Geographies of Displacement: The Karenni and The Shan Across The Myanmar-Thailand Border

GEOGRAPHIES OF DISPLACEMENT: THEKARENNI AND THE SHAN ACROSS THE MYANMAR-

THAILAND BORDER

Carl Grundy-Warr and Elaine Wong Siew Yin*

Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT

First, central to our analysis is the argument that human movement within and across bordersfundamentally challenges the view of geopolitics based upon fixed territorial states, inter-staterelations, national identities and citizenship; indeed the whole idea of “national geographic”.Using the examples of the Karen and Shan peoples, we explore the processes and patterns offorced relocation, displacement and migration in the border regions of Myanmar and Thailand.Our main concern is with forced displacement as a result of political and ethnic conflict; specifically,how the Burmese military regime’s desire for “national unity” within Myanmar’s “national space”has influenced the militarily inspired displacements of hundreds of thousands of villagers andcivilians within the border zones inhabited mostly by so-called “national minorities”. We examinethe particular problems of the so-called “internally displaced persons” within “national” boundariescompared with the “refugees” and “undocumented migrants” who make it across “international”space into Thailand. We illustrate the ways displaced people are represented by state agenciesand the media as “threats” and “transgressors”. We consider some of the “long term” aspects ofthe displacement problem along the Myanmar-Thai border and the vital contribution geographerscan make to the study of displacement.

Keywords: displacement, forced relocation, undocumented migration, refugees, Myanmar, borderlands

INTRODUCTION:GEOGRAPHY, REFUGEES ANDDISPLACEMENT

Displacement is a fundamental aspect of ourincreasingly de-territorialised world, affectingperceptions of “place” and “homeland”,creating new kinds of identity and new sets ofsocial relations and generating entirely new

experiences and ways of thinking.Contingently, in the words of an exile: “Bordersand barriers which enclose us within the safetyof familiar territory can also become reason ornecessity” (Said, 1990:365). This frame ofreference speaks directly to the centralconcerns of our paper and to the relevance ofgeographical perspectives to the study ofmigration of all types, including refugee

*Elaine Wong recently graduated from NUS aftercompleting her Masters’ thesis on Shan migration innorthern Thailand.

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studies. This whole field is pregnant withissues of major theoretical and empiricalconcern relating to notions of “place” andidentity, “homeland” and citizenship, indeed,the whole idea of “national geographic”(Malkki, 1997). No less significant are theconcerns relating to “national sovereignty”and human security raised by the coerceddisplacement of large populations “regularlyturned into ‘refugees’ within their own nationalborders, dispossessed by their owngovernments and other controllingauthorities”, that has undeniably “become apervasive feature of the post-cold war era [and]also threatens the security and stability ofcountries, regions, and through a chain effect,the international system of which they are anintegral part” (Cohen & Deng, 1998:1). In onedetailed count, by 1997 there were at least 20million “internally displaced persons (IDPs)”in 35 countries surveyed (US Committee forRefugees, 1998), certainly a far greater numberthan the 13 million plus displaced “refugees”that the United Nations High Commission forRefugees (UNHCR) recognises as fallingwithin its mandate (Korn, 1999:3). Clearly, thisdiscrepancy points to the need for a broaddefinition recognising different forms andcauses of displacement.

Central to our analysis is the understandingof displacement within the shared borderlandsof Myanmar and Thailand as being at onceboth an “internal” and a cross-border(“external”) phenomenon. This perspectiverecognises that people are still “displaced” –frequently due to the same causes – whetheror not they decide or manage to cross aninternational boundary and become termeddifferently. Yet, the internal/external distinctionprivileging state domain lies at the heart oflegal and political debates about the rights andresponsibilities of displaced persons and therole the international community can play(Barutciski, 1998; Bennett, 1999; Kingsley-Nyinah, 1999; Rutinwa, 1999; Vincent, 1999).Adopting strict definitions may also well be“used to justify political attempts to reduceassistance to all migrants, including refugees”

(Black, 1992:5). The point we wish to stress is,that by making any such analytically flaweddistinction, the very definitions of “internallydisplaced persons”, “refugees”, “ethnicminorities”, and “undocumented”, “political”,“economic” migrants, and so on, all fall intothe so-called “territorial trap” of reifying“national” spaces and sovereign stateterritories (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995).

Even so, we shall use the definitions of“internally displaced persons”, “refugees” and“illegal migrants” in order to highlight theenormous significance the mere act of crossingan international boundary has in howdisplacement is perceived, represented andmanaged by state and non-state agencies.Border-crossers confront a plethora ofconstraints associated with lack of “official”documentation, but may at least achieve adegree of relative security with the sanctuaryafforded by a host state and the interventionof humanitarian agencies. Whereas, peoplewho remain internally displaced are oftenbeyond the effective reach of concernedagencies simply by being on the wrong sideof a political boundary (Cohen, 1998; Korn,1999), where the “home” state authorities failor prefer not to recognise a problemimplicating them as causal agents. As Korn(1999:108) observes, states can “fend offintervention from abroad simply on theprinciple of non-intervention in their internalaffairs”; therefore, he correctly argues: “Amore equitable balance is needed between thesovereignty of states and the equallycompelling obligation to provide protectionand assistance to the internally displaced andother threatened populations”.

In light of this, our paper examines thedifferent geographies of displacement alongpart of an international boundary – the easternborderlands of Myanmar/Burma1 -Thailand.Using the examples of the Karenni1 and Shanpeoples, we chart the underlying causes,processes and patterns of displacement. Ourprimary concern is with state practices andthe military regime’s1 quest for “national unity”

94 Grundy-Warr and Wong

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and territorial sovereignty and the forcedrelocation, displacement and migrationoccurring within very large areas of theborderlands of Myanmar, particularly over thelast decade. We examine how and why theexistence of the international boundary createsdistinct patterns and experiences ofdisplacement relating to where people moveto, as well as their ethnic origins, and whatthey do or how they survive. We also reviewthe ways displaced people are represented astransgressors and threats by state agenciesand the media and the wider geopolitical,national security and cross-border issuescomplicating the regulation and managementof their predicament. Finally, we argue that amuch better understanding of the complexpolitical geography of migration anddisplacement in the borderlands of Myanmaris vital to any serious efforts to resolve theproblems associated with it. We focus on thescope of the long-term human geographyissues.

Our primary data on displacement areobtained from numerous visits to different fieldsites along the border to interview keyinformants and refugees living inside Thailand,and from published and unpublisheddocuments of key agencies involved directlyin issues surrounding displacement. As alwaysin such research, there are bound to be someinadequacies in methodology. Perhaps ourgreatest obstacle is not being able to directlyaccess “internally displaced” people inMyanmar or enter some of the places we discussinside Kayah/Karenni and Shan territories(limited access was possible during the 1990swhen forced relocations were intensified,though not in the heavily militarised zones).For all these reasons, this paper represents onestage in an ongoing research agenda toappreciate more fully the complexities,ambiguities and problems of displacement inthis region. By charting some of the“geographies of displacement”, we hope to addto debates that look at long-term prevention,management and resolution of forceddisplacement and associated human insecurity.

Forced relocation and displacementA useful working definition of “internallydisplaced persons” has come from the GlobalIDP Survey (Hampton, 1998:2):

[As people or groups of people] whohave been forced or obliged to flee orleave their homes or places of habitualresidence in particular as a result of,or in order to avoid the effects of, armedconflict, situations of generalizedviolence, violations of human rights orhuman-made disasters, and who havenot crossed an internationallyrecognized state border [emphasisadded].

The words “in particular”, not intending“arbitrarily to exclude any serious futuresituation” (Korn, 1999:14), provide a moresatisfactory definition than an earlier one setout in a UN Commission on Human Rightsreport (1992), stressing that internaldisplacement had to happen “suddenly” andinvolve “large numbers” (Korn, 1999: 11). Infact, many cases of forced relocation are“systematic”, planned and affect enormouslyvarying numbers depending on the motives,target population and time-scale.

