28ru INTTnNATIoNAL CnuRcntr-r- CoNprReNcr, LoNooN, ENGLaNo, Ocronrn 2011

Thr " Sp ecial Relationship" t

hdry andhmorrow

SIR DAVID MANNING

should like to begin by thanking RandolphChurchill for his generous introduction. Itwas my good fortune during my time in\flashington to get to know several very dis-

tingr-rished members of the Churchill family. It isa great pleasure to see some of them here today,

and to take part in this conference that celebrates

Sir \íinston Churchill's remarkable transatlanticvision. My only regret is that I have not been

able to attend the whole event.

My thanks, too, to Allen Packrvood andPhil Reed for their help and support in preparingfor the Conference. Again, I know them bothfrom my previous incarnation and I am thereforein no doubt as to how fortunate we are to have

them in their current roles. And I cannot resist

adding that my wife and I were lucky enough tobe in \Tashington in2004 for the exhibition"Churchill and the Great Republic," curated byAllen. It was opened by Lady Soames and thePresident of the United States, and was a memo-rable celebration of the extraordinary Anglo-American relationship that was forged byChurchill against the odds, and of which he was,

of course, the incarnation.

Sir David Geoffrey Manning GCMG CVO was British Ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2007 . He drafted the famous "Manning Memo"

summarizing the substance of a January 2003 meeting between President George'ïí. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair during the prelude to the invasion

of lraq. He has since been appointed to the Household of HRH The Duke of Cambridge and Prince Harry of Wales. Sí'e hasten to explain (Churchill might

say "for the benefit ofany old Etonians present") that in the first two paragraphs opposite, Nell Gwynne (1650-1687) was the mistress ofKing Charles ÌI.

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hurchill's Special Relationship has

been anallzed and discussed by thebest in the business in the pasttwenty-four hours, so I have m?ny

hard acts to follow I am conscious, too, that adegree of caution and humility is very -ulh inorder: I left \X/ashington and the DiplomaticService some four years ago and no longer dealwith the U.S. relationship up close and personal.And I was reminded just how easy it is to ger rheperspective wrong when I was walking past NellGwynne House in Chelsea recently. Standing infront of it were r\Mo middle-aged Americanladies. I heard one challenge the other:

have enjoyed over thepast sixry years-with

"There is a corrosive crisis of confidence. consequences nor just

These are very rou7h times...but white the flïJïï:ï:'i.Y:::"United States, Great Britain and our transatlantic relation-

European poltners are all in the same deep ship too. Let me listr some of the factors thathole, there has been little a7reement on worry me.

what to do about it.There has been little First, there is a

confidence among Americans that Europeans ;:ïilï:;',:*i:ït(whether in the Euro Zone or not) have the tough,r;mes. -we

are liv-political will to dig their way out; and little ing throúgh the worst

confid,ence ctmong Europeo.ns that the recession since theGreat Depression of the

United States is up to the job eitherl' 1930s. Butwhile theU.S., Great Britain andour European partners

"Nell Gwynnç-d'ysu know who she was?" "oh hole, there has been ,rr,r.Xo3lnlï;iïi#:ïsure," the other replied confidently, "She was a do about it. There has also been little confidencegood-works sort of person." \(/ell perhaps, in a among Americans that Europeans (whether inway, she was. the Euro Zone or not) have the political will to

So, with those important caveats, where dig their way our; and little .orrfid.n.. amongdo I think the Special Relationship is today and Europeans that the U.S. is up to the challenge ei-where might it be goingì ther. Americans look with dismay

"t th. prol

On the face of it, the relationship seems tracted problems of the Euro Zone,whiÀ theyto be in good shape. President Obama's State fear threaten the prospects for global e.orromi.Visit to the UK in May was a reaffirmation of recovery; and also with polite, Lut I suspect deep-des at the pinnacle of government; militarily ening, skepticism

"t th. UK', approaclrwhich

^

Britain and the United States worked hand in they worry is all retrenchment ""a "o

growth.glove in the successful Libya campaign. A-long For their part, the Europeans including manyrvith France, they can take much of the credit for Brirons, look at th. rt"t. of the U.S. economr,, tt

the overthrow of an egregiously vicious dictator.Bilateral intelligence ries are apparently âs srrong

. as ever; trade and investment remain at the coreof the relationship; and so do contacrs berweenBritons and Americans at all levels and in allwalks of life. But despite these apparently en-couraging appearances, I worry that recent, highlevel political exchanges and military successes

may mask a more troubling underlying trend.For reasons I shall discuss, I think we risk a

process of secular decline in the strength of thebilateral relationship in which, partly by designand partly by accident, rhere is a weakening ofthe intimacy and reflex of cooperation tharwe

&'

FÌNEST HOUR 154 / 53

The "Speciol Relotionsh iP":Todoy and Tomorrow...

and wonder whether the world's great engine ofpostwar growth can any longer power national,let alone international, recovery. \Vhat are we tomake of a U.S. that r,mr $ massive debts, flirtsdangerously with default, and whose.political sys-

tem now seems to many outsiders so polarizedthat effective government is parallzed? Tim Gei-thner shakes his head over the Euro Zone; we

shake our heads about a U.S. Congress thatseems to confuse separation of powers with thepromotion of impotency, if not bankruptcy. Bothsides deplore the other's apparent penchant fornear-death financial experiences.

