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Commerce Affected. London Is Almost 3 Times Larger Than the Next Largest U.S. – Transatlantic Market, and Is Bigger Than the Next 3 Largest Markets Combined. Exhibit NW-1. Times London Larger. O&D Traffic. London (LHR/LGW) Paris (CDG) Frankfurt Amsterdam Zurich Munich Brussels Vienna - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Commerce Affected
London Is Almost 3 Times Larger Than the Next Largest U.S. – Transatlantic Market, and Is Bigger Than the Next 3 Largest Markets Combined
London (LHR/LGW)Paris (CDG)FrankfurtAmsterdamZurichMunichBrusselsViennaCopenhagen
9,379,7543,378,9412,971,6761,937,3871,153,6981,144,083
866,883489,866420,005
--2.83.24.88.18.2
10.819.122.3
O&D TrafficTimes
LondonLarger
Exhibit NW-1
Source: Based on MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
The U.S. – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Larger Than the Entire U.S. – Germany Market and the Entire U.S. – France Market
6.8 Million
9.4 Million
4.4 Million
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
U.S. - London U.S. – Germany U.S. - France
Mill
ions
of
Annual Pass
engers
Exhibit NW-2
Source: Based on MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
409 402 378
182 162
692
1,475
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
JFK LAX ORD BOS EWR MIA DFW
The Seven Nonstop Overlap U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Markets Represent 60.7% of U.S. – Heathrow Annual Passengers
U.S. – London Heathrow Total Passengers 6,096,9637 Overlap Markets 3,699,495 *Percent of Total 60.7%
U.S. – London Heathrow Total Passengers 6,096,9637 Overlap Markets 3,699,495 *Percent of Total 60.7%
Pass
engers
Per
Year
(00
0)
Source: Based on MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
* DFW – London Service, since DFW does not have nonstop Heathrow service.
*
Exhibit NW-3
The Seven Nonstop Overlap U.S. – London Heathrow* (LHR) Markets Account for Almost $3.9 Billion and Represent 74.7% Total Annual U.S. – Heathrow Revenues Per Year
Revenue P
er
Year
($ M
illio
ns)
179182313
421465
738
1,565
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
JFK LAX ORD EWR BOS MIA DFW
Source: DOT O&D Survey Year End 2000; MIDT: True O&D Bookings Data, Year Ended April 2001
U.S. – Heathrow Revenue ($mil) Total Revenue 5,2037 Overlap Markets 3,886 **Percent of Total 74.7%
U.S. – Heathrow Revenue ($mil) Total Revenue 5,2037 Overlap Markets 3,886 **Percent of Total 74.7%
*
* DFW – London Service, since DFW does not have nonstop Heathrow service.** Individual market revenues do not tie to the 7 overlap market total due to
rounding.
Exhibit NW-4
The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Markets Are 12 Times Larger Than The Overlap Routes Analyzed in the United (UA)/Lufthansa (LH) Antitrust Immunity Application
0.3 Million
3.7 Million
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
UA/LH
Mill
ions
of
Pass
engers
AA/BA
* Includes DFW – Gatwick Service, since DFW does not have Heathrow service.
*
Exhibit NW-5
Source: Based on MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Routes Are Twice As Large As the United (UA)/US Airways (US) Nonstop Overlap Routes That Prompted a DOJ Announced Court Challenge
$1.9 Billion
$3.9 Billion
$0.0
$1.0
$2.0
$3.0
$4.0
UA/US **AA/BA *
$ B
illio
ns
* DOT O&D Survey 2000; MIDT: True O&D Bookings Data, Year Ended April 2001** DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2001
Exhibit NW-6
The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Routes Are Over Ten Times Larger Than the Northwest (NW)/Continental (CO) Routes That Prompted a DOJ Court Challenge
$350 Million
$3.9 Billion
$0.0
$1.0
$2.0
$3.0
$4.0
NW/CO **AA/BA *
$ B
illio
ns
* DOT O&D Survey 2000; MIDT: True O&D Bookings Data, Year Ended April 2001** DOJ Press Release, October 23, 1998
Exhibit NW-7
Heathrow Preference
Based on DOT Data, Different Passenger Mix at LHR versus LGW Results in Average Round Trip Fares Between the U.S. and London That Are 31% Higher at Heathrow Than at Gatwick
$650
$497
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
London Heathrow
Avera
ge F
are
$
Source: DOT O&D Survey 2000
London Gatwick
Exhibit NW-8
According to British Airways, Its Unit Revenues for London Heathrow (LHR) Services Are 15% Higher Than Unit Revenues at Gatwick (LGW)
“Where does the value come from for the shareholder from this new strategy? On the longhaul side, the value comes from having a higher proportion of our network at Heathrow, where we make of the order of 15% higher unit revenues.”
-- Robert Boyle, British Airways General Manager Network Planning, British Airways Investors Day, Network, page 14.
