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PUBLISHER'SNOTE
TheFrencheditionofthiswork,underthetitleIntroductionG^ndralealaPhilosophic,appearsasthefirstvolumeofseven,whichdealwithFormalLogic,TheoriesofKnowledge,Cosmology,Psychology,Metaphysics,Ethics,^Esthetics,andtheHistoryofPhilosophy.But,sincesixoutofthesevenvolumesremaintobewritten,ithasbeenthoughtbettertoissuethepresentvolumequiteindependently.
Theseriesasawholeisintendedtoprovidetext-booksforaregularuniversitycourseasitisfoundinFrance,andwiththatparticularendinviewprintsinlargertypethoseparagraphswhichthestudentshouldreadfirst,andinsmallertypethoseparagraphswhicharemerelyexplanatoryorexpansiveofthem.Thisschematisinghasbeenabandonedtomakethevolumeserveforgeneralreaders,nouniversitycoursebeingenvisagedinEnglandorAmerica.
ThetranslationhasbeenmadefromtheeleventhFrenchedition.
PREFACE
MychiefaimincomposinganElementsofPhilosophyseries,towhichthisbookmayserveasanintroduction,istogiveafaithfulpresentationofthesystemofAristotleandSt.Thomas,andinitsUghttojudgetheimportantsystemswhichhavefollowedeachotherduringthelastthreecenturiesandtheprincipalproblemsdiscussedbymodernphilosophy.Ihavetriedtoadaptthemethodofexpositiontocontemporaryconditions,andinparticularhavefollowedofsetpurposeaprogressiveorderofexposition—asfaraspossibletheorderofintellectualdiscovery—neverappealingtoanytruthnotalreadyknownandunderstood,andneverintroducinganewnotionorpropositionforwhichthewayhasnotbeenpreparedbythosewhichhavegonebeforeitandleduptoit.Themethodhasobligedmetodepartonseveralpointsfromtheprocedureofthetraditionaltext-books—aboveall,considerablytomagnifytheimportanceandextendthescopeofthisIntroduction.Yet,thus,IhavebutreturnedtothemethodfollowedbyAristotlehimself.ThefirstthreebooksofhisMetaphysicsare,infact,nothingbutanextensiveintroduction.
Aworkofthiskind,ifitistobethorough,demandsthedetaileddiscussionofcertainpoints,withoutwhichthestudyitseekstopromotewouldloseallits
valueasamentaldiscipline.Ishouldbeuntruetotradi-
PREFACE
tionalphilosophyifIreducedittoafewmaintheseswhichhavelosttheirfreshness,andafewcommonplacesofaspiritualistmetaphysic,andneglectedtobringoutitsfineintellectualcontoursanddisplayitspowerofpenetratinganalysis.
Thepresentworkisintendedforbeginners.Itcanthereforemakenoattempttoreproducethedepthorthewealthofsubtledialectictobefoundintreatiseswrittenforspecialists,andremainsstrictlyelementary.Itmust,however,preservethescientificcharacterpropertoaphilosophicalexposition.
Somereadersmaytakealarmatscholasticterminology.Yetnoscience,nodiscipline,noformofsport,even,orindustry,candispensewithaspecialterminology—oftenfarmorearidandartificialthanthevocabularyofphilosophy.Torequirethatphilosophersshoulduseeverydaylanguageimpliesthattheirscienceisjustanenterprisingtopicofconversation,idlearm-chairspeculationforafterdinner.Ontheotherhand,itmaylegitimatelybedemandedthatnotechnicaltermbeuseduntilithasbeenclearlydefined.
Finally,Iwouldsaythat,ifthephilosophyofAristotle,asrevivedandenrichedbySt.Thomasandhisschool,mayrightlybecalledtheChristianphilosophy,bothbecausetheChurchisneverwearyofputtingitforwardastheonlytruephilosophyandbecauseitharmonisesperfectlywiththetruthsoffaith,neverthelessitisnotproposedhereforthereader'sacceptancebecauseitisChristian,butbecauseitisdemonstrablytrue.Thisagreementbetweena
PREFACE
philosophicsystemfoundedbyapaganandthedogmasofrevelationisnodoubtanexternalsign,anextra-philosophicguaranteeofitstruth;butitisnotfromitsagreementwiththeFaith,butfromitsownrationalevidence,thatitderivesitsauthorityasaphilosophy.
Nevertheless,reasonandfaith,whiledistinct,arenotseparate,and,sinceIamwritingprincipallyforChristianreaders,Ihavenotdeniedmyselfanoccasional
referencetoknowledgefamiliartoeveryCatholic,ortocertaintheologicalapplicationsofphilosophicprinciples,thebettertoputphilosophyinitsproperplaceinChristianminds,ortohelpthemtomaintaintheunityoftheirthought.Thefactremzdnsthatinourargumentsandintheverystructureofourexpositionofphilosophy,itisnotfaith,butreason,andreasonalone,whichoccupiestheentiregroundandholdsundividedsway.
CONTENTS
m.THESOPHISTSANDSOCRATES.
IntroductionThesophistsSocrates....
(a)Ethicsandknowledge
(b)Irony,maieutic,dialectic
(c)Moderateintellectualism
64
6568
69
70
72
IV.PLATOANDARISTOTLE.
TheminorSocratics.Plato....
(a)Histheoryofideas.
(b)Hissystemofphilosophy
(c)Itslimitations.Aristotle....
(a)CorrectionsofPlato.
(b)TheAristoteliansystem
(c)Aristotle'sworksAristotleandSt.Thomas.Philosophiaperennis
7475757881828387929799
V,DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY.
Scientificknowledge.ItsmaterialobjectItsformalobject
ConclusionI
Furtherconsiderations
102103107
108
loB
VI,PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
Philosophyjudgesthespecialsciences
Itgovernsthem
Itdefendsthem
Itispre-eminendyfree
Furtherobservations.
ConclusionII12
III113117118118
CONTENTS
VII.PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY....I24
Natureoftheology....124
Theologyjudgesphilosophy..126
Philosophysubmitstotheologyits
conclusions,notitspremises.126
Philosophiaancillatheologiae...129
Furtherconsiderations...129
ConclusionIII.-132
VUI.PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE..'133
Unscientificknowledge..-133Philosophyisderivedfromcommonsense,understoodasthenaturalapprehensionoffirstprinciples.136Commonsensemayaccidentallyjudge
philosophy.....138
ConclusionIV..141
Themethodofphilosophy..141
PARTTWOTHECLASSIFICATIONOFPHILOSOPHY
147
CONTENTS
Theproblemofuniversals
(a)Nominalism
(b)ReaUsm.
(c)ModerateRealism
159159160160
III.THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICSANDTHE
PHILOSOPHYOFNATURE
Thetermbody.
Thephilosophyofmathematics
Thephilosophyofnature
(a)Mechanism
(b)Dynamism
(c)HylomorphismPsychologyProblemoftheoriginofideas
ConclusionVIII
.163
•163
164
.166
.166
169
.170
Abstraction:ProblemofhumannatureConflictingschools....
172
172174
163
IV.CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOOY)
Beingquabeing.Criticism....Problemoftruth
ConclusionIX
Conflictingschools:.
(a)Scepticism
(b)Rationalism
(c)ModerateintellectualismProblemoftheobjectoftheintellect
ConclusionX.
Beingandintelligibility
ConclusionXI.
14
178178179181
181182182183185
187
187
187
CONTENTS
V.ONTOLOGY:ESSENCE
Problemsofontology.Essence
(a)Inthewidesense
{b)InthestrictsenseCharacteristicsofthisessence
ConclusionXII
Furtherobservations.
Ourintellectcanapprehendessence
ConclusionXIII
Furtherobservations.
Essenceisuniversalinthemind.
ConclusionXIV
Individualnatureandmatter:
(a)Individualnature
(b)Firstmatter
(c)Archetypalbeing
(d)Nature,essence,andquiddity
189
189191191194197
201
201203
203
203205
207
207208209210213
VI.ONTOLOGY!SUBSTANCEANDACQDENT
OriginofthesenotionsSubstance....
ConclusionXV
Furtherobservations
Accident.....
ConclusionXVI
Furtherobservations.
Conflictingschools
Theindividualityofsubstance.
(a)Substantiaprima,substantiasecunda
(b)Perse,as«,inse...
217
217222
224
224227
227
228230233233
CONTENTS
VII.ONTOLOGY:ACTANDPOTENTIALITY
Originofthesenotions
(a)Identityandchange.
(b)Theirapparentincompatibility
(c)SolvedbytheconceptpotentialityPotencyorpotentialityAct
ConclusionXVII
Thenatureofchange
ActandpotentiaHtyinthings
Axiomsi-vii....ConflictingschoolsTerminology:.
(a)Materialandformal
(b)Virtualandformal(actual)
(c)Implicitandexplicit
(d)Inexpressact,inaccomplished
act.....
239
239239241242242244
245246246248
250
251252
254255
255
VIII.THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGY)
Subsistentbeingitself
257
257
IX.THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS
Introduction
Thephilosophyofart
Ethics
Divisionsofethics
Conflictingschools
261
261261264267268
CONCLUSION....
Classificationofphilosophy
271
271
INTRODUCTORY
Philosopherswereoncecalledwisemen.ItwasPythagoraswhofirstinventedthetermphilosophy(91X1*TT^i^(To^iat;',loveofwisdom),^observingthatwisdombelongsinthestrictsensetoGodalone,andforthatreasonnotwishingtobecalledawiseman,butsimplyafriendorloverofwisdom.Hismodestywasitselfamarkofgreatwisdom,forthesublimityanddifficultyofthehighesttruths,andtheweaknessofournature"insomanyrespectsenslaved,"forbidmantoacquire"apropertyrightinwisdom"'suchthathecanemployitinentirefreedom.Asaresultofthemanynecessitiestowhichheissubject,heholdsitonlybyaninsecuretitle,sothathemaybetermednotwise,butfarmoretrulyabeggaratwisdom'sdoor.Neverthelessphilosophyisnothingotherthanwisdomitselfsofarasitisaccessibletohumannature.
Itisnotawisdomsupernaturallyinfusedintooursoulswhichmanpossessesinvirtueofasuperhumanillumination.Neitherisitawisdomwhollyspontaneousandunconscious(suchaswithinitslimitsistheprudenceofanimals,andeventhewisdomofsimplesouls),whichhepossessesinvirtueofanaturalinstinct.Itisthewisdomofmanasman,whichhe
'Cicero,Tusc,v.8;cf.DiogenesLaertius,i,12.»Aristotle,Metaph.i,2,982b.St.Thomas,InIMetaph.,1.3.Cf.DeVeritate,q.,7,a.7.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
acquiresbythelabourofhisintellect,anditisforthatveryreasonthathiswisdomisgainedwithsuchdifficultyandheldsoinsecurely,andthatthosewhoseekitshouldbecalledphilosophersratherthanwisemen.
Suchisthenatureofphilosophyderivedfromtheetymologyofthetermanditsemploymentinordinaryspeech.Aphilosopherisamanhumanlywise.Andthemanwhodevoteshimselftophilosophy,bysodoingundertakestoshowhisfellowsthesublimestviewsatwhichman'sunderstandingcanarriveofthegreatproblemswhichsolicitthemindoftherace.
Thedefinitionofphilosophyas"humanwisdom"isstillasuperficialdefinition,andanominaldefinition,whichsimplyrendersagreementpossibleastothesenseoftheterm.Toattainamoreprofounddefinition,arealdefinitionwhichrevealsthenatureoftheobject,weshallstudyinthesequenceofconcretehistorytheformationorgenesisofwhatmenhaveagreedtocallphilosophy.
Insodoingweshallfollow,sofarasitispossibleinanexplanatorytext-book,theactualmethodofAristotle,toooftenneglectedbybookswhichteachhisconclusions,butapparentlyignorehisspirit.Thatgreatreahstadvancednothingaprioriandalwaysstudiedthehistoricaldevelopmentofaproblembeforeheproposedhisownsolution,whichthusappearedasthenaturalgoalofaprocessofdiscovery.Suchamethodwillnodoubtcompelustoundertakeaconsiderabledigressionintothefieldofhistory,butitis,nevertheless,inouropinionindispensable.
Ontheonehand,fromthepracticalandeducationalstandpoint,anaccountofthehistoricaloriginsof
INTRODUCTORY
philosophicthoughtisthebestmethodofacquaintingbeginnerswiththeproblemsofphilosophy,introducingthemintotheworld,entirelynewtothem,ofrationalspeculation,andfurnishingthem,incidentally,withmuchextremelyusefulknowledge.Theirfirstrequisiteistoknowwhattheyarestudying,andtopossessasufficientlyliveandaccuratenotionoftheproblemsofphilosophypresentedintheirsimplestform.
Ontheotherhand,injusticetooursubjectitself,tostatestraightaway,withnopreviousexaminationorconcretejustification,conclusionsrelatingtothenatureofphilosophy,itsobject,dignity,andsoforth,wouldbetopresentthetraditional
conceptionofphilosophyunderanarbitraryandaprioriaspectwhollyalientoit,andtoriskenslavingourpupilstoemptyformulae.Bybeginning,onthecontrguy,withabriefoutHneofthehistoryofancientphilosophyuptoAristotle,thatistosayuntiltheconclusionofitsformativeperiod,wedisplayphilosophyinitsoriginandconstruction,andtherebyshowhowthetransitionwaseffectedbetweentheteachingofcommonsenseandthescientificknowledgeofphilosophers,howthegreatphilosophicproblemsaroseofthemselves,andhowaparticularconceptionofphilosophy,whichwillbeputlatertothetestofdiscussion,resultsinevitablyfromthishistoricalinquiry,andnaturallyforcesitselfuponthemind.Weneednotfeartoinsistuponthesepreliminaryquestions,whichweshallhavetoconsideragainfromanotherangleincriticism.Theyconcerntheveryexistence,thenature,andthevalueofphilosophy.
PARTONETHENATUREOFPHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHICTHOUGHTBEFOREPHILOSOPHYINTHESTRICTSENSE
Philosophicspeculation,preciselybecauseitisthesupremeachievementofreason,isunknowntoalltheso-calledprimitiveraces.Indeed,evenofthecivilisationsofantiquitythegreaterparteitherhavepossessednophilosophyorhavefailedtodiscoveritstruenatureanddistinctivecharacter.Inanycase,philosophyonlybegantoexistataverylateperiodabouttheeighthandespeciallythesixthcenturyB.C.,andthenfoundtherightpathtotruthbyasuccesswhichmustberegardedasextraordinarywhenweconsiderthemultitudeofwrongroadstakenbysomanyphilosophersandphilosophicschools.
Nevertheless,someofthemostelementarytruthswithwhichphilosophydealswereknownlongbeforephilosophyitselfhadcometobirth,andthemoreimportantofthesearetobefoundinamoreorlessrudimentaiyformandmoreorlessseriouslycorruptedamongallthepeoplesofantiquity,evenatthemostremoteepochs.Butitwasnotfromthephilosophersthatthesepeopleshadlearnedthem;theirknowledgewasderivedinpartfromthatwhollyspontaneousandinstinctiveexerciseofreasonwhichwecallcommonsense,butaboveallfromprimitivetradition.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Themostreliableinductionsofhistorycombinewiththeconclusionsoftheology^toprovetheexistenceofaprimitivetradition,commontothedifferentbranchesofthehumanraceandgoingbacktotheoriginofmankind.Andevenindefaultofanypositivesourcesofinformation,itisaveryreasonableconjecturethatthefirstmanreceivedfromGodknowledgetogetherwithexistence,thatbyeducationhemightcompletetheworkofprocreation.
Butwasitpossiblethatthisknowledge,togetherwiththeprimitivereligioninwhichitwasincorporated,couldbetransmittedinitsintegritybythehumanrace?Wehave,ontheonehand,truthsoftheloftiestsublimitytobehandeddownfromonegenerationtoanother,yet,ontheother,anintelligencedominatedbythesensesandimagination.Adisproportionsoextremeinevitablydeterioratedthetraditionreceivedattheoutset,aslittlebylittletherustofobHviongathereduponit,errordefiledit,anditfellapreytothecorruptionsofpolytheismandthemoredegradedformsofreligion(animism,totemism,idolatry,magic,etc.).Nevertheless,inspiteofthechangeswhichitunderwent,theprimitivetraditionhaspreservedformankindthroughouttheagesadeposit,progressivelydiminishingnodoubt,offundamentaltruths.Inthisdepositwereincludedmanyphilosophicconceptions—thatistosay,conceptionswhichconcernedthemostsublimeproblemswithinthescopeofreason.Butsincetheyweretaughtonlybyareligioustraditionwhichcorroboratedtheinstinctiveteachingsofcommonsense,theywere
1p.Lemonnyer,O.P,(followingSchmidt),LaRivilaiionprimitiveetlesdoTtnSesactuellesdelascience.Paris,1914.
PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT
knowninapre-philosophicfashionandexistedinapre-philosophicstate.
Itisnotsurprisingthatallpeoplesintheprimitive^stageofhistorywereignorantofphilosophicspeculation.Butitismoreastonishingthatevencertaincivilisationsweredevoidofphilosophy—forexample,theSemitic,andtheEgyptian,whichis,inthisrespect,inthesamecategoryastheSemitic.Despitethehighlevelofscientificculturereachedbytheintellectualaristocracyoftheseraces,thesolephilosophicconceptions,itwouldseem,whichtheEgyptiansandChaldeanspossessedwereafewverygeneralideas,implicitintheirreligion,concerningtheDeity,thehumansoulanditsstateafterdeath,andthepreceptsofmorality.Thesetruths,which,moreover(asinthecaseofeveryrace),arepurer
thefurtherbackwefollowtheirhistory,werenevermadethesubjectofrationalstudyandspeculation,butweresimplyaccepted,asalsoweretheirscientificbeliefs,aspartofasacredtradition.Religiontooktheplaceofphilosophy,andfromreligiontheseracesreceivedcertainphilosophictruths;philosophytheyhadnone.InthismattertheJewsdidnotdifferfromtheirfellowSemites.Scornfulofhumanwisdomandtheachievementsofpurereason,and,indeed,withoutaptitudeforsuchinvestigations,theyproducednophilosophers(atleastnotbeforePhilo,whowasacontemporaryof
*Primitiveinrespectofaparticularbrainchofthegreathumantreeandsofarasourknowledgeofthepastextends,butnotprimitiveintheabsolutesense.Farbehindwhatwetermtheprimitivestateofthepeoplesknowntousliesalongstretchofhumanhistoryofwhichweknownothing.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
JesusChrist),buttheypossessedtheprophetsandtheLaw.
AllthegreatIndo-Europeancivilisations,ontheotherhand,manifestanimpulse,whichnodoubttookwidelydifferentforms,towardsrationaland,inthestrictsense,philosophicspeculation.But,exceptinGreece(andtoaverypartialextentinIndia),thisimpulsenowheresucceededinachievinganindependentscientificdisciplinedistinctfromreligion.Atraditionalreligiondidnotinthiscasetaketheplaceofphilosophy,butphilosophy,or,weshouldrathersay,humanwisdom,penetratedreligionandwasconfusedwithit.Thewisemanfulfilledasacredfunction.Hewasnottheheadofaphilosophicschool,butthefounderofareligioussect,ifnotofanewreligion.
{a)AmongthePersians,'^whoseoriginalreligion,sofarasweknowitfrominscriptions,wasafairlypuremonotheism,ZoroasterorZarathustrafoundedMazdeismorZoroastrianism(abouttheeighthorsixthcenturyB.C.?),apowerfulachievementofspeculationwhichsystematised(andincidentallydistorted)certainfundamentaltruthsderivedfromtheprimitivetradition,
*InthissummaryreviewofthegreatAryanreligions,wehavebeenobligednotonlytoisolatebyaprocessofabstractiontheintellectualaspectsofthosereligionswithwhichthephilosopherisconcerned,but,moreover,tosimplifyconsiderablyandreducetoanartificialclassificationdoctrineswhosevastandfluctuatingcomplexity(thisisespeciallytrueofBrahmanismandBuddhism),
andoccasionalinconsistency,dismayhistorians.ItshouldbeaddedthattheexplanationsofOrientalthoughtgivenbyscholarsarestilllargelyconjecturaland,inallprobability,especiallyasfarasphilosophyisconcerned,inmanycasesextremelyinadequate.
PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT
intheattempttogivearationalexplanationofthevastproblemwhichhasfacedhumanthoughtfromtheoutset,theproblemofevil.ByhisfailuretoperceivethatGodisthesolesupremeprincipleandthesourceofeverythingwhichexists,sofarasitpartakesofbeing,andthatevilismereprivationofbeingwithoutpositiveexistence,andthereforethatnocreatureisevilbynature,Zoroasterendedindualismandtaughttheexistenceoftwoprinciplesimcreatedandco-eternal,theprincipleofGood{Ormuzd)andtheprincipleofEvil(Ahriman),whosharethedominionoftheuniverseandwhoseunrelentingstruggleconstitutesitshistory.SofarasAhrimanistobeidentifiedwiththerebelangelofprimitivetradition,ZoroastrianismtendedtomakethedevilagodstrivingagainstGod.
(b)AmongthepeoplesofIndia,whoseintellectualandreligioushistoryisfarmorecomplex(sinceinthisfieldnocertaintyhasyetbeenreached,wepresenttheinterpretationoftheirbeliefswhichseemstousmostprobable),wewitnessaremarkablephenomenon.Whentheoriginalreligion—theprimitivereUgionoftheVedas^—nolongerprovedsufficienttosatisfytheintellectualdemandsorsocialneedsofamoreadvancedcivilisation,philosophicnotions,whichseemtohaveoriginatedasinterpretationsofsacrificeandothersacredritual,butdevelopedinaspirithostiletotheancienttraditionsandthecultofthe
^ThemostancientamongthereligiousbooksoftheHindus(Vedameansknowledge),theRig-Veda,isapparentlynotolderthanthetwelfthcenturyb.c.Vedicreligionseemstohavebeenanincoherentpolytheismcolouredbyavaguepantheism.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
gods,foundahomeamongthesacerdotalcasteandtookpossessionofthepriesthood.Toreconciletheperpetuationoftheirofficewiththeirnewopinions,thepriests,whilecontinuingtoperformthetraditionalceremonies,directedtheirworshipnolongertotheoldgods,buttotheundefinedandsecretforcesofthe
universe.
(i)Thisresulted,afteraperiodofconfusion,intheformationofanewsystem,Brahmanism(orHinduism),whichisessentiallyaphilosophy,ametaphysic,aworkofhumanspeculation,butbeing,sotospeak,clothedintheornamentsofthesanctuary,wasinvestedfromtheoutsetwiththesanctionsandattributesofareligion.Adivineoriginwasascribedtothebooksinwhichitwastaught(theBrahmanasandUpamshads)^andtheycouldbeobtainedonlyfromthepriests.HenceBrahmanismmaybecalledasacred,hieraticortheologicalmetaphysic,andalreadyintheeighthcenturyB.C.thesupremacyofthepriestlycasteamongtheHindusseemstohaverealisedinitsfashionthatsocialandspiritualsovereigntyofthephilosopher-priestandthereligionofsciencewhichwasthedreamofcertainnineteenth-centurythinkers.
Itistruethatthesciencewhichthosethinkerswishedtoinvestwithasacredcharacterwasthescienceofphenomena,or,asitwastermed,positivescience,whichisnotwisdom,evenhuman,and,asAugusteGomtejustlyobserved,isincapableofproducingorderinanydepartment.ThehumansciencetowhichBrahmanismgaveadivinecharacterwas,onthecontrary,thescienceofultimaterealities,metaphysics,humanwisdominthestrictsense:apowerfuleffortofmetaphysicalthought(sofaraswecanjudgeofit
PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT
fromdocumentswhoseinterpretationisstillfarfromcertain),buttheproductofreasonstilluntrained,incapableofmaidngthenecessarydistinctionsandofavoidinginternalcontradictions,seducedbythedreamofanintuitiveknowledgeoftheAll,angelicratherthanhuman,anddoomedbyitsveryambition.Thissystem,atleastwhenweconsideritspredominanttendencies,taughtthattheFirstPrincipleoftheworld,namedBrahma^orAtman,^constitutesinhimselftheintimaterealityofeverythingwhichtrulyexists,whencelogicallyfollowspantheism,ortheidentificationofGodwithhiscreation.^Nevertheless,
1Fromthenameoftheoccultandsacredforcewhichgaveritualitsefficacyandpervadedallthings.OriginallyregardedasthefirstemanationofthesupremeGod,itbecamefortheBrahmanstheuniquesourceofbeing.Themasculinenoun,Brahma,designatestheFirstPrincipleasGodandLord,theneuter,Brahman,astheoneimp>er5onalsubstance.
2Fromthenameoftheprincipleoflife(the"self"transcendingthephenomenalindividual),whichwasregardedasanimatingmanandtheimiverse.
'Thetermpantheismisrelativelyrecent,havingbeenintroducedintothevocabularyofphilosophybyTolandintheeighteenthcentiiry.ButthedoctrineitdesignatesisasancientastheearUestphilosophicalerrors.
Forasystemtobepantheistic,itneednotexplicitlyidentifyGodandcreatures(veryfewpantheistsfulfilthiscondition).ItissufficientthatitsteachingsarelogicallyineconcilablewithanabsolutedistinctionbetweenGodandcreatures.
ThisobservationisparticularlyimportantforthestudyofOrientalphilosophies,ofwhichpantheismistheoriginalsin.Indeed,itarisesintheircasefromtheverymethodofthoughttheyemploy,whichappearstoconsistprimarilyinthetreatmentofanalogousconcepts(realiseddifferentlyindifferentobjects)asthoughtheyexistedassuchoutsidethemind,whichledthemtoconcludethatthingswhichremainthesamebecomeondifferentplanesofrealityessentiallydifferent.Forexample,Atmanisboththesupremeprincipleoftheuniverse,transcendingallmultipUcity,andtheprinciplewhichdistingiiishesandconstituteseverypersonality.LiketheSchoolmen,butfor
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
anattemptwasmadetoavoidthisconclusion.TheSupremePrinciple,whichpossessesneitherpersonalitynorknowledge,towhichnoattributecanbeapplied,whichisabsolutelyunknowablebyanyconcept,howeveruniversal,notevenbytheconceptofbeing,sothatitmustbecalledNothingorNon-Being,isthesoletruereality.Thereforetheexistenceofeverythingmultipleorlimited,everythingwecanknowbyoursensesorevenbyourconcepts,isassuchillusion,mereappearance.Thisisidealism,thedenialoftherealityoftheworldandofthings.Butthebareexistenceofthisappearanceorillusionisanevil,indeedevilpureandsimple.TheexistenceofindividualobjectsandofthiscosmicdelusionwhichiscalledNature(Maya),andwhichkeepsuscaptivesofthemanifoldandthetransitory,isessentiallyevilandthesourceofallsuffering.
Theproblemofevil,therefore,seemstodominatetheentirespeculationoftheIndianmetaphysicians,asalsoofthePersiansages.ButthePersians,whosebentwaspractical,alwaysconsideredevilundertheaspectofsin,and,obsessedwiththedifferencesbetweenmoralgoodandevil,whichtheyattemptedtouseasa
criteriontodividebeingsintotwometaphysicalcategories,endedindualism.TheHindus,onthe
differentreasons,theIndiansdistinguishbetweenthepersonality(whichisforusthespiritualsubsistenceofthesoul)andthematerialindividuality(whicharisesfromthedispositionsofthebody).
Thismodeofthought,whichwemeetagainmoreorlessemphasizedineverydoctrineoftheosophicorientation,makesitpossibletoavoidtheappearanceofpantheism,becauseitsinherentself-contradictionpermitstheaffirmationofessentialdifferencesbetweentermswhichshouldlogicallybeidentified.But,preciselybecausetheseaffirmationsareonlypossibleinvirtueofafundamentalself-contradiction,itinevitablyinvolvesarealpantheism.
PRE-PHILOSOPHICTHOUGHT
contrary,exclusivelyoccupiedwithcontemplation,regardedevilpre-eminentlyundertheaspectofsuffering,orratherprivation,inthesenseinwhichmetaphysiciansunderstandtheterm.^Ledastraybyaprofoundrealisationofagreattruthwhichtheywereunabletoapprehendclearly(forwhileitisverytruethatitwerebetterforusnottoexistthantoexistwithoutbeingimitedtoGod,theybelieveditwerebetterforallthingsnottoexistthantoexistwithoutbeingGod),theyendedinapessimismwhich,thoughundoubtedlyverydifferentfromtheromanticpessimismofaSchopenhauer,wasprimarilythebarrenrenunciationofaproudintellect,andattemptedtobeself-sufl5cient.
What,then,intheirconceptiondidwisdomteachman?Ittaughthimtofreehimselffromsufferingandillusion,andwiththatobjecttoridhimselfofallindividualexistence.TheBrahmansheldthedoctrineofthetransmigrationofsouls,ormetempsychosis;theybelievedthatsouls,onthedeathoftheorganismwhich
1FromthispointofviewIndianspeculationmaybesaidtoaffordaprominentexampleofpuremetaphysicalintellectualism.Regardingthingssolelyfromthestandpointofintellectualspeculationandtheuniversalorder,andnotfromthestandpointoftherectitudeofthehumanwillandthatparticularorderbywhichmanisorderedtohislastend,itquicklycametolosesightalmostentirelyofthenotionofmoralgoodandevil,anditsethicsconsistsprimarilyinametaphysicalpurification,directedexclusivelytoaparticularidealofintellectualknowledge.
Ananalogoustendencyisobservableineverysystemwhichconfusesbyanexaggeratedintellectualismthemoralwiththemetaphysicalorder(aconfusionwhichisglaringinSpinoza'sEthics,forexample)and,failingtorecognisethatGodisnotonlytheprovisoruniversalisofcreation,butalsotheprovisorparticularisofthemorallife(cf.St.Thomas,Sum.TheoLi,q.103,a.8,withCajetan'sCommentaty),endsbyclaimingtotranscendthedistinctionofgoodandevilanddenyingtheexistenceofmoralevil.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
theyhadanimated,passedintoanotherorganism,thuslivingsuccessivelyindifferentbodiesofmen,animals,orplants.^Thepunishmentofthewickedandfoolishconsistedaccordinglyincontinuingtoundergoinaseriesofreincarnationsthepainofindividualexistence.Thesoulofthewiseman,onthecontrary,wasdeliveredfromtheyokeoftransmigration;absorbedorreabsorbedinAtman,itescapedthesufferingsoftheworldbylosingalldistinctiveindividuality.
TheethicsofBrahmanismteachesthemeanswherebythisdeliverancecanbeachieved;thewisemanprogressestowardsthatgoalinthislifebymeansofcontemplation.Brahmanismunderstandsthatcontemplationisabeginningofbeatitudeinthislife;but,asitmistakesthenatureofbeatitude,soitmistakesthenatureofcontemplation.Thecontemplationwhichitclaimstoteachis,infact,onlyametaphysicalcontemplation,orratheraspeciesofsupra-rationalvision,whichitexpectstoachievebythemerelynaturalpowersofthecreatedintellect;unlikeChristiancontemplation,itistheproductoftheintellectalone,notofsupernaturalcharityandthe
1S05atleast,metempsychosisiscurrentlyunderstood.Itisnotunlikelythatthisinterpretationofthedoctrineisthepopulartranslationofadoctrinelesscrude,accordingtowhicheverybeingpassesthroughanindefiniteseriesofstatesorcyclesofexistence,eachofwhichisonlylivedonce,andourearthlyexistenceissimplyoneparticularstateamongmanyothers.Ifthisbethecase,thedoctrineofsuccessivereincarnationsoriginatedinanunintelligentdistortionofthistheory,stillfurthercorruptedwhenitwasintroducedintotheWest.(Thepossibility,however,remainsthatoriginallythePythagoreansandOrphicsunderstoodthetransmigrationofsoulsinasymbolicsense.)
Itisalsopossible,onthecontrary,thatthetheoryinquestionwasalearned
interpretation,elaboratedbytheIndianmetaphysicians,ofapopularbeliefintransmigration.
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infusedwisdomwhichaccompaniesit.ItsaimisunionwithGodbyknowledge,notbylove.Insteadofadmittinganactivityoverflowingfromitsownsuperabundance,itwithdrawsfromactivityofanykind,whichitabandonswhollytotheinferiorpowers.Bythismetaphysicalcontemplation,Brahmanismproposestoputusgraduallyinpossessionofourlastendandinitiateusintotheblessedstateofthedelivered.Sinceitthusstrivestoreachbyman'sunaidedpowersheightswhichgracealonecanattain,itresultsinapseudo-mysticismofapurelyintellectualcharacter(incontrasttoother,purelyemotional,formsoffalsemysticism)inwhichthewiseman,hopingnotonlytobeunitedwithGod,buttoblendwithhim,intoxicateshimselfnotwithGod,butwithhisownself-annihilation.Hence(apartfromthoseinstancesofgenuinespiritualitywhichgraceisalwaysfreetoproduce)ahostofcounterfeitsofsupernaturalmysticism,alsoofasceticexercisesandmethods,includingamongtheirbaserforms(withthefakirs)thosetoursdeforceofexaggeratedasceticismwhichprovethatthemortificationoftheflesh,whennotregulatedbyreasonanddictatedbylove,canbeasfallaciousaspleasure.NaturalismisthusthefinalcharacteristicandthecapitalviceofBrahmanism,^asindeedofphilosophicmysticismingeneral,whetheritbetheproductofBrahmanism,Buddhism,neo-Platonism,orIslam.
(ii)Fromthesixthcenturyonwardsnewschools
^WedonotmeanthatBrahmanismdescendstotheadorationofsensiblenature,abovewhich,onthecontraryitclaimstorisecompletely.Bytheterm"naturalism"weheremeantheclaimtoarriveatunionwithGodandperfectionwithoutthesupernaturalassistanceofgrace.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
aroseinIndia,someorthodox,othersheterodox.OfthesetheprincipalwasthatfoundedbyCakya-Muni,surnamedtheBuddha^(theenlightened,thesage).Buddhism,adoctrineessentiallynegativeandsolvent,directed,moreover,topracticeratherthantospeculation,mayberegardedasthecorruptionanddissolutionoftheBrahmanphilosophy.
Substitutingforthatwhichisthatwhichpassesaway,refusingtosaythat
anythingdoesordoesnotexist,andadmittingonlyasuccessionofimpermanentformswithoutfixedfoundationorabsoluteprinciple—inotherwordssubordinatingbeingtowhatisknownasbecomingorferi—^itshowed,attheverytimeatwhichinGreeceHeraclitusformulatedthephilosophyofflux,allthecharacteristicsofaperfectevolutionarysystem,and,ifitdeclaredtheexistenceofGod,asofasubstantialselfandanimmortalsoul,unknowable{agnosticism),itsrealtendencywastodenytheexistenceofGod(atheism),andtosubstituteforsubstanceofanykindastreamorflux,regardedindeed^asitselfreal,offormsorphenomena(phenomenalism).^HenceforBuddhismmetempsychosisconsistsinacontinuouschainofthoughtsandfeeHngs(astreamofconsciousness,asweshouldtermitto-day)passingfromonemodeofexistencetoanotherinvirtueofasortofurgetowardsUfe,dueitselftothedesiretolive:itisdesirewhichisthe
"HisactualnamewasGautama.ThenameCakya-Munimeanstheasceticorhermit{muni)oftheraceorclanoftheCakya.BuddhalivedduringthesecondhalfofthesixthcenturyB.C.Hewouldseemtohavediedabouttheyear477.
2AtleastbyBuddha'soriginaldisciples.
'"Ever>'thingisempty,everythingvmsubstantial"wasasayingofBuddha's.
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causeofexistenceand"wearewhatwehavethought."
Atthesametime,theteachingofdeliverancefromsuffering,whichinBuddhism,evenmorethaninBrahmanism,dominatestheentiresystem,assumesadifferentandevenmoreradicalform.Evilisnolongermerelythepossessionofindividualorpersonalexistence;itisexistenceitself:itiseviltobe,andthedesireofexistenceistherootofallsuffering.Thewisemanmustthereforedestroyinhimselfman'snaturallongingforexistenceandforbeatitude,thefullnessofbeing;hemustabandonallhopeandextinguisheverydesire.Hewillthusattainthestateofemptinessortoialindeterminationcallednirvana(literallynakedness,metaphoricallyimmortality^refresh-ment,thefartherbank—theterm,initselfindefinite,wasneverdefinedbyBuddha),whichwilldeliverhimfromtlieevilofexistenceandtheyokeoftransmigration,andwhich,inthelogicalconsequenceofBuddhistprinciples,mustberegardedastheannihilationofthesoulitself.Forsincethesoulisonlythechainor
currentofthoughtsandfeelingswhichderivetheirexistencefromthedesiretobe,toextinguishthatdesireistoextinguishthesoul.
ThisnirvanaisthegoalforwhoseattainmentBuddhismmadeuseoftheasceticpracticeswhichittookoverwithconsiderablemitigationfromBrahmanism,alsoofitsmoralcode^whichisthusdirected,nottoGod,buttoaspeciesofmysticalnothingness
*Weheretmderstandmoralcodeinaverywidesenseasmeaningacodeofbehaviour.Iftheexpressionbetakenasimplyingmoralobligation,whoseultimatebasisistheChristiandoctrineofGodthetranscendentCreator,wemustconcludethatBuddhism,asindeedalltheOrientalreligions,IndianorChinese,hasnomoralcode.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
asitslastend.Moreover,thesourceandultimatemeasureofBuddhistethicsisman,notGod.Ifitrejectedthesystemofcasteswhichexaggeratedthedemandsofsocialorderanddividedmanalmostintodistinctspecies,itwasonlytodissolvesocialorderofanykindinanabsoluteequalityandindividualism.Andthoughitprescribedauniversalbenevolence(whichextendedeventoprohibitingtheslaughterofanimalsandtoacompulsoryvegetarianism),almsgiving,pardonofinjuries,andnon-resistancetothewicked,itsmotivewasnotloveofone'sneighbourassuch,whosepositivegoodand(byimphcation)existenceweareboundtowill,buttoescapesufferingtooneselfbyextinguishingallactionandenergyinakindofhumanitarianecstasy.Buddhismis,therefore,aproofthatgentlenessandpity,whentheyarenotregulatedbyreasonanddictatedbylove,candeformhumannatureasmuchasviolence,sincetheyarethenmanifestationsofcowardice,notofcharity.
ThisdoctrineofdespairisnotonlyaheresyfromthepointofviewofBrahmanism;itisanintellectualplaguetohumanity,becauseitproceedsfromthenegationofreason.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatwefindinitthemajorityofthefundamentalerrorsbywhichcontemporaryattacksonreasonareinspired.IfatthepresentdayithasfoundawarmwelcomeamongcertaincirclesinEurope,itisbecauseallthosewhohopetoderivefromhumanitarianismamoralcodeofhumankindnessfortheacceptanceofanatheisticsocietyarealreadyimplicitlyBuddhists.
(iii)Buddhismisaphilosophy,agnosticandatheistic,whichneverthelessusurpsthesocialand
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ritualfunctionsofareligion.Itisasareligionthatithaswontheallegianceofsomanymillions.^IncertainotherschoolstowhichBrahmanismgavebirth—schoolsrecognisedas"orthodox"—wefind,ontheotherhand,atendencytowardsthenormaldistinctionbetweenphilosophyandreligion.
Thesedarshanas,itistrue,wouldseemtobenotsomuchdistinctsystemsascomplementaryaspectsofoneandthesamedoctrine,theBrahmanistmetaphysics.HerewemaypassovertheVedanta,themostcompletestatementofthatmetaphysicsanditsdoctrineofdeliverance;theMimamsa,aspeciesofcommentaryontheritualandanexplanationoftheunseenforcessetinmotionbyeveryact;theSankhya,founded,itissaid,byKapila(fifthorsixthcenturyB,c.?),whichtreatsoftheemanationofallthingsfromtheirsource,andseemstohavetaught,likePlato,apsychologicaldualismwhichexplziinssufferingbytheunionsoulscontractwithmatter;andalsoToga^whichteachesthepracticalmethodswhichleadtocontemplation,thatistosay,thetotallossofconsciousnessandidentificationwiththeuniversalBeing(Iskvara)byasupra-rationalknowledge.ButthedarshanaVaisesika,ascribedtoKanada(aboutthefourthcenturyB.C.?),whichincludesaroughoutlineofcosmology,anddivideseverythingwhichexistsintoanumberoffundamentalclassesorcategories,substance,quality,movement,association,difference,and
^However,inproportionasithassecuredwideacceptance,Buddhismhasceasedtobeatheistic,onlytofallintothemostdegradedconceptionsofdeity.PopularBuddhismaspractisedto-dayinmanypartsofAsia,where,toadaptitselftoexistingbeliefs,ithasassumedthemostvariedshapes,isnothingmorethanaformofidolatry,totallydifferentfromphilosophicBuddhism.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
inherence,andexplainsthefourelementsofponderablematter,earth,water,air,andfire,bytheunionofindivisibleandindestructibleparticles,"atoms"inthelanguageofphilosophy,^andthedarshanaNyaya^foundedbyGotama,whichattemptstoconstructatheoryofreasoningandproof—thatistosayalogic,thoughalogicextremelyconfusedandincomplete—areclearlytherough
sketchesofaworkstrictlyandsolelyphilosophical.Butthesecrudeattemptsdidnotleadtoacompletedsystem,andIndianthoughtneverachievedarationalandautonomousphilosophy.
{c)WhenweturntotheFarEastandconsidertheveryancientcivilisationofChina^^wefindthatwhentheprimitivereligionoftheChinese,whichseemstohavebeenfairlypure,'hadfromthetwelfthcenturyb.c.undergonegrosscorruptionandmaterialisation,substitutingtheskyforGod,*worshippingthesunandmoon,payingdivineworshiptothesoulsofancestorsandtospirits,andallowingitselftobecometaintedbymagicandsorcery,wisemenwerecompelledhere
1Kanada,however,toexplainthisunion,attributedrealqualitiestohisatoms.ObservethatBrahmani^m,whichrejectsatomism,admitsfiveelements(etherbeingthefifth);Buddhismonthecontrary,whichhaswelcomedatomism,onlyfour.
2WhateverbetheracialappurtenanceoftheChinese,theirhistoryundoubtedlyshowscloserconnectionswiththeAryansthanwiththeSemites.ItisforthisreasonthatChinesephilosophyisdiscussedinthepresentsection.
*IttaughttheexistenceofonesoleGod—Shang-ti—personal,intelligent,distinctfromtheworld,SovereignRuleroftheracesofmankind;alsotheimmaterialityandimmortalityofthehumansoul,andevenofferedtothespiritsofancestorsthesamesacrificesandmarksofreverenceastothegoodspiritswhoareguardiansofmen.
*InallprobabilityHeaven{Tien)wasinoriginsimplyametaphoricalsynonymoftheSovereignRuler{Skang-H).
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alsotoseekaremedyforadecadencewhichaboutthesixthcenturyB.C.threatenedtheirciviHsationwithutterruin.
IthaslongbeenbeUevedthattheChinesesagesweresimplymoralistswhollyoccupiedwithlayingdownrulesofconductandcompletelyindifferenttometaphysicalspeculation.ThisisatrueaccountonlyofConfuciusandhisfollowers;itdoesnotseemtobeappHcabletoLao-Tse,thoughwecanonlyacceptwithconsiderablereservetheinterpretationsofhisteachingofferedby
certainmodernTaoists.
Accordingtotheiraccount,Lao-Tse(born604b.c)washimselfthediscipleofatraditionwhoseoldestmonumentistheTi-King,abookwhichconsistsessentiallyofsixty-fourgraphicsymbols(hexagramsordoubletrigrams)arrangedinaseriesofmechanicalgroups/formedbycombiningsimplersignsandsusceptibleofverymanyinterpretations(metaphysical,logical,mathematical,moral,political,astronomic),eachnumbercorrespondinganalogicallywiththeothers.ThemetaphysicalspeculationoftheTi-Kingappearstohavebeenprimarilyconcernedwiththequestion,HowcantheAbsolute,beingwhollyself-sufficient,actandmanifestitself?ItdistinguishesinthesupremeandsoleFirstPrincipleorPerfectiontwodifferentaspects,Chien^theunmovirigandunknowablesourceofallactivity,andChuen,knowableactivity,whicheternallymanifestsperfectioninaprocessofspiralevolutionandanendlessfluxofforms.Butthesetwoaspectsmergeinonesingleandself-identicalbeing,andallthings,afterpassingthroughalltheforms
1RaymondLull,inhisattemptstocreateanideographicalgebra,employedananalogousprocedure.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ofevolution(ofwhichthehumancycleisbutonecurve),mustreturntoChien.Thismetaphysicmaythereforebedescribedasaspeciesofevolutionarypantheism.ItconstitutesthefoundationofLao-Tse'ssystem(Taoism),hischiefcontributionbeinganelementofoccultismandasceticism,^Tao(theWay),theeternalgoalandprocessofevolution,istheroadbywhichallthingsmustpasstoarrivefinallyatthecompletecessationofactivity[Nibban,theChinesenirvana),inwhichtheyarereabsorbedinnothingnessandbecomeonewiththefirstprincipleofailactivity.ThewisemanwillimitatetheTaobycuttinghimselfofffromallthings,fortheWay,thoughithasproducedbeings,doesnotpartakeoftheirmovements."Havingbuiltthishouse,itdwellethnottherein."Detachedfromwealth,passions,andsensibleexperience,andknowingthatevilismereappearance,hetrainshimselfinsolitude,secrecy,andhumility(ahumilitywhichhasnothingincommonwiththeChristianvirtueofthatname,beingnothingmorethanprudenceandcontemptforone'sfellowmen),untilhereachesastateofperfectknowledgeinwhichhenolongeractsexceptbythepureintelligence.Thewisdom,theillusorywisdom,towhichTaoistasceticismleadsitsdisciples,anasceticismwhichmakesuseofopium,asBuddhistasceticismofhypnosis,is
formanaprincipleofrevolt,thereforetheadept
1Itmaybeaddedthatinthetwelfthcenturya.d.Chu-Hi,whohasbeenregarded,mistakenlyitwouldseem,asamaterialist,formulated,inthetraditionofLao-Tse,asystemwhichintheChinesesystemofeducationhasbecome,practicallyspeaking,theofficialphilosophy.Itexplainstheconstitutionofthingsbyadualprinciple{liandki)whichisnotwithoutresemblancetothedualityofformandmatterinAristotleandtheAlexandrians.
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mustkeepitasecretforhimselfandanarrowcircleofinitiates.*
NodoubtConfucius(Kung-fu-tse,551-479B.C.),who,unlikeLao-Tse,representsfortheChineseamoderateandpracticalwisdom(which,fromitsplaceintheirsystemofeducationanditsownactivecharacter,isgenerallyaccessible),preservedmanytruthsoftheprimitivewisdom.Heavoided,however,everyultimatequestion,andconfinedhimselftoanethicpurelyhuman,social,earthly,andevencommonplace.Opportunism,heobserves,isthedistinctivemarkofthewiseman.Everypredeterminedlineofaction,everypreconceptionisamistake.Inallmattersoneshouldpursueamiddlecourse,liveunfetteredbyonefixedpurpose,embracenoopinionwithenthusiasm,rejectnothingbecauseitisantipathetic,dowhateverseemsbestinthecircumstancesofthemomentandasthesituationdemands.Confucianism,asystemintendedforthemultitude,endedinpurematerialism.Taoism,whichclaimedtoaddressasmallcircle,andwhich,iftheinterpretationgivenabovebecorrect,constitutes,togetherwithBrahmanism,oneofthemostsingularattemptsevermadebymantoattain,inthatignoranceoflovewhichseemsanaboriginalcharacteristicofOrientalthought,awisdomexclusivelyoftheintellect,bywhichhecoulddeifyhimselfinmetaphysics,hasexperiencedinChinaalternateperiodsoftriumphandpersecution,andhasorganised,apparentlyeversincetheopeningcenturiesofourera,secretsocieties
*"Emptytheirheads,andfilltheirbellies,"wasLao-Tse'sadvicetoastatesman;"weakentheirmindsandstrengthentheirsinews.ToteachthepeopleistoruintheState."
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
inwhichithasdefinitivelytakenrefiigesincetheseventeenthcenturyandin
whichithasdegeneratedintoaphilosophicandpoliticaloccultismofthemostpernicioustype.
Thisbriefhistoricalsketchhasshowntheimportantpartinthehfeofhumanityplayedbysagesandtheirwisdom.Allthesenations,situatedonthefrontiersofdarkness,andlackingadivinerevelationoftruth,wereobliged,whentheirreligionsprovedincapableofsatisfyingtheneedsoftheindividualsoulorofsociety,tohaverecoursetothewisdomsuppliedbyhumanreason.Thiswisdom,inthecivilisationsofwhichwehavespokenhitherto,wasneverdifferentiatedfromreligion,but,onthecontrary,encroachedonthedomainofthelatterandclaimedtoconductmentotheirlastend,untilinIndiaweactuallyfindthatBrahmanismsuccessfullyachievedthatcanonisationofmetaphysicswhichthreatenedtheGreco-Romanworldinthereignoftheneo-Platonicemperor,JuliantheApostate.ItachievedalsothattransfusionintoreligionofahumanphilosophyattemptedbyKantianmetaphysicsinthenineteenthcentury{Modernism).
Ithasalsoshownhowthishumanwisdomhaseverywhereprovedbankrupt,andhow,evenbeforephilosophytookshapeasanindependentdiscipline,mostofthegreatphilosophicerrorshadbeenalreadyformulated.Fromtheveryfirst,themostarduousproblemstowerhkemountainsbeforetheintellectofman;theproblemofevil,theproblemofbeing,theproblemofthebecomingandfluxofthings.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatareasonliableto
PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT
errorthemomentittranscendedtheelementarytruthswithintherangeofcommonsense,areasonstillunstableandundisciplined,andthereforeallthemoreambitious,wentastrayfromtheoutsetandopenedthehistoryofmetaphysicswiththedualismofZoroasterandthepessimismoftheHindu,thepantheismandidealismoftheBrahmans,theatheisticevolutionismofBuddha,andtheillusorywisdomofLao-Tse.Whenitbecamemoremodest,itwasonlytofallintotheethicalpositivismofConfucius,renouncingallsublimityandevendenyingitsownraisond'etre.Norshoulditsurpriseustofindthesameerrorsreappearingatalaterstage,v/henphilosophyhadbeenfullyelaborated.Error,atwhateverperiodofhumanhistoryitmayarise,isduetoafailureofman'sreasoningpower—is,sotospeak,areturnofitsprimitiveweakness,andthereforeofitsverynatureretrograde.
Afurtherfact,however,callsforremarkhere,afactonlytoowellestablishedbythisprehistory,sototermit,ofphilosophy:namely,thatthesefundamentalerrorsarenotunsubstantialandinsignificantdangers;theymaysucceed,tothebaneofthosediseasedcultureswhichtheycondem.ntosterility.Truth(inallmatterswhichtranscendthedataofcommonsense)isnot,asthoseareapttobehevewhohavehadthegoodfortunetobebomintoacultureformedbyit,giventomanreadymade,likeanaturalendowment.Itisdifficulttoattain,andhardtokeep,andonlybyafortunateexceptionisitpossesseduncontaminatedbyerrorandinthetotahtyofitsvariouscomplementaryaspects.Wehavethereforethemosturgentcausetobegratefulforthepossession
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ofarevelation,bywhichGodhasgivenusfromonhigh,besidesaknowledgeofsupernaturaltruthinaccessibletoreason,asureandeasyaccesstotheessentialelementsofthesametruthwhich,sofarasitfallswithinthenaturalorder,isindeedaccessibletoourspeculation,butcanbesoeasilymissedbyit.Thosealsohavethestrongestclaimonourgratitudewhofrombelow,bythestrenuousexerciseoftheirreasonandunaidedbyrevelation,succeededinbringingtolighttheprinciplesandlayingthepermanentfoundationofthisnaturaltruth,andinconstructingatrueandprogressivehumanwisdom,inotherwordsaphilosophy,which,whenmetlaterandraisedbythetruthrevealedfromheaven,wouldbeincorporatedintothefabricofahigherwisdom,theology,thewisdomofmandeifiedbygrace,wisdominthehighestsenseoftheterm.HowhighlythereforeoughtwetoprizethesacredheritageofGreekthought!
InGreece^aloneintheancientworld,thewisdomofmanfoundtherightpath,andastheresultofafortunateharmonyofthesoul'spowersandofalongefforttoachievementalorderanddisciplinehumanreasonattaineditsfullvigourandmaturity.Inconsequence,thesmallHellenicraceappearsamongthegreatempiresoftheEastlikeamanamidstgiganticchildren,andmaybetrulytermedtheorganofthereasonandwordofmanastheJewishpeoplewastheorganoftherevelationandwordofGod.
ItwasinGreecealonethatphilosophyachievedherautonomyandwasexplicitlydistinguishedfromreligion.Atleastduringthepurestandmostglorious
PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT
ageoftheHeilenicmind,itrecogniseditsownboundariesandwascontenttoclaimastrictlylimitedterritory—thescientificstudyofpurelyrationaltruths—whereasGreekreligion,alreadyverymuchdegradedinthetimeofHomer,becameincreasinglyincapableofsatisfyingtheneedsoftheintelligence,andgrewmorecorrupteveryday.True,thetimewouldcomewhentheGreeks,arrogantlyabusingphilosophyandreason,wouldattempttoembracethethingsofGodwithinthelimitsoftheirwisdom,"wouldbecomevainintheirthoughts"anddeservethecondemnationpronouncedbySt.Paulonthewisdomofthisworld,"whichisfoolishnessinthesightofGod."Buttheirphilosophy,thoughbornoftheirmind,isundefiledbytheircorruptions,anditssoleobjectisthetruth.
