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1
DENMARK’S PEACE AND STABILISATION PROGRAMME FOR THE
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN REGION 2015-2017
CONCEPT NOTE
Ver. 19 August 2014
File no. 46.H.1-6-0-2.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
2
Abbreviations _______________________________________________________________ 3
1. Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 5
2. Strategic framework for programming _______________________________________ 6
3. Context analysis ________________________________________________________ 6
3.1. Regional perspective ___________________________________________________ 7
3.2. Relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan ______________________________ 8
3.3. Key findings on Afghanistan _____________________________________________ 9
3.4. Key findings on Pakistan ________________________________________________12
3.5. Tendencies in neighbouring countries _____________________________________15
4. Experiences from the first phase of the programme ____________________________15
4.1. Activities in the first phase 2011-14 _______________________________________15
4.2. Lessons identified _____________________________________________________17
5. Intervention logic _______________________________________________________19
5.1. The strategic thematic and geographic focus ________________________________19
5.2. Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Buildning _____________21
5.3. Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue __________________________22
5.4. Compliance with cross cutting objectives (incl. gender) ________________________22
5.5. Complementarity _____________________________________________________23
5.6. Results framework ____________________________________________________24
6. Budget _______________________________________________________________24
7. Risk management ______________________________________________________25
8. Envisaged management structure __________________________________________25
Annex 1: Updated Process Action Plan ___________________________________________26
Annex 2: Bibliography ________________________________________________________27
Content
3
Abbreviations
Af-Pak PSP Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme
ALO The Department for Asia, Latin America and Oceania, MoFA
ANA Afghan National Army
ANA TF Afghan National Army Trust Fund
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
APP Appraisal Consultant
C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive Device
DAC (Register of Overseas Development Assistance by OECD´s) Development Assistance Committee
DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies
DKK Danish kroner
EoD Embassy of Denmark
ENR Department for European Neighbourhood, MoFA
FATA Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
HRBA Human Rights Based Approach
KP Khyber Pakhtunkwa
LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MOD Ministry of Defense
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOI Ministry of Interior, Afghanistan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAP1325 Denmark’s National Action Plan on Resolution 1325
NDU National Defence University (Islamabad, Pakistan)
OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (see DAC)
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Pgm Programme
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSF (Danish) Peace and Stabilisation Fund
4
PSP Peace and Stabilisation Programme
RDDC Royal Danish Defence College
SIDA Swedish International Development Assistance
tbd To be decided
ToC Theory of Change
TOR Terms of Reference
TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)
UFT Technical Advisory Services, MoFA
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WGSS Whole of Government Stabilisation Secretariat
WGSSC Whole of Government Stabilisation Steering Commitee
5
1. Introduction
This document presents the conceptual framework for Denmark’s Whole of Government
Afghanistan–Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2015-2017 (in the following referred
to as the Af-Pak PSP). The concept note summarizes the political, economic and security
context. It will also point to a number of thematic programmes and engagements that will be
further elaborated at the programming stage. It will be guided by the Theory of Change
approach.
The programme’s strategic objective is to:
Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region through more capable and accountable
institutions to protect the civilian population and enhanced regional confidence and
reconciliation.
The concept note suggests two thematic components:
1. Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building
2. Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue
The overall value of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme is in 2015-17
suggested to be DKK 335 million.
As part of the Chicago Summit in 2012, where the coalition of contributing countries (3C)
pledged to fund the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF) in the coming years, Denmark pledged to
contribute 100 million DKK per year – 80 million for the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 20
million for the Afghan National Army (ANA). It has been decided that this commitment will draw
270 million from the total value of the Af-Pak PSP. Thus, the resources available for new
engagements amount to 65 million DKK.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan nexus is one of the most complex stabilisation challenges presently
facing the international community. The complicated security situation in Afghanistan has led to
a large international focus and engagement, including from Denmark. The situation is however
also influenced by wider regional dynamics, in particular from Pakistan. The Peace and
Stabilisation programme builds on the assumption that stability needs to be achieved by
addressing stabilisation in a regional context and that stabilisation and economic development
of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a precondition for stabilisation of the wider region.
Needless to say, the Danish interventions are minor seen in an international perspective, but by
focusing the limited resources available – both geographically and thematically and by careful
selection of partners – the programme aims at contributing effectively to the overarching goal of
stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
6
2. Strategic framework for programming
The programme design has been guided by the policy paper for Denmark’s integrated
stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, Denmark’s policy
towards Fragile States “Peace and Stabilisation” and principles from the Danish Defence
Agreement 2013-2017. The policies outline key priorities and principles for Danish cooperation
in fragile states and situations and draw upon the work by the OECD/DAC as well as Danish and
international experience, when focusing on contributing to stabilisation, state- and peace-
building in fragile states through integrated efforts that make use of all the assets available to
the Danish government. In addition, the Danish Government’s development strategy “The Right
to a Better Life” has stability and protection as a focus area.
The Programme has been developed in accordance with Guidelines for the Peace and
Stabilisation Fund (February 2014) and draws on Danida’s Aid management Guidelines
(February 2013) as well as the provisions of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states
which relates to aid effectiveness in fragile states, risk management and the application of the
Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) including gender issues.
The programme is complementary to other Danish funded activities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region. This includes support through the Afghanistan and Pakistan Country Programmes (with
development objectives), the Regions of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan (refugees and IDPs) and
humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it draws on long lasting defence experience in capacity building
of institutions and efficient military-to-military cooperation.
This is the second phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan PSP. A Mid-term review of the first phase
was finalised in November 2013. The broader Peace and Stabilisation Fund was evaluated in
mid-2014. The recommendations of both have been taken into consideration during the
formulation of the concept note. (cf. chapter 4.2.)
Taking into account the overall uncertainty with respect to developments in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the regional Peace and Stabilisation programme aims at setting out a realistic Danish
programme, maintaining if possible a degree of flexibility and adaptability. With Afghanistan
entering a new phase, including the change of government in mid-2014 and the assumption by
national security forces of full responsibility for the country’s security as of 2015, the planning
base for the programme is inevitably uncertain.
3. Context analysis
This section provides an overview of the context in which the Peace and Stabilisation
Programme is anchored. It describes the drivers of peace and conflict – primarily in Afghanistan
and Pakistan and touching upon Iran and Central Asia.