Exhibit NW-9
Virtually No U.S. – London Traffic Connects Over Other European Gateways
Source: MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
London Gatwick
London Heathrow
Frankfurt
Paris (CDG)
Brussels
Amsterdam
Zurich
Munich
Vienna
Copenhagen
3,412,635
5,967,119
2,971,676
3,378,941
866,883
1,937,387
1,153,698
1,144,083
489,866
420,005
0%
3%
10%
11%
17%
17%
21%
40%
65%
66%
O&D Passengers
Percent ConnectingOver Other
European PointU.S.-European Point
Exhibit NW-10
Connecting Service to London Heathrow (LHR) via Other European Gateways Imposes a Substantial Time Penalty on U.S. – Heathrow Passengers
Connections to London HeathrowNew York
(JFK)New York
(EWR)Boston (BOS)
Chicago (ORD)
Miami (MIA)
Los Angeles (LAX)
6:40 6:40 6:25 7:30 8:30 10:15Via Amsterdam AMS Connect Time 9:40 9:35 9:15 10:10 11:00 15:55
Hours More Than NS 3:00 2:55 2:50 2:40 2:30 5:40% Increase 45% 44% 44% 36% 29% 55%
Via Brussels BRU Connect Time 10:55 10:50 10:15 11:50 14:10 18:40Hours More Than NS 4:15 4:10 3:50 4:20 5:40 8:25% Increase 64% 63% 60% 58% 67% 82%
Via Paris CDG Connect Time 9:15 8:55 9:00 10:15 11:00 13:10Hours More Than NS 2:35 2:15 2:35 2:45 2:30 2:55% Increase 39% 34% 40% 37% 29% 28%
Via Frankfurt FRA Connect Time 10:25 10:00 10:05 11:15 11:20 13:10Hours More Than NS 3:45 3:20 3:40 3:45 2:50 2:55% Increase 56% 50% 57% 50% 33% 28%
Via Zurich ZRH Connect Time 10:15 10:45 9:55 12:00 13:35 14:00Hours More Than NS 3:35 4:05 3:30 4:30 5:05 3:45% Increase 54% 61% 55% 60% 60% 37%
Via Munich MUC Connect Time 12:25 10:15 13:25 12:40 13:15 15:45Hours More Than NS 5:45 3:35 7:00 5:10 4:45 5:30% Increase 86% 54% 109% 69% 56% 54%
Via Vienna VIE Connect Time 12:35 12:35 14:05 13:20 16:55 13:10Hours More Than NS 5:55 5:55 7:40 5:50 8:25 2:55% Increase 89% 89% 119% 78% 99% 28%
Via Copenhagen CPH Connect Time 10:35 10:50 13:05 11:45 15:35 17:45Hours More Than NS 3:55 4:10 6:40 4:15 7:05 7:30% Increase 59% 63% 104% 57% 83% 73%
Nonstop (NS) to London Heathrow
*
*
*
*
**
*
* Connection times had to be manually constructed – each trip required three stops
Source: Official Airline Guide, September 2001
Exhibit NW-11
Market Power
2,0401,800
3,327
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
240 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
240 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,287 HHI points – 12 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,287 HHI points – 12 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated ThresholdAfter Merger AA/BA Control 53.5%
of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the U.S. – London (LHR/LGW) Market
U.S. - London (LHR/LGW)Frequencies
The Overall U.S. – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 12 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
231 (W.F.) 409 (W.F.)
125 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 765
Exhibit NW-12
2,659
1,800
4,388
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
859 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
859 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,729 HHI points – 17 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,729 HHI points – 17 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 61.0% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Market
U.S. - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The Overall U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 17 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
112 (W.F.)305 (W.F.)
83 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 500Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-13
2,691
1,800
4,831
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
891 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
891 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 2,140 HHI points – 21 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 2,140 HHI points – 21 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 66.7% of
the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the New York (JFK) – London (LHR/LGW)
Market
New York (JFK) - London (LHR/LGW)Frequencies
The New York (JFK) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 21 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
31 (W.F.)
104 (W.F.)21(W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 156Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-14
2,581
1,800
4,662
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
781 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
781 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 2,081 HHI points – 20 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 2,081 HHI points – 20 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 65.1% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the New York (JFK) – London Heathrow (LHR)
Market
New York (JFK) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The New York (JFK) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 20 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
97 (W.F.)21(W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 149
31 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-15
2,323
1,800
3,980
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
523 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
523 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,657 HHI points – 16 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,657 HHI points – 16 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 59.0% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the New York (JFK/EWR) – London (LHR/LGW)
Market
New York (JFK/EWR) - London (LHR/LGW)Frequencies
The New York (JFK/EWR) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 16 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
125 (W.F.)42
(W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 212
45 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-16
2,596
1,800
4,593
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
796 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
796 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,997 HHI points – almost 20 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,997 HHI points – almost 20 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 64.1% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
New York (JFK/EWR) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market
New York (JFK/EWR) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The New York (JFK/EWR) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration Almost 20 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
118 (W.F.)28
(W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 184
38 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-17
2,500
1,800
4,375
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
700 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
700 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,875 HHI points – 18 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,875 HHI points – 18 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 62.5% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
Boston (BOS) – London (LHR/LGW) Market
Boston (BOS) - London (LHR/LGW)Frequencies
The Boston (BOS) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 18 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
35 (W.F.)14 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 56
7 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-18
3,889
1,800
7,222
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
2,089 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
2,089 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 3,333 HHI points – 33 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 3,333 HHI points – 33 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 83.3% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the Boston (BOS) – London Heathrow (LHR)
Market
Boston (BOS) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The Boston (BOS) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 33 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
Other U.S.
