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The Red (Team) Analysis Society From weak signals to crisis scenarios Dr Helene Lavoix Fourth Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management “AnEcipaEng crises and their potenEal pathways” Geneva, Switzerland 2829 May, 2015

4th Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management, Keynote Presentation, From weak signals to crisis scenarios

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Page 1: 4th Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management, Keynote Presentation, From weak signals to crisis scenarios

The  Red  (Team)  Analysis  Society  

From  weak  signals  to  crisis  scenarios    

Dr  Helene  Lavoix  

Fourth  Workshop  on  Strategic  Crisis  Management    “AnEcipaEng  crises  and  their  potenEal  pathways”    

Geneva,  Switzerland    28-­‐29  May,  2015  

1

Fourth Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management “Anticipating  crises  and  their  potential  pathways”

28-29 May 2015

Geneva, Switzerland

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

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e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Outline  

•  Why  do  we  anEcipate?  •  How  do  we  anEcipate?  Approaches  &  Processes  

•  How  do  we  anEcipate?  PracEce    1.  The  SF&W  Officer’s  challenges  2.  Methodologies  and  tools  

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WHY  DO  WE  ANTICIPATE?  

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Dr  Helen

e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Why  do  we  anEcipate?  

An0cipa0on  is  in-­‐built  in  living  being  and  species  for  survival  

Jasmine  by  By  Inga  Munsinger  Co\on  (h\ps://www.flickr.com/photos/ingamun/4640117097)  [CC  BY  2.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

Pink  jasmine  (Jasminum  polyanthum)  -­‐  flowers.  Reunion  island.  By  B.navez  (Own  work)  [GFDL  (h\p://www.gnu.org/copyleg/fdl.html),  CC-­‐BY-­‐SA-­‐3.0    

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The  Re

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nalysis  Society  

Why  do  we  anEcipate?  

Predic0on,  an  age  old  ac0vity  for  survival  

Temple  of  Apollo  in  Delphi.  eigen  foto  Sofie  Debognies  april  2005  by  Napoleon  Vier  from  nl  [GFDL  (h\p://www.gnu.org/copyleg/fdl.html)  or  CC-­‐BY-­‐SA-­‐3.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by-­‐sa/3.0/)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

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e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Why  do  we  anEcipate?  AnEcipaEon  is  used  for  most  common  but  vital  acEviEes…  and  for  coordinaEon  

Photography  of  Lascaux  animal  painEng  By  Prof  saxx  -­‐  CC-­‐BY-­‐SA-­‐3.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by-­‐sa/3.0/)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

EaEng  -­‐  Preparing  a  meal  

A  Fancy  Meal  by  Peggy  Greb,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Public  Domain  

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The  price  of  failure:  Surprise  

§  Shorter term dynamics

§  Loss of markets, market-share

§  Disruption of production, logistics

§  Loss of competitiveness

§  Reduced profitability

§  Bought by competitors

§  Bankrupt

§  Etc.

States  (countries)  Businesses  

Impact  increased  during  instability  and  transiEon  

§  Longer term dynamics

§  Loss of relative and absolute power

§  Loss of legitimacy for government

§  Loss of legitimacy for state

§  State fragilisation

§  Ultimately state collapse

§  Rebellions, revolutions, civil wars

§  Etc.

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HOW  DO  WE  ANTICIPATE?  APPROACHES  &  PROCESSES  

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Dr  Helen

e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

How  do  we  anEcipate?  

•  We  create  “organized  and  systemaEc  processes  to  reduce  uncertainty  regarding  the  future  for  policy-­‐makers  (decision-­‐makers)”  (Thomas  Fingar,  2009)  

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nalysis  Society  

The  family  of  “an0cipatory  ac0vi0es”  

10  

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The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Science  

The  ScienEfic  Universe  -­‐  This  image  is  the  original  work  of  Eric  Fisk.  Images  are  composited  from  Wikipedia  -­‐  By  Eprazil  (Own  work)  [CC  BY-­‐SA  3.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by-­‐sa/3.0)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons    

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The  Re

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nalysis  Society  

Intelligence  et  al.  

NaEonal  Intelligence  EsEmate  &    

Assessment  (US)  

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Dr  Helen

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The  Re

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nalysis  Society  

Intelligence  et  al.  

An0cipatory  Intelligence  

Strategic  Futures  (US)    

Strategic  Warning    

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nalysis  Society  

Strategic  Foresight  and  Warning  

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The  Re

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nalysis  Society  

Risk  Management  

Cover  Page  of  Topics  Magazine  By  Munich  Re  

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The  Re

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nalysis  Society  

SF&W  versus  Risk  Management?  Managing  Risk  

 Avoiding  surprise  

16  

Risk  =  The  effect  of  uncertainty  on  objecEves  -­‐ISO  Guide  73:2009,  definiEon  1.1  

Now  both  are  rather  similar  YET  Time  component  missing  in  risk  management  

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Horizon  Scanning  

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d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Future  studies  (Futurism,  Futurology)  

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nalysis  Society  

Prospec3ve  (French)  