THEPRE-SOGRATIGPHILOSOPHERS
TheearliestthinkersofHeliaswerethepoets,theinterpretersoftraditionalreligion.Myth-makers,likeHesiodorHomer,sometimesprophets,suchasthatEpimenidesofCnossoswhopurifiedAthensfrompestilencebyerectingaltarstounnameddivinities,theyhavenoplaceinthehistoryofphilosophyinthestrictsense,Greekphilosophy,asAristotleshows,onlybeganwithThalesofMiletus,oneoftheSagesorGnomics,wholivedintheseventhorsixthcenturiesB.G.^
TheprimaryaimoftheseSages,traditionallyseveninnumber(theirnamesarevariouslyhandeddownbyancientwriters),wastoimprovetheconductoftheirfellowcitizens.Theiraphorisms,someofwhichPlatoquotesintheProtagoras,donomorethanembodythepracticallessonstheyhadlearnedfromtheirexperienceoflife.Theyweremenofacdon,legislators,ormoralists,menofprudence,butnotyetphilosophers.AloneamongthemThalesembarkedonscientificspeculadon.Geometricianandastronomer,hedemonstratedthatailtheanglesinscribedinasemicirclearerightangles,andappearstohavepredicted—nodoubtowingtohisacquaintancewith
^FortheiragitnentsfromtheearlyphilosophersquotedinthischapterProfessorBurnet'stranslation(EarlyGreekPhilosophy)hasbeenusedIforAristotle'sMetaphysicsProfessorW.D.Ross'stranslation.
46
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Babylonianscience—thetotaleclipseofthesunwhichoccurredonMay28th,
585.
Thephilosopherswhosucceededhimwerestillforthemostpartmenwhoplayedanactivepartinpublicaffairs,ardentpoliticiansofthecitystate;but,inspiteofthispracticalactivity,theyweremoreorlessclearlyconsciousfromthebeginningofthetruenatureoftheirwisdom.Moreover,saveinthecaseofafewexceptionalindividuals(forinstance,Empedocles,themiracleworker,andPythagoras,whofoundedareligioussect),Greekphilosophywasfromtheveryfirstdistinctfromreligion—indeedittookshapeasacriticandfoeofthepopularmythologyandwasmanifestlytheproductofpurereasoning.
InthisworkweareconcernedonlywiththeprogressivedevelopmentofGreekphilosophyfromThalestoAristotle,foritwasduringthisperiodthatphilosophy,withitsabsolutevalidityformankindasawhole,tookdefiniteshape.Theprocessoccupiedsomethreecenturiesandisdivisibleintothreegreatepochs—theperiodofformation(thepre-Socraticphilosophers),theperiodofcrisis(theSophistsandSocrates),theperiodoffruitfulmaturity(PlatoandAristotle).
THElONIANS
(a)Humanreasonnowsetoutwithitsunaidedpowersinsearchoftheprinciplesandcausesofthings.Whatfirststrikesman'sintelHgenceiswhatheseesandtouches,whatheknowsbyhissenses,andwhenheattemptstounderstandanything,hebeginsbyaskingwhatitismadeof.ThereforethefirstthinkersofHellasonlyconsideredinthingsthematerialofwhich
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
theyaremade,theirmatter(whatweshalllearntocallthematerialcause),whichtheynaivelytooktobeacompleteexplanationoftheobject.Moreover,sincethemostuniversalandmostimportantphenomenonofnatureischange,especiallythechangebywhichonebodybecomesanother{e.g.breadbecomesflesh,woodfire),theyconcludedthattheoriginalmatterofwhichallthingsarefashionedmustbeidenticalinall,thecommonsubjectofallcorporealchanges.Butsincetheywerestillunabletoconceiveanyimpalpableorinvisibleprinciple,theythoughttheyhaddiscoveredthismatterinsomeoneofthe,elementsperceivedbythesenses.
Thales,forexample(624-546),influencedbytraditionalmythswhichderivedall
thingsfromtheprimordialwaters,andarguingfromthefactthatplantsandanimals"arenourishedbymoisture"andthatthegermofanimallifeismoist,concludedthatwateristhesolesubstance,preservingitsidentitythroughallthetransformationsofbodies.ForAnaximenes(588-524)thissubstancewasair,forHerachtus(540-475?)fire,forAnaximander(610-547)theboundless(bywhichheunderstoodtheindeterminate,arceipov),afusionofallthecontraries.Moreover,water,air,fire,andtheboundlesswereregardedassomethingactive,Uving,andanimate,endowedbyaninternalforcewithamanifoldandunlimitedfecundity.ThiswasthemeaningofThales'sdictum,allthings"arefullofgods,"Travxankripy]6eoiv.^FromthehistoryofthisextremelyprimitiveIonianschool,whosephilosophyistermedhylozoistbecauseitascribedlife(Ccoy))tomatter(uXv)),welearn
1Aristotle,DeAnima,i,5,411a7.48
THEPRE-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHERS
toregardasthemostelementaryandcrudeofphilosophicdoctrinesthematerialisticmonismwhichteachestheexistenceofaonesinglesubstanceofamaterialnature,andevolutionism^whichattemptstoexplaineverythingbyanhistoricprocessofunfolding,development,orevolutionofsomethingpre-existent.
Evolutionism,which,owing,ontheonehand,toGermanmetaphysics,ontheothertoDarwinandSpencer,becamesopopularinthenineteenthcentury,wasalreadytaughtinGreecebythephysicistsofthesixthandfifthcenturiesb.c.^Anaximanderinparticulartaughttheeternalevolutionofworlds"whichriseandsetatlongintervals,"andheldthatanimalssprangfromthemudoftheseafloor,clothedatfirst,aswithaspeciesofshell,inapricklybarkwhichtheyshedondryland,^andthatmanarosefromanimalsofanotherspecies,'havingbeenoriginallyformedwithinthebodiesoffishes,wherehedeveloped,beingejectedassoonashehadbecomesufficientlylargetoprovideforhimself.*
LaterEmpedoclesofAgrigentum(493-433?),whosespeculationinotherrespectsmarksanadvanceonthatofthelonians,^explainedtheoriginofUvingbeings
1InIndiaaboutthesamedateBuddhismwasformulating,aswehaveseen,thereligionofevolutionism.
*Plac.Philos.,V,19,i.Dox.430,15.
'Pseudo-Plut.,Strom.,frag.2,Dox,579,17.
*Plut.,Sjmp.,q,viii.579,17.
"ForasinglecorporealsubstanceEmpedoclessubstitutedfourelementsspecificallydifferent,thefourwhichbecamelaterthefourclassicalelementsofancientchemistry—earth,water,air,fire.Hisdominantinterestwastodiscovertheefficientcauseoftheevolutionofthings,whichhebelievedtoconsistinthetwogreatmotiveforcesloveandhate.Empedocleswasnotonlyaphilosopher:hewasalsoamagician,doctor,poet,orator,andstatesman.Aristotleascribestohimtheinventionofrhetoric.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
bytheseparateproductionoftheindividualorgansandmembers,e.g.thehead,eyes,arms,whichweresubsequentlyjoinedbychanceineverypossiblecombination,ofwhichonlythosehavesurvivedwhichwerefittedtoUve{cf.theDarwinianprincipleofthesurvivalofthefittest).
Itisalsoworthremarkthat,beforeDemocritus,AnaximanderandEmpedoclesalsosought,Ukethepseudo-scientificevolutionismofmodemtimes,toexplainallthingsmechanically,thatistosay—astheresultofasimpleaggregationofmaterialelementseffectedbylocalmotion.
(b)Amongthesephysicists,asAristotletermedthem,orphilosophersofsensiblenature,mustbereckonedthreegreatthinkers,Heraclitus,Democritus,andAnaxagoras.
(i)HeraclitusofEphesus,^alonelyandproudgeniuswhodespisedthemultitudeandpopularreHgion,drewheroicallyfi*omthethoughtoftheIonianphilosophersitsultimatemetaphysicalpresuppositions,andtherebyfixedforaUsucceedingagesoneofthepossibleextremesofspeculationanderror.Aparticularrealityperceivedinthingshadtakenholdofhisintellectwithsuchforcethathebecameitshopelessslave.Thatrealitywaschangeorbecoming.Hisvisionwassofixedonthechangewhichallthingsundergothathedeclaredthatchangealoneisreal.IlavTapel,aUthingsareinflux;andmenarefoolstotrustinthestabilityoftheirfalsehappiness,"whentheyareborn,theywishtoliveandtomeettheir
^ThedatesofHeraclitiis'sbirthanddeathareuncertain.Hewasinhisa-Kix-fiftheprimeofhisage,about500B.C.
THEPRE-SOGRATICPHILOSOPHERS
doom—orrathertorest—andtheyleavechildrenbehindthemtomeettheirdoominturn."Wedonottouchthesamethingtwicenorbathetwiceinthesameriver.Theverymomentwetouchanobject,ithasalreadyceasedtobewhatitwa5before.Whateverexistschangesfromtheveryfactofitsexistence.
Thatistosaychangehasnoabidingandpermanentsubjectidenticalwithitself,Ukeanivorybilliardballwhichremainsanivorybilliardballwhileitisinmotion.Wearethereforecompelledtopronounceboldlythatthatwhichis(thethingwhichchanges)atthesametimeisnot(becausethereisnothingwhichpersiststhroughoutthechange)."Westepanddonotstepintothesameriver;wcareandarenot."Moreover,contrariesmustbepronouncedidentical.Theseaisthepurestandtheimpurestwater.Goodandillareone.'Noone,"writesAristotleinafamouspassage,"canpossiblyconceivethatthesamethingdoesanddoesnotexist.Accordingtosome,Heraclituswasofadifferentopinion,butwearenotobligedtobelievethatamanreallythinkswhateverhesays.Thereasonoftheopinionheldbythesephilosopherswasthattheonlyrealitiestheyadmittedweresensibleobjects,and,sincetheyperceivedthatsensiblenatureisinperpetualmotion,somehaveheldwithCratylus^thatnostatementcanbemadeaboutit;hewascontenttowaghisfinger."ThisscepticismwastheinevitableconsequenceofHeraclitus'sphilosophyofpureflux,despitehispersonalconviction,
*OneofHeraclitus'smostfamousdisciples.HewasPlato'sfirstteacher.(Aristotle,Metaph.,i,6.)
*Metaph.,iv,5,loioa13.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
passionatelyheld,oftherealityandvalueoftruih."Ifyoudonotexpecttheunexpected,"hesaid,"youwillnotfindtruth,foritishardtobesoughtoutanddifficult."
HeracUtusisthusthephilosopherofevolutionandbecoming.Inhisview,allthingsarediflbrentiationsproducedbydiscordorstrife{7z6'kz[io<^Tcar^p
Tcavrcov)ofasinglemobileprinciplewhichheconceivesintheformoffire,afireethereal,living,anddivine.Sofromtheoutsetstandsoutintheclearestlightthatfatalnecessitywhichchainseveryphilosophyofpurebecomingtomonism'ortopantheism^"If,"wroteAristotle,'''youmaintainthatallbeingsareone,yousimplyreturntoHeraclitus'sopinion.Allthingsarethenconfused,goodandevilbecomeidentical,manandthehorseareoneandthesamething.Butthisisreallytomaintainnotthatbeingsareone,butthattheyarenothing."
(ii)BornwithinafewyearsofHeraclitus'sdeath,DemocritusofAbdera(470-361?),whohadamoresuperficialintellectandapredilectionforideaseasilycomprehensible,attemptedtodiscoverinthefluxofsensiblephenomenaapermanentandunchangingelement;butinhissearchforthisunchangingelementhemadeuseofhisimaginationratherthanhisunderstanding.Thereforethesolerealityhewouldrecognisewassomethingwhich,thoughitisinaccessibletothesenses,canneverthelessbeapprehendedbytheimagination—namely,puregeometricalquantityassuch,strippedofallqualities(colourless,
^Thedoctrinethatailthingsareonesinglebeing.'ThedoctrinewhichidentifiestheworldwithGod.*Phys.,i,2,185b19.
THEPRE-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHERS
scentless,tasteless,etc.),andpossessedsolelyofextensioninthethreedimensionsofspace.Democritusfoundtheexplanationofeverythingintheplenum,whichheidentifiedwithbeing,andthevoid,identifiedwithnonentity.Theplenumwasdividedintoindivisiblepartsofextension("atoms"),whichwereseparatedonefromanotherbythevoidandinastateofeverlastingmotion,anddifferedonlyinshape,^order,'andposition.'Theorderoftheuniverseandthestructureofindividualbeingsheattributedtotheblindnecessityofchance.ThusDemocritus*introducedintoGreekphilosophyduringthelifetimeofSocratesthedoctrineofatomismandmoregenerallythephilosophytermedmechanical,whichraisesgeometrytothepositionofmetaphysics,reduceseverythingtoextensionandmotion,andprofessestoexplaintheorganisationoftheuniversebyahostoffortuitouscoincidences.InthisfashiontheParthenoncouldbe"explained"astheresultofthrowingstonesoneonanotherduringanindefinitetermof
^As,forexample,AdiffersfromN.
»AsANdiffersfromNA.
'AsNdiffersfromthesameletterplaceddifferently:Z.
*AsalsohismasterLeucippus.HadLeucippusandDemocrituscomeinanywayundertheinfluenceoftheIndianphilosopherKanada?Themorelikelyhypothesisisacoincidenceduetosimilarityofintellectualoudook,particularlyifKanada,whosedateisveryuncertain,wascontemporarywithorevenposteriortoDemocritus.Speakinggenerally,thereseemsnoreasontobelievethatOrientalspeculationsoinfluencedGreekthoughtastoteachitinthestrictsenseortransmitanyparticularsystem.That,ontheotherhand,itinfluencedtheGreeksbyarousingaspiritofspeculativeinquiryandprovidingintellectualmaterial(whichtheyalonewereabletotreatscientifically)istheobviousconclusionfromthesimplefactthatGreekphilosophyoriginatedinthoseprovincesoftheHellenicworldwhichwereincontactwiththeEa^t.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
years,thetragediesofRacineasduetotheindiscriminateshufflingoftypeforasufficientlengthoftime.
(iii)FinallyAnaxagorasofGlazomenae(500-428),whowasafriendofPericles,andinthematurityofhispowerswhenDemocrituswasbornandHeracUtushadjustdied,turnedGreekphilosophytowardsahighersourceofillumination,andcorrectedratherthancontinuedthespeculationoftheloniansbytheaidofideaswhich,itmustbeconfessed,heeitherworkedoutbadlyorwasunabletouse.
Ontheonehand,heperceivedthatthematerialprincipleofwhichallbodiesareformed,andwhichthelonianshadidentifiedwithoneparticularelement,mustalreadysomehowcontaininitselftheentirediversitytowhichitwillgivebirth:unlesseverythingwereineverything,nothingcouldcomefromnothing.^Hethereforeconcludedthattheprincipleinquestionconsistedofanendlessmixtureofallnaturesandquahtiesinsuchfashionthateachcorporealparticlecontainedwithinitselftheelements{homoeomeries)ofalltherest;forexample,eachparticleofthebreadweeatcontainsinvisibleelementsofthebone,blood,flesh,etc.,whichwillbediscoveredlater,changedonlyintheirrelativeproportions,ineachparticleofbone,blood,flesh,etc.Itwasabizarreconception,and,astaughtbyAnaxagorsis,notworthseriousdiscussion,butneverthelessacrudeadumbrationofAristotle'sgreatconceptionoffirstmatter{materiaprima)which
isnothinginact,butaUbodiesinpotentiality.
1Cf.Aristotle,Phys.,i,4,187a26.Simpliciiu,Phys,,155,23.
THEPRE-SOCRATIGPHILOSOPHERS
Ontheotherhand—anditishischiefclaimtodistinction—herealisedthatthematerialprinciple,thatofwhichallthingsaremade,isinsufficienttoexplainthem.Wemustalsodiscovertheagentthatproducesthem(theefficientormotorcause)andtheendforwhichtheagentacts(thefinalcause).Isit,asPlatowastoasklater,asufficientexplanationofthefactthatSocratesissittinginprisontosaythathehasbone,joints,andmusclesarrangedinaparticularfashion?Wemustalsoknowwhobroughtaboutthatdispositionofthesebonesandmuscles—namely,Socrateshimselfbyhiswill—andwhyhewilledit.
BecauseAnaxagorasarrivedattherecognitionthattheremustnecessarilyexist,besidesthematerialelementsoftheworld,aseparateIntelligence(voui;')towhichtheorderingoftheuniverseisdue,healone,asAristotleremarks"keptsober"whenalltheotherphilosophersofhisperiod,drunkwiththewineofsensibleappearances,"spokeatrandom."^
THEITALIANS
BesidestheschoolofIonianphilosophy,thereexistedintheHellenicworldofthesixthandfifthcenturiesB.C.twoothergreatphilosophicschools—thePythagoreanandtheEleatic.
PythagorasofSamos(572-500;accordingtootherauthorities,582-497),thefounderofaphilosophicsocietyofareligiousandpoliticalcharacter,whichheldthereinsofgovernmentinseveralcitiesofMagnaGraecia(SouthernItaly),andwaslaterdissolvedby
1Metaph.,i,3,984b18.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
violence,^understoodthatthereexistedrealitiesofahigherorderthanthoseperceptiblebythesenses.ButitwasbythestudyofnumbersthathehadarrivedattheknowledgeoftheseinvisiblereaUties,whoseimmutableorderdominatedanddeterminedtheprocessofbecoming;andhenceforwardhehad
understandingonlyfornumbers.Notcontentwithteachingthatthereispresentinallobjectsandintheuniverseasawholeahiddenprincipleofmeasureandharmony,hetaughtthatnumbers—bywhichthisharmonyisrevealedtooursenses—arethesoletruereality,andregardedthemastheveryessenceofthings.PythagoraswasnotonlyconversantwiththeimportantobservationsofOrientalastronomy,but,byhisfundamentaldiscoveryoftherelationshipbetweenthepitchofsoundsandthelengthofvibratingstrings,hadreducedtotherigidityofnumericallawsofugitiveaphenomenonassound.Imaginetheawedastonishmentwithwhichhemusthavediscoveredbehindthefluxofsensiblephenomenatheintelligibleconstantandimmaterialproportionswhichexplaintothemathematiciantheregularitiesweobserve.Consider,moreover,themysterioussymbolicvalueofnumbersattestedaUkebythesacredtraditionsofmankindandthemostpositiveofphilosophers(fromAristotle,whopaidhomagetotheholinessofthenumber3,toAugusteComte,whowillconstructanentiremythologyoftheprimenumbers),anditiseasytounderstandhownaturallythethoughtofPythagoras
*Inthissocietyabsoluteobedienceprevailedeveninthespeculativesphere.ItwasinthePythagoreanbrotherhood,notintheschoolsoftheChristianMiddleAges,thateverythingyieldedtotheMagisterdixit,airrbs^<pa
THEPRE-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHERS
andhisdisciplespassedfromthesigntothecauseandmadethesymbolaprincipleofreality.
Consequently,numericalprincipleswereregardedastheprinciplesofeverythingthatexists;fromtheoppositionbetweenthedeterminateandtheindeterminate(infinite)arederivedallthefundamentalpairsofopposites—oddandeven,theelementsofnumber,theoneandthemany,rightandleft,maleandfemale,restandmotion,straightandcrooked,lightanddarkness,goodandevil,thesquareandthequadrilateralwithunequalsides—whichdeterminethenatureandactivityofthings.Everyessencehasitsnumberandeveryessenceisanumber.Thenumber4,forexample,isnotsimplyafigureofjustice,itconstitutestheessenceofjustice;similarlythenumber3constitutesholiness,thenumber7time,thenumber8harmony,thenumber5theunionofthesexes,thenumber10perfection.Whennumberswhichinthemselvesarenotlocalisedreceiveapositioninspace,bodiescomeintoexistence.Thusallspeculationontheoriginornatureofthingsresolvesitselfintospeculationonthegenesisandproperties
ofnumbers.
Pythagoras,therefore,andhisschool,towhommathematics,musicandastronomyowesomuch,neverarrivedatthetrueconceptionofthefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.Theyachieved,itistrue,adegreeofabstractionsuperiortothatatwhichthelonianshadhalted,anddidnot,likethem,confusemetaphysicswithphysics.Buttheyconfuseditwiththescienceofnumber,intowhich,moreover,theyimportedqualitativeinterpretations;and,consequently,inspiteoftheirefforttoreachtheobject
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ofpureintelligence,theywereheldfastinthebondsofimagination.Andif,ontheotherhand,theyperceivedthatthenatureofthingsisintrinsicallydeterminedbyimmaterialprinciplesmorerealandtruerthanthatwhichistangibleandvisible,theywerenotyetabletoattciinthenotionoftheformalcause,whosefullelucidationwasreservedtoAristotlealone.
ItistoPythagoras,aswehavealreadyremarked,thatweowetheterm,philosophy.ApassageofDiogenesLaertius(viii,8)showsthatforhimthedignityofscienceconsistedinitspurelyspeculativeanddisinterestedcharacter,apointonwhichAristotle,atthebeginningofhisMetaphysics,wastoinsiststrongly."Humanlife,"hesaid,"maybecomparedtothepubhcgames,whichattractdiversesortsofmen.Somecometocompeteforhonoursandthecrownsofvictory,otherstotrade,others,themorenoblesort,solelyfortheenjoymentofthespectacle.SimilarlyinUfesomeworkforhonour,othersforprofit,afewfortruthalone;theyarethephilosophers...."PythagorasappearstohavetaughttheunityofGod,whomheregardedasoneomnipresentSpiritfromwhomourspiritsemanated.Hewasthefirsttogivetheuniversethenamey.6a[ioc^,which,liketheLatinmundus,conveystheideaofbeautyandharmony.
Themostfamousandthemostderidedofhistenetswasthedoctrineofthetransmigrationofsouls,ormetempsychosis,whichheprobablyderivednotfromEgypt,asHerodotussuggests,butfromHinduism(bywayofPersia);^adoctrinewhichveryearly
^AsGomperzobserves,"theAsiaticGreeksandaportionofthepopulationofIndiawerealreadysubject,whenPythagoraslefthis
THEPRE-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHERS
obtainedinGreecetheadhesionoftheOrphicsandthePythagoreans."Comingonedayuponapuppywhichwasbeingcruellybeaten,"theagedXenophaneswroteofPythagorasinmordantverse,"helamenteditsfateandcriedoutinpity'Stop!Don'tbeathim.Thatisthesoulofoneofmyfriends;Irecognisehimbyhisvoice.*"
ThePythagoreansalsobelievedthattherevolutionofcosmiccyclesmustproducetheeverlastingrecurrenceatenormousintervalsofallthings,reproducedidenticallyeveninthemostinsignificantdetails."AccordingtothePythagoreans,"Eudemustoldhisdisciples,"adaywillcomewhenyouwillbeallgatheredagain,sittingintheverysameplacestolisten,andIshallbetelUngyouthesamestoryoncemore."^
AstronomywasamongthescienceswhichthePythagoreanschoolcultivatedmostsuccessfully.Philo-laus,whotaughtthattheearth,thesun,andallthestarsrevolvedaroundamysteriouscentreoftheuniversefilledwithfire,mayberegardedasadistantprecursorofCopernicus.ButeveninthisspherethePythagoreansbetrayedinthemostflagrantfashionthevicesoftheexclusivelymathematicalmind.
nativeIonia,tothesameruler,Cyrus,thefounderofthePersianEmpire"{ThinkersofGreece,i,3).
Speakingmoregenerally,itwas,itwouldapf>ear,bywayolthePythagoreanschoolthatcertaindistinctivelyOrientalconceptionsandmodesofthoughtfirstenteredGreece,topassfromPythagoreanismtoPlatonismandneo-Platonism,andthence,swollenbyfurtheradditions,intoGnosticismandthemoreorlessundergroimdstreamofheterodoxspeculation.
1Simplicius,Phys.,732,30D.Nietzsche,whowasobsessedanddriventodespairbythethought"oftheeverlastingrecurrenceofthings,"derivedthissingularconceptionfromGreekphilosophy.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
"ThePythagoreans,"wroteAristotle/"havingbeenbroughtupinthestudyofmathematics...supposethewholeheaventobeamusicalscaleandanumber.Allthepropertiesofnumbersandscaleswhichtheycouldshowtoagreewiththeattributesandparts,andthewholearrangementoftheheavens,theycollectedandfittedintotheirscheme;iftherewasagapanywhere,theyreadily
madeadditionssoastomaketheirwholetheorycoherent.Forexample,asthenumberioisthoughttobeperfectandtocomprisethewholenatureofnumbers,theysaythatthebodieswhichmovethroughtheheavensareten;butasthevisiblebodiesareonlynine,tomeetthistheyinventatenth—thecounter-earth—notstudyingthephenomenatodiscovertheircausesandtesttheirhypotheses,butimposinguponthephenomenatheirhypothesesandpreconceivedbeliefs,therebyclaimingtoassistGodtofashiontheuniverse."
THEELEATICS
Thoughitcannot,strictlyspeaking,besaidthattheschoolofEleafoundedmetaphysics,sinceitfailedtokeepafirmgraspofthetruth,itmustreceivethecreditofhavingraisedGreekthoughttothemetaphysicallevelandattainedthenecessarydegreeofabstraction.TheoldestoftheEleaticswasXenophanes,awanderingrhapsodist,bornabouttheyear570atColophon,whencehemigratedtoEleainsouthernItaly—banished,nodoubt,bythePersianinvasions.Xenophanespouredscornuponthemythologyofthepoetsandtheopinionsofthecommon
1Melaph.,\,5,986a.DeCaelo,ii,13,293a.60
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people."Farbetter,"hesaid,inslightingreferencetothehonourspaidtoathletes,"isourartthanthestrengthofmenandhorses."HetaughttheabsoluteunityofGod,butconfoundedhimwiththeuniverse,declaringinapantheisticsensethatGodisoneandall,evxalTcav.
Butthemostprofoundthinker,indeedthetruefounderofthisschool,washisdiscipleParmenidesofElea(born540),theGreatParmenides,asPlatocalledhim.Transcendingthew^orldofsensiblephenomenaandeventhatofmathematicalformsoressencesandnumbers,heattainedtothatinthingswhichispurelyandstrictlytheobjectoftheintellect.Foritcanscarcelybedeniedthatthefirsttruthaboutthingswhichtheintellectperceivesisthattheyexist,theirbeing.Thenotionofbeing,thusabstracted,impressedParmenidessopowerfullythatitfascinatedhim.AshiscontemporaryHeraciituswastheslaveofchange,Parmenideswastheslaveofbeing.Hehadeyesforonethingalone:whatisis,andcannotnotbe;beingis,non-beingisnot.Parmenideswasthusthefirstphilosopherwhoabstractedandformulatedtheprincipleofidentityornon-
contradiction,thefirstprincipleofallthought.
Andashecontemplatedpurebeing,heperceivedthatthisbeingiscompletelyone,absolute,immutable,eternal,withoutbecoming,incorruptible,indivisible,wholeandentireinitsunity,ineverythingequaltoitself,infinite^andcontaininginitselfeveryperfection.-Butwhilehethusdiscoveredtheattributesofhimwhois,herefusedtoadmitthatanyotherbeing
^Simpiicius,Phys.,144,25-145,23.(Diels,frag.8,22.)'Aristotle,Phys.,i,3.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
couldexist,andrejectedasascandaltothereasonthebeingmingledwithnonentity,becauseproducedfromnothingness,ofeverycreature.
Hewasthusledsofarastraythatheascribedtothebeingoftheworldthatwhichbelongsonlytouncreatedbeing.Andratherthanbefalsetowhathebelievedweretheexigenciesofbeingandreason,hepreferredtorefuseheroicallythewitnessofthesensesanddenytheexistenceintheuniverseofchangeormultiplicity.Change,motion,becoming,asalsothediversityofthings,arebutanillusoryappearance.Thereexistsonlybeing,theone.
Doesnotchangeimplythatanobjectbothwasandwasnot(whatitbecomes),andatthesametimecontinuesandceasestobe(whatitwas)?Doesnotmultiplicityimplythatwhatis(this)isnot(that)?Donot,therefore,multiphcityandchangecontradictthefundamentalprinciplethatwhatispossessesinitselfbeingandnotnon-being?
ItwasindefenceofParmenides'sdoctrineoftheimpossibilityofchangethathisdiscipleZenoofElea^(born487)composedhisfamousarguments,bywhichheclaimedtoprovethattheveryconceptofmovementisself-contradictory:argumentsfallacious,nodoubt,butofsingularforceandrefutableonlybythedoctrineofAristotle.
ThusParmenides,reachingtheoppositepoletoHeraclitus,fixed,ashedidonceforalloneoftheextremehmitsofspeculationanderror,andprovedthateveryphilosophyofpurebeing,fortheveryreasonthatitdeniesthatkindofnon-beingwhich
^NottobeconfusedwithZenotheStoic,wholivedmuchlater(350-264)and
wasbornatCittiuminCyprus.
THEPRE-SOGRATICPHILOSOPHERS
Aristotletermedpotentialityandwhichnecessarilybelongstoeverythingcreated,isobligedtoabsorballbeinginabsolutebeing,andleadsthereforetomonismorpantheismnolessinevitablythanthephilosophyofpurebecoming.
THESOPHISTSANDSOCRATES
Thelongeffortofthesespeculativepioneerswhichwehavebrieflyrecapitulatedhadequippedhumanthoughtwithanumberoffundamentaltruths.Butif,lookingbackwardswithaknowledgeofthemightysynthesisinwhichallthosetruths,thenpartiallyperceived,havebeenharmonisedandbalanced,wecancontemplatewithadmirationthegradualformationofthevitalcentresandarteriesofphilosophy,atthetime,infifth-centuryHellas,thesegoodresultswereconcealednotonlybythemedleyofcontradictorytheories,butbythenumberandgravityofprevalenterrors,anditseemedasthoughtheentiremovementhadachievednothingbutdisorderandchaos.
TheGreekthinkershadsetoutwithhighhopesofknowingeverything,andclimbingtheskyofwisdominasinglestep.Asaresultofthisimmoderateambition,andbecausetheylackeddisciplineandrestraintinhandlingideas,theirconceptswereembroiledinaconfusedstrife,aninterminablebattleofopposingprobabilities.Theimmediateandobviousresultoftheseattemptsatphilosophisingseemedthebankruptcyofspeculativethought.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatthisperiodofelaborationproducedacrisisinthehistoryofthought,atwhichanintellectualdiseaseimperilledtheveryexistenceofphilosophic
64
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speculation.Thisintellectualdiseasewassophistry,thatistosay,thecorruptionofphilosophy.
THESOPHISTS
Sophistryisnotasystemofideas,butaviciousattitudeofthemind.
Superficiallythesophistswerethesuccessorsanddisciplesofthethinkersofanearliergeneration—eventhewordsophistoriginallyborenoderogatorysignificance—inreaHtytheydifferedfi-omthemcompletely.Fortheaimandruleoftheirknowledgewasnolongerthatwhichis,thatistosay,theobjectofknowledge,buttheinterestoftheknowingsubject.
Atoncewanderingprofessorsaccumulatinghonoursandwealth,lecturers,teachersofeverybranchoflearning,journalists,ifonemaysocallthem,supermen,ordilettanti,thesophistswereanythingintheworldbutwisemen.Hippias,whoachievedequaleminenceinastronomy,geometry,arithmetic,phonetics,prosody,music,painting,ethnology,mnemotechnics,epicpoetry,tragedy,epigram,dithyramb,andmoralexhortation,ambassadorofEUs,andjack-of-all-trades(heattendedtheOlympicGamesinclothesmadeentirelybyhimself),remindsusofsomeherooftheItaUanRenaissance.Othersresemblethephilosophesoftheeighteenthorthe"scientists"ofthenineteenthcentury.ButthemostcharacteristicfeatureofallaUkewasthattheysoughttheadvantagesconferredbyknowledgewithoutseekingtruth.
Theysoughttheadvantagesconferredbyknowledgesofarasknowledgebringsitspossessorpower,preeminence,orintellectualpleasure.Withthisinview,
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
theyputthemselvesforwardasrationalistsandwalkingencyclopaedias;toeveryquestiontheyhadananswerready,deceptivelyconvincing;^andtheyclaimedtoreformeverything,eventherulesofgrammarandthegenderofnouns.^Buttheirfavouritestudywasman,ofallthemostcomplexanduncertain,butoneinwhichknowledgeiseasiestcoinedintopowerandreputation;andtheycultivatedmostassiduouslylaw,history,casuistry,'politics,andrhetoric.Theyprofessedtobeteachersofvirtue.Theydidnotseektruth.Sincethesoleaimoftheirintellectualactivitywastoconvincethemselvesandothersoftheirownsuperiority,theyinevitablycametoconsiderasthemostdesirableformofknowledgetheartofrefutinganddisprovingbyskiliularguments,forwithmenandchildrenalikedestructionistheeasiestmethodofdisplayingtheirstrength,andtheartofarguingwithequalprobabilitytheprosandconsofeveryquestion—anotherproofofacumenandskill.Thatistosay,intheirhandsknowledgealtogetherlostsightofitstruepurpose,andwhatwiththeirpredecessorswassimplyalackofintellectualdisciplinebecamewiththemthedeliberateintentiontoemployconceptswithouttheleastregardforthat
delicateprecisionwhichtheydemand,butforthepure
^Critias,forexample,consideredbeliefinthegodsastheinventionofanastutestatesmanwhosoughttokeepthecitizensobedientbyclothingthetruthinagarmentoffiction.
2ItwasProtagoraswhoattemptedtorationalisethegendersofnouns:desiring,forexample,thatnijvis(anger)shouldbegiventhemasculinegender,alsottt^Xt?^(helmet),etc.
*Recall,forexample,thecelebrateddiscussionbetweenProtagorasandPericlesafteranaccidentalhomicideinthecourseofanathleticcontest,onthequestionwhooughttobepunished:themanwhoarrangedthecontest,theunskilfulplayer,orthejavelinitself.
THESOPHISTSANDSOCRATES
pleasureofplayingthemoffoneagainsttheother—anintellectualgameofconceptualcountersdevoidofsolidsignificance.Hencetheirsophismsorquibbles.Theirethicswereofapiece.Everylawimposeduponmantheydeclaredtobeanarbitraryconvention,andthevirtuetheytaughtwasinthelastresorteithertheartofsuccess,orwhatourmodernNietzscheanscallthewilltopower.
Thus,ofthespiritwhichhadinspiredtheloftyintellectualambitionsoftheprecedingage,thesophistsretainedonlytheprideofknowledge;theloveoftruththeyhadlost.Moreardentlythantheirpredecessorstheydesiredtoachievegreatnessthroughknowledge,buttheynolongersoughtreality.Ifwemayusetheexpression,theybelievedinknowledgewithoutbelievingintruth.Asimilarphenomenonhasrecurredsinceinthehistoryofthoughtandonafarlargerscale.
Undertheseconditionsthesoleconclusionwhichsophismcouldreachwaswhatistermedrelativismorscepticism.ProtagorasofAbdera(480-410),forexample,maintainedthat"manisthemeasureofallthings—ofwhatis,thatitis,andofwhatisnot,thatitisnot,"bywhichhemeantthateverythingisrelativetothedispositionsofthesubjectandthetruthiswhatappearstruetotheindividual.Andhiscontemporary,GorgiasofLeontini(died375),afamousorator,inhisbookentitledOfMatureortheNon-Existent,taught(i)thatbeingisnot,inotherwords,thatnothingexists:non-existenceisnon-existence,andthereforeitis—
aquibbleonthewordiswhichonedaywouldbeHegel'sgrandmetaphysicalgame—hencebeing,itscontrary,isnot;(ii)thatifanything
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existedwecouldnotknowit;(iii)thatifanyonecouldknowanything,hecouldnotcommunicatehisknowledgetoanother.
SOCRATES
ItwasSocrates(469-399)whosavedGreekthoughtfromthemortaldangerintowhichthesophistshadbroughtit.Exceptforthefactthathetooknofeesforhisinstruction,hismannerofUfewasexternallythesameastheirs.Likethem,hespenthistimeindiscussionswithyoungmen,anditisnotsurprisingthatasuperficialobserver,suchasAristophanes,confusedhimwiththesophists.Inreality,hewagedagainstthemanunrelentingwarandopposedthemateverypoint.Thesophistsclaimedtoknoweverythinganddidnotbelieveintruth;Socratesprofessedignoranceandtaughthishearerstoseeknothingbutthetruth.Thushisentireworkwasaworkofconversion.Hereformedphilosophicreasoninganddirectedittothetruth,whichisitspropergoal.
ThisworkwasofsuchimportanceforthefiitureofthehumanintellectthatitisnotstrangethatSocratesaccomplisheditasamissiondivinelyimposed.Hepossessednotonlyanextraordinarypowerofphilosophiccontemplation(weareinformedbyAulusGelliusandPlatothathesometimespassedentiredaysandnightsmotionless,absorbedinmeditation)butalsosomethingwhichhehimselfregardedasdaimonicorinspired,awingedfervour,afreebutmeasuredforce,evenperhapsattimesaninteriorinstinctofahigherorder,giftssuggestiveofthatextraordinaryassistanceinregardtowhichAristotle
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saidthatthosewhoaremovedbyadivineimpulseneednoguidanceofhumanreason,sincetheypossessinthemselvesabetterprinciple.^HecomparedhimselftoagadflysenttostingtheAtheniansawakeandforceupontheirreasonaconstantexaminationofconscience,aservicewhichtheyrepaidwithhemlock,thusaffordingtheagedSocrates,alreadyonthevergeofthegrave,opportunityforthemostsublimedeathtowhichmerelyhumanwisdomcanlead.
(a)Socrateswasnotametaphysician,butapractitioner,aphysicianofsouls.His
businesswasnottoconstructasystem,buttomakementhink.Thiswasthemethodbywhichhecouldbestconquerasophistrywhoseradicalvicewasnotsomuchanerrorofdoctrineasadeformityofthesoul.
ForthechieftopicofSocrates'sdiscussionswastheproblemoftheconductofhumanHfe,themoralproblem.Hisethics,asfaraswecanjudgeitbythereportsofPlatoandXenophon,seemsatfirstsighttohavebeendictatedbynarrowlyutiUtarianmotives.WhatIoughttodoiswhatisgoodforme,andwhatisgoodformeiswhatisusefultome—reallyuseful.Butatoncetheneedbecomesevidentofdiscoveringwhatisreallyusefultoman;andatthispointSocratescompelledhishearerstoacknowledgethatman'strueutilitycanonlybedeterminedbyreferencetoagood,absolute,andincorruptible.Bythusconstantlyraisingthequestionofman'slastend,^anddirectingmentowardstheirsovereigngood,hewentbeyondutilitarianismofeverydescription,and,
^Magn.Moral.,vii,8.Cf.Eth.,vii,i.
'Aquestionwhichhehimselfseemstohaveansweredsomewhatambiguously.
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withthefullforceofasanecommonsense,vindicatedthesupremacyofmoralgoodandourgreateternalinterests;hisethicsthuspassedoverintothemetaphysicalsphere.InthesecondplaceSocratesprovedbyeverymethodofargumentthatinordertobehaverightlyman'sfirstrequisiteisknowledge;heevenwentsofarastomaintainthatvirtueisidenticalwithknowledgeandthereforethatthesinnerissimplyanignorantman.Whateverwethinkofthismistake,thefactremainsthatforSocratesethicswasnothingifnotacollectionoftruthsestablishedbydemonstration,arealandagenuinescience.Inthistwofoldcharacter,metaphysicalandscientific,ofhismoralteaching,hestoodinradicaloppositiontothesophists,andmayberegardedasthefounderofethics,
{b)Butitwasimpossibletofoundscientificethicswithoutdefiningatthesametimethelawswhichdeterminescientificknowledgeofeverydescription.HerewereachtheessenceoftheSocraticreform.Byreturningtoreasonitselftostudytheconditionsandvalueofitsprogresstowardstruth,thatistosay,bytheuseoflogicalandcriticalreflection,Socratesdisciplinedthephilosophicintelligence,showedittheattitudetoadoptandthemethodstoemployinordertoattaintruth.
Thefirstrequisitewastocleansethemindofthefalseknowledgewhichpretendstogettothebottomofthingswithafewfacileideas.Thatiswhyhealwaysbeganbyleadingthosewhomheentangledinthenetofhisquestionstoconfesstheirignoranceofthatwhichtheyhadbeencertaintheyknewbest(Socraticirony).Butthiswasmerelythepreliminarystageofhismethod.Soonthequestioningbegan
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afresh,butitsobjectnowwastoleadSocrates'sinterlocutor,whosethoughtitguidedinthedirectiondesired,todiscoverforhimselfthetruthofwhichhehadadmittedhisignorance.ThiswastheessenceoftheSocraticmethod,hismaieutic,theartofintellectualmidwifery.Moreover,SocratesreaUsedsothoroughlythattheattainmentoftruthisavitalandpersonalactivity,inwhichtheteachercanonlyassisthispupil'sintelUgence,asadoctorassistsnature,butthelatteristheprincipalagent,^thathecomparedtheacquisitionofknowledgetotheawakeningofamemorydormantinthesoul,acomparisonfromwhichPlatowastoderivehisfamoustheoryofreminiscence(dva[xvif)(Ti.(;').
How,then,didthismaieuticformthephilosophicintellect?Bydeterminingitsproperobject,teachingittoseektheessencesanddefinitionsofthings.^Socrateswasneverwearyofrecallingreasontothisoneobject:thatwhichthesubjectofdiscussionis,whatiscourage,piety,virtue,theartofship-buildingorcobbling,etc.Allthesehaveabeingpeculiartothemselves,anessenceornaturewhichthehumanunderstandingcandiscoverandexpressbyadefinitionwhichdistinguishesitfromeverythingelse.BecauseSocratesthusrequiredthattheessentialshouldinallcasesbedistinguishedfromtheaccidental,andbecausehepersistentlyemployedhisintellectinthesearchforessences,hisphilosophymaybetermedthephilosophyofessences.Itwasnolongeraquestionofreducingeverythingtowater,fire,numbers,orevenabsolutebeing,noryetoffindingsomeindeterminateconcept
1Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.,i,q.117,a.i.
2Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,xi,4,1078b17-3^'.
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sufficientlyelastictoenfoldeverythinglikeashapelessmantle.Onthecontrary,Socrates'saimwastoattaintheproperintellectualexpressionofeverything—to
defineanddetermineitsessencebyaconceptapplicableonlytoitself.
AtthesametimeSocratestaughtthereason,ifnotbyafinishedtheoryofratiocination,orbyconstructing,asAristotlewouldconstructlater,alogicofsyllogismanddemonstration,atleastpracticallyandofsetpurpose,toemployconcepts,not,asinthebarbarousword-playofthesophists,asweaponstodeliverstrokesathaphazard,butinsuchafashionthattheyfittedexactlytheouthneandstructureofreahty.Hethuscreateddialectic,aninstrumentofknowledge,asyetnodoubtdefective,butwhichpavedthewayforthecorrectnotionofscientificknowledge,andwascomparedbyPlatototheartoftheexpertchefwhocutsupafowlbydistinguishingandfollowingcarefullythesmallestjointsofitsanatomy.
(c)Thusthisunwearieddisputer,forallhissuperficialscepticism,possessedaninvincibleconfidenceintheintellectandinscience—butofanintellectdisciplined,humbleinitsattitudetowardsreality,andascienceawareofitslimitations,advancingsuccessfiillyandsecurelyintheapprehensionoftruthonlysofarasitrespectedthesovereigntyoftherealandwasconsciousofitsignoranceineverydirection.InthiswerecogniseSocratesastheteacherofthescientificspirit,asalsoofthephilosophywhichweshalllearntoknowasmoderateintellectualism.Byhislogicalandcriticalworkheforgedtheinstrumentindispensablefortheprogressofthemindandturned
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thecrisiscreatedbysophistrytotheprofitandsalvationofreason.Byhisworkasateacherofmorality,henotonlyfoundedthescienceofethics,butUberatedthoughtfromthefascinationofthesensible,andunintentionally,perhaps,setphilosophicspeculationontheroadtometaphysics,wisdominthestrictsense.Thishedidsimplybyraisingphilosophy(thiswasthetruesignificanceoftheSocraticdemandforself-knowledge)fromexclusiveoccupationwiththephysicaluniverse^tothestudyofhumannatureandhumanactivities,whichcontainaspiritualelementofahigherorderaltogetherthanUiestarsortheentireuniverseofmatter.
ButSocrateswasnomorethanapioneerofgenius.Hegavetheimpulse,butneverreachedthegoal.Whenhediedeverythingwasstillintheair.Formethodisnotenough,asystematicbodyofdoctrineisnecessary;andSocrates,thoughhisteachingwasfertileinfruitfulhints,possessed,apartfromtheelementsof
ethics,nodoctrineinthestrictsense.ThedoctrinalcompletionofhisworkandtheconstructionofthetruephilosophywerereservedforPlatoandAristotle.
1Parmenideshimselfarrivedatthemetaphysicalconceptionofbeingbyanexclusiveconsiderationofthecorporealimiverse.
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SoundoctrinalwasSocrates'steachingthathisdisciplesdevelopeditalongverydivergentlines.ThephilosophersknownastheminorSocratics,whoseizeduponsomepartialaspectoftheMaster'sthought,whichtheydistortedmoreorless,wereeithermoralistspureandsimple(liketheCyrenaics,^whoplacedman'slastendinthepleasureofthemoment,andtheCynics,^who,goingtotheoppositeextreme,deifiedforceofcharacterorvirtue),orlogiciansinfatuatedbytheloveofargument(eristics),liketheneo-sophistsofElisandespeciallyoftheschoolofMegara,'whotendedtodenythepossibilityofknowledgeand,bycompellingphilosopherstofindanswerstotheirarguments,indirectlycontributedtotheprogressoflogic.TheMegariansdeniedthatinanyjudgmentonethingcouldbepredicatedofanother.Accordingtothem,thisamountedtoaffirmingthatthepredicatewasthesubjectandthuseverythingbecameidenticalwith
1TheleadingphilosophersofthisschoolwereAristippusofGyrene,TheodoretheAtheist,Hegesias,andAnniceris.
2ThenamewasderivedfromthegymnasiuminAthens(Kwdaapye^)whereAntisthenestaught.ThechiefCynicswereAntisthenes(born445B.C.),DiogenesofSinope(400-323),andCratesofThebes.
*TheprincipalrepresentativesoftheschoolofEliswerePhaedoandMenedemus,oftheMegarian,EuclidofMegara(nottobeconfusedwithEuclidthegeometrician),EubulidesofMiletus,DiodorusCronos,andStilpo.
74
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everythingelse.Hencebeingexistsisthesolelegitimateproposition,andtheEleaticmetaphysicstheonlytruephilosophy.
PLATO
TheappellationmajorSocraticsbelongsonlytoPlato,Socrates'sintellectualheir,andhisdisciples.Plato(427-347),^whosefatherwasofroyaldescentandwhosemothertracedherpedigreetoSolon,ambitioustoreignaskingintheintellectualdomain,endeavouredtocombineinthepowerfulunityofanoriginalsystemtheentirehostofspeculationswhichhefoundscatteredandfragmentaryintheconflictingsystemsofhisphilosophicpredecessors.Withhimphilosophyattainedhermajority.ButtheworkwhichheattemptedandwhichtheSocraticreformhadmadepossibleremainedincompleteanddefective.Undertheimpulseofhisloftyanddaringgenius,theintellectsoaredtoofastandtoohigh,andfailedtoachievebyafinalvictorytheconquestofreaHty.
(fl)LikeParmenides,PlatounderstoodthatthesubjectofmetaphysicsisbeingitselfButherefusedtoabsorbeverythingwhichexistsintheunityofimmutableandabsolutebeing.Andhewasthusledtothediscoveryofimportantmetaphysicaltruths.Heperceivedthat,sincethingsaremoreorlessperfect,moreorlessbeautifulandgood,moreorlessdeservingoflove,andsincetherearethingswhosegoodnessismixedwithevil—whichinphilosophicterminologyparticipateingoodness—theremustneces—
1Afterextensivetravels,PlatosettledinAthens,v^'herehepurchasedtheestateofacertainAcademustobethehomeofhisschool,knownthereforeastheAcademy.
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sarilyexistabeinginwhichgoodness,beauty,andperfectionarefullandentire,unmingledwiththeircontraries,abeingwhichisthegroundofthebeautyandgoodnessofeverythingelse.HisthoughtthusascendedtothetrueGodtranscendingtheworldanddistinctfromit,whomhesawasgoodnessitself,theabsolutegood,thegood,sotospeak,inperson.ButthiswasnotthemostprominentaspectofPlatonism.Aswepointedoutabove,Socrates'sphilosophy—aphilosophyrathersuggestedbyhispracticethanformulatedtheoretically—wasthephilosophyofessences;Plato'sphilosophywas,beforeeverythingelse,thephilosophyofideas.
Socrateshadshownthatwhatwemustseekandattainatallcostaretheessencesofthingswhichthemindapprehendsandexpressesinadefinition.What,then,is
itwliichtheintellectperceiveswhenitapprehendstheessenceofaman,atriangle,white,orvirtue?Clearlyman,abstractingfromPeter,Paul,John,etc.,triangle,abstractingfromanyparticulartriangle,isoscelesorequilateral,andsimilarlywhiteandvirtue.Moreover,theconceptorideaofmanortrianglepersiststhesamewhenappliedtoahostofmenortrianglesindividuallydifferent.Inotherwords,theseideasareuniversals.Further,theyareimmutableandeternalinthissense,thatevenif,forexample,noactualtriangleexisted,theideaoftriangle,withallthegeometricaltruthsitinvolves,wouldremaineternallythesame.Moreover,theseideasenableustocontemplate,pureandunalloyed,thehumanity,triangularity,etc.,inwhichthedifferentbeingsweknowasmen,triangles,etc.,participate.Failingtoanalysewithsufficientaccuracythenature
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ofourideasandtheprocessofabstraction,andapplyingtoohastilyhisguidingprinciple,thatwhateverexistsinthingsbyparticipationmustsomewhereexistinthepurestate,Platoarrivedattheconclusionthatthereexistsinasupra-sensibleworldahostofmodelsorarchetypes,immaterial,immutable,eternal,maningeneralormaninhimself,triangleinitself,virtueinitself,etc.Thesehetermedideas,whicharetheobjectapprehendedbytheintellect,thefacultywhichattainstruth—thatistosay,theyarereality.
Butwhat,then,isthestatusofthesensibleworld?Whatarewetothinkoftheindividualchangingandperishablethingsweseeandhandle?Sincetheyarenottheideas,theyarenotreality.Theyare,asHeraclitustaught,merebecoming.Platodidnotdenytheirexistence,butregardedthemasfeebleanddeceptiveimagesofreality,theobjectofopinion(So^a),notofcertainortrueknowledge,fleetingasshadowscastuponawall.Man,therefore,captiveofthebodyandthesenses,islikeaprisonerchainedinacave,onthewallofwhichheseespassbeforehimtheshadowsofthelivingbeingswhomovebehindhisbackinthesunlight—fugitiveshadows,evadinghisgrasp,oftheidea-substanceslitbytheSunoftheintelligibleworld,Godortheideaofthegood.
But,afterall,isametaphoranexplanation?ThePlatonicideasarethatinvirtueofwhichthingspossesstheirspecificnatures—maninhimselforhumanityisthatwhichmakesSocratesaman,thebeautifulinitselforbeautyisthatwhichmakesAlci-biadesorGalliashandsome.Inotherwords,thePlatonicideasaretheessencesandtheperfectionsofthings.But,ontheotherhand,theyare
distinct
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fromthings—belong,indeed,toanotherworld.How,then,arewetoexplaintherelationshipbetweenthingsandtheirideas?Platorepliedbycallingthemlikenessesorparticipationsoftheideas.Buttheseterms,whichlaterwillreceiveinScholasticismaprofoundsignificance,areinPlato'ssystemnothingmorethanmetaphorsdevoidofstrictlyintelligiblecontent.Andthefurtherquestionimmediatelyarises,whyandhowanythingexistsexceptideas—thatistosay,anythingnotpurereality.Inotherwords,Platohastoexplainwhatthethingiswhichparticipatesintheideas,receivestheirlikenessorreflection.Platorepliedthatitismatter(ortheboundless,(ScTCEtpov).Andsincetheideasarethatwhichis,hewascompelledtoregardmatterasthatwhichisnot,asortofnon-existentbeing:apregnantconceptionwhich,inAristotle'shands,wastobepurgedofallinternalcontradiction,butwhich,aspresentedbyPlato,seemsself-contradictory,themoresosinceheconfusesitelsewherewiththepurespaceofthemathematician.
{b)Undisturbedbythesemetaphysicaldifficulties,Platoproceededtobuildup,inaccordancewithitsinnerlogic,theedificeofhissystem.Forthetheoryofideasinvolvedanentiresystemofphilosophy,embracingthenatureofknowledge,man,andthephysicaluniverse.
Humanknowledgewasdividedintotwototallydifferentcategories:imagination(elxacria)andopinion(So^a),whichareconcernedwiththatwhichofitsnaturecannotbetheobjectofknowledge,thevisibleandcorruptibleworldanditsdeceptiveshadows;and
PLATOANDARISTOTLE
intellectualknowledge(voyjcji,!;'),whichisconcernedwithintelligiblethingsandisitselfsubdividedintoreason(Siavoia),whoseobjectismathematicalnumber,andintellect(vou(^),whichrisesbymeansofdialectictotheintuitivecontemplationoftheidea-essencesandfinallyofGod,thesuper-essentialgood.
