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THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE BY THE FRENCH ARMY DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR
OF INDEPENDENCE (1954-1962): THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE AND REPARATION
by Eduard Ortiz i Jornet
BACHELOR’S DEGREE DISSERTATION
Bachelor’s Degree in Global Studies
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Academic Year 2018-2019
« Le courage, c’est de chercher la vérité et de la dire ; c’est de ne pas subir la loi du mensonge triomphant qui passe, et de ne pas faire écho, de notre âme, de notre bouche et de nos mains aux applaudissements imbéciles et aux huées fanatiques »
- Jean Jaurès, Directeur de L’Humanité (1904-1914) et Président du Parti Socialiste Français (1902-1905). Le 30 Juillet 1903 lors de la distribution des prix du lycée d'Albi.
ABSTRACT
The Bachelor’s Degree Dissertation The Practice of Torture by the French Army during the Algerian War of
Independence (1954-1962): The enforcement of Justice and Reparation preeminent objective is to delineate a well-
grounded criterion to evaluate and determine whether the policy-making enacted by France to achieve the target 16.3
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, “Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels
and ensure equal access to justice for all”, has been successful in fulfilling its paramount objective according to the
United Nations standards. Concretely, the dissertation inquiries how France is accomplishing with the Goal 16,
“Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies”, in the specific case of implementing justice and enforcing reparation
to those who suffered torture by the French Army during the Algerian War of Independence. The first part, “The
practice of torture”, analyses the polyhydric phenomenon of torture and how it was applied in this case. The second
part, Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, explore to which extend France has addressed this Goal. The third
part, “Evaluation and recommendations”, establish whether the policies have reached its objectives and prescribe
further policy-making. To summarize, “Final Remarks” part, concludes undertaking a general outline of how France
has engaged to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to tackle this challenge.
KEYWORDS: Torture; United Nations; United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; Goal 16: Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions; Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels
and ensure equal access to justice for all; France; Algerian war of Independence.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... ii
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ ... v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
I. SELECTED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL AND TARGET...... 2
II. COUNTRY OF ANALYSIS....................................................................................... 3
III. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION ........................................................ 4
IV. CASE ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 5
PART I. THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE .................................................. 7
I. THE NOTION OF TORTURE ................................................................................. 8
a) Definition of torture ......................................................................................... 8
b) Legal dimension ................................................................................................ 9
II. THE USE OF TORTURE BY THE FRENCH ARMY ....................................... 14
a) Torture as an institution of war .................................................................... 14
b) The practice of torture by the French Army .............................................. 16
III. THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR ......... 17
a) Torture as a systematic and institutionalized technique in Algeria ......... 17
b) The case of Maurice Audin ........................................................................... 19
PART II. GOAL 16: PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS. 22
I. CURRENT SITUATION ......................................................................... .................... 23
a) Actors involved ............................................................................................... 23
b) Main indicators ............................................................................................. ... 25
c) Adopted policy-making and historical precedents ..................................... 27
II. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION .......................................................... 29
IV. EXPECTATIONS AND FORECAST FOR THE COMING 5 YEARS ....... 29
PART III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................ 31
I. ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................... 32
II. RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................... 36
FINAL REMARKS ......................................................................................... 38
ANNEXES ...................................................................................................... 42
PHOTOGRAPHIES ………………………………………………………….. 83
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................... 90
ii
ABBREVIATIONS
ALN National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale)
ADT Land Forces of France (Armée de terre)
ANOM Overseas National Archives (Archives nationales d’Outre-Mer)
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAA Army Corps (Corps d’Armée)
CCE Coordination and Execution Committee (Comité de coordination
et d’exécution)
CCI Joint Inter-Army Coordination Centre (Centre de coordination
interarmées)
CDC Hunting Commandos (Commandos de Chasse)
CICR Red Cross International Committee (Comité international de la
Croix-Rouge)
CMI Military internee camps (Camps militaires d’internés)
COE Council of Europe
CRA Information and Action Centre (Centre de renseignement et
d’action)
CRUA Revolutionary Committees for the Unity and Action (Comité
révolutionaire pour l’unité et l’action)
CTT Sorting and transit centres (Centres de tri et de transit)
DOP Operational Protection Detachment (Détachement Opérationnel
de Protection)
DUP Urban Protection Dispositive (Dispositif de protection urbaine)
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ERA Information and Action squads (Équipes de renseignement et
d’action)
FAF French Armed Forces (Forces armées françaises)
FFL French Foreign Legion (Légion étrangerè)
FIDH Human Rights International Federation (Fédération
internationale des droits de l’homme)
FLN National Liberation Front (Front de liberation nationale)
GCMA Groups of Mixed Airborne Commandos (Groupements de
Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés)
iii
GGA Algerian General Government (Gouvernement général
de l'Algérie)
GMI Mixed Intervention Groups (Groupements Mixtes d’Intervention)
GPRA Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement
provisoire de la République algérienne)
GRE Information and Operations Group (Groupe de renseignements et
d’explotaition)
HQ Headquarters
HUMINT Human Intelligence
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Politica Rights
IGAME Public Administration General Inspector on Extraordinary
Mission(Inspecteur général de l’administration en mission
extraordinaire)
INSEE National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut
National de la Statistique et des Étudies Économiques)
JMO War Operations Diaries (Journaux de marche et opérations)
KIA Killed in Action
LDH Human Rights League (Ligue des droits de l’Homme)
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MIA Missed in Action
MNA Algerian National Movement (Mouvement National Algérien)
MTLD Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (Mouvement
pur le triomphe des libertés démocratiques)
OAS Secret Army Organization (Organisation de Armée Sècret)
OR Information Officer (Officier de Renseignment)
OS Special Organization (Organisation spéciale)
OSINT Open Source Intelligence
PAIS Psychological Action and Information Service
PAM People that took up arms (Pris les armes à la main)
PCA Algerian Communist Party (Partie communiste algerién)
PCF French Communist Party (Partie communiste franaçais)
PM Prime Minister
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder
RGF French General Reserve (Réserve Générale)
iv
RAP Information-Action-Protection (Renseignement, action,
protection)
SAS Special Administrative Section (Section Administrative
Spécialisée)
SLNA North African Link Service (Service des liaisons nord-africaines)
TPFA Army Permanent Tribunal(Tribunal Permanent des Forces
Armées)
UN United Nations
UNCAT United Nations Convention against Torture
UNSDG United Nations Sustainable Developments Goals
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WIA Wounded in Action
ZNO Military Zone (Zone militaire)
1RCP 1st Parachute Chasseur Regiment (1er Régiment de Chasseurs
Parachutistes)
1REP 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment (1er Regiment Étranger de
Parachutistes)
2RPC 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2e Régiment de Parachutistes
Coloniaux)
3RPC 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment (3e Régiment de Parachutistes
Coloniaux)
10DP 10th Parachute Brigade (10e Division Parachutiste)
11BP 11th Parachute Brigade (11e Brigade Parachutiste)
19RDG 19th Engineering Regiment (19e Régiment du genie)
v
METHODOLOGY
The research conducted in the dissertation “The Practice of Torture by the French Army
during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962): The enforcement of Justice and
Reparation” is grounded on an extensive literature review on the different epistemic
fields required to comprehend the involved phenomena, utmost need to evaluate the
emanated policy-making regarding imparting justice and enforcing reparation. The
dissertation summarized the developed information displayed in the Annexes.
This qualitative literature review has mainly involved the phenomenon of torture, found
in academic articles, in military handbooks, and in military strategic reviews.
Notwithstanding, a meaningful review of the befallen historical facts have been explored
in order to match with the requirements of the thesis as well to asseverate the rightfulness
of France policies to achieve the Target 16.3, mainly focused on local and national
newspapers, history books and qualitative information gathering through an interview.
Moreover, as the paramount goal of this dissertation is to apprise the policy-making
adopted by France, a quantitative research throughout the databases available,
preeminently from those offered by the United Nations Statistical Unit as well by the
French Institute of Statistics, has been done to indagate into figures, indicators and
complementary statistical data necessary to observe the evolution of the policies
outcomes and objectives, establishing thus a causal relationship between the raised
policies by France and its objectives.
Thereby, in order to balance the official statistics and to deepen within this ubiquity
phenomenon of torture condemnation, a considerable revision of torture standards posed
by the most-acknowledged international governmental and non-governmental
organizations, like Amnesty International or the Institute for Economics and Peace
Institute has been realized to establish the policy adequacy paradigm of well-developed
policies and compare to those French policies that have been done.
This dissertation is framed within the scheme of the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals, which defines the global priorities for the coming 15 years. The
effectiveness of the SDGs and their 169 targets will largely depend on their
implementation and monitoring. So far, 230 indicators have been proposed by the Inter-
Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators and agreed upon by the UN Statistical
Commission in March 2016 (Schlecht and Lührman, 2017:1).
1
INTRODUCTION
2
I. SELECTED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL AND TARGET
The selected Sustainable Development Goal to monitor in this dissertation is the Goal 16:
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Within Goal 16 targets aiming to the promotion of
just, peaceful, and inclusive societies (Figure 6), the selected target is the objective 16.3
or Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal
access to justice for all.
This essay will focus concretely on the performance of France in assuring peace and
justice (Goal 16) through the promotion of the rule of law in order to assure equal access
to justice for all (Target 16.3) in the specific case of the tortures practiced by the State
along the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), converging in how France has
established a justice and reparation scheme to compensate torture victims.
By one estimate, 40% of the adult male Muslim population of Algiers, approximately
55,000 individuals, were put through the French interrogation system (DiMarco,
2006:73). Allegedly, 3,024 persons which disappeared in the theatre of the war suffered
tortures (Libération, 2018). Official records from the French colonial public agency
SLNA, 2,049 of tortured have been accounted (Riceputi, 2018). However, official
statistics still occult in the National Archives of Overseas (ANOM). A minority of the
families concerned dared to complain to the colonial authority, but this service collected
at least 2,000 of these files, all of them discarded (Riceputi, 2019:31).
Notwithstanding, according to the most preeminent historians in this topic (Pierre Vidal-
Naquet and Raphaëlle Branche) it is unattainable and unpractical to perform any
quantitative research to establish the number of people who suffered torture, how many
times these people were tortured, how many torture sessions were hold aggregately, and
to which level of torture they were exposed to (Branche, 2001:95).
The phenomenon of torture it is intrinsically unworkable and impossible to undergo into
a reification process as an independent variable but it must be encompassed holistically
within the rest of war techniques, underscoring its synergies with other warlike methods.
It is impractical to isolate all the events and to establish a general framework to ascribe
specific case-by-case behaviours to a major category coined as “torture” (Branche,
2001:94). No single-causal explanation makes it possible to affirm its existence or to
deduce its absence from conflict engagements (Branche, 2001:94), any historian could
never discern the qualitative (number of people tortured).
3
II. COUNTRY OF ANALYSIS
The territorial scope of the dissertation analysis is France, despite the fact the events
developed in Algeria, by that time Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France
(Pimlott, 2011:60), status hold since General Thomas Robert Bugeaud claimed Algerian
territory after French expeditionary force conquered the native forces of the Arab leader
Abd-el-Kader in 1848. French deliberately took steps to politically and economically
marginalize the Muslim inhabitants, they proceeded to politically absorb Algeria, not as
a colony of France as might be expected, but rather as a province of France (DiMarco,
2006:65).
Thus, France is the subsidiary and the actor that upholds the prerogative of sovereignty
to enforce justice. The relevance of this dissertation to France is based on the fact that the
investigation of such tortures was (Pictures 1 to 7 and 32) and still being nowadays an
utmost and pressing issue in the public agenda constituting a non-resolved controversial
taboo (Branche, 2005:45), since France has not acknowledged neither investigated such
colonial practices, challenging thus the French national narrative construction as the
global paramount stakeholder on upholding Human Rights.
France, despite being one of the most developed country (Figure 54), achieving high
standards of living and quality of life sustained over a strong welfare state, developing a
state-of-the-art public infrastructures (Government de la République, 2016:2) being the
fifth contributor to the OHCHR UN Torture voluntary fund (Figure 11), it lost its
credibility and legitimacy as the freedom for torture index downgraded the country
standards during the war (Figure 29), despite along time it maintained an stable tendency
tending to portray France as a torture-free territory (Figure 30). Currently, Amnesty
International does not consider France as a vulnerator State that inflicts torture (Amnesty
International, 2018:211).
Despite the fact reconstruction, development and enforcing sustainable peace is a sine
qua non condition for assuring a prosperous scenario for post-conflict countries (Panic,
2005:20), about 32% of France population do not vow to condemn politically the torture
during the war, in contrast with the 56% that they do, according to a L’Humanité CSA
poll (Libération, 2001).
4
III. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION
Globally, torture has been prevalent in the 21th century (Einolf, 2007:118). The UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture reports yearly that torture is committed in more than 130
countries (Hope, 2004: 827), being thus considered as a global crisis (Amnesty
International, 2014). Torture is wide-spread around the globe and integrates a challenge
to physical integrity (Figure 26 and 27), constituting a glocal phenomenon. According to
the President of the International Council for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims, the
practice of torture has worsened and incremented for 30 years (Garcia, 2014). About half
of the world population (44%) fear torture if they are detained (Amnesty International,
2014:2). Furthermore, there has been impunity for past abuses, since authorities usually
does not take steps to counter torture (Amensty International,2018:15). Torture
prevalence could be understood following three causes: (a)Changes in military
techniques; (b)prevalenve of civil conflicts; and (c)nation-state as a perfect machine to
pursue opposition forces (Einolf, 2007:113). By 1954-1962, torture was more extended
globally due to the post-colonial movement (Pimlott, 2011:62) and Cold War dynamics:
as Colonel Antoine Argoud stated: to halt the decadence of the West and the march of
communism we must win in Algeria using every tool (Pimlott, 2011:66).
Regionally, MENA countries performs on average worse compared to other regions
(Figure 22). MENA countries are below average regarding physical integrity index and
Human Rights (Figure 26 and 27). 75% of MENA countries sengaged in torture through
systematic abuse (Conrad, Haglund & Moore, 2012:25), as part of a broader structural
problems, including weak institutions, lack of respect for the rule of law, and impunity
(Redress Trust, 2013:5), as well arbitrary detention and unfair trials, which commonly
goes hand-by-hand with torture (Amnesty International,2018:6), due to security
legislation allowing extended pre-charge and pre-trial detention of suspects, torture have
become common in MENA (Redress Trust, 2013:4). Torture has served as a key tool for
MENA authoritarian regimes to repress dissent, instil fear and maintain their grip on
power (Redress Trust, 2013:4). Another factor explaining torture in MENA is the broad
presence of non-legitimate armed groups triggers and subject civilians to torture and other
ill-treatment (Amnesty International,2018:8). Women, girls, refugees, asylum-seekers
and migrants are most prone to torture (Amnesty International,2018:11). The worse
countries where torture is practiced is Iran (Amnesty International, 2018:14), Cameroon,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sudan. (Amnesty International, 2018: 24).
5
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
The dissertation scrutiny scope is limited within the sphere of the Algerian Independence
War (1954-1962). Muslims were deprived from their political rights and ousted from
holding their land property (Pimlott, 2011:60), raising the discontent among indigenous
population.
First tensions arose in 1945, when small riot took place in the city of Setif, sparked by
independentists expressions during a World War II victory parade killing (DiMarco,
2006:66). As France granted independence to the adjoining protectorates of Morocco and
Tunisia in 1956, Algeria also claimed independence (Pimlott, 2011:62). The Algerian
national liberation movement was organized in the MTLD, which was the political
movement and the OS was armed branch. After the OS was dismantled, The CRUA was
created, the predecessor of the FLN (Branche, 2001:25).
The conflict started on 1st November 1954, when the independentist Front de Libération
National claimed the authorship of 30-35 low-intensity attacks to colonial authorities
calling for a general uprising (Branche, 2001:25). France never abscribed their activity
neither acknowledged the situations as a “was” but as opérations de maintien de la paix
(Law Enforcement Operations), aiming to undervalue the real crisis (Branche, 2001:14)
and attempting to be outside the scope of Geneva Conventions (Maran, 1989:26). The
actors involved were the FLN which demanded independence; the French government
which wanted to uphold colonial rule and the French Army, which sometimes sided with
the government but sometimes acted as an independent actor seeking to sustain their own
interests (Figure 2), provoking attempts by the Army to interfere in the internal politics
on two occasions: the coup of 13 May 1958 and the Algiers Putsch of 1961 (Pimlott,
2011:46).
Torture was a preminent phenomenon in this conflict especially during the guerrilla 1956-
1957 Battle of Algiers (Picture 26). On 7 January 1957, Robert Lacoste, governor of
Algeria, following the special powers enacted by the parliament, transferred the civilian
executive power to military staff. General Massu lead 2 milion conscripts and 8,000 10DP
unit elite soldiers entered in Algeria proclaiming the Martial Law (Andersson, 2018).
6
Tortures were supported along the State hierarchy, with a clear connivance with the
military (Branche, 2001:573), relapsing prominent French public figures, such François
Mauriac, to categorize this as “the new Dreyfus Affair” (Pierre, 2009:19), since France
acted under the paradox to justify their uncivilized conduct in Algeria as necessary to
fulfil the civilizing mission of France (Weissbrodt and Maran, 1991:218), through the
army, the representative and spearhead of European values and control (Pimlott,
2011:47).
The conflict ended territorially in Algeria after the 1962 Evian Agreements and the
independence of Algiera on 5th July 1962 leaving 240,000 military casualties, 60,000
civilians assassinated, 2,000,000 internally displaced people, and an undetermined
number of disappeared. Nonetheless, the conflict continued in metropolitan France by
disaffected military and civilian officers with Evian Agreements outcome and the
government, forming the terrorist organization OAS to continue the fighting incentivized
for their particular interests of reparation and subsidies to harkis and pied-noirs (Pimlott,
2011:67).
7
PART I. THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE
8
I. THE NOTION OF TORTURE
a) Definition of torture
State torture is defined by the Article 1 of the Convention against Torture as: “any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as (a)obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, (b)punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
[...] or (c)intimidating or coercing him or a third person,[...] when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity”.
The definition grounds the purposes of inflicting torture from Foucault’s Discipline and
Punishment (Foucault, 1995:17). Torture is used by states to subject individuals
(Foucault, 1995:24) and as social control tool (Hope, 2004:808), since it is a cost-effective
tool deepening in the Hobessian logic axioms that influences human beings to dodge pain
as the paramount objective in life in order to survive.
The definition excludes lawful punishments aiming exclusively to condemn such
arbitrary practices, constituting the preeminent debate whether the legitimate State,
having the prerogative tool of the monopoly of violence within the Weberian conception
could use torture (Hope, 2004:809). Notwithstanding, international standards rule out
normatively torture as a tool available to States. Some scholars (Einolf, 2007:103) prefers
to exclude the motive inducing torture and comprehend torture exclusively as a human
behaviour and to asseverate torture as inflicting pain withdrawing the lawfulness element.
