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Department of British Studies Faculty of World Studies University of Tehran Course: International Relations Dr. Vaez-zadeh By: Maryam Shariat

Security Dilemma

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Page 1: Security Dilemma

Department of British StudiesFaculty of World Studies

University of Tehran 

Course:International Relations

Dr. Vaez-zadehBy: Maryam Shariat

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Security Dilemma

The security dilemma exists when "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.“Magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables: 1. Offense-defense balance 2. Offense-defense differentiation

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How Does the Security Dilemma Lead to Undesirable Outcomes?

1. By setting in motion a process that reduces the state's own military capability.

2. By increasing the value the adversary places on expansion, which makes it harder to deter.

3. By simply wasting money.

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Reducing the State's Military Capability

If the state deploys a new weapons system that favors offensive missions and if its adversary responds by deploying this system, the country's ability to defend itself will be reduced, leaving it less secure than before this round of arming. The ability to perform offensive and defensive missions can also vary with force size. Thus, action-reaction processes that result in larger forces can increase or decrease the state's military capability for defense.

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Making Adversary Less Secure Increases the Value It Places on Expansion

Reducing an adversary's security can reduce the state's own security by increasing the value the adversary places on expansion, thereby making it harder to deter.

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ACTIONS THAT REDUCE AN ADVERSARY'S SECURITY: SIGNALING

OF MOTIVES A state's military buildup can change the adversary's beliefs about the state's motives, convincing the adversary that the state is more dangerous than it had previously believed.

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Wasting Money

The security dilemma results in self-defeating efforts that leave the state less prosperous, yet no more secure.

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Why Can't States Cooperate to Avoid Less Desirable

Outcomes?

The core of the answer lies in appreciating that states are uncertain about their adversaries' motives, lacking confidence that others are pure security seekers.

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Offense-Defense Variables:Offense-Defense Balance

The severity of the security dilemma decreases as the offense-defense balance shifts toward greater defense advantage. When defense has the advantage, the forces deployed by a status quo power will increase its security more than they decrease the adversary's security. Both states will achieve reasonable levels of security from action and reaction cycles, and arms races will diminish.

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Offense-Defense Balance

When offense has the advantage, it is impossible for states of equal size to enjoy high levels of security simultaneously.Arms races will be intense because when one country adds forces, its adversary will have to make a larger addition to restore its ability to defend.

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Offense-defense Differentiation

Whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack.Offense-defense differentiation has the potential to eliminate the security dilemma.

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Two Additional Variables: 1.Greed

When a state knows that its adversary is greedy, maintaining adequate military capabilities becomes more important and being sensitive to the adversary's insecurity becomes less important.

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2. Unit-Level Knowledge of the State's Motives

States interpret their adversaries' actions to infer their motives. A state remains uncertain of an adversary's motives but believes unit-level information enables its adversary to appreciate that it is a pure security seeker. Competitive policies now become more desirable, since they do not signal malign motives.

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Critique 1: Greedy States, Not the Security Dilemma, Are the Problem

For example, the First World War, the cold war, and much alliance behavior is better explained by focusing on states' greed than on their insecurity.

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Critique 2: The Security Dilemma Does Not Exist; it is Logically Flawed

The security dilemma is constructed( or not) by states.security dilemma is a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others' intentions.

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Critique 3: Offense-Defense Theory Is Flawed

Indistinguishability of offensive and defensive weapons undermines the theory.Perceptions of the balance, not the balance, are key.

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The Requirements of Analytical Model

1. Offering highly accurate description2. Having capacity to explain relationships among phenomena under investigation3. Offering reliable prediction

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Levels of Analysis

1. National state (sub-systemic)2. International system (systemic)

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Comparison of Systemic & sub-systemic levels

1. In terms of description, systemic level produces more comprehensive picture of intl. relations than natl. or sub-systemic level.

2. In terms of explanation, sub-systemic is more fruitful, permitting more thorough probe of process by which foreign policies are made.

3. In terms of prediction, both orientations offer similar degree of promise.

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Reductionist TheoryA reductionist theory is a theory about the behavior of parts. For example, international outcomes are simply the sum of the results produced by the separate states, and the behavior of each of them is explained through its internal characteristics.

From a knowledge of how capitalist economies work, Hobson believed he could infer the external behavior of capitalist states.

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Traditionalists vs. Modernists on Intl. & Natl. Politics

Traditionalists focus on anarchic character of International politics as marking distinction between internal and external realms but modernists not.Both traditionalists and modernists focus on ‘subsystem dominant people‘. They concentrate on who is doing what to produce outcomes.

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Legitimate Intl. Order vs. Revolutionary Intl. Order

According to Kissinger, intl. order is legitimate if it is accepted by all major powers.While, revolutionary order occurs when some major states refuse to deal with other states according to conventional rules. Legitimate intl. order tends toward stability and peace.While, Revolutionary intl. order tends towards instability and war.Kissinger says Revolutionary states may tend toward peaceful coexistence and at times peaceful, stable coexistence .Legitimate states may be unstable, and war prone. It is not possible to predict intl. outcomes from natl. Characteristics.

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Theory of International Politics

A theory of intl. politics can tell us:1. Some things about expected intl.-political

outcomes 2. About the resistance of the systems in response

to unpredictable acts of varied set of states3. About expected effects of systems on states.A theory has explanatory and predictive power as well as elegance. A theory explains continuity.A theory in intl. politics explain why, for example, war recurs. It will indicate some of the conditions that make war likely. But it does not predict the outbreak of special war.

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Structural Concepts

Structural concepts lack details but can help to explain big, important, and lasting patterns.Structures may change.

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Systems Theory

A systems theory explains changes across systems, not within them.A systems theory of intl. politics deals with forces that are in play at international and not at natl. level. Politics among European states became different in quality after WWII because intl. system became bipolar from multipolar.

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Meanings of SystemA system is composed of a structure and of interacting

units.System has two meanings:1. It may designate a compensating device that works to produce a uniformity of outcomes despite variety of inputs.Body’s liver keeps blood’s sugar within certain level despite variety of food ingested.2. Structure in second sense designates a set of constraining conditions. Such a structure acts as a selector. Structures select by rewarding some behavior and punishing some other. Like socialization and competition.Selection occurs according to consequence.

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Domestic Political structure

Domestic Political structure is defined: 1. According to the principle by which it

is ordered; 2. By specification of the functions of

formally differentiated units; 3. By the distribution of capabilities

across those units.Political structures make political

processes and can be seen by comparing different governmental systems.

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Domestic vs. Intl. Systems1. Ordering principles

1. Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic; while international systems are decentralized and anarchic. 2. Domestic political structures have governmental institutions and offices as their concrete counterparts; while International politics is called politics in the absence of government.

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Domestic vs. Intl. Systems2. The Character of the Units

In domestic systems units are differentiated.In international systems units are the same.

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Domestic vs. Intl. Systems3. Distribution of Capabilities1. The parts of heretical system are

related to each other which are determined by their functional differentiation and by extent of their capabilities.

2. The units of anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units are differentiated according to their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks.

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Figure The circle represents the

structure of an intl.-political system.

As the arrows indicate, it affects both the interactions of states and their distributes.

While, states retain their autonomy, each stands in a specifiable relation to others.