Coerced movements associated with ethnicconflicts and civil strife include places asdiverse as Bosnia, Kosovo, the Caucasusregion of the former Soviet Union, Rwanda,Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Liberia, the Sudan,Sierra Leone, Colombia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka,East Timor, Cambodia and Myanmar, to namethe obvious few. Indeed, there is plenty ofscope for fruitful comparative research onissues of conflict, ethnicity, politics and forcedmigration. For instance, numerous points ofcomparison emerge between far-flung placesand peoples adversely affected by processesof forced relocation and displacement – fromthe military inspired relocations of Indiangroups in the highlands of Guatemala in thelate 1970s and early 1980s (Falla, 1994; DelliSante, 1996) to the Iraqi Army’s systematic al-Anfal campaigns to “exterminate” Kurdish

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people in the mountains of northern Iraq inthe late 1980s (Makiya, 1993) to the “FourCuts” strategy against ethnic “rebels” inMyanmar/Burma. But in each case, there maybe multiple reasons for displacement, andgeographically differentiated processes andpatterns of displacement (Cohen & Deng, 1998;Korn, 1999). There also needs to be far moreattention given to the “situational, individual,interpersonal, cultural, historical, and cross-contextual variability” (Indra, 1999:3) of forcedmigration. As we note later, there are distinctexperiences of displacement even within thesame locations and village communities.

Whilst “refugees” have captured theattention of geographers, the specific issuesof “internal displacement” have received lessdetailed attention, except in terms of theconnections between displacement,development and environmental issues. Forexample, in valuable studies on theenvironmental causes and consequences ofrefugee movements (Black & Mabwe, 1992;Black, 1994, 1998) and the role and “place” ofrefugees in rural transformations in Africancontexts (Bascom, 1998). In Southeast Asiancontexts, too, studies have highlighted theplanned and coerced displacement ofcommunities for a variety of “developmentprojects” involving competition and conflictsover natural resources, such as clearances forhydro-electricity projects, cash-cropplantations, national parks or reserves andwatershed conservation in forest areasinhabited by hill-tribes, as well as for “urbanrenewal” or other infrastructure developmentswithin cities (see McCaskill & Kampe, 1997;Hirsch & Warren, 1998; issues of Watershed).

There have been as many forms ofdisplacement within Myanmar/Burma. Wefocus on “forced” relocation as a major causeof displacement affecting hundreds ofthousands, if not millions of people sinceindependence. For example, in 1958-1960,under an elected government 62,000households, about one quarter of the totalpopulation of the capital Rangoon, were

forcibly relocated to the east side of the cityas a form of squatter clearance (BERG, 1998:15).Since the military takeover of state power in1962, similar acts of “urban renewal” haveincluded relocating “unwanted elements” afterthe 1988 pro-democracy uprising by studentsand other activists was crushed by themilitary. Thus, not all forced relocation isassociated with the violent civil strife ofnational politics in the militarised struggle forpolitical hegemony within the border zones,which is our main focus.

According to the report of a former UNSpecial Rapporteur on Myanmar, since 1988over one million people may have been“forcibly relocated, without compensation totowns, villages or relocation camps in whichthey were essentially detained” (UN Economicand Social Council, 1997). In some ethnic areas,such as in Kayan and Karenni territory, up to20 per cent of the population may have beensubject to forced relocations, which couldmean the vast majority for any one district ortownship at any one time (BERG, 1998, 2000;KHRG, 1998; SHRF, 1998a). In 1998, the BurmaEthnic Research Group (BERG, 1998:4)established that “approximately 30 per cent of480,000 of the rural Karen population of EasternBurma is currently displaced”, including thoseacross the border as refugees in Thailand;there have since been many moredisplacements in Karen areas. In the westernborderlands, in 1991-92, there was an exodusof around 260,000 Rohingya (Muslims) intoBangladesh, displaced from 15 of the 17townships in Arakan state. Whilst many wereeventually repatriated, there is considerableconcern about the guarantees and conditionsfor their safety (UNHCR, 1993; Burma CentrumNederland, 1995; Lambrecht, 1995; Grundy-Warr & Wong, 1997). The bitter and protractedbattle for de facto sovereign control over thefrontier borderlands has been a consistentfeature of the history of modern Myanmar/Burma (Smith, 1999). To appreciate the complexhistory of the titanic struggles involvingnumerous political groups, armies, factionsand ethnic groups (e.g. Burman, Karen,

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Karenni, Kachin, Shan, Chin, Mon, Rohingya)since independence, requires reading beyondthis modest paper (see especially Smith, 1999).Though relevant, we do not delve into thedynamics of ethnic politics, dealt with bynumerous other writers and observers (Carey,1997; Pedersen et al., 2000). We focus on thecauses, patterns and experiences ofdisplacement experiences compelled by statepractices to point to the scope for further andmeaningful geographical study.

MILITARY QUEST FORNATIONAL UNITY AND DEFACTO SOVEREIGNTY

Central to any analysis of forced relocation inMyanmar/Burma is the military regime’s goalto forge a “unified” national entity understrong central control and with a particularly“Burman” national character (Brown, 1994;Smith, 1999; Steinberg, 2000). According toChao Tzang Yawnghwe (1987:9), son of the

first president of the Union of Burma and anactivist in the Shan rebel movement (1963-76)now in exile, the greatest flaw in post-colonialpolitics was the confusion of the term“nationality” in relation to the “internationally-recognised political perimeter known as Burma,which in reality is a composite of manyhomelands”. This criticism of Burmannationalist claims to all territories and peopleincorporated within the inherited de jurecolonial boundaries also directly reflects thedevelopment of counter-nationalisms ofnumerous politicised ethnic groups who arethe majority population in the geographicallyperipheral states (Plate 1).

In fact, since independence in 1948, largeborder territories have effectively been underthe de facto administration of various ethnicpolitical organisations that have continueddemands for self-determination or considerablepolitical autonomy within some kind offederation. In the eastern borderlands,2 theseinclude the Karen National Union (KNU) in

Plate 1. Trainee soldiers of the Shan State Army (SSA), which operates in southern Shan statenear sections of the Thai border. All these soldiers in a base camp inside Shan territory hadfamily members killed by the Tatmadaw between 1996-98 in central Shan state (Figure 2).

Photo by Dean Chapman, 2000.

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Karen state (or Kawthoolei, borderingThailand)), the Kachin IndependenceOrganisation (KIO) in Kachin state (borderingChina and India), the Karenni NationalProgressive Party (KNNP), the main resistancegroup in Kayah/Karenni state (borderingThailand) and several resistance groups inShan state (bordering Thailand, Laos andChina) – all with their own “governments”,ministries, armies, schools and other trappingsof statehood. At customs points along theborders, it was these ethnic agencies, not theMyanmar/Burma government, that collectedtaxes and revenues derived from cross-bordertrade with neighbouring countries (Rajah, 1990;Grundy-Warr, 1993). This geopoliticallandscape of militarily contested sovereigntiesand ethnic resistance is very pertinent to ouranalysis of displacement in relation to the“national” geography of fixed territorial unitsand needs to be seen in historical perspective.

Silencing multiple and overlappingsovereigntiesPrior to the era of fixed line boundaries, thehighland frontier zones of Burma were areasof considerable cultural interpenetration withpolitical systems characterised by numerouschiefdoms, tribal affiliations, tributaryrelationships, multiple and often overlappingsovereignties. Thongchai Winichakul (1995:96)argues that the delineation of fixed boundariesand the creation of “national geo-bodies”effectively “silenced” many of the pre-existingpolities because they did not have a clearexistence on the modern political map: “Thefate of the tiny tributaries under disputeremains virtually unknown. Their voices havenot been heard. It is as if they occupied a deadspace with no life, no view, no voice, and thusno history of their own”. One such area of“silenced” polities is the vast trans-Salweenregion, including the Kayah/Karrenni andShan states.

When the British annexed Upper Burmaafter the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1886,an indirect colonial rule policy was adopted inthe Frontier Areas, which made up over one-

third of colonial Burma and comprised severalethnic groups. Thus, unlike most Burmanchiefs of (central) Burma Proper who weredeposed, the indigenous saophya (chiefs) andleaders “retained, in the case of the Shan andKarenni States, traditional prerogatives similarto those of the princely states under themaharajas of India; and they held muchautonomy, at least in principle” (Renard,1996:28). And in no small way, one might add,due to the sheer impossibility of extendingcentral administrative rule over scattered,relatively autonomous and rebelliouspopulations in zones of mountainous terrain(Crosthwaite, 1912). In this pre-territorialnation-state context, in 1894, the onlyinternational boundary with Siam (Thailand)was settled as part of the British effort to secureteak resources in the Karenni areas and limitSiamese encroachments. As with other fixedline boundaries, this has had serious social,economic and geopolitical consequences. Notjust very large areas, but also human networkstraversed for very long periods of history byconsiderable movement, multiple loyalties,kinship structures (Wijeyewardene, 1990) andtrade exchanges became politically partitionedas the familiar shapes of “national geo-bodies”emerged on the political map.

