Course Info - Florida International University

CourseInfo

• Instructor:Dr.DengPan• Email:pand@cs.fiu.edu• Officehours:– TuesdayandThursday,10am-12PM,ECS-389– Orbyappointment

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Chapter1Introduction

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Internetprotocolstack• application

– supportingnetworkapplications• transport

– process-processdatatransfer• network

– routingofdatagramsfromsourcetodestination

• link– datatransferbetweenneighboringnetworkelements

• physical– bits“onthewire”

application

transport

network

link

physical

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Securityrelatedterminology

• Risk• Threats• Vulnerabilities• Adversary• Attacks• Participants• Trust• SecurityModel

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Chapter3SecretKeyCryptography

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SecretKeyEncryption

• orconventional/private-key /single-key• senderandrecipientshareacommonkey• allclassicalencryptionalgorithmsaresecretkeybased

• wasonlytypepriortoinventionofpublic-keyin1970’s

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SomeBasicTerminology

• plaintext/cleartext - originalmessage

• ciphertext - codedmessage

• cipher - algorithmfortransformingplaintexttociphertext

• key - infousedincipherknownonlytosender/receiver

• encipher(encrypt) - convertingplaintexttociphertext

• decipher(decrypt) – recoveringplaintextfromciphertext

• cryptography - studyofencryptionprinciples/methods

• cryptanalysis(codebreaking) - studyofprinciples/methodsofdecipheringciphertextwithout knowingkey

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SymmetricCipherModel

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Requirements

• tworequirementsforsecureuseofsymmetricencryption:– astrongencryptionalgorithm– asecretkeyknownonlytosender/receiver

• mathematicallyhave:Y=EK(X)X=DK(Y)

• assumeencryptionalgorithmisknown

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Cryptanalysis

• objectivetorecoverkeynotjustmessage• generalapproaches:– cryptanalyticattack– brute-forceattack

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BruteForceSearch• alwayspossibletosimplytryeverykey• mostbasicattack,proportionaltokeysize• assumeeitherknow/recogniseplaintext

Key Size (bits)

Number of Alternative Keys

Time required at 1 decryption/µs

Time required at 106

decryptions/µs32 232 = 4.3 × 109 231 µs = 35.8

minutes2.15 milliseconds

56 256 = 7.2 × 1016 255 µs = 1142 years 10.01 hours128 2128 = 3.4 × 1038 2127 µs = 5.4 × 1024

years5.4 × 1018 years

168 2168 = 3.7 × 1050 2167 µs = 5.9 × 1036

years5.9 × 1030 years

26 characters (permutation)

26! = 4 × 1026 2 × 1026 µs = 6.4 × 1012 years

6.4 × 106 years

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ClassicalSubstitutionCiphers

• wherelettersofplaintextarereplacedbyotherlettersorbynumbersorsymbols

• orifplaintextisviewedasasequenceofbits,thensubstitutioninvolvesreplacingplaintextbitpatternswithciphertextbitpatterns

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CaesarCipher

• earliestknownsubstitutioncipher• byJuliusCaesar• firstattesteduseinmilitaryaffairs• replaceseachletterby3rdletteron• example:

PHHW PH DIWHU WKH WRJD SDUWB

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CaesarCipher

• candefinetransformationas:

• mathematicallygiveeachletteranumber

• thenhaveCaesarcipheras:c=E(p)=(p+k)mod(26)p=D(c)=(c– k)mod(26)

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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CryptanalysisofCaesarCipher

• onlyhave26possibleciphers– AmapstoA,B,..Z

• couldsimplytryeachinturn• abruteforcesearch• givenciphertext,justtryallshiftsofletters• doneedtorecognizewhenhaveplaintext• eg.breakciphertext"GCUAVQDTGCM"

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MonoalphabeticCipher

• ratherthanjustshiftingthealphabet• couldshuffle(jumble)thelettersarbitrarily• eachplaintextlettermapstoadifferentrandomciphertextletter

• hencekeyis26letterslongPlain: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzCipher: dkvqfibjwpescxhtmyauolrgzn

Plaintext: ifwewishtoreplacelettersCiphertext: wirfrwajuhyftsdvfsfuufya

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MonoalphabeticCipherSecurity

• nowhaveatotalof– 26!=4x1026 keys

• withsomanykeys,mightthinkissecure• butwouldbewrong• problemislanguagecharacteristics

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LanguageRedundancyandCryptanalysis

• humanlanguagesareredundant• eg"thlrdsmshphrdshllntwnt"• lettersarenotequallycommonlyused• inEnglishEisbyfarthemostcommonletter– followedbyT,R,N,I,O,A,S

• otherletterslikeZ,J,K,Q,Xarefairlyrare• havetablesofsingle,double&tripleletterfrequenciesforvariouslanguages

