to sbpport a strong fleet. If this is carried out, the threatened struggle might yet be averted, and the British Navy will have carried out its chief function-the preservation of the peace of the world.

T H E EXILING O F T H E LATE EX-EMPEIIOK KARL OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

EXTRACTS FROM A DIARY OF THE MOVEMENTS OF TILE DANCHE FLOTILLA BETWEEN THE DATES OF OCTOBER 2 3 ~ ~ AND NOVEMBER

5TH, AND OPEI~.~TIONS ASHORE TILL NOVEMBER 7TH, 1921.

UNTIL October 23rd, 1921, the situation in the Balkans had been one of absolute tranquillity. 'The Danube Flotilla, consisting of the two monitors Glowworm, flying the pennant of the Senior Naval Officer, and Ladybird, and the Motor Launch, No. 196, had completed their summer cruise up river as far as Vienna. Returning officially 011 August alst, they had proceeded to 0 Moldova, at the head of the Rapids Section of the river, with tlie object of passing through to Galatz; but the river was so low that for even these ships of as little as five feet draught, this section was not negotiable; so they had returned to Novisad, about 60 miles above Belgrade, to wait their chance to slip through. But the water did not rise, and just as the possibility of spending the winter at Buda Pesth instead of Galatz was corning uppermost in the minds of those concerned, the events which I am about to relate, occurred.

About this time a convoy of stores was due to arrive under escort, by train from Constantinople, but had been left, due to Customs difficulties, at Tsaribrod on the Bulgarian frontier. It was, however, realised late on October 23rd that the Flotilla night have to move, and that the advent of these stores and the utmost celerity of their embarkation was a factor of the most vital importance.

In order to pack into this narrative the number of incidents which were crushed into the four days following this date, it will be more advantageous ~f I quote from my diary, explaininq the points as they occur.

October 23rd. The Senior Naval Officer lefl ior Buliarest and Galatz, for

the Plenary Sessions of the European Ilan~ibe Commission, early this morning, leaving the Capt-ain of Ladybird in charge of the Flotilla during his absence.

During the forenoon the 1st Lieutenant of Ladybird and I left with the football team by. rail for SubotiCa, a large town situated close to the Hungarian frontier, and about 70 miles due north of Novisad. W e viere also to obtain permission for

THE EXILING OF THE LATE EX-EMPEROR KARL. 131

a petty officer, who had recently joined the Flotilla, to cross into Hungary to regain possession of his kit which had been left in the frontier Customs office by mistake. On making enquiries at the station, we were told that the stationmaster had received instructions to the effect illat the frontier was closed. No trains were allowed to pass on the Buda-Pesth line, and that all lines of communication were in the hands of the military.

After the match we got an evening paper, and read the alarming news that, firstly, there had been a scuffle between Serbian and Hunga~ian Irregulars only a few lnlles out oi SubotiCa, and sxondly that the Ex-Emperor Karl of Austria- Hungary, who had retired to Switzerland after the Great War , had landed from an aeroplane close to Buda-Pesth, marching into the capital at the head of an army of 20,000 Loyalist troops, sweeping all before him. In addition. Count Betillen, the Hungarian Prime Minister to the Regent, and Admiral Horthy, had resigned, and Count Julian Andrassy was on the point of forming a loyalist Government to replace Karl on his former throne. This was immediately recognised as being a typically extravagant version of something that might have happened, and very little notice of it was taken.

October 24th. No definite news in which any degree of faith could be

placed accrued during the day. But it seemed fairly obvious that something of political importance had occurred, for troops in large numbers were reported as passing through Novisad railhead en route for SubotiCa, the headquarters of the 1st Yugo Slav Army. Various visitors on board Glowworm told stories of the hurried calling up af reserves ; no one seemed to be certain of what the hustle and bustle was all about, save that Karl had landed in Hungary.

During the day the convoy of stores including fuel for the motor launch arrived at Novisad, but determined hedging " on the part of the Serb Customs officials made it impossible, consistent with politeness, for us to embark these supplies.

Otto ber 2 j t l ~ . The papers this morning giv% a fairly concise account of

what has happened. The Ex-Emperor and Empress Zita have landed at some small village in Western 1Iungary from an aeroplane, having started fro111 Switzerland. Realising that Karl and the 8,000 Loyalist troops who received him would have to march on Ruda-Pesth, a number of farm-carts from the district had been previously collected together, to act as a means of transport. At this particular time as luck would have it, the peasants wanted to get their onions in and accordingly removed their carts, expecting to be able to replace them without the knowledge of the Loyalist Army.

132 NAV.AL REVIEW.

Just at this mon~ent, at a time which was not anticipated, Karl landed. H e was urged by his Commanders to march witllout transport. Karl did not approve of this and the Loyalists were delayed for several hours while the carts were re-collected. rhis gave Admiral Horthy time to mobilise his " Students .Army." The rival forces met outside Buda-Pesth, but Karl, having expected no opposition and not wishing to shed blood, withdrew. Nc further details were given, but the papers stated that complete mobilisation had been ordered bf the Little Entente. The Rumanians seem to be trying to baclr out, but the Yuge-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks have taken distinct offensive fines, and are reported to have advanced their armies over the Hungarian borders operating from their four concentration points, Bratislava and Kombrom in Czecho- Slovak, and SubotiCa and OsyeB in Yugo-Slavia. The intention of the Czechs is announced, that unless the Ex-Emperor is r~moved immediately they will declare a state of war on November st, and that of the Yugo-Slavs a similar action to commence on November 2nd.

The ultimatum reads as follows :- (i.) That Karl shall abdicate at once and be placed out of

reach. (ii.) That Hungary shall entirely demobilise. (iii.) That Hungary shall pay for the mobilisation of the

Little Entente. (iv.) That some definite guarantee will be given to prevent

further repetition of such an occurrence. (It must be remembered that this was Karl's second attempt.)

October 26th. Owing to these disturbed circumstances and the fact that

our stores are not yet out of the Novisad Customs, I was sent by the Captain of Ladybird to Belgrade this morning for four different purposes. Firstly, to report the state of readiness of the Flotilla to the British Minister. Secondly, to obtain written permission from the Serbian Minister of Finance himself to allow our stores to be released without further question. Thirdly, to report details of troops passing through Novisad to the Military Attach&. Fourthly, to obtain pilots for the Flotilla in event of their being ordered to move up river.

The Minister informed me that the Flotilla would be required to move to Buda-Pesth to protect British interests, and that I should see Admiral PriCa, the Head of the River Syndicate, with reference to pilots. Admiral PriCa told me that two pilots were ordered but an hour ago from Novisad. I said that these were undoubtedly for the British monitors, and that I would take them back to Novisad with me.

When we arrived at Novisad the pilots said that as all other ~ i l o t s had been called up with the reserves they must first report

THE EXILING OF THE LATE EX-EMPEROR KARL. I33

at their office in the town, but that they would come on board immediately afterwards.

They did not, however, appear at all, and at midnight the Captain of Ladybird having already decided to sail at daylight at all costs, determined to search high and low in Novisad to get some kind of a pilot. One only could be found, evidently an inferior man, who was taken on board, and accordingly, Ladybird, with the Flotilla Lighter in tow sailed at dawn, leaving Glo\vworm to embark the stores and follow without delay.

October 27th. The whole of the day was taken up in embarking stores the

evolution being corr~pleted by dark. During the evening a telephone message was passed to Belgrade to ask for one pilot, but the Head Pilot Office replied that there was none who could be sent.

October 28th. I left Novisad by the 6 a.m. train for Belgrade with instruc-

tions to bring back one pilot with me before midnight, being given carte blnnche as to my method of procedure. I got out at Zemun which is a large town on the opposite side of the tributary Sava to Belgrade, and went to the house of Admiral Wickerhauser, the Yugo-Slav Naval Commander-in-Chief. The Admiral simply shrugged his shoulders at the word "pilot." He could do nothing he said. S o I crossed to Belgrade by steamer and aslied the Minister if he would not give me a letter to the Yugo-Slav Minister of War , asking of their courtesy to attend to the matter. I accompanied the Military Attach6 to the Ministry of War, and we were received by General TassoviC, who said that the question would come before the W a r Council, and that we should be in receipt of a written answer by 6.30 p.m. at the Legation.

T o explain the terms " illinistry of W a r " and " W a r Council," it is interesting to note that upon the Order for Mobilisation, the Yugo-Slav Government is dissolved, its duties being entirely talien over by the Military, with the Minister of W a r at its head.

On the way back to the Legation, the Military Attach6 told me the news that the four Yugo-Slav monitors based at Novisad, had been ammunitioned and had left for BezdAn on the frontier during the morning.

On our arrival at the Legation, the Minister showed me a wireless message ordering the Flotilla to proceed up river to remove the Ex-Emperor Karl from Hungary. H e has now been captured while in flght in the direction of Kom6rom, and is now under guard in a monastery on the shores of Lake Balaton.

I34 NAVAL REVIEW.

The message came verbally from General TassoviC, that authority for releasing one pilot had been given to Admiral Wickerhauser, arid that no document would be necessary.

I accordingly crossed to Zernun and saw the Admiral, but he denied all knowledge of any orders from Belgrade. I decided that it was too late to return to Belgrade to investigate the matter, but as a last ei'fort before rejoining my ship, I would make an attempt to coerce a pilot from his home by one of the & I easier " n~ethods.

All this difficulty in obtaining pilots' emphasises the awkward position in which a British ship may find herself when on the River Danube, from one of the Riverain States which is in opposition to 1115 pdlicy adopted by the British Government. Navigation over the whole length of the Danube by skilled pilots is necessary on account of the continually shifting sand- banks.

After hunting about in Zemun for over three hours, and having exploited many arguments, I at last prevailed upon the Chief Pilot of a well known river shipping firm, the D.D.S.G.; we caught the 11 p.m. train back to Novisad with the ultimate result that Glowworm sailed at dawn.

October 29th and 30th. Carrying out the equivalent of a full-power trial up river

wherever possible, Glowworm joined Ladybird at Baja in Hungary at 2 p.m. on the 30th. The Captain of Ladybird had gone to Buda-Pesth to confer with and receive instructions from the British Minister there, but returned on board a few hours after Glowworm arrived.

October 31~1. Stores were transferred from Glowworm to the Flotilla during

the forenoon. The ships left Baja at 2 p.m. and proceeded up river in the direction of Buda-Pesth, but, contrary to the expectations of all, anchored at dusk between Baja and Paks. Glowworm was then carefully darkened, and the mast got down to the level of the deck in readiness for returning to llaja, and passing under the railway bridge noiselessly and invisibly.

The Captain of Ladybird took over command of Glow- worm, the 1st Lieutenant of Glowworm transferring to Ladybird in command.

November 1st.

Glowworm weighed and proceeded down river an hour before dawn. The short trip up river had been intended as a blind to prevent the people of Baja itnowing our final arrangements. A quarter of an hour before dawn Glowwvrm slid silently under Baja bridge in absolure darkness, this precaution being takea

F:MIIAKKING THE EX-EX~PEKOR KARL AT RAJA, O N NOVEMS~ER IST, 1 Y ' l .


to hinder the discovery of our return by the bridge sentries. This organisation was apparently successful.

Glowworm went alongside the bank about a hundred yards below the bridge head, and within a few moments a train crossed the bridge from the western side and halted at the bridge head. This train contained a co~lsiderable number of Hungarian dismounted cavalry, who immediately formed a wide cordon round the ship and train, and a close-cordon-alley from the bridge head direct to the ship.

Four Colonels, representing Great Britain, France, Italy and Hungary, and a Ilungarian Minister Plenipotentiary, came on board ; a document was prepared and signed by them all, giving the necessary authority for the handing over to the British Flotilla of the Ex-Emperor Karl and Ex-Empress Zita.

On completion of this document, the party returned to the bridge head to meet a second train which arrived shortly afterwards.

Down the alley came the Ex-Emperor in Infantry General's uniform, followed by the Ex-Empress Zita, attended by Count EsterhAzy, the former Kstrlist Prime Minister, Countess BoroviCenyi the Lady-in-waiting, and two servants. 'They were received on board Glowworm in absolute silence, and were taken to the Senior Xaval OEcer's cabin. The Ex-Emperor's chaplain followed, leaving immediately after High Mass had been conducted.

Ladybird arrived at about this time, and the Flotilla weighed and proceeded down rivcr.

The ex-royal party were, for the time being, treated strictly as prisoners of war, a sentry being posted in their vicinity.

At about noon the Motor Launch, which had been left at Novisad to embark the Senior Naval Officer as soon as he arrived, joined the l~lotilla.

The latter, in~inediately after arrival on board, approached the Ex-Emperor and pointed out that he was anxious to carry out the delicate duties entrusted to him in as little a painful manner as possible. He made the suggestion to Karl that, should he think fit to give his parole in writing, writing being necessary to justify the action taken in the event of any untoward incidents occurring, the Senior Naval Officer would then be glad if the Ex-Emperor and his party would consider themselves guests on board his ship.

Without any hesilation Karl seated himself at the writing table, and in his own composition and handwriting, drafted and signed !he parole, a facsimile of which is reproduced.

As far as is lrnown this is the only time in history when a King'and Enlperor has given his parole on board a British Man of W a r .

The Flotilla passed BezdAn and the Yugo-Slav monitors at 5 p.m.. during which time the Royal party were kept out of

136 NAVAL REVIEW.

sight. The ships reached Dalj at nightfall and remained there at anchor un t~ l the following morning.

November 2nd. The Ex-Emperor having expressed a wish to see a priest,

with the idea of celebrating Mass and obtaining absolution, the motor launch was dispatched ahead to Novisad in order to obtain the services of a liornan Catholic priest.

The lioyal party sat up on the boat deck for the major part of the day and appeared happy and talkative. The Ex-Emperor remarked that he was so rclieved to be on a British Man of War, and that he had been given freedom. H e told us that he and his party had been shut up in one room in the monastery for nearly a weck without light or fresh air.

Count Esterhiizy came down to the ward room after lunch and gave us some interesting anecdotes upon the Great W a r from his p*~irit of view, and also a few quaint but amusing sidelights upon the famous German Marshal Hindenburg, whom he knew intimately.

The motor launch came alongside after the Flotilla had passed through Novisad, but by this time the noon hour was pasT, being thus t ~ o late for Mass. The priest was re-landed without having been able to fulfil his functions.

The ships anchored near Zemun at dark, and almost immediately a launch came alongside, bearing the Yugo-Slav, Commander Mariachevib, who had been detailed to act as temporary liaison officer, and also three extra pilots. This, in contrast to the Yugo-Slav's previous attitude, emphasised their satisfaction a t the deportation, as viewed by the Yugo-Slav Government.

Glowworm had made a certain amount of smoke while passing through Novisad, for in one oi the pro-Hungarian papers printed in that town, a paragraph was given to the subject a literal translation of which reads :-

" W i t h the black smoke of t h e E n g l i s h illonitor Glowworm disappears the last chance of another W o r l d War."