7
Describing the full context of the conflicts in the region is a vast study that goes far beyond the
scope of this concept note. Instead this paper refers to credible existing published conflict
analyses that can be consulted for a comprehensive description. One of the most useful of
these is the British study “Understanding Afghanistan”1 published in 2008 that paints a
comprehensive picture of Afghanistan’s conflict and other challenges. Another very useful study
is the ‘Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan’2 produced for SIDA by swede.peace and
Cooperation for Peace and Unity in 2012. This study resulted in identification of a number of
peace and conflict triggers that correlates largely with the key findings of the ‘Understanding
Afghanistan’ research project. Furthermore, the study points to a number of options for
assistance that will contribute to peace and stability and presents the drivers of Peace and
Conflict identified.
Key findings from these and other studies are presented below. Unfortunately it has not been
possible to identify similar official comprehensive studies on Pakistan. A full list of the sources
used is annexed (annex 2).
3.1. Regional perspective
The region demonstrates a complex and negative interaction between poor standards of
governance, low levels of human security and human development, militancy and insurgency,
and poor economic conditions. While there are obvious differences between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, including their relative states of development, the challenges facing the two countries
are in some regards interlinked. The challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan – or the nexus
between the two – cannot be tackled in isolation. Lasting stability depends on successfully
engaging the wider region – countries like India, the Central Asian States, Iran and even China
and Russia as well as taking into account the prominent role of USA in the region. Many of
Afghanistan´s neighbours have recent histories of internal violent conflicts that have spilt over
into neighbouring countries due to the weakness of state and linked with the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan. The regional situation is also shaped by unresolved issues in and between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, including real or perceived threats to both the territorial integrity and
the internal cohesion of the two countries. Creating more trust between Afghanistan and
Pakistan in particular, and amongst regional actors more generally, is thus of utmost
importance.
1 Understanding Afghanistan – Synthesis Report, University of York, Post-war Reconstruction and
Development Unit (PRDU), for DFID, 2008.
2 Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan, swede.peace and Cooperation for Peace and Unity (produced for
SIDA), 2012.
8
The peace process in Afghanistan should be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led, but it is clear that
all regional actors have important roles to play in both facilitating and supporting a successful
peace process and guaranteeing or maintaining any resulting peace agreement. This would
benefit not just Afghanistan, but also the wider region. Increased regional cooperation and
interdependence can play an important role in underpinning a political process by creating
incentives for the region to benefit from more stable countries. Effects would include increased
trade and commercial activities and less need for exorbitant security budgets.
In Pakistan, challenges include reconciliation and reintegration of militants and separatists, the
questions of Baloch separatism and the legal foundation of the Federal Administrated Tribal
Areas in Northwest Pakistan, while struggling with ineffective institutions and growing
intolerance. Pakistan's policies are also affected by long-standing issues and lack of confidence
in its relationship with India.
3.2. Relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan
While being separate states with individual challenges, Afghanistan and Pakistan are pulled
together in a complex of security imperatives that – if not addressed – threatens to further de-
stabilise both states while pulling in other regional actors. Bilateral relations between the two
countries are driven and constrained by a number of sometimes interlinked challenges. Three
will be highlighted here:
Firstly, relations between the two countries are strained by the disputed Pashtun areas and the
controversial border demarcation along the ‘Durand Line’. During the second Anglo-Afghan war,
Afghanistan had to cede parts of Western Baluchistan, Quetta and the bulk of the FATA to
Britain under the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. This decision however remains contested in
Afghanistan to this day, where it is notably rejected by large numbers of the Afghan Pashtuns.
The second theme to be highlighted concerns the strained relationship between Pakistan and
India and the underlying sense of insecurity which continues to be a dominating factor in
Pakistan. As long as the dispute on the “Durand Line” has not been resolved between the two
countries and as long as the animosity between Indian and Pakistan prevails, Pakistan will
uphold a very strong interest in Afghanistan as a Pakistani rear area; as a source of “strategic
depth”3.
Thirdly, the bilateral relations between the two countries are strained by the vast number of
refugees which Pakistan has hosted from Afghanistan, of whom 1.6 million are still in primarily
3 The concept of “strategic depth” implies that Pakistan in a major conflict with India would wish to have access
to Afghan soil to protect command and force structures from Indian superiority [and Indian alleged attempts to dominate Afghanistan]. The concept thus implies that Pakistan would seek influence in Afghanistan to secure this - leading to deep rooted Afghan distrust in Pakistani motives and intentions.
9
in the border regions of Pakistan. Presently Afghanistan receives refugees from Pakistan as a
result of the Waziristan offensive towards militant groups.
Besides these three challenges, relations between the two countries are further challenged by a
number of cross-border destabilising factors.
The lack of effective border management and cooperation is a central issue in the region with
grave implications. The borders in the region, especially the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, are impossible to fully control. In the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
radicalisation and lawlessness are widespread, and substantial illegal trade and smuggling,
including weapons and opium, make the situation unstable. Furthermore, Afghan insurgent
groups and Pakistani terrorist groups use the tribal areas – on each side of the border – as safe
havens, conducting recruitment and training in the area. A large proportion of the narcotics
smuggling that finances the Taliban’s activities in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan.
However, Pakistan is at the same time Afghanistan’s most important trade partner making
efficient legal border trade a potentially important booster of development on both sides of the
border.
3.3. Key findings on Afghanistan
Afghanistan has made considerable political, judicial, security, economic and developmental
progress over the past decade. But the gains made are fragile and reversible. Thus, Afghanistan
will continue to be a weak state with some of the lowest human development indicators whose
future will depend largely on the ability of a new president and government to make progress in
negotiating an inclusive political settlement with all major insurgent and militia groups; maintain
security; tackle corruption; bring rule of law and effective governance to its population; and
enact key economic and political reforms.
Afghanistan will increasingly take control of its own affairs over the coming years, as
international presence and influence will be reduced. Yet, even in the most optimistic scenario,
Afghanistan will remain dependent on international financial assistance and prone to outbreaks
of violent conflict. The central government will need to mitigate the threats posed by
insurgency, corruption and the criminalisation of the state and maintain security and service
delivery in sparsely populated rural areas if it is to retain credibility and popular support.
Because of this, a continued and long-term international development effort in Afghanistan will
be needed.
An inclusive political settlement. Weak parties and political movements, with many
intellectuals not engaging, leave the political game to traditional strongmen accustomed to
zero-sum games and violent means. The pursuit of a ‘grand bargain’ would prove unsettling for
northern militias, in particular, who had initially been privileged in the first post-Bonn (after
2001) systems of governance. Presently there is a challenge of establishing a ‘national unity
10
government’ after the presidential election in 2014. The ambition is political inclusiveness
where the two presidential camps might agree to a new formula of power sharing.