Platohadnowtoexplainthisintellectualknowledge,theoriginoftheideasinourminds,imagesoftheeternalideas.Sincetheseideascannotbederivedfromthesenses,whicharefetteredtoillusion,wemustreceivethemimmediatelyfromonhigh,andtheymustbeinnateinoursoul.Inaformerexistence,before
itsunionwiththebody,thesoulbeheldtheideasandpossessedintuitiveknowledge.Thatknowledgestillremainswithus,but,cloudedanddarkenedbytheUfeofthebody,itabidesinthesoulasadormantmemory,anditisbygraduallyrevivingitthatthequestofwisdomenablesustoreconquerouroriginalintuitionoftruth.Thusmanisapurespiritforciblyunitedwithabody,asitwereanangelimprisonedintheflesh{psychologicaldualism).Thehumansoullivedbeforeitanimatedthebody,towhichitistiedasapunishmentforsomepre-natalsin,andafterdeathitentersanotherbody;for,whilePlatobelievedintheimmortalityofthesoul,healsoheldthePythagoreantenetoftransmigration,ormetempsychosis.
Sincethephysicalworldisnotanobjectofknowledge,Platocanspeakofitonlyinfablesormyths,whichhedevelopswithalltheresourcesofaconsummateart,althoughtheyserveonlytodisguisetheimpotenceofhisphilosophytoaccountformaterialreality.
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Itisinhismythsthatheascribestheproduction,orrathertheorganisation,oftheworldtoademiurge—whom,intheopinionofmanycommentators,heregardedasdistinctfromGodandinferiortohim—andexpoundsthequeernotionthatmanistheoriginofalllivingorganisms:thefirstmencreatedbythegodswereofthemalesex;thosewholedevilliveswerechangedafterdeathintowomen,who,inturn,iftheycontinuedtosin,werechangedintoirrationalbrutes,perhapsevenintoplants.
InethicsPlato,likehismasterSocrates,butmoreclearlythanhe,establishedthefundamentaltruthofmoralphilosophy:neitherpleasurenorvirtuenoranypartialgood,butGodhimself,andGodalone,isthegoodofman.Buthowdoesmanattainhisgood?Bymakinghimself,Platoreplied,aslikeaspossibletoGodbymeansofvirtueandcontemplation.Platoalsoexamined,thoughinadequately,theconceptofvirtue,andoutlinedthetheoryofthefourcardinalvirtues,prudence,justice,fortitude,andtemperance.Hetaughtthatitisbettertosufferthancommitinjustice,andintheRepublic^hepaintssosublimeandsoflawlessaportraitoftherighteoussuffererthatitisasthoughhehadcaughtaglimpseoftheDivdneFace.But,asaresultofhisexaggeratedintellectualism,hefailedtodistinguishtheactsofthepracticalfromthoseofthespeculativeintellectandidentifiedvirtue,whichrequiresrectitudeofthewill,withknowledge,whichisaperfectionofthereasonalone.Hethereforemisapplied
theprinciple,initselftrue,thatthewillalwaysfollowstheguidanceoftheunderstanding,andmaintednedthatsinissimplyduetolackofknow—
ii,362A80
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ledgeandthatnoonedeliberatelydoesevil:"thesinnerismerelyanignorantperson,"Theconsequenceofthistheory,whichPlatodidnotintend,isthedenialoffreewill.
Plato'ssociologybetraysthesameidealistandrationaHsttendencywhichleadshimtomisapplyanothertrueprinciple,namely,thatthepartexistsforthewhole;sothatinhisidealrepublic,governedbyphilosophers,individualsareentirelysubordinatedtothegoodofthestate,whichaloneiscapableofrights,anddisposesdespoticallyofeverypossiblespeciesofproperty,notonlythematerialpossessions,buteventhewomenandchildren,thelifeandhberty,ofitscitizens{absolutecommunism).
{c)TheradicalsourceofPlato'serrorsseemstohavebeenhisexaggerateddevotiontomathematics,whichledhimtodespiseempiricalreahty.Theywerealsoduetoanover-ambitiousviewofthescopeofphilosophy,inwhichPlato,likethesagesoftheEast,thoughwithgreatermoderationanddiscretion,placedthepurification,salvation,andlifeoftheentireman.
Moreover,itisonaccountofthesefalseprincipleslatentinhissystemthatallthosephilosophicdreamswhichtendinonewayoranothertotreatmanasapurespiritcanbetraceddirectlyorindirectlytoPlato.
ButofPlatohimselfwemaysaythathisfalseprinciplesgrewinanatmospheretoopuretoallowthemtoyieldtheirfullfruitandpoisontheessenceofhisthought.St.AugustinewasthereforeabletoextractfromPlato'sgold-minetheoreoftruth.
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Plato'sthoughtworkedonalargescaleandsoughttoembraceallthingsinasinglegrasp.Buthissuperiorwisdomandamazinggiftofintuitionpreventedhimfromfixinginafinalanddefinitestatemenofdoctrinemanyaspeculationwhichfloatedvaguelybeforehismind.Weakpointsonwhichanother
philosopherwouldhaveinsistedhetouchedlightly.Hencewhatinitselfisamarkofimperfection—vagueness,imprecision,hints,neverworkedout,withwhichheisoftensatisfied,amethodofexpositionmoreaestheticthanscientific,employingonlym,etaphorsandsymbols,amethodwhichSt.Thomaswithgoodreasoncriticisesseverely^—wasactuallyhissafeguard,preservinghimfromatoodisastrousdistortionofthetruthshehaddiscovered.FromthispointofviewitmaybesaidthatPlatonismisfalse,ifregardedinesseasafullydevelopedsystem,but,ifregardedinJieriasaprogresstowardsagoalbeyonditself,oftheutmostvalueasastageinthedevelopmentofthetruephilosophy.
ARISTOTLE
ToextractthetruthlatentinPlatonismwasthemightyreformeffectedbyAristotle.AristotlesuccessfullytooktopiecesPlato'ssystem,adaptedtotheexigenciesofrealitytheformalprincipleshehaddiscoveredandmisapplied,reducedhissweepingperspectiveswithinthelimitsimposedbyasublimecommonsense,andthussavedeverythingvitalinhis
1Platohabuitmalummodumdocendi;omniaenimfiguratedicitetpersymbola,intendensaliudperverba,quamsonentipsaverba.(St.Thomas,InIDeAnima,viii.)
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master'sthought.Hedidmore:hefoundedforalltimethetruephilosophy.Ifhesavedwhateverwastrueandvaluable,notonlyinPlato,butinalltheancientthinkersofGreece,andbroughttoasuccessfulconclusionthegreatworkofsynthesiswhichPlatohadattempted,itwasbecausehedefinitivelysecuredtheattainmentofrealitybythehumanintellect.Hisworkwasnotonlythenaturalfi^itofGreekwisdompurifiedfromPlato'smistakesandthealienelementsincludedinPlatonism;itcontained,completelyformedandpotentiallycapableofunlimitedgrowth,thebodyoftheuniversalhumanphilosophy.
BeforeAristotle,philosophymayberegardedasinanembryonicstageandinprocessofcomingtobirth.Thenceforward,itsformationcomplete,itwascapableofindefinitedevelopment,andknewnobounds.Inventumphilosophicumsemperperfectibile.
Infact,GreekspeculationafterAristotlehadspentitsforce,andwasunabletokeepfirmholdofthetruth.Itwouldreceiveconsiderablematerialenrichment,
butinessentialswoulddeforminsteadofperfectingphilosophy.^
{a)FortwentyyearsAristotlewasPlato'sdisciple;buthewasadisciplewiththeequipmentofaformidablecritic.NoonehasrefutedPlato'sidealismmorepowerfullythanhe,ormoreeffectivelydemolishedasystemwhichplacesthesubstanceofthingsoutsidethemselves.
Itisperfectlytruethattheprimaryobjectoftheintellectis,asSocratestaught,theessencesofthings;
^ThisisthereasonwhywehaveendedwithAristotlethisintroductorysketchofthehistoryofphilosophy,ormoreexactlyoftheformationofphilosophy.
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perfectlytruealso,asPlatohadperceived,thattheessenceofPeter,Paul,orJohnishumanityorhumannature,abstractingfromtheindividualcharacteristicspeculiartoPeter,Paul,orJohn.Butthisessenceasauniversalexistsonlyintheintellect—inourmind,*whichextractsorabstractsitfromthethingsinwhichitexistsindividualised^—and,ontheotherhand,itissolelyasanobjectofintelligence(inasmuchasitcannotbeconceivedapartfromcertainattributes),andnotinitsrealexistence,thatitiseternalandnecessary.Thereforetheessencesofperishablethingspossessnoseparateexistenceinthepurestate,-andtheentirePlatonicworldofarchetypalideasissheerfiction.Thetruthofthematteris,asweshallprovelaterindetail,thatthereexistsineverythinganintelligibleandimmaterialelement,whichAristotlecallsform^invirtueofwhichitpossessesaspecificnatureoressence.Butthisprincipleisnotseparatefromthings;itinheresinthemasoneofthefactorswhichconstitutetheirsubstance.Thusindividualobjects,thoughmutableandmortal,arenolongerdeceptiveshadows;theyarereality.
Ifrealobjectsofahigherorderexist,nonearemoreimmediatelyaccessibletoourknowledge.Ifthesensibleworldbe,asitwere,animperfectlikenessofthedivinelifeofpurespirit,itisabeingwhichresemblesanotherbeing,notamereimagewhichhasnoexistenceinitself.Iftheworldissubjecttobecoming,itisnotpurebecoming,butcontains
1AndprimarilyintheDivineIntellect,astheSchoolmenweretoexplain,thustakingaccovmtofthetruthcontainedinPlato'sexemplarism.
»Cf.St.Thomas,InIMetaph.,1.lo,158(ed.Gathala).
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enduringandsubstantialrealities.Ifthereisnoscienceoftheindividualobjectofsenseassuch,neverthelessascienceofsensiblereaUtyispossible,becausethereexists,incarnate,sotospeak,inthatreality,somethingintelligibleandimmaterial.
Thusthecorporealuniverseistheobjectnotofmereopinion,whichcanbeexpressedonlybymythandallegory,butofscientificknowledge,thescienceofphysics.Aristotlewasthetruefounderofphysics.^HisincomparablypowerfulgeniusviewedmobihtyintheimmutableHghtofintellect,showedthatallchangeobeysunchanginglaws,laidbarethenatureofmotionitself,ofgenerationandcorruption,anddistinguishedthefourspeciesofcausationoperativeinthesensibleworld.
Inlanguagestrangelytrenchantandsevere,hesumsuphislongpolemicagainstthedoctrineofideas.Plato,heargues,completelymisconceivedthenatureoftheformalcausewhenheseparateditfromthings.Whilehefancied"hewasstatingthesubstanceofperceptiblethings,"heasserted"theexistenceofasecondclassofsubstances,"andhis"accountofthewayinwhichtheyarethesubstancesofperceptiblethingsisemptytalk;for'sharing'(participating)meansnothing."Hethusmadeitimpossibletogiveasatisfactoryaccountofnature,and,byattributingallcausationandalltruerealitytotheideas,hewasunabletodistinguishintheactivityofthingsthelespectivepartsplayedbytheefficientandthefinal
1Aristotle'sexperimentalphysics(thescienceofphenomena)isamagnificentintellectualconstructiontotallyruinedbymistakesoffact.Buthisphilosophicalphysics(thescienceofmovingbeingassuch)laysdownthefoundationsandprinciplesofeverytruephilosophyofnature.
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cause.Hethusneglected"theefficientcausewhichistheprincipleofchange,"Hefurtherfailedtogiveanyaccountofthecauseof"thatwhichweseetobethecauseinthecaseofthearts,forthesakeofwhichmindandnatureproduceallthattheydoproduce."For"mathematicshascometobethewholeofphilosophyformodernthinkers,andtheyprofesstoexplainallotherthingsby
mathematics.""Andastomotion,iftheideasaremotionless,"thereisnoarchetypeofmotionintheworldofideas,butinthatcase"whence,"accordingtothePlatonists,"didmotioncome?Ifwecannotexplainmotion,thewholestudyofnaturehasbeenannihilated."^
RefutationofthetheoryofideaslogicallyinvolvedthecriticismandcorrectionofalltheotherpartsofthePlatonicsystem.InepistemologyAristotleshowedthatphysics,mathematics,andmetaphysics,orthefirstphilosophy,areindeedthreedistinctsciences,butthattheyaredistinguishedbytheirsubject-matter,notbythefacultyemployed,whichinallalikeisreason.Buthismostimportantachievementinthisspherewastoprove,bythemarvellousanalysisofabstractionwhichdominateshisentirephilosophy,thatourideasarenotinnatememoriesofpre-natalexperience,butderivedfromthesensesbyanactivityofthemind.
Inpsychology,ifinhisreactionagainstPlato'smetempsychosis,andfromanexcessivecaution,herefrainedfrominquiringintotheconditionofthesoulafterdeath,atleasthelaidthefirmfoundationsofthespiritualistdoctrinebyproving,ontheonehand,inoppositiontoPlato'sdualism,thesubstantialunityof
1Meiaph.,i,9,992a25-992b10.
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thehumanbeing,composedoftwosubstantialpartsincompleteandcomplementary,and,ontheother,againstthematerialists,thespiritualnatureoftheoperationsoftheunderstandingandwill.Hethuscreatedtheonlypsychologycapableofassimilatingandexplainingthevastmaterialaccumulatedbymodernexperiments.
Inethics,bydistinguishingbetweenthespeculativejudgment(whichproceedsfromtheunderstandingalone)andthepracticaljudgment(whichproceedsconjointlyfromthewill),heshowedhowfreewillispossible,andhowthesinnerdoeswhatheknowstobeevil,anddrew,especiallyinhistreatmentofthecardinalvirtuesandinhisanalysisofhumanacts,theoutlinesofwhatwastobe,sofarasthenaturalorderisconcerned,theethicsofChristianity.•
{b)ButAristotlemustbestudied,notonlyinhisattitudetoPlato,butabsolutelyinhisattitudetothatwhichis.ForPlatodidnomorethanfurnishhimwiththeoccasiontowrestlewiththeproblemofbeing.Aristotlewonthematch,leaving
ushisgreatconceptsofpotentialityandact,matterandform^thecategories^thetranscendentals,thecauses,asweaponswherewithtowagethesameintellectualcontest,andteachingus,asairuemasterofwisdom,toriseabovethestudyofvisibleandperishablethingstocontemplationofthehving,imperishablerealitywhichknowsnochange."Immovableinitspureactivity,thisbeingisinnowaysubjecttochange....Onsuchaprincipledependtheheavensandtheworldofnature.ItsUfeissuchasthebestwhichweenjoy,andenjoyforbutashorttime.Foritiseverinthisstate,since
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itsactisalsopleasure—theactofthesupremeintelligence,purethoughtthinkingitself....IfGodisalwaysinthatgoodstateinwhichwesometimesare,thiscompelsourwonder;andifinabetter,thisisyetmorewonderful.LifealsobelongstoGod:fortheactofthoughtisUfe,andGodisthatact;andGod'sessentialactisUfemostgoodandeternal.WesaythereforethatGodisalivingbeing,eternalandperfect,sothatlifewhichendureseverlastinglybelongstoGod,forGodisthislife."^Moreover,thisGodisperfectlyone,absolutelysingle."Thosewhosaymathematicalnumberisfirst,andgoontogenerateonekindofsubstanceafteranotherandgivedifferentprinciplesforeach,makethesubstanceoftheuniverseamereseriesofepisodesandtheygiveusmanygoverningprinciples;buttheworldmustnotbegovernedbadly.AsHomerobserved,theruleofmanyisnotgood;oneistheruler^*
ThusAristotle,asAlexanderofAphrodisiasremarksinafinepassageofhisCommentaryontheMetaphysics*"leadsusfi"omthethingswhicharethemselvesonthelowestplane,butmostfamiliartous,uptotheFather,whohasmadeallthings,toGodthemostsublime,andprovesthatasthefounderisthecauseoftheunityoftheglobeandthebrass,sotheDivinePower,authorofunityandmakerofallthings,isforallbeingsthecauseoftheirbeingwhattheyare."
Aristotle'smindwasatonceextremelypracticalandextremelymetaphysical.Arigorouslogician,butalsoakeen-sightedrealist,hegladlyrespectedthe
1Metaph.,xii,7,1072b;9,1074b35.
*Metaph.,xii,10,1076a.
'AlexanderofAphrodisias,InMetaph.,ad1045a36.
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demandsoftheactual,andfoundroominhisspeculationforeveryvarietyofbeingwithoutviolatingordistortingthefactsatanypoint,displayinganintellectualvigourandfreedomtobesurpassedonlybythecrystallinelucidityandangelicforceofSt.ThomasAquinas.Butthisvastwealthisarrangedinthelightofprinciples,mastered,classified,measured,anddominatedbytheintellect.Itisthemasterpieceofwisdom,awisdomwhichisstillwhollyhuman,butnevertheless,fromitsloftythrone,embraceswithasingleglancethetotaUtyofthings,
Aristotle,however,wasaprofoundratherthanacomprehensivethinker.Hetooklittlecaretodisplaytheproportionsandwideperspectivesofhisphilosophy;hisprimaryobjectw£istoapprehendbyanabsolutelyreliablemethodandwithafaultlessprecisionwhatineverynatureaccessibletohumanknowledgeismostcharacteristic,mostintimate—inshort,mosttrulyitself.Thereforehenotonlyorganisedhumanknowledge,andlaidthesolidfoundationsoflogic,biology,psychology,naturalhistory,metaphysics,ethics,andpolitics,butalsocutandpolishedahostofpreciousdefinitionsandconclusionssparklingwiththefiresofreality.
ItcanthereforebeaffirmedwithouthesitationthatamongphilosophersAristotleholdsapositionaltogetherapart:genius,gifts,andachievement—allareunique.Itisthelawofnaturethatthesublimeisdifficulttoachieveandthatwhatisdifficultisrare.Butwhenataskisofextraordinarydifficultybothinitselfandintheconditionsitrequires,wemayexpectthattherewillbebutoneworkmancapableofitsaccomplishment.Moreover,awell-builtedificeis
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usuallybuiltnotontheplansofseveralarchitects,butontheplanofasingleone.If,therefore,theedificeofhumanwisdomorphilosophyistobeadequatelyconstructed,thefoundationsmustbelaidonceforallbyasinglethinker.Onthesefoundationsthousandsofbuilderswillbeabletobuildinturn,forthegrowthofknowledgerepresentsthelabourofgenerationsandwillneverbecomplete.Buttherecanbebutonemaster-builder.^
Forthatreason,inspiteofthemistakes,defects,andgapswhichbetrayinhisworkthelimitationsofhumanreason,^Aristotleisastrulythe
^DescartesremarksverytrulyinhisDiscoursdelaMithode:"Workscomposedofmanypiecesandmadebythehandofseveralworkmenarenotsoperfectasthosewhicharetheworkofasingleindividual."
Buthewaswronginbelieving(i)thathewasthemandestinedtolaythefoundationofphilosophy,aworkwhichtheancientshadfailedtoaccomplish;(ii)thatbyhimselfhewascompetent—atleast,givensufficienttimeandexperience—notonlytolaythefoundationofscience,buttocompletetheedifice;and(iii)inrejectingcontemptuouslytheentireachievementofprecedinggenerations,togetherwiththetraditionalwisdomofhumanity.Aristotle,onthecontrary,succeededinhistaskbyconstantcriticismandanalysisofhispredecessors'thought,andbymakinguseoftheaccumulatedresultsofhumanspeculationinthepast.
2Aristotleisoftencreditedwithcertainerrorsmadebyhisdisciplesorcommentators,especiallyaboutthehumansoulandthedivineknowledgeandcausality.Butacarefulstudyofthetextprovesthatwhenthephilosophermaintainedthattheintellectisseparate,hemeantthatitisseparatefrommatter,notfromthesoulitself{cf.St.Thomas,InIIIDeAnima,4and5),andthereforehedidnotdeny,asisoftenasserted,thepersonalimmortalityofthehumansoul{cf.alsoMetaph.,xii,3,1070a26).NordidheteachthatGodisnottheefficientcauseoftheworldandmovesitonlyastheend,orgood,whichitdesires.(ThepassageintheMetaph.,xii,7,meanssimplythatGodmovesasfinalcauseorobjectoflovetheintelligencewhichmovesthefirstheaven;hedoesnotaffirmthatGodcanactonlyasfinalcauseandhasnotmadethings.Onthecontrary,inMetaph.,ii,i,993b28,hesaysthattheheavenlybodiesaredependentonthefirstcause,notonly
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philosopherparexcellence,asSt.Thomasisthetheologian.^
fortheirmotion,butfortheirverybeing.Cf.Metaph.vi,i,1026b17.)Cf.alsothepassagefromAlexanderofAphrodisias,quotedaboveinthetext,inwhichGod'sefficientcausalityinAristotle'ssystemisadmirablybroughtout.Asforthepassage{Metaph.,xii,9)inwhichAristotleinvestigatestheformalobjectoftheDivineIntellect,remarkingthatitisbetternottoknowthantoknowcertainthingsofalowerorder,itmostcertainlydoesnotamounttothedenialthatGodknowsthethingsoftheworld;thestatementisputforwardsimplytoprepare
forthesolutionofthequestiondiscussed.Thatsolution,asindicatedbyAristotle,isformallytrue,andconsistsintheproposition,whichSt.Thomaslateraffirmedmoreexplicitly,thattheDivineIntellect,becauseofitsabsoluteindependence,hasnootherformalobjectthantheDivineEssenceitself,andthereforedoesnotknowthethingsoftheworldinthemselves,butinthatessenceinwhicheverythingislife.
Itremainstrue,nevertheless,thatAristotlecommittedseriouserrors(forinstance,hisattempttoprovetheexistenceoftheworldabaeterno),andwasalsoguiltyofmanyomissions.Inparticular,thedoctrineofcreation,whichfollowswithabsolutenecessityfromhisprinciples,isnowhereexplicitlyformulatedbyhim(indeed,noheathenphilosopherreachedaclearnotionofcreationexnihilo);andonthosequestionswhich,thoughinthemselvescapableofrationalproof,aremostdifficulttosolvewithouttheaidofrevelation—therelationoftheworldtoGod,thelotofthesoulafterdeath—hemaintainedareserve,whichwasperhapsveryprudentinitself,butleaveshisworkmanifestlyincomplete.
1Goethe,repeatingthethemeofRaphael'swonderfulSchoolofAthens,inwhichPlatoisdepictedasaninspiredoldman,hisfaceturnedheavenward,Aristotleasamaninthefullvigourofyouthpointingtriumphantlytotheearthanditsrealities,hasdrawninhisTheoryofColours(Part2,Ueberliefertes)astrikingcomparisonbetweenPlatoandAristotle."Plato,"hesays,"seemstobehaveasaspiritdescendedfromheaven,whohaschosentodwellaspaceonearth.Hehardlyattemptstoknowthisworld.Hehasalreadyformedanideaofit,andhischiefdesireistocommunicatetomankind,whichstandsinsuchneedofthem,thetruthswhichhehasbroughtwithhimanddelightstoimpart.Ifhepenetratestothedepthofthings,itistofillthemwithhisownsoul,nottoanalysethem.Withoutintermissionandwiththeburningardourofhisspirit,heaspirestoriseandregaintheheavenlyabodefromwhichhecamedown.Theaimofallhis
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
(c)Aristotlewasbornin384atStagira,inThrace.'Thesonofadoctor,bynameNicomachus,hebelongedtothefamilyoftheAsclepiadae,descended,itwassaid,fromAesculapius.AttheageofeighteenhebecameapupilofPlato,whoselecturesheattendeduntilhisdeath(347).AfterPlato'sdeathhewenttoliveatAtarneusinMysiawhereHermiaswasking,andfromtheretoMytilene.Hethen
spenteightyearsatthecourtofKingPhilipofMacedon,wherehebecameAlexander'stutor.Afterhispupil'saccessiontothethrone,hesettledinAthens,whereheestablishedhisschoolattheLyceum(agymnasiumconsecratedtoApolloLycaeus).HetaughtashewalkedtoandfrowithhispupilsunderthetreesoftheLyceum,whencethenamePeripatetics(walkers)bywhichhisdisciplesbecameknown.HespenttwelveyearsinAthens.Whenthepartyopposed
discourseistoawakeninhishearersthenotionofasingleeternalbeing,ofthegood,oftruth,ofbeauty.Hismethodandwordsseemtomelt,todissolveintovapour,whateverscientificfactshehasmanagedtoborrowfromtheearth.
"Aristotle'sattitudetowardstheworldis,ontheotherhand,entirelyhuman.Hebehaveslikeanarcliitectinchargeofabuilding.Sinceheisonearth,onearthhemustworkandbuild.Hemakescertainofthenatureoftheground,butonlytothedepthofhisfoundations.Whateverliesbeyondtothecentreoftheearthdoesnotconcernhim.Hegiveshisedificeanamplefoundation,seekshismaterialsineverydirection,sortsthem,andbuildsgradually.Hethereforeriseslikearegularpyramid,whereasPlatoascendsrapidlyheavenwardlikeanobeliskorasharptongueofflame.
"Thushavethesetwomen,representingqualitiesequallypreciousandrarelyfoundtogether,dividedmankind,sotospeak,betweenthem."
1"Wemustremember,moreover,thatStagira,acityofChalcidice,wasaGreekcolonywhereGreekwasspoken.ItisthereforeincorrecttoregardAristotle,asheissometimesregarded,asonlyhalfGreek.HewasapureHellene,aspureasParmenides,forexample,orAnaxagoras."(Hamelin,LeSystemed'Aristote,p.4.)
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totheMacedoniansbroughtagainsthimanaccusationofimpiety,onthepretextofahymnhehadoncecomposedonthedeathofhisfriendHermias,heretiredtoChalcis,wherehediedattheageofsixty-three(322).
Thestoryistoldofhimthathisloveofstudywassogreatthathedevisedtheplanofholdinginhishand,whileatwork,aballofcopperwhich,ifhefellasleep,wouldrousehimbyfallingintoametalbasin.ToassisthisresearchesPhilipandAlexanderplacedtheirvastresourcesathisdisposal.Hewrotebooks
tobereadbythegeneralpublic{dialogues),whicharealllost—Ciceropraisedtheirstyleinthehighestterms:flumenaureumorationisfundensAristoteles{Acad.,II,38,119)—andacroamaticbooks,inwhichhesummarisedthelecturesgiventohisdisciples;themajorityofthesehavesurvived.^
Thehistoryofthesebooks,asrelatedbyStrabo,isverystrange,andillustrates,asaptlyasPascal'sremarkonCleopatra'snose,thepartplayedbytrifling
*ThefollowingisalistofAristotle'sworks:—
i.ThecollectionofworksdealingwithLogicandknowncollectivelybythenameofOrganon(instrumentofscientificknowledge).TheyconsistoftheKary^yoplcn,theCategories;the'AvaXvTiKairpdrepaKaiOffrepa,thePriorandPosteriorAnalytics;theTdmKa,theTopics;theHfpl<To(piaTiKQ)viXiyx'^i',OnSophisticArguments;andtheUeplipfiTivelai,OnInterpretation,DeInterpreiatione,atreatiseonthemeaningofpropositions,whichinspiteofAndronicus'srejectionmustbeacceptedasauthentic.
ii.ThePhysics,^vciKi]dxpSaais(theauthenticityofBook7isdoubtful),withwhichwemustgroupthefollowii^treatises:OntheHeavens{DeCaelo),TlepldvpavoO;OnGenerationandCorruption,Ueplyeveaiu^Kai<p0opS.s;OnthePartsofAnimals,Uepl^i^wvfi6pitav;OntheSoul,Uepl^vxv^;OnSensation,Tleplal(r6r,ffewskcualadriruv;OnMemory,Uepltj.vf)fi.r)%Kaiavafivva-eta^;theMeteorology,MereupoXoyiKd;theHistoryofAnimals,riepirifi^al<rroplai(theauthenticityofBook10isdoubtful);andmanyothertreatises,severalofwhichareofdubious
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
accidentsindeterminingthedestiniesofmankind.Atthephilosopher'sdeaththeywereinheritedtogetherwithhisUbrarybyhisdiscipleandsuccessorTheophrastus.Theophrastusbequeathedthemtoadisciple
authenticity,especiallytheDeMundo.(ThetreatiseonPhysiognomyisspurious,butisapparentlyacompilationfromauthenticfragments.)
iii.TheMetaphysics,Tduer^rk(f>v<nKd,ofwhichthesecondbook,aiXttTTov,istheworkofadisciple,PasiclesofRhodes.
iv.TheNicomacheanEthics,'HdiKo,^iKOfiixfia,andtheEudemianEthics,
'KdiKctEvBrifida.Thelatterworkwascomposed,notbyAristotle,butbyEudemushimself.TothesewemayaddtheGreatEthics(MagnaMoralia),"ROiko,tieyaha,whichisarisumiofthetwopreceding;andthereforenotwrittenbyAristotle;thePolitics,UoKitiko.;thePoetics,Tlepinoti]TiKT]i;andtheRhetoric,T^x^r)pr/TopiKifi.ThetreatiseOnVirtuesandVices,theEconomics,andtheRhetorictoAlexanderarespurious.In1891wasdiscoveredandpublishedtheConstitutionofAthens,'AO-nvalwvTToXiTela.ItformedpartofacollectioninwhichAristotlegaveanoutlineoftheconstitutionsof158Greekstates.
OftheSchoolmenwhocommentedontheworksofAristotle,themostimportantareAlbertusMagnus,St.Thomas,andSilvesterMaurus,whoseparaphraseandcommentaryfollowingthetextwordforwordmaystillbeusefullyconsulted.SaintThomaswrotecommentaries:(a)ontheDeInterpretatione(unfinishedandreplacedbyCajetan'sforlessons3-14ofBook2);[b)onthePosteriorAnalytics;(c)onthePhysics;(d)ontheDeCaeloetMundo(St.Thomasdiedbeforeitwascompleted,andfromBook3,lesson8,thecommentarywascontinuedbyhispupil,PeterofAuvergne);[e)ontheGenerationandCorruptionofAnimals(St.Thomas'sunfinishedCommentaryhasbeencompletedbypassagesborrowedfromotherwriters,inparticularfromtheCommentaryofAlbertusMagnus);(/)ontheMeteorology(completedbyanotherhandfromBk.2,lesson11);[g)ontheDeAnima(thecommentaryonBooks2and3isbySt.Thomashimself,thecommentaryonBk.icompiledfromhislecturesbyoneofhispupils,RaynaldofPiperno;(A)ontheParvaNaturalia[DeSensuetSensato,deMemoriaetReminiscentia,deSomnoetVigilia);(i)ontheMetaphysics(moderneditionbyPadreCathala,Turin,Marietti,1915);(j)ontheNicomacheanEthics;{k)onthePolitics(completedbyPeterofAuvergnefromBk.3,lesson6,or,asothersthinkfiromBk.4).Cf.DeRubeis,Dissert.23invol.i.Op.Omn.S.ThomaeAq.,Leonineedition.
ForthewritingsofSt.Thomasandtheauthenticityofhisvariousminorworks,seeMandonnet,O.P.,DesEcritsautherUiquesdeSaintThomas(reprintedfi:omtheRevueThomiste,1909-1910)Friburg.
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namedNeleus,Neleusinturntohisheirs.Thelatter,fearingtheymightbeseizedfortheroyallibraryatPergamum,hidtheminanundergroundchamber.Theydiedandthemanuscriptswerelost.Theyremainedlostforacenturyanda
halfandwereonlyrecoveredbythegoodfortuneofasuccessfulbook-lover.AbouttheyearlOOb.g.thedescendantsofNeleus'sheirsdiscoveredthemanuscripts(inaverybadcondition,aswecanwellimagine)andsoldthemforalargesumtoawealthycollector,ApelliconofTeos,whopublishedthem,inaveryfaultyedition.AtthecaptureofAthensbytheRomansin86b.g.theycameintothepossessionofSulla.ThegrammarianTyrannichadaccesstothemandmadeuseofthem,andfinallyAndronicusofRhodescataloguedandrepublishedthem.^CommentarieswerecomposedbyAlexanderofAphrodisias(secondcenturya.d.),alsobyseveralneo-Platonicphilosophers.Porphyry(thirdcentury),Themistius(fourthcentury),Simplicius,andPhilo(sixthcentury).
1Strabo,Geog.,xiii,i,54;Plut.Sulla,26.Strabo'stestimonyisofconsiderableweight.Ithas,however,beenprovedthatsomeofthemostimportantscientifictreatisesofAristotlewereknowntothePeripateticsandtheiropponentsinthethirdandsecondcenturiesB.C.WemustthereforeconcludethatStrabo'saccountisreliableinitspositiveassertions,sofarasthehistoryofAristotle's"acroamatic"manuscriptsareconcerned,butinaccurate,oratleastexaggerated,initsnegativestatements.MoreorlesscompletecopiesofthePhilosopher'sworksmusthavebeenincirculationinthePeripateticschoolbeforeApellicon'sdiscovery.WemayneverthelessagreewithHamelin'sconclusionthat"thescientificwritingsofAristotlewerelittlereadevenbythePeripateticschoolinitsdegeneracy.Apellicon'sdiscoverywouldhavehadtheeffectofmakingtheseworksoncemorefashionable."Thetruthofthematterthereforewouldbethat,beforethisdiscoveryandtheworksofAndronicus,Aristotle'sscientifictreatiseswerenotindeedunknown,asStrabosays,butatanyratelitdeandbadlyknown.
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TheScholastictradition,whichgrewupfromtheeighthcenturyonwardintheChristianWest,wasforlongignorantofAristotle'soriginalworks,withtheexceptionoftheOrganon(thetreatisesonlogic),whichhadbeentranslatedintoLatin^byBoethius(480-526).Butitwasacquaintedwithhisthought,whichhadbeentransmittedandpopularisedatsecondhandandformedanintegralpartofthegreatphilosophicsynthesisoflateantiquity,Platonicthoughitwasinthemain,onwhichtheFathers,especiallySt.Augustine,haddrawnsolargelyintheserviceofthefaith.IntheChristianschoolsAristotle'slogicwastaughtinBoethius'stranslation.ButitwasnotuntilthelatterpartofthetwelfthcenturythattheotherwritingsofthePhilosopher{physics,metaphysics,ethics)begantoreachtheSchoolmen,mainly,itwouldappear,asaresultoftheardentpolemic
conductedatthatdatebytheleadersofChristianthoughtagainstthephilosophyoftheArabs,whopossessedthesebookstogetherwiththeneo-PlatoniccommentariesinaSyrianversiontranslatedlaterintoArabic,andappealedtotheirauthority.Atfirsttheobjectofconsiderablesuspicion*onaccountofthesource
^LaterBoethius'sworkwaspartiallylost,anditwasnotuntilafterH41thatcertainbooksoftheOrganon,reintroducedfromtheArabs,begantoappearinthephilosophicliteratureoftheMiddleAges,wheretheyformedwhatwasthenknownastheLogicaNova.ThesewerethePriorandPosteriorAnalytics,theTopics,andtheSophisticArguments.Cf.deWulf,Hist,delaPhil,midiivale,anded.pp.149sqq.
*Censures(issuedin1210byacounciloftheprovinceofSenswhichmetatParis,andrenewedin1215,inthestatuteimposedontheUniversityofParisbythelegateRobertdeCourcon,astatuteconfirmedbyGregoryIXin1231andbyUrbanIVin1263)forbadetheemploymentofAristotle'swritingsinpubliclecturesorprivateteaching.Wemustremember,however,that,asM,Forgetpointsout{Rapp.cm
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fromwhichtheyhadbeenreceivedandthemistakeswhichtheArabcommentatorshadfoistedintothem,alltheworksofAristotleweresoontranslatedintoLatin,atfirstfromtheArabictext,later^fromtheoriginalGreek.^
Nowtookplacethemeetingofhumanwisdomanddivinetruth,ofAristotleandtheFaith.AlltruthbelongsofrighttoChristianthought,asthespoilsoftheEgyptianstotheHebrews.Quaecunqueigiturapudomnespraeclaradictasunt,nostraChristianorumsunt,*becauseaccordingtothatsayingofSt.Ambrose,whichSt.ThomasdeHghtedtoquote,everytruth,whoeversaidit,comesfromtheHolySpirit.'^Butsomeonemustactuallytakepossession,someonemustenrolin
congr.scientif.intern,descath.,Brussels,1894),individualsremainedfreetoread,study,andcommentonthesebooksinprivate.Moreover,thecensuresboundonlytheUniversityofParis.In1229theUniversityofToulouse,foundedandorganisedundertheprotectionofthepapallegatehimself,attractedstudents
byannouncinglectxiresonthebooksforbiddenatParis.Finally,evenatParis,whenthefacultyofartsincludedinitscoursefrom1255publiclecturesonthePhysicsandMetaphysics,ecclesiasticalauthoritymadenoattempttointerfere.And,moresignificantlystill.PopeUrbanIV,akwyearslater,tookunderhispersonalpatronageWilliamofMoerbeke'stranslationofAristotleandSt.ThomasAquinas'sCommentaries.SeeGhoUet,"AristotelismedelaScolastique"inVacantandMangenot'sDictionnairedeThiologie,anddeWulf,op.cit.,p.242.
1SomeofAristotle'sworkswereapparentlyreadatfirstinaLatintranslationfromArabic,othersinadirecttranslationfromtheGreek.Inanycaseitwasnotlongbeforethelatterentirelysupersededtheformer.St.ThomasusedonlydirectversionsfromtheGreek.
2ThebestofthesetranslationsisthatoftheentireworksofAristotlemadebetween1260and1270byWilliamofMoerbekeatthesuggestionandunderthesupervisionofSt.Thomas.ItisanabsolutelyliteralrenderingoftheGreektext.
'St.Justin,ApoL,ii,13.
*Omneverumaquocumquedicatur,aSpiritusancioest.
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theroyalserviceofChristthemarvellousintellectofAristotle.Thiswork,begunbyAlberttheGreat(i193-1280),wascontinuedandbroughttoasuccessfulconclusionbySt.ThomasAquinas(1225-1274).Itsaccomplishmentdemandedarareconjunctionoffavourableconditions—theripecultureoftheageofSt,Louis,themagnificentorganisationoftheDominicanorder,thegeniusofSt.Thomas.^St.Thomas,whomtheChurchhasproclaimedDoctorparexcellence,DoctorCommunisEcclesiae,andwhomshehasenthronedastheuniversalteacherofherschools,wasnotcontentwithtransferringtheentirephilosophyofAristotletothedomainofChristianthought,andmakingittheinstrumentofauniquetheologicalsynthesis;heraiseditintheprocesstoafarhigherorder,and,sotospeak,transfiguredit.
Hepurgeditfromeverytraceoferror—thatistosay,inthephilosophicorder,forsofarasthesciencesofobservationorphenomenaareconcerned,St.ThomaswasnomoreablethanAristotletoescapetheerrorsprevalentinhisday,errorswhichdonotinanywayaffecthisphilosophyitself.Heweldeditintoapowerfulandharmonioussystem;heexplored
*ForthesuccessfulperformanceofsuchataskitwasalsorequisitethatChristianthoughtshouldhaveattainedthehighdegreeofelaborationalikeinthephilosophicalandtheologicalorderwhichithadreceivedfromtheFathersandtheScholasticpredecessorsofSt.Thomas.ThereforetheworkofAlbertusMagnusandSt.Thomaswasnottochange,butonthecontrarytocompleteChristianphilosophy,givingititsmatureexpression.Ifcontemporarieswereprimarilyimpressedwiththenoveltyoftheirwork—anovelty'ofcompletion,notofalteration—thereasonisthatthefinalprocesswhichperfectsasystemmustalwayscomeasashocktothosewhowitnessit,andwhomostlikelyareattachedbyforceofhabittocertainaspectsofitsimperfectstateassuch.
PLATOANDARISTOTLE
itsprinciples,cleareditsconclusions,enlargeditshorizon;and,ifherejectednothing,headdedmuch,enrichingitwiththeimmensewealthoftheLatinChristiantradition,restoringintheirproperplacesmanyofPlato'sdoctrines,oncertainfundamentalpoints(forexample,onthequestionofessenceandexistence)openingupentirelynewperspectives,andthusgivingproofofaphilosophicgeniusasmightyasthatofAristotlehimselfFinally,andthiswashissupremeachievement,whenbyhisgeniusasatheologianhemadeuseofAristotle'sphilosophyastheinstrumentofthesacredsciencewhichis,sotospeak,"animpressonourmindsofGod'sownknowledge,"^heraisedthatphilosophyaboveitselfbysubmittingittotheilluminationofahigherlight,whichinvesteditstruthwitharadiancemoredivinethanhuman.BetweenAristotleasviewedinhimselfandAristotleviewedinthewritingsofSt.Thomasisthedifferencewhichexistsbetweenacityseenbytheflareofatorchlightprocessionandthesamecitybathedinthelightofthemorningsun.
Forthisreason,thoughSt.Thomasisfirstandforemostatheologian,wemayasappropriately,ifnotwithgreaterpropriety,callhisphilosophyThomistratherthanAristotehan.
ThisphilosophyofAristotleandSt,Thomasisinfactwhatamodernphilosopherhastermedthenaturalphilosophyofthehumanmind,foritdevelopsandbringstoperfectionwhatismostdeeplyandgenuinelynaturalinourintellectaUkeinitselementaryapprehensionsandinitsnativetendencytowardstruth.
Sum,TTieoL,i,q.i,a3,a</2.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Itisalsotheevidentialphilosophy,basedonthedoubleevidenceofthedataperceivedbyoursensesandourintellectualapprehensionoffirstprinciples—thephilosophyofbeing,entirelysupportedbyandmodelleduponwhatis,andscrupulouslyrespectingeverydemandofreality—thephilosophyoftheintellect,whichittrustsasthefacultywhichattainstruth,andformsbyadisciplinewhichisanincomparablementalpurification.Andforthisveryreasonitprovesitselftheuniversalphilosophyinthesensethatitdoesnotreflectanationality,class,group,temperament,orrace,theambitionormelancholyofanindividualorany
practicalneed,butistheexpressionandproductofreason,whichiseverywherethesame;andinthissensealso,thatitiscapableofleadingthefinestintellectstothemostsubHmeknowledgeandthemostdifficultofattainment,yetwithoutoncebetrayingthosevitalconvictions,instinctivelyacquiredbyeverysanemind,whichcomposethedomain,wideashumanity,ofcommonsense.Itcanthereforeclaimtobeabidingandpermanent[philosophiaperennis)inthesensethatbeforeAristotleandSt.Thomashadgivenitscientificformulationasasystematicphilosophy,itexistedfromthedawnofhumanityingermandinthepre-philosophicstate,asaninstinctoftheunderstandingandanaturalknowledgeofthefirstprinciplesofreasonandeversinceitsfoundationasasystemhasremainedfirmandprogressive,apowerfulandlivingtradition,whileallotherphilosophieshavebeenbornandhavediedinturn.And,finally,itstandsoutasbeing,beyondcomparisonwithanyother,one;onebecauseitalonebestowsharmonyandunityonhumanknowledge—bothmeta—
lOO
PLATOANDARISTOTLE
physicalandscientific—andonebecauseinitselfitrealisesamaximumofconsistencyinamaximumofcomplexity,andneglectoftheleastofitsprinciplesinvolvesthemostunexpectedconsequences,distortingourunderstandingofreahtyininnumerabledirections.Theseareafewoftheexternalsignswhichwitnesstoitstruth,evenbeforewehavestudieditforourselvesanddiscoveredbypersonalproofitsintrinsiccertitudeandrationalnecessity.
lOI
DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY
Webeganbycallingphilosophyhumanwisdom.Nowthatthehistoryofitsoriginshasgivenusfurtherinformationastothenatureandobjectofthiswisdom,weareinapositiontoattemptamoreprecisedefinitionofphilosophy.
Forthispurposeweshalltakephilosophytomeanphilosophyparexcellence,thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.Whatweshallsayofitintheabsolutesense[simpliciter)willbeapplicablerelatively[secundumquid)totheotherdepartmentsofphilosophy.
Philosophyisnota"wisdom"ofconductorpracticalfifethatconsistsinactingwell.Itisawisdomwhosenatureconsistsessentiallyinknowing.
How?Knowinginthefullestandstrictestsenseoftheterm,thatistosay,withcertainty,andinbeingabletostatewhyathingiswhatitisandcannotbeotherwise,knowingbycauses.Thesearchforcausesisindeedthechiefbusinessofphilosophers,andtheknowledgewithwhichtheyareconcernedisnotamerelyprobableknowledge,suchasoratorsimpartbytheirspeeches,butaknowledgewhichcompelstheassentoftheintellect,Hketheknowledgewhichthegeometricianconveysbyliisdemonstrations.Butcertainknowledgeofcausesistermedscience.Philosophythereforeisascience.
Knowingbywhatmedium,bywhatlight?Know-
DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY
ingbyreason,bywhatiscalledthenaturallightofthehumanintellect.Thisisaqualitycommontoeverypurelyhumanscience(ascontrastedvsdththeology).Thatistosay,theruleofphilosophy,itscriterionoftruth,istheevidenceofitsobject.
Themediumorlightbywhichascienceknowsitsobjectsistermedintechnicallanguageitslumensubquo,thelightinwhichitapprehendstheobjectofitsknowledge(itselftermedtheobject,quod).Eachofthedifferentscienceshasitsowndistinctivelight{lumensubquo,mediumsenmotivumformale)whichcorrespondswiththeformalprinciplesbymeansofwhichtheyattaintheirobject.ButthesedifferentprinciplesareaUkeinthis,thattheyareallknownbythespontaneousactivityofourintellect,asthenaturalfacultyofknowledge,inotherwordsbythenaturallightofreason—andnot,hketheprinciplesoftheology,byasupernaturalcommunicationmadetoman{revelation),andbythelightoffaith.Wehavenowtoconsidertheobjectquodofphilosophy.
Knowingwhat?Toanswerthisquestionwemayrecallthesubjectswhichengagedtheattentionofthedifferentphilosopherswhoseteachingswehavesummarised.Theyinquiredintoeverything—knowledgeitselfanditsmethods,beingandnon-being,goodandevil,motion,theworld,beingsanimateandinanimate,manandGod.Philosophythereforeisconcernedwitheverything,isauniversalscience.
Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatphilosophyabsorbsalltheothersciences,or
isthesolescience,ofwhichalltherestaremerelydepartments;noron
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPH'y
theOtherhandthatitisitselfabsorbedbytheothersciences,beingnomorethantheirsystematicarrangement.Onthecontrary,philosophypossessesitsdistinctivenatureandobject,invirtueofwhichitdiffersfromtheothersciences.Ifthiswerenotthecasephilosophywouldbeachimera,andthosephilosopherswhosetenetswehavebrieflysketchedwouldhavetreatedofunrealproblems.^Butthatphilosophyissomethingreal,andthatitsproblemshavethemosturgentclaimtobestudied,isprovedbythefactthatthehumanmindiscompelledbyitsveryconstitutiontoaskthequestionswhichthephilosophersdiscuss,questionswhichmoreoverinvolvetheprinciplesonwhichthecertaintyoftheconclusionsreachedbyeveryscienceinthelastresortdepends.
"Yousay,"wroteAristotleinacelebrateddilemma,'onemustphilosophise.Thenyoumustphilosophise.Yousayoneshouldnotphilosophise.Then(toproveyourcontention)youmustphilosophise.Inanycaseyoumustphilosophise."
^Nodoubttheyalsostudiedmanyquestionsrelatingtodiespecialsciences,forthedifferentiationofthescienceshadnotbeencarriedsofarasinmodemtimes.Neverthelesstheprimaryobjectoftheirstudylayelsewhere,and,atleastafterSocrates,thosespecialsciences—astronomy,geometry,arithmetic,music,medicine,andgeography—whichtheancientscultivatedwithsuccessdevelopedseparately,andincleardistinctionfromphilosophy.Thevery.ki'oryofthespecialsciences,whichinmoderntimeshavemadesuchenormousprogressindependentlyofphilosophyandasautonomousbranchesofstudy,plainlyprovesthattheyarenopartoftheformer
2"elfikv(pCKoao(ptyreov,(pt\oao(pr,Tiov,Kal,elfiiicp'TocprjTiov,(pCKoaocpt)-riov,w6.vT(t}%&pa.(pi\oiTo(prjTiov."
ThisdilemmaistakenfromtheUporftirTiKd?,alostworkofwhichonlyafewfragmentshavecomedowntous,{Cf.fr.50,1483b29,42;1484a2,8,18.)
DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY
Buthowcanpliilosophybeaspecialscienceifitdealswitheverything?Wemustnowinquireunderwhataspectitisconcernedwitheverything,or,toputitanotherway,whatisthatwhichineverythingdirectlyandforitselfintereststhe
philosopher.If,forexample,philosophystudiesman,itsobjectisnottoascertainthenumberofhisvertebrasorthecausesofhisdiseases;thatisthebusinessofanatomyandmedicine.Philosophystudiesmantoanswersuchquestionsaswhetherhepossessesanintellectwhichsetshimabsolutelyapartfromtheotheranimals,whetherhepossessesasoul,ifhehasbeenmadetoenjoyGodorcreatures,etc.Whenthesequestionsareanswered,thoughtcansoarnohigher.NoproblemsUebeyondorabovethese.Wemaysaythenthatthephilosopherdoesnotseektheexplanationnearesttothephenomenaperceivedbyoursenses,buttheexplanationmostremotefromthem,theultimateexplanation.Thisisexpressedinphilosophicalterminologybysayingthatphilosophyisnotconcernedwithsecondarycausesorproximateexplanations;^butonthecontrarywithJirstcauses,highestprinciplesorultimateexplanations.
Moreover,whenwerememberourconclusionthatphilosophyknowsthingsbythenaturallightofreason,itisclearthatitinvestigatesthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesinthenaturalorder.
Whenwesaidthatphilosophyisconcernedwitheverything,everythingwhichexists,everypossibleobjectofknowledge,ourstatementwastooindefinite.Wedeterminedonlythematterwithwhichphilosophy
^Thatistosay,approximatingtotheparticularsofsensiblephenomena.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
deals,itsmaterialobject,butsaidnothingoftheaspectunderwhichitviewsthatobject,ortheattributesofthatobjectwhichitstudies;thatistosay,wedidnotdefineits,formalobject,itsformalstandpoint.Theformalobjectofascienceistheaspectunderwhichitapprehendsitsobject,or,wemaysay,thatwhichitstudiesprimarilyandintrinsicallyandinreferencetowhichitstudieseverythingelse;^thatwhichphilosophystudiesinthisformalsenseinthings,andthestandpointfromwhichitstudieseverythingelse,isthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesofthingsinsofarasthesecausesorprinciplesbelongtothenaturalorder.
Thematerialobjectofafaculty,science,art,orvirtue,issimplythethingorsubject-matter—withoutfurtherquahfication—withwhichthatfaculty,science,art,orvirtue,deals.Forinstance,thematerialobjectofchemistryisinorganicbodies;ofthefacultyofsight,objectswithinourrangeofvision.Butthisdoes
notenableustodistinguishbetweenchemistryandphysics,whichisalsoconcernedwithinorganicbodies,orbetweensightandtouch.Toobtainanexactdefinitionofchemistrywemustdefineitsobjectastheintrinsicorsubstantialchangesofinorganicbodies,andsimilarlytheobjectofsightascolour.Wehavenowdefinedtheformalobject{objectumformatequod),thatistosay,thatwhichimmediatelyandofitsverynature,orintrinsicallyanddirectly,oragainnecessarilyandprimarily(theseexpressionsareequivalentrenderingsoftheLatinformulaperseprimo),isapprehendedorstudiedinthingsbyaparticularscience,
1Qtodperseprimohaecscientiaconsideraletsubcujusrationecaeteraomniacogncscil.
DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY
art,orfaculty,andinreferencetowhichitapprehendsorstudieseverythingelse.
Thusphilosophy,aloneamongthebranchesofhumanknowledge,hasforitsobjecteverythingwhichis.Butineverythingwhichisitinvestigatesonlythefirstcauses.Theothersciences,onthecontrary,havefortheirobjectsomeparticularprovinceofbeing,ofwhichtheyinvestigateonlythesecondarycausesorproximateprinciples.Thatistosay,ofallbranchesofhumanknowledgephilosophyisthemostsublime.
Itfollowsfurtherthatphilosophyisinstrictesttruthwisdom,foritistheprovinceofwisdomtostudythehighestcauses:sapientisestaltissimascausasconsiderare.Itthusgraspstheentireuniverseinasmallnumberofprinciplesandenrichestheintellectwithoutburdeningit.
TheaccountwehavejustgivenisapplicableinanunquaUfiedsenseonlytothefirstphilosophyormetaphysics,butmaybeextendedtophilosophyingeneral,ifitisregardedasabodyofwhichmetaphysicsisthehead.^Weshallthendefinephilosophyingeneralasauniversalbodyofsciences*whoseformalstand-
^Theancientsunderstoodbythetermphilosophythesum-totalofthemainbranchesofscientificstudy{physics,orthescienceofnature;mathematics,orthesciencesofproportion;metaphysics,orthescienceofbeingassuch;logic;andethics).Therecouldthereforebenoquestionofdistinguishingbetweenphilosophyandthesciences.Theonequestionwithwhichtheywereconcernedwashowtodistinguishthefirstphilosophy,ormetaphysics,fromtheother
sciences.We,onthecontrary,sincetheenormousdevelopmentofthespecialsciences,mustdistinguishfromthemnotonlymetaphysics(thescienceofabsolutelyfirstprinciples)butthestudyofthefirstprinciplesinaparticularorder(forinstance,themathematicalorthephysical);andtheentirebodyoftheseconstituteswhatwecallphilosophy.