The Article 1.2 of the 1974 UN Declaration Against the Torture discerns also torture as
an aggravation factor of cruel treatment or punishment.
Torture is practiced generally by State actors such as police, prision officers and military
staff (Figure 23). The most common victims are marginalized and criminals (Figure 24).
The preeminent torturer-tortured unidirectional relationship is military, para-military or
intelligence officers torturing dissidents (Figure 25), according to (Conrad, Haglund and
Moore, 2012). From a constructivist mindset, it is considered as a narrative practice that
reflects State power from the pain inflicted to the individual bodies (Branche, 2001:31).
The 1999 Instanbul Protocol or Manual on Effective Torture Investigation provides a
polyhydric and multi-dimensions scrutiny of torture in order to assess of people who has
been tortured, providing investigative outcomes used by States to investigate and evaluate
torture.
9
Considerated evidences that constitute are delineated in the Istanbul Protocol, sorting
those effects between physical and psychological (Figure 18). Torture consequences lead
to a deterioration of cognitive, emotional and behavioural functions (OHCHR, 2014:45)
Torture methods are also compiled by the Instanbul Protocol, establishing a large range
of habits and mechanisms used, which the most preeminent are kicks, electric shocks and
burns (Figure 19), the plethora of physical torture injuries in the human body practiced
in Algeria could be observed in the pictures 8 to 12 and 14 to 24. The torture
dimensionality is a threehold: (a) the relative intensity of pain or suffering inflicted; (b)the
purpose for which it is inflicted and; (c) the status of the perpetrator (Hope, 2004:825).
The first reported proto-Westphalian State that relapsed to torture were the warrants
issued by English Privy Council in 1540 (Hope, 2004:809), however these practices are
rooted in Athenians when evaluating slaves’ capabilities. Torture was morally accepted,
in most ancient, medieval, and early modern societies (Einolf, 2007:104)
Those practices involving the use of violence that does not constitute torture are:
(a)injuries suffered accidentally by a prisoner in custody, and interrogation without
violence or the infliction of pain; (b)pain inflicted by a police officer to someone trying
to escape; (c)painful types of religious penance, and (d)the person undergoes the pain
voluntarily (Einolf, 2007:104).
b) Legal dimension
The first legal instrument which forbids torture was in 1252 when a decree of Pope
Innocent IV sanctioned this mode of examination in the case of persons accused (Hope,
2004:810). The freedom for torture, the protection against torture and the condemnation
of torture is extensively developed within the different layers and instances of legislation
aiming to protect and prevent individuals to be tortured by anykind of international actor
with certain autonomy, with influence capability and ability to mobilize resources.
Notwithstanding, legal obligations are a State prerogative. The State is in charge to
enforce such instruments, even in the absence of an express complaint, an investigation
shall be undertaken by States (OHCHR, 2014:59).
Torture related instrument ranges territorially (National, regional and international)
oscillating from three typology instruments: (a)international humanitarian soft law, which
comprehend customary law but is not a legal binding obligation to States; (b)international
10
hard law, which is an obligation to States; and (c)international criminal law, which scope
is to punish already committed (Figure 33).
The practice of torture involves the vulneration of Human Rights, in consequence, despite
the non-existence of regulation in any determined State or if any State is not party to
conventions against the torture, every individual is subject to international protection,
since the prohibition of torture has attained status as a jus cogens (universal law), giving
rise to the obligation erga omnes (owed to and by all States) status abscribed to the Article
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Laws against the torture are not
subject to derogation, even in times of war or emergency (International Justice Resource
Center, 2019), specific case of Algerian War, wherein torture was supported by Martial
Law (Branche, 2001:28) by Loi sur les pouvoirs spéciaux en Algérie (Loi n°55-385 du 3
avril 1955) which instituted the Urgency State allowing torture and warlike techniques
(Branche,2001:91). In addition, any State is able to judge, to extradict or to condemn any
crime committed extraterritoriality from its jurisdiction due to the universal justice, legal
figure that allows and binds State to prosecute crimes against the humanity committed
overseas (International Justice Resource Center, 2019).
Furthermore, if those crimes are committed under the declared status of war or martial
laws that derogates liberties and freedoms such the guarantee to justice, torture-related
crimes do not prescribe and cannot be suspended, neither judged by military tribunals
(Special Rapporteur on Torture, 2019:3) or absolved through an Amnesty. It should be
also mentioned the fact that crimes against the humanity do not prescribe never, so they
could be prosecuted. Despite the fact General Massu wanted to be exempted by
transferring the torture responsibility (plausible deniability) to superior authorities (i.e.
politicians) through the article 327 of French penal code (Branche, 2001:541), individuals
which committed tortures are directly punishable. Therefore, French judiciary power is
entitled and is able to punish torture crimes in Algeria, eventhough they are covered by
an amnesty law, without regard to the fact that other nations could judge such crimes by
universal justice or other international organization tribunals such as International
Criminal Court ad hoc tribunals.
On 22 March 1962, entered in force a decree amnestying (Branche, 2001:581), but the
decree did not elucidate clearly what law enforcement operations encompassed, leaving
thus a vacuous boundless conception of such operations aiming to reach any activity
commited by the French Army (Branche, 2001:581).
11
A second decree on 18 June 1966, extended the amnesty to offenses "committed within
the framework of administrative or judicial police operations (Liberation, 2001).
Nonetheless, any amnesty exempts such crimes to be judged, in consequence, the amnesty
is useless for international instances but useful for national legal complaints filled in
France.
When a complaint was filed when the amnesty was enacted, the case was placed under
the condition of non-lieu, established in the article 1771 of the French Penal Procedure
Manual, meaning that the case was dismissed. The principal causes for a case-dismissal
was as a result of an existing amnesty. However, when the amnesty was not applicable,
all torture-related complaints were also dismissed grounded within the pretext that was
impossible to identify the authors or due to unconvincing evidences, showing thus the
concurrence of judiciary power to the military practices (Branche, 2001:563). However,
not everybody consented tortures: France vowed to create a parallel and unofficial in
charge to inquiry the complaints presented by citizens regarding torture (Branche,
2001:541). These reports were read by Edmond Michelet, Mnister of Justice, who wrote
a letter of complaint to the Minister of the Armed Forces, Michel Debré, about the
acquiescence of the military judiciary and the lack of separation of powers with the
military officers indicted by crimes, in which most of the cases were declared as non-lieu
(Branche, 2001:542).
The French Penal Code typifies widely throughout its body the forbiddance of torture,
comprehending it as inhuman and degrading treatment that are described as torture and
acts of barbarism. It clearly expressed that tortures are both physical and psychical in its
article 222-14-3. Torture is forbidden in the following articles of the Penal Code:
- Article 212-1 in Book II: Crimes and offenses against persons; Title I: Crimes
against humanity and the human being; Subtitle I: Crimes against humanity;
Chapter II: Crimes against humanity.
- Article 222-5 in Book II: Crimes and offenses against persons; Title II: Attacks
on the human person; Chapter II: Damage to the physical or psychological
integrity of the person; Section 1: Willful attacks on the integrity of the person;
Paragraph 1: Torture and acts of barbarity.
- Article 221-4 in Book II: Crimes and offenses against persons; Title II: Attacks
on the human person; Chapter I: Attacks on the Person's Life; Section 1:
Willful Attacks on Life.
12
- Article 222-1 in Book II: Crimes against Persons; Title II: Attacks
on the human person; Chapter II: Damage to the physical or psychological
integrity of the person; Section 1: Willful attacks on the integrity of the
person; Paragraph 1: Torture and acts of barbarity.
- Article 461-1 in Book IV bis: Crimes and War Crimes; Chapter I: Different
Crimes and War Crimes; Section 2: Crimes and War Crimes Common to
International and Non-International Armed Conflicts; Sub-section 1: Crimes
and War Crimes Common to International and Non-International Armed
Conflicts the human person perpetrated during an international or non
international armed conflict; Paragraph 1: Damage to life and physical or
psychological integrity.
The Penal Code endowes economic compensations to victims and punishing sentences
for the aggressors. Economic compensations vary according to the degree of torture,
fluctuating between 750€ fees to 150,000€ fees (Figure 9). The typification and the degree
of torture is also determined between the existent relation between the torturer and the
tortured: in the Algerian War, public servants will be condemned to 20 years
imprisonment, according to the article 222-3 paragraph 7 (Figure 10), notwithstanding, if
torture was succeded by death, the established sentence is life imprisonment.
Furthermore, within the french military justice, torture is also condemned in Code of
Military Justice Book III, Title II.
The most preeminent humanitarian international hard law instruments are the Hague
Conventions and Geneva Conventions, which regulates the conduct of war in bellum. The
applicability to this case was extensively discussed. These conventions can be applied
since the writers of the Geneva Convention expressed clearly that there are non-
international armed conflicts in which the applicability is obliged (Branche, 2001:238).
CICR expressed in press releases and in reports that FLN prisoners had to be subjected
to Geneva Convention, since they were POW and not PAM or hors-la-loi (Branche,
2001:240)
The importance international criminal law par excellence is the International Criminal
Court, in which anybody could sue any individual for committing crimes against
humanity. The 1998 Rome Statute regulating the ICC condemns torture in the in the
Article 7; paragraph (f) in Part 2: Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law, crimes
against humanity. The ICC can judge the war in algeria, it already fulfills the four
characteristics that the Rome Statute designates for a crime to be treated as a crime against
13
humanity: "as part of a generalized, systematic attack against a civilian population and
with knowledge of said attack" (Hernando, 2014: 287).
To denounce these crimes, those affected first have to denounce within the national level,
later in the committee against the torture of united nations, later in regional mechanisms
to finally denounce in the ICC.
The important body of principles of international humanitarian soft law are encompassed
within the UNGA resolutions, however, the UN System upholds the right to investigate
such crimes (Figure 13) and the right to enforce to national legislation the broad
legislation, such the UN Convention Against the Torture (Figure 12), despite the fact UN
cannot judge this crimes but the national justice. As well, the UN sets the soft international
standards (Figure 21) to evaluate torture. Althought the importance of UN in relation to
torture it is their huge non-binding texts regarding the protection of Human Rights, like
the UN Charter.
Althought the existance of resolute lawful mechanisms, justice enforcement is sometimes
impractical: for example, Algiera people that died during torture seasons were registered
officially dead by natural causes or declared disappeared (Branche, 2001:193), raising the
impossibility to discern whether they had been tortured.
14
II. THE USE OF TORTURE BY THE FRENCH ARMY
a) Torture as an institution of war
Torture has constituted as a concurrent and ubiquitous phenomenon along humanity.
Notwithstanding, torture practice has been prevalent within conflict periods of time.
Torture is an inextricable war feature as well it is intrinsically attached to the human
behavior when any individual is subject to warlike conditions. Torture is the real-case
hegelian dialectic of the slave master conflictive relationship. Torture is a categorized as
an elemental act of war (Branche, 2001:91) as well an absolute act of war (Branche,
2001:454). When torture is used against citizens, it is most commonly used in response
to extremely serious crimes, such as treason, and where the state is perceived to be under
threat (Einolf, 2007:102).
Torture within colonial logics were first reported within the British Police in India by
reports of Edward Peters in 1855 (Branche, 2001:47). Torture is thus the expression of
groupal defeat individualized (Branche, 2001:454), deepening on the settlers-colonized
roles and settlers control institutions shifting power relations by pain (Branche, 2001:47).
Despite the fact torture is spread along all the conflict typologies, torture is the corner-
stone institution of war encompassed within the insurgency, counter-insurgency and
revolution logics. Colonel Georges Bonnet conceives torture as essential in Revolutionary
Warfare or guerre révolutionnaire (e.g. guerre révolutionnaire was the war mood the
French Army adopted in Algeria, which mixed Partisan (Guerilla) Warfare and
Psychological Warfare (Pimlott, 2011:58)).
Torture in war appears when war tactics are combined with strategic ideological
disrespect for conventional limitations on war (Einolf, 2007:114). It is practiced mostly
upon prisoners of war (Einolf, 2007:114). Torture emanates within the soldier
psychological “State of War”, being used within revenge logics and is practiced,
according to General Salan not only committed by maverick soldiers who were already
crazy before entering the military or who act under the influence of alcohol but also by
average French conscripts with no criminal background (Pierre, 2009:15).
Torture is useful in war as (a)a way of inflicting terror and imposing control upon the
civilian populations of occupied territories (Einolf, 2007:115; (b)to enforce disciplinary
15
logic aiming to the pacification (e.g Law Enforcement in Algeria) of territories (Branche,
2001:31); and (c)as a military technique to gather HUMINT through the use physical or
mental violence, perpetrators inflicts pain to the individual in order that this individual
release the information sought by the torture enforcer.
Torture was imposed in Algeria within war logics as a means of bringing down a political
organisation as part of a long-term strategy (Branche, 2004:2). The use of torture was part
of the French handbook to tackle with FLN rebels (Figure 4) in order to gather
information. Torture was needed as it was established in the guidelines wrote by Capitan
Eyraud, in the Bulletin d’information et de liaision des officiers d’artillerie d’active et de
reserve in April 1958, urging the use of torture in interrogatories since if one refuses to
torture, about 5& to 10% of interrogatories are not fruitful. Torture usually came along
with death, as it was ordered by the commander in charge of Oran CAA officers should
proceed to the elimination of those indispensables (Branche, 2001:92). Torture in war and
colonization spheres is also motivated by racism (Branche, 2001:434). General Massu
acknowedleg that without torture, victory was impossible in Algiers (AIDH, 2007:3).
Notwithstanding, torture in war is not convenient. Foucault, states that torture was
abolished because the authorities found “disciplining” methods to be more effective than
torture and corporal punishment in enforcing social control (Foucault, 1995:20), however
it only ha s suffered some changes in how torture is conducted (Einolf, 2007:111). Torture
destroy victims’ sense of self, voice, and reality (Einolf, 2007:105), relapsing the
individuals into a status which commits mistakes. This was proven by the USA Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence 2012 Feinstein report (Senate Select Committee On
Intelligence, 2014:2), that suggested that coercive interrogations do not produce
intelligence, but false answers (García, 2014). The application of psychological,
emotional, and/or physical pressure can force a victim of torture to say anything just to
end the painful experience. (Human Rights First, 2014).
Neurological science also shows that torture and abuse are ineffective ways to interrogate
prisoners. In fact, according to neuroscience professor Shane O’Mara, abusive
interrogation techniques (both physical and psychological) can “compromise memory,
mood, and cognitive function,” which are essential to eliciting accurate information
(O’Mara, 2014, 10). Militarily, using torture eventually reinforces the enemy
Clausewitzian Center of Gravity by increasing the rebellion’s popular support (Pierre,
2009:14).
16
b) The practice of torture by the French Army
The practice of torture has been a long-standing instrument utilized by the French Army.
French Army understood as preeminent element in its model to counter the first phases
of insurgencies (Figure 1), as well it constituted the ultimate phase of the guerre
révolutionnaire (Figure 3). Military officers considered that justice was lax, inducing thus
paralegal behaviours such as torture to punish (Branche, 2001:170). Such behaviours
were described as harsh interrogatories (musclés), extensive interrogatories (serrés), and
coerced interrogatories (sous la contrainte).
Torture was adopted by the French Army extensively in the context of foreign wars and
in maintaining control of colonial possessions (Einolf, 2007:106), incorporating a rigid
theory of response to colonial insurgencies (i.e. guerre révolutionaire). The lack of
political direction and lack of coordination between political and military authorities was
reflected in the command of forces, leaving to them the tactics used in colonial spheres
(Pimlott, 2011:56). First reports on torture on the 1930 in Indochine (Branche, 2001:46),
torture was also practiced in Madafgascar in 29 March 1947 uprising (Branche, 2001:46),
and it was also spread in Tunisia and Morcco (Branche, 2001:46). The 1946-1954 War in
Indochina created and shifted torture as a war technique used by the army, whereas in
Indochina was unsuccessful, the lesson of Indochina was learnt and applied as a doctrine
in the Algeria War of Independence (Pimlott, 2011:64). Beginning in 1956, the French
army started to adjust their tactics and operational approach. This was mainly due to the
arrival in theater of experienced officers and troops from Indochina who understood the
Maoist approach to revolutionary warfare using torture (DiMarco,2006:67)
Torture was systematic, General Salan said in March 1957 that every individual under
detention had to undergo into the “most extensive” interrogatory possible (Branche,
2001:91). The tortures which sought information gathering were mastered by Intelligence
Officers, known as OR. Notwithstanding, during torture seasons other FAF officers
usually practiced tortures under OR supervision (Branche, 2001:183). OR officers were
present in military companies with a 1:80 proportion (Branche, 2001:185). OR officer’s
presence was widespread among all sectors and military units (Branche, 2001:246). But
tortures as a punishment and vengeance was done by mobile “flying columns” (Pimlott,
2011:49), mainly the elite unit 10DP which acquired experience in Indochina, experience
that applied latterly in Algeria (Branche, 2001:165) and also by loyal indigenous people
(i.e. harkis) (Pimlott, 2011:57).
17
The most implicated military units and personalities in torture were the General Massu-
lead 10DP, that latterly it was transformed into the 11BP; and the General Salan,
commander-in-chief of FAF in Algeria (Branche, 2001:177). Other sub-military units
known for they harsh torture were the 1REP, the 3RPC, the 4th Zouaves Company, the
2RPC 1st Company, and the 1RCP (Branche, 2001:177).
The predominant torture techniques were (a)electric shocks delivered with Tucker
Telephone portable-electricity 200 volts generators or gégène (Picture 39) applied along
the body, especially in sexual organs, (b)waterboarding and use forced water swallowing
aiming to drown the subject, (c)reverse hanging tying the hands to a rope while the
individual was suspended on the air (Picture 20), (d)general knocking with batons and
(e)skin burns with fire and acids (Branche, 2001:189).
Despite the fact there was an official guide (Guide provisoire) stating that during
interrogatories must not conduct violent behaviours in the Chapter 4 Branche, 2001:247),
French torture guideline was idealized within war thesis wrote by colonel Lacheroy
(Andersson, 2018). Torture was learnt by OR officials through the unofficial meetings.
The duration of the torture was carried each day except Sundat following an established
timetable: they began between 7:30AM or 8:00AM, torture was stopped for lunch. They
were started again at 2:15PM, and they ended in the afternoon (Branche, 2001:365).
Tortures were done aiming not to create physical injuries in order not generate evidences
(Branche, 2001:529).
III. THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR
a) Torture as a systematic and institutionalized technique in Algeria
The practice of torture during the Algerian War of Independence was characterized and
acknowledged by the French president, Emmanuel Macron as "system legally instituted"
by the French State during the war of Algeria, allowing the use of torture against civilians
and fighters (Jublin, 2018). These tortures were institutionalized within the military chain
of command and integrated the system (Figure 5 and Picture 41). Declassified archives
in 1992 revealed that torture was inextricably part of the Algerian War (Branche,
2001:12). The use of torture was authorized by politicians and allowed military, at least
implicitly, to resort to illegal methods, triggering an “industrialized” torture system
(Branche, 2001: 361). The torture methods could be observed in Pictures 28, 29 and 31.