In addition, sustainable progress within security, economic development and social inclusion is
likely to be difficult without a political settlement with the Taliban. The process of dialogue and,
eventually, negotiation over power-sharing is and should remain led by the Afghan government.
Insecurity will remain a concern. The conflict in Afghanistan has entered a new phase. As the
international troops withdraw, it is now increasingly a contest between the insurgents and the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The contemporary conflict within Afghanistan involves
a growing and diverse group of fighters representing several factions and numerous interests
and motives. The widespread perception, however, that all attacks aim to achieve the overthrow
of the State is unfounded, and it appears likely that many insurgent leaders, including some
among the Taliban, see their interests best served by incorporation into the government. In all
transitional areas there is a variety of unfinished business that may result in further violence
post-2014. Historical feuds and unresolved grievances are worsening after having been, in some
cases, temporarily contained by the presence of international troops. Similarly, clashes among
pro-government actors may become more frequent. Also mistreatment of Afghans at the hands
of their own security forces, operating with less supervision from foreign troops as well as
pervasive corruption and injustice, breeds resentment that feeds the insurgency. Finally, despite
its rhetoric, Pakistan has not yet produced credible evidence that the politics of supporting
“good Talibans” (= Talibans operating in Afghanistan) and their safe havens in FATA has been
changed to a politics of zero-tolerance against any insurgency. In June 2014 Pakistan launched
a large scale operation in North Waziristan with the aim of clearing the area of militant groups
and leading to government control. However, despite fierce fighting and the disruption of
insurgent command structures it is very likely that the bulk of the fighting force of the Pakistan
Taliban (TTP) though fractured and degraded - and not the least the Haqqani network may have
dislocated elsewhere in the region, leading to unchanged hostile responses by Afghanistan –
especially in Kandahar and Kunar – with an eminent risk of worsening cross-border relations.
US have recently announced total troop withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2016, but
remain committed to support the ANSF financially together with other nations that pledged at
Chicago in 2012.
Afghan forces suffered record casualties in 2013 and retreated from some locations in the face
of rising insurgency but maintained the tempo of their operations in most parts of the country.
Afghanistan still has no shortage of young men joining the ANSF, offsetting the rising number of
those who opt to leave them or abandon their posts (see paragraph on youth bulge below). The
government remains capable of moving supplies along highways to urban centres. ANSF
cohesiveness, or lack of it, may prove decisive in the coming years, and Paktia notwithstanding,
only minor reports emerged in 2013 of Afghan units fighting each other.
11
However, this will not stop the Taliban and other insurgent groups, such as the Haqqani
network, from pushing for such gains, however. The rising number of attacks show that the
insurgents are able to motivate their fighters in the absence of foreign troops, shifting their
rhetoric from calls to resist infidel occupation to a new emphasis on confronting the “puppets” or
“betrayers of Islam” in the government. The emerging prominence of splinter groups such as
Mahaz-e-Fedayeen is a further indication that the insurgency will not lack ferocity in the coming
years. For the first time, the insurgents inflicted almost as many casualties on Afghan security
forces in 2013 as they suffered themselves, and several accounts of battles in remote districts
suggested the sides were nearly matched in strength. There are concerns that the balance could
tip in favour of the insurgency, particularly in some rural locations, as foreign troops continue
leaving. Thus, continued support to ANSF is crucial.
Rule of law is one of the three pillars of a government that is accountable to its population.
Rule of law is also a prerequisite for development in many other sectors of state. For instance,
without a functioning justice system (police, prosecutor, court etc.) compliance with human
rights obligations by the government is void. In Afghanistan this rings especially true with
regard to the rights of women making the capacity building of rule of law institutions essential in
promoting gender equality in the long term. Rule of law also plugs into the capacity building of
the security sector and the two areas are interlinked. For instance, support to the functioning of
the Afghan National Police is essential in order to ensure their ability as first responders at a
crime scene which in turn is essential for any possible prosecution in court. This is crucial in any
attempt to counter the insurgency in Afghanistan and consequently in creating long term
stability in the country.
Human rights remain challenged as violations of human rights in general and women’s rights
in particular are daily occurrences. Hence, there is need for support of civil society organisations
which work to promote the human rights situation. The needs and interests of women must be
more fully addressed. In some areas – such as justice, safeguarding women’s rights, as well as
the rights of other marginalised groups – it will require training and monitoring to ensure the
rule of law. The Afghan government and the international community must support equitable
justice, access to social services and the amplification of empowering customary messages while
ensuring accountability through consistent quantitative as well as qualitative monitoring of
women’s evolving position. One critical step in tackling this epidemic of violence could be the
engagement of more women in the police and judiciary and the taking of tangible steps to
protect and empower women – not only relying upon the family to provide protection.
The present-day Afghan State continues to struggle to gain legitimacy. The credibility and
success of the transition depend as much on strengthening democratic and accountable
governance in Afghanistan at all levels, as on the capability of the security forces. The goal of
the present international support for ANSF is to strengthen the accountability of the security
forces, including by reducing corruption and mismanagement, and thereby enhancing the
legitimacy of the Afghan government.
12
There is increasing concern about the negative short to medium term fiscal situation caused by
substantially lower rates of economic growth and the economic effects of the ISAF withdrawal.
This situation is troubling given the close relationship between economic growth, revenue
mobilisation (i.e., taxation), governmental legitimacy, political stability, development and
security.
3.4. Key findings on Pakistan
Pakistan, the world’s sixth most populous nation, is today at the crossroads of the pressing
issues of terrorism, extremism, development and democracy. As a nuclear armed, pivotal state,
Pakistan’s stability and governance, and its relations with neighbouring Afghanistan and India,
has consequences not only for the region, long afflicted by strife and poverty, but for the
international community. Likewise, global geopolitics and regional developments also impact
Pakistan and influence the country’s ability to establish peace and stability.
Despite being created in 1947, Pakistan is still wrestling with establishing a coherent political
unity, strengthening its political institutions and ensuring state control over the entire territory.
Pakistan is in a crisis over its own identity, constantly debating whether it is fundamentally an
Islamic country, or if it has an identity broader than the religious core, which will also allow
other minorities and beliefs to fit into the system.