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EnglishLetterFrequencies

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UseinCryptanalysis• keyconcept- monoalphabeticsubstitutionciphersdonotchangerelativeletterfrequencies

• calculateletterfrequenciesforciphertext• comparecounts/plotsagainstknownvalues• ifcaesarcipherlookforcommonpeaks/troughs– peaksat:A-E-Itriple,NOpair,RSTtriple– troughsat:JK,X-Z

• formonoalphabeticmustidentifyeachletter– tablesofcommondouble/triplelettershelp

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ExampleCryptanalysis

• givenciphertext:UZQSOVUOHXMOPVGPOZPEVSGZWSZOPFPESXUDBMETSXAIZVUEPHZHMDZSHZOWSFPAPPDTSVPQUZWYMXUZUHSXEPYEPOPDZSZUFPOMBZWPFUPZHMDJUDTMOHMQ

• countrelativeletterfrequencies(seetext)• guessP&Zaree&t• guessZWisthandhenceZWPisthe• proceedingwithtrialanderrorfinallyget:

it was disclosed yesterday that several informal butdirect contacts have been made with politicalrepresentatives of the viet cong in moscow

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Example

• AgeneralizationoftheCaesarcipher,knownastheaffinecipherisasfollows:C=E([a,b],p)=(ap+b)mod26

• Aciphertexthasbeengeneratedwithanaffinecipher.Themostfrequentletteroftheciphertextis‘B’,andthesecondmostfrequentis‘U’.Breakthecode.

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PlayfairCipher

• noteventhelargenumberofkeysinamonoalphabeticcipherprovidessecurity

• oneapproachtoimprovingsecuritywastoencryptmultipleletters

• the PlayfairCipher isanexample• inventedbyCharlesWheatstonein1854,butnamedafterhisfriendBaronPlayfair

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PlayfairKeyMatrix

• a5X5matrixoflettersbasedonakeyword• fillinlettersofkeyword(sansduplicates)• fillrestofmatrixwithotherletters• eg.usingthekeywordMONARCHY

M O N A RC H Y B DE F G I/J KL P Q S TU V W X Z

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EncryptingandDecrypting

• plaintextisencryptedtwolettersatatime1. ifapairisarepeatedletter,insertfillerlike'X’2. ifbothlettersfallinthesamerow,replaceeach

withlettertoright (wrappingbacktostartfromend)

3. ifbothlettersfallinthesamecolumn,replaceeachwiththeletterbelowit(againwrappingtotopfrombottom)

4. otherwiseeachletterisreplacedbytheletterinthesamerowandinthecolumnoftheotherletterofthepair

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SecurityofPlayfairCipher

• securitymuchimprovedovermonoalphabetic• sincehave26x26=676digrams• wouldneeda676entryfrequencytabletoanalyse(verses26foramonoalphabetic)

• andcorrespondinglymoreciphertext• waswidelyusedformanyyears– eg.byUS&BritishmilitaryinWW1

• itcanbebroken,givenafewhundredletters• sincestillhasmuchofplaintextstructure

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PolyalphabeticCiphers

• polyalphabeticsubstitutionciphers• improvesecurityusingmultiplecipheralphabets• makecryptanalysisharderwithmorealphabetstoguessandflatterfrequencydistribution

• useakeytoselectwhichalphabetisusedforeachletterofthemessage

• useeachalphabetinturn• repeatfromstartafterendofkeyisreached

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VigenèreCipher

• simplestpolyalphabeticsubstitutioncipher• effectivelymultiplecaesarciphers• keyismultipleletterslongK=k1 k2 ...kd• ith letterspecifiesith alphabettouse• useeachalphabetinturn• repeatfromstartafterdlettersinmessage• decryptionsimplyworksinreverse

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ExampleofVigenèreCipher

• writetheplaintextout• writethekeywordrepeatedaboveit• useeachkeyletterasacaesarcipherkey• encryptthecorrespondingplaintextletter• egusingkeyworddeceptive

key: deceptivedeceptivedeceptiveplaintext: wearediscoveredsaveyourselfciphertext: zicvtwqngrzgvtwavzhcqyglmgj

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SecurityofVigenèreCiphers

• havemultipleciphertextlettersforeachplaintextletter

• henceletterfrequenciesareobscured• butnottotallylost• startwithletterfrequencies– seeiflookmonoalphabeticornot

• ifnot,thenneedtodeterminenumberofalphabets,sincethencanattackeach

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AutokeyCipher• ideallywantakeyaslongasthemessage• Vigenèreproposedtheautokey cipher• withkeywordisprefixedtomessageaskey• knowingkeywordcanrecoverthefirstfewletters• usetheseinturnontherestofthemessage• eg.givenkeydeceptive

key: deceptivewearediscoveredsavplaintext: wearediscoveredsaveyourselfciphertext: zicvtwqngkzeiigasxstslvvwla