18
The systematic practice of torture was idealized by Generals Salan and Massu. Roger
Wuillaume, Inspector General of the Administration, wrote a report in March 1955
suggesting that the judicial police of Algeria could be allowed to practice certain tortures.
Robert Lacoste, General Governor of Algeria and French Minister stated that the war in
Algeria imposed its inner logics, which cannot be included and must be excluded from
those ethics ruling the army (Branche, 2001: 93), ordering to General Jaques Massu,
10DP commander, to assume full powers and apply the guerre révolutionnaire doctrine.
The first OR learnt to torture in Maison-Carré (Branche, 2001:251).
The place where torture was done is mostly concerned in normal zones of control (Figure
5). In Algiers city, torture location varied: ranging from schools to sports stadium
(Branche, 2001:170), however, most of the torture was practiced in Centres de tri et de
transit (Sorting and transit centres) (Branche, 2001:171). The distinguished centres where
torture occurred were: La Villa Susini, Clos Salembier, Biar Es-Saada, the Algiers city
council basement, municipal stadium located in Lyon street, the 19RDG HQ in Hussein-
Dey, 94 Clemenceau Street in El Biar, and Zouaves HQ in Henri Klein square (Branche,
2001:176)
The people who practiced torture were not only military, but also local colon harkis used
torture violence in connivance with French conventional army (Pimlott, 2011:62). Torture
by the military was practiced by military unit 10DP, mainly done by its sub-unit 1REP
(Figure 7), and also was done by 11BP, by its sub-unit 1RCP (Figure 8). But an
specialized organization was constituted to perform tortures: les Détachement
Opérationnel de Protection (Operational Protection Detachment) or DOP. Although they
were officialy created to monitor the excesses of other military units (Branche, 2001:
363), they were indeed the torture institutionalized. 18 DOPs were created in 1957 by the
Centre de coordination interarmées (Joint Coordination Center), that was a counter-spy
agency framed within the Information-Action-Protection (RAP) strategy (Branche,
2001:274).
The torture structure emanated from the RAP service, which commanded the Section P,
directed by a Clément Ruat, which was in charge to the DOP coordination (Branche,
2001: 275). DOPs were created to include the doctrine of non-conventional warfare in
active-duty military (Branch, 2001: 275), they were granted autonomy from the rest of
the Army through their special status and hierarchy (Branche, 2001: 361).
19
Seeking to concentrate and eliminate the multiplicities of the different military functions,
the Centre de renseignement et d’action (Information and Action Centre) were set up
aiming to centralize the information obtained by the different units, centralized
territorially in a military sector scale and divided along the neighbourhoods. CRAs were
defined as an organism of circumstance with a permanent character.
Torture was done firstly by the information gathered by the organization in charge of
political activism intelligence gathering, the SLNA was in charge of political
investigation of civilians in algiers (Riceputi, 2018). Torture started when Massu ordered
a large number of arrests and rendered the suspects to the DOP for interrogation, where
they will be brutally tortured (Pimlott, 2011:63). Massu doctrine was to combine
patrolling, intelligence-gathering, arrests and torture (Pimlott, 2011:64). Usually, tortured
were arrested midnight at home. 64% of tortured people were apprehended at home
between 10:00PM and 6:00AM, with a peak between midnight and 3AM, compared to
22% who were detained at their place of work and the rest 14% which were captured on
the street, usually during raids and unannounced inspections. The most frequent scenario
involved 10DP often accompanied by a local harki "guide" or "informer", which informed
to the military officers the person to torture (Riceputi, 2018).
The minority of the tortures (about 3,000) ended with forced disapparitions (i.e. summary
executions) in order to avoid eventual problems. This outcome was coined by Raphaëlle
Branche “as the continuation of the torture by other means” (Branche, 2001:204). Military
assassinated tortured people following two methods: (a)tortured people were forced to
dig their own grave (Corvée de bois) (Picture 35) and killed mercessly or (b) they were
shot them from behind during the transfers (Fuyards abattus), pretending they attempted
to flee (Picture 13).
b) The case of Maurice Audin
The archetypical and representative individual case of the people tortured in Algeria is
the case of Maurice Audin, becoming the paramount symbolic representation of what
torture meant. Audin Affaire was and still is a controversial topic in the French public
sphere, since the French government did not recognize his dead until 2018. Maurice
Audin is the symbol of the torture in Algeria (Branche, 2001:534). Maurice Audin, was
a young math assistant in the University of Algiers and member of the Algerian
Communist Party (PCA), he was an anti-colonial activist for Algerian independence, he
20
was husband of Josette father of three children, Michèle, Louis et Pierre (Libération,
2001). He was arrested by the 1st regiment of paratroopers (1RCP) in the night from June
11 to 12 in 1957 at his home in Algiers (Branche, 2001:533). Allegedly, the the young
couple hosts clandestine militants in his apartment on Flaubert Street, in the district of
Champ-de-Manœuvre (Vergnol, 2019).
Audin was arrested by Captain Devis, Lieutenant Philippe Erulin and other non-
recognized soldiers of the 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment, he is directly led to the
interrogation center of El-Biar, on the heights of Algiers (Vergnol, 2019). Josette Audin
was told by the officers that if he is reasonable, he'll be back in an hour (Vergnol, 2019).
A witness that was also present in El-Biar, Henri Alleg, who was also tortured as member
of the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) and as a director of Alger Républicain, the
official newspaper of the PCA (Branche, 2001,187), stated that he saw Audin on June 12,
he states the following: “ I saw Maurice's pale, haggard face staring at me as I swayed on
my knees” (Alleg, 1958:25). Audin was in pants, lying on a board with electrodes attached
to the right ear and left foot (Alleg, 1958 :24). He was last seen alife on June 18
(Libération, 2001). He was tortured by André Charbonnier, 1RCP Lieutant (Libération,
2001). Lieutenant Charbonnier was blamed for torturing him, however general
Aussaressess confirmed in an interview that Charbonnier was not in the sector when
Audin was killed, but he was responsible of capturing him (Branche, 2001:573). He was
tortured using electricity and water. Finally, he was declared disappeared the June 21
(Libération, 2001). Officially Maurice Audin was killed attempting to "escape" during
his transfer by jeep from one detention center to another, being thus a fuyard abattu. His
body has never been found. His death certificate is established by a judge of the High
Court of Algiers on June 21 (Audin, 2013: 27). He was executed by lieutant Garcet,
following the orders from Aussaresses (Deschamps, 2018). Josette Audin never accepted
the official version, she thought that the soldiers attempted to hide the death of her
husband. The Audin Affaire began on the evening of 21 June (Libération, 2001). Pierre
Vidal-Naquet demostra proves that the military version is fake (Vidal-Naquet, 1989 :24).
General Paul Aussaresses wrote in his memoir book, published in 2001, that he ordered
Charbonnier to question Audin (Libération, 2001). On January 8, 2014, a document was
broadcast exclusively in which General Aussaresses told journalist Jean-Charles Deniau
that he gave the order to kill Maurice Audin.
21
Josette Audin alerted to the authorities of the disappearance of his husband on 27 June
(Riceputi, 2018). On July 4, 1957, she lodged a complaint against X for intentional
homicide. The family of Maurice Audin is the only one to support him in these painful
weeks, where support is scarce. The colleagues at the faculty are not rushing to help him.
As for the comrades, "it was too dangerous for them to contact me". The investigation of
the case was transferred to Rennes in 1960. Two years later, the first non-lieu will be
pronounced for "insufficiency of charges". In December 1966, the Court of Cassation
declared a second non-lieu dismissing and archiving the as a result of the impossibility to
judge facts covered by the Amnesty (Vergnol, 2019).
The disappearance of Maurice Audin jumps into the public agenda on 13 August when a
letter from Josette Audin is published in Le Monde. She started sending letters to public
figures in order to support her cause. Josette Audin triggered the Audin Affair into the
public sphere. In June 2007, Josette Audin wrote to Nicolas Sarkozy, asking him to clarify
the disappearance of her husband and to make France assume its responsibility in this
case. On January 1, 2009, his daughter, Michèle Audin, refuses to receive the rank of
Chevalier of the Legion of Honor because Sarkozy had not responded to her mother's
request or even responded to her letter (Mediapart, 2009). The last attempt to lift this state
lie dates back to Tuesday, May 16, 2001 Josette Audin went to the courthouse in Paris,
in the office of the Dean of Investigating Judges. She filed a complaint against X for
kidnapping charges, after General Aussaresses published his book (Liberation, 2001).
Audin Affaire was included to the public agenda as public French personalities pushed for
the official recognition of the crime. Jaques Ferrand proposed the creation of the
Committee for the research of Maurice Audin (Branche, 2001:533). Pierre Vidal-Naquet
attempts to delegitimize the authorities through this committee and to influence the public
opinion. Altogether with others committes, such as Djamila Committee, a plethora of
public figures started a public endeavor on denouncing torture. Whereas Chirac
“recognized the role of France in the tortures practiced in Algeria” (AIDH, 2007:5),
François Hollande visited the stele erected in memory of Maurice Audin in Algiers and
orders to inquiry about his disappearance to the Ministry of Defense. Finally, on
September 2018, president Emmanuel Macron admitted that Maurice Audin died under
torture by French government in Algeria (Macron, 2018).
22
PART II. GOAL 16: PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS
23
I. CURRENT SITUATION
a) Actors involved
The actors involved in imparting justice, reparation and recognition, in accordance with
the Goal 16, of the tortures practiced by the French Army conforms an heterogenous net.
France holds the responsibility as it is the main torture inflictor, so normatively France
must reparate the pain inflicted. Practically, France is the entitled actor to tackle the
challenge of assuring peace since States are the unique actors retaining the justice
prerogative and because French lawmakers are able to enact policy-making to assure the
until nowadays denied equal access of justice to all (UNSDG Target 16.3).
The most important actor in this case is the French public opinion, considered as an entity
influenced by key individuals as well constructed by the press. Newspapers were the most
active stakeholder decrying France for the harsh methodology conducted, being the
utmost gatekeepers (Branche, 2001:206).It has been demonstrated that public opinion
influences policy-making (Page and Shapiro, 1983), thus making this entity the main
gatekeeper on shifting the application of Target 16.3. French torture was revealed to the
public opinion by two articles published by François Mauriac, “La Question” (The
Question) and Claude Bourdet, “Votre Gestapo d’Algérie” (Your Algerian Gestapo); later
in 1956, Henri Alleg published a book disclosing the torture with the help of Jean Paul
Sartre (Branche, 2001:13). French historians Vidal-Naquet and mathematician Laurent
Schawtz pushed and mediatized the torture taboo (LDH, 2007). Public mediatized
condemns were produced from a plethora of individual actors coming from multiple
typology involving scouts (Le Dossier de Jean Muller, 1956), catholic priests’ collectives
(Des rappéles témoignent, 1957), judges such Jean Reliquet, prosecutors like Paul
Pézaud, writers (Contre la torture de Pierre-Henri Simon), protestant religious federation
in 12 March 1957, cardinals and archbishops assembly in 14 March 1957, former
government cabinet members with De Gaulle such René Capitant, military staff like
General Jaques Pâris de Bollardière, philosophers like Jean Paul-Sartre, activists like
Simone de Beauvoir or the multiple adhoc convergence of manifold university
movements that constituted the association to defence liberties in Algeria (Branche,
2001:208). The Algerian press, which reappears legally from July 1962 (mainly al-
Chaâb) published search ads of those missing (Rahal and Riceputi, 2019). French
newspapers involved in publicizing tortures are France Observateur, L’Humanité,
L’Express and preeminetly Le Monde (Le Monde, 2018).
24
Whereas the ad hoc lawyers associations constituted to sue specific individual cases of
torture are the primary actors on enforcing, or at least attempting, to enforce justice and
seek reparation, International Organizations such CICR have developed an investigative
task to check whether Human Rights were violated during the Algerian War of
Independence, concretely, CICR reported tortures in Internment Camps as it expressed in
its inform of 23 May 1955 (Branche, 2001:47).
Non-governmental organizations have developed a decisive and became a game-changer.
Both the Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme and Ligue des droits de
l’Homme (International Crimes Database, 2019) worked on monitoring, reporting,
condemning and providing help to victims. LDH is strongly committed to denounce the
practice of torture by the French army in Algeria (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, 2019).
Other initiatives like online 1000autres give some victims an identity, a story, a face, a
humanity, awebsite by making public a file of a thousand of their search notices issued
from February 1957 by the prefecture of Algiers (Riceputi, 2019:30).
Within the decolonization process, concerned nation-states with French colonization but
also being motivated by their own interests, have campaigned in the UN to blame the
practice of torture by the French Army, mainly Syria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunis, which
have been engaged into a public campaign within the UNGA to condemn France for its
inhuman techniques along law enforcement operations (Branche, 2001:206).
The French army accepted complaints from disappeared relatives, but only to the extent
to "calm the considerable emotion”. The army provided a response deemed valid by the
prefecture only 30% of these requests. This file provides a list -very incomplete- of people
wanted by their relatives in 1957 (Rahal and Riceputi, 2019). France have in its archieves,
mainly in the colonial archive in Aix-en-Provence (ANOM) those documents related to
torture. The french government attempted to hide information about how torture was
developed (Weissbrodt and Maran, 1991:218). Notwithstanding, socialist minorities
opposed to Guy Mollet's Algerian policy, such as Daniel Mayer, Henri Nogueres or
Robert Verdie (Morin, 2004: 2). On 14 February 2018, the two deputies, Cédric Villani
and Sébastien Jumel, called for an official recognition of the assassination of Maurice
Audin by the French army, in the presence of Josette Audin and her son Pierre.
25
b) Main indicators
The two unique and essential indicators delineated by United Nations to assess the
performance of countries in relation to the Target 16.3 (Figure 44) are the figures that
expresses the proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported
their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict
resolution mechanisms (16.3.1) and the indicators displaying the unsentenced detainees
as a proportion of overall prison population (16.3.2) (UNGA Resolution 71/313, 2017).
UN appointed indicators to assess the country performance in achieving the Goal 16 does
not incorporate any figure aiming to conceive the number of people tortured. Neither
tortured people indicators can be found in the Home Affairs Ministry Statitcs nor in the
Official Statistic Institute of France (INSEE) since they are aggregated within the
category “others” as part of the broader crime of aggression (Figure 36) in the report
about crime condemnations in France during 2017: “Les condemnations pendant 2017,
Secrétariat general, Service de l’expertise et de la modernisation Sous-direction de la
Statistique et des Études” (Ministère de la Justice[b], 2018). It is impossible to discern
how much of those 27,496 condemened because of aggression in 2017 have undergo into
torture (Figure 38).
Regarding the UN pointed indicators to assess Goal 16, the indicator 16.3.1 data
availability globally is not researched neither published by States. France does not assess
this indicator, neither the plethora of States (Figure 49) (Institute for Economics and
Peace,2017). Concerning the indicator 16.3.2, the indicators analyzed globally displays a
situation wherein countries of the world do not progress on reducing the proportion of
unsentenced prisoners in relation to overall prision population (Figure 45), the proportion
of prisoners held in detention without sentencing has remained almost constant in the last
decade, at 31% of all prisoners (United Nations, 2019). Most of the countries have shown
a stable tendency (Figure 46). In France, the number of unsentenced people in prison
reached the figure of 20,852, indicator growing since octobre 2017, the highest proportion
reached in the last 12 years (Ministère de la Justice, 2018:3).
The government of France has entitled INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies) to coordinate for France all statistical work relating to the indicators
within the Official Statistical System from the Ministry of Ecologic transition (SDES), to
monitor the Sustainable Development Goals globally and nationally.
26
According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, in France the 60% of the UNSDG
delineated data concerning Goal 16 is available (Figure 50). INSEE has grounded four
main indicators to reificate the developments in regards to the Goal 16 (Figure 39)
(Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, 2017).
France have defined the first indicator as the absolute quantity of homicides (Figure 40)
in order to weight the level of violence in France: the tendency show that France is
performing deficiently as the number of homicides have grown from 795 victims in 2010
to casualties 845 in 2018. The second indicator is defined as the proportion of sexual
aggression victims in proportion to the rest of aggressions (Figure 41), France is
performing regulary since the figure oscillates between the 2,5%. The third indicators in
the number of unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population, the
same as UNSDG proposed indicator 16.3.2. Within an historical evaluation, the number
in relative terms of unstenced detainees has increased dramatically (Figure 42), from
25,9% in 2010 reaching the 29% in 2018, whereas in absolute terms (Figure 52), the
number of unsentenced prisoners is estable. Finally, the fourth indicator is the trust of
inhabitants on its institutions, showing an estable trend (Figure 43)
The UN has classified three group of indicators according its level of problem reification,
the first tier comprehends an indicator conceptually clear, methodology established
and standardized internationally, data regularly produced by countries; the second tier:
is defined for being an indicator conceptually clear, with methodology established and
standardize dinternationally, however data is produced occasionally or no existing data;
and to conclude, the tier three is the indicator typology for which there is no standardised
methodology or where themethodology is being tested/developed (Institut National de la
Statistique et des Études Économiques, 2017:2) 17 of the 23 indicators are classified as
Tier II and III. According to the INSEE, 52 indicators of the Tier 1 are non statistical, 29
indicators are unavailable and 6 are available; within Tier 2 indicators, 38 are non
statistical indicators, 23are unavailable and 8 are available; Tier 3 indicators are mostly
unavailable (46), whereas there are a 23 of available statistical indicators and 21 of non-
statistical indicators. As this data shows, there is a conundrum regarding measurability in
France, the most affected goal is the 16, in which 14 indicators are non available (Figure
35), according to the INSEE.
27
Unavailable statistical indicators have not been collected for various reasons: indicators
are not currently produced. But the majority of indicators will be solved if they were more
precisely (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, 2017:8). The
preeminent problem with Goal 16.3 is that there is not any indicator that accounts the
access of justice in promoting the rule of law at the national or international level,
relapsing the performance of such policies into a partisan qualitative analysis (Insitute for
Economics and Peace, 2016:42). Thus, the lack of indicators from the past and the
uncertainty of the present indicators triggers qualitative data to establish the right
paradigm and assess in consequence whether France has accomplished on fulfilling
Target 16.3.
Regarding torture figures: 40 percent of the adult male Muslim population of Algiers
(approximately 55,000 individuals) were put through the French interrogation system.
This action likely irrevocably alienated the entire 600,000 Muslim population of the city
from the French cause (DiMarco, 2006:73). 3,024 dissapeared in Algeria during the Law
Enforcement Operations (Libération, 2018). 850 complaints have been filled, according
to the SLNA, the same organization that accounted an approximate estimation 2,049
disappearances (Riceputi, 2018).
c) Adopted policy-making
France has not enacted any relevant policy-making aiming to subsidize those practices of
torture during the Algerian War of Independence. In addition to the fact France have not
established any policy-making aiming to reparate and make justice, France has neither
abrogated such laws of Amnesty that forbids the inquiry of torture crimes.