For years, the political scene has been tormented by widespread corruption and nepotism, a
political unwillingness to actually address the underdeveloped social and educational functions
and an increasing gap between energy demand and supply with severe consequences for
private households, the industry, and thus the economy. Add to these widespread terror
activities by insurgents and militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory both
domestically and likely also in neighbouring states.
In 2013, for the first time since the establishment of the state 67 years earlier, Pakistan
witnessed after an uninterrupted election term a transfer of power from one civilian government
to another. A new single-party government, the PML-N, came to power on a political platform
promising to bring electricity to the people, improve the economy, provide education to all, and
eradicate extremism through a process of dialogue. It also vowed to improve relations with
India and Afghanistan.
The armed forces and the army in particular, are a dominating political and economic factor
that has exercised military rule in almost half the life time of Pakistan. The armed forces
accounts for around 1/4 of the economy, and the army is still seen to have a defining role when
it comes to Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The army perceives itself as the custodian of
the state, and it is arguably still the most respected institution in Pakistan. However, at the
same time it is widely acknowledged that there is a need to ensure civilian and political control
over an army that today literally governs itself.
13
While the former government of Pakistan lead by PPP, the Pakistan People’s Party, and General
Kayani, the former Army Commander, over time developed an understanding of the role of the
army as the external protector of the nation. This may have changed since the present Pakistan
Muslim League (N) government took over in May 2013. The government decided to arrest the
former military dictator, general Musharraf, for high treason and thereby openly disrupting the
de facto immunity of army officers' actions – much to the discontent of the army. Secondly, the
new government’s attempts to negotiate a political settlement with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)
have not provided viable results. At the same time, the army has taken heavy casualties in its
fight against the insurgency but with no mandate to respond militarily to this increase in
attacks. The previous year has therefore deepened the ditch between the Pakistani government
and its army. This in turn will most likely postpone a genuine civilian control of the armed forces
of Pakistan as envisaged by the current presidency of the country.
The security situation continues to be very volatile, particularly in the areas bordering
Afghanistan. The withdrawal of foreign combat forces from Afghanistan as well as developments
in US-Pakistan relations are major factors. The on-going military operation in FATA and its
possible outcomes could also be seen as potentially contributing factors in the volatile security
situation. Extremist militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, sectarian violence against shias and Baloch insurgency in Balochistan, target
killing in Sindh and presence of hard core Jihadis in Punjab are unpredictable and they all fuel
an unstable overall security situation.
For decades, the Pakistani state cultivated radical, militant groups as regional foreign policy
instruments. Some of these have increasingly become an internal menace. Most militant groups
have their headquarters in the FATA, provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan –
areas which have never been brought fully under the state’s control.
Several attempts to establish peace accords between Pakistan and insurgent groups within the
last decade have failed. The latest attempt of a peace process in the spring of 2014 never
reached to the level of substantive negotiations. The breakdown of talks was succeeded by a
large-scale military operation with the purpose of bringing the area of North Waziristan under
control and with a vision to abolish the archaic tribal rule in all of the areas. The Post Crisis
Needs Assessment – Pakistan’s main peace-building and development strategy for the border
region – foresees long term interventions up to 2020 to reinstate peace.
Insecurity will most likely continue to be a serious threat to the civilian livelihood in the tribal
belt and it is expected to continue to inspire violence in the larger urban areas. The public
insecurity is linked to the militant movements since the militant activities of these seem to be
funded from criminal activities having severe consequences for the economic development of
Pakistan.
14
The situation in Pakistan is thus precarious. On the one hand, legal and state reform promoting
involvement of the people in decision-making and enhancing mechanisms for accountability
have been introduced. On the other hand, these initiatives are still to bear fruit in a situation
where state finances face increasing instability.
One of the more successful fields have been that of rule of law where commitment by the
government supported by international donors leads toward a strengthened judiciary system.
Likewise substantial efforts are done to support the roles of the law enforcement agencies by
introducing new legislation, training and equipment that intend to decrease the trust deficit
between Law enforcement and the citizens. The rule of law will continue be one of the most
important areas for governance and the parliament needs to show decisiveness and political will
in order to mainstream the society.
The conflict in the border areas continues to destabilise the country and the region. In relation
to stabilising Afghanistan, an obvious and major challenge to border management is mitigating
the impact of trafficking in opiates and related precursors. Managing the border with
Afghanistan is difficult, but disrupting the illegal economy that spans the border is crucial for
conflict prevention both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is important to recognise that, due to
the porosity of this frontier, Pakistan’s other borders – the coast, Iran, India and China – are, de
facto, Afghanistan’s borders and can to some degree be considered relevant in a stabilisation
context.
There is a marked difference between human rights in principle and in practice. Most
international conventions have been ratified, albeit with some delays. Translation into national
legislation is taking place with important achievements in recent years, not least in relation to
pro-women legislation. Yet implementation lacks behind. The situation on the ground is
characterized by extra judicial killings and forced disappearances, violence against women and
honour killings, sectarian attacks against shias and other minority groups, child labour,
continuous threats to human rights activists and investigative journalists leaving an impression
of a state with growing intolerance.
Humanitarian needs are always there in the country. Pakistan has hosted over 5 million
refugees from Afghanistan, of whom 1.6 million are still in the country. Major military
operations in 2009 against militants in parts of KP and in 2014 in FATA have resulted in further
substantial population displacements, damage to private and public infrastructure, and loss of
assets and livelihoods. Such operations have continued and give rise to important movements
of internally displaced persons (IDPs), so currently there are more than one million IDPs of
which many have been displaced for years, often with bleak prospects for returning home in the
short term.
In summary, developments in Pakistan over the coming years are expected to have great and
direct impact on regional peace and stability.
15
3.5. Tendencies in neighbouring countries
Three Central Asian republics share a border with Afghanistan, namely Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. For these Central Asian states the two main challenges of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan security complex are spread of Islamic fundamentalism and narcotics. The
regimes in the three republics are heavily engaged in fighting fundamentalism, but it is widely
assumed that local and national authorities to some extent profit from the transit of narcotics.
Addressing these transnational challenges and controlling external borders is a common priority
for the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan.
Iran has deep cultural and historic connections to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran’s foreign
policy towards the region and Afghanistan and Pakistan is driven by a number of factors
including: the international and regional play of power; the common problems with regard to
narcotics trafficking, terrorism and refugees; and access to energy. The antagonistic relationship
with the US has caused Iran to feel pressured by the sizeable US military presence in the
region. Iranian policy is characterised by realpolitik rather than export of the Islamic Revolution.