November 3rd. Ladybird remained in the vicinity of Belgrade. In

Glowworm, e n route for 0 Moldova, the question of the further procedure of the Royal party was meditated. The nearest railhead to 0 Moldc@va is at Orsova, just above the Iron Gates, and about 00 miles by river down stream. H.RI1.S. Cardiff is reported to he due a: Salina, the river mouth, on November 6th to transport the Ex-Emperor and his retinue to Madeira. It was decided that a commissioned launch should fill the intervening gap between 0 Moldova and Orsova, as the river level is still too low to allow che Glowxvorm to pass the upper rapids.


Glowworm anchored abreast 0 Moldova at 3 p.m., and Lieutenant Garnier, the French Naval Officer temporarily in charge of the R a p ~ d s in the absence of the British Naval Representative of the International Danube Commission, was communicated with by telephone. H e replied that the launch drew too much water. H e was asked to come to 0 Moldova immediately. He arrived at 8 p.m., and having conferred with the Senior Naval Officer, left shortly afterwards.

The Rumanians have placed sentries from the frontier guard along the river bank abreast us, for it must be borne in mind that this part of the country is in the province of 'Transylvania, Hungarian before the war. I do not think it is necessary to inquire further into the significance of this point.

November 4th. In the forenoon a Rumanian, Major Kirculescu, and with

him the Subaltern of the Guard and the district Captain of Gendarmes, came on board to make transport arrangements. As, however, the Senior Naval Officer had been instructed that he only was to deal with the situation, Major Kirculescu's proposals were rejected.

But in the middle of the day, a wireless message was received from the British Minister in Bukarest, directing that the transport, rhe knowledge of which had been given to Major Kirculescu, sliould be used.

Major Kirculescu accordingly came on board. A motor lorry, one Closed and four touring cars would be at 0 Moldova at daylight on November 5th. A Rumanian Guard of an officer and four men would be in attendance. A Simplon train with a special carriage and restaurant car attached, would be in readiness a: Orsova.

Major Kirculescu, who accompanied us during the latter part of the trip, told us that ihe yugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks being satisfied wlth the action which has been taken, have withdrawn their armies and their ultimatum, and are demobilising.

Nozwm ber 5th. As if by a miracle, the lorry arrived at 6 a.m. What luggage

there was, being taken ashore by the motor launch, was loaded on the lorry and dispatched to Orsova direct.

At g a.m. the motor launch conveyed the Senior Naval Officer, with the Ex-Emperor and Empress Zita, Count Esterh6zy and Countess BoroviCenyi, the two servants, the Senior Naval Officer's secretary, a petty officer and six ratings, with myself as Officer of the Royal Guard, ashore. No delay was experienced with the cars. In the first were Lieutenant Garnier, Major Kirculescu, the Colonel Commanding the Rumanian troops on the frontier, myself and one sailor. In the second, the closed car, were the Senior Naval Officer and the

138 NAVAL REVIEW.

Ex-Emperor and En:press with the petty oficer and one sailor. In the third Count Esterhiizy and Countess BoroviCenyi, the secretary and two sailors. In the fourth the two servants and two sailors, and in the fifth, the Rumanian Guard.

During the journey along the Sechknyi Road, undercut into the cliffs along the Rapids, the cars kept jo-yard station. In the few villages passed the streets were lined with soldiers, and sentries appeared at every IOO yards along the road.

The convoy strr~ved in Orsova in a cloud of dust at about noon, proceeding direct to the railway goods yard, where, between two lines of trucks, stood the " Special."

The engine driver and the train servants, all Hungarians, were examined 2nd w-arned, and the train was searched from end to end. A sentry was placed in the entrance to the last, the special carriage, with loaded rifle and fixed bayonet. ?'he state of readiness of the remainder of the guard was " magazine charged, cut-off closed," and bayonet fixed. The train stopped frequently on the journey from Orsova to Galatz via Bukarest, in order to telephone on, to make certain that the line was clear. Whenever ihese stc;ps occurred the guard were imnlediately mounted round the train, and especially the last carriage. As the train started the guard returned to their carriage, the Officer of the Guard and one sailor with pistol equipment, standing on the footboards an e;1c11 side of the last carriage, covering the train from end to end until it had gathered considerable way.

These very careful precautions-were taken, not against the Ex-Emperor escaping, but from the point of view of keeping any

a ion spectators \ve11 clear, and checking any attempt at demonstr t' either in favour of a r against the proceedings. The off-chance, also, of the fanltic armed with bomb or pistol in anlong the crowd, or between trucks on a siding, could not be entirely neglected. -

But with the exception of a large crowd of peasants in Turnu- Severin, who were much too stubbornly inquisitive, and who were rapidly dispersed at the sight of the " plan-view- " of seven bayonets, things went smoothly until late evening.

At Pitesti, a young civilian boarded the train by permission of Major Kirculescu, with a chit to pass him from the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ne only managed, however, to interview Count Esterhiizy. The Count spolce to hill1 for about twenty minutes without stopping. , What he said was never to the point, non-committal, and entirely devoid of anything which could be reproduced as " copy." The intruder, of course, was a reporter.

At Chitila, close to Bukarest, the Rr~tish Military Attach6 was waiting. He had come to inform the Senior Naval Officer of arrangements which had been made at Galatz. I-Ie was told about the reporter, rind knowing the signature of the Minister


of Foreign Affairs, declared fhe chit to be a forgery. The reporter left the train, and also Chitila station very hurriedly.

An amusing incident also occurred during the night, when a fat Rumanian peasant carrying a suitcase and a cloth bag, although repulsed by two sentries, managed to board the train while it was moving. He was met by the Officer or' the Guard in the corridor. A comedy-drama ensued, which was kept up, though he only turned out to be a harmless individual who had missed the last train to Galatz and was asleep in the station when the " Special" drew in. H e had not, of course, the remotest idea of his mistake !

From Ploesti a police official telephoned to Galatz that the time of arrival of the " Special " would be 9 a.m. at the Commission Palace Jetty.

November 6th. At g a.m., according to plan, the train arrived in Galatz,

but instead of co:nplying with the information which had been given went quietly on to a siding on the far side of the Winter Harbour. With no one to see, the party were transferred to the Rumanian Yacht Princephsa Maria, specially commandeered for the purpose.

Meanwhile, half the population of Galatz had collected little less than a mile away, parading naval and military guards, a band, and cartloads of enthusiasm !

Count Esterhhzy and Countess BoroviCenyi returned to Buda-Pesth, being relieved by the Count and Countess Hunyardi.

The yacht steamed down river at 15 knots, arriving at Sulina and going alongside H.M.S. Cardiff, at 6 p.m. The Ex-Emperor and Empress Zita were then turned over to the cruiser, responsibility being transferred to her Captain.

November 7th. Cardiff sailed for Madeira at 7 a.m., and as we watched her

leave, it struck me how absolutely sportsmanlike under very adverse circumstances, had been the Ex-Emperor's mien throughout what turned out to be the first half of his last long journey.

SOUTHEY'S L I F E OF NELSON. EDITED, WITH INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES, BY

PROFESSOR GEOFFREY CALLENDER. Dent, 6s.

AN annotated edition of Southey's Life of Nelson has recently been brought out by Mr. Callender for the reason that, as he says, though the highly favourable opinions of that book have long gone unchallenged, "in Nelson's interest, after the lapse of a century, they demand some scrutiny and revision." With this object, he corrects statements which are incorrect ; he discusses opinions, such as those expressed about Caracciolo's execution or Nelson's relations with Lady Hamilton; and explains naval terminology-this last, one must suppose, for the benefit of the man in the street.

S o voluminous and learned a body of notes, accompanied as they are by an Appendix consisting of a set of nine examination papers, gives the edition the character rather of a school book than one for reading for the pleasure of reading. Cer- tainly it is desirable that grave errors should be corrected; but we cannot resist a feeling that the business of editorship might stop short of much of the detail contained in these notes.

Those who attempt analogies between fleets of the past and those of to-day run some risk. On his first page Mr. Callender institutes an ingenious tabular comparison of the ships of I914 and those of Nelson's day, in the following form :-

I 1914 1 Nelsons' Day

I Pre- Dreadnought , Sixty-four Dreadnought Seventy -four Super-Dreadnought Eighty or Ninety Hyper-super-Dreadaougbt Hundred

I -- -- - -- . - -- -

What the " Hyper-Super-Dreadnought " of the late war was we do not precisely know. Rut, assuming this term (with which we were not well acquainted) to refer to the Queen Elizabeth or Ramillies classes, the classification does not express a tactical truth. The difference between a 64 and a 74 was far less than that between a pre-Dreadnought and a Dreadnought; and, if the

theory that two 74's were calculated as the equivalent of a three- decker be correct, the analogy between the Dreadnought, with her rzin. guns, and the H.S. Dreadnought, with her gin., will not receive acceptance by a large number of officers. The 64 was still a recognised ship of the line-Nelson's Agamemnon for example; but by the time the 15in. gunned ships had joined the fleet, the pre-Dreadnoughts were recognised as being a hindrance only. Scheer took his Pommern's to sea, but against his own judgment; moreover, he did not expect to meet the Grand Fleet. It is perfectly true that analogies can be drawn; but caution and technical knowledge are needed in drawing them.

In a note (p. 53) on Nelson's action with three 44-gun frigates, Mr. Callender comments that " Frigates like those that composed the French flotilla ought to have been able easily to elude a battleship like the Agamemnon. It argues amazing skill on Nelson's part that he was able to bring one of them to action." This appears based on a supposition that a frigate could always outsail a battleship; but the record of old fights show that frigates were by no means always so greatly superior in sailing. The Leander, 50, was overhauled and captured by the Gdniireux, unable, " owing to her inferiority in sailing " (James), to escape. The Severn, 50, was run down and cap tured by the Terrible, 74. The Dreadnought, 60, chased the Mkdbe, 26, for fifty hours and took her, the Moamouth, 70, similarly took the Panther, 26, after a hard pursuit, and the Tremendous, 74, captured in chase the Canonnihre, 44. The assumption that frigates could " easily elude " ships-of-the-line is a common one; it is by no means correct; nor, therefore, is the corollary that amazing skill must have been exhibited by Nelson on this particular occasion.

In a note on p. 18, Mr. Callender, referring to Southey's statement that some " register ships were captured," remarks that " treasure ships " would here have been more expressive, since every ship trading from Spain to America had to be registered. But it is to be remarked that every ship trading to America was not a register ship, nor every register ship a " Lreasure ship." Ships also carry merchandise. The term " Register Ship " originally applied to merchants trading on their own account, with the privilege of carrying goods to any part of the Spanish Dominions. Whether the ships in question belonged to the class called " Register Ships " does not appear.

Mr. Callender gives a rather lengthy note on the word ' I Foretop." " A mast," he tells his readers, " could be elon- gated telescope-wise according to the strength of the wind. The summit, whatever its height, was known as the ' masthead.' The ' top ' was a platform, for fighters with small arms, surrounding the head of that part of the mast which was built

142 NAVAL REVIEW.

into the fabric of the hull." There are certainly three very misleading statements in this sentence; nor can it be called a very neat description of the top.

A reminder that both the bower anchors, though called the " best " and " small " bowers, were of the same size, invites thought as to why they were called " best " and " small." They were apparently of the same size in the beginning of the 18th century, according to a list of ships'dimensions of 1714. Captain John Smith, of a century earlier, says : " Then there is the first, second and third Anchor, yet all such as a ship in faire weather may ride by, and are called Bow Anchors. The greatest is the Sheat Anchor and never used but in great necessity." Does this mean that at that time the first, second and third anchors were all of the same size ? From the word " yet " one might presume they were not. At an earlier time they seem certainly to have been of different sizes. In the Naval Accounts of Henry VII. the three anchors of the Mary Fortune are given as costing twenty-two shillings, twenty-three and fourpence, and thirty shillings-the last being the " Shute " anchor. At what period did this difference between the bowers disappear ? Perhaps that valuable periodical, the Mariner's Mirror, could tell us ; also, what is the original of the word " Sheet " anchor ?

While we may dissent from some of the comments in the notes, and even from the picture drawn of Nelson, which in places reaches a strain of lyrical exaltation, we feel grateful to Mr. Callender for the work of correcting errors and adding maps-a lack that every previous edition of Southep has suffered. There are some who read Southey and take him as a reliable authority; others, at the opposite extreme, who will not trouble to read so out-of-date a Life of Nelson. The judgment of the last century has pronounced with no uncertain voice that it stands in the front rank of literature. For that alone it is worth reading; it gives a picture of Nelson's life that no other book gives with the same skill and beauty; and, as to the in- accuracies, Mr. Callender's notes enable us to realise where they lie and what are the correct facts. This is a service for which we are most grateful to him. Rut we wish he had omitted the examination papers.

H.M.S. CANOPUS, A U G U S T , 1914, T O MARCH, 1916.-I.

The history of these experiences is compiled from my various Service Reports and rough diary, and is directly the narrative of the events as they occurred, written down at the time, as also any comments critical or otherwise.

?'he Canopus had a cheyuered career and perhaps it may be said as eventful a one as any battleship in the first two years of the war, comprising as it did, firstly : Patrol of the Channel during the transport of the Expeditionary Force to France in 1914; secondly : Independent cruising and charge of a base in the Atlantic ; thirdly : Operations from Falkland Islands under Adniiral Sir C. Cradock in search of the enemy squadron Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Dresden, Leipzig, and Niirnberg; fourthly : Return to Falklands after action at Coronel and defence of the islands; fifthly: Service at the landing at the Dardanelles and subsequent operations there ; sixthly : Blockade of Smyrna and adjoining coast after occupation of MJ-telene.

It was with somewhat mixed feelings that one commenced the journey from the 11orth of Scotland to Devonport to join the old battleship C a n o ~ u s , my war appointment, I having only lately arrived in England from the United States of America where my appointment as naval attach4 had expired, and was awaiting in the ordinary course my appointment to one of the then home fleet. The course of diplomatic conditions which brought on'the war, however, determined differently, and it was not exhilarating to find that on the almost certainty of war with Germany, one would command an almost obsolete battleship of the Battle Squadron.

On arriving on board things were very busy, besides the necessary coal, stores, etc., required, there were many war conditions to be carried out which among others included the removal of as much \voodwork and inflammable material as could be spared, including furniture. This did not conduce to comfort later, as most carpets, cushions and cabin partitions had to disappear. In the rigorous climatic conditions afterwards experienced these were badlv missed.

From the point of view of fighting efficiency the armament gf the Canopus consisted of four 12-inch and ten 6-inch, her speed obtained at full speed trial after the late manceuvres was

I44 NAVAL REVIEW.

approximately 15 knots, but owing to age and wear 12 knots was found lyer best for any consecutive steaming. The crew were composed of some active service petty officers and' ratings but mostly of Royal Naval Reserve, Fleet Reserve and pensioners.

The officers were principally of the Royal Navy as heads of departments, and of the Royal Naval Reserve as junior lieutenants, with a small number of Royal Naval Mids. Here I wish to pay them the tribute that, in the whole of the commission, in all difficulties and active service experiences, no officers and men could have carried out their duty with more self-denial and devotion than withobt exception did the oficers and men of the Canopus.