Michel Debré, the Minister of Armed forces started in September 1958 to imagine an
amnesty project to all the exerced violences during the law enforcement operation
(Branche, 2001:579). President Patin informed commanders through a letter to slow down
the military process which condemned torture because an amnesty was being created
during the 1961 spring (Branche, 2001:580), in order to incorporate such soldier that
commited tortures under the logic of Law Enforcement Operations.
On 22 March 1962, entered in force a decree amnestying (Branche, 2001:581), but the
decree did not elucidate clearly what law enforcement operations encompassed, leaving
thus a vacuous boundless conception of such operations aiming to reach any activity
commited by the French Army (Branche, 2001:581). A second decree on 18 June 1966,
28
extended the amnesty to offenses "committed within the framework of administrative or
judicial police operations (Liberation, 2001)
The lawmakers enacted in 2005 a law which acknowledged the positive role and the
prodigious role of France in its former Colonies (Loi portant reconnaissance de la Nation
et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés), contributing not only to the
non acknowledging of torture crimes but the apology of torture.
The unique policy-making was the paradoxical condemination to General Paul
Aussaresses. In his memoir, he recognized the summary executions of 24 individuals. The
justice cannot trial him because of the amnesty law, but he was condemned to 7,500€ for
war crimes apologies but he was not condemned for commiting these crimes, 2002).
During the year 2003, initiatives led to a revival of the search for the truth about the case
of Maurice Audin: among these initiatives should be mentioned the decision of the Paris
City Council to give the name of Maurice Audin to a place of the 5th arrondissement,
inaugurated on May 26, 2004 (Association Maurice Audin, 2019)
In France, under a Parliamentary mission mandate, the ministries’ general inspectorates
analyse sector policies conducted in their areas to produce a more detailed public policy
evaluation with respect to the Sustainable Development Goals. The Government submit
annually to Parliament a report on previous trends in the new wealth indicators and a
qualitative or quantitative assessment of the impact of key reforms implemented in the
previous and current year, as well as and those planned for the next year based on those
indicators and GDP (Bernstein, 2018:59).
The preeminent adopted policy-making aiming to fulfil the Goal 16 is the 20% of the
funding delegated by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs to the Agence Française
de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency) to finance projects initiated by
French civil society organizations involved in international solidarity are allocated to
human rights, governance and vulnerable populations (France Diplomatie, 2019). France
understands only UNSDG as a climate matter, employment leaving apart human rights.
it decided to enact legislation for ecologoical transition the Energy Transition for Green
Growth Act gave legislative shape to France’s voluntary commitment to cut its
greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 (Government de la
République, 2016:2) plan to tackle unemployment based on three priorities, aiming to
reduce social charges, improve training and assure young people entering into the market
(Government de la République, 2016:3).
29
On 6 June 2016, Ségolène Royal, Minister of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, in
charge of Sustainable Development, and André Vallini, Minister of State for
Development and Francophonie, launched consultative workshops on the implementation
of the Sustainable Development Goals. France considers that the involvement of civil
society, the private sector and the general public is key to the success of the
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and, more generally to public
policymaking. However, no public citizenship initiative contributed to the development
of policy-making regarding Goal 16, Target 16.3 or the enforcement of peace in Algeria.
II. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION
The Global and Regional situation regarding the application of Goal 16 by countries is
negative: generally, in countres the application is unsatisfactory (Figure 46), concretely,
MENA countries development of measures to tacke with the enforcement of Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions is deficient since they do not possess the required data to
develop a well grounded policy (Figure 51).
Regionally, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in comparison with the European and
interAmerican systems, Africa does not have a convention on torture and its prevention.
The question of torture is examined on the same level as are other human rights violations.
The question of torture is dealt with primarily in the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted by the Organization of African Unity on 27 June
1981 and which entered into force on 21 October 1986 Article 5 of the African Charter
state (OHCHR, 2014:7).
IV. EXPECTATIONS AND FORECAST FOR THE COMING 5 YEARS
The forecast for the incoming 5 years is neutral to the extend figures displays the fact that
France indicators have maintained a stable tendency (Figure 29 and 30). Under the right
conditions, the practice of torture decreases, and has nearly disappeared from the
experience of citizens of liberal democratic societies. As other countries adopt liberal
democratic forms of government, there is strong reason to believe that torture will be
eradicated there as well (Einolf, 2004:118)
30
The improvement of technology could lead into a transformation in the measurability on
the UNSDP, triggering thus metadata which makes available data disggregation and
wider use of indicators preeminent challnges (UNDP, 2015). The main issue within the
forecast is the fact that indicators related to Goal 16 are not well-grounded, in
consequence, the advance of technology will contribute to the better measurement of the
phenomenon, producing thus more cost-effective politics since the data will show with
be more precise.
Regarding the indicator 16.3.2, rates of pretrial detention suggest that progress with
respect to the rule of law and access to justice has been slow. Globally, the proportion of
people held in detention without being sentenced for a crime has remained almost
unchanged (from 32 per cent of total prisoners in 2003-2005 to 31 per cent in 2013-2015)
which indicates that substantive progress has not been achieved in the ability of judicial
systems to process and try the accused in a fair and transparent manner (United Nations,
2019). On the report about the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals,
France has not defined as a target the inquiry and further compensations and reparation
of torture (Government de la République, 2016), so in consequence the forecast is that
France will not adopt specific policy-making to address the tortures in Algeria.
31
PART III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
32
I. ASSESSMENT
In order to assess whether the policy-making enacted by France aiming to enforce justice
and victim reparations to the tortures practiced in Algeria by the French Army in Algeria
two pathways could be followed: the indicators of the UNSDG could be verified in order
to assess the rightfulness of polices, or the adopted policy-making by France could be
compared to those international established paradigms on how torture should be
prosecuted.
On one hand, the assessment of enforcement of policies seeking to achieve the Goal 16
by France by explorating its indicators are blurred. The indicators do not clearly reflect
its objectives. It is impossible to determine whether tortures have been reparated using a
figure which relates the homicide rates (as proposed by the INSEE) or explaining the
proportion of unsentenced population in comparision with the overall jailed population.
If we attempt to discern whether France has accomplished the Goal 16 and the Target
16.3 by looking to the statistical data, we could determine that the adequacy and efficacy
of policies are deficient, disappointing and unsatisfactory. The indicators that the French
government established to reificate the developments of Goal 16 (Figure 39) does not
tackle neither conceptualizes the broader phenomenon of enforcing peace. The indicators
proposed by INSEE shown that the indicator 1 regarding homicides has worsened (Figure
40), France is performing deficiently as the number of homicides have grown from 795
victims in 2010 to casualties 845 in 2018. The second indicator is defined as the
proportion of sexual aggression victims in proportion to the rest of aggressions (Figure
41), France is performing regulary since the figure oscillates between the 2,5%. The third
indicators in the number of unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison
population, the same as UNSDG proposed indicator 16.3.2. Within an historical
evaluation, the number in relative terms of unstenced detainees has increased dramatically
(Figure 42), from 25,9% in 2010 reaching the 29% in 2018, whereas in absolute terms
(Figure 52), the number of unsentenced prisoners is estable. Finally, the fourth indicator
is the trust of inhabitants on its institutions, showing an estable trend (Figure 43). Torture
is impractible to discern since INSEE does not inquiry on this phenomenon separately.
On the other hand, if we try to assess the policy-making by comparing the measures taken
to address the reparation of torture, we found that these measures do not exist, since the
Amnesty Law forbids to inquiry on such crimes. Reviewing the international instruments
France is party to and in consequence, it is mandatory and peremptory to apply, we could
33
determine clearly that the policies are not adequate, neither they have contributed to the
resolution of torture in Algeria. The applicability of such intenational standards is
prospective and retroactive, so the applicability of such conventions was valid in the past,
since the reality is ummutable and international standards have been violated,
compensations have to be established in order to reparate the committed crimes.
France is not complying with the obligations established in the 1987 United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Figure 12). France is failing to carryng out the Article 2 and 3, since it has
not taken effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture. This article establishes that no exceptions, including war, may be invoked as
justification for torture, reason to which France has resorted to. France is not neither
fulfilling the article 11, as well the principles 11-13, 15-19 and 23 of the Body of
Principles on Detention; paras. 7, 22 and 37 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, since the detention type developed in Algeria was
incommunicado detention, non-granting to physicians, lawyers and family members
access to detainees. France also violates Art. 12 of the UNCAT, since it does not ensure
that the competent authorities undertake a prompt and impartial investigation. If France
does not compensate economically the tortured victims, it is vulnerating the articles 13
and 14 of the UNCAT, as well the 35 and 36 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. Tortured people or relatives of them cannot sue a complaint since
the case will be dismissed, in consequence, France is performing unsatisfactorily on
upholding the article 7 which assevereates that offenders are subject to criminal
proceedings if an allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment is considered to be well founded, the alleged offenders shall be subject to
criminal, disciplinary or other appropriate proceedings.
Moreover, France assessment regarding torture peace enforcing does not performs
accurately following the Istanbul Protocol, which established The Manual on Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
34
In order to punish, reparate, make justice and ground the conditions for the non-repetition
of such practices France had to follow the delineated policy-making. To the extend the
Amnesty law forbids to inquiry on the investigation, France is performing deficiently in
the, Section A since it does not investigate the facts elating to alleged incidents of torture
(Figure 14). Moreover, France does not perform accurately since it does not accomplish
the Section B, which states that an effective investigation must be conducted as an
outcome of a report. Such report has never been done by any French authority. France
unaccomplished the Section B to the extend the it did not ensure that complaints and
reports of torture or ill-treatment are promptly and effectively investigated as well any
commission chosen for its impartiality, competence and independency has been formed
to inquiry in the crimes (Figure 15). In addition, France is neither fulfilling its obligations
in the Section C, Procedures of a torture investigation, since it did not conducted any
investigation (Figure 16) as well France policy-making neither fulfils the Section D
(Figure 17), since there has not been any commission of inquiry.
France is not imparting justice within the Goal 16 of the UNSDG due to the reiterate non-
compliances set by the Special Rapporteur (Figure 20). Concretely, France is failing to
fulfil the following requirements: (c.2) since it has not implemented effective legal,
preventive and protective measures; (d.2) since public campaigns aimed at informing the
population at large have not been conducted; (e.1) as a reason that interrogation took place
in secret; (g.1) due to the existence and recurrence on the Incommunicado detention ;
(g.2) since there has not been any information regarding the time and place of arrest as
well as the identity has not been identified of the law enforcement officials having carried
out the arrest; (g.3) no legal provisions have been ensured since the detentions were
arbitrary. Other non-compliances are found along the articles (g.4), (g.5), (g.6), (g.7),
(g.8), (g.9) and (k.1). The preemenint articles France has not respected are:
(i.1) Provisions should give all detained persons the ability to challenge the
lawfulness of the detention, e.g. through habeas corpus or amparo
(k.2) Creation of witness protection programmes for witnesses to incidents of
torture
(k.3) Legal provisions granting exemptions from criminal responsibility for
torturers, such as amnesty laws (including laws in the name of national reconciliation or
the consolidation of democracy and peace), indemnity laws, etc. should be abrogated
35
(k.4) If torture has occurred in an official place of detention, the official in charge
of that place should be disciplined or punished
(k.5) Military tribunals should not be used to try persons accused of torture
(k.6) Independent national authorities, such as a national commission or
ombudsman with investigatory and/or prosecutorial powers, should be established to
receive and to investigate complaints
(k.7) Complaints about torture should be dealt with immediately
(l.1) Legislation should be enacted to ensure that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and fair and adequate compensation, including the means for the fullest
rehabilitation possible, including the principles of restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
In addition to the reparation, granting public access to information is also a requirement,
but France has not contributed to reparate tortures within perspective of liberating
information since the French Common Law obliged undisclosed military archives to be
revealed after 30 years, so in 1992 most of the archives asseverating torture techniques
became public (Branche, 2001:14). Nonetheless, for those archives considered as
“sensitive”, the French Law establishes a period of 60 years, being the 2022 the year when
all the archives will be disclosed (Branche, 2001:14), however, some archives release
date was reduced to the 50 years, thus making 2012 the publication year (Branche,
2001:19). However, the law regulating the archives made them public but restricted
(Branche, 2001:17)
France in neither enforcing the Goal 16 within the framework of universal justice to
prosecute warcrimes. On 25 April 2001, several people filed a complaint (plaints) at
Office of the Paris Prosecutor alleging that General Haled Naysayer. He was allegedly
responsible for torture and death under torture. In the afternoon, the complaint was
deemed admissible and a preliminary inquiry was opened. Reportedly, no steps were
taken at the preliminary investigation stage to place the suspect in investigative detention
(garde à due), the General left Paris and France did not issue any international arrest
warrant (Amnesty International, 2001:8). The assessment of enforcing Goal 16 is also
negative to the extend the selected indicators are not useful to quantificate valid indicators
to comprehend the phenomenon.
36
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
The dissertation recommendations are based within the international standards, mainly
those suggestions stated by the Special Rapporteur of Torture, the Human Rights
Committee, the Istanbul Protocol or the Convention against torture among others. In
addition, the recommendations follow the criteria established by the Convention Against
Torture iniative which established in its handbook the guidelines to inquiry, make justice
and reparate (Figure 52). France must be encouraged to follow the Istanbul Protocol,
concretely along its sections, aiming to establish the purposes of an investigation into
torture, the principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the procedures of the
torture investigation and the creation of a commission of inquiry. The main
recommendations are:
· Establish and ad hocombudsman, as the Special Rapporteur reported on 12 January
1995. In paragraph 926 (g) of the report, he stated: Independent national authorities, such
as a national commission or ombudsman with investigatory and or prosecutorial powers,
should be established to receive and to investigate complaints (OHCHR, 2014:6),
moreover, this ombudsman must research in order to validate the torture crimes and
establish a quantity to compensate. This investigative authority shall have the power and
obligation to obtain all the information necessary to the inquiry (OHCHR, 2004:59).
· France must entitle the United Nations to conduct investigations. Each report by the
Committee against torture makes general comments and recommendations and include
this information in its annual report to the States parties and to the General Assembly.
The United Nations could develop a strategy to reparate and to establishing justice
conditions (OHCHR, 2014:5).
· Secret archives related to the practice of torture must be regulated in order to make
public this information and provide the effective tool for relatives to acknowledge the
truth (Branche, 2001:15). Furthermore, all the photographies must be public since the
governemnt refuses to disclose any photography, even for historians (Branche, 2001:16)
· Concentrate archives, since the documents regarding torture are divided between several
Ministries and within different places, it will be better to concentrated them (Branche,
2001:15). In addition, these archives most of them are private hands, like Guy Mollet
archives (Branche, 2001:18), in consequence they must be of public dominion.
37
· Release military justice archives, since they are hold in secret for a time-lapse of 75 and
100 years, most of them account the human right violations committed by soldiers
· Open the archives from the colonial state (ANOM) "opening archives" of the colonial
state, where they hope that we find the truth so eagerly sought. A general derogation of
information privatization, the contours of which will be specified by ministerial decrees
after identification of the available sources, would open to free consultation all the
archives of the State which concern this subject.
· Abrogate laws impeding the investigation of torture, such as the Amnesty passed by the
parliament. Legal provisions granting exemptions from criminal responsibility for
torturers, such as amnesty laws (including laws in the name of national reconciliation or
the consolidation of democracy and peace), indemnity laws, etc. should be abrogated
(Special Rapporteur on Torture, 2019:3).
The framework of the recommendations is grounded on the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights recommendations and in the Manual on the
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In that context, countries should be guided by the
Principles on the effective investigation and documentation of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (the Istanbul Principles) as a useful tool
in the effort to combat torture (Special Rapporteur on Torture, 2019:4).
38
FINAL REMARKS
39
Enforcing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16, and concretely the
Target 16.3 within the nation-state perspective is unstrustworthy and impracticable. Goal
16 intrinsically paramount objectives relapses the evaluation and the adequace of policies
aiming to achieve this Target as a possibility but not as a probability within the current
Westphalian nation state. Answering the title of this dissertation, France has not enforced
justice neither reparated those victims of torture during the Algeria War of Independence.
The issue raised here is how it is possible to assess a post-conflict and transicional justice
within the Goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, it is possible
to assess whether there is a well-defined status of Peace, or if Justice have been done not
as a long-standing complex process but as an simple objective to fulfil, or to which extend
Strong Institutions are conceived, whether a country representative of Human Rights as
France, within the regional framework of the European Union which paramount objective
is to assure peace, encompassed within the International order and system that enacts
binding legislation that latterly is not applied even to the investigation of Human Rights
Violation. The issue of pertinence is clear, applying the global UNSDG is utmost along
all the transitional justice processes. Despite the fact reconstruction, development and
enforcing sustainable peace is exclusively an endeavour portrayed by and for post-
conflict countries, new multi-dimensionsal and integrated approach to such challenges,
an approach that goes beyond the capabilities of a single country and relies on the global
governance institutions and in the international body law is necessary. In a globalized
world, lasting prosperity and peace are possible only through collective commitment and
effort (Panic, 2005:20).
Ernst Renan asseverates that process of nation-building is not grounded on an assembly
of individuals sharing common ethnographic profile but is grounded on the base of a
collective memory. Each event through which this assembly of individuals had to
overcame, it contributed to the enforcing of the unified identity. The torture practiced by
France contributed clearly to the identity formation of Algerian people, but did not
preclude that the Algerian people from committing those crimes their previous settlers
practiced to them. Nationhood is born from memory, from legacy, but also from
forgetting. A nation is about all the people felt together despite their differences and the
cohesion of a nation is made by force, not ubiquitous but as a long-enduring process.
Nationhood is born from memory, from legacy, but also from forgetting. France
deliberate decision to forget about its crimes in Algeria is produced within the logics of
asserting their identity of Human Rights upholders, despite the fact they violated them.
40
Torture as a quintaessential part of a holistic politico-military counter-insurgency doctrine
(Pimlott, 2011:60) is useful to conditionate the enemy, which is swamped, groggy,
demoralised and psychologically ready to be defeated (Pimlott, 2011:59). Torture was
used as part of a broader strategy from the Generals in charge of the army in Algeria:
General Salan and General Challe (Branche, 2001:28), but the conundrum of enforcing
peace and justice is the fact that the same institutions that allowed and promoted tortures
are those entitled to judge its crimes. Torture in Algeria was not exclusively a military
decision, but a raison d’êtat decision according to the extensive investigation by Pierre
Vidal-Naquet, displaying the internal dysfunctions of the Republic (Branche, 2001:29)
that was peremptory to undertake, even if the methodology used were those taken from
the Gestapo, as General Massu asseverated (Branche, 2001:210). As torture reports
seeped out, many people began to express their revulsion at methods employed and the
French public opinion wanted a political settlement for the “Algerian question” (Pimlott,
2011:64). The level of public awareness was low and when disquiet was expressed, it
tended to be overshadowed by the belief in the civilising mission of colonial expansion,
leading to a degree of military complacency (Pimlott, 2011:49). The public could not
support seeing political opponents being tortured to death to send powerful deterrent
message. For understandable reasons, torture has become symbol of tyranny for the public
(Hope, 2004:827).
