American Policy in Southern Africa || United States Policy toward the Rhodesia Rebellion

United States Policy toward the Rhodesia RebellionAuthor(s): J. Leo CefkinSource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 5, American Policy in Southern Africa (Oct., 1967), pp. 14-17Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184827 .

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United States Policy

Toward tie Rhodesia Rebellion J. Leo Cefkin

Historical Comparison: Rhodesia and the U. S. Europeans in Rhodesia perceive important

similarities between their history and that of the United States. They are the second British colony to take independence unilaterally. We were the first. Their declaration of independence para- phrased some of our own. They believe their pioneer traditions parralleled ours. We both oc- cupied an undeveloped primitive land and made it prosperous and modern by our industry, de- votion, perseverence, skills, and intelligence. Rhodesia and the United States both face grievous and perplexing race problems.

To be sure these are super- ficial similarities. To equate the revolution of 1776 and its aims of liberty for all and govern- ment by "the consent of the governed" with the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Inde- pendence (UDI) of November 11, 1965, taken to assure that Euro- peans in Rhodesia shall decide wffhen, if ever, majority rule will take place, is to distort history.

The Rhodesian Declaration " 7 is a lackluster paraphrase of our own. "Whereas, in the course of h u m a n affairs, history has shown that it may become neces- sary for a people to resolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people...."

"And whereas in such event a respect- for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to as- sume full responsibility for their own. affairs. .." Nor is this simply a matter of felicitous language. Rhodesia's Declaration contains no reference to men being "created equal," or to "inalienable rights."

Further, relationships between Europeans and Africans in Rhodesia.are not analagous with the white man and Indian in the United States. Amer- icans have been guilty of varying mistreatment of Indians, but exploitation of cheap Indian labor did not occur. Rhodesian prosperity requires the cheap labor of Africans. Rhodesian whites deni- grate the contributions of the African people to the building of modern Rhodesia, believing that they alone built the land.

Perhaps because Rhodesians focus on the similarities rather than the crucial differences between their independence and ours they find it

difficult to understand Washington's condemna- tion of UDI and its support for measures to end the rebellion. Many Rhodesians believe that the position of the U.S. Government differs from the attitude of the American people which favors Ian Smith. They want to believe that the succession of right-wing Americans who have come to their country -singing the praises of the Smith govern- for its reactionary principles, its fight against liberalism, and its unabashed support of white supremacy-and this is the only opinion which is aired by Rhodesia's radio and TV-speak for most Americans.

It is against this background that white Rho- desian criticism of U.S. policy should be under- stood. But U.S. policy must also be evaluated against the general background of the UDI crisis.

The UDI Crisis: Background

UDI took place because the Smith govern- ment was unprepared to give assurances of unim- peded progress toward majority rule in the form of a constitution acceptable to the people as a whole. Rhodesian politics had become polarized along racial lines. Africans had little trust that white man's rule would allow for political, economic, or social advancement. Therefore they supported nationalist revolutionary parties-the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-who demanded power through majority rule. The moderate, gradualist United Peoples Party, while represented in Parliament because the nationalists boycotted the elections, had very little popular support within the African population. Most Europeans believe that should Africans gain power they would pose a grave threat to their lives, property, and prosperity. To protect their good life. and the retention of the benefits which flow from their control of political power they supported the white supremist Rhodesian Front (RF),' rejecting the moderate Rhodesia Party which spoke of majority rule in fifteen years. In the-elections of May 1965 the RF won all 50 "A" roll seats -for which a preponderantly European electorate voted. Six months later Rhodesia had its UDI.

UDI was widely condemned by the interna- tional community. The Rhodesian government had been warned of the disastrous consequences which would res;ult from its rebellion. On the eve of UDI, President Johnson, Prime Minister Men- zies, and other Western statesmen privately warned Smith to heed the British admonitions and not take the fateful step. After UDI the UN, the Organization of African Unity, and the Com- monwealth condemned the rebellion. Britain brought the Rhodesian question before the Secur-

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ity Council and gained support for a program of voluntary and limited sanctions. The OAU and the African members of the Commonwealth de- manded that London bring the rebellion to an end by the use of force, a demand which the Wilson government resisted.