The 8th Battle Squadron to which Canopus belonged assembled at Portland on August st, war being declared on August 4th with Germany. In the month of August the transport of the British military force to France commenced. Briefly, the Canopus' duty with others of the 8th Battle Squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral The Hon. Sir Alexander Bethell, was to patrol the Channel and to protect the military transports from attack by enemy craft, while the military force was effecting its landing in France under destroyer escort. These operations were not without excitement, as with others, we were in constant expectation of an attack from enemy submarines, destroyers, or even larger craft, so it was with mixed feelings that in the uncertain light of early morning or evening and foggy weather one encountered our French Ally's destroyers and often submarines. One misty morning it was most confidently reported that tfiree enemy cruisers were standing directly for us and their appearance was sufficient to warrant all hands being at their action stations until the doubtful craft were satisfactorily made out to be Ihree of our own destroyers.

However, the transport of all troops was safely effected without casualty.

The various ships of the Sth Battle Squadron were now disposed by the Admiralty for different duties, and our existence as a squadron came to a close. On August zznd, 1914, Canopus with Albion, under the command of Rear-Admiral H. L. Tottenham, C.R., left for Gibraltar, but unfortunately soon after our departure we began to develop engine room defects which were later to give considerable cause for anxiety. The passage to Gibraltar was w~thout incident except the stopping of the steamer Zeelandia, which on boarding was found to contain several Germans of military age; as, however, we were anxious to arrive at 'Gibraltar as soon as possible she was handed over to the flagship of Sir B. Milne, homeward bound, who opportunely arrived on the scene. Our visit to Gibraltar though hurried was a pleasant break as neither officers nor men had landed for some time, also as our supply of fresh pro-

I1.M.S. CANOPUS, AUGUST, 1914, TO MARCH, 1 9 1 6 . ~ 1 . 145

visions had got somewhat low, and although large supplies from the Rock were not allowed we were able to replenish the canteen to a certain extent; clothes were also a difficulty and anything in the way of white clothing was eagerly bought.

The engine repairs were taken in hand, and with the assistance of the dockyard, we were ready to proceed to sea by August 29th. My original orders on leaving Portland were, in company with H.M.S. Albion to defend the trade routes to Gibraltar.

On leaving Gibraltar, Canopus was to proceed to Cape Verde Islands, passing Madeira and the Canary Islands, destroying any enemy cruisers met, to capture any enemy merchant ships and finally getting into touch with Rear-Admiral Stoddart, 5th Squadron Crutser, inform him that I was to protect British trade in these waters using Sierra Leone, Dakar and Cape Verde Islands, as temporary bases for coaling, etc.

The Canopus perhaps could hardly be recognised as one of the class likely to catch an enemy cruiser of any speed, the programme however appeared of considerable interest.

The night of August 29th, by previous orders, we rendezxoused with the arlned cruiser Edinburgh Castle and transferred charts and despatches to her. At a rendezvous off Cape Palmas we met Rear-Admiral Stoddart flying his flag on H.M.S. Carnarvon having in company with him the armoured cruiser Highflyer and the A.M.C. Victorian; after visiting the rear-admiral we proceeded under orders for Sierra Leone, meeting the A.M.C. Marmora on September 4th, and the A.M.C. Empress of Britain the following night, discharging supernumeraries to both. Various Dutch vessels had been boarded on this passage but their papers were all found in order according to the existing instructions for contraband, thouqh no doubt most of the cargoes for Rotterdam and other Dutch ports reached the enemy later. It was not until September 6th, that we received instructions by wireless that foodstuffs destined to certain ports were contraband, and the same day boarded a steamer loaded for one of the ports named, finding it necessary td put an ~ f f i c e r and prize crew on board and send her to Sierra Leone. The same night we received orders from the Admiralty, passed by W/T from the Carnarvon, which again upset our previous orders. They were to the effect that on our arrival at St . Vincent we were to coal and proceed to Abrolhos Rocks, ant1 guard the flying base there to be formed for supply ships for cruisers in the Atlantic.

September 7th.-We arrived at St. Vincent, the anchorage of which was a somewhat extraordinary sight being filled with German merchant crafl, either voluntarily interned for fear of capture, or iuvoluntarily, being unable to qet coal. The Consul there, an old friend and brother officer, Captain A. T. Taylor R.N., informed me that he was afraid there would be trouble

14b NAVAL REVIEW.

with the German crews, and before leaving, the Portuguese Commandant requested assistance in shifting some of the most truculent to another position in the anchorage, but I was obliged to refuse, Portugal at that time being neutral.

Captain Taylor did everything possible for us and among other things presented me with a grey parrot, who became a great companion and favourite aboard. He was however a rank coward and later had to be sent below whenever in action, being horribly afraid of guns. Our stay at St. Vincent was short and on September 9th we sailed for Abrolhos with the Impoco oil steamer in tow, that being the most rapid method of convoying her. En route we sighted several ships, boarded all we could catch, but made no prizes. The constant sea work was something of a strain, as all hands generally were in three watches day and night, keeping one third of the armament manned under control ofljcers. The best shelters possible were provided for officers and nien at the exposed guns, and the military tops made snug for loolr-outs and control officers. Coupled with the usual exercises during the day and night, everyone was fully occupied. It was not without incentive as we had reason to believe that enemy armed merchant cruisers might be sighted at any time. It was with considerable joy that on September 16th, the day before our arrival at Pernambuco where it was necessary to coal, we intercepted a WIT giving the news of the British -4.M.C. Carmania's victorious action with the German A.M.C. Cap 'I'rafalgar, a good fight at even odds.

September 17th.-One had been looking forward to arrival at this port with some anxiety, as being quite unaware of any chance of getting coal at Abrolhos, and being very short on arrival at Pernambuco, it was proposed to take advantage of the usual obligations from a neutral country and to request the Brazilian autliorities for sufficient coal and provisions to proceed to our next port of call nominally Monte Video.

Everything at first seemed promising, the Impoco proceeded into harbour, while the Canopus anchored in the roadstead.

On visiting the authorities they expressed themselves as willing to supply all the stores required, but the weather unfortunately prevented the Canopus from coaling at once.

The following day when the coal was alongside the ship the Brazilian authorities fired their mine; they presented me with a document which ran as follows :-

" T o the Commanders of men of war of any of the powers at war which may enter in Brazilian ports to make repairs or to receive provisions and coal, will be requested to give a written declaration that they will not capture merchant ships under the flags of their opponents, even outside the Brazilian territorial waters, if these merchant ships be met within the long. 3oVI' parallel of the 4th degree, and thirty minutes North, and that of thirty degrees South, when they have left with cargo received

H.M.S. C.INOPUS, AUGUST, 1914, TO MARCH, 1916.-I. 147

at Brazilian ports, or are carrying any manifests of cargo to the I3razilian ports.

It is forbidden that any of the belligerents should receive in Brazilian ports, goods that came directly in vessels of another nation."

On revisiting the Governor he proved obdurate, and n o arguments being of any avail, 1 was obliged to flatly refuse to sign an agreement that would prevent us from carrying out our proper operations on the enemy's merchant shipping and would certainly be taken advantage of by all the German craft at present waiting their chance to escape from Pernambuco.

W e therefore weighed at once and proceeded to sea with what I trusted would be just sufficient coal to enable me to reach Abrolhos R o c ~ ~ s , but no reason but a trust in Providence thxt we should find any coal there on our arrival.

On getting outside on September 18th, to my great relief we spoke the British Collier Adampton, bound for Abrolho,~, who had made Pernambuco in hopes of finding an escort. 'Mie Impoco meanwhile was delayed in the inner harbour by her screw having been fouled by a hawser; in the opinion of the skipper it had been done in the night and on purpose by some enemy agent.

A word on the situation existing at Pernambuco will explain the dificulties placed in our way.

Brazil being a neutral power, and the German merchant vessels in the vicinity knowing that British cruisers were in these waters and watching the port, had temporarily interned themselves there. The port regulations were to the effect that these German vessels were to take down their wireless installations while in port, this order had not been observed and there was no doubt that one or other of these vessels was sending out information to the German cruiser Karlsruhe, who was inflicting considerable damage to our merchant shipping in the adjacent waters.

On landing, one was immediately slruck with the number of German officers and men in the town, probably n~ostly from the ships in harbour, who seemed on the best of terms with the Brazilian townfolk. The Patagonia, Hamburg-American liner, had escaped from harbour on September 13th, in spite of the feeble protests of the port authorities.

There were remaining in the port the German ships Holger, Otan, Eisenagh, Rahia Laura, Cap Villano, Henry MToorman, Blucher, Sierra Nevada, and the Austrian 1;tTalborg.

On the whole it was quite evident that at this time Brazilian sympathies were with the Nun.

On the evening of September 18th, we picked up the Macedonia and Carmania on WIT making a rendezvous with them on the following day, and on the rgth, passed them both at sea.

1 4 ~ NAVAL REVIEW.

There was very evident German W/T during the night and fairly close.

W e made the Abrolhos on September zznd, and found there H.M.S. Carnarvon with two prizes, the Kelbergen and Santa Caterina, and the British collier the Kepton.

The Abrolhos was truly a deserted spot, consisting of a small island with lighthouse and small power W I T , inhabited by the lighthouse keeper and his coloured family. The animal life consisted of a small herd of goats, and the vegetation of a dozen cocoanut trees.

The island itself is surrounded by coral reefs doubtfully charted, coupled with the fact that they gave little shelter from the prevailtng wind and sea, and that the bottom gave bad holding ground, it had no attractions from the sailor's point of view. Abrolhos, however, served us well, as otherwise there was no port on the whole coast except the Falkland Islands, in which British prizes, colliers and supply ships could lie and discharge their cargo, etc., as required. The international conditions were observed as far as possible, and we anchored three miles from the island, shifting the ships from one side to the other according to the direction of the prevailing wind and sea if heavy.

Later the mids. and some of the other officers and men found some relaxation in bathing ashore and fishing from the ship, which afforded excellent sport, monster rock cod and other fish being captured, welcome additions to the larder which with the exception of the bare ship rations had run out, vegetables, potatoes and fresh xieat having long since disappeared.

Prize crews were at once put on board the prizes ; the Cano- pus completed with coal. The matter of communications was extremely difficult. There was no way of sending any wireless communication in code except by one of our own men of war if she was in touch, as no station on the coast of any neutral power would receive wireless messages in code, with the exception of Monte Video, " when addressed to the British Charge d'Affaires," this station was unfortunately out of the radius of the Canopus' wireless. The result was that the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral's orders were often much delayed, and it was necessary to carry out the disposition orf the colliers and stores as seemed most reasonable.

Fortunately n rough disposition of the British cruisers haJ been obtained from the British Intelligence Officer at Pernambuco, and was as follows :-

H.M.S. Good Hope, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir C. Cradock, with the A.M.C. Otranto, were sweeping South from Monte Video, their position however was unknown.

The cruisers Glasgow and Monmoyth in the vicinity of the Straits of Magellan, probably proceeding to the Westward to capture German shipping, etc. Position unlrnown.

H.M.S. CANOPUS, AUGUST, 1914, TO MARCH, 1916.-I. 149

H.M.S. Defence reported to be joining from the Mediterranean, but her position also unknown.

Cruisers Cornwall and Bristol patrolling the Brazilian coast. A.M.C. Victorian was ordered t o relieve the Macedonia a s guardship a t Abrolhos; as regards these, on our arrival at Abrolhos nothing was known of their movements.

It was with considerable misgivings that on September 2 jth, having received wireless instructions from H.M.S. Cornwall, we sailed for Monte Video with the collier Boldwell and oiler Impoco to take up the duty of protecting British trade off the River Plate, leaving no guardship at Abrolhos.

W e had only been at sea a few hours when a wireless message from the Cornwall was received to the effect that the German cruiser Karlsruhe was repolted in Lat.1.S. Long.sW., and I decided at once to return to Abrolhos, sending the colliers or1 to their destination.

Fortunately we spoke the I3litish ship St. Barbary on our way back and sent despatches to the British Consul Monte Video, explaining the siruation to the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 4th Cruiser Squadrcn.

The Cornwal! and Biistol I recalled to Abrolhos a5 they weie to the southward, and despatched them after completing with coal in pursuit of the Karlsruhe; subsequent information showed they must have been close to her but had not the luck to sight her.

From September 26th until October gth, there was continuous and hard work for the officers and men in unloading stores from the supply ships and embarking them in the various colliers for despatch to Monte Video and the Falklands, etc. The work was the pore laborious as ~t had nearly all to be done by open boats, it being generally too rough to put the vessels alongside each other ; their efforts viere repaid, however, for on our arrival at the Falklands later we found that the colliers had arrived safely and the ammunition for Rear-Admiral Cradock's squadron nras forthcoming.

On October gth, while on patrol outside the anchorage, a W/T was relayed to us from the Admiralty, that the German cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and probably Dresden were working across from China to South America, and that the Canopus 'was to accompany the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto under Admiral Cradock to search for them and protect trade; and at midnight, Cornwall passed orders : " Canopus is to take immediate steps to be relieved by a cruiser and proceed to Falkland Island, Port Stanley, with all despatch."

we returned to the Abrolhos anchorage at daylight on October 10th and coaled at once.

The A.M.C. Orama, Captain Segrave, having reported that he would arrive at midnight, the conundrum of finding a guard-

I5O NAVAL REVIEW.

ship to relieve u:; was solved, though I am afraid much to the disgust of Captain Segrave.

The Orama had some interesting information; she had left England on September ~ o t h , calling at St. Vincent, where she had received ~nformation that the Karlsruhe had boarded a steamer in lat. 0.50 S., long. 31.30 W., and that two German armed cruisers were between Trinidad Island and Pernambuco, this tallied with previous information we had received.

Captain Segrave had been able to rendezvous with the Macedonia and search on his passage to Pernambuco, where he had picked u p the Bristol, and in company with both these, " as per orders given to the Bristol by me," they had searched towards Rocas Island and Fernando Noronha, but missed the enemy.

Captain Segsave was positive that there was wireless communication going on from some ship or station close to Pernambuco in German cypher, to Karlsruhe or other German cruiser at sea.

CIIAPTLR 11 .-FALKLAND ISLANDS. The orders, etc., having been transferred to Orama, Canopus

sailed for Port Stanley that evening, making some 13 knots. The passage was uneventful except for bad weather, and we

made Port Stanley at 9.30 p.m. on October 18th. On entering Port Stanley we received a signal from the

Good Hope to take up our position on her, not a very easy thing in the dark with no lights showing, but with the usual foresight of Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, he had laid out a mark for us and put his search light on it.

October 19th.-We immediately started coaling having only some 400 tons aboard, and also our machinery repairs, having had some considerable trouble wlth our condensers, etc., on the passage down. This was hardly to be wondered at, as we had since the commencement of the war in August, not been able to put our fires out and had by this time run some 12,000 miles or more. With this class of battleship in peace time it was nearly always necessary to get fresh water for the boilers in harbour, not only had this been impossible, but we had to make all the fresh water for the ship's use as well, resulting in a severe strain on our condensing machinery.

On visiting the Rear-Admiral, who was an old aad intimate friend of mine since the days when we were midshipmen together, we discussed the situation.

Sir Christopher was under no delusions as to the relative strength of the force under his command as compared with that of the enemy, i.e., cruisers Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, merchant cruiser Otranto and Canopus, as opposed to the German force which as far as we could estimate from information received up to date consisted of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Niirnberg.