The condemnation and reparation of such practices is condition sine qua non for those
victims and their relatives, but the paramount idea to reinforce and establish policy-
making to assure the achieving of Target 16.3 is not to reparate, but to assure the condition
for non-repetition. Nowadays. About 36% of the world population belief that torture
(Amnesty International, 2014:2), Global Opinions on the use of torture reflects a tendency
on relapsing to torture (Figure 31). The application of the Goal 16 is required to avoid
exactly this phenomenon, the Hegelian historical condition through which people is
condemned to repeat such devastating war condition.
Torture has been described as a ritual that establishes community boundaries, unites
members of the community against transgressors, and establishes social hierarchies
(Abrahamian 1999; Collins 1974; Gregory and Timmerman 1986), probably contributing
to the construction of the Algerian identity and leading to the inevitable independence of
Algeria, since revolutionary wars of national liberation seeked to capture not military or
geographic objectives, but the population (Pimlott, 2011:59).
41
But the only real "victory" of the French military participating in Law Enforcement
operations in Algiers in 1957 is that victory that has ensured impunity (Riceputi,
2019:30). A bidirectional process of mutual acknowledgment of crimes committed by
France as well by the FLN must be done in order to assure and ground the conditions for
non-repetitions. However, probably the practice of torture by the French Army in Algeria
have prompted and enforced the Algerian identity and struggle for independence.
Notwithstanding, since torture has not been solved from the French part, France still
nowadays need to review its past, in order to take a decision, If the country vows to
forgive to forget or prefers to forget so as not to forgive.
42
ANNEXES
43
MICHÈLE AUDIN INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT AND BIOGRAPHY
Michèle Audin (Algiers, 1954) is a mathematics university
professor. However, she is best known because she is the
daughter of Maurice Audin, the french mathematics assistant
at the University of Algiers and member of the Algerian
Comunist Party that was tortured and killed by the French
Army during the Battle of Algiers the 11th June 1957 because
of his political anti-colonial activism. Audin's wife, Josette,
denounced his dissaparition and as she did not receive news
from him. She started a campaign to uncover the fate of her
husband. This case, the Audin Affaire, became controversial
within the French Metropole public opinion and became the
paradigmatic case of torture during the Algerian War of
Independence, because the case was officially denied by
France until 2018.
« Pensez-vous que sans les efforts de Pierre Vidal-Naquet, le comité Audin au travail de ses
proches, en particulier de votre mère, l'affaire Audin aurait disparu de l'agenda public
français? »
C’est Josette Audin, ma mère, qui a « créé » ce qu’on appelle l’Affaire Audin, dès juin
1957. Elle a vite été soutenue par Laurent Schwartz, Pierre Vidal-Naquet et d’autres.
Sans elle et sans eux, personne n’en aurait jamais parlé, comme on n’a pas parlé des
autres disparus de la bataille d’Alger.
« Pourquoi pensez-vous que l'État français a essayé de cacher la réalité de la torture et des
pratiques extrajudiciaires depuis si longtemps? »
Au pouvoir, il y a eu, soit des politiciens réactionnaires nostalgiques de la colonisation,
soit des politiciens « de gauche » manquant de courage politique.
« Pensez-vous que la société française préfère connaître la vérité et enquêter sur les
événements en Algérie ou préfère oublier? »
Je pense qu’il est nécessaire qu’elle connaisse la vérité, pour pouvoir vivre en paix avec
elle-même. Il y a sept millions de Français d’origine algérienne, quand même!
« Croyez-vous que les lois d'amnistie de la guerre en Algérie devraient être abrogées et les
victimes réparées? »
Non, je crois qu’il est temps de faire une histoire « apaisée ».
« Pourquoi la société française soutient-elle aujourd'hui le rôle positif de la colonisation
française? »
Par méconnaissance des réalités de la colonisation.
« Est-ce que vous ou vos proches avez pensé à dénoncer le cas de votre père au niveau
français ou international? Croyez-vous que si vous dénoncez votre cas, vous prospérerez
dans les instances internationales ou dans les instances françaises? »
Je ne sais pas répondre.
« Quel est le rôle de l'Etat algérien dans la condamnation de la torture et en particulier dans
le cas de son père? Avez-vous reçu de l'aide de l’Algérie? »
Nous n’avons pas reçu d’aide du gouvernement algérien (mais nous avons reçu beaucoup
de soutiens de citoyens algériens).
« Espérez-vous que la vérité soit enfin connue, que justice soit faite et que la réparation du
crime commis soit établie dans l'Êtat français? »
Le crime a été reconnu par le président de la République et la responsabilité de l’état
aussi. C’est bien pour moi
Michèle Audin (left), with Emmanuel Macron (centre) and Josette Audin
(right). Residence of Josette Audin (13 September 2018)
44
SELECTION OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
ARTICLE 1: Le Monde Editorial (14 September 2018)
Torture en Algérie: la responsabilité de l’Etat dans la mort de
Maurice Audin, une salutaire vérité Macron parachève le « devoir de vérité » que la République a eu tant de mal à assumer.
Editorial du « Monde ». Pour les hommes comme pour les
Etats, la vérité fait mal. Plus encore quand, honteuse et
douloureuse, elle a été trop longtemps occultée ou refoulée.
Pour les Etats comme pour les hommes, le travail de mémoire
et la vérité qui en résulte sont pourtant les remèdes nécessaires
aux traumatismes du passé.
Il convient donc de saluer la déclaration faite par le président
de la République, jeudi 13 septembre, à propos de Maurice
Audin, ce jeune professeur de mathématiques à l’université
d’Alger, militant communiste et anticolonialiste, arrêté le 11
juin 1957 par des militaires français et disparu sans que les
circonstances de sa mort aient jamais été officiellement
établies de façon crédible et sans que son corps ait été
retrouvé.
Soigneusement pesés, les mots d’Emmanuel Macron sont
forts : il reconnaît que Maurice Audin « a été torturé puis
exécuté ou torturé à mort par des militaires qui l’avaient
arrêté ». Et il ajoute :
« Sa disparition a été rendue possible par un système dont
les gouvernements successifs ont permis le développement,
le système appelé arrestation-détention à l’époque, qui
autorise les forces de l’ordre à arrêter, détenir et interroger
tout “suspect” dans l’objectif d’une lutte plus efficace contre
l’adversaire. Ce système s’est institué sur un fondement légal :
les pouvoirs spéciaux », votés par le Parlement en 1956. « Ce système a été le terreau
malheureux d’actes parfois terribles, dont la torture, que l’affaire Audin a mis en lumière. »
Cette reconnaissance n’effacera pas la part d’irréparable que comporte la « tragédie algérienne »
– le mot est de Raymond Aron, dès 1957. Mais elle parachève le « devoir de vérité » que la
République française a eu tant de mal à assumer. Ainsi, il avait fallu attendre 1999 pour que
l’Assemblée nationale reconnaisse que les combats qui firent, de 1954 à 1962, plusieurs centaines
de milliers de morts en Algérie furent bien une « guerre » et non de simples opérations de maintien
de l’ordre contre des rebelles. Il avait fallu attendre 2007 pour qu’un président français, Nicolas
Sarkozy, déplore, à Alger, la « profonde injustice » de la colonisation. En 2012, enfin, François
Hollande condamnait, devant les députés algériens, « le système de la colonisation » et « la
violence, les injustices, les massacres » – ainsi que la « torture » – qu’il avait engendrés.
Photo de Maurice Audin prise dans les
années 1950. Ce jeune professeur de
mathématiques à l’université d’Alger,
militant communiste et anticolonialiste,
a été arrêté en 1957 par des miliatires
français et a disparu sans que les
circonstances de sa mort aient jamais été
officiellement établies. STF / AFP
45
Un pas determinant
Conformément aux réalités dénoncées, dès l’époque de la
guerre d’Algérie, par des journaux comme France
observateur, L’Express ou Le Monde, et en s’appuyant sur
les travaux menés par les historiens depuis des décennies,
Emmanuel Macron a franchi un pas déterminant. Il a eu
raison. Comme il a eu raison de saluer « l’honneur de tous
les Français qui, civils ou militaires, ont désapprouvé la
torture, ne s’y sont pas livrés ou s’y sont soustraits ».
Comme, enfin, il a eu raison d’ouvrir « à la libre
consultation tous les fonds d’archives de l’Etat qui
concernent ce sujet » afin que les historiens puissent
approfondir leur travail salutaire.
Récusons par avance les accusations de coupable «
repentance » qui pourraient être adressées au président de la
République par tous ceux qui préfèrent le déni à la vérité sur
les pages sombres de l’histoire nationale. Concernant la
guerre d’Algérie, les reconnaître et les assumer lucidement
est la seule façon de réconcilier les mémoires des deux côtés
de la Méditerranée et d’inviter les Algériens eux-mêmes à
s’engager dans une démarche similaire.
“Le Monde (2018). Torture en Algérie: la responsabilité de l’Etat dans la mort de Maurice
Audin, une salutaire vérité. Le Monde. Retrieved from
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/09/14/torture-en-algerie-salutaire-
verite_5354941_3232.html”
Le Monde frontpage (14 September 2018)
46
ARTICLE 2: Libération article by Brigitte Vital-Durand (12 June 2001)
L'affaire Audin, un mensonge d'Etat De non-lieux en lois d'amnistie, tout s'est conjugué pour enfouir la vérité sur Maurice
Audin, mort en 1957 sous la torture.
Quarante-cinq ans après les premiers témoignages sur la torture, la guerre d'Algérie a resurgi dans
les mémoires. Pendant une semaine, «Libération» revisite cette histoire inconnue des plus jeunes.
Demain, troisième volet avec l'affaire Bollardière.
Nuit du 11 au 12 juin 1957. Centre de triage d'El-Biar, avenue Georges-Clemenceau, Alger. «Il
était environ 1 heure du matin [...] Audin était en slip, allongé sur une planche [...] des pinces
reliées par des fils électriques à la magnéto étaient fixées à l'oreille droite et au pied gauche [....]
J'ai, pendant longtemps, entendu les cris de Maurice Audin, cris qui me paraissaient étouffés par
un bâillon.» Nuit du 12 au 13 juin, même lieu. «"Allez Audin, dites-lui ce qui l'attend. Evitez-lui
les horreurs d'hier soir." C'était Charbonnier qui parlait. [...] Au-dessus de moi, je vis le visage
blême et hagard de mon ami Audin qui me contemplait tandis que j'oscillais sur les genoux.»
«"Allez, parlez-lui", dit Charbonnier. "C'est dur, Henri", me dit Audin. Et on le remmena.»
«Charbonnier», c'est André Charbonnier, lieutenant au 1er régiment des chasseurs parachutistes.
Devenu colonel et commandeur de la Légion d'honneur, il est mort en 1995 dans son lit. «Henri»,
c'est Henri Alleg, journaliste, directeur d'Alger républicain de 1950 à 1955, militant communiste
(1). Il a fait le récit des tortures qu'il a subies dans son livre la Question, paru en 1958 aux Editions
de Minuit. Et «Audin»?
Maurice Audin était un jeune homme au visage d'enfant, cheveux en bataille. Il avait 25 ans. Il
était mathématicien, assistant à l'université des sciences d'Alger, militant du parti communiste. Il
avait une épouse, Josette, et trois enfants. Comme nombre d'autres habitants d'Alger, Arabes et
Européens, que les parachutistes soupçonnaient de «terrorisme», il avait été arrêté par les
militaires français et «assigné à résidence» dans un immeuble de la ville transformé par les paras
en centre d'interrogatoire. Les militaires, à la recherche des poseurs de bombes, avaient reçu du
général Massu la mission de «rétablir l'ordre», «par tous les moyens».
Torturé. Le 18 juin, le jeune homme vit encore. D'après le récit de l'un de ses codétenus, le Dr
Hadjadj, arrêté 24 heures avant lui, lui aussi torturé, on sait que ce jour-là, il portait «au niveau
du lobe de l'oreille droite et au niveau du gros orteil gauche des traces de brûlures». Maurice
Audin a la force de parler au médecin, de lui dire comment il est torturé par les militaires:
«Electricité et eau.» Que s'est-il passé le lendemain, puis le 20 juin, et le 21? Les parachutistes
sont les seuls à pouvoir témoigner sur les dernières heures du professeur. Ils n'ont jamais rien dit.
Personne n'a plus revu Maurice Audin, disparu cette nuit d'été dans la bataille d'Alger.
Entre janvier et septembre 1957, 3 024 personnes arrêtées par les paras ont «disparu». Mais, ce
disparu-là avait une épouse, aimante (Josette Audin ne s'est jamais remariée), enseignante elle
aussi, militante comme lui. Et extrêmement tenace. Il avait mieux qu'un métier: il était membre
de l'enseignement supérieur. Son directeur de thèse s'appelait Laurent Schwartz, médaille Fields
1950 (prix Nobel des mathématiciens). Il était militant d'un parti politique alors puissant: le parti
communiste, premier parti de France, avait récolté 25,9 % des voix aux élections législatives de
1956 et comptait 150 députés à l'Assemblée. Audin, enfin, était un Européen. Objet d'attention de
la part des parachutistes, dont ne bénéficiaient pas leurs obscurs suspects arabes. Huit jours après
l'arrestation, le 19 juin, le président de la République René Coty avait été averti que l'assistant de
la fac d'Alger était entre les mains des paras. La présidence était intervenue. Trop tard.
47
Quand Maurice est arrêté, le plus jeune de ses enfants a un mois. Son épouse est encore en congé
maternité lorsqu'elle le voit pour la dernière fois, s'éloignant de leur HLM de la rue Flaubert, ce
11 juin 1957, à 23 heures, après le couvre-feu, encadré des parachutistes du 1er RCP venus le
chercher au domicile familial. Elle a très vite appris que, trois heures plus tard, on étouffait ses
cris avec un bâillon. Et elle a eu, très tôt aussi, la conviction qu'il était mort sous la torture. Ou
étranglé par Charbonnier. Elle en garde, aujourd'hui encore, la foi inébranlable. Le secrétaire
général de la FEN, bastion syndical de l'Education nationale, lui suggérera en décembre 1957
qu'en acceptant la thèse de l'évasion elle pourrait continuer à recevoir le traitement de son mari,
alors que, veuve d'un si jeune époux, elle n'aura pas droit à une retraite. Josette Audin a résisté.
Elle n'a jamais accepté la thèse officielle, celle des militaires qui ont camouflé la mort de son mari
pour se préserver de toute enquête gênante.
Mise en scène. La seconde partie de «l'affaire Audin» commence le 21 juin au soir. A 22 heures,
l'armée française a mis en scène une évasion fictive. «Un faux corporel», selon l'expression du
procureur général de la Libération, André Boissarie, relevée par Pierre Vidal-Naquet. L'historien,
alors jeune assistant à la faculté de Caen, s'est appliqué à démontrer, pièce par pièce, témoignage
après témoignage, comment l'évasion était un mensonge destiné à cacher le meurtre. Il en a fait
un ouvrage paru en mai 1958 sous le titre l'Affaire Audin (2). Un modèle de contre-enquête. La
version des militaires, d'abord. Vers 21 heures, Charbonnier prévient Alleg et le Dr Hadjadj qu'ils
vont être transférés, ainsi qu'Audin. Une Jeep quitte le centre de triage d'El-Bair vers 21 h 30. Elle
est conduite par le sergent Yves Cuomo. Un autre sergent, Pierre Misiri, est à l'avant. Il est armé.
«Audin» est à l'arrière. Six cents mètres plus loin, dans un virage, la Jeep a un «léger accident»,
elle ralentit, «Audin» s'enfuit, Misiri bondit, mitraille le fugitif, le manque, et court à sa recherche
dans les rues d'Alger. En vain.
Pierre Vidal-Naquet montrera qu'Alleg et Hadjadj n'ont jamais réellement vu le transfert d'Audin.
Ils n'en ont qu'entendu parler par Charbonnier. Voilà deux témoins que l'on ne soupçonnera pas
de partialité en faveur des militaires, mais qui sont inventés. L'historien s'apercevra que l'évasion,
à 600 mètres du centre de triage, donc à pas plus d'une minute en Jeep dans les rues désertes, ne
pouvait pas avoir eu lieu dix minutes après le départ de la Jeep, comme l'ont dit les paras. Il
prouvera que les militaires ont oublié d'établir immédiatement un bulletin de recherches. Que,
lorsqu'il a été rédigé, le 24 juin, le document fait état d'un «léger accident», qui ne sera jamais
consigné dans le registre du service auto. Alors, une seconde version du même bulletin un autre
faux évoquera un simple «ralentissement». Les tirs de mitraillette? Le lendemain, on n'a retrouvé
ni trace de balle ni douille. Est signalée l'évasion d'un «Européen, grand, fort, [...] 32 ans, Audin
Maurice». Le vrai Audin n'avait que 25 ans, il mesurait 1,72 m, était très mince... «C'est plutôt le
profil d'un para...», s'amuse aujourd'hui Pierre Vidal-Naquet à qui ni l'armée ni la justice n'ont
toujours pas donné, quarante-quatre ans plus tard, de confirmation officielle à sa contre-enquête.
Pourtant, l'historien avait relevé toutes les contradictions de la fausse évasion. Les unes après les
autres: le sergent qui a laissé «Audin» s'échapper ne sera sanctionné que cinq jours plus tard,
comme si on avait, là encore, oublié qu'il avait fauté, on arrêtera de torturer Henri Alleg dès le
lendemain, et le domicile des Audin est surveillé très mollement.
A partir de juillet 1957, la disparition du jeune homme provoque l'émotion dans les milieux
universitaires, chez les intellectuels, et les militants de gauche. Une pétition nationale est lancée.
Signataires: des enseignants, comme Michel Crouzet, un spécialiste de Stendhal, ou le futur
découvreur du virus du sida, Luc Montagnier, alors jeune biologiste. Un Comité Audin se monte,
qui ne cessera de se battre pour alerter l'opinion publique contre la torture. Le visage du professeur
«à l'éternelle jeunesse», selon l'expression de Pierre Vidal-Naquet, était devenu la figure
symbolique des communistes dénonçant les horreurs de la guerre coloniale.
48
S'ouvre alors la troisième affaire Audin, douloureuse elle aussi, et qui ne s'est toujours pas
achevée. Josette Audin avait porté plainte le 4 juillet 1957. Procédure mort-née: le crime des
militaires, comme le faux qu'ils ont monté pour le dissimuler, ont été recouverts à la fois par une
succession de «non-lieux» décrétés par des tribunaux et cours de justice en France, et par le vote
de lois d'amnistie. Le 22 mars 1962, un décret déclare amnistiés «les faits commis dans le cadre
des opérations de maintien de l'ordre dirigés contre l'insurrection algérienne». Un second décret,
le 18 juin 1966, élargit l'amnistie aux infractions «commises dans le cadre d'opérations de police
administrative ou judiciaire», comme le précise son article 3. Lequel «semble rédigé exprès pour
cette affaire», écrit l'historien. Résultat: six mois plus tard, la Cour de cassation (qui avait attendu
plus de quatre ans pour statuer) déclare éteinte l'action de Josette Audin.