16.7%
AA/BA83.3%
35 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 42
7 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-19
3,000
1,800
4,531
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
1,200 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
1,200 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 1,531 HHI points – 15 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 1,531 HHI points – 15 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 61.3% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
Chicago (ORD) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market
Chicago (ORD) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The Chicago (ORD) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 15 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
AA/BA61.3%
Other U.S.
26.3%
Other Foreign12.5%
49 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 80
21 (W.F.)
10(W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-20
3,750
1,800
6,250
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
1,950 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
1,950 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 2,500 HHI points – 25 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 2,500 HHI points – 25 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 75.0% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
Miami (MIA) – London (LHR/LGW) Market
Miami (MIA) - London (LHR/LGW)Frequencies
The Miami (MIA) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 25 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
21 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 28
7 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-21
5,556
1,800
10,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
3,756 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
3,756 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 4,444 HHI points – 44 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 4,444 HHI points – 44 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 100% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the Miami (MIA) – London Heathrow (LHR)
Market
Miami (MIA) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The Miami (MIA) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 44 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
21 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 21Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-22
5,556
1,800
10,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
3,756 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
3,756 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 4,444 HHI points – 44 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 4,444 HHI points – 44 times the
DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
After Merger AA/BA Control 100% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) – London Gatwick (LGW) Market
Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) - London Gatwick (LGW)* Frequencies
The Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) – London Gatwick (LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 44 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
* London Gatwick is used because Bermuda 2 restricts nonstop service to Gatwick
21 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 21Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-23
2,188
1,800
2,813
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
HH
I In
dex o
f Fr
eq
uen
cies
388 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
388 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 625 HHI points –
6 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 625 HHI points –
6 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold After Merger AA/BA Control 37.5% of the Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) in the
Los Angeles (LAX) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market
Los Angeles (LAX) - London Heathrow (LHR)Frequencies
The Los Angeles (LAX) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 6 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
AA/BA37.5%
Other U.S.
25.0%
Other Foreign37.5%
21 (W.F.)
Total Weekly Frequencies = 56
21 (W.F.)
14 (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
Exhibit NW-24
Heathrow Slots
New Entrant Heathrow Carriers Will Be Unable to Obtain Slots
First Obstacle: Slot Trades and Purchases may be Banned by the EU
“The draft [EU] Regulation . . . will have the effect of preventing carriers from obtaining slots from incumbent carriers except through the total or partial take-over of the carrier.”
-- ACL Response at 3. “The European Commission has published a proposal to amend EU Regulation 95/93 which currently governs slot allocation. . . BAA has significant concerns about several key elements of the draft new regulation.
• The amendment of the ‘new entrant’ provision which would reduce the opportunities for
new US carriers to benefit from this form of priority at Heathrow;
• The prevention of certain forms of slot trading which currently take place, making it more difficult for airlines to set up new services”
-- BAA Paper on Issues & Principles at 8.
Second Obstacle: Even if Slot Trading were legal, there are no slots to be had
“In ACL's professional judgment, the opportunities to accommodate new entrant US carriers from the allocation of pool slots in the first two seasons are extremely limited.”
“It may be possible to accommodate up to one daily service at timings similar to Continental's daylight Newark-Gatwick service, with arrivals in the late evening and departures mid-afternoon the next day.”
“There is also scope to offer 1-2 morning rotations (ie, pairs of arrival and departure slots) of [sic] on some days of the week, principally the weekends. However, in ACL's experience new entrant US carriers are unlikely to be willing to operate on a less than daily basis.”
“In general, it is ACL's observation that there is a general unwillingness on the part of incumbent Heathrow carriers to divest of slots and the market is illiquid.”
-- ACL Response at 5.
Exhibit NW-25
“It is important to understand, however, that a slot is not just about an allocation of a time on a runway. In order to operate that runway slot (either arrivals or departures) an airline must also be allocated capacity within a given terminal building (Heathrow has four terminals and Gatwick has two terminals). Furthermore, at Heathrow, the coordinator must ensure that the combination of airline schedules does not exceed the declared aircraft parking capacity. An airline will not be granted a slot unless it can operate within the terminal and aircraft parking capacity constraints.”