Within Rhodesia UDI, while initially opposed by many whites, served to rally most of the European population behind the Smith govern- ment. The African people were given no oppor- tunity to express their feelings. Repressive legislation effectively forestalled o p p o s it i o n. Strikes in Bulawayo and student demonstrations at several secondary schools, which were quickly suppressed, were the only open expressions of Af- rican sentiment. The RF government claimed that Africans really favored UDI but that terrorists had cowed the masses, preventing expressions of approval. The Catholic Bishops more honestly appraised the situation when they wrote, "Vast numbers of the people of Rhodesia are bitterly opposed to the unilateral declaration of independ- ence. . . . It is simply quite untrue to say that the masses are content . . . or that they have con- sented by their silence. Their silence is the silence of fear, of disappointmnt, of hopelessness.

Independent Rhodesia constitutes a setback in what had been an inexorable march of the Afri- can peoples toward independence. To entrench European dominance of southern Africa, the governments of South Africa and Portugal quick- ly moved to give support and succor to the Rho- desian regime, stopping short of de jure recogni- tion.

The Survival of the Smith Regime At this writing Rhodesian independence is

approaching its second anniversary. The expecta- tions of general collapse of the Rhodesian regime proved overly optimistic. On the other hand, within Rhodesia the hope for recognition and large-scale Western investment also has not ma- terialized. Nevertheless voluntary sanctions were widely circumvented as businessmen disregarded the statements of their governments supporting sanctions. In April 1966 Britain obtained Security Council authorization to prevent the off-loading of oil for Rhodesia at the Mozambique port of Beira.

During 1966 London and Salisbury held ex- ploratory conversations to see if a basis for settle- ment could be found. At the, same time Wilson responded to international pressures for more effective action to bring the rebellion to an end. He promised that in the event the rebellion con- tinued beyond 1966 the United Kingdom would seek mandatory sanctions from the Security Coun- cil, would withdraw all previous terms of settle- ment given to the Smith regime and would agree to no independence before majority rule (NIBMR). Negotiations reached a climax with the meeting between Wilson and Smith aboard H.M.S. Tiger from December 2 to 4, 1966, which produced a working document for settlement. The Tiger agreement was accepted by London but rejected by Salisbulry. On December 16, 1966 the Security Council passed a resolution, by a margin of 11 to 0, imposing mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. The resolution determined that the situation in

Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace and re- quired members of the UN to impose sanctions on imports and exports of a number of commodities vital to the Rhodesian economy. The Secretary- General was asked to report upon observance of the resolution.

The efforts to return Rhodesia to constitu- tional government on the basis of advance toward majority rule hasn't succeeded. Sanctions have harmed the Rhodesian economy. Tobacco, the major Rhodesian export, has not been sold and 1967 production has been reduced to less than half of the 1965 crop. Unemployment has grown. European emigration has exceeded immigration but the figures on this score are kept secret. Af- rican nationalist parties have attempted to over- throw the RF regime by guerrilla warfare but a wider revolution of the African people has not occurred and seems unlikely at the present time. European opposition to the RF has, at best, grown to a minor degree. In a word, while UDI has been detrimental to the Rhodesian economy and has put the future viability of the country, as present- ly constituted, in doubt, it has not brought Smith to his knees-nowhere near it. It has not made the Rhodesian regime more tractable. At worst the Rhodesian status quo will continue indefinite- ly if more effective measures are not brought to bear. Should the situation be allowed to drift sanctions may well be widely circumvented and the Rhodesian government may gain de jure recognization. It is unlikely that catastrophic de- terioration will set in.

U.S. Policy Certain principles have guided U.S. policy

on the Rhodesian question: First, belief in democracy, self-determination,

human rights, equality, and freedom has led Washington to take the side of the African major- ity and oppose white supremacy in southern Africa. President Johnson spoke in this vein in his address to the Ambassadors of OAU countries.

".... we have supported self-determination and an orderly transition to majority rule in every quarter of the globe. These principles have guided our policy from India to the Philippines and from Viet Nam to Pakistan. They guide our policy toward Rhodesia.

.... we are giving every encouragement and support to . . . restore legitimate government in Rhodesia . . . to open the full power and respon- sibility of nationhood to all the people of Rho- desia-not to just six percent of theme. . . . We will not permit human rights to be restricted in our own country. And we will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law."

Second, support for the peaceful devolution of power into the hands of Africans explains the U.S. endorsement of London's position on the gradual transition to majority rule and opposition to "one man, one vote" now. Along with insisting on progress toward majority rule the Johnson administration has favored firm guarantees of minority rights thereby seeking to quiet the con-

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cerns of the European minority for their security under African rule. Wilson has American support in his refusal to use force to terminate Smith's rule. While the U.S. has given scholarships for African students, training for guerrilla warfare has come from Moscow, Peking, and other quar- ters.