Across fluid “friendly” frontiers secured bycultural mores of consensus, compromise andrecognition of hierarchical power relations(Lim, 1994:4), many traditional trading andmigration routes in the frontier areas wereinscribed on parts of current-day Yunnan(China), Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodiaand Thailand (Lim, 1984; Walker, 1998). Theconcepts introduced with the boundarydelineation “were not readily adopted and thecentral governments lacked the power to makethe boundaries actually work. …The borderregion, beyond the effective control of bothBurma and Thailand, is a kind of open zonewherein passports, visas, customs, and otheraccoutrements of boundaried countries holdlittle value” (Renard 1987:92). Until recently,these border zones of Karenni and Shan stateswere still controlled by local ethnic authorities

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and Pa-O, Shan, Chinese, Indian and Karennimerchants carried on a thriving cross-bordertrade, wending their way along jungle-paths,mule-tracks, or riverbeds to avoid the fewroutes controlled by the Myanmar/BurmaTatmadaw.3 In this sense, a form of traditionalsovereignty and autonomy had extended intothe “modern” era, while the political leaders ofvarious ethnic parties and administrations,from the Karen (Rajah, 1990) to the Karenni,Shan (Yawnghwe, 1987) and Kachin (Lintner,1996) adapted their political demands fordegrees of autonomy or completeindependence to the modern politicalgeography of fixed boundaries (Grundy-Warr,1997).

For example, Karenni activists are engagedin constructing a territorial homeland in a“Karenni state”, with clear fixed boundariesbased on those of Kayah (Karenni) state onmaps. Also as part of this process, the KNPPoften refer to an agreement with the Britishand Burman ruler in 1875 that effectivelyrecognised the independence of the fourwestern Karenni states, and thus their rulers’political autonomy predating Burma’sindependence, in order to reaffirm and mobiliseresistance to being incorporated into Burma’sboundaries without a promised right ofsuccession being fulfilled. There are obviousproblems of using history in this way to re-claim a nineteenth century context of verydifferently negotiated spheres of influence inan era when fixed national geo-bodies havealready been created. Even so, the use ofhistoric claims by political exiles and refugeescan perhaps be understood as part of anarrative rooting that displacement in aprocess of “inventing homelands in theabsence of territorial, national bases – not insitu but through memories of and claims onplaces that they can or will no longercorporeally inhabit” (Malkki, 1997:52).

Reconsolidating the “Union”, Unityand Sovereignty“Three Main National Tasks” are highlightedin Endeavours of the Myanmar Armed Forces

Government for National Reconsolidation:“Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Unity, and thePreservation of National Sovereignty” (YanNyein Aye, 2000:1). One of the “paradoxes” ofthe nation-state “is that, for all its stress onthe people as its basis, it will give up populationbut not land” (McVey, 1984:13), an observationparticularly apt to the military quest for “non-disintegrations” in the ethnic homelandssecuring Myanmar’s international boundary.It is precisely the drive to preserve the “Union”at all costs and expand Tatmadaw authorityto all parts of the national geo-body that haslegitimised the excesses of military pacificationmeasures in the border regions. Apart fromthe “Four Cuts” (below) military practice of,literally, altering the human landscape, twoother critical strands to achieve theseobjectives are: ceasefire agreements withethnic armed forces in areas where “rebelforces” are active – and failing which violenceis used; and implementations of the so-calledBorder Area Development Programme(BADP), an aspect of the SPDC’s statedpolitical objectives for national recon-solidation.

The official perspective of ceasefiresreinforced in the state-controlled newspapersand Yangon publications places greatemphasis on the singular role of the SPDC andTatmadaw – which is still seen as the maininstrument “holding the country together” –in bringing various “national races” back into“the legal fold”. During an official visit toLoikaw, Kayah state, in 1993, the head of state,Secretary Number 1, Lieutenant General KhinNyunt, stated:

The armed groups in Myanmar havebeen fighting against the State for over40 years. It is time to ponder seriously,what good or benefit this has or hasnot achieved, and whether or notresulted in the development of theState. At present, the Government isdoing everything possible, without anykind of discrimination whatsoever

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between the States and the mainland[i.e. between the border states and thecentral authorities], to close the socialgaps that may exist. The Governmenthas achieved success in its peaceinitiatives with some of the armednational groups and they have nowrejoined the legal community. In theregions in which peace now prevails,development has gained momentumwithin a short period of time. So, onbehalf of the Government, I would liketo officially urge the remaining groupsto take advantage of discussions forpeace that will enable them to enter thelegal fold (Nan Nyein Aye, 2000:3).

New Light of Myanmar (the nationalEnglish-language newspaper) carries frequentcoverage of official visits, inspections andmeetings related to “border developmenttasks”, usually touting the flourishing of a“Union Spirit” and the regime’s aims in acountry of “over 100 national races” (NewLight of Myanmar, 13 February 2001). Equallypurported is the success of local ceasefireagreements, seen as a prerequisite to borderarea development “implemented with thegreatest and noblest of intentions” to bringthe national races out of “darkness” into anera of “peace and prosperity” (New Light ofMyanmar, 14 February, 1994). Reviewing therhetoric of “border development”, Lambrecht(2000:30) argues that such “noble language”masks policies that are in fact “a vehicle foroppression” and “domination” of the ethnicminority peoples within a unitary state, citingexamples of border area development projectsthat have been associated with militaryoffensives in nearby villages, forced labour,tighter military control, close surveillance ofethnic communities, rapid resourceexploitation that tends to benefit companieswith military patronage and “the constructionof national identity through efforts todepoliticise ethnicity”.

But, it is also important to consider the lessphysically violent implications of ceasefires

and military-sponsored “developmentprojects”. As BERG (1998) has shown, thereare various motives for relocating peoplespecified by the Myanmar authorities. Thesecan be summarised as: (1) Politicallymotivated displacement – to assimilatepopulations; prevent self-determination/ethnic nationalism/autonomy; prevent“destructive” opposition; win hearts andminds; and foster amity between nationalraces; (2) Economically motivated displace-ment – to carry out urban renewal and clearingof squatter areas; undertake rural developmentworks; promote border trade and border areadevelopment projects; foster social deve-lopment; promote tourism, transportinfrastructure, industry in border areas; exploitenvironmental resources; eradicate poppiesand the drug trade; and engage populationsas labourers, porters, miners, agricultural andinfrastructure workers; and (3) Militarilymotivated displacement – to counterinsurgents; maintain the unity of the country;preserve and maintain peace; establish law andorder; and engage populations in work for theTatmadaw, such as in building barracks,portering near frontlines, de-mining activities,and people’s militias.

It can be seen that purely military objectivesare only one aspect of the overall pattern offorced relocations; but, as with so many aspectsof Burmese life, these often coincide or overlapwith civilian programmes (Callahan, 2000). Thisis clear for “border area development projects”,often under direct military auspices, thatfrequently involve relocating people to so-called “safe areas” for “security”. Initiatives for“infrastructure” projects, too, have militaryimplications; for instance, logging trackspenetrating into heavily forested areas haveenabled the Tatmadaw easier access to someof the most valued territorial zones oncecontrolled by ethnic insurgents (Bryant, 1997;Grundy-Warr & Rajah, 1997). Similarly,“promotion of border trade” first requires theelimination of ethnic army units that may enjoycontrol over sections of border. Thus, the actualexperience of border development projects

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varies greatly between zones and communities,often with who is actually the de facto authorityin a particular area. In areas still influenced byparties opposed to ceasefires, as in large areasof the Karen, Kayah/Karenni, central andsouthern Shan states, counter-insurgencycampaigns result in pockets of low-intensitywarfare and persisting human insecurity.

Without denying that there are someceasefire zones where infrastructure projectsor new social health and educational facilitieshave produced benefits to local communities,the “military truces” allowing some ceasefiregroups to continue carrying arms have notproduced a lasting political settlement to theso-called “nationalities” problems (Smith,1999:440), and in several border areas remainfragile due to factionalism within the ethnicparties themselves. Though ceasefires mayenable some ethnic leaders to join indeliberations in Yangon, this should not betaken as a sign that the SPDC is willing to share“national power” with them (Steinberg,2000:103). Furthermore, whilst the SPDC mayargue that these groups have entered “the legalfold”, there may be more pragmatic, localisedpolitical and economic motives at work. Forexample, in Kayah/Karenni state, some smallpolitical parties have formed local ceasefireswith the SPDC, namely, the Karenni NationalPeople’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), the ShanState Nationalities Liberation Organisation(SSNLO) and the Kayan New Land Party(KNLP). Because Kayah state, like all the borderstates, is not unified politically or ethnically,some of these small factions may have soughtterritorial gains at the expense of the main KNPP,albeit with the Tatmadaw’s increasing presence.Unfortunately, factionalism has resulted in acomplex political geography that puts manyvillages in the frontline of battles for de factosovereignty.