2Onlymetaphysicsandlogicconstituteauniversalsciencespecificallyone.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
point^isfirstcauses(whetherabsolutelyfirstcausesorprinciples,theformalobjectofmetaphysics,orthefirstcausesinaparticularorder,theformalobjectoftheotherbranchesofphilosophy).Anditfollowsthatmetaphysicsalonedeservesthenameofwisdomabsolutelyspeaking{simpliciter),theremainingbranchesofphilosophyonlyrelativelyorfromaparticularpointofview{secundumquid).
ConclusionI.—Philosophyisthesciencewhichbythenaturallightofreasonstudiesthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesofallthings—is,inotherwords,thescienceofthingsintheirfirstcauses,insofarasthesebelongtothenaturalorder.
Thedifficultyofsuchascienceisproportionatetoitselevation.Thatiswhythephilosopher,justbecausetheobjectofhisstudiesisthemostsublime,shouldpersonallybethehumblestofstudents,ahumility,however,whichshouldnotpreventhisdefending,asitishisdutytodo,thesovereigndignityofwisdomasthequeenofsciences.
Theperceptionthatthesphereofphilosophyis
1Strictlyspeaking,thereisnooneformalobjectofphilosophy,sincephilosophyasawholeisnotsimplyone,butacompoundofseveraldistinctsciences{logic,naturalphilosophy,metaphysics,etc.),eachspecifiedbyadistinctformalobject{ensrationislogicum,ensmobile,ensinquantumens—cf.PartII).Butbetweentheformalobjectsofthedifferentphilosophicsciencesthereissomethinganalogouslycommon—thefactthattheystudy,eachinitsownorder,thehighestandmostuniversalcauses,andtreattheirsubject-matterfromthestandpointofthesecauses.Wemaythereforesaythatthehighestcausesconstitutethefinalobjectortheformalstandpointanalogouslycommonofphilosophytakenasawhole,
DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY
universalledDescartes(seventeenthcentury)toregardphilosophyasthesolescience^ofwhichtheotherswerebutparts;AugusteComte,onthecontrary,andthepositivistsgenerally(nineteenthcentury),soughttoabsorbitintheothersciences,asbeingmerelytheir"systematisation."Itisevidentthatthecauseofbotherrorswasthefailuretodistinguishbetweenthematerialandformalobjectofphilosophy.
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.ThomasPhilosophyandthecorpusofotherscienceshavethesamematerialobject(everythingknowable).Buttheformalobjectofphilosophyisfirstcauses,oftheothersciencessecondarycauses.
DescartesAugusteComte
PhilosophyabsorbstheThesciencesabsorb
othersciences—isthewholephilosophy—thereisnoofscience.philosophy.
Wesaidabovethatphilosophyisascience,andthatitattainscertainknowledge.Bythiswewouldnotbeunderstoodtoclaimthatphilosophyprovidescertainsolutionsforeveryquestionthatcanbeaskedwithinitsdomain.Onmanypointsthephilosopher
1Descartesusedtheterm"philosophy"initsancientsense.Fortheancients,asforDescartes,theworddenotedtheentirebodyofscientificknowledge.Buttheancientsdividedphilosophythusunderstoodintoseveraldistinctsciences,amongwhichmetaphysicswasdistinguishedasinthefullestsensephilosophy.Descartes,onthecontrary,regardedphilosophy,stillunderstoodastheentirebodyofscientificknowledge,asasciencespecificallyone(ofwhichmetaphysics,physics,mechanics,medicine,andethicsweretheprincipalsubdi.isions).Hethusrecognisedonlyonescience.Inourviewphilosophyisabodyofscienceswhichowesitsimityanddistinctionfromtheothersciencestoitsformalstandpoint(firstcauses).Theleadingmemberofthisbodyofsciencesismetaphysics,asciencespecificallyone,whoseformalobjectisluiiversal(beingquabeing).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
mustbecontentwithprobablesolutions,eitherbecausethequestiongoes
beyondtheactualscopeofhisscience,forexampleinmanysectionsofnaturalphilosophyandpsychology,orbecauseofitsnatureitadmitsonlyofaprobableanswer,forexampletheapplicationofmoralrulestoindividualcases.Butthiselementofmereprobabilityisaccidentaltoscienceassuch.Andphilosophyyieldsagreaternumberofcertainconclusions,andofthosemanymoreperfect,namely,theconclusionsofmetaphysics,thananyotherpurelyhumanscience.
no
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
W^Ehavenowtodefinetherelationshipbetweenphilosophy(particularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)andtheothersciences.
Everyscienceismistressinherownhouse,inasmuchaseverysciencepossessestheindispensableandsufficientmeansofattainingtruthwithinitsownsphereandnooneisentitledtodenythetruthsthusproved.
Ascience,however,orratherascientist,mayhappentomakeamistakeinitsowndomain.Insuchacasethescienceinquestionisnodoubtcompetenttojudgeandcorrectitself,butitisobviousthatasuperiorsciencehasalsotherighttojudgeandcorrectit,ifthemistakeshouldcontradictoneofitsownresultsandthuscomeunderitsjurisdiction.Butphilosophy,andespeciallyphilosophyinthehighestsense,thatismetaphysics,isthesovereignscience.Thereforeitiscompetenttojudgeeveryotherhumanscience,rejectingasfalseeveryscientifichypothesiswhichcontradictsitsownresults.
Takeforexampleanhypothesisofphysicswhichappearstocontradictatruthofphilosophy.^Physicsiscompetenttojudgethathypothesisbythelawsof
1Itmay,forinstance,bequestionedwhetherthelawofinertia,asformulatedsinceGalileoandDescartes,canbereconciledwithtlicaxiomofphilosophy:quidquidmoveturabaliomovetur.
Ill
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
physics,butphilosophyisalsocompetenttojudgeitbytheprinciplesofphilosophy,determiningwhetherandhowfaritreallycontradictsthe
philosophictruthinquestion.(Ifthecontradictionisreal,itisevidentthatthehypothesisofphysicsinquestionmustbefalse,foronetruthcannotcontradictanother.Thephysicistmustthereforebowtotheverdictofphilosophy,revisehisargumentsandmakefurtherexperiments.^)
Letusnowtakeaconclusionofphilosophywhichappearstocontradictatruthestabhshedbyphysics.^Itisforphilosophytojudgethatconclusioninaccordancewiththeprinciplesofphilosophy,todecidewhetherandhowfaritisreallyinconflictwiththephysicaltruthinquestion.Butphysicsisincompetenttodeterminethequestionbytheprinciplesanddataofphysics.(Ifthecontradictionisreal,itisobviousthattheallegedconclusionofphilosophyisfalse,foronetruthcannotcontradictanother.Thephilosopherwillthereforebow,notindeedtotheverdictofphysics,buttotheverdictofphilosophyjudgingitselfbymeansofphysics,andwillrevisehisargumentsaccordingly.)
*Itistrue,nodoubt,thatwehaveactuallytodo,notwithphilosophy,butwithphilosophers,andthatphilosophersarefallible,andaphilosophermaythereforebemistakeninjudginganhypothesisofphysics,butthisdoesnotprovethathehasnorighttojudgeit.
Aphysicistmaythereforebejustifiedinaparticularcaseinmaintaininganhypothesisofphysicsagidnstaphilosopherwhoassertsthatitcontradictsatruthofphilosophy.Butthatisbecausetheevidencehepossessesinsupportofhishypothesisconvinceshimthatthephilosopherismistakeninhisverdict—inotherwords,hasnotgivenitutphilosophus,asamouthpieceofphilosophy.Buthewouldnotthereforebejustifiedindenyingthephilosopher'scompetenceassuchtodeterminethequestion.
2Forexample,whenthephilosophicaldoctrineoijreewillappearstothemechaniststocontradictthephysicallawoftheconservationofenergy.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
Moreover,sincethelawsofonesciencearesubordinatetothelawsofasuperiorscience,itclearlyfollowsthatitistheofficeofthesuperiorsciencetogoverntheinferior.Butsincetheprinciplesofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)aretheabsolutelyfirstprinciplesofallhumanknowledge,theypossessanauthorityovertheprinciplesofallotherhumansciences,whichareinacertainsensedependentuponthem.Thatistosay,philosophy(thefirst
philosophyormetaphysics)governstheothersciences.
Sincetheprinciplesofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)aretheabsolutelyfirstprinciplesofallhumanknowledge,theprinciplesorpostulatesofallhumansciencesareinacertainsensedependentuponthem.
Theydonot,itistrue,dependdirectlyontheprinciplesofmetaphysics,asthetruthofaconclusiondependsonthetruthofitspremisses.Theyareself-evidentbythelightofnaturalreason[principiapersenota).Buttheyarenotabsolutelyspeaking{simpliciter)firstprinciples.Therefore,althoughtheycarryconvictionindependentlyofmetaphysics,neverthelesstheypresupposeinfacttheprinciplesofmetaphysicsandcanberesolvedintothem.Theycanbeknownwithoutanexphcitknowledgeoftheprinciplesofmetaphysics,buttheycouldnotbetrue,unlessthelatterweretrue.Andinthissensetheyareindirectlysubordinatetothelatter.Forinstance,themathematicalaxiom,twoquantitieswhichareequaltoathirdquantityareequaltooneanother^canberesolvedintothemetaphysicalaxiomofwhichitisaspecialcase:twobeingsidenticalwithathirdareidenticalwithoneanother.
Itisforthisresisonthatallthesciencesaresaidto
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
beindirectlysubordinatetometaphysics.Moreover,theyareobligedonoccasiontoemploytheuniversallyvalidprinciplesofmetaphysics.Inthissensetheyaresaidtobesubordinatetometaphysicsinaparticularaspectorrelatively{secundumquid).
Togovernordirectanythingistoprescribeitsobjectorend.Thesciencesarenotdirectedbyphilosophytotheirend,inthesensethattheycannotattainitwithouttheaidofphilosophy.Arithmetic,forexample,hasnoneedofphilosophytoinvestigatethenumericaltruthswhichitinvestigatesofitsverynature.Philosophy,however,assignsthedistinctiveendsofthespecialsciencesinthesensethatitdeterminesspeculativelythedistinctiveobjectofeach,andwhatconstitutestheirspecificunityanddifferentiationfromtherest(classificationofthesciences).^Andsodoingitassignstheorderinwhichtheystandonetoanother.Thusallthesciencesareorderedbywisdom:sapientisestordinare.Ifthereforeascience,ormorecorrectlyascientist,shouldhappentolosesightofitstrueobjectbyencroachingonthedomainandrightsofanother
science,*itisthedutyofphilosophytoredressthedisorderinvolved.Inthiscapacityphilosophygovernsordirectsthesciences
*Aproblemdiscussedinmajorlogic.
2Suchdivagationsandencroachmentsareonlytoofrequent.Forexample,thenon-EucIidcangeometriesmaybesotreatedastodivertmathematicsfromitsproperend.Ontheotherhand,sinceDescartes,mathematicshasusurpedthedomainofallthesciences,andinourtimephysicsandchemistryareconstantlyencroachinguponthedomainofbiology,medicineuponpsychology;whiletheincursionsmadebyphysicsorbiologyintotheprovinceofphilosophyitselfareinnumerable:forexample,thepseudo-scientifictheoriesofthenonexistenceaffinalcauses,theunrealityofqualities,determinism,atomism,orthebiologicaldogmasoffransformismandmechanism.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
(tothesedistinctiveends),notbypositiveprescription,butbysettingthemright,iftheytransgresstheirboundaries.
Ontheotherhand,thatknowledgeinwhichthemindattainsitsultimategood,thatistosay,thehighestknowledge,mayberegardedasthecommontranscendentgoaltowardswhichallthespecialsciencesconverge.Butthisknowledgeisbestowedbyphilosophy—thescienceoffirstcauses—whichinthiscapacitygovernsordirectsthesciencesinviewofthecommonendtowhichtheirparticularobjectsaresubordinate.Allthesciencesarethusdirectedtowisdom.
Fromallwehavejustsaiditfollowsthattobeproficientinthesciencesitisnotnecessarytobeaphilosopherortobaseone'sworkonaphilosophy;neitherneedthescientistwhileengagedinhisspecialtaskseekadvicefromthephilosopherorattempttoplaythephilosopherhimself;but"philosophyaloneenablesthemanofsciencetounderstandthepositionandbearingsofhisspecialscienceinthesum-totalofhumanknowledge"or"toacquireanotioneitheroftheprinciplesimplicitinallexperimentalknowledgeorthetruefoundationsofthespecialsciences."^Itfollows,further,thataperiodinthehistoryofhumancultureinwhichphilosophyisnotallowedherrightfulsuzeraintyoverthesciencesasscientiarectrix°inevitablyendsinaconditionofintellectualchaosandageneralweakeningofthereasoningfaculty.
Descartes,justbecauseheabsorbedallthesciences
1T.Richard,Philosophicduraisonnementdanslascienced'aprisSaintThomas,p.14..'St.Thomas,InMetaph.,Inlroduction.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
inphilosophy,andregardedscienceasabsolutelyandwithoutquaUficationone,believedthattheprinciplesofallthesciencesdependdirectlyontheprinciplesofthefirstphilosophy(metaphysics).Inconsequenceheheldthatthestudyofthesciencesandofphilosophyitselfmustbeginwithmetaphysics,thatistosay,withthecoping-stoneoftheentireedifice.
Thecontraryerroristhebeliefthattheprinciplesofscienceareabsolutelyindependentoftheprinciplesofphilosophy.Thereisthereforenoplaceforascientiarectrix,andthesciencesarenolongerastructurebuiltonadefiniteplan,butaformlessagglomeration.ItissurprisingthatAugusteGomte,whowishedtoreducephilosophytoameresystematisationofthespecialsciences,failedtoseethatthisveryfunctionofclassifyingandsystematisingthesciences(inwhathetermstheirobjectivesynthesis)isonlypossibleifphilosophyisadistinctscienceofahigherorderonwhichtheothersareinacertainrespectdependent.^
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.TfiomasTheprinciplesofthespecialsciencesaresubordinatetotheprinciplesofphilosophy,butonlyindirectly.Philosophythereforegovernstheothersciences,butitsgovernmentissuchthatitmaybetermedconstitutional.(Thespecialsciencesareautonomous.)Thestudyofthefirstphilosophy(metaphysics)shouldbeundertaken,notatthebeginning,butattheendofintellectualresearch.
PhilosophyofPhilosophyofthosewhoreject
DescartesPhilosophy
TheprinciplesoftheTheprinciplesofthe
specialsciencesarcdirectlyspecialsciencesarenot
subordinatetothoseofsubordinatetotheprin-
*ForGomte,indeed,sociologytakesthepositionofscientiarectrix,only,
however,asorderingthesciencesinreferencetothehumansubject,notinthemselves.{Subjectivesynthesis.)
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
philosophy.Thelatterciplesofanyscienceofa
thereforeexercisesoverthehigherorder.Thesesci—
othersciencesagovernencesthereforeareinno
mentv^hichmaybetermedsensegovernedbutarein
despotic.aconditionwhichmaybe
Thestudyofthefirsttermedanarchy.Thereis
philosophy(metaphysics)nosupremescienceorfirst
shouldbeundertakenatphilosophy(metaphysics),thebeginningofintellectualresearch.
Finally,ifasciencebasesitsdemonstrationsoncertainpostulatesordata,whichitcanneitherexplainnordefend,theremustbeasuperiorsciencewhosefunctionitistodefendthesepostulatesordata.Inthissensethescienceofarchitecturedefendsthatofbuilding.Itis,however,obviousthateveryscience,exceptthehighest,basesitsdemonstrationsonpostulatesordataitisincapableofexplainingordefending.Forinstance,mathematicsdoesnotinquirewhatisthenatureofquantity,number,orextension,norphysicswhatisthenatureofmatter.Andifanobjectorshoulddenythatthesensibleworldexists,thattwoquantitiesequaltoathirdareequaltooneanother,orthatspacehasthreedimensions,neitherphysicsnormathematicscanrefutehisobjection,sincetheyonthecontraryassumethesepostulatesordata.Thereforeitmustbethefunctionofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)todefendagainsteverypossibleobjectionthepostulatesofallthehumansciences.
Itisfromcommonsense,orfromthenaturalevidenceoftheintellectandexperience,thatthesciencesderivetheirpostulates.Thisisnodoubttheirsufficientwarranttobuildonthesepostulates,butitisinsufficienttosafeguardandprotectthemagainst
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
errorswhichcallthepostulatesinquestion.Anditisalsoinsufficienttoprovidefortheperfectingstabilityandessentialneedsofhumanknowledge.Humanknowledgewouldremainexcessivelyimperfectandweak,andwouldfailtoreachitsfinalend,ifthepostulatesofthescienceswerenotscientificallyexplained,discussed,anddefended.
Philosophy,therefore,andparticularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics,becauseitiswisdomandthesupremescience,judges,governs,anddefendstheothersciences.Buttheruleriscertainlynotdependentuponthosewhomhegoverns.Wethereforeconcludethatphilosophyisindependentoftheinferiorsciences,oratanyratedependsonthemonlyinthesensethatasuperior,whenheisnotstrongenoughtobeself-sufficient,dependsontheservantsorinstrumentswhichheemploys.ItwasforthisreasonthatAristotleregardedphilosophyasthesciencepreeminentlyfree.
Philosophyappealstothefacts,thedataofexperience.Toobtainthenecessarymaterialsitusesasinstrumentsthetruthsprovidedbytheevidenceofthesensesandtheconclusionsprovedbythesciences.Itdependsonboth,asasuperiorwhocannotdohisownworkdependsontheservantsheemploys.
Adependenceofthiskindisapurelymaterialdependence,sincethesuperiordependsontheinferiortobeservedbyhim,nottodohimservice.Hethereforejudgesbyhisownlightofwhateverhisservantsbringhimtosupplyhisneeds.Forexample,oneofthemostsuccessfulstudentsofbees,Francois
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
Huber,whowasblind,interpretedbythelightofhisintellectthefactsseenbyhisservants'eyes.
Butfurther,thispurelymaterialdependenceofphilosophy,thoughabsolutelynecessaryinrespectoftheevidenceofthesenses,isrelativeandcontingentinrespecttotheconclusionsofthesciences.Itisinfactfromtheevidenceofthesensesthatphilosophyderivesthefundamentalprincipleswhich—interpretedbyitsownHght—itemploysaspremissesinitsdemonstrationsandasthemeanstoproveitsspecialtruths.Forinstance,thetruth,perceivedbythesensesandinterpretedbythelightofphilosophy,thereismotionintheuniverse,servedAristotleasthepremissfromwhichheprovedthatbeingisdividedintoactand
potentiality,andthatthereisafirstmoverthatispureact(God).Itisobviousthatphilosophyisabsolutelyunabletodispensewithdataofthiskind,andthatthedatathusemployedaspremissesmustbeabsolutelytrue.Otherwisetheconclusionswhichphilosophydeducesfromthemwouldbeuncertain.Butitisotherwisewiththepropositionsandconclusionsofthesciences.Nodoubttheseconclusions,iftrue,contributetothestoreofmaterialsutilisedbyphilosophy—butphilosophy(andparticularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)isundernonecessitytoemploythem,indeedoughtnottoemploythemtoestablishitsownconclusions,atanyratenotitscertainconclusions,thoughitmaymakeuseofthemasconfirmatoryevidence.Itmustcertainlyhaveatitsdisposalsomescientificconclusions,indeedasplentifulasupplyaspossible,becauseitcannotdevelopitsprinciplessatisfactorilyuntilitseesthemembodied,sotospeak,inconcreteexampleswhich
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
thesensescanperceive.Butitdoesnotneedoneparticularscientificpropositionratherthananyother,provided,thatistosay,that,truetoitsownnatureandmaintainingtheHbertyduetoasuperiorscience,itdrawsitsproofsfromitsownprinciplesandfromthefundamentaltruthssuppliedbytheevidenceofthesensesandnotfromtheconclusionssuppliedbythesciences.Theselatter,infact,shouldnotbepremissesbutsimplyillustrationswhichassistphilosophytoattainitsowntruths.Asoundphilosophycanthereforedispensewiththeparticularsystemofscientificexplanationsofwhichitmakesuseinaccordancewiththestateofscienceataparticularepoch,andifthatsystemwereonedayprovedfalsethetruthofthatphilosophywouldnotbeaffected.Onlyitslanguageandthesensibleillustrationswithwhichitclotheditstruthswouldrequiremodification.
Theseremarksareimportant.TheyshowhowthedatumofexperienceonwhichphilosophyisprimarilybasedsuflScesfortherequirementsofasupremeanduniversalscience.Thisdatumisprovidedbyaninstrument—theevidenceofthesenses—earlierthanscientificobservation,infinitelymorecertainthantheinductionsofthesciences,andplacedbynatureatthedisposalofeveryman,andconsistsoftruthssosimplethattheyareuniversallyandabsolutelyvalid,soimmediateandevidentthattheircertziintyexceedsthatofthebestestablishedscientificconclusions.^
^Tothisfundamentaldatumwemayadd—butassecondarymatterandattimes
valuableconfirmation—thefactsofamorespecialdescriptiondiscovered,controlled,andmeasuredbytheobservationsandexperimentsofscience.Weshouldbearinmindthattheabsolutelyevidenttruthswhichconstitutetheprimitiveandfundamentaldatumofpliilosophymustbecarefullydistinguishedfrom
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
FromwhathasbeensaidwecanalsounderstandwhythepurelyscientificmistakestobefoundinolderstatementsofAristoteUanandThomisticphilosophy,statementswhichinevitablybearthestampofthescientificbeliefsoftheirperiod,donothingtodiscreditthetruthofthatphilosophy.FornophilosophyhasobservedmorefaithfullythanthatofAristotleandSt.Thomasthelawsofthoughtwhichguaranteeitspurityandfreedom.
Ontheotherhandphilosophy,thoughdistinctfromthespecialsciences,isnotunrelatedtoorisolatedfromthem.Onthecontrary,itpossessesthedutytoexerciseitsofficeasscientiarectrixbyconstantlythrowingitslightonthediscoveriesandhypotheses,theunceasingactivityandthedevelopmentofthesciences,andoneofthemostessentialrequisitesforitslifeandprogressintheworldistomaintainanintimatecontactwiththelowerbranchesofstudywhosedataitinterpretsandrendersfruitful.
Totheextenttowhichphilosophythusconcernsitselfwithinterpretingbytheaidofitsowntruthsthefactsorhypotheseswhichpositivescienceregardsasproved,theerrorsorlacunaeofpositivesciencemayintroduceaccidentallyintoatruesystemofpliilosophyelementsoferrorwhichare,sotospeak,thetokenandpriceofthehumandevelopmentofphilosophy—but
certaininterpretationsofexperiencedrawnfromunscientificobservationwhicharenothingmorethanpseudo-scientificstatements.If,forexample,innaturalphilosophy,toprovetherealityofsubstantialchange,itwerearguedthatwhereaswaterisaliquidbody,hydrogenandoxygenaregaseousbodies,theargumentwouldrest,notonatruthattestedbythesenses,butonascientificerror,forinrealitythesameinorganicbodiesarefoundinthethreestatessolid,liquid,andgaseous.Obviouslyanadequatescientifictraininghelpsthephilosophertoavoidpitfallsofthiskind.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
theycanonlyfalsifyaphilosophyitselftotheextenttowhichitisuntruetoitsownnatureandenslavesitselftothelowerbranchesofstudy.^
Itisclearfromeverythingwhichhasbeensaidthatthenatureandneedsofphilosophymakeitincumbentuponthephilosophertokeephimselfasfullyacquaintedashecanwiththescientificknowledgeofhisperiod,provided,however,thathepreservesintactthefreedomofphilosophictruth.Forthoughthephilosopherassuchneednotusetheaffirmationsofthespecialsciencestoestablishhisowntruths,heoughttomakeuseofthem,(i)toillustrateaptlyhisprinciples,(ii)toconfirmhisconclusions,(iii)tointerpret,throwHghtupon,andassimilate,theassuredresultsofthesciencessofarasquestionsofphilosophyareinvolved.Andfinallyheshouldusetheaffirmationsofscience(iv)torefuteobjectionsanderrorswhichclaimsupportfromitsresults.
Fromyetanotherpointofviewthestudyofthesciencesisnecessaryforthephilosopher:hisowneducationmustofnecessity,owingtotheveryconditionsofhumannature,beaprogressfromtheimperfecttotheperfect,sothatbeforeundertakingthestudyofwisdomheshouldundergothetrainingofthesciences.*
1The'*crime"ofthedecadentScholasticsofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturieswasthattheybeUeved,andmadeothersbelieve,thatthephilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomaswasinthissenseboundupwiththemistakesofancientscience,ofwhichitisinrealitywhollyindependent.
2Thephilosopheralsorequiresascientifictrainingtobeinapositiontodistinguishreadilybetweentheprimaryevidenceofexperienceandcertainpopularbutreallypseudo-scientificinterpretationsofexperience,such,forexample,asthehypothesisofthesun'smotionaroundtheearthortheover-hastybeliefthataparticularinorganicbodyisessentiallyliquidandanotheressentiallysolidorgaseous.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES
Itisnotthereforesurprisingthatallthegreatphilosophershavebeenthoroughlyacquaintedwithcontemporaryscience.Somehaveevenbeengreatscientists(forexampleAristotle,AlbertusMagnus,andLeibniz),andseveralscientificdiscoveriesofthefirstmagnitudehasbeenmadebyphilosophers,forinstarrcethemathematicaldiscoveriesofPythagoras,Descartes,andLeibniz.
Inthisconnectionwemayobservethataprofoundandpracticalknowledgeofa
singlesciencewithwhichthestudentisdirectlyacquaintedcontributesfarmoretoaphilosophictrainingthanasuperficialandsecondhandknowledgeofalargenumber.Thoughowingtothedegreetowhichspecialisationhasbeencarriedinmoderntimeshecannothopeevertopossessthatcompleteknowledgeofallthescienceswhichispossessedbythescientistinhisparticulardepartment,thephilosophershouldneverthelessaimatacquiringasufficientlythoroughknowledgeoftheentirebodyofthesciences,anidealinitselfnotbeyondtheboundsofpossibility,asisprovedbytheexampleofseveralpowerfulminds.
ConclusionII.—Philosophyisthehighestofallbranchesofhumanknowledgeandisinthetruesensewisdom.Theother(human)sciencesaresubjecttophilosophy,inthesensethatitjudgesandgovernsthemanddefendstheirpostulates.Philosophyontheotherhandisfreeinrelationtothesciences,andonlydependsonthemastheinstrumentswhichitemploys.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY
Philosophyisthehighestofthehumansciences,thatis,ofthescienceswhichknowthingsbythenaturallightofreason.Butthereisascienceaboveit.ForiftherebeasciencewhchisaparticipationbymanoftheknowledgepropertoGodhimself,obviouslythatsciencewillbesuperiortothehighesthumanscience.Suchascience,however,exists;itistheology.
ThewordtheologymeansthescienceofGod.ThescienceorknowledgeofGodwhichwecanattainnaturallybytheunassistedpowersofreason,andwhichenablesustoknowGodbymeansofcreaturesastheauthorofthenaturalorder,isaphilosophicscience—thesupremedepartmentofmetaphysics—andisknownastheodicyornaturaltheology.TheknowledgeorscienceofGodwhichisunattainablenaturallybytheunassistedpowersofreason,andispossibleonlyifGodhasinformedmenabouthimselfbyarevelationfromwhichourreason,enlightenedbyfaith,subsequentlydrawstheimplicitconclusions,issupernaturaltheologyorsimplytheology.Itisofthissciencethatwearenowspeaking.
Itsobjectissomethingwhollyinaccessibletothenaturalapprehensionofanycreaturewhatsoever,namely,Godknowninhimself,inhisowndivinelife,orintechnicallanguagesubrationeDeitatis,not,asin
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naturaltheology,Godasthefirstcauseofcreaturesandtheauthorofthenaturalorder.AndalltheologicalknowledgeisknowledgeintermsofGodthusapprehended,whereasallmetaphysicalknowledge,includingthemetaphysicalknowledgeofGod,isknowledgeintermsofbeingingeneral.
ThepremissesoftheologyarethetruthsformallyrevealedbyGod{dogmasorarticlesoffaith),anditsprimarycriterionoftruththeauthorityofGodwhorevealsit.
Itslightisnolongerthemorenaturallightofreason,buttheUghtofreasonilluminatedbyfaith,virtualrevelationinthelanguageoftheology,thatistosay,revelationinsofarasitimplicitly(virtually)containswhateverconclusionsreasoncandrawfromit.
Alikebythesublimityofitsobject,thecertaintyofitspremisses,andtheexcellenceofitslight,theologyisaboveallmerelyhumansciences.Andalthoughitisunabletoperceivethetruthofitspremisses,whichthetheologianbeHeves,whereasthepremissesofphilosophyareseenbythephilosopher,itisneverthelessasciencesuperiortophilosophy.Though,asSt.Thomaspointsout,theargumentfromauthorityistheweakestofall,wherehumanauthorityisconcerned,theargumentfromtheauthorityofGod,therevealer,ismoresolidandpowerfulthananyother.^
Andfinallyastheobjectoftheologyishewhoisaboveallcauses,itclaimswithafarbettertitlethan
*Licetlocusabauctoritate,quaefundaiursuperrationehumana,sitinfirmissimus,locustarrumabauctoritatequaefundatursuperrevelationedivinaestefficacissimus.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.i,q.i,a8,ad2.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
metaphysicsthenameofwisdom.Itiswisdomparexcellence.^Whatrelations,then,mustobtainbetweenphilosophyandtheology?
Asthesuperiorscience,theologyjW^^jphilosophyinthesamesensethatphilosophyjudgesthesciences.^Itthereforeexercisesinrespectofthelatterafunctionofguidanceorgovernment,thoughanegativegovernment,which
consistsinrejectingasfalseanyphilosophicaffirmationwhichcontradictsatheologicaltruth.Inthissensetheologycontrolsandexercisesjurisdictionovertheconclusionsmaintainedbyphilosophers.
Thej&r^mfjj^j^ofphilosophy,however,areindependentoftheology,beingthoseprimarytruthswhichareself-evidenttotheunderstanding,whereasthepremissesoftheologyarethetruthsrevealedbyGod.Thepremissesofphilosophyareself-supportedandarenotderivedfromthoseoftheology.Similarlythelightbywhichphilosophyknowsitsobjectisindependent
*Theologyistheoreticalwisdom,parexcellencethewisdomwhichknowsGodbytheintellectanditsideas,thatistosay,bythenormalprocessesofhumanknowledge.ThereisanotherwisdomofastillhigherorderwhichisagiftoftheHolySpirit,andenableslistoknowGodexperimentallyandbymeansofcharity.Itenablesxistojudgeofdivinethingsinstinctively,asthevirtuousmanjudgesofvirtue{permoduminclinationis),notscientificallyasthemoralistjudgesofvirtue{permodumcognitionis).Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.i,q.i,a6,a</3.
2Seeabove,pp.111sqq.Thephilosopherandthescientistareneverentitledtodenytherightswhichtheologypossessesoverphilosophyandthesciences.Theymay,however,bejustifiedinrejectinginaparticularinstance,notindeedtheauthorityoftheChurch,butthejudgmentofanindividualtheologian,sincetheindividualtheologiandoesnotnecessarilyspeakasthemouthpieceoftheology,andmaythereforebemistaken.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY
oftheology,sinceitslightisthelightofreason,whichisitsownguarantee.^Forthesereasonsphilosophyisnotpositivelygovernedbytheology,^norhasitanyneedoftheologytodefenditspremisses(whereasitdefendsthoseoftheothersciences).Itdevelopsitsprinciplesautonomouslywithinitsownsphere,thoughsubjecttotheexternalcontrolandnegativeregulationoftheology.
Itisthereforeplainthatphilosophyandtheologyareentirelydistinct,andthatitwouldbeasabsurdforaphilosophertoinvoketheauthorityofrevelationtoproveaphilosophicalthesisasforageometriciantoattempttoproveatheorembytheaidofphysics,forexample,byweighingthefiguresheiscomparing.Butifpliilosophyandtheologyareentirelydistinct,theyarenotthereforeunrelated,
andalthoughphilosophyisofallthehumansciencespreeminentlythefreescience,inthesensethatitproceedsbymeansofpremissesandlawswhichdependonnosciencesuperiortoitself,itsfreedom—thatis,itsfreedomtoerr—isUmitedinsofarasitissubjecttotheology,whichcontrolsitexternally.IIntheseventeenthcenturytheCartesianreform
^Thislightisitsownevidenceandinphilosophyissufficientofitself.Butthisdoesnotpreventitservingalso—intheology,however,notinphilosophy—astheinstrumentofasuperiorlight;neither,ofcourse,doesitimplythathumanreasonisnotsubordinateinitsveryprinciplestotheFirstIntellect.
2Theologycanturntheinvestigationsofphilosophyinonedirectionratherthaninanother,inwhichcaseitmaybesaidtoregulatephilosophypositivelybyaccident{peraccidens).Butabsolutelyspeakingtheologycanregulatephilosophyonlynegatively,ashasbeenexplainedabove.Positivelyitdoesnotregulateiteitherdirectly,byfurnishingitsproofs(asfaithforapologetics),orindirectly,byclassifyingitsdivisions(asphilosophyitselfclassifiesthesciences).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
resultedintheseveranceofphilosophyfromtheology,^therefusaltorecognisetherightfulcontroloftheologyanditsfunctionasanegativeruleinrespectofphilosophy.Thiswastantamounttodenyingthattheologyisascience,oranythingmorethanamerepracticaldiscipline,andtoclaimingthatphilosophy,orhumanwisdom,istheabsolutelysovereignscience,whichadmitsnoothersuperiortoitself.Thus,inspiteofthereligiousbeliefsofDescarteshimself,Cartesianismintroducedtheprincipleofrationalistphilosophy,whichdeniesGodtherighttomakeknownbyrevelationtruthswhichexceedthenaturalscopeofreason.ForifGodhasindeedrevealedtruthsofthiskind,humanreasonenlightenedbyfaithwillinevitablyemploythemaspremissesfromwhichtoobtainfurtherknowledgeandthusformascience,theology.Andiftheologyisascience,itmustexerciseinrespectofphilosophythefunctionofanegativerule,sincethesamepropositioncannotbetrueinphilosophy,falseintheology.^
*Itmay,itistrue,berepliedthatDescartes'sintentionwassimplytoemancipatephilosophyfromtheauthorityofaparticulartheologicalsystem—Scholasticism—whichheregardedasworthless,becauseittookitsphilosophicormetaphysicalprinciplesfromAristotle.
Inreality,however,itwaswiththeologyitselfthathebroke,whenhebrokewithScholasticism,whichisthetraditionaltheologyoftheChurch.Andmoreoverhisconceptionofscienceimpliedthedenialofhisscientificvalueoftheology.Inanycasetheresultofhisreformwastheassertionoftheabsoluteindependenceofphilosophyinrelationtotheology.{Cf.Blondel,"LeChristianismedeDescartes."RevtiedeMitaph.etdeMorale,1896.)
2Thetheoryofadoubletruth,bywhichthesamethingmaybetrueinphilosophy,butfakeintheology,wasinventedbythemediaevalAverroists,whosoughtinthiswaytoevadethecensuresoftheChurch.Invariousformsithasbeenrevivedinmodemtimesbyallwho,likethemodernists,wishtokeepthenameofCatholicswhilefreelyprofessinginphilosophyopinionsdestructiveofsomeparticulardogmatictruth.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY
Ontheotherhand,philosophyrenderstotheologyservicesofthegreatestvaluewhereitisemployedbythelatter.Forinfacttheologyemploysinitsdemonstrationstruthsprovedbyphilosophy.Philosophythusbecomestheinstrumentoftheology,anditisinthisrespectandinsofarasitservestheologicalargumentthatitiscalledancillatheologiae.Initself,however,andwhenitisprovingitsownconclusions,itisnotabond-servantbutfree,subjectonlytotheexternalcontrolandnegativeruUngoftheology.
Aswasshownabove,philosophyisfromtheverynatureofthingsobhgedtoemployasaninstrumenttheevidenceofthesenses,andeven,inacertainfashion,theconclusionsofthespecialsciences.Theology*consideredinitselfasasciencesubordinatetotheknowledgeofGodandtheblessed,isnotinthiswayobligedtomakeuseofphilosophy,butisabsolutelyindependent.
Inpractice,however,onaccountofthenatureofitspossessor,thatistosay,onaccountoftheweaknessofthehumanunderstanding,whichcanreasonaboutthethingsofGodonlybyanalogywithcreatures,itcannotbedevelopedwithouttheassistanceofphilosophy.Butthetheologiandoesnotstandinthesamerelationtophilosophyasthephilosophertothesciences.^Wehaveseenabovethatthephilosopher
^Thisdistinctionbetweentherelationshipoftheologytophilosophyandthatofphilosophytothespecialsciencesderivesfromthefactthat,sincetheologyisa
participationofthedivinewisdom,thehumansubjectistooweakforitsunaidedstudyandtodrawconclusionsfromitiscomj)elledtoemployaspremissesconclusionsestablishedbyaninferiordiscipline.
Since,however,philosophyisahumanwisdom,atwhichreasoncan
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
shouldemploythepropositionsorconclusionswhichheborrowsfromthesciences,nottoestabUshhisownconclusions(atanyratenotconclusionsforwhichmetaphysicalcertaintyisclaimed),butmerelytoillustratehisprinciples,andthereforethatthetruthofametaphysicalsystemdoesnotdependonthetruthofthescientificmaterialitemploys.Thetheologian,onthecontrary,makesuseateveryturnofphilosophicpropositionstoprovehisownconclusions.Thereforeasystemoftheologycouldnotpossiblybetrueifthemetaphysicswhichitemployedwerefalse.Itisindeedanabsolutenecessitytiiatthetheologianshouldhaveathisdisposalatruephilosophyinconformitywiththecommonsenseofmankind.
Philosophytakeninitselfnormallyprecedestheology.Certainfundamentaltruthsofthenaturalorderareindeedwhatwemaytermtheintroductiontothefaith{praeambulaJidei).Thesetruths,whicharenaturallyknowntoallmenbythelightofcommonsense,areknownandprovedscientificallybyphilosophy.Theology',beingthescienceoffaith,presupposesthephilosophicalknowledgeofthesesametruths.
Philosophyconsideredastheinstrumentoftheologyservesthelatter,principallyinthreeways.Inthefirstplacetheologyemploysphilosophytoprovethetruthswhichsupportthefoundationsofthefaithinthatdepartmentoftheologywhichistermedapolo—
arrive,thoughwithdifficulty,byitsunassistednatviralpower,thehumanmindshouldbeabletodrawfromitcertainconclusions(especiallymetaphysicallycertainconclusions)withoutemployingaspremissestheconclusionsofsciencestowhichitissuperiorind^[nityandincertainty.
PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY
getics,^whichshows,forexample,howmiraclesprovethedivinemissionoftheChurch;secondarilytoimpartsomenotionofthemysteriesoffaithbytheaidof
analogiesdrawnfromcreatures—asforinstancewhentheologyusesthephilosophicconceptionofverbummentale,thementalword,'toillustratethedogmaoftheTrinity;andfinallytorefutetheadversariesofthefaith—aswhentheologyshowsbymeansofthephilosophictheoryofquantity*thatthemysteryoftheEucharistisinnowayopposedtoreason.
Wemustnotforgetthat,ifphilosophyservestheology,itreceivesinreturnvaluableassistancefiromthelatter.
Inthefirstplace,sofarasitisofitsnaturesubjecttotheexternalcontrolandnegativeruhngoftheology,itisprotectedfromahostoferrors;andifitsfreedomtoerristhusrestricted,itsfreedomtoattaintruthiscorrespondinglysafeguarded.*
Inthesecondplace,insofarasitistheinstrumentoftheology,itisledtodefinemorepreciselyandwithmoresubtlerefinementsimportantconceptsandtheorieswhich,lefttoitself,itwouldbeindangerofneglecting.Forexample,itwasundertheinfluence
SeeGarrigou-Lagrange,DeRevelatione,i,2,1918.
2Atheorystudiedinpsychology.
'Anexplanationgivenbycosmology.
*Unassistedreasoncanindeedavoiderroronanyparticularpointwhatsoeverwithinthesphereofphilosophy,butinviewoftheweaknessofhumannattireitisunablewithouttheassistanceofgracetoavoiderroronsomepointorother;thatistosay,withoutaspecialgraceorthenegativecontrolofrevelationandtheologyitcannotachieveaperfecthumanwisdom.{Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.,i,q.i,a.I;Sum.contraCent.,i,4;Garrigou-Lagrange,DeRev.,i,pp.411sqq.)
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
oftheologythatThomismelaboratedthetheoryofnatureandpersonality,andperfectedthetheoryofthehabitus,habits,etc.
ConclusionIII.—Theology,orthescienceofGodsofarasHehasbeenmadeknowntousbyrevelation,issuperiortophilosophy.Philosophyissubjecttoit,
neitherinitspremissesnorinitsmethod,butinitsconclusions,overwhichtheologyexercisesacontrol,therebyconstitutingitselfanegativeruleofphilosophy.
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
Beforewcknowthingswithascientificorperfectknowledgebyreflectinguponthemandbytheircauses,weknowthemimperfectly{unscientificknowledge,theknowledgeofeverydaylife).Wemustrememberthatweareobligednotonlytobeginwiththisunscientificknowledgeofeverydaylife;wemustbecontentwithittotheend,improvingitmoreorlessbystudyandreading,inthatenormousnumberofcaseswherescienceinthestrictsenseisunattainable.
For,sofarastheknowledgeofsecondarycausesisconcerned,nomancanpossiblyattain,withtheperfectionrequiredofthegenuinescientist,universalknowledge;inotherwords,hecannotspecialiseinallbranchesofscience,acontradictioninterms.Heisfortunate,indeed,ifhecanmakehimselfmasterofasinglescience.Foralltheothershemustbesatisfiedwithaknowledgewhich,howeverenrichedandimproveditmaybeinthecaseofwhatisknownasacultivatedman,thatistosay,amanwellacquaintedwiththescientificknowledgeofotherpeople,isalwaysinferiortoscienceinthestrictsense.Butinthedomainoffirstcauses,thescienceofallthingsiswithinaman'sgrasp,foritispreciselythedistinguishingcharacterofthesciencecalledphilosophytoknow
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allthingsbytheirfirstcauses/anditistothephilosopherorthesage,thewiseman,thatwehavetherighttoapplyLeonardodaVinci'saphorism:facilecosaefarsiuniversale;itiseasyforamantomakehimselfuniversal.
Ordinaryknowledge-consistsforthemostpartofmereopinionsorbeliefs,moreorlesswellfounded.Butitimpliesasolidkernelofgenuinecertaintiesinwhichthephilosopherrecognisesinthefirstplacedataofthesenses(forexample,thatbodiespossesslength,breadth,andheight),secondly,self-evidentaxioms(forexample,thewholeisgreaterthanthepart,everyeventhasacause,etc.),andthirdly,consequencesimmediatelydeduciblefromtheseaxioms(proximateconclusions).Thesecertaintieswhicharisespontaneouslyinthemindwhenwe
firstcometotheuseofreasonarethustheworkofnatureinus,andmaythereforebecalledanendowmentofnature*asproceedingfromthenaturalperception,consent,instinct,ornaturalsenseoftheintellect.Sincetheirsourceishumannatureitself,theywillbefoundinallmenaUke;inotherwords,theyarecommontoallmen.Theymaythereforebesaidtobelongtothecommonperception,consent,orinstinct,ortothecommonsenseofmankind.
Thegreattruthswithoutwhichman'smorallifeisimpossible—forexample,knowledgeofGod'sexistence,thefreedomofthewill,etc.—belongtothisdomainof
^Itisthereforeobviouswhatastupendousdelusionisinvolvedinthepositivistviewofphilosophy.Werephilosophymerelytheco-ordinationorsystematisationofthesciences,itsattainmentwouldpresupposeaperfectmasteryofallthesciences,thatistosay,specialisationineveryscience,whichamountstosayingthatphilosophyisbeyondthereachofman.
*Kleutgen,Laphilosophicscolastique,i,p.439.
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
commonsense,asconsequencesimmediatelydeducible(proximateconclusions)fromprimarydataapprehendedbyobservationandfirstprinciplesapprehendedbytheintellect.Allmen,unlessspoiledbyafaultyeducationorbysomeintellectualvice,possessanaturalcertaintyofthesetruths.Butthosewhoseunderstandinghasneverbeencultivatedarenotabletogiveanyaccountoratleastanysatisfactoryaccountoftheirconvictions;thatistosay,theycannotexplainwhytheypossessthem.
Thesecertaintiesofcommonsense,conclusionsofanimplicitreasoning,areaswellfoundedasthecertaintiesofscience.Buttheirpossessorhasnoknowledge,oranimperfectknowledge,ofthegroundsonwhichhebasesthem.Theyarethereforeimperfectnotintheirvalueastruthbutinthemodeorconditionunderwhichtheyexistinthemind.
Oftheself-evidenttruths{thewholeisgreaterthanthepart,everyeventhasacause,etc.)whicharetheobjectofwhatistermedtheunderstandingofprinciples,andwhosecertaintyissuperiortothatofanyconclusionofscience,commonsensepossessesaknowledgewhosemodeisequallyimperfect,becauseitisconfusedandimplicit.
Commonsensethereforemayberegardedasthenaturalandprimitivejudgmentofhumanreason,infalUble,butimperfectinitsmode.
Thewhollyspontaneouscharacterofcommonsense,anditsinabilitytogiveanaccountofitsconvictions,haveledcertainphilosopherstoregarditasaspecialfacultypurelyinstinctiveandunrelatedtotheintellect(theScottishschool,endofeighteenthandbeginningofnineteenthcentury;Reid,DugaldStewart,andinFrance,JoufFroy),orasasentiment
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
distinctfromandsuperiortoreason(theintuitiveorsentimentalistschool;forinstance,Rousseau,Jacobi,andinourowntimeBergson).Butinthatcaseitwouldnecessarilybeblind,forwepossessnootherlightthanthatoftheintellectorreason.Thelightofcommonsenseisfundamentallythesamelightasthatofscience,thatistosay,thenaturallightoftheintellect.Butincommonsensethislightdoesnotreturnuponitselfbycriticalreflection,andisnotperfectedbywhatweshalllearntoknowasascientifichabit{habitus).
Wemustnowdefinetherelationswhichobtainbetweenphilosophyandcommonsense.
Philosophycannot,astheScottishschoolmaintained,befoundedontheauthorityofcommonsenseunderstoodsimplyasthecommonconsentoruniversalwitnessofmankind,orasaninstinctwhichinfactcompelsourassent.Foritisinfactfoundedonevidence,notonauthorityofanykind.
Butifbycommonsenseweunderstandonlytheimmediateapprehensionofself-evidentfirstprinciples,whichisoneofitsconstituents,wemaysaywithtruththatitisthesourceofthewholeofphilosophy.Forthepremissesofphilosophyareindeedtheevidentaxiomswhichinvirtueofitsnaturalconstitutionimplantintheminditsprimarycertainties.
Itisimportanttobequiteclearthat,ifphilosophyfindsitspremissesalreadyenunciatedbycommonsense,itacceptsthemnotbecausetheyareenunciatedbycommonsense,orontheauthorityofcommonsenseunderstoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind,butentirelyandsolelyontheauthorityoftheevidence.
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
Finally,ifwetakeintoaccounttheentirebodyoftruths(premissesandconclusions)knownbycommonsensewithcertaintybutinanimperfectmode,wemustconcludethatphilosophyissuperiortocommonsense,astheperfectstageofanything(inthiscasethescientificstageofknowledge)issuperiortotheimperfectorrudimentarystageofthesamething(inthiscasethepre-scientificstageofthesameknowledge,whichisyettrueandcertainatbothstages).
Ifincommonsenseweconsidernottheconclusionswhichitreachesbutthepremissesalone,itisstillinferiortophilosophyinrespectofitsmodeofknowledge,butsuperioraliketophilosophyandtoallthesciencesinrespectoiitsobjectandofthelightinwhichitknows.For,aswehavesaidabove,philosophyandallthesciencesareultimatelyfoundedonthenaturalevidenceoffirstprinciples(towhichphilosophyreturns—incriticism—tostudythemscientifically,whereastheothersciencesarecontenttoacceptthemfromnature).
Philosophystudiesscientificallythethreecategoriesoftruthstowhichcommonsensebearsinstructivewitness:(i)thetruthsoffactwhichrepresenttheevidenceofthesenses;(ii)theself-evidentfirstprinciplesoftheunderstanding,inasmuchasitclearsuptheirmeaningbycriticalreflectionanddefendsthemrationally;(iii)theconsequencesimmediatelydeducible(proximateconclusions)fromthesefirstprinciples,inasmuchasitprovidesarationalproofofthem.And,further,wherecommonsenseyieldstothemereopinionsofpopularbelief,philosophycontinuestoextendindefinitelythedomainofscientificcertainty.Thusphilosophyjustifiesandcontinues
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
commonsense,as,forinstance,theartofpoetryjustifiesandcontinuesthenaturalrhythmsoflanguage.
Itisalsotheprovinceofphilosophytodecidewhatarethegenuinecertaintiesaffirmedbycommonsense,andwhatistheirtruesignificance;afunctionwhichcommonsenseisincapableofperforming,fortheveryreasonthatitdoesnotunderstand,ordoesnotunderstandclearly,thegroundsofitsknowledge.Inthissensephilosophycontrolscommonsense,as,forexample,theartofpoetrycontrolsthenaturalrhythmsoflanguage.
Nevertheless,commonsensehastherightanddutytorejectanyphilosophic
teachingwhichdeniesatruthofwhichitpossessesnaturalcertainty,astheinferiorhastherightanddutytoopposeasuperiorwhoactsinamannerevidentlyunjust.Forassoonasatruthbecomesknowntous,bywhateverchannel,itisasinnottoacceptit.Commonsensemaythereforeaccidentallyjudgephilosophy.
ItisrelatedofDiogenesthatwhenZenotheEleaticwasarguinginhispresenceagainstthepossibilityofmotion,hissolereplywastogetupandwalk.Similarly,whenDescartestaughtthatmotionisrelativeor"reciprocal,"sothatitmakesnodifferencewhetheryousaythemovingobjectismovingtowardsthegoalorthegoaltowardsthemovingobject,theEnglishphilosopherHenryMoreretortedthatwhenamanrunstowardsagoalpantingandtiringhimself,^hehasnodoubtwhichofthetwo,themovingobjectorthegoal,isinmotion.
Theseprotestsofcommonsensebzisedontheevidenceofthesenseswereperfectlyjustified.Itmust,however,beaddedthattheywereinsufficient
1LetterofMarch5,1649.138
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
—notindeedtoconfutetherespectivethesesofZenoandDescartesbuttoconfutethemaserrorsinphilosophy.Thatwouldhavedemandedaphilosophicrefutationoftheargumentsadducedbythesephilosophers,andexplanationsshowingwhyandatwhatpointtheywentwrong.
Itmustbeobservedthatthoughinitselfandinordertoestablishitsdemonstrationsphilosophydoesnotdependupontheauthorityofcommonsense,understoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind,neverthelessitisdependentuponitinacertainsense{materially,orinrespectofthesubject),initsoriginasahumanactivityandinitsdevelopmentinthemindofphilosophers.Fromthispointofviewphilosophymaybecomparedtoabuilding,andthegreatpre-scientificconclusionsofcommonsense(theexistenceofGod,thefreedomofthewill,etc.)tothescaffoldingwhichnaturehaserectedbeforehand.Oncetheedificehasbeencompleteditsupportsitselfonitsrock-bed,thenaturalself-evidenceofitsfirstprinciples,andhasnoneedofscaffolding.Butwithoutthescaffoldingitcouldnothavebeenbuilt.
Itisnowevidenthowunreasonablethatphilosophyis,whichpridingitselfonitsscientificknowledgeofthingsdespisescommonsenseaprioriandonprinciple,
andcutsitselfofffromitsnaturalconvictions.Descartes(whoinotherrespectsandinhisveryconceptionofscienceconcedestoomuchtocommonsense)beganthisdivorce,ontheonehand,byadmittingastheonlycertaintruthsthosescientificallyestablished,thusdenyingtheintrinsicvalueoftheconvictionsofcommonsense,andontheotherhand,byprofessingaspartofhissystemseveraldoctrines
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
incompatiblewiththoseconvictions.HisdiscipleMalebranche,andaboveallthecriticalphilosophersoftheKantianschool,asalsocertainmodernistphilosophers,havecarriedthistendencytoitsextreme,untilforsomeofthesephilosophersitissuflSdentthatapropositionshouldbeacceptabletocommonsenseforittobequestionedordeniedbyscience,whichwouldbecontaminatedbythe"credulity"ofthecommonherd,unlessittaughtthecontraryofwhatmankindatlargebelievestobetrue.
Yetthegreaterthenaturalstrengthofaman'sintelligence,thestrongershouldbehisgraspofthesenaturalcertainties.Hethereforewhoprofessestocondemncommonsenseshowsnotthestrengthbuttheweaknessofhisunderstanding.
Itisnowobviousthatinitsattitudetocommonsense,asinitssolutionofthemajorityofthegreatphilosophicproblems,ThomismkeepsthegoldenmeanbetweentwoopposingerrorsHkeamountainsummitbetweentwovalleys.
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas
Theconvictionsofcommonsensearevalid,andscienceisuntruetoitselfifitrejectsthem.Butthebasisofphilosophyisthenaturalwitnessoftheintellect,nottheauthorityofcommonsense.
