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A Journey To Protect Points Of Sale
Nir Valtman, CISSP
W : www.valtman.org
. : @ValtmaNir
Introduction
2
Photo by Bill Fraser
01/07/2014 3
01/07/2014 4
I’m an architect
5
01/07/2014 6
7
Zombies!!!
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Defacement
9
AntiDef
OPEN SOURCE
Memory Scraper
Secure TDD
10
Why Points Of Sale Targeted?
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Deployment
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Payment ApplicationPoint Of Sale
IS NOT
V
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RAMDB
POS Payment Processing
Host
PA Server
Store Payment Processor’s Data Center
PA Client
RAM
DB
RAMDB
POS Payment Processing
Host
PA Server
Store Payment Processor’s Data Center
PA Client
RAM
DB
Rest Transit Memory
Where Are My Credit Cards?
Mobile App Presentation Server Application & Payment Server Payment Processor’s Data Center
Rest Transit Memory
Where Are My Credit Cards?
Mobile App Presentation Server Application & Payment Server Payment Processor’s Data Center
Token
Server
Credit
Cards
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
100% PCI Compliant
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Notvulnerable
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Cashier ≠ hacker
Retail
Environment
Assumptions
Big Brother
RATs
RemoteAdministrationTools
Routing
Threats
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READ&WRITE
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I AM BOB
ME TOO
Payment Stages - Authorization
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PA
Processor
IssuerGateway
Acquirer
Route Track1/2 Transmit Track1/2
POI
Transmit Track1/2
Difficult
Exploitation
Payment Stages - Authorization
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Payment Stages - Settlement
42Processor
IssuerGateway
Acquirer
Transmit SettlementStore & Send PANs
PA Server
Credit Merchant’s Account
Difficult
Exploitation
Payment Stages - Settlement
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Memory Scraping
Demo
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OfflineOnline VS
Bypassed Solutions
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SecureString Class
Demo
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Next NextNextNext Next Generation Firewall
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ANTI
*
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Whitelist
MD5 SHA256
Correct Solutions
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Cyber
Intelligence
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I have access to POS terminals in the US,
what is the best malware I should use?
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You need to infect the firmware of the terminal.
By doing that, you can get full track 1 + 2,
but the PIN will be hashed.
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Selling malicious firmware for Verifone’s POS terminals.
Leaks dumps + PINs through GPRS.
Price: Only 700$
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Business Development Offer
Owner of a fake POS sells his terminal.
Price: 50% from revenue sharing.
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RFI: Change terminal configuration to require PIN for all cards.
Cause: Get only 101 data, but wants PINs
Proposed Solution:
Thermal Imager
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Sandbox
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Network-based
Anomaly Detection
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Operating System
Anomaly Detection
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Runtime Obfuscation
Not only products required
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Performance Security
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Assembly Signing
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Assembly Obfuscation
PROCESS ISOLATION
What Next
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?
? ?
?
??
?
?
??
??
? ?
?
What Would You Steal?
BIP BIP
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Memory
Scraping
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Memory
Scraping
Cashier = hacker
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Memory
Scraping
Summary
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Memory
Scraping
Security by Obscurity
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Memory
Scraping
Simple Exploitation
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Memory
Scraping
Hard to Protect
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Memory
Scraping
You’re Insured
Nir Valtman
W : www.valtman.org
. : @ValtmaNir
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