THE “FOUR CUTS” AND MASSDISPLACEMENTS

The “Four Cuts” (Pya Ley Pya) is a counter-insurgency measure “to make the people ‘cut

off the insurgent’s head’” (Maung AungMyoe, 1999:192-3); essentially, military actionsto cut-off sources of food, funds, intelligenceand recruits to ethnic insurgent groups. It isthe single-most important way the Tatmadawhave managed to change political facts on theground by altering demographic, settlementand community patterns and processeswherever “rebel forces” are deemed to operate.Since the early 1960s, the Four Cuts hasremained integral to the Tatmadaw’s view ofUnion as a strategy to reshape the politicalmap. During early rehearsals in the KachinHills against the KIO, “thousands diedunreported to the world outside” (Smith,1999:220).

Since the early 1980s, the most importanttargets of the Four Cuts have been the ethnicarmy stronghold regions in the border zones.The wider political geographic dimension isclearly described by Smith (1999:259):

The map of Burma was divided into avast chessboard under the Tatmadaw’ssix (later nine) commands and shadedin three colours: black for entirelyinsurgent-controlled areas; brown forareas both sides disputed; and whitewas ‘free’. The idea was that eachinsurgent-coloured area would becleared one by one, until the whole mapof Burma was white. For the black‘hard-core’ areas and brown ‘guerilla’zones a standard set of tactics wasdeveloped which, after a littlerefinement, has remained little changeduntil today.

The usual modus operandi is for a localTatmadaw commander to select “black” and“brown” rebel zones to be declared “areasprohibited for security reasons”, followingwhich, all the civilian villages are given ordersto relocate to “strategic hamlets” (byu hlajaywa), which are under tight militarysurveillance. Villagers who fail to comply are“categorised as rebels” and shot. Troopstypically confiscate or destroy food stores

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including rice banks, burn homes and fields,and frequently mine the outskirts of thevillage. Thus, the whole logic of the Four Cutsto undermine insurgency operations bycutting off their civilian bases, in effect, blursthe line between “rebel” soldier and civilian inall ethnic zones considered “black” or“brown”.

Reshaping the political map:Examples from Kayah (Karenni) andShan statesOne section of Kayah/Karenni state that hasseen an intensification of forced massrelocations is the area between two main rivers– the Pon and Salween, deemed to be underthe political sway of the resistant KNPP andKarenni Army. Shortly after the breakdown ofthe ceasefire agreement between the thenSLORC and the KNPP, in May 1996, theShadaw Law and Order Restoration Council(LORC) sent orders to all the villages inShadaw Township. A translated copy of one,received by the headman of Daw Pu Ei village,South Shadaw Village Tract, dated 31 May1996, gave villages just one week to relocate,or be “shot according to the order by front-line Light Infantry Battalion, Number 337”. Anestimated 96 villages were affected by forcedrelocations to two “strategic hamlets” orrelocation sites at Shadaw and Yaw Thit(Figure 1).4 The Tatmadaw burnt down somevillages and mined the perimeter of others(CIDKnP, 1999; BERG, 2000). The evidencefrom a great many oral testimonies of peoplewho fled either after receiving relocationorders or from the strategic hamlets, andfurther verified by information collected bycross-border medical teams, confirms theextent and coercive nature of such relocations.Preh Mou and Ei Meh, a couple with fourchildren from Daw Tam Wi village, reported:

When we were sitting in the house, theSLORC came into the village and theydrove us out of our home and thenforced us to go with them to Shadaw –the relocation site. At that time somevillagers were not in the village, they

were working on their farms. Later weheard that the SLORC troops had metthem in the village and killed them atonce. They left their bodies in thevillage (ABSDF, 1997).

In Shan state, similar forced massrelocations of villages had been intensifiedafter January 1996, following the “retirement”deal with SLORC of the infamous drug warlordKhun Sa, leader of the Shan resistance MongTai Army (MTA) since its establishment in1985. Large numbers of MTA troops refusedto put down their weapons; some moved intozones of other Shan resistance groups,including the Shan State Army (SSA) and ShanState National Army (SSNA); some regroupedinto the new Shan United Revolutionary Army(SURA), led by Major Yord Serk (SHRF,1998b:40). The success of the Shan resistancearmies in central Shan state led to an angrySLORC response. According to interviewswith displaced persons by the Shan HumanRights Foundation (SHRF, 1998b:41),beginning in March 1996, village after villagein eight townships – Larng Kher, Murng Nai,Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng Kerng, Kun Hing,Ke See and Murng Su (Figure 2) – were givenfive days to relocate:

Those village people with ox-cartscould carry some supplies with them,but those walking on foot could carryalmost nothing. The relocation siteswere often a day’s walk away. The vastmajority being farming families, theywere forced to leave behind their cropsand most of their animals, many ofwhich were stolen immediately bySLORC troops. During the relocation,people were beaten, burned to death,and shot dead.

Figure 2 indicates the area of forcedrelocations in Shan state in 1996-98. The SHRF(1998b) report estimated that probably as manyas 1,400 villages were forcibly relocated andover 300,000 people adversely affected over atwo-year period. Whatever the precise

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statistics are, these reports indicate anextensive zone of forced relocations in centralShan state (see Wong, 2001).

PATTERNS AND EXPERIENCESOF DISPLACEMENT

Figure 3 is a diagrammatic representation ofdisplacement based upon our field interviews

with displaced persons living inside refugeecamps in Thailand and indicates distinct villageclusters: some abandoned and destroyed as aresult of forced relocations; some resettledafter an earlier round of relocation, probablydue to local ceasefire arrangements orTatmadaw confidence that rebel activity inthose villages had been eliminated; and othervillages that remain untouched, perhaps

Figure 1. The land between the Pon and Salween rivers showing the locations ofvillages forced to relocate in May-June 1996.

Source: Collated from Karenni Human Rights Group (KHRG) monitors’ reports and fieldwork in Mae Hong Son Province, Thailand.

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because they are near or within zones fullyunder Tatmadaw authority and are thus “whiteareas”, free of insurgents. Also indicated hereare the different kinds of displacementexperience: some villagers relocate intostrategic hamlets near to military bases; someflee into “temporary hide-out areas” or jungle;whilst others make the decision to move longerdistances, into another district or state, oracross the border into Thailand. All thesepersonal experiences of internal displacementvary according to local circumstances and

chance events, and the decisions people takeon their own futures, whether they decide tolive in refugee camps in Thailand or stay closeto their former village locations.

Another geopolitical feature of Figure 3 isthe large “free fire zone” completely cleared ofcivilian populations, effectively, a militarisedzone within which no unauthorized civilianmovements are permitted. An example inKayah/Karenni state extends east of theSalween to the Thai border (Figure 4), an

Figure 2. Areas affected by forced relocations in central Shan state, 1996-98.

Source: Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF, 1998a).

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extremely dangerous territory for civilians tocross without expert guides and, for manydisplaced persons, only possible with the aidof Karenni soldiers who are familiar with boththe difficult mountain terrain and the positionsof Tatmadaw infantry bases. The area is alsomined by both the Tatmadaw and KarenniArmy (Plate 2).

Human insecurityThe Karenni refer to all displaced people andrefugees simply as preh bae piah sae –“persons who suffer”. Some villagers havebeen displaced several times over a period ofyears, whilst for others it is a one-timeexperience. Adding to the political insecurityof fragile local ceasefires are the very realproblems of food and livelihood insecurityfaced by all internally displaced people. In thestrategic hamlets, there is often a shortage offood. Land around such sites is either alreadycultivated by nearby villagers or unsuitablefor cultivation. New concentrations of peoplealso create pressures on available sources ofwater. Unless displaced villagers haverelatives in the vicinity with whom they can

live, they must build their own huts, sometimessharing living space with other displacedfamilies. In the case of Shadaw, displacedpersons were ordered to clear an area of forestfor growing crops, though once cleared it wasconfiscated by the Tatmadaw to grow beansfor soldiers (BERG, 2000:57). Special permitsare needed to travel to areas beyond theimmediate vicinity of the strategic hamlet inorder to tend crops, collect forest products orsearch for work, but tight military control overtheir issuing greatly restricts the potential forany form of subsistence farming.

Relocated villagers are a ready source oflabour (whether “conscripted” or “forced”) towork on military-related projects, even thoseconsidered to be under the SPDC’s BADP(Lambrecht, 2000). For example, in southwestKayah/Karenni state, families in Maw Chistrategic hamlet and surrounding villages were“requested” to send one person each day towork on a clearance for the Maw Chi-Toungooroad, stretching 96 miles and about 600 feetwide including the strategic buffers on eitherside to prevent ambush by Karenni soldiers.