H.M.S. CANOPUS, AUGUST, 1914, TO MARCH, 1916.-I. I5I

H e was in hopes, however, of being reinforced by the Defence, which did not occur.

The Rear-Admiral informed me that the Glasgow and Otran- to were at this time in search of the enemy in the vicinity of Port Laguna on the other side of the Magellan Straits, and that he proposed to sail with the Good Hope, Monmouth and Canopus, to reinforce them as soon as we had coaled, provisioned and made good our engine room defects. H e arranged with me that if he was fortunate enough to locate the enemy in force, he would endeavour as far as possible to keep the action at such a speed as would enable the Canopus to assist him with her heavier armament of 12-inch guns, this we both realised would be a difficult task, as the most we could possibly expect to keep up in our present condition would be some 14, possibly 15 knots for a short period. The enemy would it was expected have an average speed in excess of all of our squadron with the exception of the Glasgow and Otranto, the latter hqwever would be a useless unit in any general action against the superior armament of any of the enemy's ships.

There appeared two possible chances, one of catching them separated and th? other if they would stand action if found in force and opposed to our whole squadron.

No opportunity, however, occurred of the first, and in the action at Coronel the squadron were scattered, and the Canopus was unfortunately unable, possibly, to reach the scene of action in time to participate, being some zoo miles off.

T o return to our story, the Rear-Admiral and self landed to call on Governor Allardyce, who afterwards became Sir William Allardyce, he struck me at the time as a most practical and energetic man, which later I found a correct impression, when after the action of Coronel we returned to Port Stanley to prepare the Port to the best of our ability against the probable raid of the German squadron, when he, the Governor, was of the greatest assistance in every possible way.

The Governor had quite a respectable little force of local volunteers some of whom were good marksmen, organised for defence, and had made arrangements in case of necessity for the removal of all women and children and non-combatants from Port Stanley if the enemy appeared.

On the following day, October zoth, Admiral Cradock and I went for what was to be our last walk together; we first called at Government house for some charts of the Pacific Coast of which we were all in want, and of which the Governor had fortunately been able to secure a few copies on the island.

It was a lovely day- and I think the Admiral enjoyed it as much as myself. H e had been rather depressed with what he considered his poor chances of catching the enemy under favourable conditions, if at all, and no wonder with a scratch squadron such as he had, most of the neighbouring coast and

1.52 NAVAL REVIEW.

ports full of German spies, the Pacific Ocean open to them, and all the innumerable hiding places round the Straits of Magellan, in which they could safely conceal themselves before their probable attempts to break through to the Atlantic side.

The island strongly reminded one of the Shetlands, with i!s bare heather-covered hills, and patches of peat and grass. It was full of interest to both of us, as it was at this time teeming with wild bird life, duck of all sorts, geese and penguins all coming in for their breeding season. W e found a goose nest and many others, and later came on a big colony of penguins who had just landed and were very busy making preparations for their future nurseries. Cradock's dog, Jack, made a determined attack on the penguin army and was with difficulty restrained from despatching a pugnacious old cock bird. Sea lions were sighted and many seal, and for a time both of us forgot our troubles.

Meanwhile, all 'were busy on board embarking stores from our old friend the collier Langoe, who we had filled up at Abrolhos, making good our machinery defects, etc.

The Rear-Admiral inspected the ship on the zrst and expressed himself as satisfied with nhat he saw, and it was afterwards with his permission possible to give the ship's company leave for a run ashore, which they richly deserved and apparently enjoyed.

Dined that night with the Admiral atid said my goodbyes to Captain Franklin and other friends aboard, our final ones. The Admiral sailed in the Good Hope at 4 p.m. on the aznd, and we never met again. The collier Benbrook had been despatched previously with ~ r d e r s to call at Punta Arenas, Magellan Straits, with despatches for tlie British consul, and to try and collect further charts of the Paclfic and Straits, and any information of value. ..-. . .

She was to meet tlie Canopus after this at Freshwater Bay, situated some few mlles to the West of Punta Arenas.

Canopus' orders were that she was to sail on the following day, October 23rd, via the Straits of Magellen to Port Laguna in lat. 45.15 S., long. 73.45 W., arranging to pass Punta Arenas during the dark hours. These orders were a very necessary precaution, for as we were aware this port was full of German spies and syinpathisers.

After picking up the Renbrook, Canopus was to proceed with her and the collier Langoe to Port Languna. This latter rendezvous was however altered shortly before the Admiral sailed on his receiving a message from the Glasgow from Vallona Hay that the Otranto had been ashore and damaged her bottom, that the h4onmouth had such serious defects in her boilers that they would take at least four days to repair, and that in consequence all three ships were remaining at that port. This news was decidedly disturbing, meaning that one of our two biggest cruisers would probably be a lame duck.

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD.l LIEUT.-COMMANDER A. S. ELWELL-SUTTON,

R.N., B.A., F.R.G.S.

THIS is an account of the work done by one of I-I.M. gunboats on the river Tigris above Baghdad in 1918. From a geographical point of view the importance of it lies, perhaps, in the survey of the river between Samarra and Tikrit, which was carried out at the request of the General Officer Commanding 1st India Army Corps w ~ t h a view to its navigability; but some account of our experiences generally may be of intere3t.

S o far as has been ascertained there have been only three attempts to navigate the Tigris beyond the mouth of the 'Adhain?, and none in ally vessel approaching the size of a river gunboat. In 1835 a boat belong to Colonel Chesney's party got as far as Sultan Abdallah, some 35 miles below Mosul. In April, 1846, Lieut. R. G. Jones got just beyond El Fatha, about 35 miles above Tikrit. And at some later period the Comet, a small vessel that plied as a rule between Baghdad and Basra, is said to have actually got to Mosul; but strange to say, there appears to be no record of this voyage at the Royal Geographical Society, and in no case was any attempt made to chart the river. Charting the river below the 'Adhaim would be useless, as the bed being soft, is conti~lually changing; whilst above that point it seems to have beer1 generally accepted that the river is unnavigable. On the other hand, as will be explained more fully later on, the bed is much inore permanent in the upper reaches, and consequently charts have some permanent value.

It fell to the lot of our gunboat to get up the river to Tikrit, some 150 miles above Baghdad, and her crew charted the river with some accuracy between Samarra and Tikrit. The gunboat in question was one of the so-called " Fly " class, and our particular species was the Caddisfly. These vessels were of ~ o o tons burthen, with a length of 1 2 0 feet, a breadth of 20 feet, and carried a long range +inch gun, a 12-pounder, a pom-pom, and five maxims, on an average draft of a little over three feet. The living quarters and navigating positions, protected by bullet- proof screens, were built up from the upper deck, and housed a crew of some 30 officers and men, including a variegated collection of supernumeraries, amongst them an Arab pilot, a Somali bop who acted as interpleter, and a young Armenian refugee who acted as " boy."

1 Reprinted from the "Geographical Journal," of July, 1922, by the kind permission of the author and the Council of the Royal Geographical Society.

I54 NAVAL REVIEW.

The fall of Baghdad had seemed to foreshadow the end of naval activity of any importance for the rest of the campaign, and as a matter of fact the gunboat flotilla during the latter part of 1917 had done little but patrol up and down the Tigris, with occasional intervention in the qtlarrels of Arab tribes. W e came in for one rather exciting incident up the Euphrates, which I have not time to dwell on here. Things on the whole were naturally enough not too cheerful throughout the intense heat of the summer, and their aspect was rendered still more depressing by the poor prospect of any more real activity for us in the future. For the front was far away up at Samarra, and the Tigris was supposed to be quite unnavigable to those parts for vessels of our size. There were, so the reports ran, hard shingly bars with only 18 inches of water on them at the best of times, and swift shallow rapids, and even hidden rocks-all things quite unknown to us hitherto. In the last 600 miles or so of its course, where the river flows through the flat alluvial Mesopotamian plains, there is scarcely such a thing as a pebble to be seen, much less rocks. Grounding was an everyday occurrence below Baghdad and for some 60 miles above, and, so long as you were going upstream, was a light-hearted enough affair. You felt yourself gently stopping, heard a muttered exclamation from your Arab pilot, and then reversed your engines, backed out, and tried another way. I t was a bit worse going down, becausc: the current tended to swing you round broadside-on lo the shoal after the bows touched, and it meant laying out the kedge with only a small iron dinghy to carry it upstream. Still it was nothing serious; it only meant delay, and a friendly passing vessel could lend a hand. Rocks were a more serious proposition, more than 600 miles from a slip or dock.

Then again, it so happens that the cool weather period, which begins about October, and which is of course most favourable to military operations, is also that when the river is at its lowest. W e had had plenty of opportunity of appreciating the fact coming down from Sindiya to Baghdad in September. In most places there was little more than three feet of water-our nominal draft-when there wasn't less. W e used to send a portion of the crew, clothed in sun helmets, on ahead on foot. You could tell by the amount of their anatomy showing above water where the deepest channel lay, and directed your course accordingly.

Now the river doesn't make its substantial rise till March, when the snow begins to melt on the Armenian mountains ; and by May, even as far north as Samarra, it is really too hot for satisfactory military operations.

On the other hand there are often plentiful rains in Mesopotamia and on the Armenian mountains in November, December and January, and these cause temporary rises of the river, during which it might be practicable to negotiate the

156 NAVAL REVIEW.

shoals and bars. If an adventurous gunboat could succeed in doing this she might take her place in the first line to meet the expected Turkish offensive, and her long range +inch gun would be a valuable acquisition to the defenders. The objection was that the same flood which might make the bars passable would probably render the rapids quite impracticable.

However, when the Caddisfly arrived at Baghdad just before Christmas Day, 1917, we had a consultation with the Senior Naval Officer. As a result we were instructed that after relieving the advanced gunboat at Akab, opposite the mouth of the 'Adhaim, and the most northerly point to which the river had hitherto been navigated by our craft, we were to explore the river as far north as pract~cable, and ascertain whether after crossing the bars the rapids could be negotiated by haulage, the military being asked to supply the requisite man-power.

Accordingly on January 7th) 1918, we left Baghdad, but the conditions under which our departure took place occasioned some doubts and qualms. There had been heavy rains during the previous days--the streets of Baghdad bore witness to the fact. I t was usual for diners out to wade through the mud in sen boots, carrying a pair of shoes in the hand, and the sea boots were often only just high enough. There must have been heavier rains still u p in those Armenian mountains we thought, for during the night before our departure the river rose no less than the astonishing arnount of 2 feet. As a matter of fact it was obvious that something more unusual than mere rains had taken place, only we didn't hear what it was till later. What we did find, however, was that we could scarcely make headway against the tremendous current. On an average our hourly progress was about two miles, and at some of the bends we hardly seemed tc move at all. The prospects with regard to the rapids did not look very hopeful.

The rain ceased towards sunset, and as we were a long way short of our proposed stopping place we decided to push on through the first part of the night. One avoids night work on the river as a rule, both because of the difficulties of navigation and in order to rest the crew. The searchlight has to be used to light up the banks and any leading marks or buoys that may exist, and with its aid we found our way on this occasion without mishap.

One curious spectacle we remarked that evening. All along the banks as the darkness drew on, we observed what looked like lighted torches or small lamps moving in and out among the brushwood. It was most uncanny. The actors in the affair when we came to identify them proved to be nothing more than jackals, and the lighted torches were their eyes glowing in the searchlight rays. W e must have hit on a regular pack of them, for though they were plentiful enough we had only seen them in twos or threes before. They had had rather a thin

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. I57

time since the Sanitary Sections of the B.E.F. had got under way, and indeed, cowardly brutes though they are, there had been cases of their entering camps in search of food and even attacking sleeping soldiers.

Next day we got on to 'l'uwair, and here we heard what had happened on the river. At Tuwair was the first of the three pontoon bridges which at one time spanned the Tigris above Baghdad, the other two being at Ukub and Samarra. The Tuwair bridge was connected by a branch line to Sumaika on the Baghdad Railway, and supplied the line which ran from Sindiya on the left bani< right down to Ba'quba on the Diyala. W e found the bridge officer in considerable perturbation, not diminished by our inopportune request to have the bridge opened in order that we might pass through. H e explained to us in highly figurative language that two nights before a great Aood 2 0 feet high had suddenly swept down the hitherto dry bed of the 'Adhaim-one supposes some natural dam up in the Jabal Hamrin, through which the 'Adhaim passes, had burst-that it had carried away the trestle bridge which supplied the brigade on the northern side of it, had wrecked the pontoon bridge which ran from Ukub across the Tigris just below the 'Adhaim's mouth so that the brigade in question was quite isolated, that the derelict pontoons had come down in the morning and smashed his bridge, and that he had only just succeeded in getting it together again in order to pass the supplies over to the unfortunate posts along the Sindiya-Ba'quba line. This had caused the great flood we had been steaming against, and of course we gave up the idea of further progress that day.

Next morning we passed tlirough, and after taking about eight hours to cover 1 7 miles, -Eve reached Ukub and took over the duties of advanced gunboat from another " Fly "-the Hoverfly. She had had a pretty bad time we found. The flood had swept her from her moorings, and with all her anchors down and engines going full speed ahead she had only just managed to escape being swept on to the wrecked pontoons. Moreover the present position was by no means comfortable. The cliffs below which the gunboats were moored rose up perpen- dicularly some 40 feet, and undermined by the swirling current, were beginning to fall down, as periodical crashes, loud as thunder-claps and some of them alarmingly near, announced. As the opposite side was shoal water for some distance, and was in any case remote from headquarters, it was difficult to find a suitable and safe billet, though we determined to do so as soon as possible. Before the determination could be realised we had a narrow escape from wreckage. At 3.30 a.m. on the following night we were all awakened by a tremendous crash and got up in time to see the bows of the gunboat, just visible in the dark, swinging away from the bank. A11 the forward part where the anchors were stowed was covered with a huge

19 NAVAL REVIEW.

heap of mud which had once belonged to the cliff. All the forward moorings had come away, and we were drifting down towards the wrecked bridge, though the moorings, dragging along the bottom, fortunately delayed our progress somewhat. In the vital necessity for economising fuel at this distance from our base we had not felt justified in keeping steam at immediate call, and we couldn't let any more anchors go till the mud was cleared away. Altogether things looked pretty bad. As lucli would have it, however, we drifted into a backwater, and before we got out of it we had dug the anchors clear and got steam at command.

Nobody was in a particularly good temper when the daylight came, but the incident did in fact lead to a momentous decision. After breakfast I sent for the engineer and said, " I 'm fed up with this place. I'm going to Samarra to-morrow." I t really seemed the only solution, and as a matter of fact it was the right moment. The river was " up," and that might make the bar passable, but it was beginning to fall, and so the bar would not be passable for long. On the other hand a falling river meant less current, and that 1nig11t malie the rapids navigable. It was however a leap into the unknown, and any mishap in those wild parts might have had unpleasant consequences; but to confirm the decision a small motor launch arrived that day under orders to explore a channel as far north as possible; her presence diminished the risk and we set out.