Iran prefers a stable Afghanistan and an Afghan government receptive to Iranian influence. The
Taliban is viewed as a threat also to Iran's own security and therefore Iran does not want the
Taliban to regain a dominant role in Afghanistan. Although Iran and Pakistan have a common
interest in a relatively stable and economically viable Afghanistan, they distrust each other’s
intentions and conduct in the country.
4. Experiences from the first phase of the programme
4.1. Activities in the first phase 2011-14
The programme objective of the first phase of the Peace and stabilisation Fund (PSF)
programme was:
Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by supporting efforts to build capable
and accountable security and justice sectors and supporting regional confidence-building.
The first phase has been focused on three mutually supportive tracks for Danish engagement in
the region;
Component 1: Capacity development of security forces to enhance security and stability, with
the objective to: Capacity of security forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan enhanced to undertake
security related assignments.
Component 2: Law and Order & Criminal Intelligence, with the objective to: Capacity of police,
military and border officials enhanced to improve law enforcement and crime prevention.
Component 3: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue, with the objective to: Support confidence
building and enhance regional cooperation towards reduced tensions and increased stabilisation
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
16
Table 1: Phase-one components and sub-components
Objective Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by supporting efforts to build capable and accountable security and justice sectors and supporting regional confidence
Component 1. Capacity development of security forces to enhance security and stability.
2: Law and order and criminal intelligence 3: Regional reconciliation and Dialogue
Immediate objective
Capacity of security forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan enhanced to undertake
security related assignments
Capacity of police, military and border officals enhanced to improve law enforcement and crime prevention
Support confidence and enhance regional cooperation towards reduced tensions and increased stabilisation in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan region
Sub-component
1.a - Capacity
Building of Afghan
National Security
Forces and Structures
1.b - Civil-military Relations
2.a - Regional Academy
for Security Analysis and
Training (Dhaka)
2.b - Counter-IED Training and Support
(Pakistan)
2.c - Maritime security
2.d - Border management and regional Counter
Narcotics
2.e UNDP office in Helmand
3.a - Track II Regional Confidence Buliding
3.b Support to National and
Regional Reconciliation
3.c Women, Peace and Security
Project ANA Trust Fund
- Commanders Pool (Helmand)
Dhaka Regional Academy
C-IED Maritime security project
(1) UNODC Pakistan Country Programme
UNDP office in Helmand
(1) Dialogue with Iran (SIPRI)
(1) Salaam Support Group (UNAMA)
UN Women Pakistan
- Civil-military engagement
(2) UNODC Afghanistan Country Programme
(2) India-Pakistan and India-Pakistan-Afghanistan (University og Ottawa)
(2) Istanbul process/Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures on Counter Narcotics and emergency response
1) Cooperation between RDDC and NDU
(3) UNODC Iran Country Programme (closed)
2) Support for EU-donated C-IED vehicles
(4) UNODC Regional Programme
(3) DIIS/ Chatham house joined seminar in London on regional conflicts
3) Exchange of military personnel
(5) UNODC Inter-regional Drug Control (Vienna)
(4) Increase analutical capacity of DIIS regarding stability, security and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(6) UNODC NATO-Russia project
(7) OSCE Border project Tadsjikistan
Exc. Agency DK Military/ ANA TF
MoD/NDU tbd UK MoD MoD UNODC/OSCE MFA Multiple UN Women
Country Afghanistan Pakistan Bangladesh/ Regional
Pakistan Pakistan Pak./Afgh./ Iran/Reg Regional Afghanistan/ Regional/(Pak)
Pakistan
DK Mgt. MoD MoD EoD/ASI EoD/MoD EoD/MoD EoD/ENR ASI EoD+
Budget (mill.) 85 2 7 15 + 0,75 1 37 4.75 12.25 5
DAC/Non-DAC §12 Non-DAC
§12 Non-DAC DAC §12 Non-DAC §12 Non-DAC
DAC DAC DAC DAC
17
4.2. Lessons identified
The draft overall evaluation of the PSF recommends to use a Theory of Change approach in
programming. Furthermore, it recommends having a stronger strategic focus and consequently
a reduction in the number of non-coherent activities under each component/sub-component of
the programme. The evaluation also recommends securing unallocated funds and adequate
human resources in order to maintain the flexibility and effectiveness of the PSF.
A midterm review in November 2013 undertook an assessment of the PSF-Afghanistan-Pakistan
programme with regard to relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and programme management
and monitoring. It should be noted that the support for LOTFA was not part of the review, as
this activity in phase one was funded on a separate budget-line outside the Af-Pak programme.
On relevance, the assessment showed that the programme provides a foreign policy tool that
allows for engagement in a very uncertain and fragile context. By doing so it becomes relevant
to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the other recipient countries in the region; as well as to Danish
interests in managing the drawdown in Afghanistan and in reducing threats emanating from the
region.
On coherence, the review found that most of the programme´s implementing options are
organised along recipients' national lines due to lack of cross-border cooperation structures. This
challenges coherence and leads to activities to promote cross-border cooperation being add-ons
to a focus on building national capacities.
The Review Team found it positive, for example, that in Pakistan the military engagement on
Counter-IED capacity is tied together with the civilian police engagement on crime scene
investigation (UNODC). Similarly, in Afghanistan there is a positive relationship between support
for civilian border management (UNODC) and support for critical capabilities in the ANA (ANA-
TF). One could assume that the same conclusion could have been drawn in regard to LOTFA if
this programme had been included in the review.
The Review Team identified four opportunities to increase relevance and coherence of the
portfolio:
Investigate opportunities to support regional cooperation through Pakistan’s Counter-
IED Organisation, such as by sponsoring students from other countries to train there.
(followed-up: extending of existing Counter-IED project to include maintenance and
spare parts for donated equipment has been initiated and is under development.
Simultaneously, potential for Counter-IED efforts during the 2015-17 programme is
being explored.)
Consider support to female officer participation in ANA training. (Is followed-up:
Establishing and funding of facilities for female instructors and cadets at Afghan Army
Officer Academy in Kabul is underway.)
18
Explore whether the law enforcement sub-programme of UNODC’s Regional Programme
requires funding. (Is followed-up: Subsequently the programme was funded.)