Plate 2. Amputees on a training course in Mae Hong Son Province learn how to make theirartificial limbs. Except for the man on a crutch, all are former Karenni Army combatants.

Border areas are heavily mined by the Tatmadaw and ethnic armies. Photo by DeanChapman, late 1990s (see also Chapman, 1998; Grundy-Warr et al., 2002)).

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Men, women and children have worked on thisproject, having to take their own food andremain beside the road until the length thateach family is assigned is completed (KHRG,1998).

According to an NGO worker in Mae HongSon who helps the undocumented Shanmigrants in Thailand, about 75 per cent ofmigrants cite forced labour and relocations astheir main reason for leaving Shan state (Wong,

Figure 3. Patterns and types of displacement experience associated with forced relocations.

Source: Collated from field research (Grundy-Warr, 2001).

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2001). The following represent collectiveexperiences:

Once I was taken to become a porterfor one month. When I went back, thevillage had already moved. TheBurmese Army always makes us move.So far, I’ve had to move six timesalready. When we move to a new village,

we think we can do some farming. Butthen the Burmese Army makes us moveagain and again.

(Shan farmer; Wong, 2001)

I am a farmer. Back at home we have atea plantation. We also have places togrow rice. ...If it were not for thebrutality of the Burmese soldiers, we

Figure 4. Eastern Karenni/Kayah state showing the “free fire” zone east of the SalweenRiver and locations of the three existing refugee camps (Camps 2,3 and 5) in

Mae Hong Son Province along the Thai border.

Source: Collated from field research (Grundy-Warr, 2001).

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wouldn’t be here working so hard andgetting very little. …All the men wouldflee the village at the news of Burmesesoldiers because they always forcedmen as porters. Sometimes women tooare taken as porters and they rape thesewomen often. We are not able to do ourwork, since we have to work for them inone way or another. …and that is whywe came here to Thailand with theintention of finding good jobs so wecan save money for our future.

(Shan woman, age 22, constructionworker, Chiang Mai Province;

Caouette et al., 2000:103)

Life running and hidingForced relocation means being dispossessedand submitting to a restricted and uncertainlife in the strategic hamlets. Thus, manyvillagers try to flee; go into hiding in temporaryshelters in forested areas, living off hiddenstores of food or by foraging in the jungle(Figure 3). Others only attempt this once theyhave experienced the deprivations of life insiderelocation sites. Life on the move containsmany obvious dangers, as one middle-agedfemale interviewee from Maw Chi recounted:“We couldn’t sleep at night. Every soundcould be a soldier coming to kill us. We werealways scared of being found out. We had tobe careful where we moved and how wemoved” (Grundy-Warr, field interview, 2001).A farmer from Shadaw recalled the experienceof his group of 100 people hiding in one place:“If we could find the place for farming, we wereable to work hill cultivation. But in such adangerous situation, we could not workpeacefully” (Amnesty International, 1999:5).

Such periods of hiding in the forest, livingin fear of being caught or killed can last fordays, months or even years; deaths fromdiarrhoea and “unknown diseases” are theother commonplace misfortune. The testi-monies of some of the 105 new arrivals toKarenni Camp 2 in Thailand in February 2001(Grundy-Warr, field interviews, March 2001)bear similar witness. For instance, the family

of Soe Reh, 37, a farmer from Daw Mu Setvillage, Shadaw District, decided not to berelocated in May 1996, but to hide in jungleareas close to their village instead. When theirhidden stores of food were depleted, theylived off paddy owned by others and whateverthey could find or grow in the jungle. Twochildren (aged eight and six) died of diarrhoeain the jungle; of the remaining two (aged oneand four), the youngest was born whilst thefamily were in hiding. After almost four yearsin hiding, Soe Reh’s family moved to a placeon the west bank of the Salween to join otherfamilies wishing to move to Thailand and hadmade a nine-day journey on foot, reaching theborder on 20 February. About life in hiding,Soe Reh simply said that there were manythings he wished to express, but he could notfind the words to do so.

Border crossingsInformation about Thailand, pre-existingmigrant networks and contacts with refugeefamily members or friends are all-important indecisions to brave the journey to the border,often on foot, at some expense and withconsiderable uncertainty. Deterrents includethe fear of being caught by the Tatmadaw,landmines, harsh terrain, rumours about poorliving conditions in Thailand and fear of theunknown. Not surprisingly, some displacedpeople prefer to stay as long as possible nearto their old lands and village areas. For thoseintending to look for employment in Thailand,there are other important issues. For instance,displaced Shan living in areas closer to theThai border are familiar with establishedmigrant networks and may find it easier tocontemplate this since they are ethnicallyrelated to the Thais, also practice TheravadaBuddhism and can communicate in the Thailanguage. Still, sometimes the stark realities ofrelocation leave little luxury of choice, as onerefugee from Keng Kham Township puts it:

In Kali and Kun Hing [relocation sites]we had heard there was nothing formost of us. How could we move there?We had no money, so how could we

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buy food there? Some people hadmoney and they came to Thailandimmediately… We knew that if we cameto Thailand we could work and getmoney, but if we went to Kun Hing, wewould starve (SHRF, 1998b: 43).

Dreams of homeland: Confined tothe campsFor people inhabiting the betwixt and betweenworld of the concealed Karenni refugee campsin Thailand, issues of identity and homelandare sharply felt. One of our observations isthat many newcomers are often less concernedabout homeland issues than those who havebeen in the camps for longer periods,sometimes several years, although this alsodepends on whether or not they werepreviously politically active in ethnic“national” organisations, such as the KNPP.“Trying to understand the circumstances ofparticular groups of refugees illustrates thecomplexity of the ways in which peopleconstruct, remember, and lay claim to particularplaces as ‘homelands’ or ‘nations’” (Malkki,1997:53). The “most striking social fact” ofMalkki’s study of Hutus who fled genocidalmassacres in 1972 in Burundi and ended up ina refugee camp in western Tanzania, was thatthe camp’s “inhabitants were continuallyengaged in an impassioned construction andreconstruction of their history as ‘a people’”(Malkki, 1997:66). The very acts of being“uprooted”, forced into another “nation” andbeing granted “refugee status” emphasised“the ultimate temporariness of exile” and “notbelonging”. A similar situation exists for theKarenni refugees engaged in constructions ofa “Karenni state” as a homeland with “acategorically distinct, collective identity”.

For most ordinary villagers in the borderzones, “national” political aspirations remainfar from their day-to-day livelihood struggleswithin small, relatively remote communitieswith specific group identities. But, the veryact of becoming a “refugee” immediatelyexposes distinctive ethnic sub-groups andcultures to others who also live in the territory

called Kayah/Karenni state, but with whomthey had limited contact prior to entering thecamps. Even within the total population ofabout 17,000 in the existing three camps (Figure4), trying to find out which “group” or“community” a person belongs to elicits abewildering array of replies – Kayah, Kayan,Kayaw, Bre, Yingtalai, Paku and Shan, to namea few, each again known by several othernames as there are also different dialect groupswho have their own local names to describethemselves and “others”. According to thework of Lehman (1967), the only anthropologistto study the ethnicity of groups “inside”Kayah state, the situation is furthercomplicated by the fact that even sub-groupsmay be sub-divided (e.g. Northern Bre,Southern Bre, Mano, Karen, Red Karen).However, the experience of displacement hasled to entirely new situations of proximity. Forexample, near to Camp 3, is a village with threegroups – Kayan, one of the most easilyrecognisable groups in the camps (Plate 3),Kayaw and Kayah – unusually, living side-by-side, whereas in Kayah state they live indistinct villages. Consequently, the refugeecamps have become a microcosm of thecultural diversity that exists inside Kayah/Karenni state, including religious affiliation,like having Catholics, Baptists, Buddhists andanimists in just one camp.

Thus, within the camps, displaced Karennileaders have a unique “captive” populationto propagate their “modern” ideas of historicalautonomy and an independent homeland(discussed earlier). Crucially, sharedexperiences of forced relocation by theTatmadaw, of violence and fear, of “hiding andrunning” and of journeying to the border, havehelped to create a new historical sense ofcollective uprooted-ness that makes peoplemore receptive to notions of togethernesssuch as a “common identity” and “homeland”.Of course, not everybody in the campsidentifies with the “Karenni” dream,particularly the small number of Shaninhabitants and Burman exiles. It should alsobe stressed that many refugees are relatively

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poor hill farmers whose main dream is to goback to what they regard as their land and tostart farming again. Many of those weinterviewed have little knowledge about thebroader geopolitical context and conflicts thathave led to their forced migration into Thailandand remain perplexed at their predicament.Even so, for the political activists, theassociation between village ties, security,homeland, Karenni identity and freedom havebecome interlinked in a political mantra thatpermeates throughout the camps.