Rationalist,Critical,andScottishSchoolModernistSchools
NotonlyaretheconvicNotonlyistheauthority
tionsofcommonsenseofcommonsenseincapable
valid,buttheauthorityofoffurnishingthebasisof
commonsenseimposingphilosophy,butthecon—
itselfasablindinstinctonvictionsofcommonsense
themindisthefoundationaredestituteofanyspecu—
onwhichphilosophyshouldlativevalue,bebased.
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
Fromallthathasbeensaiditisevidentwhatanimportantpartthecertaintiesofcommonsenseplayasanintroductiontophilosophy.Thosewhoarebeginningthestudyofphilosophyandabouttoacquaintthemselveswiththemostrecentproblems,andevenperhapsthemostmisleadingsystems,oughttoreposeanabsolutetrustintheconvictionsofcommonsenseofwhichtheyfindtheirmindsalreadypossessed,fortheywillhelpthemtorisetoahigherandmoreperfectknowledge,conclusionsscientificallyestablished.
ConclusionIV.—Philosophyisnotbasedupontheauthorityofconunonsenseunderstoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind;itisneverthelessderivedfi-omcommonsenseconsideredastheimderstandingofself-evidentfirstprinciples.
Itissuperiortocommonsenseastheperfector"scientific"stageofknowledgeissuperiortotheimperfectorordinarystageofthesameknowledge.Neveithelessphilosophymaybeaccidentallyjudgedbycommonsense.
Forthepurposesofthispresentoutlineweneedonlyaddthatphilosophyisnotconstructedapriorionthebasisofsomeparticularfactselectedbythephilosopher(Descartes'scogito),orprinciplearbitrarilylaiddownbyhim(Spinoza'ssubstance,Fichte'spureego,SchelUng'sabsolute,Hegel'sidea)whoseconsequencesheingeniouslydevelops.Itsformalprinciplesarethefirstprinciplesapprehendedintheconceptofbeing,whosecogencyconsistswhollyintheirevidence
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
fortheintellect,^andontheotherhanditsmatterisexperience,anditsfacts*thesimplestandmostobviousfacts—thestarting-pointfromwhichitrisestothecausesandgroundswhichconstitutetheultimateexplanation.Notawhimsyspunoutofhisownbrain,buttheentireuniversewithitsenormousmultitudeandvarietyofdatamustbethephilosopher'steacher.
Andhemustalwaysbearinmindthat,ifphilosophyenablesthehumanintellecttoapprehendwithabsolutecertaintythehighestandmostprofoundreaUtiesofthenaturalorder,itcannotthereforeclaimtoexhaustthoserealitiesbymakingthemknowntotheutmostextentoftheirinteUigibiUty.Fromthispointofviewsciencedoesnotdestroythemysteryofthings,thatinthemwhichisstillunknownandunfathomed,butonthecontraryrecognisesanddeUmitsit;'evenwhatitknowsitneverknowscompletely.Thewisemanknowsallthings,inasmuchasheknowsthemintheirultimatecauses,buthedoesnotknow,isinfinitelyremovedfromknowing,everythingabouteverything.Ignorance,however,isnotthesameaserror.Itissufficientforthephilosopherthatheknowswith
ThisiswhatthePositivistsfailtosee.
2Thisiswhatthepureintellectttalists—fromParmenidestoHegel—whoconstructtheirmetaphysicswhollyapriori,havefailedtograsp.
'Aristotle{Metapk.,i,2)remarksthattheoccasionalcauseofphilosophyisroOavfidi^eiv,admiratio,bywhichhemeanswondermingledwithdread,inotherwordsawe,awonderwhichknowledgetendstoremove.Butwemustbecarefultounderstandhismeaningofthewonderwhichdoesnotunderstand,notoftheadmiration,indeedtheawe,bomofunderstanding.Thewisemanisastonishedatnothingbecauseheknowstheultimatecausesofallthings,butheadmiresfarmorethantheignorantman.Cf,DePart.Arum.,i,5,645a16:^c■waffLrois<pvaiKoUivearluOav/xaffrdv.
PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE
certaintywhatitishisprovincetoknowandwhatitisofthefirstimportanceforustoknow.Indeed,itisbetternottoknowthingswhichdivertthemindfromthehighestknowledge,asTacitusremarks:nescireguaedam,magnaparssapientiae.
Wehaveconsideredthenatureofphilosophy;itremainstodistinguishitsdepartments.Weshallthusobtainaclearnotionofitssphere,andatthesametimebecomeacquaintedwithitsprincipalproblems.
PARTTU'OTHECLASSIFICATIONOFPHILOSOPHY
THEMAINDIVISIONSOFPHILOSOPHY
Whenamanundertakesawork,hebeginsbytestinghistoolinvariouswaystolearntheusehecanandshouldmakeofit.
Thephilosopher'sworkistoacquireknowledge;histool,reason.Thereforethephilosopherbeforehebeginshisworkmustexaminereasontodiscovertheuseheshouldmakeofit.
Thestudyofreasonasaninstrumentofacquiringknowledgeormeansofdiscoveringtruthiscalledlogic.
Logicistherefore,strictlyspeaking,notsomuchadepartmentofphilosophyasascienceorart,ofwhichphilosophy(andindeedallthesciences)makesuse,andtheintroductiontophilosophy.Itisapropaedeutictoscience.^Theothersciencesaredependentuponlogicinasmuchasitteachesthemethodofprocedureintheacquisitionofknowledge,andweareobUgedtopossessthemeansortoolsofknowledgebeforewecanacquireknowledgeitself.
Itisthusevidentthatthestudyofphilosophymust
1"Resautemdequibusestlogica,nonquaerunturadcognoscendumpropterseipsas,sedutadminiculumquoddamadaliasscientias.Etidealogicanoncontinetursubphilosophiaspeculativaquasiprincipalispars,sedquasiquoddamreductumadearn,proutministratspeculationisuainstrumenta,scilicetsyllogismosetdejinitiones,etaliahujusmodi,quibusinspeculativisscientiisindigemus.UndeetsecundumBoethiuminComment,sup.Porphyrium,nontarnestscientiaquamscientiaeinstrumentum."St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,a.i,a^2.Itisthereforeonlyreductivelythatlogicbelongstotheoreticalphilosophy.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
fromtheverynatureofthingsbeginwithlogic,althoughonaccountofitsdifficultyandextremelyabstractcharacterlogicusuallyrepelsratherthanattractsbeginners.^Afewofthemodernsrebelagainstthisorderofstudy,andmaintainthatlogicshouldbestudiedonlyinthecourseoflearningtheotherbranchesofphilosophy,oraftertheyhavebeenlearned.Butthisislikearguingthatthesurgeonshouldonlystudyanatomybythepracticeorafterthepracticeofhisartuponthesick,itisabsurd,Aristotleremarks,tostudyatthesametimeascienceanditsconditionsormethodofprocedure.axoTxova^xaJ^YITetv£7ti,cJTYi[i.ir)vxalXpOTTOVerutcTTYifXYjc;'.''
Whenbythestudyoflogichehasmadehimselfmasterofhistool,thephilosophercansettowork.Whatthatworkisweknowalready:toacquireaknowledgeofthingsbytheirfirstprinciples.
If,however,weconsidertheaimoflearning,therearetwodistincttypesofknowledge.Wecan,forexample,makeuseofoureyessimplyinordertosee
•Cf.St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.6,a.i,ad3."Dicendumquodinaddiscendoincipimusabeo,quodestmagisfacile,nisinecessitasaliudrequirat.Quandoqueenimnecesseestinaddiscendononincipereabeoquodestfacilius,sedabeoacujuscognitionecognitiosequentiumdependet.Ethacpositioneoportetinaddiscendoinciperealogica,nonquiaipsasitfaciliorscientiisceteris;habetenimmaximamdifficultatem,cumsitdesecundointellectis;sedquiaaliaescientiaeabipsadependent,inquantumipsadocetmodumprocedendiinomnibusscientiis.Oportetenimprimumsciremodumscientiaequamscientiamipsam,utdiciturII.Metaph.
2Metaph.,ii,995a12.St.Thomas,InIIMetaph.,1.5."Quiaenimdiversisecundumdiversosmodosveritateminquirunt,ideaoportetquodhomoinstruaturperquernmoduminsingulisscientiissintrecipiendaeaquaedicuntur.Etquianonestfacile,quodhomosimulduocapiat,seddumadduoattendit,neutrumcaperepotest:absurdumest,quodhomosimulquaeratscientiametmodumquicorwenitscientiae.Etpropterhocdebetpriusaddiscerelogicamquamaliasscientias,quialogicatraditcommunemmodumprocedendiinomnibusscientiis."
THEMAINDIVISIONSOFPHILOSOPHY
andenjoythesightofthings,andwecanalsomakeuseofthemforthepracticalpurposesoflife.
Inthesamewaywecanemployourreasonscientifically,solelyforthepleasureofknowledge.Thesciencesthusacquiredexistsolelyforthesakeofknowledge(thetheoreticalsciences).Andiftherebeatheoreticalsciencewhichseekstoaccountforthingsbytheirfirstprinciples,itsobjectwillbethatwhichisthefirstprincipleinthetheoreticalorder,namely,thefirstcausesofeverythingwhichexist(thatistosay,thefirstcausesnaturallyknowable).Thatscienceistheoreticalphilosophy.Wecan,ontheotherhand,employourreasonscientificallyforourprofitandtheimprovementofourhfe;thesciencesthus
acquiredexisttoprocurebysomekindofactivitythegoodofman(thepracticalsciences).Andiftherebeapracticalsciencewhichseekstoregulatehumanactsbyfirstprinciples,itsobjectwillbethatwhichisthefirstprincipleinthepracticalorder,namely,theabsolutegoodofman(theabsolutegoodnaturallyknowable).^Suchascienceispracticalphilosophy—otherwisetermedmoralscienceorethics.^
Thereare,indeed,otherpracticalsciencesbesidesethics;forexample,medicine,whichseekstoprocurethehealthofman.Buttheobjectofthesesciencesisnotgood,pureandsimple(thesovereigngood),butsomeparticularhumangood.Theydonot,
*Thatistosay,thesovereigngoodofmanasitwouldbe,ifhisendweresimplynaturalhappiness.Seebelow,pp.265-267.
*Observethatthisdivisionofphilosophyintotheoreticalandpracticalrelatestotheend,theaim,nottotheobjectitselfofthescience,whichassuchisalwaysnecessarilytheoretical.Thereforeitdoesnotenterintothespecificationinthestrictsenseofthephilosophicsciences.Seebelow,p.271.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
therefore,referinthepracticalordertowhichtheybelongtothefirstprincipleofaction,andforthatreasonarenotphilosophies.Ethics,ormoralscience,isthustheonlypracticalsciencewhichdeservesthenameofphilosophy.^
Wemustbearinmindthatalthoughtheobjectofethicsistoprocureagoodwhichisnotsolelyagoodoftheintellect,thatistosay,doesnotconsistinknowledgealone,itsruleoftruthisthatwhichis,anditproceedsbywayofdemonstration,resolvingconclusionsintotheirpremisses.Inotherwordsitispracticalinvirtueofitsobject(toknowinordertoprocurethegoodofmanintheorderingofhisacts),butasscienceinthestrictsenseitistheoreticalknowledge.*
Wemustfurtherremarkthatthepracticalsciencesareobviouslysubordinatetothetheoretical,(i)aspresupposing(ifnotintheorderoftheiroriginin
1Itmaybeaddedthatofthepracticalsciences,onlyone,ethics,isinfactvereetpropriescieniia,thatistosay,proceedsbywayofdemonstration,inanecessarymatter,andimpartsatruth,whichconsistsinknowingthingsinconformitywith
whatis,andnotinproperlydirectingacontingentaction.Theotherpracticalsciences(medicine,architecture,strategy,etc.)arearts,notsciencesinthestrictsense.{Cf.JohnofSt.Thomas,CursusPhilos.,i.Log.ii,q.i,a.5).
Butthoughethicsisinthestrictsenseascience,itisforthatveryreasononlyinanindirectsensepractical:foritsprocedureconsistsinprovidingknowledge{speculabiliter)notinproducingaction{opera-biliUr),andthoughitcertainlysuppliesrulesimmediatelyapplicabletoconcretecases,therightapplicationandgooduseoftheserulesinpracticeistheeffectnotofethicsbutofthevirtueofprudence.
Ontheotherhand,asweshallseelater,thephilosophyofartisalso,inasense,apracticalphilosophy.Butitisveryfarfrombeingapracticalscience,evenhkeethicsintheindirectsense,forittreatsonlyofprinciplesandisunabletodescendtotherulesimmediatelyapplicabletotheconcreteworktobeexecuted.
*Henceevenpracticalphilosophyisatheoreticalwisdomwhichproceedsbywayofknowledge(seeabove,p.102).
time,atleastinthenatureofthings)thetruthsprovedbythesesciences,whichtheyapplyforthebenefitofman—forexample,medicine,asthescienceofheaUng,presupposesanatomy;(ii)assciencesinferiorindignitytothetheoreticalsciences.Forthelatterarestudiedfortheirownsake,andarethereforegoodinthemselves,whereasthepracticalsciencesarestudiedforthegoodorutiUtyofman,andarethereforegoodonlyinrelationtothatgoodorutility.Itfollowsthatphilosophyinthestrictestsenseistheoreticalphilosophy(especiallythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics),logicbeingthescienceintroductorytoit,andethicsthesciencedetachedfromittotreatspeciallyofthatwhichconcernsthegoodofman.
Wearenowinapositiontodefinemoreexactlytheobjectofthesethreemaindivisionsofphilosophy.
Asciencewhichseekstoprocureman'ssovereigngoodmustbeforeallelsetreatofthosethingswhicharetheindispensableconditionsofitsattainment.Butthesearetheactionswhichmanperformsinthefreeexerciseofhisfaculties;inotherwords,humanactsassuch.Wemaythereforesaythathumanactsaretheformalobject(subject-matter)ofmoralphilosophy.
Asciencewhoseaimistoknowthingsbytheirfirstcausesmusttreatprimarily
ofthatinthingswhichdependsimmediatelyuponthosecauses.Butthatinthingswhichdependsimmediatelyuponthefirstorhighestcausesisthatwhichismostessentialinthem,theirbeing,andthatwhichisthemostwidely,indeeduniversally,distributed,being,whicheverythingwhatsoeverpossesses.Wethereforeconcludethatthe
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formalobjectoftheoreticalphilosophyisthebeingofthings.
Nowtheoreticalphilosophystudiesthebeingofthingsindifferentfashionsandfromhigherorlowerpointsofview(degreesofabstraction).Itmaystudythebeingofthingswiththeirsensibleproperties{ensmobile),orthebeingofthingswiththesolepropertiesofquantity{ensquantum),orthebeingofthingswiththesolepropertiesofbeing(beingquabeing,ensinquantumens).Hencearisethethreeprincipaldivisionsoftheoreticalphilosophy(seebelow,Ghs.Ill&IV).
Finally,asciencewhichstudiesreasonasthetoolfortheattainmentoftruthmusttreatbeforeallelseofthatwhichwehandleormanipulatewhenwereason.Butthatwhichwehandleormanipulatewhenwerezisonisthethingsthemselves.Forexample,whenweaffirmthatmanissuperiortotheotheranimalsbecausehepossessesintellect,itisindeedthethingitself,man,whichweholdinourmindandtowhichwejoinorattributethoseotherthings,intellectandsuperiority.Butthemanthatwethushandleinourmindisobviouslynotthemanasheexists,orcanexistinreality;thereisnoquestionofseizingsomemanwhopassesinthestreettostickanattributeontohisback.Thatourmindmayworkonthem,thingspossessinthemindamannerofbeingwhichtheydonotandcannotjjossessinreality.Theyexisttheresofarastheyareknown.Predicatedoneofanotherdivided,reunited,linkedtogetheraccordingtothenecessitiesofknowledge,theyleadthereadistinctlife,withitsownlaws.Itisthislifeanditslaws,theordertowhichthingsmustsubmitsofarastheyareobjectsofknowledge,iftheyaretoguidethemind
totruth,thatlogicprimarilystudies,andsinceitisconcernedwithsomethingwhichexistsandcanexistonlyinthemindorwithwhatphilosopherstermanensraiionis,aconceptualbeing,wemaysaythattheformalobjectoflogicis
thatconceptualbeing,ensrationis(theorderwhichshouldprevailamongconceptualobjects)whichdirectsthemindtotruth.
Asopposedtoconceptualbeing,theensrationisywhichcanexistonlyinthemind—forexample,thegenusanimalorthespeciesman{thegenusanimalcomprisesmankindandthebrutes,manisthespeciesofPeter)—wetermrealbeing,ensreale,thatwhichexistsorcanexistinreality—forexample,animals,man,humannature{allanimalsaremortal,humannatureisfallible).
ConclusionV.—Philosophyisdividedintothreeprincipalparts:(i)logic,whichistheintroductiontophilosophyinthestrictsense,andwhichstudiestheconceptualbeing{ensrationis)whichdirectsthemindtotruth;(ii)theoreticalphilosophyorsimplyphilosophy,whichstudiesthebeingofthings(realbeing,ensreale);(iii)practicalphilosophyorethics,whichstudieshumanacts.
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LOGIC
Logicstudiesreasonasthetoolofknowledge.Tostudyanycomplicatedmachine,areaperforinstance,wemustbeginbymakingitworkinthevoid,whilewelearnhowtouseitcorrectlyandwithoutdamagingit.Inthesamewaywemustfirstofalllearnhowtousereasoncorrectly,thatistosay,inconformitywiththenatureofratiocination,andwithoutdamagingit.Hencearisesourfirstproblem:Whataretheruleswhichwemustobeyinordertoreasoncorrectly?Weshouldnextstudyourreapernolongerinthevoid,butasappliedtotheactualmaterialwithwhichitwasdesignedtodeal,learninghowtouseit,notonlycorrectly,butprofitablyandefficiently.Inthesamewaywemuststudyreasoningasappliedtofacts,askingourselvesunderwhatconditionsreasoningisnotonlycorrectbutalsotrueandconclusive,andproductiveofknowledge.Itisinthisdepartmentoflogicthatwestudythemethodsemployedbythedifferentsciences.Butbeforethisafargraverproblemwillariseanddemandsolution.
Itisbyourideasthatthingsarepresentedtothemind,sothatwecanreasonaboutthemandacquireknowledge.
Everybodyknowsbyexperiencewhatanideais.Itissufficientforamantoreflectonwhatisin
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LOGIC
hismind,whenhemakesajudgmentofanykind.Forinstance,philosophershavemademanymistakes;philosophers^mistakes,havemade,many—allthesearepresentinthemindassomanyideas.Neverthelesstoclearupanypossibleobscurity,wewilltrytodescribewhateverybodymeansbytheword.Wewill,forinstance,defineideasasimagesorinteriorreproductionsofthings,bywhichthelatterarepresentedtousinsuchawaythatwecanreasonaboutthem(andthusacquireknowledge).
Nodoubtthewordsweemployexpressourideas.Buttheybringwiththemsomethingbesides.If,forexample,Ipronouncethewordangel,Ihaveinmyconsciousnesstwoimagesofthebeinginquestion.Inthefirstplaceanidea,invirtueofwhich,strictlyspeaking,Iknowthatparticularbeing(theideaofapurespirit),butinadditionasensiblerepresentation(theimageofsomefiguremoreorlessnebulousandwinged)whichpossessesnoUkenesswhatevertothebeinginquestion,forapurelyspiritualbeingisinvisible.
If,again,IpronouncethewordsquareIhaveinmyconsciousnesstheideaofthesquare,bymeansofwhichIcanreasonaboutthethingconcerned(theideaofarectangularpolygonoffourequalsides)andatthesametimeasensiblerepresentation—whichinthiscaseadequatelyrepresentsthethinginquestion—aparticularfigurewhichIimaginedrawninchalkontheblackboard.Theideaandtherepresentationarequitedistinct,asisshownbythefactthatIcanvarythelatterinahostofdifferentways(theimaginarydrawingcanbelargerorsmaller,white,red,yellow,etc.)withoutanyvariationoftheformer.Moreover,
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ifIweretopronounce,forexample,thewordmyriagoninsteadofsquare^IshouldpossessasdefiniteandasclearanideaofitasIhadofthesquare(theideaofapolygonoftenthousandsides)^whereastheonlysensiblerepresentationIcouldformofitwouldbeextremelyvagueandconfused.
Itisevidentthatifthesensiblerepresentationsassistmetoreason,theyarenottheinstrumentwithwhichIreasontoacquireaknowledgeofthings.ForIcanreasonasaccuratelyabouttheangelorthemyriagonasIcanaboutthesquare.
AndmyreasoningisinnowaydependentonthethousandalterationsIcanmakeinmysensiblerepresentationsofanangel,myriagon,orsquare.
Fromthisweconcludethatthingsarepresentedtoourconsciousnessintwodifferentfashions,eitherbyanideaorbyasensiblerepresentation.
Bythefirstwethink(intelligimus)thething,bythesecondweimagineit.Therepresentationissimplyaspeciesofphantom,animageofwhatwehavepreviouslyseen,heard,touched,etc.,inshort,ofwhathasbeenoriginallymadeknowntousbyasensation.Formerlycalledaphantasm,itisnowcalledsimplyanimage.Infuture,then,weshallreservetodenoteitthetermimage,whosemeaningweaccordinglyrestrict.(Butwemustnolongerusethesamewordtodenoteanidea.)Weconclude,therefore,that—
ConclusionVI.—Ideasaretheinternallikenessesofthingsbywhichthelatterarepresentedinsuchawaythatwecanreasonaboutthem(andthusacquireknowledge);imagesaretheinternallikenessesofthingsbywhichthelatterarepre-
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sentedtousasoursensationshavefirstmadethemknowntous.Wordsdirectlysignifyideas,atthesametimeevokingimages.
Ifnowwecompareobjectsastheyarepresentedbyideasandastheyarepresentedbysensationsorimages,weseeatoncethattheyaredistinguishedbyacharacteroftheveryfirstimportance.If,forexample,Icallupbeforemymindtheimageofaman,Iseepresentinmyimaginationwithoutlinesmoreorlessvagueandmoreorlesssimplifiedsomeparticularman.Heisfairordark,tallorshort,whiteorblack,etc.ButifIformtheideaofman,as,forinstance,whenIstatethepropositionmanissuperiortotheirrationalanimals,orwhitesandblacksarealikemen,thatideadoesnotbringbeforemeanymaninparticular.Itleavesoutofaccountalltheindividualcharacteristicswhichdistinguishonemanfromanother;inthelanguageofphilosophyitabstractsfromthem.
Thisisprovedbythefactthatwhileremainingabsolutelythesameandwithoutneedofanymodificationwhatsoever,itcanbeappliedtothemostdissimilarindividuals;SanchoPanzaisjustasmuchamanasDonQuixote.Moreover,whenwecastourmindoverthedifferentsciences,thatistosay,thedifferentsystemsofideasbywhichweknowreality,wefindthatnoneofthemis
concernedwiththeindividualassuch.Chemistry,forinstance,onlystudiesinchlorineornitrogenwhatiscommontoalltheindividualmoleculesofchlorineornitrogen.Andthismustnecessarilybethecase.Theindividualassuchexplainsnothing(for,sinceitrepresentsonly
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itself,itobviouslycannotaccountforanythingelse).^Again,wehaveonlytotakeanyideawhatsoeverandfixourattentiononwhatitpresentstous,comparingitwiththeimageswhichformanddissolvearoundit,toperceiveatoncetheabstractnatureoftheidea.Inthetransitionfromtheimagetotheideawhateverisindividualevaporates,sotospeak,slipsbetweenourfingers,andvanishes.Take,forexample,theideaofweaponwhichIemploywhenIstatethatmanistheonlyanimalobligedtomanufactureitsweapons.AsIpronouncedthewordweapons,Iwasnodoubtconsciousofahalo,sotospeak,offluctuatingimagessurroundingtheideathusexpressed,toanyofwhichIcanatpleasuregiveamoredefiniteshape,dijavelinveryshadowynodoubt,aflintaxe^across-bow,agun....Butoftheindividualcharacteristicsoftheparticularjavelin,axe,bow,orgunastheyappearinmyimaginationwiththeirdistinctiveform,colour,anddimensions,nothingwhateverremainsinmyideaofweapon.Everythingofthesorthasdisappeared.ThoughwhatIapprehendbytheideaiscertainlysomething,thatsomethingisofanentirelydifferentorder(immaterial),itissimplyacertaindeterminationofbeing,acertainnature,aninstrumentofattackordefence;andthatisdevoidofanyindividualcharacter.Thatistosay,objectsaspresentedtousbyoursensationsandimagesarepresentedinastatewhichisindividual,orintechnicallanguagesingular.Onthecontrary,objectsaspresentedtousbyourideas,bytheinternallikenesseswhichenableustoreasonaboutthem,arepresentedinastatewhichisnon-individual,abstract,orintechnicallanguageuniversal.
1Cf.T.Richard,op.cit.,p.21.158
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Wecalluniversalthatwhichisthesameinamultitudeofindividuals,oneinmany,unuminmultis.)Weshallthereforeholdasanestablishedtruththat—
ConclusionVII.—Oursensationsandimagespresenttousdirectlyorbythemselvestheindividual,ourideasdirectlyandbythemselvestheuniversal.
Butthequestionatoncearises:Sincerealobjectsareindividualorsingular,howcantheknowledgeweobtainbymeansofourideasbetrue,sinceourideasdirectlypresentonlytheuniversal?
Thisproblem,whichwillcompelustoinvestigatecarefullyinwhatexactlyconsiststheuniversalityofthatwhichourideaspresent,is,notindeedinitself,butatanyrateforusmen,thefirstandmostimportantofphilosophicproblems.^Foritisconcernedwiththenatureoftheintellectitselfandofourideas,thatistosay,withtheinstrumentbywhichallourknowledgeisobtained;andthesolutionpropoundedbydifferentphilosophersdominatestheirentiresystem.
Fromthispointofview,andtakingnoaccountofmanydifferencesofsecondaryimportance,wemayclassifyphilosophersinthreegreatschools:
{a)Thenominalistschool,forwhichuniverszdshave
1Doestheproblemofuniversalsbelongtologic,psychology,ormetaphysics(criticismorepistemology)?Toallthree,infact,accordingasitisstudiedfromthreedifferentstandpoints.Wemayinquirewhatconstitutesthenatureofauniversal(standpointoftheformalcause),orthemannerinwhichauniversalisformedinthemind(standpointoftheefficientcause),ortheepistemologicalvalueoftheuniversal(standpointoithefinalcause).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
noexistenceexceptasnamesorideaswithwhichnothinginrealitycorresponds;forinstance,thereisnothingintherealityofhumannaturewhichisequallypresentinPeter^Paul,andJohn.Thispositionamountstosheernegationofthepossibilityofintellectualknowledge,andreducessciencetoafigmentofthemind.Themosttypicalrepresentativesofthisschoolare,inantiquitythesophistsandthesceptics,inmodemtimestheleadingEnglishphilosophers,WilliamofOccaminthefourteenthcentury,HobbesandLockeintheseventeenth,BerkeleyandHumeintheeighteenth,JohnStuartMillandSpencerinthenineteenth.Itmaybeaddedthatthemajorityofmodemphilosophers(thatistosay,ofthosewhoignoreoropposethescholastictradition)aremoreorlessdeeply,andmoreorlessconsciously,imbuedwithnominalism.
(b)Therealistschool("absoluterealism")forwhichtheuniversalassuch,theuniversaltakenseparately,asitexistsinthought,constitutestherealityofthings.
Thispositionreducessense-knowledgetomereillusion.Thatwhichisrealis,forexample,ahumannatureexistinginitselfandseparatelyoutsidethemind,amaninhimself(Platonism),orauniversalbeingexistingassuchoutsidethemindandregardedasthesoleanduniquesubstance(doctrineofParmenides,Vedantism).Thesystemsofcertainmodernphilosophers(Spinoza,Hegel)approximatemoreorlesscloselytorealism.^
{c)Theschoolwhichisusuallycalledthatof
>Itmastbeborneinmindthatrealismunderstoodinthissense,farfrombeingincompatiblewithidealism,isessentiallyanidealistdoctrine.Forrealismofthistyperegardsastherealityofthingsthatwhichisdistinctiveofourideasassuch.Platoisthusatoncethemosttypicalrepresentativebothofidealismandabsoluterealism.
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moderaterealism.(Itsdoctrine,however,isinthemoststrictsenseoriginal,andkeepsthejustmeanbetweenrealismandnominalism,notbywateringdownormodifyingabsoluterealism,butbyaviewofthingswhichtranscendstheopposingerrors.)Thisschool,distinguishingbetweenthethingitselfanditsmodeofexistence,theconditioninwhichitispresented,teachesthatathingexistsinthemindasauniversal,inrealityasanindividual.Thereforethatwhichweapprehendbyourideasasauniversaldoesindeedreallyexist,butonlyintheobjectsthemselvesandthereforeindividuated—notasauniversal.Forexample,thehumannaturefoundalikeinPeter,Paul,andJohnreallyexists,butithasnoexistenceoutsidethemind,exceptintheseindividualsubjectsandasidenticalwiththem;ithasnoseparateexistence,doesnotexistinitself.ThismoderaterealismisthedoctrineofAristotleandSt.Thomas.
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{ModerateRealism)
ThatwhichourideasThatwhichourideas
presenttousasauniversalpresenttousasauniversal
doesnotexistoutsidetheexistsoutsidethemind
mindasauniversal.individuated.
NominalismRealism
ThatwhichourideasThatwhichourideas
presenttousasauniversalpresenttousasauniversal
hasnorealexistencewhatreallyexistsasauniversal,soever.
Itisimpossibletoover-emphasisetheimportanceoftheproblemofuniversals.Itisforwantofattentiontoitthatsomanyphilosophersandscientistsofmodemtimesclingtothenaivebeliefthatscience
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mustbeacopypureandsimple,atracingoftheindividualreality;serveupthestockargumentsofignoranceagainstabstraction,theessentialpreconditionofallhumanknowledge;andwhentreatingoftheprinciplesofthesciences,especiallyofmathematics,spinelaboratetheories,devoidofsolidfoundation,whosesoleresultistorenderknowledgetotallyimpossible.
-i
THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICSTHEPHILOSOPHYOFNATURE
Thedistinctiveobjectoftheoreticalphilosophyisthebeingofthings.Thethingswhichareimmediatelyobservedarecorporealthings,bodies.Butthetermbodymaybetakenintwodistinctsenses.Itmaymeanamathematicalbody,oranaturalorphysicalbody.Amathematicalbodyissimplythatwhichpossessesthree-dimensionalextension,breadth,length,andheight.Anaturalorphysicalbodyisthatwhichisperceivedbythesensesaspossessingcertainactiveandpassiveproperties.
THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS
Ifthephilosophyofmathematicsstudiesthebeingofbodiesinthefirstsenseofthetermbody,itisobviousthatthefirstproblemitmustconsiderisinwhatdoestheprimaryobjectofmathematicsconsist;inotherwords,whatisthenatureofquantity,extension,andnumber?^
1Questionsrelatingtothephilosophyofmathematicsareusuallytreatedin
naturalphilosophyorinmetaphysics.Webelieve,however,thatifclassificationistobescientific,weareobligedtomaintaininwhatisnowknownasphilosophy(scientificknowledgeofthingsbytheirfirstcauses)thefundamentaldivisionofthesciences(thewholegroupofwhichconstitutedfortheancientstheoreticalphilosophy)intothreeparts:physica,mathematica,metaphysica,correspondingto
163
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Theenormousprogressmadebymodernmathematicshasrenderedmoreindispensablethaneverbeforethephilosopliicstudyofthefirstprinciplesofthemathematicalsciences,whichalonecanprovidearationalaccountofthetruenatureofmathematicalabstractionandthementzdobjectswhichitconsiders,theproperties-andmutualrelationshipsofthecon'tinuousandthediscontinuous,therealmeaningofsurdsandtransjinitenumbers,theinfinitesimal,non-Euclideanspace,etc.,andfinallyofthevalidityofmathematicaltranscriptsofphysicalreahty,andofsuchhypotheses,forexample,asthetheoryofrelativity.
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Sincethephilosophyofsensiblenaturestudiesthebeingofbodiesinthesecondsenseofthetermbody,it
thethreegradesofabstraction(seep.152).Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vi,i,1026a18.TjoeiiiveUv<pi\o(Xo<plaidewptjTiKal,ixad7)/j,aTiKT^,<(>v<nKi/i,deciXoyiKTi.
Itistrue,asweshallseelater,thatthephilosophyofmathematics,fortheveryreasonthatitstudiestheessenceofquantityandisthusatleastreductivelymetaphysical,transcendsthestrictsphereofthemathematicalsciencesandisspecificallydistinctfiromthem.This,however,doesnotalterthefactthatitisconcernedwiththeseconddegreeofabstractionandmustthereforebestudiedasaseparatebranchofphilosophy.
1Inthelogicalorderofthesciences,thenaturalscienceswhichcorrespondtothefirstdegreeofabstraction(seep.152)precedethemathematicalsciences,whichcorrespondtothesecond,sothatinaccordancewiththisorderweshould
beobligedtodividetheoreticalphilosophyinto(i)Thephilosophyofnature(correspondingtothefirstdegreeofabstraction),(ii)Thephilosophyofmathematics(correspondingtotheseconddegree),(iii)metaphysics(correspondingtothethirddegree).
Neverthelessthephilosophyofmathematicsshouldprecedenaturalphilosophyfortworeasons.
Ontheonehand,truthsofthemathematicalorderareeasierto
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mustdealwithalargenumberofproblems.Wecan,however,pickoutthemostimportantoftheseformentionhere.
Themostuniversalandobviouscharacteristicofthecorporealworld,whichisinvolvedineveryphysicalevent,ischange.Philosophers,inwhosevocabularychangeofeverydescriptionistermedmotion,mustthereforeinquirewhatmotionis.
Itisatonceobviousthatifmotionexists,somethingmustbemoved,namely,bodies.Further,certainchangesseemtoaffecttheverysubstanceofbodies;as,forinstance,whenthechemicalcombinationofhydrogenandoxygenproducesanewbody,water.Howisthispossible?Wearecompelledtoaskwhatcorporealsubstanceis.
(a)Themechanists—whetherintheirdoctrineofthehumansoultheyarematerialists(Democritus,Epicurus,Lucretius,amongtheancients,Hobbesintheseventeenthcentury,etc.)orspiritualistsUke
apprehendthantruthsofthenaturalorder,whichpresupposeexperience.Forthisreasonchildrenshouldbetaughttheelementsofmathematicsbeforethenaturalsciences,thestudyofwhic^equiresamoreadvancedage.{Cf.Aristotle,Mc.Eth.,vi;St.T'homas,Sup.Boet.deTrm.,q.5,a.i,a//3.)
Weshouldthereforefollowthesameorderinphilosophyandleadtheminduptothestudyofnaturalphilosophybythestudyofthephilosophyofmathematics.
Ontheotherhand,andthisisthemoreimportantconsideration,naturalphilosophywiththelastandhighestofitssub-divisions,namelypsychology,
touchesthefrontierofmetaphysics.Itwouldbeabreachofcontinuitytoinsertthephilosophyofmathematicsbetweennaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics.
IntheseventeenthcenturySylvesterMaurusmaintained—andinsodoingwasfaithfultotheAristoteliantradition—thatthenaturalorderofstudyisasfollows:(i)logic,(ii)mathematics,(iii)physics,(iv)metaphysics.{Quaest.philos.,i,q.vii.)
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Descartes—reducecorporealsubstancetomatter,whichinturntheyconfusewithquantityorgeometricalextension.Theycanthereforeadmitnoessentialorspecificdifferenceamongbodies,whichareallmodificationsofonesinglesubstance.Moreover,thephysicaluniverseisforthemdevoidofqualityandenergy,sincespaceandlocalmotionalonearereal,andtheunionofmatterandspiritinabeingsuchasmanbecomesabsolutelyunintelligible.
{b)Anotherschool{dynamism)tendsonthecontrarytogetridofmatterasaconstituentofbodies.ItculminatesinthesystemofLeibniz,whoreducedcorporealsubstancetounitsofaspiritualcharacter{monads)analogoustosouls.ForLeibnizextension,indeedsensiblereaUtyasawhole,isnothingmorethananappearanceorasymbol,andthecorporealworldassuchisabsorbedinthespiritual.ThedynamismofBoscovich(eighteenthcentury),whoreducedcorporealsubstancetopointsofforce,andthemodernphysicaltheorywhichclaimstoexplaineverythinginthephysicaluniverseasmanifestationsofonesolereality,energy(ofwhich,however,itsexponentsfailtogiveaphilosophicdefinition),mayberegardedasdegradationsandmaterialisationsofLeibniz'sdoctrine.
{c)TheAristotelianphilosophyrecognisesincorporealsubstancetwosubstantialprinciples:(i)matter{firstmatter,materiaprima),which,however,innowayrepresents,asintheconceptionofthemechanists,theimaginablenotionofextension,buttheideaofmatter(thatofwhichsomethingelseismade)initsutmostpurity—itiswhatPlatocalledasortofnon-entity,simplythatofwhichthingsare
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made,whichinitselfisnothingactual,aprinciplewhollyindeterminate,incapableofseparateexistence,butcapableofexistinginconjunctionwith
somethingelse(theform);(ii)anactiveprinciple,whichissotospeak,thelivingideaorsoulofthething,andwhichdeterminesthepurelypassivefirstmatter,somewhatastheformimposeduponitbythesculptordeterminestheclay,constitutingwithitonesinglethingactuallyexistent,onesinglecorporealsubstance,whichowestoitboththatitisthisorthatkindofthing,thatistosay,itsspecificnature,anditsexistence,somewhatastheformimposedbythesculptormakesastatuewhatitis.Onaccountofthisanalogywiththeexternalformofastatue(itsaccidentalform)Aristotlegavethenameof/orm{substantialform),whichmustbeunderstoodinasensealtogetherspecialandtechnical,tothisinternalprincipleofwhichwearespeaking,whichdeterminestheverybeingofcorporealsubstance.
TheAristoteliandoctrine,whichregardsabodyasacompoundo{matter[xikri)andform([xopcprj),isknownashylomorphism.Itacceptsthereahty,ontheonehand,ofmatter,thecorporealworld,andextension,^ontheotherofphysicalqualities,'alsoadistinctionofnatureoressencebetweenthebodieswhichweregardasbelongingtodifferentspecies.Itrevealsthepresence,evenininanimatebodiesandHvingthingsdevoidofreason,ofasubstantialprinciple,immaterialinitsnature,which,however,differsfromspiritsin
^Extensionofquantityisnot,asthemechanistshold,thesubstanceofbodies,buttheirfirstaccident.
*Qualitiesarealsoaccidentsofcorporealsubstance.(Seebelow,pp.217-232(substanceandaccident).)
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theStrictsense,initsincapacitytoexistapartfrommatter.Anditrendersintelligibletheunioninthehumanbeingofmatterandaspiritualsoulwhichistheformofthehumanbody,butdiffersfromtheOthersubstantialformsinasmuchasitcanexistapartfrommatter.
PtdlosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{Hylomorphism)
Everycorporealsubstanceisacompoundoftwosubstantia!andcomplementaryparts,onepassiveandinitselfwhollyindeterminate[matter),theotheractiveandtheprincipleofdetermination{form).
MechanismDynamism
Ck>rporealsubstanceisCorporealsubstanceis
regardedassomethingexplainedeitherasunitssimple,amatteritselfbelongingtothecategoryidentifiedwithgeometricalofpureformsandspiritsextension.(Leibnizianmonadism)or
asamanifestationofforce
orenergfy.
Wehavenowtoconsideraclassofbodieswhichpossessapeculiarinterestforus,andseemtobesuperiortoalltheothers.Theyarelivingbodies,fromthelowliestmicro-organismtothehumanorganism.Thepropertywhichdistinguishesthemfromallotherbodiesisself-movement.Onthataccountcommonsenserecognisesinthemasoulorprincipleoflife,irreducibletoanycombinationofphysico-chemicalfactorsorelements.Ifthisisindeedthecase,wemustinquirewhethertherearenotdifferentkindsofsoul,whethervegetablesandanimalspossessasoul,etc.Ontheotherhandcertainphilosophers(knownbythegeneralappellationofmechanists)claimthatsciencewillonedayexplainallthephenomenaoflifebytheforcesoflifelessmatter,thatistosay,thattheliving
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organismissimplyaverycomplicatedphysico-chemicalmachine.Thisinvolvesaproblemofthefirstimportance.WhatisUfe?Whatarethefirstprincipleswhichconstitutethelivingorganism?
Butofalllivingthingswhichpossessabodythehighestisman.Manisasitwereaworldapart,forthestudyofwhichweareinapeculiarlyfavourableposition,becauseweknowhimfromwithinbywhatiscalledself-consciousness.Hismostdistinctivecharacteristicisthepossessionofintelligenceorreason.If,however,intelligenceisindeedsomethingwhollyimmaterial,itfollowsthatthesciencewhichstudiesman,thoughabranchofnaturalphilosophywhichtreatsofmovingorsensiblebeing,isinasenseintermediatebetweenthisdepartmentofphilosophyandmetaphysicswhichtreatsofthewhollyimmaterial.^
Ifitisthepossessionofintelligenceorreasonwhichmakesmanman,theproblemswhichrelatetohisintellectualactivitymust,itwouldseem,dominate
theentirescienceofman.^Andinfactthe
1Thescienceofmanoccupiesthereforeasingularposition(duetotheverynatureofitsobject)astridetwodistinctsciences,nattiralphilosophyandmetaphysics.Itisforthisreasonthatallquestionsinvolvingtheintellectandthestrictlyspiritualportionofpsychologydisplayinthecaseofmansuchextremecomplexityandare,sotospeak,overshadowedbymatter.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatwhentheThomistswishedtoinvestigatethesequestionsintheirpuritytheystudiednotmanbuttheangels.HencetheextremeimportanceofthetreatiseDeAngelis,notfortheologyalone,butalsoforphilosophyandmetaphysics.
'Observethatpsychologyasunderstoodbythemodernsdoesnotcorrespondexactlytotheancients'treatmentofthesoul.Aristotle'sTreplfvxv^>DeAnima,studiesnotonlythehumansoul,butalsothesoulingeneralastheprincipleoflife,whethervegetative,sensitive,orintellectual.Suchatreatisethereforebelongstowhatwenowcallbiologyaswellastopsychology.
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fundamentalproblemofpsychologyisthatoftheorigin,ofideas:howwearetoexplainthepresenceinusoftheideaswhichenableustoreasonaboutthingsandwhichpresentthingstousasuniversals.
Atthispointwehavebeenbroughtbackbyadifferentapproachtotheproblemofuniversalswhichwehavelatelyconsidered.Wethennotedthatwhatourideasimmediatelypresenttousissomethingnon-individualoruniversal.Wehavenowtoaskhowthisknowledgeoftheuniversalisacquiredbyourminds.
Wesawabovethatthingsastheyareknownbythesensesandthaimaginationarepresentedasindividuals.ItisthisparticularmanthatIsee,withthisparticularappearanceactuallyimpressingitselfonmyretinaanddistinguishinghimfromtheothermanIseebesidehim.Sense-knowledgeisthusknowledgeoftheindividualalone.Theobjectasobjectofsensationortheobjectreproducedbyanimageistheobjectapprehendedinitsindividuality.Since,therefore,whatweknowimmediatelybyourideasisnotindividual,thereasonmustbethatourideasareinfactextractedbyusfromoursensationsandimages,butinsuchafashionthatthereentersintothemnothingwhatsoeveroftheobjectasitexistsasanobjectofsensationorreproducedbyanimage(thatistosay,asweshallsee
later,astheobjectofaknowledgesteepedinmateriality).Arisingfromimages,butofahigherorderthantheimage,andapprehendingnothingoftheobjectasreproducedbytheimage,ourideasmustnecessarilybeunabletogiveusanyknowledgeoftheobjectinitsindividuality.
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Moreover,wecouldnotpossiblyderiveourideasfromthings,exceptbywayofoursenses,whichareinimmediatecontactwiththings.Andwehaveonlytoobservethementaldevelopmentofachildtobeconvincedthatallourknowledgebeginswiththesenses.Thereforeintellectualknowledge(knowledgebymeansofideas)mustundoubtedlybederivedfromsense-knowledge.
Ontheotherhand,sinceeverythingapprehendedbysensationsandimagesischaracterisedbyindividuality,ourideasmustbeextractedfromimagesinsuchawaythatnothingoftheimage,assuch,entersintotheidea.
Buthowisthisprocessofextractionconceivable?Ifnothingwhateveroftheobjectasitisreproducedbytheimageentersintotheobjectasitisapprehendedbytheidea,itisobviousthattheideaisnottheresultofanycombinationordistillationofsensationsorimages.Wearethereforecompelledtopostulateanagentofahigherorder,thevoii<;7roL7]Ti.x6(;,asthePeripateticstermedit,theintellectusagens—akindofintellectuallight(wemayperhapscompareittoX-rays)which,whenappliedtotheobjectpresentedtousbytheimage,drawsoutofitforourunderstandingsomethingalreadycontainedinitbuthidden,whichtheimagebyitselfcouldneverreveal.ThesomethingthusextractedandUberatedfromthatwhichconstitutestheindividualityoftheobject(becauseitisliberatedfromthatwhichconstitutesthematerialityofsense-knowledge)istheformorintelligiblelikenessoftheobject,whichis,sotospeak,imprintedontheintellecttodetermineittoknow,bymakingitproducewithinitselfbyavitalreactiontheidea
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
inwhichitapprehendstheobjectasauniversal;forexample,theideaofmanorlivingbeing,ofAryanorSemite.
Wemust,however,rememberthatwhatourideaspresentthusasauniversalisinitself(abstractingfix)mitsexistenceeitherinthingsorinthemind)neitherindividualnoruniversal,beingpurelyandsimplythat.whichthethingis.^
Wemustalsobearinmindthat,ifourintellectdoesnotdirectlyknowtheindividualassuch,itknowsitindirectly.For,attheverymomentwhenitthinksofanobjectbymeansofanidea,itturnstotheimagesfromwhichtheideahasbeendrawn,whichpresentthethingasanindividual.Andbythusreflectingontheimagesitapprehends,thoughindirectlyandinamannerwhollysuperficialandtotallyinexpressible,theindividualityofthething.
ConclusionVIII.—Ourideasareextracted{ab^straded)fromthesensibledatumbytheactivityofaspecialfaculty(theintellectusagensoractiveintellect)whichentirelytranscendsthesensibleorderandis,asitwere,thelightofourunderstanding.
Philosopherstermabstractiontheoperationbywhichwethusextractourideasfromthestoreofimagesaccumulatedbysenseexperience,ideaswhichrepresentthatwhichthethingis,abstractingfromitsindividuality.
Herewemayaddthatabstractionadmitsoflesserandgreaterdegrees.Forinstance,thoughtheidea
1I.e.thenature,essence,orquiddity,oftheobject.Seepp.20i,206.
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ofhorseis,likeeveryidea,abstract,whenwethinkofhorsewecanatthesametimeseeorimaginehorses,andthusknowinthesensibleorderwhatweknowatthesametimebymeansofourideaintheintelligibleorder.If,ontheotherhand,wethinkofangelorspiritJthesolefunctionofthemoreorlessvagueimageswhichaccompanythethoughtis,aswehavealreadyobserved,toassisttheintellecttofunction.Intheirownordertheyhavenovalueasknowledge,fortheytellusnothing.Wecanneitherseenorimagineanangeloraspirit;inthiscase,therefore,wecannotatthesametimeknowbyoursensesthethingweknowbyourintellect.
Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthethingswithwhichphilosophyisprimarilyconcernedbelongtothissecondcategory.Theycannotbeknowneitherbythesensesortheimagination,butsolelybytheintellect.
Itistothishigherdegreeofabstractionthatthestudyofphilosophyowesitsspecialdifficulty.Beginnersareoftenperplexedwhentheysuddenlyexchangetheliterarystudiesonwhichtheyhavebeenengagedhitherto,studiesinwhich
theimaginationwasemployedequallywiththeintellect,foranexercisewhollyintellectual.Butthisdifficultywillsoonpass,iftheywillnottrytorepresentbytheimaginationobjectsofpurethoughtwhichareentirelyunimaginable,such,forinstance,asessence,substance,accident,potentiality,andact;achimericalattempt,whichwillonlycauseneedlessheadachesandeffectuallypreventthemfromunderstandinganythingofphilosophy.
Ifabstractionisindeedsuchanoperationaswehavedescribed,itfollowsinthefirstplacethatman
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
isendowedwithaspiritualsoul,thefirstprincipleofthisfunction(foritsresult,ourideas,isincommensurablewithsensationsandimagesandofapurelyimmaterialorder);andontheotherhand,thatitisoftheverynatureofthisspiritualsoultobeunitedtoabody(forourideascannotbeformedexceptbymeansofsensationsandimages,whichinturnnecessarilysupposebodilyorgans).Wethusperceivehowtheproblemofabstraction,ortheoriginofideas,isboundupwithanotherfundamentalproblemofpsychology,whichconcernstheveryessenceofman:inwhatdoesthehumanbeingconsist?Doesmanpossessaspiritualsoul,whollydifferentfromthatofthebeasts?Andifsowhatistherelationshipbetweenthissoulandthehumanbody?
Ontheproblemoftheoriginofideasphilosophersmaybedividedroughlyintothreemaingroups:(a)Thesensualists,whoholdthatideasarederivedfromthesenses,butreduceideastosensations,(b)Thepartisansofinnateideas,^whorecognisetheessentialdistinctionbetweenideasandsensationsorimages,butdenythatweextractourideasfi-omthesensedatum,(c)TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomas^whichholdsthatourideasdifferessentiallyfromsensationsandimages,butthattheyareextracted
^Wemaysotermthissecondgroupindefaultofamoresuitabletitle,butonlyifweconsiderablywidenitsmeaning.Forinthisclassofphilosopherswemustincludenotonlythosewhoteachthatourideasexistinourmindsfrombirthinthesamewayasoursoulexists(thedoctrineofinnateideasinthestrictsense),butthosewhoholdthattheyareimmediatelyimplantedinusbyGodorareseenbyusinGJod(Berkeley,Malebranche),orarethearbitraryproductofourmindimposingitslawsonthings(Kant).
MATHEMATICSANDNATURE
fromthembytheoperationofthespirituallightinus(voiji;noirixiy(.6c„intellectusagens).
TheprincipalrepresentativesofsensualismareLocke(seventeenthcentury)andJohnStuartMill(nineteenthcentury)inEngland,andCondillac(eighteenthcentury)inFrance.Thesensualistsare,asarule,alsonominalists,buttheconversedoesnothold,andmanyphilosopherswhomweclasshereamongthedefendersofinnateideasbetray,inmodemtimesatleast,theinfluenceofnominalism.Inthesecondclass(thedefendersofinnateideas)wemustreckonPlatoamongtheancients,Descartes(seventeenthcentury)andLeibniz(seventeenthtoeighteenthcentury)amongthemodems.Thoughtheirexplanationsdiffer,alltheseholdthatourideasareinnate.Kant(endofeighteenthcentury)alsobelongstothisgroup,thoughforhimwhatisinnateisnotourideas,butthecategories,rules,orformsinaccordancewithwhichourmindmanufacturestheobjectsofknowledge.
PhilosophyofAristotUandSt.Thomas
OurideasarederivedOurideasareessentially
fromthesenses(andtheredifferentfromsensations
forefromthings)butbyandimages,butareab—
theoperationofaspiritualstracUdfromthembythe
faculty,andareessentiallyoperationofaspiritual
differentfromsensationsfaculty,andimages.
SensualismDoctrineofInnateIdeas
OurideasarederivedIdeasdifferessentially
fromthesenses,whicharefromsensationsandimages
sufficienttoproducethem,andarenotderivedfrom
anddonotdifferessentithesenses(northerefore
allyfromimagesandsenfromthings,withwhich
sations.oursensesaloneareinimmediatecontact).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Theanswerswhichphilosophershavegiventotheproblemofhumannaturecorrespondstrictlywiththepositiontheyadopttowardstheproblemofabstraction.Thesensualists,atleastsofarastheyarefaithfultothelogicoftheirdoctrine(Gondillac,forexample,wasnot),denyeitherthatthesoulexiste{materialists),orthatwecaninanycaseknowitsexistence{phenomenalists).Thedefendersofinnateideas,ontheotherhand,tendtoregardmanasapurespiritwhichhappenstobejoinedtoabody—how,theyfinditdifficulttoexplain{dualismorexaggeratedspiritualism).^Finally,theschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthatmanisacompositeoftwosubstantialprinciples,eachincompleteinitselfandthecomplementoftheother,oneofwhichisaspiritualandimmortalsoul{animism).
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas(Animism)
Twoprincipleseachincompleteinitself,oneofwhich(therationalsoul)isspiritual,formtogetherasinglesubstance(thehumancomposite).
ErrorofDefectErrorofExcess
ThehumansouldoesnotManisaspiritacci—
exist{materialism)orisdentallyunitedtoabodyunknowable{phenomenal-{exaggeratedspiritualism):ism).thesoulandthebodyare
twosubstanceseachcompleteinitself{dualism).
Weshouldremarkfurtherthatthepositionadoptedbyphilosopherstowardstheoriginofideasalsodeterminestheirattitudetothegeneralproblemofthe
*ThistendencyrecurseveninKant(especiallyinethics),thoughhe,likethephenomenalists,deniesthatreasoncandemonstratethe/existenceofthesoul.>i
MATHEMATICSANDNATURE
existenceofthingsknownbythesenses(thesensibleorcorporealworld)andofthingsinvisibleandspiritual,accessibletoreasonalone.
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{alsoofcommonsense)Itisimpossiblewithoutabsurditytodoubteithertheexistenceofcorporealobjects(attestedbythesenses)ortheexistenceofspiritualobjects(provedbyreason).
