15
ICT SECURITY: DEFENCE STRATEGIES AGAINST TARGETED ATTACKS RELATORE: Prof. Franco Callegati CORRELATORE: Ing. Marco Ramilli PRESENTATA DA: Daniele Bellavista

ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Presentation of my master degree thesis. I propose a business process and a conceptual framework for defence against targeted attacks.

Citation preview

Page 1: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

ICT SECURITY: DEFENCE STRATEGIES AGAINST TARGETED ATTACKSRELATORE: Prof. Franco CallegatiCORRELATORE: Ing. Marco RamilliPRESENTATA DA: Daniele Bellavista

Page 2: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

INTERNSHIP AT AEPI INDUSTRIE, IMOLA● Defined a defence service for an external company

(referred as ACME corporation).● Analyzed model and taxonomies of cyber attacks

and defence methodologies.● Implemented a simulated cyber attack as part of

the defence service.● Proposed a defence strategy against targeted

attacks and applied it to clean existing infections and to detect new threats.

ICT SECURITY: DEFENCE STRATEGIES AGAINST TARGETED ATTACKS

Page 3: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

FROM OPPORTUNISTIC TO TARGETED ATTACK

● Cyber attacks targeting any vulnerable system are called opportunistic.

● In the last few years, a new kind of attack, called targeted, is spreading.

● Targeted attacks were once directed against nations or military organizations.

● Now, cyber criminals are targeting companies to compromise their services and steal their data.

Page 4: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

CYBER CRIME: OPPORTUNISTIC AND TARGETED ATTACKS

OPPORTUNISTIC ATTACKS:● Target any vulnerable

systems for general motives (e.g. money)

● Thousands of malware variants

● Common● Poor social engineering

techniques● Advanced knowledge NOT

required

TARGETED ATTACKS:● Specific target (company,

nation), motives are fulfilled by compromising the target

● Unknown and unseen malware

● Rare● Advanced social

engineering techniques● Requires advanced

knowledge and complex attack process

Page 5: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

MODELS FOR THE ATTACK PROCESS

RECONNAISSANCE WEAPONIZATION

ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVE

EXPLOITATION

INSTALLATIONCOMMAND AND CONTROL

DELIVERY

INCURSION DISCOVERY CAPTURE DATA EXFILTRATION

Page 6: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

TARGETED ATTACK AGAINST ACME

Many papers claim that targeted attacks are able to bypass conventional defence systems.

THE ATTACK● Information gathering to know involved defence

systems, email addresses, names and communication protocols.

● Multi-staged malware to bypass defence systems. First stage deployed physically, the second via email.

RESULT● Bypassed every defence system.● Performed keylogging and file stealing.

Page 7: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

● Signature based detection doesn’t work against unseen malware.

● Automatic behavior detection can be fooled by complex malware.

● Defence systems focus was to narrow.

● Defence systems didn’t take into account the whole attack process.

WHY DID DEFENCE SYSTEMS FAIL?

Page 8: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

DEFENCE SERVICES● Defence against opportunistic attacks: they still are

the most numerous cyber attacks and IDSs can counter them.

● Defence from unknown attacks: exploit of rules and policies to define detection of suspicious events for further analysis.

● Systems check: analysis and test of existing systems.

PROPOSAL● HAZARD: a business process.● WASTE: a conceptual framework, used by HAZARD.

DEFENCE STRATEGY AS SERVICES OFFERED BY A SECURITY TEAM

Page 9: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

DEFENCE STRATEGY: ANALYSIS OF SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

WASTE: Warning Automatic System for Targeted Events● Detection of malicious events is based on

automatic auditing of system or network events.

● Some events are not malicious per se, but may be suspicious in the company context.

● WASTE is a conceptual framework to define detection methods for suspicious events.

● The architecture cannot be defined a priori.

Page 10: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

WASTE use cases

Page 11: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

HAZARD: BUSINESS PROCESS FOR CYBER ATTACKS DEFENCE

HAZARD: Hacking Approach for Zealot Attack Response and Detection

ACTORS:● Analysis Team● Detection Team● Vulnerability Team● Hacking Team● Company IT

PROCESSES:● Incident Analysis● WASTE warning analysis● WASTE issues managements● Vulnerability Assessment● Targeted attack evaluation● Targeted attack test

HAZARD is studied to share information between actors in order to provide an effective defence strategies against targeted attacks.

Page 12: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack
Page 13: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

DEFENCE STRATEGY APPLICATION INSIDE ACME: RESULTS

● Found some opportunistic malware programs reported as non malicious by the IDS.

● No sign of targeted attacks was found.● Reduction of infection events reported by the IDS.

Page 14: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

FURTHER WORKS

● Use HAZARD for information sharing to better understand targeted attacks.

● Test the defence strategy against a real targeted attack:○ How to test if a defence approach is

effective against a targeted attack?

Page 15: ICT Security: Defence strategies against targeted attack

ICT SECURITY: DEFENCE STRATEGIES AGAINST TARGETED ATTACKSDaniele Bellavista

GRAZIE PERL’ATTENZIONE