A game of hide and seek: “Illegal”and rootless in Thailand

For the tens of thousands of displaced Shanmigrants who continue to live illegally insideThailand beyond the “official” temporaryshelters of the “refugee community”, beingrootless and mobile is their means of survivalto avoid the attention of Thai authorities. Inrural areas, it is a very challenging researchtask just to ascertain where they may be. Manylive in makeshift shelters in forested areas away

Plate 3. Kayan (Padaung) women and children shower in the monsoon rains in Nai Soi, MaeHong Son Province, Thailand. The Kayan are allowed to live in villages away from the

concealed refugee camps because the women, who wear striking brass coil neck ornaments,have been successfully promoted as a “tourist attraction” (as are those displaced within

Myanmar) by Thai agencies. Few visitors realise they are a displaced community.Photo by Dean Chapman, late 1990s (see also Chapman, 1998).

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from main roads, but often near to villageswhere they can look for work; if they find noneor consider it too risky to stay, they simplymove on. To avoid arrest, many families whowork in fields by day prefer to sleep in thesurrounding hills at night. Shan migrants alsowork in cities such as Chiang Mai, onconstruction sites, in low-paying jobs, andyoung women have filtered into the local beerbars and brothels (Empower, Thai NGO,Grundy-Warr, personal communications, 2001).

These Shan migrants constantly fear theauthorities, which have the power to repatriatethem or exploit their vulnerable position bydemanding bribes. Periodic police clampdownson illegal migrants are the main source of theirinsecurity in Thailand. In early 2000, in oneShan village in Mae Hong Son Province, wheresome families had lived for about three yearsand others simply came and left as theypleased, all went into to hiding when they heardthe authorities were rounding up illegalmigrants in that area, returning as soon as theauthorities had left (Wong, 2001). In anothervillage, migrant Shan workers paid the villageheadman between 500-3,000 baht (US$1 thenaround 43 baht) to avoid police detection. One39-year old Shan farmer who paid 1,000 baht, alot of money considering his average dailyincome of about 60 baht, said he was uncertainwhere the money actually went: with eachpayment, all he received was a slip of paperwith some personal bits of information writtendown (Wong, 2001).

It is clear that the experience ofdisplacement is very different for registered“refugee” camp residents and for the undocu-mented and “illegal migrants”, even thoughShan migrants, in particular, may fare and betreated a little differently. The Thai authoritiesrefer to most migrants from Myanmar/Burmaas “migrants or displaced people” (chonplatthin or phuu oppayop) and do notofficially acknowledge those confined to thecamps as refugees (phuu liiphay).Nevertheless, a distinction is drawn betweendisplaced “illegal migrants” who search for

work in the Thai economy and are consideredto be “economic migrants” (phuu oppayopthaansetthakit), as opposed to the campresidents who are considered to be “politicalmigrants” (phuu oppayop thaankeenmuang).If anything, our research illustrates that thereare no such neat categorisations of displacedpeople; many undocumented Shan “economicmigrants” are fleeing from similar problemswithin their home areas as those faced by themajority Karenni (Kayah) “political migrants”.One reason for the official distinction is thatthere already is a big problem of thousands of“minority people without documents” (chonklumnoy phuu raysanchaat) within Thailand,including people who have settled in hillvillages and still find it hard to obtain Thaicitizenship.

Official policies towards the very largenumbers of undocumented Burmese migrantworkers inside the country reflect a mix ofdomestic economic and political circum-stances, as well as cross-border and inter-staterelations with Myanmar (below). NumerousCabinet Resolutions specifically deal withvarious concerns for regulating illegal migrantlabour, such as registration, “worker permits”and employer “bail fees”; the provinces andindustrial sectors where such temporary labouris allowed; medical exam fees, and the like.5

But, recent dramatic economic and politicalevents have made the Thai authorities moreinclined towards repatriation. First, the massiveeconomic meltdown in 1997 left many Thaicitizens un- or under-employed. Second, wasthe seizure of the Myanmar Embassy byBurmese students in Bangkok in October 1999,followed by the disastrous and tragic seizureof a hospital in Ratchaburi in January 2000,planned mainly by a group calling themselvesthe Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, butimplicating the tiny Karen God’s Army. Theseled to subsequent clampdowns on “alienworkers”, including mass deportations ofBurmese workers.

It is clear that many of the Shan migrants innorthern Thailand have mostly not been in

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prescribed jobs involving such things as bailfees and official work permits and that manyemployers do hire illegal workers and payoccasional “tea money” to local police toprevent possible arrest (Caouette et al.,2000:45). A variety of unofficial forms ofdocumentation are issued at local levels inreturn for small fees paid by migrantsthemselves. Furthermore, many displacedmigrants continue to play hide and seek withthe Thai agencies charged with tracking themdown. For all these reasons, the actualnumbers and whereabouts of undocumentedmigrant workers is usually a source ofcontroversy and intrigue.

DISPLACED PEOPLE AS“TRANGRESSORS” AND“THREATS”

Soguk (1999:260) has cogently addressed thechallenges posed by migrants and displacedpeople in a world still made up of territoriallysovereign states, not merely to examine “thediscourse of the refugee” but “to afford therefugee an agency, a voice, and a face”.According to Soguk, two recurrent anddominant ways in which displaced personsare represented by state agencies and themass media are: first, as “transgressors” into“the domain of the citizen”; and second, as“threats” to “national security”, whichincludes the domain of shared core valuesand meanings promoted by states aboutnationality, citizenship and identity. Thus,official state agencies and the mediacommonly tag refugees and displacedpersons as “non-citizens”, as “stateless”, as“persons without documentation”, as“outsiders” and, particularly suggestive ofother worlds, as “aliens”. In many parts ofthe world, large-scale displacement leads tochallenging policy-related debates aboutimmigration rights and procedures; rights ofasylum and abode; citizenship and exclusion;minority rights and justice; nationality andidentity (Bader, 1995; Kofman, 1995;Martiniello, 1995).

Dis-placement is a problem preciselybecause “the citizen” remains the central“constitutive element of community in theterritory or space of the state” (Soguk, 1999:212). The “radically unsettling” and “elusive”challenges posed by the very existence oflarge numbers of displaced people threaten“to undo the practices of statecraft” in threekey aspects: first, by challenging “the spaceof the citizen”; second, by undermining “thesovereign territoriality as a sine qua non for acoherent domestic community”; and third, bychallenging “the heart of identity politics”(Soguk, 1999:216-8). Such challenges areacutely felt in Thailand where the media fuelsthe notion of the border (chaedaen) asdangerous (andharai) and “the other side”as a place of disorder and anarchy, illegalactivities such as rampant drug-production,chaos and conflict. Undocumented migrantsand displaced persons breech this boundaryand hence are often portrayed as transmittersof “anarchy” into “the domestic sphere”.Simultaneously, displaced persons allow theopportunity for “the participants ofterritorialising practices” to re-affirm thecentral significance of territorial sovereigntyand “national” integrity with “a coherentdomestic community” from which the statedraws its legitimacy and authority, and onwhose behalf the state acts (Soguk, 1996:294).In this manner, displaced persons who manageto cross “inter-national” (i.e. inter-state)boundaries are at once an aspect of “trans-state” processes over which states have littlecontrol and of “inter-state” processes overwhich states have direct influence (Taylor,1995).

Displaced people are also viewed moreconcretely as transmitting unwholesomeoutcomes for national well-being and security,particularly in health and environmentalmatters. Increased problems of communicablediseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis andHIV/AIDS, in border areas are frequentlyblamed on the refugees and migrants.According to the Thai Public Health Ministry,the government foots large health bills on

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illegal migrants (Bangkok Post, 1 March 1998).However, these overall “threats” seem to bemuch less to the host state citizens than to thedisplaced persons themselves, who are oftenbeyond the reach of most testing andpreventative education measures (seeOppenheimer, et al., 1998; Caouette, et al.,2000). Similarly, refugee communities areblamed for threatening local forests or watersupplies (Bangkok Post, 11 March 2000:2).Given that refugee camp locations are rarelychosen for their “agro-ecological potential”(Black, 1998:37), environmental degradation isinevitable. Furthermore, “host governmentschoose remote and isolated areas to preventrefugees from integrating into localcommunities and competing with nationals forscarce resources and employment oppor-tunities” (Lassailly-Jacob, 1994:215), certainlytrue of the border-hugging Karenni camps.Though much more research is required toassess the local environmental impacts andresource management issues for refugeecommunities in Thailand, a mostly negativeimpression of the environmental degradationcreated by dense, captive populations intemporary camps continues to add to theirimage as burdensome “transgressors”.