This mutual crisis of confidence across

the Atlantic is exacerbated by an accompanyingintroversion. Not surprisingly we are preoccupiedwith the scope and scale of our own immediatedomestic problems: how to find some sort of po-litically acceptable solution to the debt anddeficit conundrum in the U.S.; how to save theEuro and perhaps the EU itself. Added to ourdistraction is the political timetable. In the U.S.,the Presidential election is a year away; in France,

only six months away. And Chancellor Merkel'sre-election timetable also has an important bear-

ing on the handling of the Euro Zone crisis.

The coincidence of struggling economies

on both sides of the Atlantic, and fraught domes-

tic politics, consumes much of the oxygen, and, Isuspect, leaves rather little time or energy for thebroader úansadantic relationship and, within it,the relationship between the United Kingdomand the United States.

t is to the Anglo-American relationshipspecifically that I want now to turn. Thepresent British government made.muchwhen it came into offìce of its desire to put

more distance between London and \Tashington,and to cool the rhetoric of the Blair/Clinton,Blair/Bush, Brown/Bush years. At the same time,the Conservative Party element of the new coali-tion government câme to power skeptical aboutthe European Union and Britain's role within it.For the first time that I, anyway, can recall, we

had a British government thar paraded its reluc-tance to be closely identified with either the

United States ar Europe, the twin pillars ofBritish foreign policy for more than fifty years.

There were various reasons for thisstance: in particular, the incoming governmentbelieved that the UK had become over-identifiedwith American policies. Personally, I believe theirconcerns about "poodleism" were exaggerated

but-also personally-I have no objection to theproposition that less should be said publiclyabout the Special Relationship. In my experience,

official \Tashington can become tired and per-plexed at constânt British references to it, andconstant demands for reassurance about it. Con-tent, not labelling, is what marters to AmericanAdministrations: a "let's just do it" attitude. Andas far as the IJK is concerned, there can be toomuch analysis of, and agonizing abour, the Spe-

cial Relationship, at the expense of thinkingabout foreign policy more broadly. It is no badthing, therefore, to get on with it, without con-standy rehearsing its history and significance.

But this was not quite the set ofargu-ments that the new British government ad-vanced. Instead, we were told-or anyway leftwith the süong impression-that the UK was

consciously shifting its focus and priorities to oldCommonwealth friends and new regional pow-ers. In my view, this sent a confused message

about where the UK's key interests really lie. OldCommonwealth friendships should indeed be

carefully fostered-in the past the UK has oftenbeen careless in this regard-but Australia,Canada and New Zealand are a long way away

and through no fault of their own are no substi-tute for the relationship with the United States.

Developing good relations with the so-

called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) andother emerging powers is an entirely sensible-though in truth hardly novel-strategy in aworld of shifting political and economic realities.

But this is essentially a commercial as much as a

foreign policy calculation : we only have to lookat how those two prominent BRICs, Russia andChina, vote at the UN on Syria, or the approachof Brazil and Tirrkey to lran, to see the limita-tions of this prescription.

-L,INEST IIOUR 151 / 54

The new British government's decision neither was-nor is-a viable proposition with-to insist on greater distance from \Washington out the United States. Apart from France, there isprobably troubled the incumbent U.S. President , little appetire in Europe for an interventionistless than it would have done his recent predeces- foreign policy or an expeditionary defence capa-sors. President Obama is not just a post-\íorld biliry; and very little piospect of finding.rpúl.\War II president, he is a post-Cold \War plesi- paruners elsewhere.

dent. The military alliance that bound Britain If Libya has reminded us how critical thereÌationship with \lash-ington is in pursuit ofour foreign and securitypolicy goals, it shouldalso have reminded us

of another importanrtruth at the heart of theSpecial Relationship:our willingness and ca-

paciqy to contribute real

capability to militaryoperations. The UK has

consistently spent morethan 2o/o of GDP ondefence; and has consis-

tently sustained land,sea and air forces ofhigh-qualiry expedi-

and America together during the Second \X/orld tionary capabiliry. This has made us valued part-\lar, the Korean \Var, the Cold \íar and the Gulf ners of the United States across the defence and\7ars, is not central either to his experience or to security specrrum. Our contribution has beenhis view of foreign and securiry policy. Nor do relatively small alongside that of the Unitedhis background and upbringing make it likely States which, it may be worth reminding our-that his natural focus is the UK or Europe. \íith selves, still spends seven hundred billion dollars aa Kenyan father and an upbringing spent pardy year on defence-more than the next fourteenin Hawaii and partly in Indonesia, he is not the countries combined. But, relatively small or nor,child of containment and the Atlantic Alliance . It the UK contribution has been valued by succes-is not surprising if his personal focus is Asia sive American administrarions as real, not token.which, with the rise and challenge of China, is The UK has had a voice in the debate because wealso where United States interests are now pre- have been willing to have a dog in the fight.dominantly engaged. \flill this be true in the future?