Third, the United States has accepted British leadership in southern Africa. Official statements of the State Department recognized Great Brit- ain's sovereignty over Rhodesia. Rhodesian inde- pendence is, of course, unrecognized. Divergence on policy between London and Washington has been rare and minor. At most Washington may have abstained on a UN resolution opposed by London. Washington has accepted London's arti- culation of policy: supporting as much, and no more, sanctions as London would accept; agreeing to oppose measures which would entangle her with South Africa; fighting efforts to condemn Britain for its failure to bring down Smith.

Fourth, the United States has encouraged and supported United Nations' action on Rhodesia, at least where recommendations and decisions of the Security Council (as distinct from the Com- mittee of 24) defined the action. To be sure Secur- ity Council decision allows Washington to deter- mine the extent of its response to UDI. Neverthe- less, pursuant to Security Council decision, the U.S. government withdrew its Consul General and the USIA from Rhodesia, leaving a small residual mission behind. Rhodesian sugar quotas were cancelled; an embargo was placed upon the sale of arms and military equipment to Rhodesia. Loans, credit, and investment guarantees were suspended. Exports important for the Rhodesian economy were banned. With the adoption of mandatory sanctions the President issued an Exe- cutive Order which implements the sanctions resolution by making violation of its provisions a criminal offense.

Issues in U.S. policy toward Rhodesia The Johnson Administration has been under

a two-fold attack for its policy toward Rhodesia. There are those who charge the President with misguided involvement in an area of little con- cern to the American people. This attack, coming primarily, but not entirely, from the American Right, argues that no vital interest of the United States is involved in Rhodesia, therefore we have no business enforcing sanctions there. They insist that Smith's rule should be supported because it is anti-Communist, capitalist, has offered the U.S. support in the war against Vietnam, and represents an area of stability in an Africa now riven by turmoil.

To follow such advice would effectively make the United States a party to the inherent injustice of white supremacy enforced by police measures. It would align the United States with South Af- rica and Portugal against the rest of the world. It would increase the likelihood of "Russians in blue berets"-UN forces heavily infused with soldiers from Communist lands- -being brought into Africa to fight for the rights of Africans. The United States would surely be estranged: from the

rest of Africa. Many friendly ties there would come to an end. The United Nations would be undermined. Africa's future would be threatened by racial turmoil.

Others have criticized the United States for inhibiting effective action to ,'i_`-ng down Smith. The expectations that UDI would quickly be made to fail have not materialized. The danger that it may succeed is very real. Washington's counsel of moderation, is challenged, and with some validity, if moderation simply allows UDI to succeed. Such criticism is most often expressed as a lack of confidence in British leadership on Rhodesia.

On the face of it there is much to commend the policy of letting Wilson lead on the Rhodesian issue. Other continents, Asia and Latin America, have engaged American effort. SEATO, CENTO, the Anzus Pact, and the OAS constitute legal commitments for Washington which do not exist in Africa. Therefore, they say, Africa should be left to Britain. London's announced policy of withdrawing from its military commitments in Asia places an additional burden upon the United States there and argues against extending its com- mitments to Africa as well. Similarly, if one ac- cepts a United States role of providing counter- vailing power to Moscow's and Peking's threats of aggression, the Far East, and Middle East, Southeast Asia and Germany must command Washington's energies. Southern Africa is not now an arena for Moscow's or Peking's revisionist ef- forts and therefore should be left to the initiative of others, so the argument goes.

These are weighty reasons for foregoing a leadership role in Africa. Nevertheless, the British leadership role must be challenged if it is failing. London's direction must be questioned if what is now envisaged is years of sanctions during which the Rhodesian economy may slowly grind down.

The stern warnings of severe retribution de- livered to Ian Smith before UDI should be remem- bered. The credibility of Whitehall and to some degree of Washington is called into question when little Rhodesia can defy those British threats and get away with it. Similarly, the credibility of UN sanctions is at stake and this is a matter of im- portance to the United States. After all Washing- ton encouraged the limited sanctions which the Security Council voted. This action was considered adequate for the task in the view of the United States. The Soviet Union abstained on the sanc- tions resolution precisely because it condemned it as inadequate to alter the Rhodesian status quo. Washington, therefore, bears much responsibility for ensuring the success of UN action.

This raises two related problems for the U.S. First, can sanctions be made to work? Second, given the crucial role of South Africa in over- coming mandatory sanctions, what should the United States do about South Africa?