-- BAA Paper on Issues & Principles at 2.
“Increasingly, in addition to the ongoing impact of the runway constraint, the aircraft parking stand constraint is affecting airlines’ ability to add new services. The effect of liberalisation at Heathrow will be an increase in the proportion of long-haul services and therefore an increase in the proportion of services with larger aircraft. Unless there are enough large stands available in the peak periods to cope with this change in aircraft size, new services will either not be able to operate or will have to operate with smaller, less appropriate, aircraft.”
-- BAA Paper on Issues & Principles at 3.
“Heathrow’s schedules are co-ordinated according to three formal constraints: runway, terminal capacity and stand capacity. Aside from runway capacity, aircraft stands are currently the most restraining factor, particularly for wide-bodied aircraft. Terminal capacity is based on the capacities on all facilities involved in processing passengers and / or baggage. The following are the major constricting factors within the terminal operation:
Check-in desks (See response to Q13)SecurityImmigrationBaggage ReclaimArrivals Concourse”
-- Response from BAA plc at 6.
“It is conceivable that some new entrant airlines may receive a slot, from the pool, from inter-alliance transfers or through trading but the BAA would be unable to quickly provide the range and quality of facilities that an airline might need.”
-- ACL Response at 9.
Even If a New Entrant Heathrow Carrier Could Obtain a “Runway Slot,” It Would Face Severe Obstacles in Obtaining a Suitable “Stand” at Which to Load and Unload Its Passengers
Exhibit NW-26
“To convert slots currently being used for narrow-bodied aircraft to wide-bodied, all airport facilities used in the passenger and baggage processes would need to be considered. The chosen terminal of operation for the wide-body slots will also have an impact. If the wide-bodied slots are to be operated in the same terminal as the narrow-body service was being operated, then the need for additional capacity will be less than that if the slots are operated in a different terminal. The main areas requiring consideration are:
“Stand availability – This is dependent on the terminal of operation for the new wide-body service. Terminals 1 and 2 only have a limited number of pier-served stands suitable for use by wide-bodied aircraft of 777 or equivalent size. Terminal 3 does have some spare capacity for larger aircraft, but the cumulative total stand demand during the peak is already approaching capacity at peak hours of the day. Stand capacity at Terminal 4 [where KLM operates] is a major constraint and is already at or close to maximum levels for the larger aircraft categories (B777 / 747) for peak morning hours. Additional wide-bodied aircraft (B777 / 747) could only be managed in if other services relocated to another terminal.”
-- Response from BAA plc at 4.
There Are Virtually No Additional Stands Available at Heathrow That Are Suitable for Wide Body Operations
Exhibit NW-27
Stand availability - See Exhibit NW-27
1.“Check-in desks – Additional desks would be required for a longer period of time to convert slots from use by narrow-bodied aircraft to wide-bodied aircraft on long haul routes. For example, if the aircraft type changed from a BAE146 to a B777-200, the check-in desk requirement would increase from two to seven (including two premium desks) and would need to be open for four hours instead of three. Seven additional desks would be required if the new transatlantic carrier operated in a different terminal. An airline receiving a slot does not gain rights to specific check-in desks; these must be negotiated with the handler or airport operator.”
2.“Baggage Belt Capacity – For departures and connections baggage, delivery and sortation systems are allocated in conjunction with check-in desks and, as with check-in desks, would be required for longer periods if being used for a wide-bodied aircraft.”
3.“Baggage Handling Equipment and Make-up Area – Narrow-bodied aircraft are traditionally ‘loose loaded’ and therefore require less equipment to facilitate their baggage handling. Wide-bodied aircraft are generally loaded using containers and require additional equipment and storage facilities. Any handling agent at Heathrow handling new transatlantic services will require additional equipment as these services will be operating during peak hours, and also additional space within the baggage hall and storage area, both of which are currently already a concern in all terminals.”
4.“Gaterooms – Gaterooms are allocated in conjunction with stands so are appropriately sized for the respective stand size. The majority of gaterooms in Terminals 1 and 2, which service predominantly short haul operations, are not sufficiently sized to facilitate wider bodied aircraft and will hence be an added restriction.”
5.“Immigration – A change to wide-bodied aircraft will require increased staffing by Immigration Officers, and possibly additional desks depending on the number of services arriving simultaneously. The provision of Immigration Officers is the responsibility of the UK Immigration Service.”
6.“Baggage Reclaim – Capacity assessments of baggage reclaim areas are dependent on the number of bags per passenger, and the percentage of transfer passengers for a given terminal. Hence if the mix of traffic was changed, the length of individual belts may not be sufficient to manage a wide bodied transatlantic service (particularly in Terminals 1 and 2), and additional belts may be required to service an increased number of operations in a specific terminal.”
7.“Arrival Concourse Space – The arrivals concourses in Heathrow’s four terminals are already operating at capacity at peak hours and so new services will cause added congestion, particularly if the slots have previously been operated in a different terminal.”