French  Ministry  of  Defense  

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nalysis  Society  

Scenario-­‐building  

•  Rand  and  Herman  Kahn  •  Shell  Scenarios  

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nalysis  Society  

ForecasEng  

h\ps://dar\hrowingchimp.wordpress.com/  h\p://fsi.fundforpeace.org/  

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nalysis  Society  

Foresight  

h\p://www.foresight-­‐platorm.eu/  

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nalysis  Society  

Strategic  Analysis  

Screenshot  of  Strategic  Analysis  at  the  Henry  Jackson  Society    h\p://www.strategic-­‐analysis.org/  

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HOW  DO  WE  ANTICIPATE?  PRACTICE  

1-­‐  The  SF&W  Officer’s  Crucial  Challenges  

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The  SF&W  Officer’s  Crucial  Challenges  Being  a  Bridge  

25  

"Kapellbruecke”in  Luzern  by  Simon  Koopmann  -­‐  CC  BY-­‐SA  2.5  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

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nalysis  Society  

The  SF&W  Officer’s  Crucial  Challenges:  Tension  with  policy-­‐making  

The policy-making cycle SF&W  Process  

26  

policy initiation or

agenda setting

problem identification,

and evaluation: understanding,

impact, likelihood, timeline

policy alternatives

identification and

evaluations decision:

selection of the most

satisfactory alternative

selected alternative

operationalised (particular policy or set of policies)

policy implementation

starting with strategy and

strategic planning

policy and outcomes evaluation

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The  SF&W  Officer’s  Crucial  Challenges:  Facing  Biases  

27  

•  Meta-­‐cogniEon  deficits  •  Heuer  idenEfies  as  biases  are  (Psychology  of  

Intelligence  Analysis,  Chapter  9):  –  CogniEve  (“mental  errors  caused  by  our  

simplified  informaEon  processing  strategies”);    

–  Cultural/normaEve/belief-­‐based  at  country,  group,  individual  and  insEtuEonal  level;    

–  OrganizaEonal;    –  ResulEng  from  one's  own  self-­‐interest  

and  personal  history.    •  EmoEons-­‐induced  biases  at  individual  and  

group  level.  

Image  analysis  of  Mona  Lisa  by  the  human  Visual  System,  up  to  simple  cells  in  visual  cortex.  Simplified.  By  Clock,  CC-­‐BY-­‐SA-­‐3.0,  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

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e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

The  SF&W  Officer’s  Crucial  Challenges  Timeliness  and  Time  

•  Timeliness  –  Delivery  to  clients  

•  Lead  Eme  for  response  •  A\enEon  span  

–  When  to  start  analysis  of  specific  issue    

•  Depend  on  analysis  –  A  proper  core  model  –  Onset  of  event  (when)  

•  Timeline  indicators,  if  proper  core  model  but  enough?  

–  DuraEon  (how  long)  •  Way  forward  

–  Dynamic  Bayesian  Network  –  Dynamic  social  network  analysis  

and  visualisaEon  –  Temporal  Observatory  (The  Red  

(Team)  Analysis  Society  -­‐  forthcoming  

Light  Cone  By  MissMJ  (Own  work)  [CC  BY-­‐SA  3.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by-­‐sa/3.0)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

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HOW  DO  WE  ANTICIPATE?  PRACTICE  

2-­‐  Methodology  and  tools  

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The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

Defining  quesEons  and  scope  •  Step  1:  Exploratory  stage  =  Horizon/environmental  scanning  (or  

reconnaissance)    –  State  of  the  art  or  literature  review  (SCIENCE  );    

–  ObservaEon  and  gathering  of  facts;    

–  No  facts  from  the  future  thus    

•  understanding  at  best  underlying  processes  to  idenEfy  

•  emerging  (weak)  signals  

–  PrioriEzaEon  of  issues  (according  to  quesEon)  

•  Step  2:  Create  the  model  and  scenarios  –  IdenEfy  then  link  the  variables  and  their  interacEons  (again  SCIENCE)    

–  For  each  variable  idenEfy  possible  outcomes/values  with  probabiliEes  and  Emeline  (ideally)  

–  Synthesize  variables,  their  outcomes  and  related  probabiliEes  and  Emelines,  

–  Most  ogen  creaEon  of  narraEves  (scenarios)  ,  one  day  simulaEon?  

–  (opEonal)  Policy  and  strategy  opEons  and  alternaEves  

–  Delivery  of  foresight  product/tool  

•  Step  3:  Warning  –  CreaEon  of  indicators  for  warning  

–  Monitoring  and  verificaEon  of  scenarios  and  models  

–  Delivery  of  warning  

How  to  do  it?  Valid  for  ALL  ISSUES  from  earthquakes  to  terrorist  a\acks  to  financial  crises    

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Step  2:  Build  the  model  Most  Futures/foresight  methodologies  are  actually  graphs  or  grounded  in  graphs  

•  Structural  analysis  (Forrester  1961,  Godet  and  Duperrin    1974)  

•  Eidos  Parmenides  

•  Futures  Wheel  (Glenn,  1971)  

•  Futures  Polygon  (Pacinelli  2006):  Futures  wheel  +  probability  of  occurring  within  the  Emeframe  of  reference.  