Sanctions depend entirely upon implementa- tion by members of the UN. Countries report to the Secretary-General but there is no other policing machinery. If there is good reason to fear that sanctions are being circumvented a TJN com- mittee, authorized to investigate and police sanc-

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tions, should be appointed by the Security Council and should enjoy American membership. Im- proved performance could result from such an effort. Recently it was revealed that OECD coun- tries have bought greater quantities of Rhodesian goods during the first quarter of 1967 than for the same period in 1966. These purchases pre- sumably occurred prior to the voting of manda- tory sanctions and the commodities were removed from Rhodesia prior to December 16th in anticipa- tion of mandatory sanction. If this is the case, surely the OECD countries, including the United States, can get the companies involved to guaran- tee their observance of UN sanctions.

Washington is better able than London to challenge South African behavior in relation to its Charter responsibilities to carry out Security Council decisions on sanctions. It might take the lead in airing the South African role on sanctions in the Security Council and consider the possibil- ity of limiting trade of UN members with South Africa to 1965 levels. ZAPU's accusation that South African troops are in Rhodesia to fight nationalists should also be investigated. Military assistance by South Africa for an illegal regime, if true, must be dealt with. In a word what is suggested here is not an assertion of U.S. leader- ship to replace that of the U.K., but a show of U.S. determination that UDI will not be permitted to succeed in defiance of the Security Council's decision and that the United States is prepared to support stronger measures to this end.

U.S. stakes in the Rhodesian question. The United States does not have vital eco-

nomic ties with Rhodesia. Few Americans are resident there. Sanctions place little strain upon the U.S. economy and indeed provide a more favorable climate for U.S. investments in African countries to the north. This is not to argue that Africa should enjoy a low priority in America's international concerns.

The Rhodesian question is important for America. The future peace of Africa is at stake. The African peoples' grievances against European rule in Rhodesia are immediate and just, and if satisfaction or progress toward a more satisfactory situation cannot be gained by peaceful means then they will necessarily use force. For the United States the options will be dangerously narrowed-either we are for white supremacy or for majority rule and no matter which side we choose blood-letting will become unavoidable. African statesmen will insist upon U.S. assistance in their efforts to overthrow white man's rule, and should Washington refuse, an estrangement with black Africa will likely follow.

Already America's standing with the African people in Rhodesia has been undermined. To achieve their revolutionary goals ZAPU and ZANU have gotten support from African and Communist governments. The best estimates indi- cate that a greater portion of their financing and

guerrilla training come from Communist sources. ZAPU has the assistance of Moscow and the East European states. ZANU has Peking's aid. It isn't a matter of ZAPU and ZANU being Communist organizations. These relationships exist because assistance for revolution has not been forthcom- ing from the West, necessitating a turn toward the East. While the posture of a future nationalist-led Rhodesia in international affairs is not predictable, the United States should recognize the advantages Moscow or Peking might enjoy should Nkomo or Sithole come to power. The skills and talents of the settlers are vital to Rhodesia's well being. The nationalist parties could strengthen their cause by acknowl- edging the need for a secure future for white Rhodesians as well as black.

The tragedy of contemporary Rhodesia lies in the failure of the moderate's appeal to both the black and white communities. America is therefore asked to choose between black and white, knowing that whatever the choice an in- justice is sure to result. It is this dilemma which makes Wilson's six-point program sensible and appealing. Through its implementation a transi- tion to majority rule would take place, the in- justices of white supremacy removed, and majority and minority rights entrenched. Endorse- ment of Wilson's principles especially NIBMAR is a position which the United States should adopt.

The Rhodesian issue has put on trial Great Britain's stature as a major world power. This is a matter of vital concern to the United States. The United Kingdom has been a close and trusted ally and its position as a world power is an im- portant asset to the United States. It would be most unseemly should little Rhodesia, with its 220,000 whites, successfully defy London. The U.S. should therefore try to prevent further diminution of British prestige.

In a similar vein the prestige of the UN is engaged in this issue. The Security Council's utilization of collective security in dealing with Rhodesia has enjoyed our strongest support. Should sanctions fail it would undermine future opportunities for collective security and denigrate the importance of the UN. It is in the American in- terest that collective security remain among the peace enforcement means available to the UN.

All of this suggests that a reevaluation of America's stakes in the Rhodesian question should be made. An airing of our aims, a review of the present situation, and the outlook for the fut- ure by a Congressional body could serve a clar- ifying purpose. A statement on what we think and where we stand, announced to Salisbury, Pretoria, London, Moscow, Peking, the African countries, and the UN could have a salutory in- fluence in resolving the Rhodesian question. Action at the United Nations to police the sanc- tions resolution would be an important step in this new direction.

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