-- Response from BAA plc at 4-5.
Even If Runway Slots and Stands Were Available for New Entrant Wide Body Operations, the Scarcity of SEVEN Other Essential Heathrow Facilities and the Unlikelihood of Assembling All Seven at the Same Time and Same Terminal Make New Entry at Heathrow a Practical Impossibility
Exhibit NW-28
“Growth Prospects” “BAA expects only a few additional slots to be created at Heathrow, a small amount of which are expected in the hours that transatlantic flights are currently being operated. In addition, the new slots are likely to be departure slots and are unlikely to have accompanying arrival slots which would be required to make new services viable. . . The substantial majority of these increases have been in off-peak periods.”
-- Response from BAA plc at 8. “[U]ntil Heathrow’s Terminal 5 is approved, built and opened, [Autumn 2007 at the earliest] there is relatively little that can be done to relieve the aircraft parking and terminal capacity constraints.”
-- BAA Paper on Issues & Principles at 4.
Frozen Entry Conditions at Heathrow Are Likely to Persist for at Least the Next Six Years
Exhibit NW-29
To Be Commercially Viable in the U.S. – London Market, U.S. Carriers Require Access to Slots Within Specified Time Windows
010002000300040005000600070008000900100011001200130014001500160017001800190020002100220023002400
Commercially Viable Arrival SlotsCommercially Viable Departure Slots
Source: Official Airline Guide – July 2001
88.2% of slots usedby non-Heathrow U.S. carriers fall inside discrete Arrival and Departure windows
05:00-10:59
10:00-15:59
Exhibit NW-30
After the Merger, American Airlines/British Airways Would Control 41.5% of Heathrow’s Commercially Viable Slots
1,875 Slots 1,399
Slots
98 Slots
Total Commercially Viable Slots = 3,372(Arrivals 05:00 – 10:59; Departures 10:00 –
15:59)
Source: Exhibit NW-30; Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Exhibit NW-31
London Heathrow’s (LHR) Commercially Viable Slots are Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 2 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power
1,9981,800
2,203
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000H
HI In
dex o
f C
om
merc
ially
Via
ble
Slo
ts
198 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
198 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 205 HHI points –
2 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 205 HHI points –
2 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
London Heathrow (LHR) Commercially Viable SlotsArrivals (05:00-10:59) and Departures (10:00-15:59) – Summer 2001
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated
Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration(AA/BA only)Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Exhibit NW-32
After Both Alliances, American Airlines/British Airways and United Airlines/British Midland Would Control 58.2% of Heathrow’s Commercially Viable Slots
Total Commercially Viable Slots = 3,372
Total Commercially Viable Slots = 3,372
1,399Slots 563
Slots
1,325Slots
85 Slots
Commercially Viable Heathrow Slots
for Services to the United States
Commercially Viable Heathrow Slots
for Services to the United States
AA/BA
UA/BD
Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Exhibit NW-33
American Airlines, British Airways, and United Already Control 83.4% of All U.S. – Heathrow Weekly Frequencies (W.F.)
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001
AA/BA+UA = 83.4%
Total Weekly Frequencies = 500
Exhibit NW-34
London Heathrow’s (LHR) Commercially Viable Slots are Already Highly Concentrated. Simultaneous Creation of an AA/BA Alliance and a UA/BD Alliance Would Produce a Greater Increase in Concentration – Almost 3 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power – Than an AA/BA Alliance Alone
1,9981,800
2,283
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000H
HI In
dex o
f C
om
merc
ially
Via
ble
Slo
ts
198 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
198 HHI points overhighly concentrated
threshold
Increase of 285 HHI points –
Almost 3 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Increase of 285 HHI points –
Almost 3 times the DOJ 100 point threshold
Highly Concentrated Threshold
London Heathrow (LHR) Commercially Viable SlotsArrivals (05:00-10:59) and Departures (10:00-15:59) – Summer 2001
DOJ Definition of Highly Concentrated
Market
Pre-Merger Concentration
Post-Merger Concentration
(AA/BA + UA/BD)Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Exhibit NW-35
KLM Cannot and Will Not Make Any of Its Heathrow Slots Available to Northwest Airlines
“2. . . . KLM wishes to make it clear from the outset, that the idea of a transfer of KLM-slots to Northwest, once Northwest has been given access to Heathrow, is an academic option only.”
“3. First, it is highly debatable whether a legally acceptable ‘modus’ can be found under which such a transfer could be justified.”
“4. In addition, any slot divestiture by KLM in favour of its partner Northwest would compromise directly and immediately KLM’s competitive position in the UK market vis-à-vis British Airways and other carriers at Heathrow; it would, furthermore, strengthen the relative position of the BA-AA alliance in its home market, thus causing an effect that is opposite to what would be envisaged by slot divestiture in the first place.”