•  Relevance-­‐Tree  analysis  (Zwicky,  also  ‘father’  of  Morphological  Analysis)  

•  Somehow  too  GBN  (Global  Business  Network)  scenarios  (or  most  scenarios  methods)  

•  But  also  staEsEcal  forecasEng,  indexes  and  lists…  and  thought  processes?  

31  

Trend or Event

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Step  2-­‐1:  Build  the  model    Making  our  inner  cogniEve  model  explicit  

•  The  core  of  most  foresight  and  futures  methodologies    

–  IdenEfy  variables  (drivers/factors)    –  IdenEfy  linkages  (influence)  among  

variables  (not  all  methodologies)    

–  A\ribute  values  and  characterisEcs  to  variables  (and  linkages)  

•  Result  =  a  map  (concept  map  or  system  map  =  a  graph).  

•  CRUCIAL:  Must  Understand  phenomena  and  their  dynamics  

32  

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Step  2-­‐1:  Build  the  model  

33  

•  Allows  for  Emeliness  in  analyEcal  effort  •  Allows  for  integraEng  Eme  (Emeline  indicators  &  more)  and  likelihood  

•  Allows  for  cooperaEon  •  Allows  for  innovaEon  •  Allows  for  other  tools  

Government  Press  Office  (GPO)  -­‐  Chess  at  Camp  David  By  h\p://www.flickr.com/people/69061470@N05  [CC  BY-­‐SA  3.0  (h\p://creaEvecommons.org/licenses/by-­‐sa/3.0)],  via  Wikimedia  Commons  

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•  A  scenario  is  a  ficEonalized  narraEve  or  outline  of  how  the  world  will  be  at  a  (relaEvely)  specific  Eme  in  the  future.  

•  Scenarios  must  be  mutually  exclusive  (and  ideally  on  the  same  “Eme  plane”  except  if  specified  for  sub-­‐scenarios)  

•  Aim  =  outline  the  cone  of  plausibility  

Step  2-­‐2-­‐  Build  Scenarios  

(Rutz,  McEldowney  and  Taylor,  Taylor,  1993:  chapter  1  &  fn  7)    

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Step  2-­‐2:  Build  Scenarios  Classical  approach  

•  Reduce  the  number  of  variables  with  influence  analysis  or  ranking  (if  no  links  -­‐  likelihood  and  impact,  or  impact  and  uncertainty)  

•  If  Morphological  Analysis,  combine  most  important  variables,  if  GBN  combine  2  variables  

•  Then  develop  scenarios  (how  exactly  is  not  explained)  

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Step  2-­‐2:  Build  Scenarios  Best  Prac0ce  (a  proper  map)  

•  Revisited  influence  analysis  to  select  variables  •  Use  of  ego  networks  to  develop  the  narraEve  

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Step  2-­‐2:  Build  Set  of  Scenarios  Classical  approach  

•  3  scenarios  -­‐  Herman  Kahn  (RAND)    

•  4  scenarios  excluding  a  business-­‐as-­‐usual  (fear  to  see  people  doing  nothing)    

•  Usually  between  3/4  and  8/12  (MA)  

Best  Prac0ce  

•  As  many  as  needed  (balance  according  to  resources,  need)  

•  At  criEcal  juncture  points  (ogen  decisions),  then  the  need  for  sub-­‐scenarios  will  appear.    

•  A  set  of  scenarios,  with  likelihood,  indicators…  and  0meline?  

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Step  2-­‐2:  Build  Set  of  Scenarios  Example  Syria  (2013)  

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Step  3  –  Warn  and  Revise  

Monitor  your  indicators  

Use  indicaEons  (reality)  

To  Warn  (use  your  scenarios)

   

To  Revise  (your  set  of  scenarios)  

The  longer  your  set  of  scenario  and  indicators  are  useful,  the  more  profitable  your  investment  

(and  the  easier  to  convince  management/clients)  

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"Want  of  foresight,  unwillingness  to  act  when  acEon  would  be  simple  and  effecEve,  lack  of  clear  thinking,  confusion  of  counsel  unEl  the  emergency  comes,  unEl  self-­‐preservaEon  strikes  its  jarring  gong—these  are  the  features  which  consEtute  the  endless  repeEEon  of  history. Winston  Churchill,  Air  Parity  Lost    House  of  Commons,  May  2,  1935  

Winston  Churchill  with  American  generals  on  a  balcony  watching  Allied  vehicles  crossing  the  Rhine.  -­‐  25  March  1945  This  is  photograph  BU  2246  from  the  collecEons  of  the  Imperial  War  Museums  (collecEon  no.  4700-­‐30)  

Page 41: 4th Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management, Keynote Presentation, From weak signals to crisis scenarios

Dr  Helen

e  Lavoix  

The  Re

d  (Team)  A

nalysis  Society  

https://www.redanalysis.org!