A more explicit disaster response and gender-related programming, which may be done
through the cooperation with existing partners. This could be done by focusing some
UNODC support on gender and justice, by including disaster response into funds for
military capacity-building, or gender into military or law enforcement exchanges.
Further implementing partners could be asked to present plans to integrate human
rights and gender-relevant indicators into their monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
(Is followed-up: As a response to this recommendation UNODC were asked to present
proposals including a gender angle. This has proven difficult.)
On effectiveness, the review stressed the importance of going through a programme planning
process that also produces appropriate measuring tools. The lack of a completed log-frame
framework or a similar resource and result based framework in managing results made it
difficult to assess to what extent the PSF Af-Pak programme were achieving its objectives and
required the review team to consider effectiveness by reference to high-level trends.
The review noted that a number of activities did not proceed in line with commitments and
plans. Given the uncertain context within which the programme was to be implemented it
concluded that such rate of implementation would most probably have been considered a
success if formulated at the inception phase and it confirms the importance of having a broad
scope of tolerance in interpreting success of a stabilisation programme.
On management and monitoring, the review acknowledges the challenges linked to the
inter-ministerial nature of the programme. At the programme management level, the review
finds that partners in the Steering Committee appear to have developed mutual trust and a
good report, which leads to coherence in the understanding of the direction of the programme,
allowing for a relatively smooth decision making process. At the lower levels, management and
administration of the implementation has been light. Management was also looked at in the
evaluation of the broader PSF. The general conclusion was that management is under-resourced
and that a M&E system needs to established.
As mentioned LOTFA was not part of the mid-term review as the Danish funding was channelled
to UNDP/MoI out-side the Af-Pak PSP. LOTFA underwent a general evaluation in 20124 and in
reaction to a corruption case also an evaluation of the management structure5. Overall, the
review concludes that the continued performance of LOTFA in meeting its primary goal of
remuneration speaks to its success in addressing an important component of security sector
4 Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, phase V, by ATOS for UNDP, 2012.
5 Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, Management Review, 2012
19
reform. On the other hand, developing essential governmental capacity in MOI remains limited
and is an area of potentially increasing salience as the withdrawal of foreign troops progresses.
Regardless of the consensus ultimately reached on this issue, the need for close and active
management of an initiative such as LOTFA which operates in both challenging and sensitive
contexts should not be underestimated. Also the importance of donors refraining from bilateral
micromanagement is underscored. Continued, reliable and not least multilateral funds are
needed.
5. Intervention logic
5.1. The strategic thematic and geographic focus
At the programme level the objective is to
Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region through more capable and accountable
institutions to protect the civilian population and enhanced regional confidence and
reconciliation.
The change logic that informs the choice of thematic objectives and geographic focus within the
PSP is outlined below at the programme level. It is a logic that builds on lessons of the effect of
the various engagements that were implemented under the first phase of the Af-Pak PSP and it
reflects changes in Denmark’s approach to the region as the engagements are evolving. An
underlying premise for selection of engagements has been to ensure the increased geographic
and operational focus that the review has called for, by consolidating and building on well-
functioning engagements.
Specific Theory of Change (ToC) for each of the engagements will be developed in the
programme formulation and included in the programme document. Preferably this will be done
in consultation with the involved partners.
There is a Danish political interest in a stronger regional approach as a means to promote a
sustainable stabilisation of the region. As noted in the context analysis, the region demonstrates
a complex and challenging interaction between poor standards of governance, low levels of
human security and human development, militancy and insurgency, and poor economic
conditions. While there are obvious differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including
their relative states of development, it is assumed that the challenges facing the two countries
are in many regards interlinked. It is also the assumption that the challenges in Afghanistan and
Pakistan – or the nexus between the two – cannot be tackled in isolation.
The primary Danish strategic interest in the region is stability. Reaching a political solution to
peace and enhancing regional trust will contribute to sustainable results.
20
From a strategic perspective Denmark will in the coming programme phase emphasise
consolidation in Afghanistan of the already achieved security and stabilisation. In the present
situation, where the international military engagement is downsized, it is essential to ensure
that the Afghans are capable of taking responsibility for protecting their own population from
insecurity and lawlessness.
Denmark will further support the Pakistani law enforcement agencies' ability to meet
international standards and commitments as well as ensuring the trust of the population in their
own agencies.
Further sustainability is essential. To that end building up the capacities of the Afghan and
Pakistani governments to administrate and implement Rule of Law is needed and their
respective national ownerships a prerequisite.
Finally, Denmark is committed to adhere to international commitments on cross cutting issues
as gender and other human rights. And to fulfil the pledges given on support for security forces
in Afghanistan (see below).
Based on the above context analysis, lessons identified, and principles for the PSF it is
suggested that phase II of the regional Afghanistan-Pakistan Stabilisation Programme will focus
on two thematic components with each a number of objectives:
Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building, with the objectives to:
a) Improve the capacity of security forces
b) Enhance Law and Order
c) Improve institutions with the view of protecting the civilian population
Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue, with the objectives to:
a) Enhance the environment for a political solution in Afghanistan
b) Reduce tensions between actors in the region.
The first phase of the programme included activities in five countries; the second phase will only
have interventions in two countries. This choice is made as a follow up on the recommendation
by the evaluation team to a more focused approach, as there are limited funds for new
programming, and furthermore as a consequence of the lack of results on previous projects in
Iran and Bangladesh. The project in Central Asia has been taken over by another funding
mechanism.
During the period of the first phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan programme, there were also
activities funded by PSF that were outside the fund´s Af-Pak programme. Under phase two, all
of the PSF engagements will be brought together under the Af-Pak PSP II. As such the second
phase of the programme will largely consist of activities that have already wielded results.
Furthermore, the new phase will emphasise coherence and bring together a portfolio of similar
21
activities. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of including wider regional
engagements should this be deemed opportune at a later stage.
The individual components will be elaborated in the programme formulation. Possibilities of
cooperating with strategic partners will be pursued in order to establish coherence and effective
use of limited resources by teaming up with carefully selected bilateral partners. This approach
will give Denmark a platform for dialogue with the host nations and with our strategic partners.