Ayear and a half on, mI impression is The present British goyernment inheritedthat the British government has found that stud- a severe budgetary crisis at the Ministry of De-ied coolness about Anglo-American relations car- fence. Action was urgenr. But the scale of theries as many risks as over-hyped enthusiasm. The cuts that have been imposed on rhe armed forcesUK took the lead on Libya in close partnership raises questions about whether-despite the offì-with France; and the Prime Minister recendy re- cial assurances-we will really retain a full-spec-vived the doctrine of liberal interventionism trum capabiliry and an effective expeditionarywhen addressing the United Nations General As- force, at the end of the rerrenchmerrt p.o..rr.'\f.sembly. You may or may not support those policy have chosen to cut defence ro the point where wechoices, but the point for our discussion is that may find it hard to demonstrare thar our >>

"What o.re we to make oJ a United Statesthat runs up mcrssive debtsrfl.irts Benerouslywith default, and whose political syslgm nowseems to many outsiders so polarized thateffictive Bovernment is paralyzed? TimGeithner shakes his head over the EuroZone; we shake our heads about a U.S.Congress that seems to confuse separation ofpowers with the promotion of impotency, iJnot bankruptcy!'

I-.INEST HOUR 154 / 55

T h e "Speci ol Relqtionsh ip" :To doy o n d Tom o rrow...

spending remains at 2o/o or more of GDB thetarget that we urge our NÃTO partners to set

themselves. Cutting defence drastically is ofcourse an absolutely legitilnate political choice.

But we should be conscious that wehave deliber-ately made that choice-after all, the governmenthas chosen to ring-fenceother departmentalbudgets-and we

should be conscious,

too, that there are con-sequences for us as far as

relations with theUnited States and ourother allies are con-cerned. Security is, andhas been, at the heart ofthe SpeciaÌ Relationship.If the UK can no longerplay, or does not wantto play, more than a

minor or token militaryrole, we should not be

surprised if\Tashington views our importance inthe scheme of things accordingly.

And already, I suspect, we have to workharder than used to be the case to make our voice

heard in the \X4rite House, and to persuade Con-gress ofour relevance. I recently asked an oldfriend who is a former, very senior, U.S. diplo-mat what he thought the foreign policy issues

were on President Obama's radar screen, whenthe latter had time to tear himself away from do-mestic problems and his own re-election battles.

He listed the global economic crisis; two and a

half wars (namelyAfghanistan, and the aftermathof Iraq and Libya); China; the Middle East andIran; the Arab awakening; and the difficulty ofmodernizing international institutions and mak-

ing them fit for purpose.

You may or not may agree with this list,

or the priority he gave the different issues. \7hatseems significant to me is that neither the UKnor Europe figure-unless smuggled in underthe global economic rubric. \When I pointed this

out, my friend countered that the list was one of

problems, and Europe was not a problem. But he

acknowledged that a Europe crowded out of theagenda might easily presage declining U.S. en-

gagement and investment in the special andtransatlantic relationships. He also warned that,among a minoriry

^nyway, there was weariness in

the U.S. with seemingly intractable foreign pol-icy entanglements-a romantic longing for an

"The Special Relationship is not God-given.We need to value it, work at it,find timeforit,find new wa)ls of developing it; andBritons need to work harder at this thanAmericans because the truth is that itmo.tters more to us than to them....If the UKdoes not remain a capable security partne4we risk irrelevance....The Special Relation-ship cannot live by sentiment alonel'

isolationist approach, however unrealistic thismay be in a globalised world. He also said thatthere was a growing fatigue with the idea that thehard-pressed American tâxpâyer should continueto underwrite European security when Europeangovernments and taxpayers were unwilling tofund serious defence budgets themselves. Untilrecently, this is not a charge I would have ex-

pected Americans to have laid against the UK. As

to the future, I am not so sure.