“5. It is KLM’s opinion, therefore, that any access given to additional or -- in the case of an Open Skies agreement between the UK and the US -- to all US carriers must be accompanied by the making available of slots to these carriers without the rights of carriers from other EU or third countries being affected.”
Exhibit NW-36
Even If KLM Were Willing and Able to Provide Northwest With Heathrow Slots, It Does Not Possess Sufficient Commercially Viable Slots, Stands and Terminal Areas to Fund Even One Daily Round Trip
17
33
21
12
0
3849
21
49
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Total Commercially Viable KLM Slots
42
98
29
Slots Used for Amsterdam
Hub
Slots Used for Eindhoven and Rotterdam
Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Not available to NW because:
•Slots are an essential part of KLM’s Hub Operation
•Use stands too small for NW wide body aircraft
Not available to NW because:
•Slots are an essential part of KLM’s Hub Operation
•Use stands too small for NW wide body aircraft
• All slots are used by Turboprops*
• All slots fly into Terminal 4
• There are no large aircraft stands available at commercially viable times at terminal 4
*one slot on Sunday uses an A737-300
• All slots are used by Turboprops*
• All slots fly into Terminal 4
• There are no large aircraft stands available at commercially viable times at terminal 4
*one slot on Sunday uses an A737-300
DeparturesArrivals
71
NWA Requireme
nt for 7 Daily
Round Trips
Eindhoven andRotterdam Slots With Stands and
Terminal Space
ThereforeIt is not possible for NW
to obtain any commercially viable slots
ThereforeIt is not possible for NW
to obtain any commercially viable slots
Com
merc
ially
Via
ble
S
lots
Exhibit NW-37
The Vast Majority of Commercially Viable Heathrow Slots – 77.9% – Are Under the Control of Airlines and Airline Groups That Will Be Unable or Unwilling to Make Them Available to Non-Incumbent U.S. Air Carriers
Total Commercially Viable Slots = 3,372
Total Commercially Viable Slots = 3,372
1,399Slots
563Slots
745Slots
386 Slots
194
Slot
s
Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Oneworld
STAR
Non-Oneworld or STAR
85 Slots Virgin
Only 745 Commercially Viable Slots – 22.1% of the Total – Are Even Theoretically Available for New Entrant U.S. Carriers
Exhibit NW-38
014141432 17
528
745
126
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Although 745 Weekly Slots Are Theoretically Available for Acquisition by New Entrant U.S. Airlines, After Oneworld, Star and Virgin Are Removed, Realistically There Are NO Weekly Slots Available for Acquisition by Any U.S. Carrier
Slots used by Narrow Body Jets, RJs, and
Turboprops
Carriers Do Not Possess Enough Slots
for Even 1 Daily Round
Trip per Week
Source: Airport Coordination Limited – April 2001
Theoretical Commercially Viable Slots -
BEFORE Practical
Reductions*
KLM (Amsterdam
)
Air India (Bombay -
12JFK – 14ORD – 6)
BWIA (Port of Spain,
Trinidad)
Emirates Air
(Dubai)
Aeroflot (Moscow)
Theoretical Commercially Viable Slots
-AFTER Realistic
Reductions
It is Impossible for a U.S. Carrier to Compete with AA/BA Without
Access to London Heathrow
It is Impossible for a U.S. Carrier to Compete with AA/BA Without
Access to London Heathrow
AvailableNot Available
Slots NOT Available for
Acquisition – Used for Hub Service and Essential
Routings
Slots NOT Available for
Acquisition – Used for Hub Service and Essential
Routings
Slots NOT Available for Viable
Transatlantic Operation –
Carriers Do Not Possess Enough Slots for Even 1 Daily Round Trip
per Week
Slots NOT Available for Viable
Transatlantic Operation –
Carriers Do Not Possess Enough Slots for Even 1 Daily Round Trip
per Week
Slots NOT Available for Transatlantic Service – Slots and Facilities are Used for Narrow Body Jets, RJs, and
Turboprops
Slots NOT Available for Transatlantic Service – Slots and Facilities are Used for Narrow Body Jets, RJs, and
Turboprops
* Exhibit NW-38
Exhibit NW-39
Public Benefits – Connectivity
London Heathrow Has Limited Utility as a Connecting Facility. To Fund High Frequency Point-to-Point Service, British Airways Has Deleted Large Numbers of Cities from Its Heathrow Network
“. . . [W]e have had a renewed focus on serving the big business markets . . . There is a cost for that which is that we have to get the slots from somewhere and . . . about 15 shorthaul destinations have been dropped from the Heathrow network.”
-- Robert Boyle, British Airways General Manager Network Planning, Investment Community Presentation, page 7.