As we had anticipated the current slacked a good deal after we had passed the mouth of the 'Adhaim, and we found navigation quite easy over a soft bottom for the first-mile or so. The river was picturesque, with high cliffs, sharp bends and islets, hilt the country very bare and almost treeless. The only landmark was the fine dome of Balad mosque, set off by a few scattered date palms ; and here and there were primitive Arab encampments with patches of cultivated ground. Beyond Sinija we overtook and passed the motor launch which had got a mooring rope around her screw, but signalled that she did not require assistance. W e were now approaching the part of the river where we anticipated difficulties, and would have been glad of the pilotage of a small craft, but having started we were in no mood for waiting, and so decided to push on.

W e had with us the Tigris Corps maps, which showed the lines of the banks but of course gave no information as to the channels. All we could derive from them was the fact that there were a good maoy channels at this point, and the problem was wliich to take. As we afterwards surmised, this state of the river is due to one of the many irrigation schemes which have been carried out from time immemorial in these parts. The so-called " bar," about which we had been warned, was in reality the remains of a great dam, said by some to have been

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. I59

built by Nimrud. Another rather dubious feature was the appearance of shingly beaches, soon followed by shingly bottoms, as the grinding noise of the sounding poles announced, and this of course meant that grounding was going to be a much more serious matter.

However we went on. Our experience on the river had given most of us a certain amount of " flair," and we moved along in-

--

MILLS 1 3 . n

as a rule-from six to seven feet of water. At one spot there was a remarkable D-shaped indentation in the bank, and we had to follow round the curve of the 10. Some of us wondered how we should ever get down it again, going with the current. Not long afterwards we emerged from a deep narrow channel on to a broad open sheet uf water, and the sounding poles soon confirmed the suspicion that we were approaching the shoals. This was in fact the famous Darawish bar, across which the Arab children had been seen to walk in the low season. It was an anxious moment for us. Xo vessel of our size had ever crossed

160 NAVAI, REVIEW.

it before (or since), and ~t was likely to be a hard and stubborn thing to strike.' Soon the soundings dropped to five feet-to four feet. 'The engines were going full out, but we were only just gaining on the current, which ran very fast here. T o add to our difficulties the stern, in the shallow water, settled down three or four inches, and presently the engineer came up to say that the propeller was knocking up stones into the tunnel in which it worked. With the engines doing about 30 revolutions above their designed speed we didn't know how the propeller would like it. Now the soundings dropped to three feet six inches. W e thought we might as well go on till we struck or something happened, and as often on these occasions if only one does keep on, nothing happened; and presently came the welcome call from the sounders, " Four feet, five feet-six feet . . . " W e were over, and we were going to get to Samarra, the f i r s and only gunboat that ever did so.

Soon the river began to narrow again into a more natural course, and we left the wide expanse with its confused group of islands and channels behind us. Though we sonietimes had difficulty in finding the fairway there were no more bars, and by 3 p.m. Itre had reached Muhammad Sultan. Originally we had intended to stop here, reconnoitre on foot the " rapids," which were said to be a little further on, and then walk over to Istabulat to arrange for haulage from the brigade there if it should be necessary or practicable. But as we had got on so well and the day was yet young, we thought we might as well push forward and have a look at the " rapids " from the gunboat; and the proposal suited the mood of the moment, for we were naturally well pleased with ourselves. Accordingly on we went.

The river now narrowed exceedingly, and was apparently very deep. The sounding poles went down their full length, 1 2 feet, and found no bottom. Soon we seemed to be approaching a regular gorge, almost dark and gloomy in spite of the bright sunshine. There was no sound of any rapids. On the left bank the cliffs rose up some 60 or 70 feet, and were studded with massive blocks of a conglomerate of granite shingle cemented by a gypsum lime, of which latter we found abundant evidence later on in beds of crystals cropping up above the alluvial soil. Some of these blocks jutted right out into the river in an uncomfortable fashion, but fortunately we found none in the fairway, which meanwhile grew narrower and narrower, whilst the current began to run with great violence and to swirl and eddy about our bows.

Evidently this was the site of the " rapids," which according to reports ran amongst broken rocks in the low season. Strange

1 This statement must be modified in view of later information. I t would ba true " at that time of the year." See notes at end.

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. 1b1

to say our sounding poles never once found bottom in the fairway, though we had abundant evidence later on of the fact that that bottom really was rocky. As we were barely moving we thought we could risk a bump, and in any case there was no room to turn round. 'I'he channel was barely 100 feet wide,

M I L L S O , Z O + S u 1 I

and the current ran at five or six knots. The engines had to make a great effort, and responded nobly. The engineer claimed that they had done 60 revolutions above their maximum that day, but eve* so at times we scarcely moved at all. It took us nearly an hour to advance about half a mile, and then just as the river seemed to be widening again, and we thought our troubles were over, we saw right in front a small island apparently completely blocking the fairway. There was a

I 62 NAVAL REVIEW.

good wide expanse of water to the left, but it looked shallow and broken, whilst on the right there was no obvious passage a t all. Boos&, the first lieutenant, went aloft and reported that there was a narrow channel on the right, so we tried it. It was barely 60 feet wide, and we touched on a shelving bank at the bend where we entered it, but came off without damage. It was obviously going to be a most unpleasant place coming down, but once through it we found that our troubles for the moment were ended. W e emerged into a broad open reach where the current was comparatively moderate, and before us were the white tents of Istabulat, the first signs of civilisation since we had left Ukub.

At Istabulat the river is again spread out and broken up into channels, and we proceeded for the night into the one that ran below the camp on the right bank, crossing a rather shallow mud bar on the way. Istabulat gave us a welcome as the first gunboat in those parts, but we were somewhat upset to hear that the river was falling rapidly, so that there was a danger of being locked in if we delayed too long.

The river continued to fall rapidly that night, and we got away as early as possible next morning. As it was we only just cleared the bar. W e had been given to understand that there was a second set of rapids above Istabulat, but we received this information with equanimity now, and turned up the main channel which curved towards the left bank. Soon it took on the appearance of a gorge, similar to the one we had passed through on the previous day, and the current boiled swiftly through it. The cliffs were even finer here, towering up on the left bank, 80 or go feet, straight above us, and studded with nasty looking blocks of conglomerate. There was, one very sharp bend where the waters began to swirl and eddy and form backwaters in which the current ran quite swiftly upstream, whilst all the surface of the water was covered with a yellow scum. This was no doubt again the site of rapids, but here also there was apparently plenty of water, and though there were numerous eddies, we could not detect the characteristic disturbances caused by rocks near the surface. W e kept on therefore, making what use we dared of the backwaters. The current in the main stream was very strong, but again the engines did not fail us. It took us, however? just an hour to clear that gorge, though it was a bare half-mlle in length, but when we emerged at last we found ourselves in a wide open channel, and knew there were no further obstacles between us and our goal. W e had been lucky. W e had found just sufficient water for the bars, whilst the subsequent fall of the river, which had now made the bars impassable, had caused the current to ease up sufficiently to enable us to negotiate it. One day before the current might have been too strong; a day later, and there would not have been enough water.

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. 163

Before long we got our first view of Samarra, and it was really most impressive. ?'he morning had been rainy, and the sky was still covered with heavy banks of clouds, but just as we opened the last, almost straight, reach the sun burst through, and its rays lit up what seemed to us like a veritable fairy castle, with towers and battlements standing high up on the left hand. By some effect of mirage it seemed to rise right up into the sky, suggesting the New Jerusalem of a medizval Italian painter. This building, as we afterwards learned, was an ancient palace known as A1 Ajik, or the Abode of Love. I t is said to have been constructed by some Caliph for a favourite wife, but we never could get very authentic details about it, and I have not been able to find any information in the library. There seems to have been a legend recalling that of Hero and Leander attached to it : the Muhammadan Leander having been in the habit of swimming across the Tigris nightly. If he did it speaks well for the strength of his illicit love, for the river with its various channels is about half a mile broad there and runs at four or five knots. Perhaps, however, he used a blown-out goatskin.

The building itself is square, and what we had mistaken for towers +ere really the remains of the massive brick pilasters of walls, the intervening portions of which had fallen away. It may have been beautiful when its courts were covered with marble, and the nightingales sang in the rose bushes, but it is nought but a dismal and dusty ruin now, and perverted, when we saw it, to the base uses of war. One would like to know; a little more of its history.

While we were still gazing at A1 Ajik, the great golden dome of Samarra mosque burst on our view. As we saw it then it was most impressive with its flowing cusped curves and pointed pinnacle, and the intermittent sunlight flashing on its gilded surface. At that distance the rather sordid surroundings could not be distinguished. The smaller and older mosque not far from it is, as is probably well known, the more sacred. I t is said to mark the spot where the 12th Imam, Muhammad a1 Mahdi, removed himself from the sight of mankind, and one gathers that he is still living in a well within it.

Beyond Samarra itself is the peculiar brick tower, with a spiral staircase contrived round the outside of it, known as the Malwiya tower. I t is said to have been constructed in the eighth or ninth century A.D. as a minaret for the great mosque whose ruin9 are hard by, but I venture to suggest that this is a matter that calls for further inquiry. One understands that all so-called Arabic architecture really owes its inspiration to the Persians, but the whole style and appearance of this thing suggests Babp- lon. I am informed that its character is exactly that of the towers at Babylon and Birs Nimrud. I t stands quite by itself, a good 50 yarcis away from the remains of the great square building which is variously described as a mosque or a

164 NAVAL REVIEW.

caravanserai. I have never seen a minaret of similar structure, or thus separated from the main building. The minaret of the mosque of 'Tulun at Cairo, which is said to be an imitation of it, may indeed have been suggested by our tower, but it is really of very different structure and appearance. Moreover the building of this tower is quite different from that of the other ruins round about, and though it may well have been used as a, minaret, I should like to know what definite proof there is that it was not there long before the Arabs came.

I heard a rather frivolous legend as to its origin, which does, however, suggest that the Arabs themselves thought that its rather unortliodox appearance required explanation. It relates that the Caliph Harun was pondering one day what shape he should give to the minaret he was proposing to build. He pondered so hard that lie fell asleep and would have missed the hour of prayer had not a strange old man suddenly appeared, seized a roll of parchment and twisted it as a grocer will a paper ' cone, which he set down on its base, and then vanished. The Caliph woke up, said his prayers, and accepted the omen.

From the top of the tower one gets a fine view over the Nahrwan canal to the Jabal Hamrin. A conspicuous object is the great mound known as Tall Alij, or Julian's Tomb. It must surely have been there before Julian's time. One supposes that the soldiers of Julian's retreating army saw it, and deposited the body there, but I do not know what authority there is for the name at all. W e may perhaps discount Libanius' story that he was killed by a Christian soldier, and the disaffection that it suggests; but we can hardly believe that retreating soldiers, however much they may have loved their Emperor, would have delayed to pile up a mound of that size. It is some 70 feet high and about 150 yards in diameter at the base.

Running from the tomb towards Samarra is a kind of under- ground conduit, supplied by large circular bricked openings, designed to collect the surface water. W e saw only this one example of this kind of structure. Of the ruins of Eski Baghdad the Bait a1 Khalifa is the most conspicuous. It has a large arched hall which seems to have been copied on a small scale from the Hall of Audience of Ctesiphon, and I must repeat that all these ruins as regards style and structure, give a totally different impression from that obtained from the Malwiyah tower.

W e had plenty of time to explore all these things, but of course when we first arrived the chief business was to discover a suitable position where our armament would be of use in case of an attack. Owing to the configuration of the cliffs on the left bank such a position could be found only some 3 miles above the town, where the river is wider and the cliffs fall away. Unfortunately there were three several difficulties in the way. There was the pontoon bridge which carried the supplies from the terminus of the Baghdad railway to the brigades on the

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. I%

left bank, and which had not been designed with an eye to the needs of navigation ; there was also a wire boom which had been constructed by the R.E. to hold up floating mines which the Turks had tlioughtfully dropped into the river higher up ; and there was finally what was described as a narrow rocky ledge running right across the river with only a couple of feet or less of water on it. As a matter of fact this ledge was but the remains of another of those ancient dams such as were said to have been constructed by the enterprising Nimrud.

With a view to exploring this dangerous ledge, we succeeded in borrowing the only boat in the place-a small motor boat which had been sent up by rail from Baghdad for the use of the bridging officer. It was in a decidedly shaky state, as there was no proper workshop handy. In particular the pipe which carried the cooling water round the cylinders leaked into the sparking arrangements, causing a good deal of " missing." In this craft, nevertheless, we managed to reach the ledge, and discovered that there was a deep passage through it. I t was not however possible to make a proper examination in a single boat in that current, and over-confidence nearly brought about disaster.

Having reported satisfactorily and arranged for the opening of the bridge and the lowering of the boom, we proceeded one afternoon to take up the new position. All went well till we came to the dam; we could see the line of it on the left hand, and then an obviously clear stretch to the beach of the island on our right; but in that seem~ngly clear stretch there was just one pinnacle left of the old brickwork, and of course we ran

. on to it, breaking it off apparently, but getting holed ourselves beneath the fore compartments in the process. Soon we found that there was nothing to be done but beach on the island on our right, 2nd there we spent the night, cut off by the width of the channel from tile camp, and a little anxious lest we should, in our exposed position, become a target for bombing raiders of whom a few appeared from time to time. W e were certainly in a nasty position, 600 iniles from dock or slip, and Nimrud, if his ghost had been around, would have heard no complimentary things about himself, but we managed to pull ourselves out of the scrape. The full details of how we " made good " would only be wearisome. Suffice it to say that we first secured No. 2 bulkhead with cement and shores, and then with the aid of a German pump, part of the spoil of the last advance, we got the water down sufficiently in the foremost compartments to be enabled to explore them. W e reduced the volume of water by packing them with empty oil drums, wedged down, and ' then built up a coffer-dam over the hole, using bags of shingle to hold down the packing.

W e had beached on a Saturday evening, and by the Monday night the work was done sufficiently :o enable us to haul off on

I 66 NAVAL REVIEW.

the following morning and take up the position originally assigned to us. Some .finishing touches were required, and when things had settled down we only made an inch or two of water a day in those compartments, a matter of,a few minutes' pumping : a remarkably good piece of work considering the

asr Mutawakkil 3

Huwaislat *

MlLCS

conditions and our resources, and one reflecting great credit on Shipwright Leach and Engine-Room Artificer Reg. Blick, who took a leading part in it.

Things were now quiet enough. The river continued falling, and the expected attack did not come off. People began to talk about an advance, and one day we were sent for and asked if, when the spring rise of the river began, we would endeavour to survey the river as far as Tikrit with a view to seeing if it


were practicable for water transport. The motor boat was to be placed at our disposal, and escorts of cavalry would guard the banks to keep off snipers when the time came.

W e made our plans and preparations, and did a little preliminary exploring, but it was soon clear that the motor boat would riot take us very far. Our plan accordingly was for the gunboat to venture up herself so as to form each day an advancing base from which the motor boat could work a sectioil of the liver at a time, though it would be rather a ticklish job to navigate a comparatively large vessel in those unknown waters with their hard bottoms, and possibly hidden rocks, contact with which might well bring real disaster.