The economic crisis; political preoccupa-

tions; the shifting American and indeed European

focus of attention to Asia; American weariness

with subsidizinga Europe unwilling to pay thegoing rate for defence; and UK and wider Euro-pean doubts about American capability to tran-scend divisive domestic politics and put the

American economy and body politic on an even

keel-these are all issues that are in my opinionhaving an attritional efFect on the Special Rela-

tionship and the broader transatlantic relationship,the halÊhidden reality below the surface of State

Visits and Qaddafi's overthrow. I do not wânt to

L,ÌNEST HouR 1s4 / 5ó

exaggerate the extent or speed ofthe process. Butneither do I think that we should ignore what ishappening and the attendant ristr<s to a partnershipthat has serued us so well for so long.

o what should we do? The first tÈng,perhaps rather the Churchillian thing, is '.

keep our nerve. In my view, prophecies

about the inevitable decline of the \West

Y/ar. Against the backdrop of a rapidly changinggeopolitical landscape, we should susrain ourtried and trusted alliances and friendships. If rhe

United Kingdom does not remain a capable secu-

riry partner, we risk irrelevance . I do not mean bythis that the United States will ignore us or be-

come indifferenr to us. But American Adminis-trations are going to spend their time talking tothose who have the ability to contribute andmake a difference to the agenda that matters in\üTashington. The Special Relationship cannotlive by sentiment alone.

I believe, incidentally, though it is not avi,eú'thar úilÌ find favour with all in this audi-

'iènce, that the same argument applies to sustain-

ing Brìtain's rôle in Europe. And let me add inthis conrext that, in my experience, Americans

i *"ni'ih. EU to bè a strong and effective parrnerin a àulti=pàlài world,

"nã believe this is much

more.'.iikely if thè UK is an energetic player inEurope. They do nor see the Special Relationshipas an alternative for the UK; and nor I believeshouid we . The more relevanr we are in Europe,

,'thè,,,'rrr.gié relevanr we are to the United Srares,

"âá'üiÁtrr.r'"., l.,;l.'.'.Let me end with a specific proposal that I:havaìáiiéd elsewhere and that I believe would'strên$ihèn,lthe Special Relationship both symbol-

"',",,iç4lly,xnd,,,p,iâctically and give it new focus: an

idèa for,'a,tiiik of straitened circumsrances. In lastyear's UK StÌàtegic Defence and Security Review,the goVernment wondered aloud what it mightdo with the'riêcond of the rwo aircraft carriers

:, that we ãid,,'nãw building, and which we mây not

,!ç,.ab,lè',,iã..,,âffird to bring into service. One possi-

:.,.,briliç';r,.16"1ât úp the carrier as soon as it is built;:'r,",âíother is to sellìit- I suggest that we should in-

stead look'.,ar. íg it a joint Anglo-Americanai-r,crâ&.:,,êâiriei',tô,,,bie deployed i n b o th b ilateraland NAIO roles whether in the Atlantic, theGul[, the Indian Ocean or in the Pacific,

Here is something that would reafÊrmour security links. Here is something that wouldvery visibly reassert the potency of what has

been, and will I hope remain, a special relation-ship of real benefit to Great Britain, to theUnited States, and to the whole transatlantic

communiry. S

are overdone. Our political and economic systemhas brought us unparalleled peace and prosperiry.tWe may now be \Mrestling with enormous prob-lems but we should not conclude that our systemand values have somehow been wrong all alongor that they have outlived their,püipose and been

overtaken by history. As Sir Max Ha*ings said ,.

yesterday, the individual counts; leadershipcountsl human destiny is the result of humanagency, nol iusr ill-defined currenrs oFhistory.

Of course we musr accepr a world inwhich China is a great power and *qúiring a

new weighr in the inrernarional sysrem: of coursewe must accepr rhar we are wirnessing rhe emer-

gence of a new multi-polar global system. The ' t'.,,.

U.S. must-we all must-accomúodàqé.this',r'''new realiry. But that is not the : ê',.,thini! as ac-

cepring the argument rhar wqì:,âie ãéi!ãnêd to de- .

cline, more or less gracefully,:p_laliàg sèôôrc.11:l1l;;1l1...l1::.:rir',l,,.

fi ddle in an Asian cenrury. t ak''.I!è.,op.ti!I}t.st!Ç.',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

perhaps minoriry view that the U.S. may recover

more strongly and more quicklÍ'thân,,,,ihè pes_

simists predicr. The power of America to reinvenrirself should not be underestimared-and it ofrenis in Europe. Ler's not talk ourselvês intó,.€.x4g;

,

gerating our problems. great rhough they are" orexaggerating the strengths of China and úé1,,:b.ihét,ìì':,,,' ,l,'..:',

emerging powers, great though they are . Let's {e:. .

sist the idea of inevitable decline; let's keep faiúwith ourselves, our system and our values.

But at the same time, let's recognize thatthe exceptional quality of the Special Relation-ship is not God-given. \fle need ro value it, workat it, find time for it, find new ways of develop-ing it; and Britons need to work harder at thisthan Americans because the truth is that it mat-ters mote to us than to thern. tWe live in a worldthat is arguably more complex and more uncer-tain than at any time since the end of the Cold

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