Exhibit NW-40
Even Though Heathrow Has Limited and Shrinking Utility As a Connecting Facility, U.S. Passengers Who Can Access Points Beyond London at Heathrow Outnumber U.S. Passengers Who Can Access Points Beyond London at Gatwick by 74 Percent
16.2 Million
28.2 Million
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
U.S. – Gatwick Beyond
U.S. – Heathrow Beyond
Mill
ions
of
Ann
ual Pass
engers
Source: Official Airline Guide, September 1-7, 2001; MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
Nonstop
Service to 57
Beyond cities
Nonstop
Service to 45
Beyond Cities
Exhibit NW-41
British Airways Actually Serves 27 Fewer Cities from Heathrow With Its Own Aircraft Today Than Six Years Ago, and Six Fewer Cities Than a Year Ago
1995 - 2001 2000 - 2001
OsloMilan (MXP)Abu DhabiDetroitCalcuttaMadrasIslamabad
AmmanBeirutBilbaoBremenBasilCaracasCologneDamascusDhahranBuenos AiresOsloRio de JaneiroGothenburgHanoverHarareInvernessJerseyOsaba
Kuala LumpurSt. PetersburgLusakaLuxembourgLyonNairobiNagoyaNewquayPortoParis (ORY)PlymouthPisaSeoulTehranTurinVenice
Calcutta BilbaoCologneJerseyKuala LumpurParis (ORY)TehranVenice
7 Points Added
34 Points Dropped
1 Point Added 7 Points Dropped
Source: Official Airline Guide, September 1-7, 1995, 2000, and 2001
Exhibit NW-42
British Airways Has Implemented Commercial Strategies to Discourage Transfer Passengers Because British Airways Does Not Want Passengers to Use Heathrow Airport as a Transfer Station to Its European Network
“Direct traffic has a 25 point higher direct margin than transfer.”
“Our focus is mainly on reducing our exposure, first and foremost, to the traffic in which we and the industry are performing worst, and that is the transfer business.”
“More dramatically, what has happened to the transfer business. You can see very deep reductions in low yielding transfer business and increases again in middle yielding and higher yielding fare categories.”
-- David Spurlock, British Airways Director of Strategy, British Airways Investors Day, pages 5-6, 14.
Exhibit NW-43
British Airways Has Adjusted Its Schedule to Discourage Transfer Traffic from Using Heathrow Airport
“In terms of shorthaul, there are big benefits around freeing shorthaul from the need to structure itself to feed the longhaul operation. It allows us to tailor the shorthaul operation to the needs of shorthaul and, therefore, to have a better chance of making money.”
-- Robert Boyle, British Airways General Manager Network Planning, British Airways Investors Day, Network, page 15.
Exhibit NW-44
American and Its Current Code Share Partners Already Can Create Pervasive “On-line” Access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East
Los Angeles
New York (JFK,LGA,EWR)
Boston
Miami
Chicago (ORD)
Dallas/Ft. Worth
Stockholm
Belfast
Bologna/Rimini
Brussels
BudapestParis
Copenhagen
Dublin/Shannon/Cork
Düsseldorf/Stuttgart
Dubai
Edinburgh
Rome
Frankfurt/Prague
Glasgow
Geneva
Hamburg
Helsinki
Istanbul/Thessaloniki
Johannesburg
Cologne
Milan/Verona
LisbonMadrid
ManchesterBirmingham
Munich
Naples
Nice/Genoa
Oslo
Bucharest
Hannover/Berlin
Amsterdam
Venice
Vienna
Warsaw
Zurich
Abidjan
Lanzarote
Izmir
Malaga
Alicante Athens
Abu Dhabi
Belgrade
Banghazi Beirut
Bergen
Cairo
Chania
Conakry
Casablanca
Cantania
Dakar
Douala
Enontekio
Bilbao/San Sebastian/Santander
Lagos/Faro/Sevilla
Kinshasa
Fuerteventura
Gothenburg
GranadaIraklion
Ibiza
Ivalo
Jeddah
JoensuuTamper
e
KajaaniKuusamoKemi/Tornio
Kiev
Kokkola
Kittila
KuopioVaasa
Larnaka
La Coruna/Asturias/Santiago De Compostela
St. Petersburg
Almeria
Gran Canaria
Jyvaskyla/Lappeenranta
Menorca
Muscat
Mariehamn
Malta
Murmansk
Lyon/Marseille
Nairobi Yaounde
Barcelona/Oporto
Ouagadougou
Oulu
Pafos
LondonBristolPlymouth
Pristina/Skopje
Rhodes
Riga/Tallinn
Riyadh
Rovaniemi
Moscow
Tehran
Tripoli Tel Aviv
Malabo
Tenerife
Turku
TanglerTunis
Toulouse
SofiaValladolid
Vilnius
128 points in Europe, Africa and the Middle East128 points in Europe, Africa and the Middle East
Exhibit NW-45
With London’s Limited Utility as a Transfer City, the AA/BA Code Share Plan Provides Virtually No Additional Network Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East Beyond That Which American Airlines Already Has With Its Existing Code Share Partners
44
61
17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Total foreign points where AA/BA plan
to code share*
Number of proposed AA/BA code share
points already served by AA and 5
European code share partners
New cities made available to AA’s
U.S. passengers as a result of BA code
share
The AA/BA Alliance Would Create New Online Service to Only 17 Small Cities, Mostly in Africa
and the Middle East