SystemsmoreorlessMaterialistNothingexistswhichisnotperceptiblebythesensesandmaterial{absolutematerialism);oratleastitsexistenceisunknowable{phetwmenalistmaterialismandpositivism).
SystemsmoreorlessIdealistTheworldperceivedbythesenseshasnorealexistence{absoluteidealism);oratleastitsexistenceisunknowableanddoubtful{phenomenalistidealism).
CRITIGISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)
Instudyingmanphilosophyisdealingwithanobjectwhichalreadybyanentireportionofitselftranscendsthecorporealworld,thatistosay,theworldofsensiblenature.Butithasthepoweranddutytogofurther,andsinceitsdistinctiveobjectisthebeingofthings,itmuststudythatbeingnolongerascorporeal,sensible,ormoving(thesubject-matterofthephilosophyofsensiblenature),butsimplyasbeing;consequentlyitmuststudybeingunderanaspectabsolutelyuniversal,andasitispresentnotonlyinvisiblethingsbutalsointhingswhichpossessnocorporeal,sensible,ormobilebeing;thatistosay,inthingswhicharepurelyspiritual.Thisistheobjectofthatbranchofphilosophywhichisphilosophyorwisdomparexcellence,andisknownasthefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.^
CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)
Butbeforeundertakingthisstudy,thephilosophermustsecureagainstallpossibleattackordistortionthe
1ThenamemetaphysicsoriginatedinthefactthatinthecatalogueofAristotle'sworksdrawnupbyAndronicusofRhodes,thetreatisedealingwiththefirstphilosophy(IlepirrjsirpuTtp<t>i\oao<f>la^,thetitleprobablywhichAristotlehimselfwouldhavegiventoit)comesafterthebookswhichtreatofnaturi(Meri
tAtpvaiKi).Itwouldseem,however,thatchronologicallyAristotlefollowedthesameorderintheactualcomp>ositionofhisworks.
178
CRITICISM(EPISTEMOLOGY)
principlesofthissovereignscience,whicharealsotheprinciplesofallhumanknowledge.Foritistheofficeofwisdomtodefenditsownprinciplesandthoseoftheothersciences.
Itwillthereforebenecessary,beforestudyingbeinginitself,assuch,tostudytherelationofhumanthoughttobeing.Thisistheobjectofaspecialdepartmentofmetaphysics,knownascriticism,becauseithasthefunctionofjudgingknowledgeitselfLogicshowshowandinaccordancewithwhatrulesreasonattainstruthandacquiresknowledge;thisinturnpresupposesthepKDSsibilityoftrueknowledge(apossibilityattestedbycommonsenseandevidentbythelightofnature).Criticismsubmitsthispresuppositiontoscientifictreatment,showinginwhatthetruthofknowledgeconsists,andestablishingbyareflexargumentthattrue,certain,andscientificknowledgeisundoubtedlyattainable.^
Whatisthetruthofknowledge,andisitpossibletorefiitethosewhoquestiontheveracityofourorgansofknowledge,particularlyoftheintellectorreason?Thisclearlyisthedoublequestionwhicharisesattheoutset.Theanswer,however,issufficientlyplain.
Astothefirstquestion,thereisnodifficultyinunderstandingwhatismeantbythenotionoftruth.Whatisatrueortruthfulword?Awordwhichexpresses,asitreallyis,thespeaker'sthought;awordin
1Bythusdistinguishingcriticism(epistcmology)fromlogic,andmakingitthefirstpart,specialintroduction,orifyouprefer,apologeticintroduction,tometaphysics,wearefaithfultothearrangementanddivisionsofAristotlehimself,whodiscussescriticismbriefly{Metaph.,iv)beforestudyingthegreatproblemsofbeingassuch.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
conformitywiththatthought.What,then,isatruethought?Athoughtwhich
represents,asitreallyis,thethingtowhichitrefers;athoughtinconformitywiththatthing.Wethereforeconcludethattruthinthemindconsistsinitsconformitywiththething.
Itisimpossibletodefinetruthotherwisewithoutlyingtoourselves,withoutfalsifyingthenotionoftruthofwhichinpracticewemakeuse,inthelivingexerciseofourintelligence,eachtimethatwethink.
Wemayfurtherremarkthatathoughtfalseinallitsconstituentsisanimpossibilityfor,beinginconformitywithnothingwhatsoever,itwouldbethezeroofthought.If,forinstance,Iaffirmthatstoneshaveasoul^thisisundoubtedlyacompleteerror.Butitistruethatstonesexist,truealsothatcertainbeingshaveasoul;thatistosay,alltheconstituentswhichcomposethisfalsethoughtarenotfalse.Thereforeerroritselfpresupposestruth.^
Wemayalsoobservethatifmanwerereallyandseriouslytodoubttheveracityofhisorgansofknowledgehesimplycouldnotlive.Sinceeveryactionorabstentionfromactionisanactoftrustinthatveracity,actionandinactionwouldalikebecomeimpossible.AmanthereforewhoattemptedtocarryoutinhisUfethethoughttruthisimpossibleformewouldinevitablylosehisreason.Nietzsche,whowasagreatpoetbutregardedbeliefintruthastheultimatebondagefromwhichtheworldshouldbedeUvered,madetheexperimenttohiscost.
iCf.Sum.TheoL,ii-ii,q.172,a.6:Sicutsehabetbonuminrebus,itaverumincognilione.ImpossibiUestauteminvenirialiquidinrebus,quodtotaliterbonoprivetur:undeetiamimpossibileestessealiquamcogrdtionemquaetotalitersitfalsaabsqueadmixtionealicujusveritatis.
CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)
Asforthesceptics,whodoubt,atleasttheoreticallyandinwords,thereliabilityofourorgansofknowledge,especiallyoftheintellectorreason,itwouldobviouslybewasteofbreathtoattempttodemonstrateitsreliabilitytothem.Foreverydemonstrationrestsonsomepreviouslyadmittedcertainty,anditistheirveryprofessiontoadmitofnone.Todefendhumanknowledgeagainsttheirattackitissufficient(i)toshowinwhatthatknowledgeconsistsandhowitisattained;(ii)torefutetheargumentstheyadduce;(iii)tomakeareductioadabsurdum.Whentheysaythattheydonotknowwhetheranypropositionistrue,
eithertheyknowthatthispropositionatanyrateistrue,inwhichcasetheyobviouslycontradictthemselves,ortheydonotknowwhetheritistrue,inwhichcasetheyareeithersayingnothingwhatever,ordonotknowwhattheysay.Thesolephilosophyopentothosewhodoubtthepossibilityoftruthisabsolutesilence—evenmental.Thatistosay,asAristotlepointsout,suchmenmustmakethemselvesvegetables.Nodoubtreasonoftenerrs,especiallyinthehighestmatters,and,asCicerosaidlongago,thereisnononsenseintheworldwhichhasnotfoundsomephilosophertomaintainit,sodifficultisittoattaintruth.Butitistheerrorofcowardstomistakeadifficultyforanimpossibihty.
ConclusionIX.—Thetruthofknowledgeconsistsintheconformityofthemindwiththething.Itisabsurdtodoubtthereliabilityofourorgansofknowledge.
Onthisquestionofthereliabilityofourorgansofi8i
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
knowledgephilosophersmayagainbedivided—roughly—intothreegroups:
{a)Thesceptics,who,impressedbytheenormousnumberoferrorsputforwardbymen,andespeciallybyphilosophers,doubtthetrustworthinessofreason,andaffirmthattruthisimpossibleofattainment.Theprincipalrepresentativesofscepticismare,amongtheancients,Pyrrho(360-270),theneo-Academics(Arcesilas315-241;Cameades,214-129)andthelaterGreeksceptics(Aenesidemus,firstcenturya.d.,andSextusEmpiricus,endofthesecondcentury);inmoderntimesMontaigneandSanchezinthesixteenthcentury,andpreeminentlyDavidHumeintheeighteenth.
Thephilosopherscalledanti-intellectualists,becausetheydespairofintellectandreason,andlookfortruthtothewill,toinstinct,feeling,oraction(Rousseau,Fichte,Schopenhauer,Bergson,WilliamJames,themodernistandpragmatistschool),mustbeclassifiedwiththesceptics,because,althoughtheydonot,likethescepticsstrictlysocalled,declaretruthunattainable,theymaintainthatitisunattainablebytheorganwhosedistinctivenatureitistodiscovertruth,andbecausebyrejectingtheintellectandreeisontheyeffectuallydeprivemanofhissolenormalmeansofattainingit.
(b)Therationalists,onthecontrary,areofopinionthattruthiseasytoattain,andthereforeundertaketobringallthingswithinthecompassofreason,ahumanreasonwhichhasnoneedtosubmithumblyandpatientlytothediscipline,
whetherofreaUtyitself,ateacher,orGod.Inthefirstcasetheytendtosubjectivism,whichtakesasitscriterionoftruththeknowingsubject,nottheobjecttobeknown;apositionwhichisthedissolutionofknowledge.Inthe
CRITICISM(EPISTEMOlogy)
secondtheytendtoindividualism,whichcallsuponeachphilosophertoworkoutaphilosophyentirelyhisown,andcreateanoriginalandnovelviewoftheuniverse{Weltanschauung).Inthethird,theytendtonaturalism^whichclaimstoattaintoaperfectwisdombytheunassistedpowersofnature,andrejectsalldivineteaching.^
ThefatherofmodemrationalismwasDescartes(seventeenthcentury),towhomMalebranche,Spinoza,andLeibniztracedmoreorlessdirectlytheirphilosophicpedigree.ButitsfirstprinciplesandtruespiritwererevealedbyKant(endofeighteenthcentury),whocompletedtheCartesianrevolution;hispantheisticsuccessors,Fichte,Schelling,andHegel,deifiedthehumansubjectofknowledge.ThroughKant,andthesubjectivistphilosophywhichtracesitsorigintohim,rationaUsm,asbeforeintheeraofthesophists,hasjoinedhandswithitsopposite(scepticism),andbecomeabsorbedintheanti-intellectualismofthemodernists(endofthenineteenthandbeginningofthetwentiethcentury).
{c)TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthattruthisneitherimpossiblenoreasy,butdifficultformantoattain.
Itisthusradicallyopposedaliketoscepticismandtorationalism.Itseesinthemultitudeoferrorsput
1Naturalismrejectsdivineteachinginthesetwodifferentways:(I)ItdeniesGodtherighttoteachmentruthsinthemselvesinaccessibletotheunassistedreason{supernaturalmysteries).(2)Italsodenieshimtherighttoteachmenbyrevelationtruthsinthemselvesaccessibletounassistedreason(truthsofthenaturalorder,philosophictruths—forexample,theimmortalityofthehumansoul)whichreasoncanindeeddiscoverbyitsunaidedpowers,butalwayswiththeriskofminglingerrorwithtruth,whereasrevelationbringsthemwithinthereachofall,easilyandwithoutanyadmixtureoferror.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
forwardbymenandparticularlybyphilosophersasignindeedoftheweakness
ofthehumanunderstanding,butareasontoprizetheintellectthemoredearlyandtoembracetruththemoreardently,andaninstrumentfortheadvancementofknowledgebytherefutationsandexplanationswhichtheseerrorscallforth.And,ontheotherhand,itrecognisesthatreasonisoursolenaturalmeansofattainingtruth,butonlywhenformedanddisciplined,inthefirstplaceandpreeminentlybyrealityitself(forourmindisnotthemeasureofthings,butthingsthemeasureofourmind),secondlybyteachers(forscienceisacollective,notanindividual,achievement,andcanbebuiltuponlybyacontinuouslivingtradition),andfinallybyGod,ifheshouldpleasetoinstructmankindandbestowuponphilosophersthenegativeruleoffaithandtheology.*
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt,Thomas
{ModerateIntellectualism)
Thatwhichreallyisthecauseoftruthinthemind.
Reasoniscapableofattainingwithcompletecertainty
themostsublimetruthsofthenaturalorder,butwith
difficultyandonlywhendulydisciplined.
ErrorbyDefectErrorbyExcess
ReasonisincapableofReasonattainstruthin
attainingtruth,whicheverysphereeasilyandeitheriswhollyinaccessiblewithoutanyneedofsub-toman(scepticism)ormustmittingtoanyexternalbesoughtotherwisethandiscipline(rationalism).bytheintellect(anti-intel-lectualism).
SynthesisoftheseTwoErrorsThemindofmanmakesthetruthofthatwhichheknows(namely,phenomena),andthatwhichreallyis,thethinginitself,isunknowablebyreason(criticismorKantianagnosticism).
1Seeabove,p.124.184
CRITICISM(EPISTEMOLOGY)
Anotherquestion,amongthosewithwhichcriticismisconcerned,demandsconsiderationhere.Theintellectorreasonbeingtheinstrumentofphilosophy,whatistheformalobjectoftheintellect,towhichintellectualknowledgerelatesdirectlyandinitself?
Toanswerthisquestionitissuflficienttoaskoneselfwhethertheredoesnotexistanobjectwhichisalwayspresenttothemindwhentheintellectfunctions?Suchanobjectdoesexist.WhateverIknowbymyintellect,thereisalwayssomebeingormodeofbeingpresenttomymind.Thereis,however,nothingelseexceptbeingwhichisalwayspresentinthisway.If,forexample,Ithinkofaquality,amagnitude,orasubstance,inallthesecasesalikeIthinkofsomebeingormodeofbeing;butthereisnothingexceptbeingwhichiscommontothesethreeobjectsofthought,andthereforepresentinallthreealike.Wethereforeconcludethatbeingistheformalobjectofintellect,thatistosay,theobjectwhichitapprehendsprimarilyandinitself(perseprimo)andinfunctionofwhichitapprehendseverythingelse.
Toknowthecauseofathing,itspurpose,origin,properties,andrelationswithotherthings,isinthesevariouswaystoknowwhatitis,toapprehenditsbeingunderthosedifferentaspects.Tousetheunderstandingwithoutthenotionofbeingarisingisanimpossibility.
Theintellect,moreover,isabletoapprehendthebeingofbodiesintheirsensibleappearances(phenomena).Itisthus,forexample,thatinphysiologyitstudiesthepropertiesoflivingorganismsinreferencetocauseswhichthemselvesbelongtothesensibleorder.Ofthisnaturearethesciencesofsecondary
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
causesorthesciencesofphenomena.Buttheintellectcanalsoapprehendthebeingofthingsintheirfirstprinciples.Thisisthefunctionofphilosophyasa
whole,whichinturnissubdividedintonaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics^accordingasthebeingapprehendedinitsfirstprinciplesbytheintellectisthebeingofbodiesassuchorbeingsimplyasbeing.
Psychologyindeeddealswiththisquestionoftheformalobjectoftheintellect.Butthedistinctivefunctionofcriticismistomakeclearthatthebeingwithwhichwearehereconcernedisindeedtheactualbeingofthings,whichexistsinthemindependentlyoftheknowingmind.Tomaintainonthecontrarythattheobjectofourintellectisnotthebeingofthingsbuttheideaofbeingwhichitformsinitself,ormoregenerallythatweapprehendimmediatelyonlyourideas,'istodeliveroneselfboundhandandfoottoscepticism.Forifthatwerethecase,itwouldbeimpossibleforourmindunderanycircumstancestoconformitselftothatwhichreallyis,andtruthwouldthereforebeunattainable.Moreover,theintellectwouldstandconvictedoffalsehood,forwhattheintellectprofessestoknowiswhatthingsarc,notwhatitsideasare.Inrealityideas,astheconsciousnessofeverymanwitnessesimmediately,areourinstrumentsofknowledge.If,therefore,knowledgedidnotapprehendthethingsthemselves,knowingwouldbeanoperationoractivitywithoutendorobject,whichisabsurd.Fortoformanideaorjudgmentistoknow,justastomakeuseofaknifeistocut.And,justasitisimpossibletocutwithoutcuttingsomething
1ThedoctrineofDescartesandafterhimofallsubjectivephilosophy.
CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGy)
—theendorobjectoftheactofcutting,whichisnottheknife,butthethingcutbyit—soitisimpossibletoknowwithoutknowingsomething—theendorobjectoftheactofknowing,whichisnottheidea,butthethingknownbyit.^
ConclusionX.—Theformalobjectoftheintellectisbeing.Whatitapprehendsofitsverynatureiswhatthingsareindependentlyofus.
Fromthetwotruthsjustenunciated,theintellectisatruthfulfaculty,andbeingisthenecessaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,therearisesasacorollaryafundamentaltruth.
Byintelligiblewemeanknowablebytheintellect.Buttoaffirmthatbeingisthenecessaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,andthattheintellectattainstrueknowledge,amountstosayingthatbeing,assuch,isanobjectofwhichtheintellectpossessestrueknowledge;thatistosay,thatitisintelligible.Andto
saythatbeingassuchisintelligibleistosaythatintelligibihtyaccompaniesbeing,sothateverythingisinteUigibleinexactproportiontoitsbeing.Wethereforeconclude—
ConclusionXL—Beingassuchisintelligible.Everythingisintelligibleinexactproportiontoitsbeing.
*Intellectualknowledgecomesintoexistencebymeansofideas.Butideasaresimplythatbymeansofwhich{idquo),notthatwhich{idquod)weknowdirectly,apuremediumofknowledge,not(unlessreflexively)anobjectortermknown.Thisiswhywesaythatthebeingofthingsistheimmediateobjectofourintellectualknowledge(byimmediatewemeanknownwithouttheintermediaryofanothertermorobjectpTiviouslyknown).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Itmustbeborneinmindthatwhenweaffirmthateverythingisintelligibleinexactproportiontoitsbeingwemeanintelligibleinitself,tointellect,notintelUgibletous,toourintellect.If,indeed,asaresultoftheinferiorityofhumannature,ourintellectisdisproportionedtoabeingwhichexceedsitbecauseitissuperiortoman,thatbeing,thoughinitselfmoreintelhgible,willbelessintelUgibletous.This,however,isthecasewithallwhollyspiritualnatures,andpre-eminentlyofGod.Inhimselfheisthemostintelligibleofbeings,buthisintellectaloneisproportionatetothissupremeintelligibility.
ONTOLOGY:ESSENCE
Havingincriticismexaminedanddefendedtheprinciplesofknowledgeingeneral,whetherscientificorphilosophic,wecanproceedtothestudyofmetaphysicsinthestrictsense,thatistosay,thescienceofbeingquabeing.Thisistheveryheartofphilosophy.Wehavenowtoconsiderbeingassuch,andthegreattruthsitcontainsinitself;toinquirehowitentersintoallthingswithoutbeingexhaustedbyany;tostudyitsinseparableproperties,unity,truth,andgoodness,towhichwemayaddbeauty;andfinallytotreatofitinitsactivity,andattempttopenetratethenatureandmodesofcausation.
Wemustalsoexaminehowthroughouttheentirecreateduniversebeingisdivided,whetherweconsidertheconstitutionofallcreatedbeing(divisionofbeingintopotentialityandact^essenceandexistence)orthedifferentkindsofcreatedbeings(divisionofbeingintosubstanceandaccident).Weshallthen
realisethattheconceptselucidatedbyontologyarethekeytoeverythingelse.Certainamongthemareindeedsoindispensablethatwemustconsiderthemhere,forindeedateveryturnweareobligedtoinvoketheprimaryconceptsofessence,ofsubstanceandaccident,oipotentialityandact.Thoughitisobviouslyimpossibleinamereintroductiontogiveananalysisandcompletedefenceoftheseconcepts,weshalltryto
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
establishthemwithallduecare,employing,itistrue,examplesratherthandevelopedarguments,andsimplifyingmattersconsiderably,butfollowingneverthelesstheorderdemandedbyastrictlyscientificstudy.
Althoughthenotionofbeing,sinceitisthefirstandbestknownofall,isevidentlytooclearinitselftoadmitofdefinitioninthestrictsense,thefirsttaskincumbentonamanwhowishestothinkseriouslyistoclarifythisnotioninhismind,andwiththatobjecttodiscovertheprimaryconceptionsintowhichitisdivided.'Weshallthereforebeginbyaskingthefollowingquestion:Whataretheobjectsofthoughtwhichinevitablyandfromtheveryoutsetimposethemselvesupontheintellectwhenitconsidersbeingassuch,ortoputitinanotherway,sincebeingistheprimaryobjectofintellect,whatareabsolutelythefirstdataoftheintellect?*
Weshallseethatthisonefundamentalquestionadmitsofthreeanswersaccordingasweadoptthe
1Cf.Aristotle,Metapk.,v.
'Thenotionsexplainedinpp.191sqq.presentsomedifficultytobeginnersonaccountoftheirextremelyabstractcharacter.Itis,however,impossibletoomitthem,fortheyareliterallyofprimaryimportance.Andinparticularweareconvincedoftheurgentnecessitytodefinewiththeutmostcare,fromtheveryoutset,thefundamentalconceptofessence.Materialsforthestudyofthisconceptarescatteredindifferentplaces,butisitnotbecausewehaveforgottentocollectthemthatthetermessence,whenwemeetitonthethresholdofmetaphysics,arousesto-daysuchsuspicion,and,evenifitforcesitselfonouracceptance,leavessuchvaguenessinthemind?
Thestudentmustthereforedevoteparticularattentiontothestudyofthenotionshereexplained,without,however,attemjitingtocomprehendthemperfectly.For
themomentitwillbesufficienttomakehisfirstacquaintancewiththem.Laterwhenhemeetsthemagaininontology,afterhehasbecomemorefamiliarwithphilosophy,theywillseemmucheasier.
ontology:essence
standpointofintelligibility,ofexistence,orofaction.Theconsiderationofthefirstofthesestandpointswillleadustodeterminewhatismeantbyessence,ofthesecondtodeterminewhatismeantbysubstance(asopposedtoaccident),ofthethirdtodeterminewhatismeantbyact(asopposedtopotentiality).
ESSENCE
Weshallfirstconsiderbeingfromthestandpointofintelligibility;thatistosay,weshallconsiderbeingsofarasitisadaptedtoenterthemind,oriscapableofbeingapprehendedbytheintellect.Thisisthemostuniversalstandpointwecanadopt,forwehaveseenthatbeingassuchisintelligibleandhencethatintelligibilityisco-extensivewiththatwhichisorcanbe.Totheprimarydatumoftheintellectfromthispointofviewweshallgivethenameofessence.
(a)ToconsiderbeingfromthestandpointofintelUgibiUtyorasitiscapableofbeingapprehendedbytheintellectisinthefirstplacetoconsideritsofarasitcanbesimplypresentedtothemindwithoutaffirmationornegation—insofarasitcanbetheobjectofsimpleapprehension,asweshalltermitlater.Triangle,polygon,seated,thisman,aresomanyobjectssimplypresentedtothemindwithoutbeingaffirmedordenied.
Fromthispointofviewtheprimarydatumoftheintellectisquitesimplythatwhichisplacedattlieoutsetbeforeourmindwhenweformtheconceptionofanything,orconceivetheideaofit.Sincewehaveagreedtousethetermessenceinthissense,weconclude
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
thatanessenceisthatwhichinanyobjectofthoughtwhatsoeverisimmediatelyandprimarily{perseprimo)presentedtotheintellect:idquodinaliquareperseprimointelligitur.
Everyideawhatsoever,unlessitbe,liketheideaofasquarecircle,apseudo-
ideainvolvingacontradiction,bringsimmediatelybeforethemindsomething.Thesomethingthusimmediatelypresentedtothemindisanessenceoranature.WhenIthinkofman,humanity,animal,goodness,white,whiteness,seated,triangle,etc.,eachoftheobjectsthusimmediatelypresentedtomymind,eachoftheseintelligibleunitsisbydefinitionanessenceinthewidesenseoftheword.^
Anessencethereforeissimplyanobjectofthoughtassuch.Everyessence,however,possessesitsintelligibleconstitutionwhichdistinguishesitfromothersandinvolvescertainattributes.
Here,however,animportantobservationmustbemade.IfIconsiderthetrianglewithitsproperties,man,humanity,etc.,theyremainexactlywhattheyareasobjectsofthought,whetherIsupposethemactuallytoexistornot.Thefactofexistencedoesnotinanywayaffectessencesassuch.ToconceivethemI
1Wehavealreadyseenthattheindividualassuchisnotdirectlyapprehendedbyourintellect.Whenindirectly,byareflectionontheimages(seeabove,p.172),weformanindividualconcept,theobjectpresentedtoourmindbythisconcept,Peter,thisman,thistree,isabo,sofarasitisanobjectofthought,anessenceinthewidesenseoftheterm.Thatistosay,theconceptofessenceinthewidesensemustbeextendedeventoindividualobjectsofthought.Asforthoseconceptualbeings{blindness,forexample,ornothingness)whichpresentnothingthatreallyexists,thenameessenceisinapplicabletothemforthereasonthataprivationassuchhasobviouslynoessence.(SeeSt.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.)Nevertheless,fromourpresentstandpoint,wemaycallthemimproperlyessences,inthewidesense.
ontology:essence
abstractfromthefactthattheydoordonotactuallyexist.
Wethusperceivethatbeinginthesenseofexistenceandbeinginthesenseofessencebelongtotwodistinctcategories.^Thetermbeinghastwowhollydifferentmeanings.Forexample,inthequotation"tobeornottobe,thatisthequestion,"beingmeansexistence^butonthecontraryinthephrasealivingbeingitmeansessence.Inthefirstcasethetermbeingsignifiestheactofbeing,theact,ifImaysoputit,whichpositsathingoutsidenonentity,andoutsideitscauses{extranihil,extracausas);andinthesecondcaseitsignifiesthatwhichisormaybe,thatwhichcorrespondstosomeexistenceactualorpossible.We
maythereforesaythatbeingisdi\ddedintoessenceandexistence.
BEING(thatwhichis:essenceinthewidesense(essentia)(ens)\{entitas)\actofbeing:existence(existentia)
Therelationshipwhichobtainsbetweenthesetwotermsisaproblemwhichweshallstudylater;itis,beyondquestion,notsimplywithreferencetoourselves,Uketheproblemofuniversals,butinitselfthefundamentalproblemofphilosophy:areessenceandexistencereallydistinctinallthingsexceptGod?
Actualexistence,thefactofexistingactually,isnot
^Observethatinexistenceitselfwemaydistinguishtwothings:existenceasthefactofexisting{existereinactuexercito)andexistenceasanobjectofthought{existentiautquodquidest).Regardedfromthelatterpointofviewexistenceitselfassumestheobjectivestatusofeveryobjectofthoughtandconfrontstheintellectasaparticularessenceorquiddity.Esseduplicitersumipotest,scilicetinactuexercitoipsiusexistentiae,etpermodumquidditatis;etutexercetexistentiam,additsupraseipsumutquodquidest;etconsequenterutobjectutjiintellectusestabstractius{quamutobjectumvoluntatis):quiaestobjectumvoluntatissecundumquodstatinactuexercitoexistentiae,intellectusautemsecundumquodrationemhabetquidditatiscujusdaminseipso.Cajetan,inI,q.8a,a.3.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
includedintheobjectofanyofourideasassuch.Ourintellectcanascribeactualexistencetoaparticularobjectofthoughtonlybybasingitselfdirectlyorindirectlybymeansofratiocinationonthewitnessofoursenses(orreflexivelyofourconsciousness).Thusitimmediatelyjudgessensibleobjectsexist,Iexist,anddemonstratestheexistenceofGodbyarguing,forexample,fromtheobservedfactofmotion.Itcannotbyitselfaloneattaintheactualexistenceoftheobjectsofitsthought.
Thoseessences,ontheotherhand(suchastriangle,evennumbers,humanity),whichoftheirnatureconnoteonlyapossibleexistence(forwhichreasontheyarealsocalledpossibles),aredatafurnishedimmediatelybyourintellectandideas.
Wemustnowexaminemorecloselythisnotionofessence,orbeingunderstood
asthatwhichisorcanbe.Wehavejustdefinedanessence:thatwhichinanyobjectofthoughtwhatsoeverisimmediatelyandprimarilypresentedtotheintellect:idquodinaliquareperseprimointelligitur.Letusseewhetherthisextremelywideconcept(foritisapplicabletoanyobjectofthought)maynotbesubdividedandqualifiedinsuchawaythatthesamedefinitiontakeninamorerestrictedsenseshallhenceforwardbeapplicable,ineachparticularinstance,onlytoaparticularobjectofthought.
{b)Themerepresentationtothemindofanobjectofthought{man,white)isbutthebeginningofintellectualknowledge,whichisperfectonlyinthejudgmentbywhichthemindaffirmsordeniesthisobjectofthoughtinreferencetoanother{Peterisaman,thisfloweriswhite).Ifthenwewouldconsider
ontology:essence
beingfromthestandpointofintelligibility,todiscoverwhatisfromthispointofviewtheabsolutelyprimarydatumoftheintellect,wemustconsiderobjectsofthoughtsofarastheycanbeapprehendedbytheintellectwhenitjudges,forexamplewhenitaffirmsthatPeterisaman.Fromthispointofviewwhich,amongthevariousobjectsofthoughtwhichcanberealisedinagivensubject,isthatwhichtheintellectapprehendsimmediatelyandbeforeeverythingelse?Weshallcallitessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterm.
Consideranyobjectofthought,forexample,Peter,Paul,thisdog,thisbird:Peteristall,Paulislaughingandmoving,thisdogisbarking,thisbirdisflying.Eachoftheseisaparticularwhole,individual,concrete,andindependent,completelyequippedforexistenceandaction.
Itisindividualsubjectsofthiskindthatourmindapprehendsbeforeanythingelse(fromthestandpointofexistence)whenwethinkofthatwhichis.Whenappliedtoobjectsofthiskindtheexpressionthatwhichisacquiresamoredefiniteandspecialforce.Itnolongersimplymeansthatwhichcorrespondstosomeactualorpossibleexistence,butthatwhichfulfilsinthestrictestsenseandbeforeeverythingelsetheactofbeing.Theseobjectsareall,thoughinverydiverserespects,actorsinthedramaoftheuniverse.
When,however,weadoptthestandpointofintelligibility,ourminddoesnotamongthedifferentobjectsofthoughtwhichthingscanpresentapprehendinthefirstplacetheseindividualsubjectsassuch.Onthecontrarytheindividual,as
wehaveseenabove,escapesthedirectgraspoftheintellect.WhatIknowofPeteriswhatIknowheis—forexample,a
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
man.ItissuchobjectsofthoughtasmanorhumanitywhichitperceivesinPeter,orsuchaswhiteorwhitenesswhichitperceivesinthisflower,itiswhatathingisthat,fromthispointofview,ourmindprimarilyapprehends,anditisthereforeintliisdirectionthatwemustlookfortheabsolutelyfirstdatumoftheintellectinrelationtointelligibility(essenceinthestrictsense).
Theconceptofessenceinthewidesensehasthusbeensubdividedintotwo.Thereisinthefirstplacethatwhichinthestrictsenseis,thatwhich.Andinthesecondplacewhatathingis,what.
{thatwhichis:essencejwhatinthewidesense\thatwhichactofbeing:existence
Thatwhichisinthestrictsenseweshallentitletheprimarysubjectofexistenceandaction.Itiswhatphilosophersalsotermsuppositumandperson.Forthemomentwemayneglectit,for,asweshallsee,itdoesnotconcernourpresentinquiry.
Letus,onthecontrary,considerwhatathingis.Inthenotionofwhatathingistherearefurtherdistinctionsandexclusionstobemade,todeterminemorepreciselywhatisactuallytheabsolutelyprimarydatumoftheintellectfromthestandpointofintelHgi-bilityandthereforedeservestobeentitledessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterm;what,forexample,istheessenceofPeter.Peterisseated.Peteriscapableoflaughter.Peterisaman.IswhatisherepredicatedofPeter—seated,capableoflaughter,man—ineachofthesethreecases,orinonealone,thebeingwhichtheintellectapprehendsinPeterimmediatelyandprimarilyfromthestandpointofintelligibility?Wesaidabovethateveryobjectofthoughtis,assuch,
ontology:essence
anessence{essenceinthewidesense).NowwearestudyingwhatPeteris,andinquiringwhatistheobjectofthoughtwhichconstitutestheessenceofPeter{essenceinthestrictsense).
Thefollowingarethecharacteristicsoftheobjectofthoughtthusdefined,thatis,ofthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectwhenitconsiderswhatathingis.
Itisatonceplainthatthebeingtowhichtheintellectisdirectedinthefirstplacewhenitthinkswhatathingis,isabeingwhichtheintellectcannotconceivethatthinglackingordeprivedof.
Itisinfactintermsofthatbeingthattheintellectimmediatelyconceives,apprehend?,grasps,setsbeforeitselfandnamestheobjectinquestion.Todeprivethethingofthatbeing,ortoalteritsconstitutioninanyway,wouldbetosetbeforetheintellect,bydefinition,adifferentthing.
Itisthusabeingwhichthatthingsofarasitexistscannotlackorbedeprivedof(otherwisetheintellectwouldnotbetruthful).Forexample,Peter,sofarasheexists,cannotbeotherthanaman;ontheotherhand,hecanbenotseated.
Thebeinginquestionisthereforeabeingwhichthethingconsideredbytheintellectisnecessarilyandimmutably.
Moreover,itisobviouslythebeingwhichinthethingpossessesprimaryimportancefortheintellect,sinceitisthattowhichtheintellectisfirstdirected.Itisthusthebeingwhichbeforeanythingelse^the
ItIsplainthatthewordbeforedenotesinthisconnectionapriorityofnature,notoftime.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
objectis,andis,sotospeak,thegroundofwhattheobjectisinotherrespects.Itisthefirstbeingofthething.Peter,forexample,isamanbeforeheiscapableoflaughterormortal.
Weconcludethatthebeingtowhichtheintellectisinthefirstplacedirectedwhenitthinkswhatathingis,isitsnecessaryandfirstbeing,or,inshort,thebeingwhichconstitutesthething,whatitnecessarilyandprimarilyis.
Thisisthefirstcharacteristicofwhatweh^veagreedtocallessenceinthestrictsense.
Thereisasecond.Itwasthestandpointofintelligibility,itwillberemembered,whichweadoptedwhenweundertookthisstudyofessence.Peterisaman{rationalanimal)beforebeingmortal.Thatis,manincludesanimal,andinthenotionofanimaltheintellectfindsthenecessarycharacteristic,mortal.Thecharacteristicsmortalandcapableoflaughter—necessarilypossessedbyPeter—haveinhimaprincipleandground,whichbyitsverynotion,orbywhatitis,oritsownintelligibiUty,compelstheintellecttopositthesecharacteristics,andthisprincipleorgroundisoneoftheelementsoraspectswhichconstitutethebeingman.ItisfromthestandpointofintelligibilitythatPeterisamanbeforebeingmortalorcapableoflaughter.
Thusifthebeingmanis,aswehavesaid,first,itisintheorderofintelligibilitythatitisfirst.Inotherwords,itisinPeterthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.^Howeverlongourformula,wemustsay,ifwewouldexpressthistruthexactly,thatthebeingmanisin
1NonenimresintelligibUisestnisipersuamdefinitionemetessentiam,St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.
ontology:essence
virtueofitsconstituentelementsoraspectstherootofallthecharacteristicsnecessarilypossessedbyPeter^whichhaveinPeteraprinciplewhichbyitsverynotionrequiresthem.
This,then,isthesecondcharacteristicofwhatwehaveagreedtocallessenceinthestrictsense;ofthebeingtowhichtheintellectisdirectedinthefirstplacewhenitconsiderswhatthingsare.Itisinthethingthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.
Ourintellectapprehendsthisbeingwhichisthefirstprincipleofintelligibilityintwoways,oneimperfect,theotherperfect.
If,forexample,weknowthatanobjectisaman,without,however,beingabletostatewhatmanis,wepossessaconfusedknowledgeofthebeinginquestion.Ourintellectgraspsthatbeing,hastrulyapprehendedit,andreallyperceivesit,but,sotospeak,afterthefashioninwhichoureyesseeanopaqueobject.
If,however,weknowthissameobjectandareabletodefinewhatitis{ananimalendowedwithreason)wenowpossessadistinctknowledgeofthebeing
inquestion.
Ourintellectnotonlyperceivesit,butalsoperceivesitsprinciplesorconstituentaspects.
Inthefirstinstancethebeinginquestionispresentedtousimperfectly,inthesecondperfectly,withtheperfectiondemandedbyscience,sothatwecanemployitasafirstprincipleofintelligibility.(Forexample,fromtheknowledgethatthisthingisendowedwithreasonIcandeducethatitiscapableofspeaking,laughing,worshippingGod,etc.)Butinbothinstancesitisobviouslythesamebeingwhichispresentedto
1Thesecharacteristicsaretermedproperties.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
US.Therefore,thoughIdonotyetknoworevencanneverknowthisparticularbeingdistinctlyasarationalanimal,initselfitwillbenonetheless(thoughinthiscaseIdonotknowhow)invirtueofitsconstituentelementstherootofallthecharacteristicswhichpossessinPeteraprinciplerequiringthembyitsverynotion;itwillbenonethelessinitselftheprimarybeingofthethingasthefirstprincipleofitsintelligibility.
Wenowknowwhatarethecharacteristicsofessenceinthestrictsenseandareinapositiontodefineitasfollows:Essenceisthenecessaryandprimarybeingofathingasthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,or,inotherwords,whatathingnecessarilyandprimarilyisasintelligible,inshort,theprimaryintelligiblebeingofathing:idquodperseprimointelligiturinaliquare.^
fthatwhichis:(whatathingisprimarilyiessenceintheessenceinthe-asintelligibleistrictsense
BEING-!widesense\thatwhich:ihcs\ih}tc\.oiaction{suppositum,person)\actofbeing:existence
1Essenceconsideredasanattributeofthething(forexample,manwhenwesayPeterisaman)isstrictlywhatthethingisnecessarilyandprimarilyasintelligible.Essenceconsideredseparatelyandinthepurestate(forexample,whenwespeakofhumanityorthebeingman,wecannotsayPeterishumanityorPeteristliebeingman)isstrictlythatinvirtueofwhichathingiswhatitis
necessarilyandprimarilyasintelligible,or,toputitinanotherway,thatinvirtueofwhichitisconstitutedinadeterminatedegreeofprimarilyintelligiblebeing.Ifthereforeweconsideressenceinthepurestate,wemustsubstituteinoursynopsesfortheexpressionwhattheexpressionthatinvirtueofwhich:
(thatwhichis:(thatinvirtueofwhichathing\s\essenceintheessenceinthe!whatitisprimarilyasintelligible/strictsensewidesense\thatwhich:thesubjectofaction{suppositum,person)\nctofbeing:existence
ontology:essence
ConclusionXII.—TheessenceofathingiswhatthatthingisnecessarilyandprimarilyasthefirstprincipleofitsintelUgibility.
Thisprimarydatumoftheintellectistermedbyphilosophersnotonlytheessencebutalsothequiddityandnature.ItiswhatAristotleandtheschoolmencalledthetoxt,^velvat,thequodquidest,^andwhichtheydefinedasidquodperseprimointelligiturinaliquare,'^adefinitionwithwhichwewerealreadyacquainted,buttowhichwehavenowattachedacompletelydefinitesense.
Thedefinition,whenusedofessenceinthewidesense,meantwhataparticularideafirstpresentstotheintellect.Whenemployedofessenceinthestrictsense,itmeanswhataparticular?,\ih]tctprimarilyisfortheintellect.
Observethateveryobjectofthought,everyessencewhatsoever[essenceinthewidesense)isinfacttheessenceofsomething[essenceinthestrictsense)apprehendedmoreorlesscompletely(insomeorotherofitsproperties).WhenIthinkofanimal,Iapprehendtheessenceof^Peterinonepartofitsproperties.WhenIthinkofmanIapprehenditasawhole.WhenIthinkofAryan,Breton,orPeterIapprehenditasawholewiththeadditionofcertaincharacteristicsorattributesderivedfromthematter(seebelow,pp.207-216).WhenIthinkofalivingbodyendowedwithsensibilityIapprehendtheentireessenceofthesubject
1TheLatinequivalentoftheGreektermisquodquideratesse—asSt.Thomasexplains{DeEnteetEssentia,i),idestIwcperquodaliquidhabetessequid,thatwhichmakesanyobjectofthoughtthisorthatparticularthing.
2Orstatedmorefully:idquodprimoinreconcipitur,sinequoresessenonpotest,esiquefundamentumetcausaceterorumquaesuntineadeinre:utanimal
rationaleesthominisessentia.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
animal(andatthesametimetheessenceofthesubjectPeterinonepartofitsproperties).WhenIthinkofwhiteorprudence,Iperceivetheessenceofaparticularquality.WhenIthinkofgoodness,unity,being,IapprehendacertaincreatedparticipationoftheDivineEssence(orIapprehend,byanalogy,ifIthinkofsubsistentgoodness,etc.,theDivineEssenceitself).
Observe,further,thateverysubjectcapableofformingpartofanypropositionwhatsoever^hasanessencedistinctivelyitsown,whetheritbeanindividualsubjectsuchasPeter{substantiaprima,subjectparexcellence),anabstractanduniversalsubject{substantiasecunda)suchasanimal,anaccident,forexample,aparticularcolourorvirtue,oratranscendental,forinstancetheone,thegood,etc.
Theprimaryintelligiblebeingofathingiscalledessence{essentia)becausesincetheintellectismodelledonbeing,whatathingprimarilyisfortheintellectmustbethatwhichisofprimaryimportanceinitfromthestandpointofbeingitself;infact,asweshallseelater,itisbyandinitsessencethatathingpossessesbeingorexistence{esse).^Itiscalledquiddity{quidditas)becauseitisthatwhichthedefinitionexpressesanddeclares,whichinturnanswersthequestionquidesthoc?Whatisthis?Itiscallednature{natura)becauseitisthefirstprincipleoftheoperationsfortheperformanceofwhichthethinghascomeintobeing{nata).*
1Withtheexceptionofconceptualbeings,whichdonot,strictlyspeaking,possessanessence(seeabove,p.192,note).
2Essentiadicitursecundumquodperearnetineareshabetesse.St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.
3Qjtidditasestipsareientitasconsideratainordineaddefinitionemexplicantemquidiliasit.Entitasverareiconsideratainordiruadesse,dicituressentia;inordineadoperationemdiciturnatura.
ontology:essence
Theformalobjectoftheintellectisbeing.Ontheotherhand,whatwehave
agreedtotermessenceisnothingbuttheprimaryintelligiblebeingofathing.Ourintellectcan,therefore,reallyapprehendtheessencesofthings.^Todenythiswouldbetodenytheintellectitself,andtosaythatitisboundtomisswhatispeculiarlyitsobject.
Moreover,ourintellectclaimstogiveusknowledgeoftheessencesofthings.Thescienceswhichareitsworkhavenootheraimthantograsptheseessences,eitherdistinctly,todeducefromthemthepropertiesofathing(aswhenweknowthataparticularfigureisaright-angledtriangle,orthatPeterisarationalanimal),orconfusedly,simplyinordertoplaceathinginitsspeciesanddescribeit(aswhenweknowthataparticularbodyissulphuridacid,aparticularplantalismaplantago).Ifthereforeourintellectwereincapableofreallyattainingtheessencesofthings,itwoulddeceiveus.Itisthereforeanabsolutelynecessaryconsequenceofthefundamentalaxiomthatourintellectistrustworthy,that—
ConclusionXIII.—Ourintellectiscapableofknowingtheessencesofthings.
Wedonotmaintainthattheintellectalwaysknowstheessencesofthings(inthetotaUtyoftheirproperties).Thespecificessencesofthingsareoften
1Itcanalsoattaindirectly(byanappropriateconcept)thesecomplete,i.e.completelydetermined,essences,atleastinthecaseofthingsimmediatelyaccessibletous,namely,bodies.(Weattain,forexample,thecomplete,i.e.completelydetermined,essenceofPeter,whenweknowPeternotonlyasalivingbeingorasananimal,butasaman.)
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
unknowntous,andundefined.Thisisduetotheimperfectionofthehumanintellect.Butwemaintainthatourintellectiscapableofknowingthem—andthereforedoesactuallyknowtheminmanycases.
Neitherdowemaintainthattheintellectcanalwaysknowtheessencesofthingsperfectly,thatisdistinctly.^Thatitcanoftenknowthemonlyconfusedly*mattersUttle.Whatiscertainisthatitiscapableofapprehendingthem.Theeye,totakeaparzdlelcase,seesthecolouredobjectswithinitscompasswithmoreorlessdistinctdetail;itmayrequiretheassistanceofamagnifyingglass,butitcanseethem.
Itisimportanttobearinmindthattheexperimentalsciencesareveryfarfrombeingabletoknowperfectlytheessenceofthethingswhichtheystudy.Theyare,infact,unabletoattainatrulydistinctnotionoftheiressences,andneverpossessmorethanaconfusedorpurelydescriptivenotionofthem.Theyknowthem,sotospeak,afterthefashionofablindmanbymeansofindirectsigns.
Forexample,weknowdistinctlytheessenceornaturemanwhenwedistinguishmanfromtheotheranimalsbythespecificdifferenceendowedwithreason.Butwecannotknowinthesamefashionhowthedog,forexample,differsfromthelion;weknowitonlybydifferencesofapurelydescriptivekind.Oftenevenwhenwehavebeforeusaseriesofconceptsofdiminishinggenerality,forinstance,alivingbody,animal,irrationalanimal,vertebrate,mammal,canine,dog,poodle,
1Evensoitcandeterminethemonlybymeansofanevidentcharacterpreviouslyknownbyus(forinstance,thefacultyofreasoninhumannature)whichitperceivestobeanecessaryfactorofitsconstitution.
*Seeabove,p.J99.
ontology:essence
etc.,endingwithGyporFido,wemaynotknowwhatconcept{canine?dog?poodle?)designates(inthetotalityofitsproperties)theessenceofGyporFido.This,however,doesnotalterthefactthatsomewhereintheseriesofconceptsintheUstjustgiven,andanyotherswhichmightbeinsertedamongthem,theremustnecessarilybeaconceptwhichdesignatesthatessence.(Infact,intheexamplewehavechosen,itistheconceptdog,aszoologydiscoversbyindirectsigns,andwithoutbeingabletogiveusatrulydistinctknowledgeoftheessencethusapprehended.)
Whenwethinkofman,forexample,oranyotherobjectdirectlypresentedtothemindbyahumanidea(anabstractidea),weputbeforeourselvessomethingstrippedofindividuality,somethingwhich,beingapprehendedbyasingleconcept,constitutesinourmindasingle,andsolitaryobjectofthought—whichisthereforeinourmindsomethingbelongingtoone{man)andcapableofexistinginmany(inallmen),thatissomethinguniversal.^Thuseverythingdirectlyapprehendedbyanideaofourintellect—andconsequentlytheessenceofathing—isinourmindasauniversal.
Nodoubt,consideredasitexistsinreality,theessenceisindividuated,foritisthenidenticalwithasubject,Peterforexample,whoishimselfindividual.*
1Seeabove,p.159.
2If,forinstance,IcansayPeterisaman,itisbecausethething(thematerialobject)apprehendedundertheobjectofthoughtmanisidenticalwiththethingapprehendedundertheobjectofthoughtPeter.WhenIthusproceedfromtheexistenceofthingsinmymindtotheirexistenceinreality,Imustsaythattheobjectofthoughtman,singleinmymind,ismultipliedinalltlieindividualsinwhichitisrealisedandisidenticalwitheach.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Butthisconditionofindividualityisnopartoftheverynatureorinmostconstitutionoftheessence,doesnotbelongtotheessenceofPeterassuch,toitscharacterasanessence.Ifindeedtheessenceconsideredinitself{secundumse)wereindividual,ourintellectcouldneverknowit,foreverythingdirectlyapprehendedbyanideaoftheintellectisapprehendedasauniversal.
Consideredinitself{secundumse)theessenceisneitheruniversalnorindividual.Itabstractsfromeveryconditionandmodeofexistence,beingpurelyandsimplywhattheobjectisprimarilyasintelligibleandwhatthedefinitionexpresses..Thusitisequallypresentintheactualthing,individuated(inordertoexist)and,inourmind,universalised(inordertobeknown).Forexample,weseeamanonlyinpublic,thereforeincompletedress,whereasinhisbedroomhewearspyjamas.Neverthelessthemanweknow,whenweseehiminthestreet,isthesameman,becausehispyjamasarenomorepartofhisnaturethanliissuitofclothes;neitherbelongstothemanconsideredinhimself.Similarlyconsideredinitselftheessenceisnotuniversal,butneitherisitindividual;^thatistosay,theessenceassuch,theessenceofPetertakeninitself,abstractsfromallthecharacterswhichdistinguishPeterfromPaulorJohn.'
1Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vii,8,1033b22;10,1035b14.Herewcarespeakingonlyofcorporealthings,whichaloneareimmediatelyaccessibletous(beingconnaturaltothehumanintellect),consequentlytheonlythingswhoseessenceisdirectlyknowable(otherwisethanbyanalogy)andcanbeknowncomplete,i.e.completelydetermined.
2Fromallthathasbeensaiditfollowsthat,when,forexample,wesayPeter
andPaulpossessthesameessenceorthesamenature,thewordsamereferstotheessenceofPeterandPaulasitexistsinthemind(forthenitisoneandthesameobjectofthought),notasitexistsinreality
ontology:essence
ConclusionXIV.—Theessencesofthingsareuniversalinthemind,andconsideredinthemselvesneitheruniversalnorindividual.
Thispropositionisofthefirstimportance.Todenyitinevitablyinvolvessuspicionofthehumanintellect,whichcannotdirectlyapprehendinitsconceptstheindividualassuch;^weshalleitherdemandfromitwhatitcannotgive,aknowledgestrictlysuperhuman—intellectualintuitionoftheindividual—ordenyitsobjectivereferenceandfallintosubjectivism.
Wemustthereforebearfirmlyinmindthattoknowtheessenceornatureofanythingitisnotnecessarytoknowtheprincipleswhichconstituteitsindividuality,*sincetheessence,consideredinitself,is,infact,nothingindividual.Misconceptionofthisfundamental
(forthenitisidenticalwithPeterandwithPaul,twodifferentindividuals).Butsincetheessenceinquestionisnotindividualinitself{secundumse),inotherwordsisnotdistinctinPeterandinPaulquaessence,itfoUovrethatitisinPeterandPaulsuchthatitcanbeapprehendedbythemindinasingleconceptandconstituteinthemindoneandthesameobjectofthought.Thisisexpressedbythestatementthattheessenceformallyuniversalinthemindisfundamentallyuniversalinthingsorinreality.(Thenatureofanythingexistsinthemindeitherinaconditionoflogicalorformaluniversality,as,forexample,whenwesaymanisthespeciesofPeterandPaul,orinaconditionofmetaphysicalorfundamentaluniversality,aswhenwesaymanismortal.Thetermfundamentalherereferstotheproximatefoundationofuniversality.When,ontheotherhand,wesaythatthenatureoressenceisfundamentallyuniversalinreality,wearespeakingoftheremotefoundationofuniversality).
1Wearenowspeakingofthingsknownbyourintellectanddonotdealwiththequestionhowtheintellectknowsitsownindividualandmaterialact.
2CfSt.Thomas,DeVerit.,q.2,a.^,adi;Intellectusnostersingularianoncognoscenspropriamhabetcognitionemderebus,cognoscenseassecundumpropriasrationesspeciei.
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truthisatthebottomoftheerrorsofseveralgreatmodernmetaphysicians,Spinoza,forexample,andLeibniz(exaggeratedintellectuaiists),alsoBergsonandtheanti-intellectualistsofthepresentday.
(a)Theessenceofcorporealthingsisuniversalinthesensejustexplained.Thatistosay,inthiscategoryofbeingthereareamultitudeofindividualspossessingthesameessence.
Individualspossessingthesameessence,forexample,Peter,Paul,andJohn,areonthesamelevelinrespectofprimarilyintelligiblebeing;theyareessentiallyequal.
Neverthelesstheseindividualsdifferonefromanother.Peterisfair,short,andsanguine,Johndark,tall,andcholeric,etc.^Suchcharacteristicspeculiartoaparticularindividualarenotderivedfromtheessence.Otherwisetheywouldbeidenticalinalltheindividualswhichbyhypothesispossessthesameessence.Theyarethereforenon-essentialcharacters.
Neverthelesstheyare,infact,unalterableandnecessary.2Ifhewerenotfair,sanguine,etc.,Peterwouldnodoubtbeaman,buthewouldnotbePeter.Wemustthereforeconcludethatthesecharacteristicshavetheirgroundinwhattheobjectisnecessarilyandprimarily,butasanindividual,or,inwhatwemaytermtheindividualnatureofthething.(Byindividual
1Wearenotnowspeakingofthosepurelycontingentcharacteristicswhichdistinguishoneindividualfromanother,forexamplePeterisinParis,PaulinRome,Peterisrich,Paulpoor,etc.Wearespeakingofthosecharacterswhichariseoutoftheconstituentbeingoftheindividual,theinnatecharacters,whichare,radicallyatleast,unalterable.
*Butinafashionaltogetherdifferentfromthecharactersderivedfromtheessence(properties).Seebelow,p.212,note.
ontology:essence
naturewemeanincommunicabletoanyotherobjector,ifyouprefer,whollycircumscribed.)
{byInthisindividualnaturewefind,asintheessence,thenotesnecessaryandfirstbeing.But,ontheotherhand,andthisistheimportantpoint,itisnotthenecessaryandfirstbeingofthethingasfirstprincipleofintelligibility;itisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.Theindividualcharacteristicssuchasfair,sanguine,etc.,arenot,aswepointedout,derivedfi'omPeter'sessence;theyarenotrequiredbyit.Thatistosay,theydonotpossessinPeteraprincipleorgroundwhichrequiresthembyitsver/notion,orinvirtueofwhatitis,thatistosay,ofitsownintelligibility(as,forexample,rationalrequirescapacityforlaughter).Nevertheless,sincetheyarenecessarilypossessedbyPeter,theyhavetheirrootinPeter,inPeter'sindividualnature;theyhavethereaprinciple.