DISPLACED PERSONS,NATIONAL SECURITY AND THEBORDERLANDS IMBROGLIO

There are currently approximately 116,000registered “refugees” receiving reliefassistance along the Thai-Myanmar border(Burmese Border Consortium, 2000) and a greatmany more undocumented Burmese migrantsliving and working inside Thailand. SinceThailand does not officially acknowledge theexistence of “refugees”, the camps fordisplaced people are termed as “temporaryshelters for displaced persons fleeing fromfighting” rather than as “refugee camps”(Caouette et al., 2000:42). The CoordinatingCommittee for Services to Displaced Personsin Thailand (CCSDPT), a governmentorganisation established under the supervision

of the Ministry of the Interior, assists in theprovision of relief. The controls andrestrictions on camps largely depend upon thelocal border security situation and local-levelarrangements between officers in charge fromthe ministries of interior and defence andprovincial authorities. The Thai authoritieshave also permitted numerous NGOsproviding relief and humanitarian assistanceto service the camps along the border.6

Thailand is reluctant to sign the internationalrefugee convention and openly recognise theproblem of “refugees” on “Thai soil”, althoughthere is a long record of providing sanctuaryand accepting displaced persons fromneighbouring countries, with establishedinstitutions for tackling the issues (Robinson,1998).

A growing concern in recent years has beenthat it is almost impossible to disentangle theissue of displaced persons from otherunwanted cross-border problems, such asviolent violations of territorial sovereigntyassociated with numerous cross-border attackson refugee camps and Thai villages, and thedrug trade. The very presence of large numbersof displaced persons on Thai soil represents amultifaceted security dilemma for keyinstitutions, such as the Border Police, theRoyal Thai Army, the ministries of interior,defence and foreign affairs, and the NationalSecurity Council (NSC). Thailand has beenaccused of “harbouring insurgentsmasquerading as refugees” and so, someTatmadaw commanders regard the refugeecamps as “legitimate political targets”, even ifthey do lie across the international boundary(Images Asia & Borderline Video, 1998:12).Thus, as part of overall counter-insurgentoperations in border zones, the Tatmadaw hasprovided proxy armies with intelligence, funds,weapons and logistical support, particularlythe SPDC-backed Democratic Kayin BuddhistArmy (DBKA).

Geopolitical border tensions have createda souring of inter-state relations. For instance,in February 2001, the dry season Tatmadaw

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offensive against the SSA spilled over intoThai territory, causing many “hill-tribe people”to evacuate their homes (The Nation, 12February 2001). Over 100 Tatmadaw soldiersseized a Thai Rangers’ Base, Number 9631, inMae Pah Luang district, Chiang Rai, as theysought to attack a nearby SSA position at DoiKaw Mai “from behind” (Bangkok Post, 11February 2001). A more serious cross-borderincident followed. When shells and bulletsfrom a Tatmadaw position hit the Thai bordertown of Mae Sai killing two and injuring severalcivilians and soldiers, the Thai Armyresponded by firing on military positions nearthe Burmese twin town of Tachilek. Thecommander of the Royal Thai Third Armyemphasised the gravity of the situation: “TheBurmese soldiers’ actions are in clear violationof our border agreement. We will use forceeven if it means there will be a loss of lives”;furthermore, in border zones under the de factocontrol of the infamous United Wa State Army(UWSA), one of the biggest drug cartels inAsia, “from our own assessment, the Burmesesoldiers are supporting the Wa in producingthe drugs in a rather open manner” (BangkokPost, 12 February 2001).

Thailand’s authorities have beenparticularly concerned about the growth in themetamphetamine trade, particularly theenormous quantity of speed pills (known inThailand as ya ba or crazy drug) enteringThailand by various routes. A whole barrageof reporting has implicated the Tatmadaw inprofiting from the cross-border drug trade andusing the UWSA in a proxy war with Thailand(Bangkok Post, 13 February 2001:1, 26February 2001:4). Thailand has accused theSPDC of “turning a blind eye to the Wa’snarcotic empire”, including the creation ofMong Yawn (about 30 km north of the ChiangMai border with Shan state), “a self-containeddrug-making center” with a growingpopulation of relocated Wa people from furthernorth (Yahoo! Asia, 11 March 2001; TheNation¸13 March 2001). In the ripostes tothese allegations, pointing to Thai crime anddrug syndicates “being protected” (The

Nation, 13 February 2001), the Myanmarauthorities claimed that Thailand was assisting“SURA drug-trafficking insurgents; that somebases of the SURA are situated in Thaiterritory; that Myanmar has no intention totransgress Thai territory” (New Light ofMyanmar, 14 February 2001). Other editionsof New Light of Myanmar reiterated Thai armycollusion with the “opium smugglers” ofSURA. Foreign military analysts in Bangkokhave also argued that Thailand covertlysupports the Shan guerrilla units in order tohit the drug factories of the UWSA and othertargets across the border (Lintner & Tasker,2001).

It is obvious from the war of words betweenThailand and Myanmar over cross-borderviolations of sovereignty and the drug tradethat “the border” is at the heart of “national”and inter-state political contentions, and thatthe hundreds of thousands of undocumentedmigrants and refugees are inextricably a partof the political imbroglio. Interestingly, theThai authorities have begun to acknowledgethe plight of the Shan displaced people asfundamentally caused by military and strategicrelocations related to the SPDC’s deter-mination to wipe out the Shan insurgentgroups, as well as by the complex geopoliticalrivalries within Shan state between theTatmadaw, UWSA and SSA. On 17 February2001, The Nation reported the Royal ThaiArmy Commander-in-Chief General SurayudhChulanont’s order to the armed forces “toprepare for a mass influx of refugees” due toTatmadaw offensives against the SSA: “Thearmy had been instructed to treat the refugeesin accordance with humanitarian principles”and “might require help from the UNHCR”.Despite such high-level public recognition ofa Shan “refugee” problem and voicing offrustration over the continuing insecurity onthe Myanmar side of the border, Thailand isnot willing to allow official refugee camps fordisplaced Shan people; indeed, the NSC stillmaintains that most Shans evicted from Shanstate in 1996-98 left for economic motives, andnot due to conflict (Subin, 2001).

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Geo-economics, inter-state relationsand repatriation

Cross-border relations continue to be abarometer of inter-state relations, reflected infrequent changes in policy that can best bedescribed as nervous coexistence rather thanconfident interdependence (Grundy-Warr,1993). Despite a period of mistrust and thetense military incidents along the border ofChiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces andShan State in the first quarter of 2001, a seriesof diplomatic moves initiated under Thai PrimeMinister Thaksin Shinawatra and particularlyencouraged by Defence Minister ChavalitYongchaiyudh, whose close links withBurmese military leaders are longstanding, ledto new plans to jointly develop border areasthrough business ties, military cooperationand joint arrangements (Bangkok Post, 9 April2001:2, 25 July 2001:3; The Nation, 25 July2001:3A). A whole series of public announce-ments covered cooperation in efforts tocombat the drug trade, reduce illegal labourmigration, develop cross-border roads, andpromote trade and new investments in borderareas (Bangkok Post, 6 August 2001). TheSeptember 2001 high-level visit to Thailandby a delegation of senior SPDC officials ledby Secretary Number 1, Lieutenant GeneralKhin Nyunt, “to strengthen the tradition offriendship and mutually beneficialcooperation” (BBC World Service, September,2001), included an audience with the Thai king.This highly symbolic event was followed by ameeting with the prime minister and the 19thmeeting of the bilateral Regional BorderCommittee, all of which received top coveragein the Thai and Myanmar press.

Another significant dimension of thefriendlier inter-state ties has been the Thaigovernment’s re-affirmation of “non-inter-ference” in Myanmar affairs together with therenewed calls to push for tougher registrationof migrant labour and the repatriation of illegalmigrants and displaced persons living in thecamps. The latter process is likely to remainproblematic since guarantees and conditions

for a “safe return” under the auspices of theUNHCR are far from being met in several“places of origin”. Whilst inter-state geo-economic relations have clearly improved,geopolitical ones remain difficult, and theposition of the main ethnic political parties thatdo not have ceasefire arrangements with theSPDC remains uncertain. At the time of writing,Thailand had apparently been invited by theSPDC “to mediate with three rebel armedgroups fighting Rangoon” (Bangkok Post, 7August 2001), namely the Karen NationalUnion (KNU), KNPP and SSA. Only if Thaimediation leads to direct dialogue between allparties will there be any possibility of creatingconditions on the ground for voluntaryrepatriation (see Grundy-Warr et al., 2002).