Before beginning the account of our survey work, I should like to describe the local method of catching fish, which is rather peculiar, and which I don't rerneinber having seen described before. The stony bottoms in these parts render unsuitable the throwing net which is used lower down the river. The natives therefore lay down a ground bait of lumps of dough with a small quantity of opium. The fish swallow this, and becoming stupi- fied, float about on the surface with their white bellies uppermost betraying them. The Arabs go in pursuit on a blown-out sheepskin which they manwuvre with their feet, whilst the hands are free to hold the landing net. A strange enough sight these wild fishernIan are as they lie on their bellies on the floats with their robes tucked round their waists, and drift away down stream on the look-out for a quarry; paddling frantically with their bare bromw legs when they sight one. Hardy fellows thep must be, too, for the water is icy cold in the winter. W e used the dinghy, though sometimes the fish passed close enough to be gathered from the gunboat.

There was still a longish period of waiting before the river rose, but at last it came to an end. The moment was signalised by a terrific downpour, which must have washed away the softening snow in the Armenian mountains, and it brought down the river in flood. Just as at Ukub, and almost at the same hour of the morning, we were swept from our moorings and nearly carried on to Nirnrud's confounded dam. Fortunately there was no fall of the cliff, and we were able to let go all our anchors and fetch up in time. Then on February 27th we got orders to make a start the following day. 'The cavalry escorts were being sent out, and we were to have a week to explore the 40 miles or so to Tikrit.

W e set out next day, the motor boat going in front. W e took with us the Army T. C. maps which were constructed o t ~ a scale of one inch to the mile, and of which we had made

1 enlargements, in sections, to a scale of six inches to the mile. I Our great difficulty was to find out whereabouts on the map we

were. Near Samarra itself we could get a few fixes from A1 Ajik and the Malwiya tower, but when they could no longer

168 IiAVAL REVIEW.

be seen there was, for considerable sections, practically nothing to go upon in the way of landmarks. The chief guides were tho bends in the banks, arid by taking sextant angles of these and comparing them with the angles of the bends on the map one gradually worked the different positions in. Of course there were always definite checks at places like Qantara and Daur. After each day's work in the motor boat the rough charts of that section were left in the gunboat when she came up over it the following day, and as a good view could be got from her bridge, it was possible to verify the results with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes.

The soundings were taken with a 10-foot pole, which was about as long as a man could handle in a small boat in a swift current, so that deplhs beyond that were not recorded. Above Huwaislat, however, we anchored, and tried to get a kind of " deep sea " cast with the crew ranged along the gangway of the gunboat. W e were unable to get any satisfactory result, and a 15-foot pole put down did not reach bottom. I should judge the depth to have been over 20 feet there in the then state of the river. All soundings were reduced to a standard reading of :I river gauge at Samarra. These readings were always a matter of daily record, and on this occasion arrangements were made for our escorts to lay a field telegraph, and by means of it we got the readings every evening and reduced our soundings accordingly. Where we did reach bottom it was nearly always hard or shingly, though occasionally there were some soft natches. I - - -

At the moment wl~en we first left Samarra our chief anxietv was with regard to a bar just above Huwaislat, which we had discovered with only two feet on it in one of the preliminary explorations. It was apparently another of Nimrud's intolerable dams; at any rate it was he who had set the evil example. W e got to Wuwaislat without mishap, though the course of the fairway was sufficiently intricate. Then the motor boat went on to Qantara, taking most of the day to explore the channel. There was an advanced post at Qantara and news was received there that the river was falling. As there were only four feet of water on Huwaislat bar this was serious in view of the fact that the work had to be done in a week. It was accordingly necessary to come back and take the gunboat over the bar in the dark. It was a near thing, and as a matter of fact, gauge readings for the next three days showed that there would have been less than three feet there. After that the river rose again.

Beyond the bar the river narrowed again to a more natural course, and there were no special difficulties except at a nasty bend above Jubur. On the right hand the banks began to rise into quite imposing cliffs, 70 to 80 feet high, with fine projecting bluffs. Their tops are crowned with the ruins of the great city of Mutatvakltil, " he who trusts in God," the Orthodox Caliph.

H.M.S. " CAI)IIISI'I.Y " AT QANTARA


who persecuted heretics and unbelievers, and by his remarkable bureaucratic organisations seems to have anticipated those modern developments which we count amongst our present afflictions.

, .. A little above Qantara the great Nahrwan canal leaves the I lgris for its long, and at one time beneficent, journey across the desert. After this there was little of general interest until Daur was sighted. It is but a huddled little town of low Arab houses now, with an ancient brick tomb-called Imam-ad-Daur -of the sugar-loaf pattern, with alternated convex flutings, which makes a good landmark. All around the country is a s bare and desolate as can be. W e did not see a tree in the place and scarcely even a bit of scrub. One wonders not only what the people live on but why they live at all ! On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence of the life that exists in the grill1 bosom of the upper Mesopotamian desert. Ordinarily it is s surface of hard-baked mud, so hard and dead to all appearance that one cannot conceive the possibility of any life in it. But the occasional downpours bring up, as it were by magic, quite a crop of small bright flowers. One hardly notices them :it first, they are so small and coy, but in time one sees them everywhere, even quite far out in the desert. There were ground orchids and a kind of asphodel, various species of the heath and stonecrop families, and a good many which lay beyond the range of our botanical knowledge. T o those who know the heat and dryness that exist for eight months of the year it seems extraordinary that the seeds and roots can keep life in them, but the phenomenon is surely of good augury for future agricultural development.

The Sheikh of Daur was said to be friendly, but in any case we were well covered by the mounted patrols on either bank. There is a narrow and fairly deep channel running .close up to the town, and the natives used to make brushwood rafts which were loaded there and floated down-stream. Partly, no doubt, in consequence, there was very little brushwood about, so the " sea-borne trade " must have been rather stagnant.

The main channel of this reach was a good broad one, with subsidiary branches running through the-islands, but its chicf feature is a number of genuine rocks scattered about, most of them partly submerged in the then state of the river. They are all of the same kind of conglomerate that we had remarked on the cliffs lower down, but this was the first time we had seen them in the bed of the river. A peculiar phenomenon which gave us a good deal of anxiety was the appearance of numerous tide-rips and eddies, sometimes stretching right across the fairway. W e naturally thought they. were caused by rocks, and concluded at first that our trip was over. Careful examination, however, showed that it was not so, and that the fairway was quite clear. W e could not account for the eddies, some of

I 7 O NAVAL REVIEW.

which formed distinct craters from 12 to 18 inches wide. It was evidently no place for a swim. We had not, however, finished with rocks, for above Daur there is a formidable yet picturesque ring of them, standing out of the water in black masses with jagged edges. In view of the way in which the

DAUR

river was spread orlt below them, we had a suspicion that our friend Nimrud had been at work here too.

The gunboat got up above Daur again without difficulty. I n the next section the river was again spread out, and accordingly we began to look oqt for another dam, and we did in fact find what may have been the remains of one. After proceeding in 10 feet or more for some time we came to a regular ledge, which we traced right across the two main channels.

THE TIGRIS ABOVE B A G H D A D . I 7 I

It was quite narrow, and had not more than 3 to 4 feet on it. As the river had begun to rise again and was well up, we marked it as a probable ford at low water. I t may have been near here that Jovian's army crossed the Tigris in its retreat. A little further on was another formidable ring known as Dahri rocks.

Generally the scenery between Daur and Tikrit was fairly picturesque with reedy islets and shingly patches, set off by occasionally high and rugged cliffs split by deep dry nullahs. It was terribly desolate, and when we climbed up some of rhe nullahs to get a view there was nothing to be seen but a few scattered herds and goats. Occasionally an armed Arab stood and watched us from the bank, but there was no sniping and we were always comforted by glimpses of our cavalry escorts. Our worst anxiety was with regard to the boat. The engine began to miss rather frequently, and usually at very inopportune times.

At one point, and at one point only, our eyes were glad- dened by a real belt of scrub. Later on, after the work was over, we met one of the escorts there, and that patch was thoroughly beaten out by a hundred Indian Lancers. I t was stiff with black partridges, and we could but sigh at having no more than two guns.

The final section which we explored, to Tikrit, was quite straight and easy, and continued to be so beyond, so far as we could see. Tilzrit itself stands picturesquely enough on the right bank, its grey square-topped houses rising in tiers till they crown the high cliffs, with whose colour and general outlines they blend so perfectly as to be almost invisible. The mosque, which lies down near the river-bank, has a spherical dome without minaret; and the absence of this feature helped to make the place, from afar and beneath the deep blue sky, look rather like one of the Italian cities of the Apennines. But as we got nearer the illusion faded. How sadly it wanted a bit of green ! W e saw but one tree in the place-a melancholy- looking date palm-situated in a walled " garden." Even the picturesqueness faded on closer acquaintance. It was a dirty, smelly little hole, though the natives themselves, and even the children, were perhaps cleaner and better dressed than usual. The latter wore brightly coloured prints which might have come, and probably did, from Manchester, whilst some of the more important-looking Arabs had fine gold-embroidered abbas.

' The women, of course, were veiled, though it is to be feared that some of us were favoured with glimpses of fair faces looking down from balconies and housetops. Handsome faces they were, too, some of them, though spoiled by the dyed eyebrows and the black henna rings round the eyes.

172 NAVAL REVIEW.

It is now time to sum up on the feasibility of navigation in these parts. If it were not for the existence of those ancient dams, or what we have supposed to be such, there seems no reason why good-sized craft drawing 4 to 5 feet should not navigate the upper reaches during a considerable part of the year, if not indeed all the year round. As the channels are very intricate, and as buoys will not easily hold on the shingly bottoms, and would in any case be misleading with the constant changes in the height of the river, charts would be necessary. The channels are certainly fairly permanent, and re- surveys would not be required more than once a year at the most. It would be desirable to have what I may call " identifi- cation " marks placed along the banks so as to obviate the already mentioned difficulty of knowing where you are. It should be noted that the obstructing dams are all narrow, and passages could probably be cleared through them at small expense.

On the other hand, it may be that the prosperity and future development of the country will be best served by reconstruct- ing the dams rather than by completing their destruction; and it may well seem, too, that unless the land is made fertile there will be little call for navigation there; yet again, if oil-fields are developed, the question of river transport may come to be of importance.

These considerations, of course, did not, at the time, influence our work, which was carried out for military reasons, and had also, it should be remembered, to be done in a limited time. Having completed it, we had to consider the question of getting down stream again. W e had just been sharply reminded of it by the unexpected receipt of orders to return to Baghdad and pay off, a s all available officers and men were to be sent home to cope with the submarine peril. At the moment we were rather disgusted, but apart from these feelings we knew that the descent was going to be no light task. It was essential to have some device for holding the stern steady as we ran down the swift and narrow channels. At first we tried towing a kedge anchor astern, but soon lost it, and ultimately the problem was solved by using a large iron oil-drum in the same way. The first was also lost before long, but the second survived the rapids, and was photographed when we got to Basra. Its appearance afforded satisfactory evidence of the solid and jagged nature of the bottom of those rapids.

Even with this assistance, the return journey was not without incident. Our first difficulty was at the awkward Jubur bend, where three times we had to turn round hastily to avoid being swept on to the shoal which lay in the centre of the channel. In the end, observing that the beach on the right bank just bevond the turn was soft, we ran the nose of the gunboat deli-

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. '73

berately on to it, and then with some toil laid out warps and hauled the stern round till she lay parallel to the channel. Below Huwailat we had a worse mishap, being carried on to the point of the shoal just where the channel divides. Every attempt to haul off with anchors laid on the shingly bottom failed. Our small anchors would not grip. As a last resource we sent the motor-boat down to fetch up the largest pontoon grapnel procurable. The motor was literally at its last gasp, and just as the boat came back from its successful errand the joint of the circulator gave out altogether, so we had no means of laying out the quite satisfactory article which it had brought.

w e tried carrying it out by hand, but it was too risky t o g o anywhere deep, the men could scarcely manage the heavy thing in the swift current, and the water was very cold. After three days of this our engineers managed to make up a patch-up of the pipe, and, after about three failures or breakdowns, the boat got away. It managed to drop the grapnel in a fairlv good place, and was then ignominiously hauled back by the tow-line that we had taken the precaution to attach to its stern.

After this we decided to wait for a rise. \Ye knew that i f me pulled that grapnel in, in trying to get off, we should never get it out again. On the eighth day after grounding the rise came, and having gingerly tautended our grapnel-line, we fortunately swung off into the channel in the early morning, and after some difficulties, accentuated by the darkness and a mist that most unfortunately arose, we got clear and ran back to Samarra without further mishap.

Then came the rapids. Vl'e did in fact find them sufficiently hair-raising, especially in the narrow passage of the second set. 'Ye ran past the uncomfortably close cliffs with their jagged protuberances at about 14 knots, of which the current accounted for about 6. Yaturally the boat did not answer her helm too well. Our oil drum saved the situation, and the sharp continuous jerking astern as the improvised anchor bit into the rocky bottom, did serve to keep the bows in the right direction, but every jerk brought with it a qualm as to whether drum or cable would stand the racket. Fortunately we had a 5-inch wire for the latter, and the slings were of the same material, and though we did, as has been said, lose a drum, it was not in a critical place. The D curve at Barurah was, as we had anticipated, a nasty piece of work. W e gictually grounded pretty hard, but got off without great delay, and soon after we had reached the soft part of the river, and could feel that we were really on the way-home.

Information lias now been received that the Turks in their retreat from Kut got a vessel, the Baghdad, said to be of 500

!

/ '74 NAVAL REVIEW.

tons, right up to Oaiyara above Tikrit in 1917, and on to Mosul in April, 1918, the river then being exceptionally high.

T h e Comet which is spoken of a s being a small vessel, appears to have been of approximately the same size a s the Caddis fly.

X full history of the navigation of the Tigris above Baghdad by Captain Cheeseman of the Iraq Secretariat is appearing in the January journal of the Royal Geographical Society.

Since reading the above paper, Lt.-Commdr. Elwell-Sutton has also obtained the following information through the good offices of the India Office :-

" In 1885 the Comet proceeded, with the then British Resi- dent at Baghdad, Mr. Plowden, on a tour of the Upper Tigris, in the course of which they reached, on May rst, a point seven hours' steaming above Tikrit, and then a t Waushansh she stranded and remained stranded for: over a month. I n 1894 Col. h!lockler, then Resident a t Baghdad, proceeded in the same vessel to Samarra to investigate a disturbance by which British- Indian subjects were put in danger. I t has not been possible to find auy record of the Comet having gone so far a s Mosul at any time."

T h e Editor comments :- I t seems probable, therefore, that the story is a myth, of

which the origin was Mr. Plowden's voygge. H e seems to have reached about the same place a s did Lieut. Jones in 1846.

Information has also been received that in 1917 Lieut.- Commdr. Plummer, in H.M.S. Sedgefly, made an attempt to navigate the river above the '-Idhaim. H e managed to reach as far a s Baruru, but then had to give u p the attempt owing to the river falling. H e was the first to survey this part of the river after the Turkish retreat.