Theymustthenhaveastheirprinciplesomethingwhichdoesnotrequirethembyitsverynotion,invirtueofitsbeingorofitsownintelligibility,somethinginthenotionofwhichtheintellectcannotdiscoveranecessityforthesecharacteristicsratherthananyothers.Therefore,hisprincipleisinitselfwhollyindeterminate.Ifneitherbyitsnotionnorinvirtueofitsbeingoritsownintelligibilityitrequiresthisratherthanthat,itisbecauseinitselfithasnonotion,being,orintelligibility.Wearethusledtoaprinciplewhichofitselfisabsolutelynothingconceivable,tofirstmatterasAristotleunderstoodit,somethingwhichcanenterintotheconstitutionofabeing,butisnotitselfabeing.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Ifitbeadmittedthatnon-beingofthissortispartofallcorporealthings,andthatwhenitselfindividuatedbysomequalification^itistheprimaryrootoftheirindividuaUty,itiseasytoseethatthecharacterswhicharederivedfromtheindividualnatureofthething,sincetheirprimaryrootistheindividualmatterwiththedispositionsithappenstopossessatthemomentwhenthethingcomesintoexistence,have,astheirfirstprincipleinthething,aprinciplewhichdoesnotrequirethembyitsverynotion—forinitselfithasneithernotionnorintelligibility;itrequiresthemsolelyinvirtueoftheaccidentaldispositionsithappenstopossessataparticularmoment.
Thus,theindividualnatureisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,becauseitisbyitsmatterthatitistheprincipleoftheindividualcharacters.'
{c)Wehavemerelysoughttoindicateherehowtheobscurenotiono^firstmatter,thestudyofwhichbelongs
Insofarasitmateriasignataquantitate.Obviouslybeingswhollyincorporealorimmaterial{pwrespirits)cannotderivetheirindividuationfromfirstmatter.Theymustthereforebeindividuatedbytheiressenceitself,andeachindividualinconsequencediffersfromtherestasahorsefforexample,differsfromaman,eachbeingbyhimselfaspecificessence.Forthisreasonintheorderofpurespiritstherearenotwobeingsessentiallyequal.Andconsequentlyinthecaseofpurespirits(butonlyintheircase)theessenceissomethingindividualandtheconceptofcompleteessenceidenticalwiththatofindividualnature.*Toavoidanypossibleconfusionbeitobservedthatanindividualnatureisnotunintelligibleinitself.Itisfirstmatterthatisunintelligibleinitself.Thoughtheindividualnatureisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,isnottheprimarily'intelligiblebeingofthething,itisneverthelesstheprimaryprincipleofitsbeing,foritistheessenceasindividuatedbymatter,andisthereforeintelligibleinitself.Thatiswhyanintelligencemoreperfectthanours,theDivineMindforexample,canknowitdirectly.
ontology:essence
tonaturalphilosophy,arisesnaturallyinthemindassoonasitisunderstoodthatconsideredinitselftheessenceofcorporealobjectsisnotindividual,apropositionitselfdemandedbythefundamentalaxiomofthetrustworthinessoftheintellect.
Wemayfurtherpointoutthatsincematter,thisspeciesofnon-being,ispresentasthegroundofindividuation(andconsequentlyastheprimaryrootofcertainqualifications)^onlyintheindividualnature(inPeter'snatureassuch)andnotintheessence{humanity),wemayregardtheessence,theprimaryintelligiblebeing,asfreefromallthequalificationsduetomatterastheirprimaryrootorasimmaterialisedbeing,^inotherwordsasthearchetypalbeingofthething,'
1ThatisthesenseofSt.Thomas'sdictum:formaeetperfectionesrerumpermateriamdeterminantur{DeVerit.,q.2,a.2).
2Aristotle,Metaph.,vii,7,1032b14:Xtyu5'ovalav(LvevCXrjirbtIJjvilvai.
^Cf.St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,ii:Haecmateria(signata)indefinitionehoniinisinquantumhomononponitur;sedponereturindefinitioneSocratis,siSocratesdefinitionemhaberet.Indefinitioneautemhominisponiturmaterianonsignata...fromthisitfollows:
(i)ThatSocratespossesseshisessencenotpreciselyasSocrates,butasman,fortheessenceisthatwhichthedefinitionexpresses{cf.DeVerit.,q.2,a.2,at/g)andSocrates,asSocrates,isindefinable,Socrates'sindividualnatureistheessenceofmanindividuatedbythemateriasignata.
(ii)Thatessencetakeninthepurestateorseparately,asforinstancewhenwespeakofhumanityorthebeingman,mayberegardedastheimmaterialisedbeing(strippedofthequalitiesderivedfrommateriasignata),orastheformalbeingofthethingasawhole(comprisingbothmatter—notindividual—andform).Itisinthissensethattheancientsgavetotheessence(itselfcomprisingthematter—notindividual—andtheform)thenameoiform{formatotius):Etideohumanitassignificaturutformaquaedam.Etdiciturquodestformatotius...sedmagisestformaquaeesttotum,scilicetformamcomplectensetmateriam,cumpraecisiorutameneorumperquaemateriaestnatadesignari(St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,3).Itisimportanttoobservethat,althoughtheindividualmatter(e.g.haecossa,haecarnes)isnopartoftheessenceorspecific
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
anidealbeingwhichinthepurestateorseparatelyhasnoexistenceexceptinthemind,andexistsinrealityonlyasindividuatedbymatter,intheconcretestateoftheindividualnature.
Wemustthereforeconcludethatthereisnothingmoreintheindividualnaturethanintheessencefromthestandpointofprimarilyintelligibleorarchetypalbeing.^Fromthispointofviewallindividualsofthesamespeciesareonthesamelevelofbeing;to
nature,ontheotherhandtheunindividuatedorcommonmatter{ossa,carnes)ispartofit.Whatconstitutesmanisnotthesoulalone,butsoulandbodytogether.{Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vii;St.Thomas,InVIIMetaph.,1.lo,1492and1496,ed.Cathala).Thisunindividuatedorcommonmatter,takensimplyasreceivingtheformanddeterminedbyit,andnotastheprimaryrootofcertaincharacters(theindividualcharacters)ofthesubject,ismadeknowntousbytheform:materiacognosciturperformam,aquasumiturratiouniversalis(St.Thomas,loc.cit.Cf.DeVerit.,q.10,a.4fi?5,andispartofthatwhichwehaveheretermedtheimmaterialisedbeing(archetypalbeing)orformalbeingofthething(formatotius,seupotiusformaquaeesttotum).
^Theindividualnaturecontainsmore(thequalitiespeculiartotheindividual,forexample,aparticulartemperament)thantheessence,butonlyfromthestandpointofmatter,notfromthestandpointofpurelyintelligibleorimmaterialisedbeing.Theindividualcharactersarenopartofthatbeingandaddnothingtoitinitsownorder.
Remarkinthisconnectionthattheindividualcharacteristics(fair,sanguine,etc.)fromtheveryfactthattheyarederivedfromthematter,arenecessary,andunalterableinatotallydifferentsensethanarethecharactersderivedfromtheessence(properties).Thelatterarenecessarydejure,asderivedfromaprmcipleconstitutiveoftheessencewhichdemandstheminvirtueofitsveryconcept;itisabsolutelyimpossiblethatPetershouldexistwithoutbeingmortal.Theindividualcharacters,onthecontrary,areonlynecessarydefacto,asderivedfromparticulardispositionsofthematterwhichtheypresuppose.IfitisimpossiblethatPetershouldexistwithoutpossessingaparticulartemperament,theexistenceofthatcharacteristicpresupposescertainmaterialconditionsinvirtueofwhichPeterpossessesaparticularindividualnature,butwhicharenotthemselvesnecessary.Hencethesecharacterscanbetoacertainextentmodified,andareunalterableonlyintheirground.
ontology:essence
knowtheir(universal)essenceistoknowallthereistoknowinthem,forthebeingofPeterasPeterisnomorecompleteordeterminatethanthebeingofPeterasman.Itismerelymorecloselycircumscribed.
Wecannowunderstandhow,althoughthehumanintellectcannotdirectlyknowthebeingofobjectsinitsindividuality,itsnatureasanintellectisnotfrustratedonthataccount,nordoesitmissitsformalobject,forittrulyknowsthebeingofthingssofarasitisprimarilyintelligibleorarchetypalbeing.^Hence,thoughimperfect,itisneitheruselessnoruntrustworthy.
{d)Beitobservedthatthesynonymsessence,quiddity,andnature,allofwhichdenoteauniversal,maybestretchedtodenotesome:hingsingular,whenweconsidertheessence{humanity,forexample)asindividuatedbymatter(inPeter,forinstance),orasitpossessesinrealityasingularmodeofexistence.Nevertheless,strictlyspeaking,thetermnaturealoneiscompatiblewiththepredicateindividual,whereastheexpressionsindividualessenceorindividualquiddityareincorrect.^
Inallthiswehaveinmindthingsimmediatelyaccessibletous,namelycorporealthings,whichthehumanintellectcannotapprehenddirectlyintheirindividuality,because,sinceitisobligedtoabstractfromimagesitswhollyimmaterialideas,itisbythatveryfactcompelledtoabstractfromthatwhichconstitutesthematerialityofsenseknowledge,namelytheindividualm.atter.
Asregardsimmaterialthings{purespirits),ourintellectisequallyincapableofapprehendingthemintheirindividuality,butforanentirelydifferentreason;becausepurespiritsarenotimmediately"ccessibletous,andwecanknowthemonlybyanalogy,notintheiressence,andareunabletoapprehendtheircompleteessence.
^Sofaratleastastheorderofcorporealthingsisconcerned.Intheorderofpurespirits,onthecontrary,theessenceisindividual(see
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Wehaveindeedseenthatthetermsessenceandquiddityareusedinreferencebothtotheexistenceandthedefinitionofanything.Thedefinition,however,canexpressonlytheprimarilyintelligiblebeingofthething,foritstatesitsconstituentelementswhicharebytheirverynotionprinciplesofintelligibilityinit.Hencethedefinitioncannotexpressthematerialindividuatingprinciplesofthething,andforthatreasontheindividualnatureassuchisindefinable.Therefore,sincethequiddity,whattheobjectisasdefinable,canonlyconsistintheprimarilyintelligiblebeingoftheobject,itmustbeuniversal.Similarly,thatinvirtueofwhichanythinginvitesthatsupremeperfectionwhichconsistsinexistencecanclearlybenothingbutitsimmateriaHsedbeing.Foritisnotinvirtueofthatinitofwhichthefirstprincipleismatterthatitinvitesexistence.Itsindividualityismerelyaconditioninwhichitmustbeinordertoexist.Andsincetheessence,whatathingis,takenpreciselyasthatinvirtueofwhichitreceivesexistence,canconsistinnothingbutitsimmateriaUsedbeing,itmustbeuniversal.
Thetermnature,onthecontrary,isusedinreference
above,p.21o,notei).Andifweknowtheessencesofspiritualbeingsafterthefashionofauniversal,itisbecauseweonlyknowtheminadequatelyandbyanalogywiththecorporealobjectspreviouslyknown.
TheexpressionindividualnatureisnotuncommoninSt.Thomas{cf.DeVerit.,
q.2,a.5,naturesingularis;Sum.Theol.,i-ii,q.51,3,i,naturaindividui,etc.).Healsouses,thoughexceptionally,theexpressionessentiasingularis{cf.DeVerit.,q.2,a.7).Whatevermaybethoughtoftheproprietyoftheterm,inanycaseSt.Thomasunderstandsbyitsimplytheessenceindividuatedbythematter(notinSpinoza'ssense,theessencecomplete,asanessence,onlyintheindividual).
ontology:essence
totheoperationswhichanythingisadaptedtoperform.Athing,however,doesnotactsolelyinaccordancewithitsarchetypalorprimarilyintelligiblebeing,butalsoasitissubjecttoparticularmaterialconditionsandpossessesaparticularindividuaUty.Nothingthereforepreventsourdivertingthetermnaturefromitsprimarysignificancetodenotesecondarilywhatathingisasindividual.
(whatprimarilyasintelligible:essence,quiddity,naturewhataswhollycircumscribed(essenceindividuatedbymatter):individualnature
[thatwhichis:essenceinthewidesense
BEING-.
\thatwhich:thesubjectofaction
{suppositum,person)
^actofbeing:existence
Finallywemayremarkthatinaseriesofconceptssuchassubstance,livingbody,animal,man,Aryan,Breton,etc.,onlytheconceptman,strictlyspeaking,denotesPeter'sessence.Theconceptssubstance,livingbody,animal,denoteonlycertainelementsorintelligibleaspectswhichenterintotheconstitutionofthatessence;inotherwords,theydenotethatessenceonlyinonepartofitsqualifications,andtheconceptsArjyanorBretononlyascircumscribedanddifferentiatedbycertainadditionalnotesarisingfromthedispositionsofmatter.AryanandBretonarethus,liketheessenceman,universalobjectsofthoughtapprehendedbythemindintheindividualPeterandliberatedbyabstractionfromtheconditionsofindividualmatter;buttheyareuniversalswhoseextensionislessthanthatoftheessence,andwhichbelongtoaparticularclass
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
(race)dividedintoamultitudeofindividualspossessingthesameessence;and,sincetheycanbedistinguishedonlybymeansofcharactersrootedincertaindispositionsofmattertheycannotbethesubjectofanotionstrictlyspeakingdistinct,oratruedefinition.
-J
ONTOLOGY:SUBSTANCEANDACCIDENT
Adoptingthestandpointofintelligibility,weaskedourselvesintheprecedingparagraphwhatisthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectfromthatpointofview.Wewerethusbroughttothenotioi.ofessencestrictlyso-called,ornature(thetwotermsmayberegardedassynonymous);^whatanobjectprimarilyisasintelligible.
LetusnowconsiderthebeingofthingsnolongerinreferencetointelligibiHtybutinreferencetoexistence.
Whatfromthisnewstandpointisthebeingwhichimmediatelypresentsitselftotheconsiderationoftheintellect,thattowhichthelatterisdirectedbeforeanythingelse?Inotherwords,whatisthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectasexisting?Wehavealreadyansweredthequestion.*Whatthemindapprehendsfirstofallasexisting,isbeingssuchasPeter,Paul,thisman,thisdog,thisbird,individualconcreteandindependentsubjects,fullyequippedtobeandtoact,andwhichwehavetermedtheprimarysubjectsofaction,supposita,orpersons.^Itistheywhoprimarilyfulfiltheactofbeing.
1Seeabove,pp.201,213.^Seeabove,p.195.
2Thenamepersonisreservedforsuppositaofanintellectualnature,whoarethereforemastersoftheiractionsandpossessthemaximumofindependence.
217
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Thesubjectofactionmaybethusdefinedfromthestandpointofexistence.It
existswhollybyitselfaloneorbyitsownmeans,notinthesensethatithasnoneedofacause[Peterhasbeenengenderedandmanycausescombinetokeephiminbeing),butinthesensethatitisbyitselfsufficientlydisposedtobedrawnfromnothingnessbythecausesofitsbeing;takenseparatelyitpossessesinitselforinitsownnatureeverythingnecessarytoreceiveexistence.^Inthissensewemaysaythatitisabeingexistingbyitself[perse)orinvirtueofitself,invirtueofitsownnature,ensperseexistens.Sinceabeingofthiskindexistsasawholeandinnowiseaspartofanotherbeingorsubjectinwhichitexists,wemayalsosaythatitexistsinitself,inse.
Abeingwhichexistsperse^,orratherabeingimmediatelydisposedtoexistperse,isthusfromthestandpointofexistencethefirstdatumoftheintellect.Observefurther,thatwhentheintellectmakesbeingofthiskinditsobject,ittranscendsthelimitswhichdefinetheessenceinthestrictsenseorthenature{whatathingis,orrather—ifwetakethepureessence,abstractedfromthesubjectwhichpossessesit—thatinvirtueofwhichanobjectiswhatitis).
Wearenowconcerned,aswehavealready
*Wearespeakinghereofcreatedsubjects.Anuncreated(divine)Personpossessesinhimselfeverythingnecessarytoexistwithanunderivedexistence.Whenwesaythatthesuppositumisinnowayapartofthewholeinwhichitexists,thetermwholeobviouslymeansawholetliatisoneinitself(seep.250),notacollectivewhole,forexampletheuniverse.
2Thisformulaispreferable,becauseexistenceitselfcannotenterasaconstituentpartintothedefinitionofanythingcreated.SeefurtherSt.Thomas,Qpodlib.,2,q.2,a.4,arf2:ipsttmessenonestderationesuppositi.
ontology:substanceandaccident
hinted,withthatwhichisinthestrictsense,Peterforexample,andnotwiththatinvirtueofwhichPeteriswhatheis{humanity,thepropertyofPeterinvirtueofwhichheisaman,orhisindividualnature,thePetrinehumanity,sotospeak,invirtueofwhichheisPeter).
'thatwhichis:(what(orthatinvirtueofwhich)
BEING.
essenceintheJ
widesenseIthatwhichprimarilyexists:primarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)
actofbeing:existence
Tobesure,thatwhichis,Peter,possessesnodistinctivecharactersotherthanthosewhichconstitutewhatheisorhisindividualnature.ButwhenIsayPeterIconceivethisnatureasconstitutingthewholewhichexistsinnothingotherthanitself.^When,ontheotherhand,IsayPetefsnature,Iconceivethatnatureasdistinctfromthewholewhichitservestoconstituteandasexistinginhim,inthatwhole.*Inshort,the
1BecauseIconceiveitaspossessedofacertainmodeorfashionofbeingwhichphilosopherstermsubsistenceorpersonality,andwhichterminatesit,somewhatasapointterminatesaline.
Inthisintroductionwemakenoclaimtosolvetheproblemofsubsistence(thedistinctionbetweennatureandperson)whichconstitutesoneofthemostimportantproblemsofontology.Adoptingthepedagogicalstandpointofcoherentexposition,wehavemerelysoughttopresentandclassifynotions,sothattheirsenseandmutualrelationshipmaybeunderstoodbyasynopsiswhichiscompletefromtheoutset.
3Iconceiveitinabstractionfromthemodalitycalledsubsistenceorpersonalitywhichterminatesit.SimilarlyIcanconsideralineabstractingfromthepointwhichterminatesit,inwhichcasethelinethusconsideredissimplyapartofthewholeconstitutedbythelineandpointtakentogether,andexistsinthatwhole.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
subjectofactionpossessesanatureoressence;theconceptofthatnatureoressencetakenassuch{whatorthatinvirtueofwhich)isnottheconceptofthesubjectofaction{thatwhich).
Wewillnowturntothisnatureoressenceofthesubjectofaction.Wehavejustobservedthatthesubjectofactionexists(iscapableofexistence)invirtueofitsownnatureoritsownessence,^Thenatureoressenceofthesubjectofactionisthereforethatinvirtueofwhichitiscapableofexistencepureandsimple
{simpliciter);thenatureofPeterconsideredasthesubjectofactionisthatinvirtueofwhichIcansaysimplyPeterexists.^
ExistencepureandsimpleisundoubtedlyPeter'sprimaryortirstexistence.Butitisnothissolemodeofexistence.Heissadto-day,yesterdayhewascheerful;to-dayheexistsassad,yesterdayheexistedascheerful.Hehaslosttheformerexistenceandacquiredthelatter,buthehasnotthereforeceasedtoexistpurelyandsimply.Thatistosay,hepossessesahostofsecondaryqualificationsinvirtueofwhichheexistsnotonlysimply{simpliciter)butalsounderaparticularaspect{secundumquid).Itisthusthatheisamusicianoraphilosopher,illoringoodhealth,happyorunhappy,etc.Allthesequalificationshaveaccrued{accidere)tothatwhichheisprimarilyasexisting,areincrements,oraccretions,accidents.
Philosophy,health,happiness,sorrow;alltheseareso
'InvirtueofItsessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterminthecaseofapurelyspiritualsubject,invirtueofitsnatureinthesenseofindividualnatureinthecaseofacorporealsubject.(Seep.235,noteI.)
*Thatistosay,Vk'ithoutregardtoanyparticularpointofview,w^ithoutmodifyingmythoughtbyanyaddition.
ontology:substanceandaccident
manyessences^towhichourattentionhasnothithertobeendirected,andwhicharenotsell-subsistentinbeing,butonthecontrarysubsisting,sotospeak,onlyascoveringsofthesubjectofaction.Employingtheanalogyofsensibleobjectswemaysaymetaphoricallythatthelatterexistsbeneaththeaccidents[substat)andsupportsthem.Fromthispointofviewitmaybetermedasubstance.*Forexample,wesaythatPeterisasubstance.Moreover,sincehisnatureconsideredpreciselyassuch{whatheis,thatinvirtueofwhichheiswhatheis,thatinvirtueofwhichheiscapableofexistencepureandsimple),Ukehimselfexistsbeneaththeaccidents,italsoisentitledtothenameofsubstance,andwecanspeakofPeter'ssubstance.Wehavenowdistinguishedthenotionofsubstanceasopposedtothatofaccident.^
1Thedefinitionofessencegivenabove(p.201)isapplicabletoaccidents,ifthesubjectisconsideredinaparticularaspect.Understoodinaconcretesense,asattributedtotheobject(forexamplesadwhenwesayPeterissad),theaccident
iswhatathingprimarilyisasintelligibleinaparticularrespect{beingsadisthegroundonwhichPeterpossessescertaincharacteristicswhichnecessarilyfollowfromsadness).Understoodabstractly,andseparatelyorinthepurestate(forinstancewhenwespeakofsorrow)theaccidentisthatinvirtueofwhichathingprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligibleinacertainrespect.
WemayfurtherusethetermessencenolongerinrespectofthesubjectPeter,butinrespectoftheaccidentsthemselves,andsaythatsorrowisthatinvirtueofwhichaparticularpassionprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligible.
2Thesubjectofactionisalsocalledvwdcrraffis(hypo-stasis),-irpwrovviroKflnevov,primumsubjectumattributiorns.
3Observethatthetermsubstance{substantia)correspondstotheGreekwordovalaunderstoodinarestrictedsense.Thetermovclaprimarilydenotesessenceornature,butsincesubstancesarethefirstobjectwhichtheintellectattains,whenitconsiderswhatexists,theyarealsoforthatreasonthefirstobjectwhichconfrontstheintellectwiththenotionofessence;inotherwordstheyarethefirsttomeritthedenominationofessenceornature.Hencethetermoiitria,whichtakeninitsmost
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
'thaiwhichis:rwhatathingis(essenceorTinaparticu—
essenceinthenature)andinvirtueofJlaraspect:accident
widesense-whichitreceivesexist-j
enceyabsolutely:^
Ahatwhichprimarily.,
/.,,.^vysubstance
exists(thesubjectof|
aiction,suppontum,person)j
actofbeing:existence
SUBSTANCE
Thenamesubstanceisgiven,aswehavejustseen,bothtothesubjectofactionitself{thatwhichprimarilyexists)andtoitsnatureconsideredpreciselyasanatureoressence{whatathingis,thatinvirtueofwhichthesubjectofactioniswhatitisandclaimsexistencepureandsimple).^Whatthenshallbeourdefinition
generalsensedenotesessence,andisafterwardsdividedintosubstanceajidaccident,hasmostnaturallyservedtodenoteinaspecialsensethefirstmemberofthepair,substance.
1Thesubjectofaction(suppositumorperson)isnothingbutthesubstantialnaturecompletedbyaparticularmodality{subsistenceorpersonality)whichterminatesit,asapointterminatesaline(withoutaddinganythingtoitinitsorderofnature)andrendersitabsolutelyincommunicable.Thetermsubstance(correspondingtotheGreekovffia,whichprimarilydenotesessence—seetheprecedingnote)denotesthesubstantialnaturewithoutdefiningwhetherornoitisterminatedbysubsistence.Itisthereforeapplicablealiketothenature(apprehendedbythemindwithoutthesubsistencewhichterminatesit)andtothesubjectofaction(theterminatednature).Butwhenwedistinguishandcontrastthenature(notterminated)andthesubjectofaction,thetermsubstanceremainsattachedtothenature(notterminated)andisthencontrastedwiththesubjectofactiontakenassuch.ThuswhenwespeakofPeter'ssubstance,wemeanpreciselythenatureinvirtueofwhichthesubjectofactionPeterpossessesprimarybeing,andwhichispartofhim.AndtheologiansusetheterminthissensewhentheyteachthatintheDivineTrinitytheFatherandtheSon(twodistinctPersons)possessthesamesubstance,areconsubstantial,ojuoovaioi.
Ontheotherhand,theGreektermvwixTTaai.^{hypo-stasis,etymologicallythesameformationassub'Stantia)afteracertainvacillationin
ontology:substanceandaccident
ofsubstance?Beingreceivingexistenceofitself{perse)orinvirtueofitselfintheunqualifiedsenseadoptedabove?No.Forsounderstoodthedefinitionappliesonlytothesubjectofaction;absolutelyspeaking,italone—Peterforexample—existsasawhole,andnotaspartofabeingorsubjectinwhichitexists.Itsnature,onthecontrary,ispartofitselfandexistsinitself.Peter's
natureexistsinPeter,andispartofPeter.ItistruethatsincePeterishimselfconstitutedbyit,andexistsinvirtueofit{perearn),thisnaturedoesnotexistinsomethingpreviouslyexistingwhichreceivesit(as,forexample,sorrowexistsinPeter,whowaspreviouslyinexistence).Wecanthereforesaythatitexists(iscapableofexistence)perse,intheprecisesensethatinordertoexistithasnoneedtobepartofanotherbeingpreviouslyexistingwhichreceivesitinitself,butthatonthecontraryitconstitutesthewhole(thesubjectofaction)whichexistsbyitself.Inthissenseand,ifwearecarefultoquaUfyandexplainourmeaning,thedescriptionensperseexistensisappUcablenotonlytothesubjectofaction,butalsotoitsnature,andmaythereforeserveasthedefinitionofsubstance.^
(Thesameistrueoftheexpressionensinseexistens.)
itsemployment,camefinallytodenotethesubjectofactiontakenassuch[person)andisusedexclusivelyinthissense.Itisthuscontrastedwithsubstanceunderstoodasanaturenotterminatedbysubsistence.
Werewetemptedtodenythevitalimportanceoftheseabstractconceptsanddistinctions,wemightrecollectthatforthewordb/j-oovaios,onwhichthetrueunderstandingoftheTrinitydepends,butwhichdiffersonlybyaniotafromtheunorthodoxtermdfioiovcrioi,Catholicswerewilling,whentheArianheresyflourished,tosuffereverykindofpersecution,andsometimesevendeath.
*Cf.JohnofSt.Thomas,Cursusphilos.,i,Log.ii,q.15,a.i.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Weshalltherefore^definesubstanceasathingornaturethatcanexistbyitselforinvirtueofitself{perse)—andnotinanotherthing[inalio),thatistosay,inasubjectpreviouslyexisting.^
(Alternativelywemaydefinesubstanceasathingornaturewhosepropertyistoexistinitself.)
ConclusionXV.—Substanceisathingornaturewhosepropertyistoexistbyitself,orinvirtueofitself{perse)andnotinanotherthing.
Itisevidentthattheideaofsubstancerepresentssomethingwhichreallyexists.Ifnosubstanceexisted,noix.turecapableofexistinginitself,allnatureswould
besuchascouldexistonlyinsomethingelse.Butinthatcase,sincenatureAcouldexistonlyinnatureBandnatureBinturnonlyinnatureC,therewouldbeaninfiniteregressionwhichcouldnever
1Existenceitselfcannotbeaconstituentpartofanycreatednature.Itisforthatreasonthatsubstancemustbedefinedasathingornaturecapableofexistingperseorapttoexistperse.Thesameobservationwasmadeaboveinreferencetothesuppositum(p.218,note2).
Wemustmakethesenseofthesuggesteddefinitionclear.Ifperse(orinse)isunderstoodintherestrictedsenseexplainedinthetext,ourdefinitionwillmean:substanceisanatureapttoexistperse{orinse)quanatureoressenceinthesuppositumwhichitconstituteswhenterminatedbythesubsistence.If,however,perse(orinse)isunderstoodintheabsolutesenseinwhichitwastakenabove(p.218),theoposeddefinitionwillmean:substanceisanatureapttoexistperse{orinbe)quasubjectofaction(suppositumorperson).
'Thetermsubstancesignifiesathingcapableofexistinginitself,orofsubsisting;thatistosay,ofbeingself-containedasanexistentthing(itsfunctionsubsistere),sothat,onceitexists,itsustainsinbeingtheadditionalqualitiesoraccidentswithwhichitisinvested(itsfunctionsubstare).Butitisonlyasasuppositumthatsubstanceisimmediatelycapableofperformingthesetwofunctions.Consideredasanatureoressenceitmerelyseekstoperformthem.
ontology:substanceandaccident
reachanatureinwhichallthesenaturesexisted;theythereforecouldnotexist.
Thosephilosopherswho,likeFichte(nineteenthcentury),denouncedthe"deadsubstanceoftheLatins"toopposetoit"Teutonicactionorbecoming"werefightingagainsttheintellectitself,whichissimplyunabletodispensewiththenotionofsubstanceandimposesituponusasanabsolutelyprimaryandimmediatedatum.Moreover,thatwhichtheytookforsubstanceanddeclared"dead,""inert,"etc.,wasamerefigmentoftheirownimagination.Forsubstanceisnotan"emptyreceptacle,""aninertanddeadsupport."Itistheabsolutelyprimalbeingofathing,theradicalprincipleofitsactivityandallitsactuality.AsAristotlesaid,substantiaestprimumens.^Buttoperceivethisaphilosophermustmakeuseofhisintelligence,riseabovetheanimallifeofthesenses,andnotbecontenttoshowhisskilliuhandlingwordsdevoidofconceptualcontent
andfreightedonlywithmaterialimages.
Thesubstanceofanobject,solongasthatobjectexists,isassuchimmutable.^
Peter'ssubstanceisthatinvirtueofwhichPeterexistspurelyandsimply,thatistosay,asPeter.SolongasPeterexists,liissubstanceassuchcannotchange.AndwhenPeter'ssubstancedoeschange(whenPeter'sbodybecomesalifelesscorpse)Peterexistsnolonger,heisdead.
1Metaph.,vii,i.
''NodoubtwhenPetergrowsthechangeaffectsPeter'ssubstaneiitself,whichincreases,butsolelyinrespectofitsquantity.Itdoesnotaffectitassubstance.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Moreover,initselfsubstanceisinvisible,imperceptiblebythesenses.Forthesensesdonotapprehendbeingassuch,butpresenttousdirectlyonlythechangingandthemoving.Inacertainsense,tobesure,itisindeedthesubstanceofPeterthatmyeyessee,asitwastrulyJesuswhomthedisciplessawatEmmaus,butmyeyesthusapprehendthesubstanceonlyinfactandmaterially,notformally.
Inotherwordstheobjectseenortouchedissomethingwhichwhileseenortouchedisatthesametimealsoasubstance;butitisnotseenortouchedasasubstance.Asasubstanceitisconceived,notseenortouched,andsofarasitisseenortoucheditiscolouredorexertingresistance,notbeingandsubstance.Inthelanguageofphilosophysubstanceisintelligibleinitself(perse)andsensibleonlyaccidentally(peraccidens).Thatthereforeinthingswhichpossessesmostimportanceforusescapesthedirectgraspofoursensesandimagination,andisapureobjectoftheintellect,sincetheintellectaloneapprehendsbeingassuch(subrationeentis).
Observethat,iffromthestandpointofexistencesubstanceisinthingsthebeingwhichistheprimaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,ontheotherhandtodiscovernotonlythataparticularobjectpossessesasubstance,butalsoinwhatthatsubstanceconsists,orwhatisitsnature,weareobhgedtotakeourstanduponthatwhichrevealsthisnaturetooursenses,namelytheoperations,phenomena,oraccidents,ofthesubstance.Inthissenseweknowthesubstancebytheaccidents.
ontology:substanceandaccident
ACCroENT
Considernowsuchthingsasthelaughter,movement,sorrow,joy,colour,etc.,whichIperceiveinPeter,andwhichmakePeterexistincertainaspects.Thesethingsarecapableofexistence.Buttheyobviouslydonotexistafterthesamefashionassubstance.Toexisttheymustbelongtoanotherbeingpreviouslyexisting.^Theyexistassomethingwhichbelongstoabeingorsubjectalreadyinexistence.Inthissensewesaythattheyexistinsomethingotherthanthemselves.-
ConclusionXVI.—Anaccidentisanatureoressencewhosepropertyistoexistinsomethingelse.
1Previously—ifnotintheorderoftime,atleastintheorderofnature.
2Theaccidentofwhichwearesp>eakingisthepredicamentalaccidentwhichiscontrastedwiththesubstance.Thetermaccident,whenitiscontrastedwithpropertyandsignifiesapredicatenotderivedfromtheessence(thepredicableaccident)hasanothermeaning.
Ifwearethinkingofthepredicamentalaccident,orofthecontrastbetweensubstanceandaccident(acontrastbetweenrealbeings),wemaysaythattheattributerelatestoanaccident(theintellectinvirtueofwhichamaniscapableoflaughterisanaccidentreallydistinctfromthesubstance).If,ontheotherhand,wearethinkingofthepredicableaccident,thatistosay,ofthecontrastbetweenthoseunrealbeingsoflogic(thepredicables),genus,species,specificdifference,property,andaccident,itdenotesnotanaccidentbutaproperty,anattributepredicatedofthesubject,notassomethingwhichhelpstoconstitutehisspecificessence,butasarisingnecessarilyfromit.
Conversely,ifweareconsideringthepredicamentalaccident,wemustsaythattheindividuatingcharacteristics(thepossessionofaparticulartemperament,orheredity)belong,radicallyatleast,tothesubstantial,nottotheaccidentalorder.If,ontheotherhand,weareconsideringthepredicableaccident,wemustsaythatthesecharacteristicsareaccidents(attributespredicatedofthesubject,neitherashelpingtoconstitutethespecificessencenorasderivedfromit).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Itfollowsthatthoughanaccidentpartakes,indeed,ofbeing,itdoesnotexistasabeing;itisessentiallyofabeing,ensentis,andcapableofexistenceonlyasthecomplementorperfectionofabeing.Thusthewordbeingispredicableoftheaccidentonlyinasecondaryandindirectsense,andwhereasbeingintheprimarysenseofthetermisfromthestandpointofexistencethesubjectofaction,sothatourintellectapprehendsimmediatelyandofitselfthesubjectofaction,thesubstance,thatwhichexistsinitself,wefinditdifficulttoarriveataclearunderstandingoftheaccident.Tosucceedweareobligedtoelaborateournotionofbeing,tomakeitmorepliable,planeitdown,bindittothereal,inshort,toapprehendtheaccidentbyanalogywiththesubstancewhichiscontrastedwithit.
Themerefactthatthetermaccidentisasubstantiveinvolvesusinthedangerofregardingtheaccidentasasubstance,apieceofsubstanceorareducedsubstance.Theimaginationintervenes,andwedepicttoourselvesaccidentsandphenomenaasfragmentsofmatterinlaidinthesuppositum,likeacasingofmosaicormarquetry.Thoseforwhomthewordsaccidentorphenomenonevokeimagesofthiskindmissthenotionofaccidentaltogether.Theyconceiveinfactonlypseudo-substancesandareincapableofadvancingastepfurtherinphilosophy.Anoriginaleffortoftheintellectelaboratingthenotionofbeingisherethesoleremedy.
Itisobviousthatthingssuchasanactofthoughtoramovementofemotioncannotbeconfusedwithoursubstance,becausetheycomeandgo,andchangewithinus,whereasoursubstanceneverceasesor
ontology:substanceandaccident
changes,beingassuchimmutablesolongasweexist.Neverthelessthesethingsarerealitieswhichaffectusintrinsically.Theyare,therefore,reallydistinctfromthesubstanceinwhichtheyexistor,intechnicallanguage,inhere.Therearethuscontingentaccidents(suchthatthesubjectcanexistwithoutthem)realandreallydistinctfromthesubstance.
Butifchange,byshowingthatthereareinasubjectthingswhichcomeandgo,helpsustoarriveatthenotionofaccident,itisveryfarfrombeinganecessaryattributepossessedbyeveryaccident.Therearethingswithoutwhichasubjectcannotexist,andwhichneverthelessareaccidents,additionalbeingswhichcompletethesubstance;ourunderstandingitself,forexample,andourwillare
evidentlysomethingrealinus.Buttheycannotbeconfusedwithoursubstance.Forwepossessadistinctnotionofthemwhollyextrinsictothatofsubstance,^whichwouldbeimpossibleiftheywerenotessentiallydifferentfromthelatter.*Thereforetheunderstandingandthe
1Wedistinctlyconceivetheunderstandingorintellectasafacultyofknowingwhoseobjectisbeing,thewillasafacultyofconationwhoseobjectisthegood,substanceasanatureoressencewhosespecificpropertyisself-subsistence.Thethreeconceptsfallwhollyoutsideeachother.
2Weareabletoreasoninthiswaybecausewearedealingwiththingsproportionatetoourintellect,whichapprehendsthembyaproperanddistinctconcept(thingswhichare,wesay,knownbytheiressence).Insuchcases,iftwoconceptsarewhollyexternaltoeachother,itisbecausethethingstheypiesenttothemindreallydifferonefromtheother.Otherwiseourintellectwoulddeceiveus.Itisinthiswaythatweprovethatquantityorextensionisanaccidentreallydistinctfromcorporealsubstance,andthatineverycreatedthingtheessenceisreallydistinctfromtheexistence.(OnthelatterpointseeJohnofSt.Thomas,CursusPhil.,Phil.Nat.,q.7,a.4.)When,however,thedistinctionisduetothestandpointfromwhichthemind
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
willarerealthingsinusdistinctfromoursubstance,consequentlyaccidents(belongingasweshallseelatertothecategoryofquality).Thereare,therefore,necessaryaccidents(withoutwhichthesubjectcannotexist)realandreallydistinctfromthesubstance.
Thedifferentschoolswhichprofessconflictingdoctrinesontheproblemofsubstancemayberepresentedroughlybythefollowingscheme:
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.ThomasThereareasmanysubstancesasthereareindividuals.Invirtueofitssubstanceeachofthesepossessesprimarybeing,butthereareineachrealaccidentsreallydistinctfromthesubstance.
SubstantialistsPhenomenalists
TherearenorealacciThereisnosubstance;
dentsreallydistinctfromtheaccidentswhichare
thesubstance,whichistheapparenttothesensesor
solereality.theconsciousness(pheno—
Descartes,Leibniz,andmena)arethesolereality,
especiallySpinoza.TheEnglishsensationalists—
Germanpantheistsoftheneo-Kantianschool.Philo—
nineteenthcentury.sophyofpurebecoming.
Descartesdeniedtheexistenceofrealaccidentsreallydistinctfromthesubstance.Heidentifiedcorporealsubstancewithextensionandthesubstanceofthesoulwiththeactofthought.Hethusset
viewsthesameobjectwehaveindeedtwodistinctconcepts,butnotwhollyexternalonetotheother.Forexample,IdistinguishinPeterhisbeingamanandhisbeingananimal,thoughinrealitytheyareoneandthesamebeing.Buttheconceptman,farfrombeingexternaltotheconceptanimal,imphesitonthecontrary.
ontology:substanceandaccident
philosophyonapathwhichcouldonlyleadtopantheism(foriftherearenoaccidentsdistinctfromsubstance,everysubstanceisitsaction—aperfectionwhichbelongstoGodalone—andtheconceptof,substancebecomesidenticalwiththatofabsoluteBeingorGod,withwhomeverythingisthusconfused),orifpantheismistobeavoided,tothedenialofsubstance,whichsuchaphilosophywilldoitsutmosttodisproveandtobanishfromthehumanintellect.
SpinozaerectedontheCartesianfoundationamonismorabsolutepantheismfromwhichLeibnizattemptedinvaintoescapebysubstitutingforthesinglesubstanceofSpinozaaninfinitemultitudeofindividualsubstances(monads),thusineffectreplacingSpinoza'sGodbyaboundlesshostofdeities.Thoughtheyrejectedthenotionofsubstance,forwhichtheysubstitutedthatofbecomingorevolution,andregardedthething-in-itselfnotasanobjectwhichimposesitselfonthemindbutasabackgroundofthemindwhichproducedtheobject,theGermanmetaphysiciansinthesuccessionofKant(Fichte,Schelling,Hegel)mayberankedamongtheexponentsofpantheisticsubstantialismsince
theypositedasingleprinciplewhichconstitutesbyitsdevelopmentthestuffandrealityofallthings.
InthephenomenalistcamptheEnglishsensationalistsandassociationalistsmaintainedthatstatesofconsciousness(sensations,emotions,ideas,etc.)arethesolerealityaccessibletous,andattemptedtoreducethewholeofpsychologytothemutualassociationofthesestatesofconsciousness.Thephilosophersofpurebecoming(Bergson,inparticular,whothusjoinshandswith
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Heraclitusoveragulfoftwenty-fivecenturies)denytheexistenceofanythingpermanentinthings,andmaintainthatchangewithoutanysubjectofchangeisthesolereality.(Inpsychologythesephilosophersareopposedtotheformxrgroupinasmuchastheysubstitute"acontinuousstreamofconsciousness"(W.James)foramosaicor"host"ofstatesofconsciousness.Buttheyareagreedinrejectingthenotionofsubstance.)
Kant(eighteenthcentury)substitutedforthedistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccidentsinthings(substanceandaccidentsbeingequallyobjectsofknowledge,theformerbymeansofthesecond)^anoppositionoftwoseparateworlds,theworldofthingsastheyareinthemselves{things-in-thernselves,noumena)andtheworldofphenomenamanufacturedbyourmind.Heregardedthething-in-itselfaswhollyunknowable,thoughheaffirmeditsexistence.Thisthing-in-itself,soughtnowinthesubjectofknowledge,becameallinalltotheGermanpantheistsofthenineteenthcentury.RenouvierandtheFrenchneo-Kantians,onthecontrary,taughtthatthething-in-itself,thesubstance,isnotmerelyunknowablebutabsolutelynon-existent,andtheconceptofitchimerical.
ThevariousphenomenaHstphilosophersjustmentionedfailedtoperceivethatwhattheyreallydenyistheaccident,notthesubstance.Whattheyunderstoodhyphenomenaisamerepseudo-substanceexpressedbyaconceptashamedofitselfandself-contradictory,asubstancepulverised,melteddown,emptiedofrealsubsistence,somethingwhichisnotaccident,but
1Seeabove,p.226.232
ontology:substanceandaccident
beingofabeingsthepurecomplementofbeing,andinconceivableexceptas
correlatedwithsubstance.Sincetheyhaveneverreallyunderstoodwhatismeantbysubstance,andposit,undertheappellationofphenomena,pseudo-substances,theyquitenaturallyrefusetoadmitanothersubstancebehindthesepseudo-substancesoftheirimagination.
THEINDIVIDUALITYOFSUBSTANCE
Thebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectfromthestandpointofexistence(thesubstance)issomethingindividual.Theintellectindeedapprehendsitasindividual,foritapprehendsthebeingofthingsonlybyturningtothesensationsandimageswhichrevealthingstousundertheconditionsoftheirexistenceandintheirindividuality.Moreover,thatalonecanreallyexistwhichisbynatureacompletelycircumscribedandself-containedunit,oranindividual,
[a)Ourintellect,itistrue,canhavenodirectknowledgeofthissubstanceinitsindividuaUty;itsimplyknows,byturningtotheimagesfromwhichitderivesitsideas,thatthissubstanceisindividual,itdoesnotknowinwhatitsindividuahtyconsists;Peter'ssubstanceisdirectlyrevealedtoitonlybyauniversalidea.Peter'ssubstancethusperceived,inabstractionfromhisindividuality,issimplyPeter'snatureapprehendedinthecharacterswhichconstitutehisessence,strictlyspeaking.Andsincewesayofmanthathemoves,laughs,possessesunderstandingandwill,etc.,aswesayit(primarilyandinthefirstplace)ofPeterorPaul—sinceinconsequencethepropertyofexistingbeneaththeaccidents,whichstrictlybelongs
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
tothesubjectandhisindividualnature,isthencetransferredtothenatureofthesubjectstrippedofitsindividuaHtybyabstraction—weshallalsogivethenameofsubstance,thoughinasecondarysense(substantiasecunda),toPeter'snature,asapprehendedinabstractionfromhisindividuality,thatistosay,theuniversalessencemanorhumanity.Ontheotherhand,bysubstanceintheprimarysense{substantiaprima),weshallunderstandtheindividualsubstance.^
ItisnowclearthatwhenweconsiderthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectinmaterialthingswestresseithertheindividualbeingortheuniversalbeingaccordingasweconsiderthisbeingprimarilyapprehendedinrelationtoexistenceorinrelationtointelligibiUty.
Inrelationtointelligibilitythebeingprimarilyapprehendedinthingsbytheintellectistheessence,strictlyspeaking,whichinitselfisnotindividualandexistsinthemindinaconditionofuniversaHty;anditisonlyinanimpropersensethatthetermessenceisusedoftheessenceindividuatedbytheindividualmatter(thatis,oftheindividualnature).
Inrelationtoexistence,onthecontrary,thebeingprimarilyapprehendedinthingsbytheintellectis
1IntheAristotelianandScholasticvocabularythetermsubstantiaprima,ovaiairpLbrrj,denotes(seeabovenote)theindividualnatureofthesubjectofactionwithoutdeterminingwhetherornoitisterminatedbysubsistence.Usuallyindeeditdoesinfactdenotetheterminatednature,orsubjectofaction,thehocaliquid.Itdoesnot,however,denoteformallythesubjectofactiontakenassuchandcontrastedwiththe(non-terminated)nature.Thatfunctionbelongstothetermssuppositwnandpersona{vw6(rra.<n$).
Remarkthatthedistinctionbetweenthesubjectofactionandthenature(non-terminatedbythesubsistence)isinthemainduetotheSchoolmen.Aristotlehimselfdidnotmakeitexplicitly.
ontology:substanceandaccident
theindividualsubstance/anditisinasecondarysensethatthetermsubstanceisusedofthenaturestrippedofitsindividualitybyabstraction(thatis,oftheessenceinthestrictsense).*
Herewemaycalltomindwhatwassaidabove'abouttheindividualnature.Weseeatoncehowweshouldclassifythedifferentconceptswithwhichwehavemadeacquaintancehitherto.*
what{primarilyasintelli-ithegible{essenceintheJsub-strictsense)andin|jectjvirtueofwhichit\thatwhichis:isexists
essenceinthe-;-primarilyascomplete-n
widesenselycircumscribed{individualnature)andinvirtueofwhichitexistsassuch\^<Aa<u)AicAprimarilyis:theprimarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)J
existence
inaparticularrespect:accident
absolutely:substantia^secunda
'substarue
substantiaprima
actofbeing:
1Takenpreciselyasthatinvirtueofwhichthesubjectpossessesitsfirstbeing,thesubstance,substantiaprima,isthesubject'sindividualnature.Wesaidabove(p.214)thatthatinvirtueofwhichathingissusceptibleofexistenceistheuniversalessence,thereasonbeingthatwewerethenconsideringpreciselywhatisthegroundonwhichathingissusceptibleofexistence,incontrastwiththatwhichismerelyaconditionorstateinwhichitmustbeinordertoexist.Here,however,wearedealingwiththatinwhichtheexistenceofthethingconsideredpreciselyasinthestatenecessaryinordertoexistisgrounded,andthisisnottheuniversalessence,buttheindividualnatureofthesubject.
2Henceintheorderofpurespiritsandtherealone(wherenodistinctionexistsbetweentheindividualnatureandtheessence,seeabovep.211,n.3;p.213,n.2),thesubstanceintheprimarysenseofthewordisalsotheessence,strictlyspeaking.Inthematerialorder,ontheotherhand,substanceintheprimarysenseofthewordisthesubject'sindividualnature,anditisonJyinasecondarysensethattheessence,strictlyspeaking,iscalledsubstarue,'Seepage209.
*Thequodandthequo.Wehavealreadyobserved(seeabove,p.200,note1)thattheessencetakenintheconcreteorasattributed
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
(b)Perse,ase,inse.Wehavedefinedsubstanceasathingwhosepropertyitistoexistbyitself(perse)orinitself(inse).Wemustdeterminecarefullytheexactsenseoftheseexpressions.
Athingissaidtoexistinitself{inse)whenitdoesnotexistaspartofawholepreviouslyexisting,but
tothething{whatathingprimarilyisasintelligible)isnotpresentedtothemindinitspurity;itisinfactpresentedtothemindtogetherwiththethingorsubjectwhichitdetermines.Topossessitinitspurity,itmustbeconceivedseparately,withoutthethingorsubjectitdetermines,asforinstancewhenwespeakofhumanityor,toforcelanguage,ofthebeingman,theentityman.Inthatcaseitmustbedefinedasthatinvirtueofwhichathingprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligible,or,inotherwords,thatinvirtueofwhichathingisconstitutedinaparticulardegfeeofbeingprimarilyintelligible.Forthisreasonitwillhebettertosubstituteinoursynopsesforthetermwhatthephrasethatinvirtueofwhich.Sowefinallygetthefollowingtable:
INTELLIGIBILITY
BEING^
.thatin
virtueof
which
{idquo)
thatwhichis:whatheprimar
essenceinthejilyisascomplete—
widesenselycircumscribed
(essenceindividuatedbymatter,theindividualnature)thatwhichprimarilyexists:suppositum,person{idquod)actofbeing:thatinvirtueofwhich{idquo)athingisoutsidenothingnessoritscauses:existence
Peterexistsandis/inaparticularrespect:
whatheprimar-Jwhitenessaccident
ilyisasintelli-j
gible{esseruein|^absolutely:
thestrictsense)humanity..substantia^
Peterexistsandis^secunda
Peter'sindivi-^dualnature
substance
ysubsiantiaprima
Peter
EXISTENCE
Thedistinctionbetweenthequodandthe^moplaysapartofthefirstimportanceinthemetaphysicalanalysisofthings.
ontology:substanceandaccident
itselfconstitutesthewholewhichexists.InthissensePeterexistsinhimself.
Athingissaidtoexistbyitselforinvirtueofitself(^^rse),whenitisbroughtintoexistenceinvirtueofitself,orofitsownnature(bythecausesonwhichitdepends,ifitisacreatednature).InthissensePeterexistsj&^rse.^
Philosophymakesfrequentuseofthisexpression,perse.Italwaysmeansinvirtueofitself,invirtueofitsownessence[persuamessentiam)—whetherthequalityunderconsiderationformspartoftheessenceofthethingornecessarilyresultsfromitasitsprinciple(inwhichcaseperseisopposedtoperaccidens)^orwhetherwemerelywishtostatethattheattributeunderconsiderationimmediatelypertainstothethingwhichdoesnotreceiveitthroughtheintermediaryofanythingotherthanitsownessence(inwhichcaseperseisopposedtoperaliud).Itisinthissensethatthesubjectofactionexistsperse,whereastheaccidentexistsperaliud.
Buttheexpressionpersedoesnotmeaninvirtueofitselforofitsownnatureastheabsolutelyfirstprincipleorasthecompleteandultimateexplanation.Thisissomethingtotallydifferent,whichisexpressedbythephrasease,oforfromitself(asopposedtoabalio).Thatwhichisaseisevidentlyperse,butthat
whichisperseisnot
^Existenceperseorinsecan,wehavealreadyseen(seepp.218,223),beascribed,asitisunderstoodinamoreorlessstrictsense,eithertosubstanceingeneral(thatwhichexistsperseandinsecontainsinitselfwhateverisnecessaryinordertoreceiveexistenceandisnotpartofapreviouslyexistentwhole)orexclusivelytothesubjectofaction{suppositumorperson,whichcontainsinitselfeverythingnecessaryinordertoreceiveexistence,andexistsinnorespectaspartofawhole).
*Forexample,Peterispersealive,endowedwithintellect,andthefacultyoflaughter,theartistisperseonewhofashionsobjects.ButPeterisperaccidensasuffererfrominfluenzaortheheirtoalargefortune,theartistperacciderucelibateormarried,etc.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
byanymeansforthatreasonase.Thatwhichexistsaseorfromitself,possessinginitselftheentireexplanationofitsexistence,isuncaused;Godaloneisfromhimself,ase.Createdsubstancesonthecontrary[createdsubjectsofaction)arecaused;theyexistperse,invirtueoftheiressence;theydonotexistase.Intheirownnaturetheypossesseverythingnecessarytoreceiveexistence,butnottopossessanexistencenotreceivedfromwithout.Theyaresufficientbythemselvestoexist,inthestrictlyqualifiedsensethattheydonotexistassomethingwhichbelongstosomethingelse,but,absolutelyspeaking,theyarebynomeansasufficientgroundoftheirownexistence.Thatwhichisasecannotceasetoexist;thatwhichispersewithoutbeingasecanloseitsexistence.
Thedistinctionbetweenthatwhichexistsaseandthatwhichexistsperseisperfectlyclear.Neverthelesscertainphilosophershavelostsightofit,notablySpinoza,whoascribesaseity[a-se-itas)toeverysubstance.(Fromwhichitfollowsimmediatelythatthereisonlyonesubstance,andthateverythingisGod—monismandpantheism).WhenindeedSpinozadefinessubstanceasthatwhichisinitselfandisconceivedbyitselfhereallymeans,asthecontextshows,^thatwhichtobeandtobeconceivedneedsabsolutelynothingexceptitselfDescarteshadalreadydefinedsubstanceambiguouslyasresquaeitaexsistitutnullaaliareindigeatadexsistendum,athingwhichexistsinsuchafashionthatithasneedofnothingelseinordertoexist.'