The following considerations will be guiding the programming team:
5.2. Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution
3.6. Building
Engagement in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be relevant to pursue the objective of
improving capacity of security forces, enhance law and order and improve institutions. A long-
term financing of the Afghan security forces is needed and the Afghan government will not be
able to cover these costs in the foreseeable future. In 2012 at the NATO summit in Chicago
Denmark contributed actively in creating the foundation for long-term financing of the capacity
building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – including both the police and military
forces. The international donors pledged contributions of more than USD 1 billion in the period
2012-17. Denmark pledged to support the ANA with DKK 20 million and the ANP with DKK 80
million per year in the years 2015-17. These pledges will be part of phase two of the PSP. The
contribution for ANA will be channelled through the ANA Trust Fund (ANA-TF) to capacity
building while the contribution to the police will be channelled through the Law and Order Trust
Fund (LOTFA) in Afghanistan which is by and large used for police salaries.
Denmark has urged the UN for a stronger regional presence in Afghanistan, including in the
south as part of phasing out the military presence Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT), where Denmark has had a very active role in previous years. A stronger UN presence will
ensure the consolidation of already made progress and normalisation in the direction of a more
traditional and long-term development model for cooperation between the Afghan authorities
and the international community. The UN has agreed to this and has among other initiatives
established an office in Helmand that will support development of legitimate government
structures in one of the most fragile border regions of Afghanistan. By this it will contribute to
improve the framework conditions for stability and reconciliation, both locally and regionally.
Denmark has co-funded earmarked activities at the UN office in Helmand in 2013-14 within i.e.
building up law and order institutions. It is the intention to consider continuing the funding in
the coming programme phase.
Following the suicide attack on the Danish Embassy in 2008, the Danish government decided to
increase the Danish Development Assistance to Pakistan in order to proactively combat the
effects and causes of violent extremism and to secure that a nuclear power such as Pakistan will
not pose a serious security threat to the region and the world in the future. The activities
22
envisaged in the second phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme
go hand in hand with activities under the country program thus enhancing the effect and
promoting sustainable results.
As the context analysis on Pakistan shows the Pakistani military holds considerable influence in
all spheres of Pakistani society while maintaining links also to opposing military groups in
Afghanistan. Accountability of state entities is a major challenge in Pakistan, including for the
Pakistani security forces. It is the assumption that exposing the Pakistani military and police to
Danish methods can create entry points for change. In the first phase of the PSP a number of
pilot projects have been aiming at establishing mutual trust and has explored possible areas for
cooperation. These options need to be examined further during the programme formulation.
In relation to border management it is crucial for conflict prevention – both in Pakistan and
Afghanistan – to address the Challenge of the illegal economy that spans the border. As outlined
in the context analysis a wider focus on other borders – the coast, Iran, India and China – may
offer interesting prospects in terms of positively impacting on illicit economies and conflict in
Afghanistan. The identification of possible activities will be explored in the programme
formulation.
5.3. Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue
An overarching political agreement achieved through dialogue and reconciliation constitutes an
important element of a lasting solution to the challenges in Afghanistan. The programme will
continue to support the Afghan peace and reconciliation process, which aims at forging a
solution at a central level between the various groupings in Afghanistan. To that end it is
suggested to positively consider extending the funding for the Salaam Support Group, while
other existing and new engagements in wider regional trust building measures and
reconciliation must be examined during the programme formulation. In this context it should be
considered how and where the role of women in establishing stability can be enhanced.
5.4. Compliance with cross cutting objectives (incl. gender)
The programme will mainstream gender and human rights considerations across its
components, and focus on supporting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution
1325 on Women Peace and Security.
Denmark’s National Action Plan (NAP) on Resolution 1325 (2008) is a Whole-of-Government
document prepared jointly by MFA, MOD and the Ministry of Justice, and provides reference
points for the PSF programme. It stresses the prevention, protection, and participation of
women.
The decision on funding activities and reporting will be held up against these standards. As
examples, in Component 1 facilitating training of female officers in ANA or capacity building
rapid deployable disaster teams in Pakistan for the benefit of children and women might be a
possibility. In Component 2 based on experience with the ongoing Track II support, a male bias
23
in participation is to be expected. The NAP 1325 foresees that achieving gender equity will
require a two-pronged approach that combines gender mainstreaming with women specific
activities. Accordingly, the suite of Track II activities will include the women specific dialogue
through UN Women Pakistan to promote the participation and voice of women in the discussions
shaping the kind of reconciliation necessary.
5.5. Complementarity
Obviously Denmark cannot address all the issues affecting security and stabilisation of the wider
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The PSP builds on international and ongoing Danish and
international efforts and activities to the wider region.
In Afghanistan, the Danish combat military engagement since 2001 is terminated by the end of
2014. The last couple of years there have been a gradual transition towards support and
training. The non-combat activities is expected to continue for a period, but at a considerably a
lower level. On the civilian side Denmark has contributed with development assistance to
enhance state building and social and economic development. Humanitarian aid has been used
for alleviating crises – regardless of whether they are natural or inflicted by the armed conflict.
The Danish police force has been seconding officers either bilaterally to ANP training
programmes or to the European police mission (EUPOL).
In Pakistan, Denmark has established a close partnership with UK and efficient working relations
with other main actors within the field of Counter-IED giving Denmark a seat at an influential
table. Similar links are being built up within training activities and support for law enforcing
agencies in Pakistan. Denmark also initiated a development programme in 2010 with a purpose
of contributing to poverty alleviation through stabilisation and peace building, improved
livelihoods and service delivery, strengthened democratisation, and enhanced human rights and
gender equality. The Pakistan programme includes a civil society component focused on human
rights NGOs and media organisations. It also supports stabilisation and early recovery in
Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan through the World Bank and UNICEF. In addition
Denmark supports countrywide humanitarian assistance and Denmark has recently started to
focus more on building stronger commercial ties which will help create growth, jobs, and
ultimately contribute to stability.
The Peace and Stabilisation Programme is complementing these other engagements. PSP is
used for consolidating some initiatives – especially on the security forces in Afghanistan, while
new paths are explored in regard to regional reconciliation, dialogue and Danish-Pakistani
military cooperation within the field of law enforcement and to a certain extent also in limited
military cooperation. The flexibility and swift approval procedures of new engagements aide the
possibility to pursue new openings for supporting stabilisation.
In addition the Afghanistan-Pakistan programme will be complementary to other international
efforts or in some cases part of a basket funding of joint programmes. The latter is true for both
24
the funding of ANA-TF and LOTFA. The funding activities of the UNDP-Helmand regional office is
closely coordinated with UK which funds other activities in the same office.
5.6. Results framework
The recent evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund underlines the importance of
strengthening Denmark’s approach to results-based management in its stabilisation
engagements.