Dernière tentative. La dernière tentative pour lever ce mensonge d'Etat remonte au mardi 16 mai
2001. L'avocate de Josette Audin s'est rendue au palais de justice de Paris, dans le bureau du
doyen des juges d'instruction. Me Nicole Dreyfus y a déposé une plainte contre X avec
constitution de partie civile, notamment pour «séquestration». Une plainte. Encore une. A l'avenir
incertain. «Ça ne me rendra pas mon mari, mais le minimum qu'on puisse faire, c'est d'établir la
vérité, de rendre justice», réclame aujourd'hui encore une Josette Audin combative. Le général
Paul Aussaresses écrit dans son livre de mémoires sorti le 3 mai que c'est lui il était alors
commandant qui a ordonné à Charbonnier d'interroger Audin. Le vieux militaire a 82 ans, il est
commandeur de la Légion d'honneur. Il se contente de ces quelques lignes: «Comme on sait,
Audin disparut le 21 juin» (page 190). Le conducteur de la Jeep, Yves Cuomo, vient de sortir
d'une retraite paisible à Pau. Il a donné une interview, le vendredi 11 mai, à la République des
Pyrénées. Le journal écrit qu'il est «bardé de décorations». Cuomo affirme avoir été manipulé. Il
aurait transporté «un prisonnier cagoulé» dont il n'a, en conséquence, jamais vu le visage.
Toujours selon lui, sa hiérarchie lui aurait dit qu'il s'agissait d'Audin, seulement après l'évasion.
L'ancien sergent, démobilisé en 1971 avec le grade d'adjudant-chef, ne «demande pas mieux» que
de se rendre à une convocation de justice. Il affirme aussi qu'il est prêt à rencontrer Josette Audin.
Celle-ci lui oppose un refus catégorique: «Tout le monde veut apparaître comme n'ayant rien fait,
comme n'étant pas responsable. Eh bien, non». Elle pèse ce qu'elle dit, lentement, mot après mot:
«On ne peut pas réconcilier les assassins avec les assassinés.».
(1) Les membres du Parti communiste algérien (PCA) étaient recherchés par les militaires qui les
soupçonnaient de fabriquer des bombes pour le FLN (Front de libération national).
(2) Réédité aux Editions de Minuit, et complété en 1989, il est toujours disponible.
“Vital-Durand, B. (2001). L'affaire Audin, un mensonge d'Etat. Libération. Retrieved from
https://www.liberation.fr/politiques/0101377063-l-affaire-audin-un-mensonge-d-etat”
49
ARTICLE 3: L’Express interview by Daniel Bermond (1 June 2002)
Le cas Aussaresses devant les tribunaux En janvier 2002, Xavier de Bartillat, éditeur du général Aussaresses, s'explique après la
condamnation de son livre Services spéciaux, Algérie 1955-1957. Le 25 janvier 2002, la
17e chambre correctionnelle de Paris a condamné la maison Perrin pour la publication
du livre du général Paul Aussaresses sur les tortures qu'il avait lui-même pratiquées et
les exécutions qu'il avait ordonnées ou auxquelles il avait participé pendant la guerre
d'Algérie. L'éditeur Xavier de Bartillat, qui a fait appel de ce jugement, s'explique.
Comment avez-vous vécu, personnellement, intimement, la polémique autour du livre du
général Aussaresses, Services spéciaux, Algérie 1955-1957, et la condamnation que vous
avez subie en tant qu'éditeur en première instance?
XAVIER DE BARTILLAT. Mal mais bien aussi. Mal, parce que la pression était très
forte, que l'on est pris dans une turbulence médiatique et politique qui donne le sentiment d'être
manipulé par des groupes partisans, que l'on est contesté dans son métier d'éditeur. Cela étant, je
n'ai aucun regret, bien au contraire. J'ai accompli mon devoir d'éditeur d'histoire, qui consiste à
porter à la connaissance du public, et des chercheurs, un témoignage capital. Ce témoignage, si
dur, si révoltant soit-il, concourt à l'établissement d'une vérité souvent occultée, parfois niée, à
briser le bloc du silence. Tourner cette page d'histoire implique d'abord de la lire sans restriction.
La justice vous a reproché tout de même d'avoir voulu faire un coup éditorial et, ce faisant,
d'avoir voulu faire de l'argent...
X.B. Voilà qui n'a aucun sens! Perrin est devenu la première maison spécialisée en
histoire. J'ai publié plus de six cents livres d'histoire. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Alain Decaux, Michel
Winock, Serge Berstein, Jean-Pierre Azéma et tant d'autres témoignent de notre sérieux. Toute
mon énergie, et celle des conseillers qui m'entourent, a pour objectif de nourrir un fonds
incontestable, cohérent, dans lequel le public, les historiens, les étudiants puissent puiser. Cela ne
peut se faire que sur le long terme, dans la discrétion et la passion, en accompagnant nos auteurs
sur trois, parfois cinq années. Rien à voir avec le sensationnalisme! Quant à l'argent! Combien
vous a rapporté le livre d'Aussaresses? m'a-t-on demandé. Comme si l'argent, c'était forcément
mal. Ce n'est pourtant qu'un des moyens de bâtir un catalogue, de construire librement, et sur
plusieurs années, une politique éditoriale digne de ce nom. Cette liberté-là a un prix. Il faut savoir
qu'un gros quart de notre production est déficitaire, avant même les frais généraux. C'est la
réunion des ouvrages difficiles ou plus ouverts vers un large public, petits tirages ou best-sellers,
qui fait la richesse et la force d'une maison d'édition. Nous devons pour cela être sains
financièrement et je ne sache pas qu'il soit immoral de faire des bénéfices. D'autant qu'on ne le
sait qu'après, et que les surprises existent dans les deux sens.
Ce langage passe mal dans les prétoires...
X.B. Peut-être certains préfèrent-ils que les éditeurs disparaissent, fût-ce en beauté? Je
retiens de ce malentendu qu'il faut faire mieux connaître notre métier et ses réalités.
50
Dans les attendus du jugement on retient surtout l'accusation d' "apologie de crimes de
guerre". Peut-on publier un témoignage dans lequel un acteur de l'histoire légitime les
tortures qu'il a pratiquées et se dit prêt à recommencer? Ne preniez-vous pas d'emblée le
risque de poursuites?
X.B. Mais Aussaresses ne tient pas un discours
prosélyte, il ne prône pas je ne sais quel idéal de société à
la manière d'un dignitaire nazi. Il raconte froidement,
cliniquement, ce qu'il a fait, ce qu'on lui a fait faire. Est-
ce de l'apologie? On peut sans doute lui adresser le
reproche de ne pas battre sa coulpe mais pas celui de
vouloir recommencer. Je vous renvoie à ses dernières
pages: il ne souhaite à personne de se retrouver dans les
terribles situations qu'il a vécues. Bien au contraire d'une
apologie, ce livre fait avancer la recherche et contraint les
historiens, les militaires, le public, ma génération qui n'a
pas connu cette guerre, à se poser les questions
essentielles. En mettant un nom, en donnant sa version de
la chaîne de commandement politico-militaire,
Aussaresses a créé un tel débat qu'il ne sera plus possible
de penser l'histoire de cette guerre sans évoquer son livre.
Plus personne ne pourra dire que la torture a peu ou pas
existé.
Vous avez été condamné deux fois plus lourdement que votre auteur: 15 000 euros vous-
même et 15 000 euros Olivier Orban, 7 500 euros le général. Vous êtes deux fois plus révolté?
X.B. Il y a là une vraie confusion morale. La révélation d'un crime serait donc deux fois
plus criminelle que le crime lui-même. Ce n'est pourtant pas l'aveu qui devrait nous choquer mais
les faits qu'il dévoile. Oublie-t-on que la IVe République est morte de l'affaire algérienne? Cet
officier n'était pas un franc-tireur mais le soldat d'une République en pleine dérive. Aussaresses
a d'ailleurs bénéficié de ce qui s'apparente à des circonstances atténuantes puisque le tribunal a
été jusqu'à dire que nous, éditeur, avions provoqué un vieux monsieur qui n'en demandait pas
tant. Tout cela est évidemment contraire à la chronologie des faits. Chacun sait que Le Monde est
à l'origine de cette confession, et que, parallèlement à l'écriture de son livre - ce que, d'ailleurs,
j'ignorais -, le général Aussaresses confiait son histoire à la chaîne de télévision Arte, au cours de
très nombreuses heures d'enregistrement. Un livre, nous a affirmé le procureur de la République,
qui n'apporte rien à l'histoire. Il me semblait que l'on pouvait se fier à Pierre Nora, Jean-François
Revel, Alain-Gérard Slama, lorsqu'ils en jugeaient différemment. Pendant le procès, Pierre Vidal-
Naquet, historien et témoin de ce drame, interrogé sur la question de savoir s'il fallait publier ce
livre, a répondu oui. C'est lui encore qui déclarait au Monde en novembre 2000: "Pourquoi ce
retour de mémoire a-t-il lieu maintenant? Je n'aurais pas imaginé qu'il puisse se produire de mon
vivant même si je ne cessais de le souhaiter. [...] Il se manifeste une gigantesque envie de vérité."
Tout est dit!
Le général Paul Aussaresses (C) fait un
signe, le 25 janvier 2002 au Palais de
justice de Paris, où le tribunal
correctionnel l'a condamné avec ses deux
éditeurs à une amende de 7500 euros
chacun, pour "apologie de crimes de
guerre et complicité", après la
publication du livre sur la guerre
d'Algérie, "Services spéciaux, Algérie
1955-1957". AFP/JACK GUEZ
51
Diriez-vous vous aussi que vous êtes victime d'un "délit d'édition"?
X.B. Oui, je le pense. On donne à croire que le vrai crime n'est pas l'acte lui-même, mais
de le dire, et par cela de violer la loi du silence qui arrangerait bien du monde. L'édition n'échappe
pas à la judiciarisation globale de la société. Mais je n'accepte pas tout. Il faut sanctionner les
fautes quand elles sont avérées. Il reste que cette propension à tout régler devant les tribunaux
m'inquiète car l'édition est un secteur économiquement fragile. Je note que ni Le Monde, qui a
publié de larges extraits du livre d'Aussaresses, ni la télévision qui a diffusé les entretiens avec le
général n'ont été poursuivis.
Parce qu'il y a deux poids, deux mesures?
X.B. Non, le problème se pose en termes d'expérience. La presse sait se défendre, elle le
fait instinctivement. L'édition n'a pas cette tradition-là.
Cette multiplication d'affaires dans lesquelles des livres sont impliqués n'est-elle pas la
rançon d'une tendance de l'édition à traiter, comme la presse, de sujets sensibles?
X.B. Nous disposons, en effet, d'une liberté beaucoup plus grande que naguère pour
enquêter, mais nous en mesurons les limites. L'interdiction du livre de Gubler est là pour nous le
rappeler. Et pourtant, comment peut-on étudier les deux septennats de Mitterrand sans avoir en
tête le contenu de ce livre, qui est une véritable clé de compréhension du personnage et de son
action!
Que vous inspire le projet de livre blanc que le Syndicat national de l'édition est en train de
mettre sur pied?
X.B. L'initiative est excellente. Au cours du procès, j'ai souvent ressenti la nécessité de
mieux faire connaître les réalités du monde de l'édition: gestation d'un livre, mécanismes de la
publication - mises en place, ventes nettes. Les incertitudes du métier aussi. Mais tout cela est
secondaire par rapport au devoir d'information, et la passion qui nous anime. L'éditeur connaît les
risques qu'il court lorsqu'il publie des documents sensibles. Il les mesure et les assume en
conscience. Quand il estime légitime de publier, il le fait.
“Bermond, D. (2002). Le cas Aussaresses devant les tribunaux. L'Express. Retrieved from
https://www.lexpress.fr/culture/livre/le-cas-aussaresses-devant-les-tribunaux_806599.html”
52
ARTICLE 4: Médiapart article by Edwy Plenel (2 January 2009)
La lettre de Michèle Audin à Nicolas Sarkozy Face à l'imposture, ses simagrées et ses mensonges, il suffit parfois d'être soi-même. De
ne pas biaiser, de ne pas faire le malin, de ne pas jouer au plus fin. Tout simplement de
rester fidèle. Fidèle à quelques principes, à certaines valeurs, à d'anciens repères. En
voici un exemple, superbe de tranquille fermeté, qui, d'une simple lettre, démasque
l'hypocrisie qui nous gouverne.
Face à l'imposture, ses simagrées et ses mensonges, il suffit parfois d'être soi-même. De ne pas
biaiser, de ne pas faire le malin, de ne pas jouer au plus fin. Tout simplement de rester fidèle.
Fidèle à quelques principes, à certaines valeurs, à d'anciens repères. En voici un exemple, superbe
de tranquille fermeté, qui, d'une simple lettre, démasque l'hypocrisie qui nous gouverne. Oui,
l'hypocrisie de cette mise en scène politique qu'on nous impose plus souvent qu'à l'ordinaire lors
du passage d'une année sur l'autre: rituels vœux télévisés qui supposent une nation soumise à la
parole d'un seul, traditionnelles promotions dans l'ordre de la Légion d'honneur où se détectent
colifichets courtisans et distinctions clientélistes, avalanche de cérémonies de vœux présidentiels
dont l'origine remonte à nos âges non-démocratiques, monarchiques ou impériaux. Si l'actuel
monarque, républicain d'apparence, autocrate d'essence, ne fait ici que prolonger l'héritage de ses
prédécesseurs, il s'en empare avec tant de zèle, de gourmandise vorace et d'agitation narcissique,
qu'il finit par nous réveiller de notre torpeur. Vraiment, la démocratie, ce serait donc cela, cette
fiction?
Une fiction qu'une seule lettre, admirable de simple grandeur, vient de dévoiler. Elle émane d'une
brillante mathématicienne et elle est adressée au président de la République. Elle m'a été transmise
par son collègue Michel Broué, directeur de l'Institut Henri-Poincaré, par ailleurs président de la
Société des amis de Mediapart. La voici:
53
Michèle Audin est la fille de Maurice Audin (son portrait ci-contre), ce jeune et brillant
mathématicien qui, militant du Parti communiste algérien, engagé dans le combat anticolonialiste,
fut arrêté, torturé et assassiné par l'armée, en juin 1957. En dehors de ses tortionnaires, le dernier
à le voir vivant fut Henri Alleg, son camarade de parti, arrêté et torturé lui aussi, qui réussit à
survivre pour témoigner en écrivant La Question, aux Editions de Minuit.
Le premier livre de l'historien Pierre Vidal-Naquet, dont la mémoire est évoquée ces jours-ci sur
Mediapart à un autre propos qui n'est cependant pas sans rapport (c'est à lire ici), fut, chez le
même éditeur, L'affaire Audin, préfacé par Laurent Schwartz. Eminente figure de l'école française
de mathématiques, ce dernier présida, fin 1957, le jury de la thèse de doctorat d'État de
mathématiques de Maurice Audin, sur «les équations linéaires dans un espace vectoriel»,
soutenue in absentia. Grâce à la mobilisation de ces personnalités, l'affaire Audin marquera un
tournant dans la prise de conscience française sur la généralisation de la pratique de la torture en
Algérie.
"S'il est partisan, c'est seulement de la vérité", écrivait Laurent Schwartz dans sa préface au livre
de Pierre Vidal-Naquet. Une vérité que la famille Audin réclame toujours et que nous réclamons
tous avec elle, la justice ayant conclu par un non-lieu et son corps n'ayant jamais été retrouvé. Il
suffit de le vouloir: les réponses sont là, dans les archives d'Etat, civiles et militaires. Et sans doute
y trouvera-t-on la trace de ce lieutenant Charbonnier, déjà identifié par l'enquête de Vidal-Naquet
pour le Comité Audin comme ayant été le tortionnaire du jeune mathématicien.
Comme l'illustre le digne geste de Michèle Audin, ceux qui entretiennent la mémoire de ce martyr
des luttes anticoloniales n'ont pas voulu en faire un monument figé et inerte. Ils l'ont prouvé
encore récemment en liant ce souvenir ancien au souci très immédiat d'un autre mathématicien,
Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh (son portrait ci-contre), cet opposant tchadien disparu début 2008,
après avoir été enlevé par l'armée régulière au lendemain du départ des troupes rebelles de la
capitale. Sa mort en détention est désormais avérée. Les autorités françaises, forcément
concernées, sinon informées, en raison de leur soutien militaire du pouvoir en place à N'Djamena,
n'ont guère répondu aux questions posées par diverses ONG.
“Plenel, E. (2009). La lettre de Michèle Audin à Nicolas Sarkozy. Médiapart. Retrieved from
https://blogs.mediapart.fr/edwy-plenel/blog/020109/la-lettre-de-michele-audin-nicolas-sarkozy”
54
ARTICLE 5: Le Nouvel Observateur article (2 December 2005)
Les Français approuvent le rôle "positif" de la colonisation Selon l'institut CSA, 64% des Français (57% à gauche) souhaitent que les programmes
scolaires reconnaissent le "rôle positif" de la colonisation.
Près de deux Français sur trois (64%) souhaitent que les
programmes scolaires reconnaissent le rôle "positif" de la
colonisation française, selon un sondage CSA publié vendredi
2 décembre par Le Figaro. En pleine polémique sur l’article
de loi demandant aux programmes scolaires de "reconnaître
en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-
mer", cette proportion est plus élevée parmi les sympathisants
de droite (75%) que parmi les sympathisants de gauche (57%),
malgré l'offensive menée à l'Assemblée nationale par le PS et
le PCF pour obtenir le retrait de l’article de loi. Selon le
sondage, 68% des sympathisants communistes, 59% des
sympathisants des Verts et 55% des sympathisants des
socialistes approuvent l'article. A droite, 75% des sondés
l’approuvent.
Les cadres moins favorables au texte: vingt-neuf pour cent des
personnes interrogées se déclarent opposées à ce que soit
indiqué dans la loi que les programmes scolaires
reconnaissent le rôle positif de la colonisation. Cette
proportion monte à 38% chez les sympathisants de gauche et
descend à 19% chez ceux de droite. Les opposants ont plutôt
à rechercher chez les catégories aisées: les cadres sont 45% à l'approuver, contre 72% chez les
employés. Le directeur de CSA-opinions, Stéphane Rozès, cité par Le Figaro, explique que "les
Français estiment que la majorité (qui a voté l'article) n'a pas voulu faire l'apologie de la
colonisation, mais a souhaité que les manuels scolaires n'occultent pas ses effets positifs".
Sondage CSA réalisé par téléphone le 30 novembre auprès d'un échantillon national de 1.013
personnes âgées de 18 ans et plus (méthode des quotas).