1Cf.Ethics,i,7."PrincipiaPhilosophiae,i,51.
ONTOLOGY:ACTANDPOTENTIALITY
Whenwestudiedbeingfirstfromthestandpointofintelligibility,thenfi-omthatofexistence,wesawthattheobjectprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellect,beingintheprimarysenseoftheterm,wasintheformercasewhatwecallessence,inthelatterwhatwecallsubstance.
Wemustnowconsiderthebeingofthings(understandingthetermbeinginitsmostgeneralandindeterminatesense)fromthestandpointofaction,inreferencetothemannerinwhichthingsbehaveinreality,or,ifyouprefer,inreferencetowhattheydo.Thisnewstandpointacquaintsuswithathirdprimarysenseofthetermbeing.
(a)Whatisthefirsttruthwhichtheintellectgraspsassoonasithasformedthenotionofbeing?Itissufficienttoconsiderthenotiontoseeatoncethatwhatis,is(principleofidentity),oragainthatwhatis,cannotnotbeatthesametimeandinthesamerelation(principleofnon-contradiction).Thatistosay,thateverythingiswhatitis,thatitisnotwhatitisnot,andthatitiseverythingthatitis.
Wewillnowconsiderwhatthingsdo,whatistheirnaturalbehaviour,whatistheprimaryfactofexperiencegraspedbythesensesandconsciousness.Thingschange.Thearrowflies,theanimalruns,whatwas
239
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
coldbecomeshotundertheactionoffire,foodbecomesflesh,whatwasUvingdies,andeveryspringthatwhichhadnobeingcomesintoexistence.
Although,likeallourprimarynotions,itisverydifficulttoexplainscientifically,everybodyknowsbyexperienceinwhatthisgreatfactofchangeormotionconsists.¥/emaysaythatwhereverthereischangethereisatransition(fromonebeingtoanother,orfromonemodeofbeingtoanother).Andfortransitiontoexist,theremustbesomethingwhichundergoesit,somethingwhichisthesubjectofchange,forexampleasubjectwhichceasestobeinaparticularplaceoraparticularthing{terminusaquo,thearrowpressedtothebow,thefood,the
seed),tobeinanotherplaceoranotherthing{terminusadquern,thearrowinthetarget,flesh,thematureplant).
Thereisnochangewithoutasubjectwhi:hischanged,andwhichmustbesomeparticularthingbeforethechangeiseffected^—inotherwordsbeingispriortochange.
Those,indeed,whomaintainthatchangeispriortobeing,andthatthereischangewithoutasubjectwhichischangedandwhichissomeparticularthingbeforethechangeiseffected,denytheprincipleofidentityandfallintoabsurdity.Forwhentheytakeupthisposition,theymusteithercontinuetoacceptthenotionofbeing,inwhichcasetoaffirmthatthereischangewithoutasubjectofchange,orthatchangeispriortobeing,istoaffirmthatwhathasnobeing
1Forexample,inasubstantialchangethefirstmatter,whichisnotabeing,butpotentialbeing,isthesubjectwhichischangedandconstitutesaparticularbody,orparticularbeing,byitsunionwithaparticularsubstantialform,beforeitconstitutessomeotherbodybyitsunionwithanothersubstantialform.
ontology:actandpotentiality
changes,whichismanifestlyabsurd;ortheymustrejectthenotionofbeingasillusoryandarguethatinsteadofconceivingbeingwemustconceivechange,inwhichcasetheymustrejectasfalse,togetherwiththenotionofbeing,theprincipleofidentitywhichisboundupwithit,andmaintainthatthoughtisessentiallydeceptive,whichisequallyabsurd.
Weare,therefore,absolutelyobligedtoholdthatbeingispriortochange,andthatthereisnochangewithoutasubjectwhichischanged,andwhichissomeparticularthingbeforeitchanges;or,inthelanguageofphilosophy,thatthereisnomotionwithoutasubjectwhichismoved.
(b)Wewillnowturnawayfromexperienceandeverysensiblerepresentationandattempttoconsiderchangewithourintellect,thatistosay,intermsofbeing,theformalobjectofthelatter.Weshallinquirehoworinwhatrespectthestarting-pointofchangecanthusbecomethegoal.Youwillanswer,perhaps,thatitisaccordingasitisthisorthat,inrespectofwhatitis,thatthestarting-pointbecomesthegoal.Butthestarting-pointisnothingbutwhatitis,andisalreadyeverythingthatitis,andthereforeinthisrespectisincapableofbecoming,forit
alreadyis.Youmaythensaythatitisaccordingasitisnotthisorthat,inrespectofwhatitisnot,thatthestarting-pointbecomesthegoal.Butinrespectofwhatitisnot,thethingisnothingwhatever,ispurenothing,andthereforecannotbethesourceoftheproductofchange.Itisincapableofbecoming,foritsimplyisnot.
Hencethestarting-pointofchangecannotbecomeitsgoal—eitherinrespectofwhatitisorinrespect
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ofwhatitisnot.Inotherwords,thenewbeingwhichistheproductofchangecanbederivedneitherfromthebeingwhichakeadyexists,norfromanothing,whichhasnoexistencewhatever.Ischange,therefore,impossible,asParmenidesmaintained?Andareweobligedwithhimtodenytheevidenceofoursenses,whichwitnessestothefactofchange?
{c)No.Butweareobligedtodevelopandexploreourideaofbeing.Evidentlyintheanalysiswehavejustmadesomethinghasbeenleftout.Thestarting-pointofchangeisnodoubtalreadyeverythingwhichitis,butitisnotyetallwhichitcanbe;itisnotyetthatparticularthingitisdestinedtobecome,butitpossessesthemeanstobeit,itcanbeit.Thereforebetweenbeingandnotbeingthereisthepowerofbeing.Itisneitherinrespectofwhatitis,norinrespectofwhatitisnot,butinrespectofwhatitcanbethatthestarting-pointofchangebecomesitsgoal.
Thearrowishere{onthebow,forinstance)andfromthestandpointofbeingpureandsimple,itisnowhereelse;butitcanbethere{atthegoal,forexample),andpossessesthemeanstobethere.Breadisbreadandnothingbutbread,andnotflesh,sofarasitis,inthesenseofbeingpureandsimple,thatistosay,ofbeingcompletelyrealised;butitcanceasetobebreadandbecomeflesh.Thereisinitthatwhichenablesittoundergothechangeundertheactionofcertaindeterminatecauses.
POTENCYORPOTENTIALITY
Thingsthereforearenotconfinedandheldfastbywhattheyareandwhattheyarenot.Evenwhile
ontology:actandpotentiality
theyarehereandnotthere,thisandnotthat,theypossessthepowertobethereandnolongerhere,thatandnolongerthis.Butsolongastheyarehereorarethis,thatpowerwhichtheypossessremainsmerepowerandisnotmanifested.
Thispowerinthemisassuchsomethingreal.Consideramanasleep.Heneitherseesnorspeaksnorwalks.ButheisnotthereforebUnd,paralysed,ordumb.Heisreallycapableofseeing,speaking,andwalking.Whilehedoesnotspeakheretainsthepowertospeak,hehasitinhim;whereashecannotwithoutaviolationofnaturebecomeatreeorabird.Oragaintakeabilliardballatrest.Itisimmobile(notmoving).Butitisnotthereforeimmovable.Itisreallycapableofmotion.Whileitdoesnotmove,itretainsthepowerofbeingmoved,ithasitinitself;whereasithasnonaturalpowerofpassingthroughawall.Thepowerofbeingisnotbeinginthefullandprimarysenseoftheterm;butpowerofbeingwithoutasyetbeingisnotsheernonentity.Powerofbeingtakenpreciselyassuchisirreducibleeithertononentityortobeingpureandsimple.Itissomethingdifferentfromeither,somethingsuigenerisforwhichphilosophymustfindaplace.Preciselysofarasthingscanbesomethingtheyarenot,they,afteraninferiorfashion,are.
Wehavethusfoundsomethingwhichdoesnotdeservetobecalledbeing,onwhichthattitlecanbebestowedonlyinasecondaryandimpropersense,asanalms,sotospeak,butwhichneverthelessisreal.Itiswhatphilosopherstermpotencyorpotentiality.
Inusingthetermpotencywemustbeonourguardagainstambiguity.Thispotencyisnotthatofwhich
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
wethinkwhenwesaythatabeingispotent.Thispotencyisnotanactivepower;powertoeffectsomethingortowork,atleastwhenunderstoodasactive,istheabsolutecontraryofthepowerorpotencywithwhichwearenowconcerned,beingnotpotencybutact.Thepotencyofwhichwearespeakingisentirelypassive,nothingmorethanarealpowerofbeingorbecoming.Waxisinpotencytoreceivetheimpressoftheseal,waterinpotencytobecomeiceorvapour.Theactivepowers(forinstance,thefacultiesofthesoul)arealsorightlytermedpotenciesorpotentialities^butonlyinsofarastheyarenot,orarecapableof
notbeing,actuallyoperative,orsofarastheyaresimplecapacitiesofactionoroperation.
ACT
Since,however,powerofbeing,thoughnotnothing,isnotbeinginthefullandprimarysenseoftheterm,wemustfindanameforbeinginthefullandprimarysenseofthetermasdistinguishedfrompotentiality.Philosopherscallitact.
Herealsowemustbewareofambiguity.Wearenotconcerned,atleastnotprimarilyandchiefly,withanactintheordinarysenseoftheword,withdoingoraction.Actionoroperationisindeedanact,beinginact,butitiswhatistermedthesecondaryact[actusoperationis).Actionpresupposesbeing.Andtheprimaryactistheactofbeing[actiisexsistentiae),moreoverofbeingaparticularthing{actusessentiae).Forexample,abodyisluminousinact,evenwhenitisnotilluminatinganythingelse.Clay,oncemodelled,isastatueinact,waterat32°Fahrenheitisiceinact,
ontology:actandpotentiality
andthemomentanythingeffectivelyisonethingoranotherandespeciallythemomentanythingexists,itisinact.
Actmaythereforebedefinedasbeinginthestrictsenseoftheterm,takeninthefullnessthussignified,oragainthefinished,thedeterminate,ortheperfectassuch.Potentiality,ontheotherhand,isthedeterminable,theperfectible,thatwhichiscapableofbeingfinished,assuch;notabeingbutarealpowerofbeing.
WemusttakecarenottoattempttothinkwithourimaginationtheseconceptsofactandpotentiaUty.Theycanbethoughtbytheintellectalone.LeastofallmustweconceiveofpotentiaUtyassomesortofbeinginactwhichweimagineasmoreorlesshazy,indefinite,inactive,andhiddenintheobject.PotentiaUtyinitselfisabsolutelyincapableofbeingrepresented.Itisnotaspringoranorganhiddeninthething,noracharacterprefiguredinitafterthefashionofanimaginarystatueoutUnedbeforehandbytheveinsofmarblewithintheblock,noryetanactthwartedorrenderedabortive,likeaneffortorpressureovercomebytheresistanceofanobstacle.Itisabsolutelynothingdoneorinprocessofdoing,absolutelynothinginact.Initselfitcannotbeconceived(forinthatcase
itwouldnecessarilybeconceivedassomethingdeterminate).Itcanbeconceivedonlybymeansoftheact(theparticularthing)withwhichitiscorrelated,asthesimplepowerofbeingthatparticularthing.
ConclusionXVII.—Being,consideredinrelationtothefullnessandperfectionwhichtheterm
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
signifies,isdividedintobeinginthestrictsenseoract,andpowerofbeingorpotentiality.
Wearenowinapositiontounderstandchange.Theproductofchangearisesneitheroutofbeinginactnoroutofnothing,butfrompotentialbeing.Inotherwords,theactionoftheefficientcausedraws,educes,fromthepotentialityofthesubjectthedetermination,theform,whichwaswantinginthestarting-pointofthechangeandcharacterisesitsgoal,aswhentheactionoffireeducesfromthepotentialityofwater(thewateriscold,butcanbehot)thedetermination(aspecificintensityofheat)whichcharacterisesitastheresultofthechange.Thechangeisthetransitionfrompotentialitytoact,or,moreaccurately,accordingtoadefinitiontowhichwemustreturnlater,itistheactofathinginpotentialitytakenpreciselyinrespectofitspotentiality:actusexsistentisinpotentiaproutinpotentia.
ACTANDPOTENTIALITYINTHINGS
Fromwhathasbeensaiditfollowsthatallchangeablethings,inwhateverrespecttheyaresubjecttochange,arecompoundedofpotentialityandact.Godalone,sinceheisabsolutelyunchangeable,isdevoidofanypotentiality.SinceheissubsistentBeingitselfortheFullnessofbeing,heisincapableofbecoming;thereisnoperfectionwhichhedoesnotpossessorratherisnotalready;heispureact.
Thebeingofallotherthings,onthecontrary,istoopoorandtooweaktoreaUsesimultaneouslyeverythingtheyarecapableofbeing.Foreveryoneofthemthereisreallyopenavastrangeofpossibilities,
ontology:actandpotentiality
ofwhichtheycanneverrezilisemorethanafew,andthatbychanging.
Herewemayobservethattheobscureandmysteriousconceptoffirstmatterwhoseacquaintancewemadewhenwestudiedthenotionofindividualnatureisthatofapurepotentialityintheorderofsubstance,whichcanbeanyandeverybodyandbyitselfisnone.Itisthepurelypotentialprinciplewhichinunionwithanactualprinciple(asubstantialform)constitutesaparticularcorporealsubstance,andisthesubjectofsubstantialchanges.
Potentialityandactdividebetweenthemthetotalityofcreatedbeing,bothintheorderofsubstanceandintheorderofaccidents.Inotherwords,theyare,likebeingitself,transcendentalobjectsofthoughtwhichexceedortranscendeverylimitationofclassorcategory,andincludeallcreatedthings.Thesubstanceofbodiesiscompoundedofpotentiality{firstmatter)andact[substantialform).Thesubstanceofincorporealthings[purespirits)isnotcomposite;itisinrespectofthatwhichconstitutesitsnatureoressencewhollyact.Butitisnotthereforepureact(inthecaseofpurecreatedspirits),forthissubstance{substantialessence)isitselfpotentialityinrelationtothatwhichistheultimateactofeverythingreal{actualitasomnisformae)orexistence:purespiritsdonotderivetheirexistencefromthemselves,ase;theycannotbe.
Ontheotherhand,wemayremarkthateveryaccident{whiteness,strength,virtue,etc.)isanact{accidentalform)whichdeterminesthesubjectandisitselfsometimesinpotentialityinrespectoffurtherdeterminations.Theintellect,forexample,isan
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
accident(anaccidentalform)whosesubjectisthesoul,anditisinpotentialityinrespectofaparticularactofthought.
Itisclearthatallthenotionswithwhichwehavebecomeacquaintedhithertocanbeclassifiedinthefollowingfashion:
'uncreatedbeing:God,ensase
primarilyasin-
.pureac
createdbeing\
thatwhich
isessence<inthe
wide
sense
whattelligible{esstheenceinthestrictsub-^sense)andinvir-Itnaijectt^eofwhichitexistsVprimarilyascompletelycircumscribed{individualnature)andinvirtueofwhichitexistsassuchthatwhichprimarilyis:theprimarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)j
\actofbeing:existence
inaparticularrespect:
absolutely:substantiasecunda
substantiaprima
accident{ac-\cidentalform)
substancecomposed(inthecorporealorder)ofpo-tentialityandact,anditselfactualisedbytheultimateactofeverythingreal
beii^
com'
pound
oipote
tialit
andc
Aft-erwhathasbeensaid,itissufficienttoconsiderthenotionsofpotentiality
andacttoseeimmediatelythetruthofthefollowingAxioms:
(i)Potentialitycannotexistinthepurestate,apartfromanyact.Thisisevident.For,sinceexistenceisanact,potentiahtycanonlyexistinbeingswhichareinsomeotherrespectinact.^
1Hencefirstmattercannotexistseparatelyunactualisedbysomeparticularsubstantialform.Similarlyessenceisinrelationtotheactofexistenceapotentialityreallydistinctfromexistencebutactualinvirtueofexistence.
ontology:actandpotentiality
(ii)Nothingiseducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomebeinginact.Itisplainlyimpossiblethatthatwhichisinpotentiality,thatwhichiscapableofhavingadeterminationoraperfectionbutdoesnothaveit,shouldgivetoitselfwhatitlacks,sofarasitdoesnotpossessit,thatistosay,sofarasitisinpotentiality.
(iii)Actispriortopotentiality.Aconsequenceoftheprecedingaxiom.^
(iv)Potentialityisessentiallyrelativetoactandisforthesakeoftheact[potentiadicituradactum).Itisindeedonlyinrelationtotheactthatthepotentialitycanbeconceived(onlyinrelationtobeingwhitethatwecanconceivethepowerofbeingwhite);anditisalsoonlyforthedeterminationorperfectionthatthedeterminableandtheperfectibleassuchare.
(v)Actandpotentialitybelongtothesameorder;thatistosay,bothmustbeintheorderofsubstance,orbothintheorderofaccident.ForitisevidentthateveryactwhichatthesametimecompletesandspecificallydeterminesapotentiaHtymustbelongtothesameorderasthatpotentiality.Theactivityofthought,forexample,belongstotheorderofaccidentlikethefacultyitselffromwhichitproceedsandwhichisinpotentialitytothatactivity.
(vi)Everythingactsaccordingtoitsnatureinact.
1Thisaxiomisthemetaphysicalexplanationofthetruthpreviouslyaffirmed:beingispriortobecomingorchange.Absolutelyspeakingthisistrue.Intheorderofmaterialcausalityontheotherhandpotentialityispriortoact,becomingpriortobeing,theseedpriortothetree.Buttheseeditselfpresupposesthetreewhichproduceditandatthebeginningoftheentireprocess
theactualityoftheFirstCause.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Sinceactivityisanact{actusoperationis)whichisbroughtintobeingbythesubjectfromwhichitproceedsitpresupposes(aslaiddownbyAxiomii)thatthelatterisinacttotheextenttowhichitproducesthatactivity.Thesametruthdifferentlyenunciatedisexpressedbythedictumactionoroperationmanifestsbeing{operaticsequituresse).
(vii)ThecombinationoftwobeingsinactcannotproducesomethingwhichisoneofitselfWecalloneofitself{unumperse),asopposedtoonebyaccident^athingwhichconstitutesasinglebeingandnotaconjunctionofbeings,inotherwordsathingwhichisoneinvirtueofthenaturebywhichitexists.Forexample,alivingorganismisaunitofitself,whereasamachineorahouseisanaccidentalunit.^Thisdistinctiononceunderstood,itisplainthattwobeingsinact,andassuchconstitutingtwobeings,canneverbytheircombinationconstituteanythingexceptaconjunctionofbeings,thatistosay,anaccidentalunit.*
Oncemoreonthisquestionofactandpotentialitywefindphilosophersdividedintothreegreatschools.TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthedistinctionbetweenpotentialityandact,thepriority
1Nodoubt,ifyoudestroytheunityofthemachineorthehouse,youdestroythemachineorthehouse,butyoudonotdestroythenatures(orsubstances)ofwhichitiscomposed{iron,steel,bricks,etc.).Destroy,ontheotherhand,theunityofanorganism,youdestroyitsverynature{substance).
2Thisaxiomplaysanimportantpartinnaturalphilosophyandparticularlyinpsychology.Forinstance,theCartesianconceptionwhichregardsthesoulandthebodyasindependentofeachother,twocompletesubstances,isunabletoexplainthesubstantialunityofthehumanbeing,becausetwocompletesubstancesaretwobeingsinact.
ontology:actandpotentiality
ofacttopotentiality,therealityofmotionandbecoming,butthepriorityofbeingtomotion.ItalsoshowsthatbetweenGod(thepureact)andallthingsbesides(compoundsofpotentialityandact)thereisanabsoluteandinfinite
difference.
Exaggeratedintellectualism(Parmenides,Spinoza,Hegel)refusestoadmitthenotionofpotentiality,becausebyitselfitisobscure.If,however,everythingwhichis,iswhollyactorpureact,eithermotionmustbeunreal(Parmenides)orcontrariesidentical(Hegel)andcreaturesmustpossessthesamenatureasGod(pantheism).
Anti-intellectualism(Herachtus,Bergson)equallyrejectsthedistinctionbetweenpotentialityandact,butbecausethenotionofbeingisintheopinionofthesephilosophersillusory.If,however,beingisdeniedinfavourofbecomingorpurechange,pureactcannolongerexist;andhowevertheexponentsofthisschoolmaystruggletoescapethelogicoftheirposition,Godmustpossessthesamenatureasthings(pantheism).
ModerateIntellectualism[SchoolofAristotleandSt.Thomas)
Potentialityandactinthings.Godorthepureactisabsolutelydistinctfromcreatedthings.
ExaggeratedIntellectualismAnti-intellectualism
Nopotentialityinthings.Neitheractnorbeing.
EverythingisabsorbedEverythingisabsorbedin
eitherinpurebeing,orinchangeorpurebecoming,
thecontradictionwhichandGodisidenticalor
constitutesbecoming,andcontinuouswiththings,createdthingsareidentifiedwithGod.
Materialandformal,virtualandformal(oractual),implicitandexplicit,inaccomplishedact,inexpressact.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Inconnectionwiththenotionsofpotentialityandactphilosophersusecertainexpressionswhosemeaningmustnowbeexplained.
Wehavejustlearnedthemeaningofthetwocorrelativesinpotentialityandinact.Themarblebeforeithasbeencarvedisastatueinpotentiality;assoonasthesculptorhasgivenittheformheintends,itisastatueinact.
{a)Closelyrelatedtotheseexpressionsinpotentialityandinactaretheexpressionssofrequentlymetinphilosophymaterialandformal.Theyhavebeenborrowedfromnaturalphilosophy(cosmology)whichprovesthateverycorporealsubstanceiscompoundedoftwoprinciples,Jirstmatter(purepotentialityintheorderofsubstance)andsubstantialformorfirstact.^
Thetermsmaterialandformalhavepassedfromnaturalphilosophyintoallbranchesofphilosophy,todesignate,byanalogy,ontheonehandwhatever,initselfindeterminateandpotential,playsthepartofasubjectwhichreceivesadetermination,ontheotherhandwhateverpossessesofitselfadetermining,actualising,andspecificatoryfunction,oragainwhateveristakenaspossessingaparticularcharacter,inaparticularaspect.Itisinthissensethat,aswehavealreadyseen,^wedistinguishbetweenthematerialandformalobjectsofavirtue,science,orfaculty.
Hencearisesinparticularthedistinctionbetweenthematerialandformalstatement.Wespeakmateriallywhenwedonottakethethingsofwhichwespeakpreciselyaspossessingthecharactersdenotedbythewordsweuse;wespeakformallywheninthe
1Seeabove,pp.166-168.^Seeabove,p.106.
ontology:substanceandaccident
thingsofwhichwespeakweconsidernotsomuchthesubjectwhichpossessesthesecharactersasthecharactersthemselves,withthesharpcontourandclear-cutlinetheydescribeinit.Thisdistinctionisextremelyimportant.Formalstatementshould,indeed,betheconstantaimofphilosophy;and,ontheotherhand,manypropositionsaretrueformaliterloquendowhicharefalsematerialiterloquendo,andviceversa.Forexamplesthefollowingpropositionsaretrueunderstoodformally,butfalseifunderstoodmaterially:
Everythingwhichis,isgood(sofarasitis).
Thecommongoodisalwayspreferabletothegoodoftheindividual(providedthecommongoodisunderstoodformally,inwhichcasetheunionofthesoul
withGod,thatiswiththetranscendentcommongoodofallcreatures,istobepreferredtoeverythingelse).
Superiorsoughtalwaystobeobeyed.(Sofarastheyaresuperiors,andcommandnothingopposedtotheordersofasuperiorofhigherrank.)
Therearemenwhoarenaturalslaves.(Ifslaveisunderstoodformally,asmeaningdestinedformanualorservilework.)
Everyvirtueisstable.(Ifweconsidersolelyitsqualityofvirtue.)
Knowledgeisinfallible(sofarasitisknowledge).
Conversely,thefollowingpropositionsaretrueonlyinacertaincontext,andifunderstoodmaterially.^
*Itwouldbeofinteresttoshowhowphilosophy,sinceithasgivenupthetechnicallanguageofScholasticism,hasincreasinglytendedtousetermsinamaterialratherthanaformalsense.Henceanumberofbadlystatedproblems,andahostofmisunderstandingsbothbetween
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ThispictureistheAdorationoftheMagi.
ThisbookisthephilosophyofPythagoras.
Speechhasbeengiventomantoconcealhisthoughts.
Philosophyisproud.
TheBritishConstitutionisgoodbecauseitisillogical.
{b)Wemustbecarefultodistinguishinpotentialityfromvirtual,fortheysignifyentirelydifferentthings.*Athingissaidtobevirtual,ortoexistvirtually,whenitiscontainedinanotherthingofsuperiorrank,notinitsbeingorproperdetermination(itsformality)butunderanotherbeingordetermination(anotherformahty),sothatitistrulythereaccordingtothevirtueordegreeofperfectionwhichbelongstoit,butnotformallyoractually.Inthiscase,thebeinginwhichitisfoundisnotinpotentialityinrespectofit,butonthecontraryinactaftera
higherfashion.Itssuperiorityis,sotospeak,anobstaclewhichpreventsthethingwhichitvirtuallycontainsfrombeingpresentwithitsproperandinferiordetermination(formality).
Thustheperfectionsofallcorporealobjectsexist
modernphilosophersthemselves,andstillmorebetweenthemodernphilosophersandtheancients,withtheirformalterminology.
Itmayalsobeobservedthatcertainphilosophictermsunderstoodinamaterialsense,haveacquiredameaningtotallydifferentfromtheiroriginalsignificance.Take,forexample,thetermobject.Fortheancientstheobjectmeantwhatisplacedbe/orethemindorpresentedtoit,consideredformallyassuch.Henceimaginarybeings,thechimaeraforexample,weresaidtoexistobjectivelyorasobjectspresenttothemind,butnotreallyorasthingsexistingoutsidethemind.Themodems,onthecontrary,understandbyanobjectthethingitselforthesubjectwhichispresentedtothemind,andtoexistobjectivelyisthereforethesameastoexistreallyoroutsidethemind.
1Observe,however,thattheexpressionpotentially,inpotentia,issometimesusedimproperlyinthesenseofvirtually.
ontology:actandpotentiality
virtuallyinGod,conclusionsarevirtuallycontainedinthepremisses,partiallivesexistvirtuallyinthelifeofanorganism.
{c)Wemustnowcallattentiontothefactthatthecontrastbetweenimplicitandexplicitisnottobeconfusedwiththatbetweenvirtualandformal{actual).Athingcontainedimplicitlyinanothermaybethereformallyoractually,notvirtually:butitispresentinaconfusedfashion,wrappedupandhiddenasaflowerlieshiddenandfoldedinthebud.Forexample,inthetruthPeterisamanthereisimplicitlycontainedthefurthertruthPeterisarationalanimal.
{d)Finallyathinggivenformallyandexplicitlymaybeinactintwodifferentways.Take,forinstance,amanwhoisrunningasfastashecantoescapehisenemies.IfIsayheisfleeingImentionwhatheisdoinginexpressact{inactusignato)(whatheisdoingasstressedorexpressed,sotospeak,byhisintention).If,however,IsaythatheisacceleratingtherateofhisbreathingImentionwhatheisdoingonlyinaccomplishedact{inactuexercito).
Similarly,amanwhoreadsRonsard,Lamartine,orVictorHugo,tocountthenumberoftimestheyusethewordsaimerorcherir^readsthepoets,tobesure,andreadsthemformaDyandexpUcitly,butthatisnotwhathedoesinintention.Onthecontrary,whenweconsiderhisobjectinreadingthepoets,wemustsaythatheispreparinganessayofstylometricliterarycriticism.Wemaysaythathereadsthepoetsineffectorinaccomplishedact,butthatexpresslyorinexpressactheispreparingtheessayinquestion.
Again,whenwerepeatliliaagrinonlaborantnequenent,thinkingsolelyofthemeaningofthesentence,
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
whatwethenknowinexpressactistheliliesofthefield,whicharepresenttoourmindasneithertoilingnorspinning.Butatthesametimeweknowinaccomplishedactthenominativeplural,lilia^whichinturnweshallknowinexpressact,ifwereturntothesentenceinquestionandsubmitittogrammaticalanalysis.
Thatistosay,thephraseinexpressact{inactusignato)isusedofthingstowhichintellectorwillaredirected,whentheyaretheobjectofaconceptoftheintellectoranintentionofthewillspeciallyformedforthem,andarethuspresentedtothemindorbroughtintobeingundertheactualheadingorontheactualgroundexpressedbytheirname.Whenonthecontrarytheyarepresentedtothemindorbroughtintobeingonoccasionofsomethingelseandwithoutbeingintendedinthemselves,wesaythattheyarepresentonlyinaccomplishedact{inactuexercito).
THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGy)
Metaphysicsstudiesbeingassuch,butforthatveryreasonisobHgedtostudythecauseofbeing.Thatiswhyitshighestbranch,thecoping-stonesotospeakoftheentiremetaphysicaledifice,isconcernedwdthhimwhoissubsistentBeingitself.Thisbranchofmetaphysicsiscallednaturaltheology(thescienceofGodinsofarasheisaccessibletonaturalreason,or,fromanotherpointofview,sofarasheisthecauseofthingsandauthorofthenaturalorder).SinceLeibnizithasalsobeenknownbythelessappropriatenametheodicy.
LeibnizinhisTheodicy(1710)undertooktodefendDivineProvidenceagainsttheattacksofthesceptics(particularlyBayle).Thetermtheodicy
(etymologically:justificationofGod)hasbeenusedsincethattimetodenotethebranchofphilosophywhoseobjectisGod.Butthenameisobjectionableontwogrounds:firstbecausetheprovidenceofGodhasnoneedtobejustifiedbyphilosophers;secondlybecauseprovidenceandtheproblemofevilareneitherthesolenorthemostimportantquestionsofwhichnaturaltheologyhastotreat.
TheprimaryquestionsdiscussedbynaturaltheologyareobviouslythosewhichconcernGod'sexistenceitself.
FortheexistenceofGodisnotinfact,asMale-257
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
brancheandtheontologistsbelieved,evidenttousimmediatelyandpriortoanydiscursiveactivityofthemind;itisinvirtueofthatintellectualoperationwhichistheactivitymostprofoundlydistinctiveofman,namelyratiocination,thatitbecomesevidenttous,andtoattainthatcertaintyreasoningmustproceednotfromthemereideaornotionofperfectbeing(theontologicalargumentofSt.AnselmandDescartes)butfromfactswhoseexistenceisestablishedbeyonddispute.St.Thomas,resumingtheentiretraditionofthepast,showsbyfivedifferentargumentshowtheconclusionGodexistsisimposedwithabsolutenecessityonthehumanreason.Thereexistintheworldmotionorchange;beingsandeventsnewlybroughtintobeing;thingswhichareandarecapableofnotbeing;thingsgradedindegreesofperfection,whoseperfection,whichconsistsinbeing,ismoreorlesslimited,obscured,mingledwithimperfection;irrationalnaturesdisposedtowardsanobjectorend,asisproved,notonlybythecomplexsystemoftheuniverseorthestructureofUvingorganisms,butevenbythesimpleaptitudeofeveryagenttoproduceitsspecificoperation.Toaccountforthesevariousfactswearecompelled—forunderpainofabsurdityweareobligedtostopatanultimateexplanationofexistence—toadmitacausewhichmoveswithoutbeingmoved,causeswithoutbeingcaused,cannotlackexistence,containsinitspuritytheperfectionofwhichthingspartakeingreaterorlessdegree,possessesanintellectwhichisthefinalgroundofallnaturesandthefirstprincipleofallthings.SuchacausewetermGod;itispureact,derivingitsexistencefromitself{ase).Inotherwords,beingitselfisitsnature
THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGY)
oressence,itissubsistentBeingitself,hewhois.Thisconclusion,whichforthe
philosopherinvolvesthemostsublimetruthsofmetaphysics,isreachedverysimplybycommonsense,foritisintruththemostfundamentalnaturaloperationofthehumanunderstanding,sothatitcanbedeniedonlybydenyingreasonitselfanditsfirstprinciples(thelawsofidentityornon-contradiction,sufficientreason,causality);andasthehistoryofphilosophyshowsonlytooplainly,themindhasnootherchoicethanbetweenthealternatives:"thetrueGodorradicalirrationality."^
ItisalsotheprovinceoftheodicytoshowwithwhatmannerofknowledgeweknowGodandinduecoursetostudyhisnatureandperfections,inparticulartheunity,simplicity,andimmutabilitywhichareimmediatelydeduciblefromtheperfectionofunderivedexistence{aseity),thefundamentalcharacterofpureact,andwhichprovemostclearlythatheisabsolutelyandessentiallydistinctfromtheworld;hisrelationswiththeworld,hisknowledge,hisactivityasCreatorandMover;andfinallytheproblemsinvolvedinthedivineforeknowledgeofcontingentevents,particularlyman'sfreeacts,andthosearisingoutoftheexistenceofevilintheuniverse.
TheschoolofAristotleandSt.ThomasteachesthatGodisknownbythenaturalreasonanalogically,sothatweperceivethedivineperfections{being,unity,goodness,wisdom,love,etc.)inthemirrorofcreatures,withoutassertinganyunityofnature,commonmeasure,orproportion,ormixtureorconfusionofanykindbetweenGodandcreatedthings.This
^Garrigou-Lagrange,Dieu.sonexistence,sanature,Paris,3rded.,1920.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
teachingisopposedtotwocontraryerrors,theerroroftheagnostics,whomaintainthattheDivineBeingisbeyondthekenofourintellectandGodunknowablebythereason(sceptics;phenomenalists;positivistslikeComteandSpencer,theKantianschoolasawhole),andtheerrorofthepantheists,whoconfusetheDivineBeingwiththebeingofcreatedthings(Parmenides,Heraclitus,theStoics,Spinoza,theGermanmetaphysiciansafterLessingandKant;themodernistsandimmanentists).
PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas
Godisknownbyanalogyandisabsolutelydistinctfromcreatures.
PantheismAgnosticism
GodconfusedwithcreaGodunknowable,
tures.
THEPHILOSOPHYOFARTETHICS
Theaimofthepracticalsciencesistoknow,notforthesakeofknowing,buttoprocurebysomeactionthegoodofman(otherthanthepureactofknowingtruth).Butthegoodofmancanbeunderstoodintwodifferentsenses;eitherofthisorthatparticulargoodorofthegoodwhichisinitselfalonethegoodofmanandwhich,aswesay,determinesthesignificanceofhumanlife.
thephilosophyofart
Ofthedifferentpracticalscienceswhichareconcernedwiththegoodofmanfromthefirststandpoint(thatofparticulargoods,andnotoftheabsolutegoodofhumanhfe),none,aswehavepointedoutalready,^isaphilosophy.Fornoneoftheseproposestoregulatehumanactioninreferencetothesupremecauseinthepracticalorder,thatis(forinthepracticalordertheaimorendpursuedfulfilsthefunctionofcauseorprinciple)inreferencetothelastend(theabsolutegoodofman).
Norarethesepracticalsciencessciencesinthestrictsense,fortheydonotproceedbywayofdemonstration,drawingconclusionsfromtheirpremisses.
1Seep.149.261
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
Theyareratherartsthansciences,andbelongimmediatelytothewidecategoryofart,nottothatofscience.
Theessentialcharacterofarttakeninitscompleteextensionistoinstructushowtomakesomething,sothatitisconstructed,formed,orarranged,asitoughttobe,andthustosecuretheperfectionorgoodness,notofthemaker,butoftheobjectitselfwhichhemakes.Artthereforebelongstothepracticalorderinthesensethatitinstructsushowtomakesomething,consideringnottheusewe
shouldmakeofourfreewillbutthemannerinwhichtheworkassuchandinitselfshouldbeexecuted.Wemaythussaythatartisconcernedwithwhatistobeina.dc,factibile,7Tot.Y]T6v.
Thisformalcharacterofmakingisfulfilledprimarilyinthematerialobjectsproducedorfashionedbyman{thefactibileinthestrictsense).Butinawidersenseitistobefoundalsoinworksofapurelyspiritualnature.Inthiscaseitgoesbeyondthesphereofpracticeassuch,sofaraspracticeisopposedtospeculationandsignifiesanactivityotherthanthatofpureknowing.Itisinthissensethatthereismakinginthepurelyspeculativeorder(aformofargument,aproposition,areworks,butworksofthespeculativereason),andtherearearts,logic,forexample,whicharespeculativearts.
Inorder,however,toestablishageneraltheoryofartandmakingwemusthaverecoursetothehighestandmostuniversalconceptsandprinciplesofhumanknowledge.Suchatheorythereforebelongstothedomainofphilosophy.
Theprovinceofphilosophythusdefinedisindeed
THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS
practical,sinceitisconcernedwithmaking,anditsobjectistoorderfromabovethebranchesofpracticalinstruction.Nevertheless,sinceitisinthestrictsenseascience,itcannotbeessentiallypractical,butremainsessentiallyspeculativeinvirtueofitsobjectandmethodofprocedure;moreover,itisextremelyremotefromactualpractice.Indeed,notonlyhasitnoconcernwiththeapplicationoftherulesofarttoaparticularworktobeaccomphshed,butfurtheritformulatesruleswhicharefartoogeneraltobecapableofsuchimmediateapphcationandtobecorrectlytermedrulesofartinthestrictsense;itisthereforepracticalonlyinanimpropersenseandveryimperfectly.
Theindividualartsalone(branchesofstudyessentiallypractical)possessrulessufficientlydetailedtobeimmediatelyapplicabletoaparticularwork,andtheirapphcationbelongssolelytothem.Further,withtheexceptionofthefinearts,whoseobject,beauty,beingitselfuniversalandimmaterial,enablesphilosophytoperformeffectivelythoughfromaremoteheightherofficeofsupremearbiter,theartssincetheyaredevoidofanyum'versalcharacter,exceptthefactofbeingarts,ofwhichphilosopherscantakecognizance,escapeherjurisdictionalmostcompletely.
Ifwewouldaccuratelydescribethisbranchofphilosophy,weshouldtermitthephilosophyofmaking,butweshallcallitsimplythephilosophyofart.^Here
^Thetermaesthetics,whichhasnowbecomecurrent,wouldbedoublyincorrecthere.Modernwritersunderstandbythewordthetheoryofbeautyandart,asthoughthephilosophyofartweretheplaceinwhichtotreatquestionsconcerningbeautyconsideredinitself(suchquestionsbelongtoontology),andasthoughartwereconfinedtothefinearts(amistakewhichvitiatestheentiretheoryofart).Moreover,
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
wemustfirstinquirewhatisthenatureofart,ifitisindeed,asSt.Thomasteaches,avirtueofthepracticalintellect,andhowitisdistinguishedontheonehandfromthespeculativevirtues{understandingoffirstprinciples^knowledge,wisdom),ontheotherfromthemoralvirtues,prudenceinparticular;howartistobesubdividedandthedifferentartsclassified;andfinallywhatarethefirstprinciplesanddistinctiveconditions—thoughsolelyofthehighestandmostgeneralorder—ofthoseartswhichhavebeautyfortheirobject(thefinearts)andwhichthusoccupyasuperiorrankamongthearts.
ETHICS
Thepracticalsciencewhichaimsatprocuringman'sunqualifiedgood,hisabsolutegood,isthatofmoralsorethics.Sinceitsdistinctiveobjectisnotthe
thewordaestheticsisderivedetymologicallyfromsensibility{aiaddvofxai.=feel),whereasart,andbeautyalso,aremattersoftheintellect,quiteasmuchasoffeeling.
Scholastictextbooksdonotusuallydevoteaseparatetreatisetothephilosophyofart,andeitherstudyitsproblemsinpsychologyalone,or,thebettertoexplaintheconceptofprudence,inethics.Itwouldbenecessarytoclassifythephilosophyofart,likeethicsitself,undernaturalphilosophy,ifwekepttothesinglestandpointofthespecificationofthesciencesbytheirformalobject.Butifweadoptthewiderstandpointoftheendtowhichthesciencesareordered,wemustdistinguishpracticalfromspeculativephilosophy,anditisequallynecessarytodistinguish,inpracticalphilosophyitself,thephilosophyofmakingandthephilosophyofdoing{cf.theauthor'sArtandScholasticism).Thistreatmentpresentsthedoubleadvantageofcorrespondingtoaverymarkedtrendofmodemthought,whichtendstodevoteaspecialtreatise(aesthetics)tothetheoryofart,andofreturningtooneofAristotle'sfundamentalclassifications:TracrabidvoiafjirpaKTLKTf)i)iroirjTLKr)7JOeuprjTiKTj{Metaph.,ii,I,1025b25).Cf.Top.,vi,6,145a15,andviii,i,157a10;Metaph.,vi,i;Nic.Eth.,vi,2,1139a27.Hamelin{op.cit.,pp.81sgq.)makesaconvincingdefenceagainstZellerofAristotle'srealopiniononthismatter.
THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS
perfectionoftheworksproducedandfashionedbymanbutthegoodandperfectionoftheagenthimself,ortheusehefreelymakesofhisfaculties,itisinthestrictsensethescienceofaction,thescienceofhumanacts(intechnicallanguage,oftheagibileorTrpaxxov,thatistosay,ofthefreeuse,sofarasitisfree,ofourfaculties).
Ethicsisaspracticalasanytruescienceinthestrictsensecanbe,foritteachesnotonlythemostgeneralrulesofremoteapplication,butalsotheparticularrulesapplicabletotheparticularactiontobeperformed.
Butatthesametimethissciencehasinview,notsomeparticularsecondaryend,butthelastend(theabsolutegood)ofman,thesupremecauseinthepracticalorder.Itisthereforeaphilosophy.Itiswithoutqualificationthepracticalphilosophy.
Note.—Thoughethicsisaspracticalasanyscienceinthestrictsensecanbe,wemustnotthereforesupposethatitisessentiallypractical(nosciencevereetpropriedictaisessentiallypractical),orthatitissufficienttomakemenbehaverightly.Itsupplies,itistrue,rulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases,but
ithasnopowertomakeusconstantlyapplythemasweshouldinparticularcases,^inspiteofthedifficulties
1Onthecontrary,theessentiallypracticalsciences,thatistosaythearts,themselvesapplytheirrulestoparticularcases.Thesesciencesare,strictlyspeaking,practical,butarenotsciencesinthestrictsensebutonlyimproperly.
Therearethusmanydegreesofpracticality.Thephilosophyofart(whoseendispractical,andwhoseobjectanoperabile,buttobeknown)providesnorulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases.Itisonlyimproperlyandveryimperfectlypractical.
Ethics(whoseendispractical,andwhoseobjectisalsoanoperabile,butalsotobeknown)doesnotapply,butprovidesrulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases.Itisaspracticalasascienceinthe
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
arisingfromourpassionsandthecomplexityofmaterialcircumstances.Itremains,therefore,essentiallyspeculativeinitsfinalobject{knowledgeofhumanacts)andinitsprocedure(thedeductionoftruthsfromtheirpremisses,notincitementtoaction)andisthuspracticalonlyinanimpropersense.^Ifmanistodotherightintheorderofactionmoralsciencemustbesupplementedbythevirtueofprudence^which,if"wemakeuseofit,makesusalwaysjudgecorrectlyoftheactweshouldperform,andwillalwaysthatwhichwehavethusjudgedtoberight.
Ontheotherhand,ethicsonlysuppliesrulesofhumanconductinthenaturalorderandinrelationtoman'slastendasitwouldbe,ifitwereanaturalhappiness.Butsince,infact,man'slastendisasupernaturalgood[Godpossessednotbytheimperfectknowledgeofhumanreasonassuch,butbythe
strictsensecanbepractical,butitisnotstrictlyspeakingorperfectlypractical.
Thearts—medicine,forexample,orengineering—whoseobjectissomethingtobedone(notmerelyanoperabile,butenvisagedopera-biliter),providerulesimmediatelyapplicableandactuallyapplythemtoparticularcases,butonlybyenablingustojudgeofwhatistobedone,notbymakinguswiUtodoit(fortheartistcanmakeamistakeandstillbeanartist(becausehewillstomakeit).Theyareinthestrictsensepractical—butdonotattainthehighestdegreeof
practicability.
Finallyprudence(whoseobjectisalsosomethingtobedone)appliestoparticularcasestherulesofmoralscienceandreason,notonlyteachingustojudgeoftheacttobeperformed,butmakingusemployasweoughtourfreeactivity(fortheprudentman,assuch,alwayswillstheright).Itis,strictlyspeaking,practical,andattainsthehighestdegreeofpracticability.
1Cf.St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,a.i,arf3:Scientiamoralis,quamvissitpropteroperationem,tameniliaoperaiiononestactusscientiae,sedactusvirtutis,utpatetVEthic.Undenonpotestdietars,sedrnagisinillisoperationibussehabetvirtuslocoartisetideaveteresdijfinieruntvirtutemesseartembenerectequevivendi,utdicitAugust.X,deCiv.Dei.
THEPHILOSOPHYOFART,ETHICS
beatificanddeifyingvisionoftheDivineEssence),andsincehisactionsmustberegulatedinreferencetothissupernaturalendandsoastoenablehimtoattainit,ethicsorphilosophicmoralityisevidentlyinadequatetoteachhimeverythingheneedstoknowinordertoactrightly.Itmustbecompletedandelevatedbytheteachingsofrevelation.
Theepithetpractical,appliedtoethics,doesnotmerelymeanhavingasitsaimanactivityotherthanthatofsimplyknowing(inthissensepractical,whetherusedofartormorals,isopposedtospeculative);butmorestrictlyconcernedwithactionandbehaviour(theTrpaxTov,thedistinctivesphereofmoralscienceandthemoralvirtuesascontrastedwiththeTtoiTjTov,thedistinctivesphereofart).
Thefundamentalquestionwhichpracticalphilosophymustanswerbeforeanyotherisinwhatconsists(fromthestandpointofthenaturalorder)thelastendorabsolutegoodofman.Itmustthenstudytheactionsbywhichmanapproachesordepartsfromhislastend,examiningfirsttheirnatureandinnermachinery,thenwhatconstitutestheirmoralcharacter,thatistosay,rendersthemmorallygoodorbad.Ethicsmust,therefore,studyinthemselvesthesupremeruleofsuchactions(questionswhichtreatoftheeternallawandthenaturallaw)andtheirimmediaterule(questionsrelatingtotheconscience);itmustalsostudytheintrinsicprinciplesfromwhichthoseactsproceed,thatistosay,themoralvirtuesandvices.
Butsinceethicsisapracticalscienceitmustnotbecontentwiththeseuniversalconsiderations;itmustproceedtothemoreparticulardeterminationof
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
humanactsandtheirrules.Itisthereforeobligedtostudyingreatdetailtheruleswhichregulateman'sconductfirstsofarastheyconcernthegoodoftheagenthimselfandsecondlysofarastheyconcernthegoodofothers(consequentlythevirtueo^justice).
Thelatterinquiryintroducesanumberofmostimportantquestionspertainingtowhatiscallednaturalright,andtreatinginthefirstplaceofman'sobUgationstoGod(aquestionofnaturalreligion),^secondlyofhisobligationstohisfellow-men.Herearediscussedthequestionswhichconcernmenasindividuals[therightsoftheindividual,forexample,therightofproperty),andthosewhichconcernthemasmembersofanaturalwholewhosecommongoodindividualsmustserve—thefamilyandthepoUticalsociety(therightsofsociety).
Aristotledividedthescienceofmorality,ofhumanconduct[ethicsinthewidesense)intothreeparts:thescienceofman'sactionsasanindividual,ethics(inthestrictersense);thescienceofhisactionsasamemberofthedomesticsociety,economics;thescienceofhisactionsasamemberofthecity(thecivilsociety),politics.^
Onthefundamentalquestionofethics—thequestionofman'slastend—wefindforthelasttimetheschoolsofphilosophydividedroughlyintothreegroups.
TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthattheentiremorallifedependsonman'stendencytohissovereigngoodorhappinessandthattheobject
1I.e.ofreligionasitwouldbeapartfromthesupernaturalordertowhichmanhasinfactbeenraised.
2SeeonthispointNicEth.,vi,9,1142a9;Eud.Eth.,i,8,1218b13,andthetwofirstchaptersofthePolitics.Cf.Hamelin,op.cit.,p.85.
THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS
inwhichthishappinessconsistsisGod—whom,moreover,weoughttolove,notforourownsake,butforhimself(preciselybecauseheisourlastend,thatisto
say,thatwhichiswilledandlovedforitself,notforthesakeofanythingbeyond).
Theschoolswhichfindtheendandruleofhumanconductinpleasure{hedonism,Aristippus,Epicurus),utility{utilitarianism,Bentham,JohnStuartMill),thestate(Hegelandsociologists),humanity(AugusteComte),progress(HerbertSpencer),sympathy(theScottishschool),pity(Schopenhauer)ortheproductionofthesuperman(Nietzsche),assignasman'slastendsomethingcreated,andtherebydegradehimbelowhimself.
Theschoolswhichclaimthatvirtue(theStoics,Spinoza)orduty(Kant)isself-sufficient,eitherbecausevirtueisitselfhappiness,orbecausethepursuitofhappinessisimmoral,assignasman'slastendmanhimself,andthereby,whileseemingtodeifyman,really,Hketheschoolslastmentioned,degradehimbelowhimself,forthegreatnessofmanconsistsinthefactthathissoleendistheuncreatedGood.
ThomistPhilosophy
[EthicsofHappinessortheSovereignGood)
Manisorderedtoalastendotherthanhimself,and
thislastendisGod.
MoralSystemswhichdegradeMoralSystemswhichdeifyManMan
ManisorderedtoalastManisnotorderedto
endotherthanhimself,anylastendotherthanandthisendissomethinghimself,hisownvirtuecreated[hedonism,Epicure-beinghislastend(iS'toia'^m),anism,utilitarianism,etc.).orhisgoodnessnotdependingonanygoodforwhichhehasbeenmade[Kantism).
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
ThusoneveryoneofthegreatproblemsofphilosophythedoctrineofAristotleandSt.Thomas,whencomparedwiththedoctrinesofotherphilosophers,appearsasaneminencebetweentwocontraryerrors.ThisisanadditionalargumentforitstruthtobeaddedtothoseenumeratedearUer.^
Thetruth,indeed,isnottobefoundinaphilosophywhichkeepsthemeanbetweencontraryerrorsbyitsmediocrityandbyfallingbelowthem,beingbuiltupbyborrowingfromboth,balancingoneagainstanotherandmingUngthembyarbitrarychoicesmadewithouttheHghtofaguidingprinciple{eclecticism);itmustbesoughtinaphilosophywhichkeepsthemeanbetweencontraryerrorsbyitssuperiority,dominatingboth,sothattheyappearasfragmentsfallenandseveredfromitsunity.Foritisclearthat,ifthisphilosophybetrue,itmustrevealinfullwhaterrorseesonlyinpartanddistortedbyabias,andthusmustjudgeandsecure,byitsownprinciples,andinthehghtofitsowntruth,v/hatevertrutherrorcontainsthoughitcannotdistinguish.
1Seepp.99-101.
CONCLUSION
Philosophyisthusdividedintothreeprincipalsections:logic,speculativephilosophy,practicalphilosophy;or,ifwetakeaccountofthesubdivisionsofthesethreesections,intosevenmainsections:minorlogic,majorlogic;thephilosophyofmathematics,thephilosophyofnature,metaphysics;thephilosophyofartandethics.Thisorderisrepresentedbythefollowingtable:
IJI.Minororformallogic:therulesofreasoning
LOGIC1^2.MajorOTmateriallogic:thematterofresisoning
3.Thephilosophyofmathematics:quantity\.—„,.,,.ithematerialworldJ'■"^^^&/
4.1hephuosobhyofnature:{,,,'^\manpsychology
(truth(epistemolog^')criticism
beingingeneralontology
beingase(naturaltheology)theodicy
IIIr6.Thephilosophyofart:making
PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY[7.EthicsOTmoralphilosophy:action,conduct
II
SPECULATIVEPHILOSOPHY
Thedivisionofphilosophyintospeculativeandpracticaldepends,notonthespecificcharacterofthevariousphilosophicsciences,butontheendwhichtheypursue.Ifthatendisknowledgealone,thephilosophyisspeculative;ifthegoodofman,itispractical.^
Ifthephilosophicsciencesareclassifiedfromthestandpointoftheirspecificcharacter,^ethics,which
1SeeSt.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,ad4.'Thisspecificationdependsessentiallyonthedegreeofabstractionordegreeofimmaterialityoftheobjectstudied.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY
treatsofthemoralvirtues^andwhoseformalobjectishumanaction,andthephilosophyofart,whichtreatsofthepracticalintellectualvirtuesandwhoseformalobjectishumanmaking,aredivisionsofthescienceofman,whichitselfbelongstonaturalphilosophy(thoughitentersalsointometaphysics).Fromthispointofviewwecanrecogniseasspecificallydistinctphilosophicsciencesonlylogic,metaphysics,andthephilosophyofnature,alsothephilosophyofmathematics,ifthisisnotregardedasasubdivisionofmetaphysicsorofthephilosophyofnature.
1Sicpertinetadphilosophiam[naturalem),etestparsillius,quiaagitdtanimautestactuscorporis,etconsequenterdemoralihusejus,(JohnofSt.Thomas,Cursus.phil.,i,p.732;Log.,ii*q.27,a.i.)
U'y.'yERSirYOFFLORIDA
312b5OMMflM^fli2
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