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Biological Monitoring of Industrial Cleaners following a Large Scale Chemical Incident- a Complex (Mixture) Case Study 9th International Symposium on Biological Monitoring 9 - 11 September 2013, Manchester Henri Heussen, PhD [email protected] www.ects.nl

13.1 Heussen

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Biological Monitoring of Industrial Cleaners following a Large Scale Chemical Incident-

a Complex (Mixture) Case Study

9th International Symposium on Biological Monitoring

9 - 11 September 2013, Manchester

Henri Heussen, PhD

[email protected]

www.ects.nl

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5 January 2011

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Response by:

• Police & fire brigade• Co-ordination centre for emergency

services. • Community Health Services• National Institute for Public Health &

the Environment

Authorities:immediate

• Special team: occupational physicians& hygienists, toxicologists

• 5 communication sessions for mostlypolicemen & firebrigade

• On site occupational health clinic• 100 consults with occupational

physician > follow up• Advice on biological monitoring

OccupationalHealth Service (OHS): upon

request - onlyafter 3 days!!

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In the meantime……..conclusions afterwards by Labour inspection:

Hardly awareness among police, fire brigade, first aid etc. about risks of exposureUnnecessary exposure:

eating in the outdoor (sometimes down wind) in the first hours no adequate procedures fordecontamination of equipment & clothingfire brigade working with contaminated fire water had noadequate gloves

At least 160 of these employees had acute complaints withinthe first hours after the explosion9 employees 3 months later still complaints

irritation of eyes, mucous membranes & airwaysnauseadry lips and throat

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Our observations:

More groups with exposure and complaints, ao.: journalists, delivery services, pregnant employees, employees of surrounding plants, cleaners

During the fire: unnecessary exposure

After the fire: the same

In general: no adequate monitoring of employees

Coordination between public and occupational health care is difficult

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Biological monitoring:

• Not done• Half life? • Follow up by health

surveillance

Policemen & firebrigade

• Several companies• Cleaning started day after

explosion• Only one (?) consulted OHS

to monitor and controlexposure

Industrial cleaning

companies

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On the internet: 52 page list of stored chemicals

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Measurements by National Institute for Public Health & the Environment (RIVM):

Relevant for workers exposure :

Air measurements: 2-3 days later at plantVOCs (mostly aromatic, no benzene, rather low concentrations)

2-3 days later contaminated fire waterVOCs (mostly aromatic, no benzene)Higher concentrations (especially directly above ditches)But still < Limit Values

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Measurements by National Institute for Public Health & the Environment, ao.:

Plume dispersionAir measurements:

- during fire- dowwind, max. 10 km- VOCs, aldehydes & ketons, PAHS, dioxins, heavy metals

Deposition (ao. grassland): -PAHS, dioxins, heavy metals

Results:- No elevated VOCs, aldehydes & ketones- Dioxins: slightly elevated air, no elevated deposition- PAHS: not clear / limited effect- Heavy metals deposition elevated

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Complex mixture- What to do?

Advice OHS on lead biomarkers- 1- Hydroxypyrene- Methylhippuric & Hippuric acid- S-Phenylmercapturic acid

Internal company protocol: - taking samples itself

Contextual information provided by HSE manager

Site visit by Occupational Hygienist of OHS

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Main exposure: clean-up of contaminated fire water out of ditches using vacuum trucks.

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First 2 days: not all workers using PPE; later RPE, gloves and coveralls

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Results

Companies sampling protocol not correct

- Not taking into account half live

- Sampling (far) too late

- Sampling at 14, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27th Jan

- Of 39 samples only 8 could be related to cleaning

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Results: biomarker levels

- 14th Jan: 3 out of 8 workers action level 1OHP exceeded, related to cleaning Moerdijk

- 20th Jan: 3 out of 8 workers 1OHP exceeded, NOT relatedto cleaning Moerdijk

- 21th Jan: 1 out of 4 workers 1OHP & 2 out of 4 HA Limit Value exceeded, NOT related to cleaning Moerdijk

- 25th & 26th Jan: 2 out of 7 workers 1OHP exceeded, NOT related to cleaning Moerdijk

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Conclusions

CompanyAdditional control measures necessary: especially regardingskin exposure!For cleaning activities related to Moerdijk & other cleaningactivities

PolicyReport RIVM: Environmental health guideline for Municipal Health Services, “Biomonitoring for small scale chemical incidents”Extend to occupational healthBetter coordination public & occupational health care is necessary: public vs. private fundingIt can happen again…………

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Thank you!