“Le Nouvel Observateur (2005). Les Français approuvent le rôle "positif" de la colonisation. Le
Nouvel Observateur. Retrieved from
https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20051202.OBS7372/les-francais-approuvent-le-role-
positif.html”
Allegory of Marianne, the national
personification of the French Republic since the
French Revolution, as a personification of
liberty and reason, and a portrayal of the
Goddess of Liberty (Archive from the
Charmet/Bridgeman Giraudon private
collection)
55
FIGURES
Figure 1: French Military officer's model of revolutinary phases iused by national liberation movements (Pimlott, 2011:58)
Phase 1 Infiltration of the population by political cadres (popular support)
Phase 2 Creation of guerrilla structure (popular support)
Phase 3 Creation of alternative government system (international backing)
Phase 4 Co-ordinated all-out offensive against colonial authorities (demoralisation of colonial forces)
Phase 5 Seize colonial political power (demoralisation of colonial forces + international backing)
Figure 3: Guerre Révolutionaire template used by the French Army (Pimlott, 2011:64)
Phase 1 Isolation of the guerrillas from outside support building physiacal barries
Phase 2 Destroy the gerrilla networks of the interiors
Phase 3 Portray a determined psychological warfare campaign
Figure 4: French military interventions handbook (Pimlott, 2011:66)
Phase 1 Harkis infiltration in FLN activity areas, triggering guerrilla war
Phase 2 Commandos de Chasse are activated to chase FLN militants
Phase 3 Elite troops from the Réserve Générale kill FLN militants
Phase 4 Regular Land and Air troops support the battle against FLN militants
56
Figure 8: 11e Brigade Parachutiste Organizational Chart
Figure 5: Conflict dimensions from the French Perspective (Branche, 2001:62)
Dimension Sub-Dimensions
Military Troops Sector troops (in charge of pacification tasks, usually Army divisions)
Intervention troops (eventual support troops to fight hors-la-loi, usually Airborne)
Spatial Division
Zone normal or Normal Zone: low insurgency level, SAS presence
Zone de contrôle renforcé or Reinforced Control Zone: possible insurgency level, increased SAS presence
Zone interdit or Forbidden Zone: population must be evacauted, conflict zone
Zone d'isolement or Isolation Zone: territory control fulled gained by insurgents
Power Civilian administrative authority
Military authority
Figure 6: UNSDG Goal 16 targets
Number Goal description
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywher
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat
all forms of organized crime
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
16.A Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in
developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
16.B Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development
Figure 7: 10e Division Parachutiste Organizational Chart
57
Figure 9: Aggravating factors of blows and wounds crime
No injury or wound left 750€ fine
Total incapacity for work of less than or equal to 8 days 1,500€ fine (3,000€ in case of recidivism)
Total incapacity for work of more than 8 days 3 years imprisonment and 45,000€ fine
Mutilation or pemanent disability 10 years imprisonment and 150,000€ fine
Death without intention (homicide) 15 years of imprisonment
Death with intention (assassination) 30 years of imprisonment
Figure 10: Aggravating factors of torture crime
Torture 15 years of
imprisonment
Torture with rape Life imprisonment
Torture to aged under fifteen 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture to disabled people 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture to relatives 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture to public servants 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture to household members
20 years of imprisonment
Torture within prostitution 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture within forced marriage
20 years of imprisonment
Torture practiced by a public servant
20 years of imprisonment
Multiple torture 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture with sexual crimes 20 years of
imprisonment
Torture within couple 20 years of
imprisonment
Habitual organized torture to disabled
30 years of imprisonment
Torture with mutilation outcome
30 years of imprisonment
Voluntary death with torture Life imprisonment
Involuntary death as torture outcome
15 years of imprisonment
Torture done with a weapon 20 years of
imprisonment
Figure 11: top contributing countries to the OHCHR UN Torture Fund
United States of America 5.696.312 €
Germany 653.540 €
Denmark 447.890 €
Switzerland 197.239 €
France 128.833 €
Norway 95.270 €
Saudi Arabia 75.000 €
Canada 44.148 €
Ireland 39.459 €
Lienchestein 25.075 €
India 25.000 €
Austria 21.231 €
Luxembourg 16.760 €
Argentina 15.000 €
Andorra 11.099 €
Kuwait 10.000 €
Mexico 10.000 €
United Arab Emirates 10.000 €
Czech Republic 7.118 €
Algeria 5.000 €
Chile 5.000 €
Holy See 2.000 €
Monaco 2.000 €
Peru 1.470 €
58
Figure 12: Legal obligations to prevent torture (OHCHR, 2014)
Instrument Obligation
Art. 2 of the Convention against Torture and art. 3 of the Declaration on the Protection
against Torture)
Taking effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture. No exceptions, including war, may be invoked as
justification for torture
Art. 3 of the Convention against Torture Not expelling, returning (refouler) or extraditing a person to a country when there are substantial grounds for believing he or she would be
tortured
Art. 4 of the Convention against Torture, principle 7 of the Body of Principles on
Detention, art. 7 of the Declaration on the Protection against Torture and paras. 31-33
of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners)
Criminalization of acts of torture, including complicity or participation therein
Arts. 8 and 9 of the Convention against Torture
Undertaking to make torture an extraditable offence and assisting other States parties in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect
of torture
Art. 11 of the Convention against Torture; principles 11-13, 15-19 and 23 of the Body of Principles on Detention; paras. 7, 22 and 37 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners
Limiting the use of incommunicado detention; ensuring that detainees are held in places officially recognized as places of detention; ensuring the names of persons responsible for their detention are kept in registers
readily available and accessible to those concerned, including relatives and friends; recording the time and place of all interrogations, together with the
names of those present; and granting physicians, lawyers and family members access to detainees
Art. 10 of the Convention against Torture, art. 5 of the Declaration on the Protection against Torture, para. 54 of the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
Ensuring that education and information regarding the prohibition of torture is included in the training of law enforcement personnel (civil and military), medical personnel, public officials and other appropriate persons
Art. 15 of the Convention against Torture, art. 12 of the Declaration on the Protection
against Torture
Ensuring that any statement that is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made
Art. 12 of the Convention against Torture, principles 33 and 34 of the Body of
Principles on Detention, art. 9 of the Declaration on the Protection against
Torture
Ensuring that the competent authorities undertake a prompt and impartial investigation, whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that torture
has been committed
Arts. 13 and 14 of the Convention against Torture, art. 11 of the Declaration on the
Protection against Torture, paras. 35 and 36 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners
Ensuring that victims of torture have the right to redress and adequate compensation
Art. 7 of the Convention against Torture, art. 10
of the Declaration on the Protection against Torture
Ensuring that the alleged offender or offenders is subject to criminal proceedings if an investigation establishes that an act of torture appears to have been committed. If an allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is considered to be well founded, the alleged offender or offenders shall be subject to criminal, disciplinary or
other appropriate proceedings
59
Figure 13: UN bodies and mechanisms against torture (OHCHR, 2014)
Committee against Torture
Human Rights Committee
Commission on Human Rights
Special Rapporteur on the question of torture
Special Rapporteur on violence against women
United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture
Figure 14: Section A of Legal Torture Investigation (OHCHR, 2014:17)
Section A: Purposes of an investigation into torture
Purpose Guideline
The broad purpose of the investigation is to establish the facts relating to alleged
incidents of torture
(a)Obtain statements from the victims of alleged torture; (b) to recover and preserve evidence, including medical
evidence, related to the alleged torture to aid in any potential prosecution of those responsible;
(c) to identify possible witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the alleged torture;
(d) to determine how, when and where the alleged incidents of torture occurred as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the torture.
60
Figure 15: Section B of Legal Torture Investigation (OHCHR, 2014:17) Section B: Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Purpose Guideline
Effective Investigation and
Documentation of Torture
(a) Clarification of the facts and establishment and acknowledgement of individual and State responsibility for victims and their families;
(b) Identification of measures needed to prevent recurrence; (c) Facilitation of prosecution or, as appropriate, disciplinary sanctions for those indicated by the investigation as being responsible and demonstration of the need for full reparation and redress from the State, including fair and adequate financial compensation
and provision of the means for medical care and rehabilitation.
States must ensure that complaints and reports of torture or
ill-treatment are promptly and
effectively investigated. Even
in the absence of an express complaint,
an investigation should be
undertaken if there are other
indications that torture or ill-
treatment might have occurred
(a)The investigative authority shall have the power and obligation to obtain all the information necessary to the inquiry, all the necessary budgetary and technical resources for effective investigation.
(b)They must also have the authority to oblige all those acting in an official capacity allegedly involved in torture or illtreatment to appear and testify.
(c) the investigative authority is entitled to issue summonses to witnesses, including any officials allegedly involved, and to demand the production of evidence.
(d) Alleged victims of torture or ill-treatment, witnesses, those conducting the investigation and their families must be protected from violence, threats of violence or any other form of intimidation that may arise pursuant to the investigation.
(e)Those potentially implicated in torture or ill-treatment should be removed from any position of control or power, whether direct or indirect, over complainants, witnesses or their families, as well as those conducting the investigation
Alleged victims of torture or ill-
treatment and their legal representatives must be informed of, and have access to, any hearing as
well as to all information
relevant to the investigation and
must be entitled to present other
evidence.
Creation of a a commission chosen for their recognized
impartiality, competence and independence as
individuals
(a)Production of a report by the aforementioned experts must be made public
Medical experts involved in the investigation of torture or ill-
treatment should behave at all times in conformity with the highest ethical
standards
(a) The circumstances of the interview. The name of the subject and name and affiliation of those present at the examination; the exact time and date, location, nature and address of the institution where the examination is being conducted; any appropriate
circumstances at the time of the examination; and any other relevant factor; (b) A detailed record of the subject’s story as given during the interview, including alleged methods of torture or ill-treatment, the
time when torture or ill-treatment was alleged to have occurred and all complaints of physical and psychological symptoms; (c) A physical and psychological examination. A record of all physical and psychological findings upon clinical examination
including appropriate diagnostic tests and, where possible, colour photographs of all injuries; (d) An opinion. An interpretation as to the probable relationship of physical and psychological findings to possible torture or ill-
treatment. A recommendation for any necessary medical and psychological treatment or further examination should also be given; (e) A record of authorship. The report should clearly identify those carrying out the examination and should be signed.
61
Figure 16: Section C of Legal Torture Investigation (OHCHR, 2014:17)
Section C: Procedures of a torture investigation
Purpose Guideline
Determination of the
appropriate investigative
body
The state is considered to be involved in torture if: (a) Where the victim was last seen unharmed in police custody or detention;
(b) Where the modus operandi is recognizably attributable to State-sponsored torture; (c) Where persons in the State or associated with the State have attempted to obstruct or delay the
investigation of the torture; (d) Where public interest would be served by an independent inquiry;
(e) Where investigation by regular investigative agencies is in question because of lack of expertise or lack of impartiality or for other reasons, including the importance of the matter, the apparent existence of a pattern
of abuse, complaints from the person or the above inadequacies or other substantial reasons.
Interviewing the alleged victim and
other witnesses
(a)Informed consent and other protection for the alleged victim, they should be given contact information for advocacy and treatment groups that might be of assistance to them, including regular informs about the
process (b)Selection of the investigator should have prior training or experience in documenting torture and in
working with victims of trauma, including torture (c)Context of the investigation, investigators should carefully consider the context in which they are working, take necessary precautions and provide safeguards accordingly, the investigator’s choice of
language and attitude will greatly affect the alleged victim’s ability and willingness to be interviewed. The location of the interview should be as safe and comfortable as possible, including access to toilet facilities and refreshments. Sufficient time should be allotted to interview the alleged torture victim. Investigators
should not expect to get the full story during the first interview. Questions of a private nature will be traumatic for the alleged victim. The investigator must be sensitive in tone, phrasing and sequencing of
questions, given the traumatic nature of the alleged victim’s testimony. The witness must be told of the right to stop the questioning at any time, to take a break if needed or to choose not to respond to any question (d)Safety of witnesses, the State is responsible for protecting alleged victims, witnesses and their families
from violence, threats of violence or any other form of intimidation that may arise pursuant to the investigation.
(e)Use of interpreters and working through an interpreter (f)Information to be obtained from the person alleged to have been tortured (g)Statement from the person
who is alleging torture should be based on answers given in response to non-leading questions, asking questions that increase in specificity
(h)Alleged perpetrator's statement must have legal protections guaranteed under international and national law.
Securing and obtaining physical evidence
The investigator should gather as much physical evidence as possible to document an incident or pattern of torture. Any building or area under investigation must be closed off so as not to lose any possible evidence.
Medical evidence
The investigator should arrange for a medical examination of the alleged victim. In formulating a clinical impression for the purpose of reporting physical and psychological evidence of torture, there are six
important questions to ask: (a) Are the physical and psychological findings consistent with the alleged report of torture?
(b) What physical conditions contribute to the clinical picture? (c) Are the psychological findings expected or typical reactions to extreme stress within the cultural and
social context of the individual? (d) Given the fluctuating course of trauma-related mental disorders over time, what is the time frame in
relation to the torture events? Where in the course of recovery is the individual? (e) What other stressful factors are affecting the individual (e.g. ongoing persecution, forced migration,
exile, loss of family and social role, etc.)? What impact do these issues have on the victim? (f) Does the clinical picture suggest a false allegation of torture?
Photography Colour photographs should be taken of the injuries of persons alleging that they have been tortured, of the
premises where torture has allegedly occurred (interior and exterior) and of any other physical evidence found there
62
Figure 17: Section D of Legal Torture Investigation (OHCHR, 2014:17)
Section D: Commission of inquiry
Purpose Guideline
Defining the scope of the inquiry (a)They should be neutrally framed
(b)They should state precisely which events and issues are to be investigated (c)They should provide flexibility in the scope of inquiry
The power of the commission
(a) Authority to obtain all information necessary to the inquiry including the authority to compel testimony under legal sanction, to order the production of documents including
State and medical records, and to protect witnesses, families of the victim and other sources;
(b) Authority to issue a public report; (c) Authority to conduct on-site visits, including at the location where the torture is
suspected to have occurred; (d) Authority to receive evidence from witnesses and organizations located outside the
country
Membership criteria (a)Impartiality
(b)Competence (c)Indepedence
The commission’s staff Commissions of inquiry should have impartial, expert counsel. Where the commission is
investigating allegations of State misconduct, it would be advisable to appoint counsel outside the Ministry of Justice.
Protection of witnesses The State shall protect complainants, witnesses, those conducting the investigation and
their families from violence, threats of violence or any other form of intimidation
Proceedings It follows from general principles of criminal procedure that hearings should be
conducted in public, unless in-camera proceedings are necessary to protect the safety of a witness
Notice of inquiry Wide notice of the establishment of a commission and the subject of the inquiry should
be given.
Receipt of evidence Commissions of inquiry should have the power to compel testimony and produce
documents, plus the authority to compel testimony from officials allegedly involved in torture.
Right of parties Those alleging that they have been tortured and their legal representatives should be
informed of and have access to any hearing and all information relevant to the investigation and must be entitled to present evidence.
Evaluation of evidence The commission must assess all information and evidence it receives to determine reliability and probity. The commission should evaluate oral testimony, taking into
account the demeanour and overall credibility of the witness.
Report of the commission
(a) The scope of inquiry and terms of reference; (b) The procedures and methods of evaluating evidence;
(c) A list of all witnesses, including age and gender, who have testified, except for those whose identities are withheld for protection or who have testified in camera, and exhibits received as
evidence; (d) The time and place of each sitting (this might be annexed to the report);
(e) The background of the inquiry, such as relevant social, political and economic conditions; (f) The specific events that occurred and the evidence upon which such findings are based;
(g) The law upon which the commission relied; (h) The commission’s conclusions based on applicable law and findings of fact;
(i) Recommendations based on the findings of the commission
63
Figure 18: Physical evidence of torture (OHCHR, 2014:45)
Evaluating factors Symptons or signals
General Considerations 1. The central role of the psychological evaluation: the mainpsychiatric disorders associated
with torture are PTSD and major depression 2. The context of the psychological evaluation
Psychological consequences of torture
1. Cautionary Remarks 2. Common Psychological Responses: (a) Re-experiencing the trauma; (b) Avoidance and emotional numbing; (c) Hyperarousal; (d) Symptoms of depression; (e) Damaged self-
concept and foreshortened future; (f) Dissociation, depersonalization and atypical behaviour; (g) Somatic complaints; (h) Sexual dysfunction; (i) Psychosis; (j) Substance
abuse; (k) Neuropsychological impairment 3. Diagnostic classifications: (a) Depressive disorders; (b) Post-traumatic stress disorder; (c) Enduring personality change; (d) Substance abuse; (e)PTSD; (f) Anxiety disorder; (g)Panic
disorders; (h)Somatoform disorders; (i)Bipolar disorders; (j)Phobias development;
The psychological/psychiatric evaluation
(a) Avoidance, withdrawal and defensive indifference in reaction to being exposed to disturbing material. This may lead to forgetting some details and underestimating the severity of physical or psychological consequences; (b) Disillusionment, helplessness,
hopelessness and overidentification that may lead to symptoms of depression or vicarious traumatization, such as nightmares, anxiety and fear; (c) Omnipotence and grandiosity in
the form of feeling like a saviour, the great expert on trauma or the last hope for the survivor’s recovery and well-being; (d) Feelings of insecurity about professional skills when
faced with the gravity of the reported history or suffering. This may manifest as lack of confidence in the ability to do justice to the survivor and unrealistic preoccupation with
idealized medical norms; (e) Feelings of guilt over not sharing the torture survivor’s experience and pain or over the awareness of what has not been done on a political level
may result in overly sentimental or idealized approaches to the survivor; (f) Anger and rage towards torturers and persecutors are expectable, but may undermine the ability to maintain
objectivity when they are driven by unrecognized personal experiences and thus become chronic or excessive; (g) Anger or repugnance against the victim may arise as a result of
feeling exposed to unaccustomed levels of anxiety. This may also arise as a result of feeling used by the victim when the clinician experiences doubt about the truth of the alleged torture history and the victim stands to benefit from an evaluation that documents the
consequences of the alleged incident; (h) Significant differences between the cultural value systems of the clinician and the individual alleging torture may include belief in myths about
ethnic groups, condescending attitudes and underestimation of the individual’s sophistication or capacity for insight. Conversely, clinicians who are members of the same
ethnic group as a victim might form a non-verbalized alliance that can also affect the objectivity of the evaluation.
64
Figure 19: Torture Methods (OHCHR, 2014:45) (a) Blunt trauma, such as a punch, kick, slap, whipping, a beating with wires or truncheons or falling down;
(b) Positional torture, using suspension, stretching limbs apart, prolonged constraint of movement, forced positioning;
(c) Burns with cigarettes, heated instruments, scalding liquid or a caustic substance;
(d) Electric shocks;
(e) Asphyxiation, such as wet and dry methods, drowning, smothering, choking or use of chemicals;
(f) Crush injuries, such as smashing fingers or using a heavy roller to injure the thighs or back;
(g) Penetrating injuries, such as stab and gunshot wounds, wires under nails;
(h) Chemical exposure to salt, chilli pepper, gasoline, etc. (in wounds or body cavities);
(i) Sexual violence to genitals, molestation, instrumentation, rape;
(j) Crush injury or traumatic removal of digits and limbs;
(k) Medical amputation of digits or limbs, surgical removal of organs;
(l) Pharmacological torture using toxic doses of sedatives, neuroleptics, paralytics, etc.