CONCLUSION: THE NEED FORLONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES

Geographers can contribute much to anunderstanding of the truly long-termconsequences and urgent policy-relatedissues of a whole range of problems associatedwith forced and large-scale displacements intoanother’s “national geo-body” (Black &Robinson, 1993). We can analyse the patternsand processes of displacement; the physicaland human geographical impacts of relocatingpopulations and whole villages from one placeto another; the environmental and ecologicalimpacts of displacement; and the politicalgeographies of identity, ethnic conflicts and“homeland”. In the case of the Myanmar-Thailand borderland, the scale and intensityof forced relocations and associateddisplacement and migration have, in someparts, undoubtedly produced a completetransformation in the human landscape,resulting in numerous long-term conse-quences requiring detailed research. Theseinclude the implications of displacement onland-use patterns, land ownership, cultivationand farming, natural resource management,freedom of movement, settlement and manyaspects of socio-economic development.Unfortunately, research remains restrictedbecause many of the zones affected by

Grundy-Warr.p65 1/18/2002, 11:45 AM25

displacement are effectively “no go” areas foranybody except for the Tatmadaw.

One of the critical geopolitical problems ofdisplacement is that created by human-madeboundaries. Along the Thai-Myanmarboundary, most humanitarian assistance stopson the Thai side. Crossing the boundary is aviolation of Myanmar’s territorial sovereigntyunless actually invited by the Myanmar stateauthorities, a highly unlikely eventuality giventheir repeated denials of anything to do withforced relocations (Associated Press, 2000).International NGOs are not “officially”permitted into the contested Karenniterritories, although limited access may befeasible in the small ceasefire zones controlledby the SPDC. Nor does Thailand officiallysanction cross-border assistance programmes,although tiny, ad hoc relief measures domanage to reach across the border, forinstance, the small mobile teams of Karennimedics trained in Thailand who occasionallyadminister to internally displaced persons

hiding in forested areas. The absurdity of thepredicament of the majority who remain cutoff from the outside world because they areconsidered to be in the sovereign domain of aparticular state by the international communityis emphasised by the fact that many of thosedisplaced do not regard the rulers of thatterritorial state as legitimate, and the fact thatsovereign control has necessarily involvedmilitary coercion.

Another way in which state practices andterritorial sovereignty affect the treatment ofdisplaced people is in the way host statesregard them. Not only do Thai state authoritiesnot recognise displaced people as refugees,there has also been a tendency to view theproblem as if it will soon go away. Meanwhile,the huge numbers of so-called “temporary”residents living in the camps, even after manyyears, cannot gain any official rights ofsettlement, travel or employment withinThailand and are confined mostly to theircamps and the immediate vicinity (Plate 4). In

Plate 4. Kayah women carrying goods from Camp 2 to a village near Camp 3 (Figure 4).Maintaining traditions and livelihood skills within the camps is difficult. The majority of

the “temporary displaced residents” in Thailand are ethnically “Kayah” hill farmingcommunities. Photograph by Dean Chapman, late 1990s (see also Chapman, 1998).

Grundy-Warr.p65 1/18/2002, 11:45 AM26

1998, the Thai government invited the UNHCRto take charge of the registration andsupervision of displaced persons in the bordercamps. UNHCR is to assist in organisingvoluntary repatriation, with the consent of theSPDC and Thai authorities, and monitor andfacilitate the “safe return” of refugees backinto Myanmar (ABC News, 16 March 2000).Unfortunately, it is clear that the border zonesare still militarily contested in many areas.Even in ceasefire zones, there is little guaranteethat returnees will be allowed to resettle in theirformer villages free from harassment fromsoldiers. Nor do these local-level agreementsrepresent anything resembling lasting politicaltruces (Smith, 1999). Thus, Thailand has whatSupang Chantanavanich, Director of the AsianResearch Center for Migration (ARCM),describes as “a long-term ‘temporary’phenomenon” in the form of hundreds ofthousands of undocumented migrants anddisplaced persons to deal with (Grundy-Warr,personal communication, 2001).

Sadly, peaceful conditions enabling “safereturn” will not solve the problems created bymass forced relocations and long-termdisplacement involving literally hundreds ofvillages and whole communities. Displacementhas ruptured social, economic and culturalstructures; torn village communities andfamilies apart; led to losses and denial ofresources and livelihood; and created large-scale human suffering and insecurity.Enormous focussed efforts will have to bemade if communities and social and economicstructures are to be rebuilt. Any organisedreturn to abandoned and neglected areas willrequire not only independent humanitarianrelief and human rights monitoring, but alsointerventions to help “rehabilitate” devastatedlands and clear away landmines, reunifycommunities and families, and assist farmersand other productive sectors. Meanwhile,building up the skills capacity of displacedpersons and appropriate community-basedprogrammes are essential for the people livingwithin “temporary” camps simply because oldsurvival and subsistence skills are being lost

and the children of the camps have noknowledge of former ways of life. As oneelderly female Karenni refugee put it: “Theysay these young people in the camp are partof a ‘lost generation’, but I think that if oursituation does not improve, their children willbe lost too” (Grundy-Warr, field interview,2001).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is part of an ongoing field-basedresearch on displacement along the Myanmar-Thai border benefiting from research grantsfrom the National University of Singapore(NUS). We are indebted to the Thai, Burmese,Karenni and Shan informants and expatriateNGO staff who have helped us to obtaininformation and occasionally acted as ourinterpreters. For the use of his photographs,we are grateful to Dean Chapman, a coremember of the documentary group at SidePhotographic Gallery, Newcastle-upon-Tyne,U.K., whose projects reflecting social, culturaland political issues in Asia include his workwith the Karenni, that won him the EuropeanPublishers’ Award for Photography. We alsothank the two anonymous referees for theirinsightful and constructive comments.

ENDNOTES

1We use “Burma” (capital “Rangoon”) mostly for theperiods prior to the change of name in 1989 to thehistoric Burman name “Myanmar” (capital “Yangon”)by the ruling military regime, then the State Law andOrder Restoration Council (SLORC), in 1997 renamedthe State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).For overlapping and post-1989 periods, we use“Myanmar/Burma” or “Myanmar” depending on thecontext. “Burmese” is used to mean the citizens ofMyanmar/Burma, irrespective of ethnic group, andthe main language, while “Burman” (rendered“Myanma” in Burmese) is an exclusive label referringto the dominant ethnic group. We have also used bothKayah and Karenni to refer to “Kayah state”, thename given by the state authorities to the land alsoknown as “Karenni state” by ethnic grouporganisations.

2Some important sources on ethnic struggles include:on the KIO and northeastern Burma, Lintner (1996)

Grundy-Warr.p65 1/18/2002, 11:45 AM27

and Tucker (2000); on Karenni and Shan areas,Boucaud & Boucaud (1992); and on the Karen rebelsat the height of their struggle, Falla (1991).

3Initially formed by nationalist independence leaderAung San from a combination of different ethnicunits trained by the British or Japanese during theSecond World War, the Tatmadaw (literally, “mainarmy”) has grown into one of the largest armies inSoutheast Asia. It still is multi-ethnic, though overyears of insurgencies the dominant leaders andnumbers are Burman.

4In fact, it is difficult to verify all the precise locationsand names of the villages affected by relocationorders. First, many are tiny and may have only a fewhouseholds; second, many hill settlements areperiodically moved according to swidden agriculturalcycles; third, many villagers describe locations interms of walking distances to main towns or othervillages and are not familiar with cartographic placereferences even in their own language. (The use ofvernacular languages for place names within the samearea means that even slight differences in dialect orpronunciation make it hard to record details foraccurate mapping.)

5For instance, the August 1999 Resolution allowedmigrant labour in 18 types of business (down from47 in 1998) in 37 provinces (down from 54 in 1998).After negotiations with the private sector, 106,000migrant workers were to be registered within a 90-day period, requiring a refundable “bail” fee and“work permit” fee of 1,000 baht each, a medicalexam fee of 700 baht and compulsory purchase of a1,000-baht health insurance card. For detailedsummaries of the Resolutions in March 1992, June1996, April 1998 and August 1999, see Caouette etal. (2000).

6Many of these come under the Burmese BorderConsortium and include a wide range of groups, suchas the Thailand Baptist Missionary Fellowship(TBFM), Refugee Care Netherlands (RCN),International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit ReliefService (JRS), Handicap International (HI), CatholicOffice for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COEER),and Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF).

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