The AA/BA Alliance Would Create New Online Service to Only 17 Small Cities, Mostly in Africa
and the Middle East* Code Share cities listed in Docket OST 2001-10388
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001 and O&D Survey Year End 2000
Num
ber
of
Poin
ts
Exhibit NW-46
The AA/BA Code Share Plan Provides Virtually No Additional Network Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East Beyond That Which American Airlines Already Has With Its Existing Code Share Partners
* Code Share cities listed in Docket OST 2001-10388
17 New On-Line Cities Produce Only 45,110 Additional Annual O&D
Passengers
17 New On-Line Cities Produce Only 45,110 Additional Annual O&D
Passengers
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 2001; O&D Survey ,Year End 2000
98.3%
1.7%
Exhibit NW-47
The 527 O&D City Pair Markets That Are Transaction Specific to the AA/BA Alliance Are Very Small, Producing Only 45,110 Passengers Per Year, an Average of Less Than 0.1 Passenger Per Day Each Way (PDEW) to the 17 Unique BA Points
0.25
0.20
0.33
0.46
0.27
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Minneapolis Norfolk Cleveland NewOrleans
Pittsburgh
PD
EW
To A
ll 1
7 B
A C
itie
s C
om
bin
ed
The O&D Average Per New Online U.S. Point Is Below 0.5 PDEW for the Largest U.S. Cities to the
17 BA Transaction Specific Points Combined
The O&D Average Per New Online U.S. Point Is Below 0.5 PDEW for the Largest U.S. Cities to the
17 BA Transaction Specific Points Combined
Source: DOT O&D Survey Year End 2000
Exhibit NW-48
On a Hypothetical Total Network to Total Network Basis, American Airlines Passengers Would Have Much Broader Access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East on Its Existing Code Share Partners Than They Would Have on British Airways
BA117AA
113
0
40
80
120
160
AA – BA
SR/SN/IB/
FY/EI
154AA
113
0
40
80
120
160
AA – SR/SN/IB/FY/EI
Source: Official Airline Guide – September 1-7, 2001
Total Number Cities Operated in U.S., Europe, Africa, and Middle East
AA Points Only
BA Points Only
AA Points Only
SR/SN/IB/FY/EI Unduplicated
points
Exhibit NW-49
American’s Hypothetical Total Network Access With Its Existing Code Share Partners Is Greater Than a Hypothetical American/British Airways Combined Network
37.3 Million39 Million
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
AA/BAAA – SR /SN/IB/FY/EI
Mill
ions
of
Ann
ual Pass
engers
Source: MIDT: True O&D Bookings – Year Ended April 2001
Exhibit NW-50
Compared to Existing Major Immunized Alliances, AA/BA Provides Virtually No Additional Market Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East
NW/KL
UA/LH
AA/BA
• Increases online PDEW by 13,631*• Adds additional 9,816 new online O&D
points**• 21.1% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle
East passengers
• Increases online PDEW by 13,631*• Adds additional 9,816 new online O&D
points**• 21.1% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle
East passengers
• Increases online PDEW by 232*• Adds additional 1,508 new online O&D
points**• 0.1% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle East
passengers
• Increases online PDEW by 232*• Adds additional 1,508 new online O&D
points**• 0.1% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle East
passengers
• Increases online PDEW by 5,664*• Adds additional 11,392 new online O&D
points**• 8.8% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle East
passengers
• Increases online PDEW by 5,664*• Adds additional 11,392 new online O&D
points**• 8.8% of Total U.S. – E.U./Africa/Middle East
passengers
Additional market access relative to NW/KL PDEW
Source: MIDT: True O&D Bookings, Year Ended April 2001
** New O&D not previously served by either carrier using its own aircraft and/or code sharing with existing partners.
* New PDEW carried by Alliance not previously carried by either partner unilaterally.
Note: Excludes O&D markets that generated less than 11 bookings per year.
Exhibit NW-51
American Airlines’ Commercial Relationships, Many of Which Occur Outside of the Oneworld Brand, Already Make American Airlines the Anchor of the Second Largest Airline Group in the World – Counting British Airways, It Is the World’s Largest
188,796,613
303,597,034305,415,422
222,373,472
0
50,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000
200,000,000
250,000,000
300,000,000
350,000,000
400,000,000
Oneworldand Other AA Code Share Partners *
Star and Other UA
Code Share Partners
Tota
l A
nnu
al
Pass
engers
Sky TeamAnd Other DL Code
Share Partners
Northwest and KLM and Their
Other Code Share Partners
BA Portion
267,154,724
Source: International Air Transport Association (IATA) Year 2000
* Assumes SR/SN is part of American Airlines for all of 2000.
Exhibit NW-52
Recommended