In view of the proposed publication of the article in the N A V ~ L REVIEW, the following fuller account of how the dam.ige incurred after striliing Nimrud's dam was made good should be of interest to professional readers :-

W e struck on the 26th January, 1918, at 4.30 p.m., 2nd beached shortly afterwards, laying out the kedge on the port quarter to keep the gunboat square on to the beach. Both Yos. I and 2 compartments were found to be flooded, and the first work was to salve the stores. This was done satisfrtctorily. I t was found that in No. 2 compartment, which xtws fitted with an ejector, the water could be kept down with the assistance of the Fire Queen, and these pumps were kept going all night. No. I compartment remained full.

Next morning we turned to properly. The first thing to do was to pet No. 2 tight. This fortunately proved a falrly easy task, and by means of shores, and wooden wedges well caulked and then covered with cement, we had made this compartment

THE TIGRIS ABOVE BAGHDAD. '75

good by noon. No. I compartment had no ejector, and the water came in too fast for our hand pumps. As it was about four feet deep we could not locad& the hole. W e tried packing the compartment with bags of shingle in order to reduce the quantity of water for the pumps to tackle, whilst the First Lieutenant went off to search for a more powerful pump.

He was fortunately successful in finding one-our difficulties would otherwise have been much increased. One of the Sapper companies had a pump which had been captured on the way up. It was of German make, and was a double-acting hand fire-engine to be worked by four men. There were a good many of the kind supplied here before the war for irrigation purposes; it was, in fact, in use by the Sappers for their vege- table garden, but as there had been a fair amount of rain of late they were able to spare it for a few days.

As we only had our small iron dinghy, we had to take the pump to pieces, bring it off thus, and then set it up on the fore part of the gunboat. There was just room to work the handles. That was the end of Sunday's work, besides a brief " straf " with the usual Roche aeroplane.

On Monday morning we got all the pumps and buckets going. The German one behaved very well after giving a little trouble at the start; and, after some three hours' pumping, the water was down to about eighteen inches, and we found we could just keep it at that. I t was now time for sea-boots and overall suits, and armoured with these we went down to take stock of things.

At the fore end of the compartment was the chain-locker, simply a steel box, not watertight, built into the ship with its top edge below the level of the waterline. W e located the hole exactly beneath this. There was nothing of any importance elsewhere apparently, though we subsequently found a few leaky rivets and distorted frames.

Here, then, was something to work on. W e might build on that chain locker, plugging up the holes in the sides, and finally making the after-end of it into a bulkhead. The cables were already cleared out of it, and the first call was for old canvas, two good rolls of which were stuffed into the two sides of the locker. Then we lowered bags of shingle on to the canvas until the latter was jammed tight down over the hole. At the same time we proceeded to clear out the rest of the shingle which we had passed down the previous day, and sub- stituted for it all the available empty oil-drums. These are quite watertight, and when wedged down below the water-level would considerably reduce the amount of water that could get into the store-room. W e packed the whole place with these and wedged them down, leaving suitable gangways.

1 7 ~ NAVAL REVIEW.

Meanwhile, the shipwright had shored up the after end cf the chain-locker, and pluggeg all the lightening holes in it. Of course, the only result for the present was that the water came over the top of the locker, but we had considerably reduced the flow, and had got a grip of the matter. The next thing to be done was to build up the end of the locker to a height above the water level by means of wood baulks, and the necessary measurements were-taken.

This business lasted about five hours from the time we went down, and the pumps had therefore been going about eight hours altogether. W e were all pretty tired, but we finished up that day in happier mood. We were going to get on top, after a rather nasty set-back.

Next day the water was down in about an hour-a cheery sign-the baulk was soon fixed up and caulked, and we began to look round for smaller leaks. After the caulking a good deal of cement was required, and our supply ran out. W e couldn't get any at Samarra, so a wire was sent to Baghdad. Meanwhile, we could do nothing more. The compartment now took about seven hours to fill instead of the original rg minutes or so, whilst, of course, there was much less space for it to flood, thanks to our empty oil-drums. As No. 2 was now quite tight, we decided to haul off and take up our assigned positions. No. I was left full till the cement arrived, which it did in a few days. After it had been placed we made at first but seven inches a day in that compartment, which gradually reduced to two and even less as things settled down. The mud from the river, working into the canvas over the hole, must gradually have formed a natural cement, the caulking and wood plugs swelled and tightened, and everything became quite snug, so that after a time we almost forgot all about it. When the dockyard at Basra took her in hand some three months later, their chief trouble was to dismantle our extemporary structure.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SPEED OF BATTLESHIPS. Sir,-In Letter II., pages 662-3, Vol. X., No. 4, the follow-

ing paragraph appears :- (a) " I t is difficult to understand how a fleet can destroy

another fleet which deliberately avoids an action without some superiority of speed, and

(b) " it is equally difficult to understand why an enemy battlefleet should deliberately come to sea and engage ours unless it is so superior in numbers of ships or guns as to render 'its chance of fighting a successful action almost a certainty."

?'his paragraph has been selected for two reasons; firstly, because it contains the essence of two previous letters written by the same correspondent, and secondly, because it may be pbssible to throw some little light on the difficulties to which he alludes.

T o consider the second half (b), of this paragraph first. It is only to be hoped that in a future war our enemies will

have such a wholesome regard for the British fleet as is suggested : because the desire to create enormous fleets'may blind their eyes to the wider conceptions of war, the means will (as it has in the past) become an end in itself, and their war plans will be based wholly upon a quantitative or materialistic coaception of war. I do not think we can hope they will make such an obvious mistake.

Would your correspondent adopt the same reasoning towards our own fleet ? Are the only conditions on which we will seek battle to be a large material superiof-ity ? If so, of what relative value are morale, leadership and skill ?

lDid not Nelson deliberately seek battle before Trafalgar, and was he not inferior in numbers ? Did not Howe deliberately seek battle on the Glorious 1st June, and was he not inferior in numbers ?

What were the respective numerical values of David on the one hand and Goliath plus his shield bearer on the other ? W h y did David deliberately seek a fight ?

British. Enemy. 1 Trafa1gar.-Ships of the line ... ... 27 33

Guns ... ... ... 2,148 2,526 June 1st.-Ships of the line ... ... 25 26

Guns ... ... ... ... 1,015 1,107

1 7 ~ NAVAL REVIEW.

Are these facts, after all, so difficult to understand ? And if this reasoning does not hold good in the case of the

British fleet, why should it be valid in the case of an enemy ? Apart from this, I would remind your correspondent that

there are two very important causes, which may force even an inferior fleet deliberately to put to sea for battle : one is the political situation, the other is the progress of the war on land ; both of these have a marked effect on the conduct of naval operations.

There are, however, additional reasons why an enemy fleet, although not actually seeking battle, may have to be at sea during war: firstly, for the purpose of supporting, or acting as a covering force for, lighter forces who are engaged upon some operation, either offensive or defensive, and secondly, when proceeding from one base to another due to strategical redistribution. Nor must we forget operations, which may be conducted on our part, to entice an enemy fleet to sea, such as feints, diversions and other " Ruses de gzlerre."

Since it is always one of the principal objects of strategy to bring a superior force into contact with an inferior one, it should be pointed out before leaving this part of the discussion, that it i s always likely to be the object of an enemy to cause us to disperse our fleet, in order that he may then come to sea and engage a portion of it, the chance of success being increased by the fact that he is then in superior numbers, but he must use his fleet actively to achieve this.

Now to turn to the first part, (a), of the paragraph under consideration.

If an enemy fleet positively and persistently declines to put to sea during a war, there is no value whatever in giving to our fleet a speed greater than that of the potentia1,speed of this inert fleet; for, although they are avoiding battle, no amount of speed superiority on our part will bring it about.

One must therefore consider the conditions of a fleet being at sea, which have just been explained. The first two need no argument, the enemy want to fight.

It is in the latter cases that we must be able to bring them to action, the condition being that they cannot steam faster than our battlefleet.

Now the point which it is desired to emphasise is this, that for an enemy battlefleet to put to sea with the deliberate intention of avoiding action is not so easy to carry out as it soun,ds. Fleets do not put to sea in war time without a purpose, and when our fleet appears between the enemy and their objective they must either abandon their objective or fight. They cannot carry out their orders and at the same time avoid action unless we make a blunder, for we have the interior lines and they do not possess the speed requisite for neutralising this ~osi t ion of

CORRESPONDENCE. '79

advantage. If they abandon their objective and retreat to their base, our fleet will have achieved its ultimate object.

But we must not forget the possibility of being able to place our fleet between the enemy and their base : how then are they going to avoid battle ? Again, we have the interior lines, and again, unless we make a blunder, the enemy cannot avoid action unless they choose to remain at sea, when our superior endurance, for which we have sacrificed the extra knot, will prove its worth.

The value of this line of argument is dependent upon our ability to defeat the enemy strategically. The particular importance of strategy in relation to future wars must not be overlooked in making our preparations. In the war 1914-1918 it was almost impossible to make a major strategical blunder, we were so fortunately placed as to be able to defeat every move that the enemy might attempt in order to make full use of their battlefleet. W e cannot hope for this again.

The design of our battleships must be conditioned by the nature of possible future enemies at sea ; who are these likely to be ? One of, or a combination of, the principal maritime powers. A glance at the table1 at the bottom of this page leads us to infer that the area of the principal theatre of war in the future is likely to be very large and that the distances, over which fleets will have to move, are likely to be very large too. For this purpose endurance is required far more than speed; the ability to keep the sea for long periods, the possession of a high economical speed, and therefore a large fuel capacity, will be badly needed.

The whole problem appears to be a duel between speed and endurance, and it has been my endeavour to show in this letter, in a previous one and in an article on this subject, that endurance must in future dominate speed : that the extra knot, though useful, will avail us nothing if we are unable to keep the sea for long periods at a reasonable speed.

When good intelligence, sound strategy and secrecy have placed our fleet in a position of strategical superiority and in contact with the enemy; we must have a good reserve of fuel in the tanks and bunkers.

1 Comparison of the principal maritime powers. Capital ships. Merchant

* Washington Treaty. shipping. Tons. Tons.

. . . . . . . . . British Empire 525,000 22,070,798 . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S.A. ~ Z ~ , O O O 14,761,072 . . . . . . . . . . . . Japan 315,000 39354,806 . . . . . . . . . . . . France 175,000 3,652,249 . . . . . . . . . . . . Italy 175,000 s6502573

* Even i£ not ratitied the dominat~ng ~osit ion of U.S.A. and Japan will not be altered.

I 80 NAVAL REVIEW.

The space and weight, required for the machinery and boilers which are to give us the extra knot, are needed more for fuel.

What is the use of the extra knot when we may have to break off the action and return to our base for fuel ?

THE HON. EDITOR, NAVAL REVIEW.

Dear Sir,-Among the numerous articles that have appeared recently in the Press upon the subject of Gliding Flight-with the exception of a short contribution by an Aeronautical Corres- pondent to the Times (October q t h ) , headed " Gliding Lessons from Birds "-I have seen no mention of the possibilities of gliding over the sea, nor yet of the lessons to be learned from the flight of sea birds.

In the above-mentioned article, it is suggested that the possibilities are likely to be greater over sea than land, and generally speaking this would seem probable, for at present so far as gliding is dependent upon up currents, these are avail. able over the sea (except during very calm weather) and their position and strength may be estimated approxin~ately. I should like therefore to put forward some observations upon the flight of sea birds.

Before setting down the following notes, I would differentiate between soaring and sailing birds, inasn~uch as the latter are dependent for their progress upon the water over which they fly, and are, I think, unable to " make to windward " except during tbe period when the sea is running contrary to the wind.

Sailing birds are most often to be observed from a vessel at sea when the wind and sea are both following. The waves are probably overtaking the ship a t about seven knots. The birds follow the vessel for the purpose of picking up scraps thrown overboard, and their efforts are directed upon keeping astern. As they must keep moving at a certain minimum speed in order to support their weight, they are forced to make wide detours to either side of the vessel, and the speed at which these are carried out appears to be about 30 knots. If one watches one of these birds carefully, and it will be noted that its position relative to successive waves is, for the most part, over the face or rising side, and its direction of travel apparently at right-angles to the direction of motion of the waves. The bird is moving to leeward at about the same speed as the wave, and when this speed is too great for its purpose, it wlli turn toward the wave crest-point one wing tip upwards-and make use of its speed to shoot upward well above the back of the

CORRESPONDENCE. 181

wave, descending to a position over the face of a subsequent wave. This movement is executed without wing flapping of any kind-and this causes one to consider the effect of a wave upon the surrounding air.

Suppose that the sea is calm until a single undulation is created-then on its way it will move the air from its face, upward over the crest and down its back, so that the air is first slightly compressed and then lowered in pressure: both of which operations will abstract power from the wave, and the effect upon both air and water will be greatest nearest to the surface.

Take it that we have a sea wave of, say, 200

feet in length and 12 feet in height, travelling at 20 knots, or approximately 33 feet a second, and suppose that the surrounding air is not moving over the surface of the water, then the passing of the wave will lift the air 12

feet at an average rate of four feet the second, approximately, commencing at zero in the trough and ending at zero on the crest. W e may fairly assume that the slope of this wave face is about 10 degrees at the steepest part. Now, it has been estimated that a plane surface of approximately 30 inches by 5 inches, and of weight approximately I lb., will glide upon air without Posing its level if sloped at about: 5 degrees, and given a velocity of some 50 feet per second (I m e n t i o ~ approximate whole ,numbers for the sake of convenience). This same result could be arrived at by sloping the plane degrees downward and raising the air below it at the rate of about 4 feet per second, since in the first case by traversing the plane go feet in I second it will push 4 feet of air vertically downwards.

Now, in the case of the wave we have chosen, of zoo feet in length, etc., the air was impelled upward at 4 feet a second, so that if this plane were to be started off with a downward slope of 5 degrees and in the same direction as the wave is moving, say, at a foot or so above the steepest slope of the wave, it would glide ahead of the wave, which is only travelling at about 33 feet a second, until it lost the support of the air which is being pushed upward, when it would fall. Suppose, however, that the direction of travel of the plane is altered, so that it makes an angle with that of the wave, then a direction can be found that will enable the plane to maintain its position over the wave slope (in this case approximatelv 50 degrees to the right or left) and the plane will now travel laterally over the wave.

If, instead of a smooth wave such as we have considered above, we take a more violent one, approaching breaking point, then the plane gliding over this wave with a considerably steeper maximum slope (sav of 45 degrees) might well be subjected to an uplift of air travelling at 20 or more feet the second, enabling

I 82 NAVAL REVIEW.

it to support at least 5 Ibs. in addition to its own welght of I lb.

Again, supposing the angle of slope of the plane to be 2

degrees and the horizontal velocity 60 feet the second, we see that the I lb. plane will be supported over a wave of but 5 degrees maximum slope and giving only 2 or 3 feet the second, lift in the air, necessitating a course at about 60 degrees to the direction of th'e wave.

When such conditions as. the above are considered in relation to such a perfectly adapted plane as a bird, I feel that the evolutions of birds over the surface of the water are a trifle less incomprehensible, and although I admit that this is one of the simplest aspects of a most difficult and complicated subject, it may be of passing interest when considering the possibilities of Gliding Flight over the Sea.

November z ~ s t , 1922. To THE HON. EDITOR,

THE NAVAL REVIEW.

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P u b l i s h k b y Gale and Pdden. Portsmouth and Aldershot. \/6 Price- each plus zd. for postage.