The coming programme planning process will produce appropriate measuring tools. Having said
this it should be acknowledged that the volume of the programme will not make it possible to
measure any outcome at the meta level. In other words this programme will be a small – but
hopefully important – contribution to the wider stabilisation of the region, but it will not be
measurable at that level. It is therefore the intention to develop a resource and result based
framework that will measure results at the engagement level.
Given the nature of the programme – piloting new initiatives – it is to be expected that a
number of the results are process outcomes rather than measurable impacts. Also it should be
acknowledged that several of the engagements will be funding activities through multilateral
organisations or multidonor baskets. In compliance with good donor practice the M&E will in
those engagements be jointly agreed and formats will be those of the coordinating body or
implementing agency. When joining these funding arrangements Denmark will demand that the
M&E are appropriate and satisfies our requirements. If not – appropriate M&E tools will be
developed in dialogue – in some cases as part of the engagement.
6. Budget
Table 2: Preliminary commitment budget with indicative amounts per component.
Funding streams
Total Non-DAC DAC
Overall budget 335 85 250
1) Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building 322 85 237
Afghanistan - Capacity Building of Afghan National Security Forces1
62 62
Afghanistan – Law and Order, UN in South Afghanistan, Border management2
229 229
Pakistan – Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building 31 23 8
2) Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue 13 0 13
3) Unallocated 0 0 0
1. Of which 60 million DKK is committed to ANA
2. Of which 210 million DKK is committed to LOTFA (disbursement 80 mio/yr though)
25
7. Risk management
A Risk Management Matrix presenting significant risks identified will be developed as part of the
programme formulation.
Improving risk management in fragile and transitional contexts is high on the international
agenda and a priority for Denmark. The political and security context in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan region is fluid and unpredictable. This means that the challenges and risks facing the
programme will change over the implementation period. Recognising this, and based on lessons
learned from the on-going phase, the approach to programme delivery should be designed to:
Mitigate programmatic risks to an acceptable level. It will be important to routinely
incorporate lessons learned in the course of delivery.
React to emerging and changing political and security risks and alter the way in which
the engagements are delivered according to the changing operational context.
Ensure that implementing partners have anti-corruption checks and balances in place.
Ensure that agreements with implementing partners state their responsibilities to
immediately report in cases where Danish funds are misused or if these are being used
in manners incompatible with Danish international human rights commitments.
8. Envisaged management structure
The programme will be managed under the guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund
(February 2014).
The overall management responsibility for the programme on behalf of the Danish Government
rests with the Whole of Government Stabilisation Steering Committee (WGSSC), which
comprises members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s office, Ministry of Defence
and Ministry of Justice. The Whole of Government Stabilisation Secretariat (WGSS) functions as
the secretariat to the Steering Committee.
WGSS has a cross cutting role in providing advice, helping formulation of programmes, and
securing learning between all the regional/thematic programmes.
The specific division of labour in the day-to-day management of activities and budgets including
monitoring of the overall programme is to be determined during the programme formulation.
This also goes for programming of unallocated funds. As a point of departure the embassy in
Islamabad will manage and monitor the activities in Pakistan. As part of a progressive leaning of
the embassy in Kabul the future management of activities in Afghanistan will mainly be
undertaken by the Asia department (ALO) in MFA HQ and to a minor degree at the embassy in
Kabul.
The monitoring will include monitoring of programme and component risks as well as output
indicators and success criteria.
26
Annex 1: Updated Process Action Plan
10 Date Responsible
Draft concept note finalised 18st August ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD),
embassies in Islamabad and
Kabul
Discussion in WGSSC 27th August WGSS
Financial frame agreed to by the
government´s Coordination
committee (K-udvalg)
September WGSS
Revised Concept note 15th September ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD)
TOR for programming mission +
short listing of 3 consultants
15th – 22nd September UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),
Int.Dep (MoD), WGSS
Tender bids 30th September Consultants
Evaluation of tender bids from 3
consultants
1st October UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),
Int.Dep (MoD), WGSS
Prepare programming mission 20th – 31st October Consultant
Programming Mission 3rd -14th November Consultant + (MoFA) + MoD
ToR Appraisal 11th November UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),
Int.Dep (MoD)
Appraisal Consutant (APP) - Single
Sourcing
15th November UFT (MoFA)
Draft Pgm Document 21st November Consultant
Consultation (written) 24th – 28th November ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD)
Pgm Document Final Draft 1st – 12th December Consultant
Appraisal preparation 5th -16 January 2015 UFT/ appraisal Consultant
Appraisal Mission 19th – 30th January UFT/ appraisal Consultant
Appraisal Final Document 2nd -13th February UFT/ appraisal Consultant
Pgm Document finalisation 16th-20th February Consultant (Programming or
Appraisal)
Approval Late February WGSSC
Recommendation to the Ministers
for Development Cooperation and
for Defence
Mid March WGSS on behalf of WGSSC
Financial committee appropriation April MoFA
27
Annex 2: Bibliography
Afghanistan
Understanding Afghanistan – Synthesis Report, University of York, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), for DFID, 2008
Understanding Afghanistan - A strategic conflict assessment of Afghanistan, PRDU, 2008 Understanding Afghanistan – a Political Economy analysis, PRDU, 2008. Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan, swede.peace and Cooperation for Peace and
Unity, 2012
Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Feinstein International Center, Tufts university, 2012
Afghanistan´s Insurgency after the Transition, International Crisis Group, 2014 Conflict and peace capacities, 2014. Internal UNDP paper. Peace offerings - Theories of conflict resolution and their applicability to Afghanistan,
Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analysts Network
Afghanistan: European Union Strategy 2014-16, 2014
Pakistan
”Verdens farligste land? – Pakistan mellem militærherredømme, ekstremisme og
demokrati”, Jochen Hippler, translated to Danish by Ellekær, 2013
Regional aspects and dialogue
Prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Regional Dialogue Background Paper No. 1, Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, June 2011
Regional Politics and The Prospects for Stability in Afghanistan, Sunil Dasgupta, 2013
Security and Political Developments in Afghanistan in 2014 and After: Endgame or New Game, Vanda Felbab-Brown (pp 23-25 on regional factors)
Strategies and policies
PSF Guidelines, February 2014Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement In Fragile And Conflict-Affected Areas Of The World
Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan 2011-2014 Danish Afghanistan Plan 2013-14 Danish framework Programme for Pakistan 2013-16 (not published on the web). Also
look at Note for the grant committee. The Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 (Danish only)
Recommended