(m) Conditions of detention, such as a small or overcrowded cell, solitary confinement, unhygienic conditions, no access to toilet facilities, irregular or contaminated food and water, exposure to extremes of
temperature, denial of privacy and forced nakedness;
(n) Deprivation of normal sensory stimulation, such as sound, light, sense of time, isolation, manipulation of brightness of the cell, abuse of physiological needs, restriction of sleep, food, water, toilet facilities, bathing, motor activities, medical care, social contacts, isolation within prison, loss of contact with the outside world (victims are often kept in isolation in order to prevent bonding and mutual identification and to encourage
traumatic bonding with the torturer);
(o) Humiliation, such as verbal abuse, performance of humiliating acts;
(p) Threats of death, harm to family, further torture, imprisonment, mock executions;
(q) Threats of attack by animals, such as dogs, cats, rats or scorpions;
(r) Psychological techniques to break down the individual, including forced betrayals, accentuating feelings of helplessness, exposure to ambiguous situations or contradictory messages;
(s) Violation of taboos;
(t) Behavioural coercion, such as forced engagement in practices against the religion of the victim (e.g. forcing Muslims to eat pork), forced harm to others through torture or other abuses, forced destruction of
property, forced betrayal of someone placing them at risk of harm;
(u) Forcing the victim to witness torture or atrocities being inflicted on others.
65
Figure 20: State policy-making recommendations by OHCHR (Special Rapporteur on torture, 2019:2)
(a.1) Countries must sign and ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or punishment and its Optional Protocal or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(a.2)Within national law, torture should be designated as a utmost gravity crime and embrace the universalist application
(b.1) Countries should sign and ratify or accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(c.1) Legislation providing for corporal punishment, including excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment for a crime or disciplinary punishment, should be abolished
(c.2) Effective legal, preventive and protective measures should be put in place
(d.1) The highest authorities should publicly condemn torture in all its forms whenever it occurs (d.2) Public campaigns aimed at informing the population at large
(e.1) Interrogation should take place only at official centres and the maintenance of secret places of detention should be abolished under law
(f.1) Regular inspection of places of detention, especially when carried out as part of a system of periodic visits (f.2) Independent non-governmental organizations should be authorized to have full access to all places of detention
(f.3)Ombudsmen and national or human rights institutions should be granted access to all places of detention with a view to monitoring the conditions of detention
(f.4) International Committee of the Red Cross should be granted access to places of detention
(g.1) Incommunicado detention should be made illegal, and persons held incommunicado should be released without delay (g.2) Information regarding the time and place of arrest as well as the identity of the law enforcement officials having carried out the
arrest should be scrupulously recorded (g.3) Legal provisions should ensure that detainees are given access to legal counsel within 24 hours of detention, as well to be
informed of their right to be assisted by a lawyer of their choice or a State-appointed lawyer able to provide effective legal assistance (g.4) A relative of the detainee should be
informed of the arrest and place of detention within 18 hours (g.5) A person should undergo a medical inspection, and medical inspections should be repeated regularly and should be compulsory
upon transfer to another place of detention (g.6)Each interrogation should be initiated with the identification of all persons present
(g.7) All interrogation sessions should be recorded and preferably video-recorded (g.8) Blindfolding and hooding practices are forbidden
(g.9) Detention status without judicial warrant must not surprass 48 hours period
(h.1) Persons under administrative detention should be entitled to the same degree of protection as persons under criminal detention
(i.1) Provisions should give all detained persons the ability to challenge the lawfulness of the detention, e.g. through habeas corpus or amparo
(j.1) Training programmes should be envisaged to sensitize prison officials to the importance of taking effective steps to prevent and remedy prisoner-on-prisoner
abuse and to provide them with the means to do so (k.1) When a detainee or relative or lawyer lodges a torture complaint, an inquiry should always take place the public officials involved
should be suspended from their duties pending the outcome of the investigation (k.2) creation of witness protection programmes for witnesses to incidents of torture
(k.3) Legal provisions granting exemptions from criminal responsibility for torturers, such as amnesty laws (including laws in the name of national reconciliation or the consolidation of democracy and peace), indemnity laws, etc. should be abrogated
(k.4) If torture has occurred in an official place of detention, the official in charge of that place should be disciplined or punished (k.5) Military tribunals should not be used to try persons accused of torture
(k.6) Independent national authorities, such as a national commission or ombudsman with investigatory and/or prosecutorial powers, should be established to receive and to investigate complaints
(k.7) Complaints about torture should be dealt with immediately
(l.1) Legislation should be enacted to ensure that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and fair and adequate compensation, including the means for the fullest rehabilitation possible, including the principles of restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
(m.1) Training courses and training manuals should be provided for police and security personnel
(n.1) Health-sector personnel should be instructed
(o.1) National legislation and practice should reflect the principle enunciated in article 3 of the Convention against Torture, namely the prohibition on the return (refoulement),
expulsion or extradition of a person to another State “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”
66
Figure 21: International Standards about Torture (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019)
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OP-CAT)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of the Liberty
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
Principles relating to the status of national institutions (The Paris Principles)
67
68
Figure 32: Universal and Regional Human Rights Instruments protecting torture (International Justice Resource Center, 2019)
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 5)
American Convention on Human Rights (art. 5)
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (art. 27)
Arab Charter on Human Rights (art. 8)
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (arts. 19, 20)
Charter of Paris for a New Europe
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture)
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (art. 10)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 37)
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 3)
Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts. 4, 7, 10)
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (art. 31)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 5)
69
Figure 33: Preeminent International Instruments regarding Torture protection
Universal Regional National
Humanitarian soft law
Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Human Rights Committee,
Committee against Torture, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Charter, Human Rights Universal Declaration
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, American
Convention on Human Rights, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Arab Charter on
Human Rights (art. 8), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam, Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture
Penal Code and 1958 French Constitution
Humanitarian hard law
Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, UNCAT, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OP-CAT), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence against Women, Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principles on
the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly
Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Inter-
American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture
Penal Code and 1958 French Constitution
Legal / Penal International Criminal Court
European Court of Human Rights, Inter-american court of Human
Rights, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
Penal Code
70
71
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73
74
Figure 44: UN Proposed indicators for UNSDG Goal 16 (UNGA A/RES/71/313, 2017)
UNSDG Goal 16 Targets UNSDG Goal 16 Indicators
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related
death rates everywhere
16.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age
16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause
16.1.3 Proportion of population subjected to (a) physical violence, (b) psychological violence and (c) sexual violence in the previous 12 months
16.1.4 Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of
children
16.2.1 Proportion of children aged 1–17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month
16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation
16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access
to justice for all
16.3.1 Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict
resolution mechanisms
16.3.2 Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and
combat all forms of organized crime
16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)
16.4.2 Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with
international instruments
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public
officials, during the previous 12 months
16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public
officials during the previous 12 months
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)
16.6.2 Proportion of population satisfied with their last experience of public services
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
16.7.1 Proportions of positions in national and local institutions, including (a) the legislatures; (b) the public service; and (c) the judiciary, compared to national
distributions, by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups
16.7.2 Proportion of population who believe decisionmaking is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of
global governance
16.8.1 Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
16.9.1 Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance
with national legislation and international agreements
16.10.1 Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade
unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months
16.10.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation,
for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to
prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
16.a.1 Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles
16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development
16.b.1 Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of
discrimination prohibited under international human rights law
75
76
Figure 46: Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prision population (UN Data, 2019)
Country 2005 2016
"Afghanistan" 81 31.29
"Albania" 26.56 49.99
"Algeria" 35.46 7.68
"Antigua and Barbuda" 27.01 44.34
"Argentina" 57.58 50.89
"Armenia" 28.13 29.58
"Australia" 20.43 27.79
"Austria" 23.25 20.8
"Azerbaijan" 12.05 18.12
"Andorra" 24.59 61.7
"Angola" 63.69 45.76
"Japan" 15.01 11.32
"Bahamas" 22.53 38.42
"Bangladesh" 63.96 75.84
"Belarus" 18.91 14.3
"Belgium" 38.13 26.53
"Belize" 5.58 54.88
"Bolivia (Plurinational State of)" 73.33 66.76
"Bosnia and Herzegovina" 18 13.57
"Botswana" 52.95 23.98
"Brazil" 31.17 39.57
"Brunei Darussalam" 7.18 6.9
"Bulgaria" 18.31 8.6
"Burkina Faso" 47.37 46.64
"Burundi" 64.89 52.3
"Cambodia" 32.59 49.29
"Cameroon" 76.15 59
"Jersey" 28.82 26.43
"Jordan" 47.93 41.52
"Kazakhstan" 15.57 14.56
"Kenya" 49.93 39.89
"Kiribati" 2.58 5.29
"Kosovo" 38.57 27.41
"Canada" 29.14 36.36
"Cayman Islands" 24.47 30.11
"Chile" 37.23 26.97
"China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region"
11.46 18.78
"China, Macao Special Administrative Region"
26.42 20.28
"Colombia" 41.07 33.53
"Kuwait" 9.72 7.14
"Kyrgyzstan" 16.18 18.92
"Latvia" 39.02 31.22
77
"Cook Islands" 3.7 21.62
"Costa Rica" 20.09 19.61
"Croatia" 31.4 22.63
"Cyprus" 16.96 19.56
"Czechia" 16.83 9.76
"Denmark" 27.89 28.63
"Dominica" 21.03 22.83
"Dominican Republic" 62.02 52.89
"Ecuador" 63.07 39.6
"El Salvador" 28.77 23.88
"Estonia" 25.64 24.11
"Faroe Islands" 26.09 22.18
"Fiji" 8.65 23.13
"Finland" 13.27 19.21
"France" 36.55 27.02
"Georgia" 54.19 13.35
"Germany" 23.71 21.71
"Ghana" 30.61 12.79
"Gibraltar" 54.8 26.8
"Greece" 29.75 25.28
"Greenland" 8.11 22.57
"Grenada" 19.57 17.73
"Guam" 43.51 59.47
"Guatemala" 46.04 50.11
"Lebanon" 99.04 55.57
"Lesotho" 18.99 19.49
"Libya" 68.54 90.01
"Guernsey" 22.58 25.27
"Guyana" 33.24 37.69
"Haiti" 106.89 72.79
"Honduras" 65.35 54.73
"Hungary" 24.56 22.72
"Iceland" 10.2 16.55
"India" 67.9 67.31
"Indonesia" 46.65 36.05
"Ireland" 15.79 14.86
"Isle of Man" 31.37 21.05
"Israel" 22.37 25.23
"Italy" 37.1 18.22
"Jamaica" 14.08 22.35
"Timor-Leste" 64.69 24.78
"Tonga" 2.58 7.39
"Liechtenstein" 16.92 46.07
"Lithuania" 15.51 9.57
"Luxembourg" 43.24 47.08
78
"Trinidad and Tobago" 40.88 66.03
"Turkey" 52.98 14.33
"Uganda" 60.7 54.19
"Ukraine" 12.09 26.82
"United Arab Emirates" 41.2 38.21
"United Kingdom (England and Wales)" 10.61 9.2
"Madagascar" 88.76 53.2
"Malawi" 30.39 16.13
"Malaysia" 33.77 26.48
"United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)" 32.71 24.35
"United Kingdom (Scotland)" 18.33 19.12
"United Republic of Tanzania" 57.03 50.15
"United States of America" 22.13 21.53
"Uruguay" 84.5 67.5
"Vanuatu" 22.51 10
"Malta" 27.82 22.95
"Mauritius" 35.91 38.79
"Mexico" 42.11 45.12
"Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)" 48.28 62.43
"Zambia" 44.61 34.65
"Zimbabwe" 30.22 17.74
"Monaco" 40.86 33.85
"Mongolia" 18.77 16.02
"Montenegro" 36.2 25.11
"Morocco" 51.79 41.91
"Mozambique" 75.32 32.31
"Netherlands" 38.03 24.68
"New Zealand" 18.43 13.58
"Nigeria" 72.72 66.29
"North Macedonia" 10.09 10.7
"Norway" 19.04 24.74
"Other non-specified areas" 10.88 5.16
"Pakistan" 57.78 69.34
"Panama" 58.31 61.47
"Papua New Guinea" 31.26 38.99
"Paraguay" 72.41 74.99
"Peru" 69.71 48.46
"Philippines" 66.74 60.02
"Poland" 19.26 7.29
"Portugal" 23.96 15.89
"Republic of Korea" 34.19 35.55
"Republic of Moldova" 22.82 21.22
"Romania" 15.28 5.43
"Russian Federation" 19.39 18.08
"Saint Kitts and Nevis" 29.23 24.19
79
"Saint Lucia" 33.85 48.49
"Saint Vincent and the Grenadines" 76.24 23.3
"Sao Tome and Principe" 46.45 2.25
"Senegal" 8.26 48.56
"Serbia" 30.31 15.67
"Sierra Leone" 14.9 53.42
"Singapore" 4.1 10.59
"Slovakia" 32.75 13.71
"Slovenia" 24.76 8.54
"Solomon Islands" 35.44 60.04
"South Africa" 26.47 28.28
"Spain" 22.15 13.04
"Sri Lanka" 291.77 51.85
"Sweden" 20.69 25.15
"Switzerland" 37.68 42.59
"Thailand" 24.62 19.9
80
81
82
83
PHOTOGRAPHIES
Picture 1: Grafiti in Marché Neuf Street near Pont Neuf Bridge in Paris
tagged with the words “Here we drown Algerians” referring to the
Paris Massacre of 17 October 1961 where dozens of Algerian
Protestors were thrown (Jean Taxier)
Picture 2: Algerian workers demonstrations of 17 October 1961 in
Paris (Rofer-Viollet)
Picture 4: Wounded emonstrator during the protests of 17 October
1961 in Nanterre (Elie Kagan)
Picture 5: Wounded demonstrator during the protests of 17 October
1961 in Nanterre (Elie Kagan)
Picture 3: Maurice Papon (Second on the left), Prêfet de Police de Paris
in October 1961 (Bibliothèque de documentation international
contemporaine)
Picture 6: Demonstors being registered after 17 October 1961
demonstrations in Paris, Concorde Metro Station (Bibliothèque de
documentation international contemporaine)
84
Picture 7: Algerian women trying to enter to La Santé prison in Paris
to see their relatives jailed after 17 October 1961 protests
(Bibliothèque de documentation international contemporaine)
Picture 11: Chopped heads of Algerian civilians by the FLN that
allegedly seeked harmony with french settlers, 28 May 1956 (Source:
https://la-guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
Picture 8: Said ould laid, algerian civilian that refused to stop working
for an European business dead after being tortured by the FLN, 26
January 1957 (Source: https://la-guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
Picture 10: Maurice Feignon, French Medical aide dead with signals
on his skin of being tortured with boiling liquid and incandescent iron
by the FLN, aftermath of 18 May 1956 Palestro Massacre (Source:
https://la-guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
Picture 9: Dead civilians in the aftermath of the May 1957 massacre in
Melouza perpetrated by the FLN (Source: https://la-guerre-en-
image.forumactif.org)
Picture 12: Gonzague Heffner mutilated by the FLN the 1st January
1956 (Source: http://tenes.info/nostalgie/A1)
85
Picture 13: Sequence of pictures showing the alleged execution of a
civilian by a French Army Officer using the fuyard abattu technique
(Source: https://la-guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
Picture 15: Sequence of pictures showing the alleged execution of a
civilian by a French Army Officer (Source: https://la-guerre-en-
image.forumactif.org)
Picture 16: Young boy with evidences of being tortured in the
aftermath of 20 August 1955 El Halia massacre (Source: https://la-
guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
Picture 17: Young girl with evidences of being tortured after FLN
massacred her family, May 1956 (Source: https://la-guerre-en-
image.forumactif.org)
Picture 14: human remainings of Gasmi Bachir, postman, after being tortured by FLN in Douar for refusing to abandon his job (Source:
https://la-guerre-en-image.forumactif.org)
86
Picture 18: Unknown muslim civlian tortured by the FLN during the
massive killings in Larba (Source: http://www.algerie-française.org)
Picture 19: Benmrah Bouhassoun and Beneli Mohamed after being tortured by the FLN in Remchi, 27 May 1956 (Source:
http://www.algerie-francaise.org)
Picture 21: Tortured body of Caporal Couvreur after being captured by
the FLN (Source: http://www.algerie-française.org)
Picture 22: Young girl with torture signs in the aftermath of the 20
August 1955 El Halia massacre (Source: http://www.algerie- francaise.org)
Picture 23: unknown Harki tortured by the FLN (Source:
http://www.algerie-francaise.org)
Picture 20: FLN militant hanging while tortured in a French Army
prison, 1957 (Source: http://www.memoria.dz)
87
Picture 24: man in the aftermath of being tortured by the FLN,
unkwown date (Source: http://www.algerie-française.org)
Picture 27: political poster (Source: http://www.algerie-française.org)
Picture 25: FLN fighter arrested by the French Army, date and place
unknown (Source: http://www.tv5monde.com)
Picture 28: FLN fighter captured by the French Army, date and place
unknwon (Source: http://www.tv5monde.com)
Picture 29: FLN fighter Omar Merouane being questioned by French
Army Airborne, 14 March 1957 (AFP/J.Grevin)
Picture 26: French Army troops in Algiers during the 1957 Battle
(Source: https://contropiano.org)
88
Picture 30: FLN fighter Djamila Boupacha arrested by the French Army during the Algiers Battle 1957 (Source: http://www.histoire-en-
questions.fr)
Picture 31: suspected FLN militants being searched by the French
Army during the Algiers Battle (Source: http://www.histoire-en-
questions.fr)
Picture 33: alleged FLN fighters captured by French Army officers,
unknown date and place (Bibliothèque de documentation international
contemporaine)
Picture 34: massive civilian massacres, unknown place and date
(Source: http://www.histoire-en-questions.fr)
Picture 35: display by French Army officers of executing method corvée de bois where the executed had to dig its own grave (Source:
http://www.histoire-en-questions.fr)
Picture 32: Demonstrators in Paris during the 17 October 1961 protests
(Bibliothèque de documentation international contemporaine)
89
Picture 36: French Army officers searching for an alleged FLN militant
near to Algiers, date unknown (Source: http://www.histoire-en-
questions.fr)
Picture 39: Tucker Telephone electricity generator known as gégène
(Source: Google Images)
Picture 37: Territorial administrative organization of Algeria used by the
FLN during the Independence War (Beckett and Pimlott, 2011:61)
Picture 38: Military administrative division of Algeria used by the
French military authorities (Branche, 2016:32)
Picture 40: Military administrative division of Algiers used by the
French military authorities (Branche, 2016:164)
Picture 41: French military operations in Algeria (Pervillé et Marin,
2011:38)
90
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