Shortly before the end of the war the Admiralty took up the question of ships' badges. Until then, these badges were entirely unofficial; most of those in use were ill-chosen, .and in many ships the badge was changed with every new commission. In such circumstances badges were meaningless. I t was therefore decided in 1918, that the badge of a ship ought to be symbolical of the history of the ship, that i t ought to be as permanent as the badge of a regiment, and that it should be combined with the War Honours of the ship into a naval counterpart of the regimental colour. Before this could be done satisfactorily for any individual ship it was necessary that the history of the ship, that is d all ships that had borne her name, should be known. Thus the work of the committee set up by the Admiralty was in part historical.

I n 1921 the committee formed the opinion that the historical data collected for their purposes might with advantage be published. The first idea was to issue them as single sheets, a sheet for each ship's name, and to limit the conten(ts to a reproduction of the badge, a list of the War Honours, and a tabular statement of all the more important services. I t was however decided that the scheme would be more attractive if the history of the ship mas written up into a shyrt narrative; the old tabular statement \vould be the basis from which to work, and i t could be printed as a sort of appendix. This scheme was decided upon, and Mr. Laughton, who has been a member of the committee from its foundation, and Mr. Fraser, then on the staff of the Admiralty Library, were entrusted with the work of preparing the narratives.

Experience showed that the tabular histortical record needed checking and expansim. These sitatements had been prepared at the Admiralty, necessarily without much reference to the original records in the Public Recortl Office; they were based almost entirely on printed sources, and on such original records as were in the Admiralty itself. The writers went therefore to the originals, with the result that it can be claimed that these little histories are more accurate than any- .thing of the kind which has been hitherto attempted; and also that the " Records of Service " are a good deal fuller than the tabular statements from which they have been developed. The War Honours, as

184 NAVAL REVIEW.

printed on the title page, are not necessarily in their final form. They proceed from the belief that a ship which has distinguished herself in an action which was as a whole discreditable, should wear an honour for that action; and similarly that a ship ~vhich failed of her duty in a victorious action should not wear an honour for that action. Thus i t will be noticed that the Marlborough has had assigned to her " Toulon, 1744 " as an honour, for she was one of the two ships whicn really distinguished themselves in that fiasco. The question of campaign honours has not yet been taken into consiclerat'on; nor is it likely to arise in the case of capital ships to anything like the same degree that it will for cruisers and smaller craft, which in the old wars were unable to take part in fleet actions.

Though these booklets are thus issued I ' By authority," the publication is entirely a private venture. Messrs. Gale and Polden publish them under an agreement with the Admiralty, the purpose of which is to ensure that they shall contain trustworthy history. Three only have been issued hitherto : if the scheme receives adequate support others will be put in hand. They should be most interesting and valuable to those who have served in these ships, and the Hon. Editor suggesits that members might br'ng them to the notice of their brother officers who have done so.

BRASSEY" NAVAL A S D SHIPPlNG ANNUAL, 1923.-Clowes. 25s. Fully maintains its reputation. Among many interesting articles

may be medioned, Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference. By A. of the F. Sir F. C. D. Sturdee, Bart. The Influence of the Washingtbn Conference on Naval Design. By Sir George Thurston, in which Sir George outlines and gives sketches of three different types of battleships on a 35,000 ton basis, and discusses the questions connected with all other types of craft. The French Navy in the War and After the War. By Captaine A. Delpiure, late of the French Navy. Cruisers and Naval Warfare. Ry Rear-Admiral W. H . D'Oyley. Sea Power and Air Power. Ry Commander C. Dennis Burney, R.N., M.P. The Strategical Problem of the Pacific. By Archibald Colbeck. The Principles of Imperial Defence. By Commander H. Rundle, R.N., and Retrenchment of Officers. By Commander C. N. Robinson, R.N.

T H E MILITARY OFFICIAL HISTORY OF T H E WAR. MILI- TARY OPERATIOKS, FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1914. Compiled by- BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. E . EDMONDS. Macmillan. 21s.

Has been unanimously very highly reviewed, as being accurate. impartial and lucid, written in an easy yet graphic style, with touches of colwr and a sense of the epic quality.

SAMUEL PEPYS. ADMINISTRATOR, OBSERVER, GOSSIP,- By E. HALLAM MOORHOUSE. Leonard Parsons. 6s.

WHY WARS COME.--By REAR-ADMIRAL A. P. NIBLECK, U.S.N. The Stratford Co., Boston, Mass., U.S.A.

NOTICES OF BOOKS. Is5

I'IRAI1ES.-By C. LOVAT FRASER. Jonathan Cape. 6s. The test is taken from the 5th Edition of " The History and Lives

of all the most Notorious Pirates and their Crews," published in 1735.

BLACKBEARD, BI?'CCANEER.-By R. D. FRASER. The Penn Publishing Company, Philadelphia.

T H E WORST JOURXEY IN T H E WORLD. ANTARTIC, 191o-1913.-By APSLEY CHERRY GARRARD. Constable. £3 3s. An account of Scott's last expedition, f r m its departure from

England in 1910, to its return to New Zealand in 1913, and containing the diaries of the Polar Party and others.

FISHING BOATS AND BARGES FROM T H E THAMES T O LAND'S END.-Twenty Woodcuts by C. A. WILKINSON. Text by WALTER WOOD. John Lane, Vigo Street. 12s. 6d.

SHIPS O F T H E ROYAL NAVY, 1922.-By OSCAR PARKES, O.B.E. Sampson Low. 6s. Dr. Oscar Parkes served as a Temporary Surgeon during the war. A

handy form d guide to vessels of the post war fleet, their types and dimensions, with nates of their war services and the evolution of the various classes. There are pictures on almost every alternate page.

T H E BOtN\iADVENTURE. A IiANDOM JOURNAL O F AN ATLANTIC HOLIDAY.-By EDMUND RLUNDEN. Cobden Saunderson. 6s. I t gives the experiences of a landsman in a Tramp.

T H E EVOLUTION O F CLIMATE.-By C. E. P. BROOKS. With a Preface by G. C. SIMPSON, F.R. S., Director of the Meteorological Office. Benn. 8s. 6d.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND, I ~ T H DECEMBER, I915 T O I I T H NOVEMBE.R, 1918.-By G. A. B. DEWAR assisted by LT.-COL. J. H. BORASTON, C.B. In z Vols. Constable. 42s-

L E T T E R S OF LORD AND LADY WOLSELEY. Heineman. 25s.

NAVAL WARFARE.-By SIR J. R. THURSFIELD, M.A. (Cambirdge Manuals). 2s. 6d. Cambridge University Press.

T H E NAVAL CHKONIC1,E.-Complete, 1799 to 1818, is advertised by Francis Edmonds, secondhand bookseller,. 83 High Street,Marylebone, W.1, for £20.

OTHER BOOKS.

A SHORT HISTORY O F T H E WORLD.-By H . G. WELLS. Cassell. 15s. Has been very highly reviewed. It gives in the most general way

an account of our present knowledge of history shorn of elaborations and complications. . . . . From it the reader should be able to get that general view of history which is so necessary a framework for the study of a particular period or the history of a particular country.

I 86 NAVAL REVIEW.

T H E EVOLUTION O F MAN. A series of lectures by crninent American Prafessors. Milford. 15s.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.-By C. E . MOORE. Routledge. 15s.

SCIENCE AND HUMAN AFFAIRS.-By W. C. CURTIS. Bell. 15s. A clear and impressive account of the history of the steps by which

man has leam't to control nature, suggestive also of what1 conquests may be ahead of us.

T H E CONQUEST OF MEXICO.-By W. H. PRESCOTT. Illus- itrated by KEITH HENDERSON, with Introduction by T. A. JOYCE. Two Vols. Chatto and Windus. 42s.

T H E POPULATION PROBLEM. A Study in Human Evolution.- By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS. Oxford : Clarendon Press. London : Milford.

GREECE AND T H E ALLIES, 1g14-~2.-By G. F. ABBOTT. Methuen. 7s. 6d.

OUTLINES O F POLITICAL ECONOMY.-By SIR SYDNLY J. CHAPMAN, M.A. Longman. 7s. 6d.

LIFE O F NAPOLEON I.-By HALLAND ROSE. Bell. 10s.

BIOLOlGY FOR BEGINNERS.-By TRUMAN J. MASON. Harrop. 6s.

NOTICE.

BINDING OF VOLUlMES. Although it has been decided to allow Members t o

get the binding of their Reviews done by any other firm, Messrs. Chas. Knight & Co., Ltd., 227-239, Tooley Street, London,. S.E.1, still undertake the binding of the volumes at the following rates in the four styles indicated:-

Style. Home. Foreign.

A.-Half-bound best grey-green Buck- . ram, strong dark watered cloth

. ... sides, gilt finished.. ". . 516 each. 612 each.

R.-Half - bound stout dark blue Morocco, cloth sides, bands, gilt finished ... . . ... ... 716 each. 812 each,

C.-Full-bound best dark blue Buck- ram, gilt finished ... ... ... 516 each. 612 each.

D.-Bound in plain dark blue cloth, as reprints ... ... ... 4/6 each. 512 each.

These prices include free delivery when bound.

In order to avoid the trouble and expense o f opening up small accounts, Members are requested when forwarding copies to remit the necessary amount for binding.

W. H. HENDERSON, Hon. Editor,

REPRINTS OF VOLS. 1 AND 11

Are supplied bound in plain dark blue cloth. They can be bound as above at an extra charge of 413 for styles A and C, and 613 for style B.

OBJECTS AND REGULATIONS OF

THE NAVAL SOCIETY.

THE object of the Naval Society in founding a REVIEW is to encourage thought and discussion on such subjects as strategy, tactics, naval operations, staff work, administration, organisation, command, discipline, education, naval history, and any other topic affecting the fighting efficiency of the Navy, but excluding the material aspects of the technical sciences ; i t is hoped that it will help to build up that body of sound doctrine which is so essential

to success in war, and to provide a means of expression and discussion within the Service.

I t is proposed to maintain the publication of a quarterly number, only printing sufficient copies for distribution to members. The fact of joining the Society involves a guarantee that proper care is taken of the numbers ; that they are not left where they might be read by unauthorised persons ; that their contents are not discussed as such with anyone outside the range of the Service; and that they will on no account be used for press or political purposes.

The question of excluding confidential matter must rest with the Hon. Editor, who will obtain the opinion of other members in deciding doubtful points. Everything connected with war can be discussed in the abstract, but generally speaking, service methods should not be referred to, except when dealing with subjects already made public, such as education, administration, staff

organisation, discipline, etc. Original articles, criticisms of previous ones, notices and

reviews of books, and translations, are invited from all members of the Society. These should be sent to Admiral W. H. Henderson, 3, Onslow Houses, London, S.W. 7, who will select for publication. . They may be sent in manuscript but when possible typescript is preferable ; i f only one copy is sent it is advisable to register it.

To encourage free discussion and criticism it is thought best that all articles should be anonymous, but should contributors so desire, they can append their nanies or use a pseudonyn~.

Officers of and above the rank of Midshipman over 18, in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Indian Marine, the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, Royal Australian and Canadian

Navies, the Naval Force of New Zealand, the First Lord and Civil Members of the Board of Admiralty, Members of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the Ministers for Defence of the Dominions, are eligible for membership. Officers of and above the rank of Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Army, and Royal Air Force, can become Members on application to the Hon. Editor; it being understood that he is con~pelled to reserve to himself the right to terminate at any time the membership of all or any persons who are not officers on the active list of the Royal Navy. H e has also the right to admit to membership distinguished statesmen and individuals who are in touch with and interested in the Navy.

The annual subscription is £1; I t is due on joining and on the 1st January in each succeeding year. I t entitles new sub- scribers to receive all the back numbers for the current year. The Society's Bankers are the National Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ltd., 18, Cromwell Place, London, S.W.7., t o whom all subscriptions should be sent. I t much facilitates and reduces the clerical work of collection if all those who have banking accounts will make use of a Banker's Standing Order Form which will be supplied on joining and can always be obtained from the kon . Treasurer. If cheques, postal, or money orders are used, they should be made payable to the Bank and be crossed " a/c the Naval Society ."

Members are particularlv requested to notify all changes of address, and to send all cornmur~ications to me, addressed to the Hon. Secretary, The Naval Society, 3, Onslow Houses, London, S.W.7, except remittances which should be sent to the Society's Bank. I shall be glad to see members at any time and they are invited to offer me their suggestions or criticisms on matters connected with the REVIEW. My house is only 100 yards from the South Kensington Stations.

W. H. HENDERSON, Admiral, 3, O~lslow Houses,

London, S.W. 7.

Hon. Treasurer the Naval Society, ared Hon. Editor the Naval Revzew.

January lst, 1923.

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS for Year ending December 31st, 1922.

RECEIPTS. A s. d. A s. d.

To Balance at Bank, Jan. 1st) 1922 69 19 3 ... in Petty Cash , , , , ... 2 2 11

7 2 2 2

,, Subscriptions, and Payments for back Volumes* ... ... 1,604 17 7

, , Dividends, Deposit' Insterest and ... Income Tax Refund ... 47 7 11

* Including some back Subscriptions, and 17 for 1923.

-- £13724 7 8

-

PAYMENTS. jt; s. d. A s. d.

By Printers for Vol. 10 and ... ... Notices, &c. 1,032 14 6

,, Production osf Subject Index 123 10 o List of Members ... 2 0 15 o ,, ...

... ,, Pastage ... ... 108 3 2

,, Clerical Assistance ... ... 35 1 0

,, Overpaid Subscriptions Re- turned ... ... ... 24 4 2 4

,, Stationery, Books, &c. ... 2 1 19 3 ,, Office Expenses ... ... 6 3 14 ,, Audit and Bank Charges ... 1 2 7 4

Communications ... ,, ... 5 2 1 ,, Payments for Back Volumes 38 10 44 ,. 5% National TVar Loan ... 150 13 6 ,, Bal. at Bank, Dec. g ~ s t , 1gg2 144 3 I

, , , , in f etty Cash ... ".. I I 04 145 4 14 -- £1,724 7 8

Audited and found Correct. BEATRICE BRACKENBURY, 1 Auditors,

January gth, 1923. ISABEL A. E. BERROW. 3 1, Westminster Palace Gardens, London, S. W. r .

TOTAL INVESTMENTS T O DATE. MEMBERSHIP. ;G s. d. On December 3 1 s ~ I 921 ...

... ... ... 1,460 5% War Loan 700 o o Names removed unpaid, 1931 a6

Deceased ... ... ... UNPAID SUBSCRIPTIONS. Resigned ... ... I I I

9 ... J s. d. Removed Pending Payment

2 Members at 101-, 1921 ... ... I o o for 1922 ... ... 4 3 24 7 , 1 , 20/-> ,> 6 . , , , 101-, 1922 ... ... 5 . . 24 O O . 3 0 0

- 189

... 43 ,, 9 , 20/-J 7 , ." 43 0 0 ... ... ... 1,271 J d n e d , ~ g z z ... 96

71 o o - ... Arrears for Back Vola. ... 4 I3 0

Total Owing ... ... ... 7 c T Z Q

1,367 P