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TranspositionCiphers

• nowconsiderclassicaltransposition orpermutation ciphers

• thesehidethemessagebyrearrangingtheletterorder

• withoutalteringtheactuallettersused• canrecognisethesesincehavethesamefrequencydistributionastheoriginaltext

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RailFencecipher

• writemessagelettersoutdiagonallyoveranumberofrows

• thenreadoffcipherrowbyrow• eg.writemessageoutas:

m e m a t r h t g p r ye t e f e t e o a a t

• givingciphertextMEMATRHTGPRYETEFETEOAAT

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RowTranspositionCiphers

• amorecomplextransposition• writelettersofmessageoutinrowsoveraspecifiednumberofcolumns

• thenreorderthecolumnsaccordingtosomekeybeforereadingofftherowsKey: 3 4 2 1 5 6 7Plaintext: a t t a c k p

o s t p o n ed u n t i l tw o a m x y z

Ciphertext: TTNAAPTMTSUOAODWCOIXKNLYPETZ

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ProductCiphers

• ciphersusingsubstitutionsortranspositionsarenotsecurebecauseoflanguagecharacteristics

• henceconsiderusingseveralciphersinsuccessiontomakeharder,but:– twosubstitutionsmakeamorecomplexsubstitution– twotranspositionsmakemorecomplextransposition– butasubstitutionfollowedbyatranspositionmakesanewmuchhardercipher

• thisisbridgefromclassicaltomodernciphers

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Example

ConsidertwoCaesarciphers:E(p)=(p+3)mod(26)E’(p)=(p+7)mod(26)

Whatisthecompositionofthetwociphers,i.e.E’(E(p))?

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ModernBlockCiphers

• nowlookatmodernblockciphers• oneofthemostwidelyusedtypesofcryptographicalgorithms

• providesecrecy/authenticationservices• focusonDES(DataEncryptionStandard)• toillustrateblockcipherdesignprinciples

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BlockvsStreamCiphers

• blockciphersprocessmessagesinblocks,eachofwhichisthenen/decrypted

• likeasubstitutiononverybigcharacters– 64-bitsormore

• streamciphersprocessmessagesabitorbyteatatimewhenen/decrypting

• manycurrentciphersareblockciphers

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DataEncryptionStandard(DES)

• mostwidelyusedblockcipherinworld• encrypts64-bitdatausing56-bitkey• haswidespreaduse• hasbeenconsiderablecontroversyoveritssecurity

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DESDesignControversy

• althoughDESstandardispublic• wasconsiderablecontroversyoverdesign– inchoiceof56-bitkey– andbecausedesigncriteriawereclassified

• subsequenteventsandpublicanalysisshowinfactdesignwasappropriate

• useofDEShasflourished– especiallyinfinancialapplications– stillstandardisedforlegacyapplicationuse

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DESOverview

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DESOverview

• Initialpermutation• 16rounds• 64-bitinput– Eachroundproducesa64-bitoutput

• 56-bitinitialkey– generatessixteen48-bitper-roundkeys

• Swaptwohalvesafter16th round• Finalpermutation

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DESOverview

• DecryptionworksbyessentiallyrunningDESbackwards.

• Sameoperation,keysinoppositeorder– firstuseK16,thekeyyougeneratedlast

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ThePermutationsoftheData

• Initialpermutation(IP)– firststepofthedatacomputation– IPreorderstheinputdatabits– quiteregularinstructure(easyinh/w)

• Finalpermutation(IP-1)– Laststep– InverseofIP

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Initialpermutation(IP)InitialPermutation(IP)

58 50 42 34 26 18 10 260 52 44 36 28 20 12 462 54 46 38 30 22 14 664 56 48 40 32 24 16 857 49 41 33 25 17 9 159 51 43 35 27 19 11 361 53 45 37 29 21 13 563 55 47 39 31 23 15 7

• Numbersintablespecifybitnumbersofinput.Orderofnumbersintablescorrespondstooutputbitposition.

• E.g.:– inputbit58tooutputbit1– inputbit50tooutputbit2 45

FinalPermutation(IP-1)

• InverseofIP– IP-1(IP(M))=M

FinalPermutation(IP-1)40 8 48 16 56 24 64 3239 7 47 15 55 23 63 3138 6 46 14 54 22 62 3037 5 45 13 53 21 61 2936 4 44 12 52 20 60 2835 3 43 11 51 19 59 2734 2 42 10 50 18 58 2633 1 41 9 49 17 57 25

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ThePermutationsoftheData

• Permutationnotrandom• PatternsofIPandIP-1 (reversingthearrows)– bitsofith octetgetspreadinto(9-i)th bitsofalloctets

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GeneratingthePer-RoundKeys

• DESkeylookslike64bitslong,but8bitsareparity.– Numberthebitsfromlefttorightas1,2,...64.Bits8,16,...64aretheparitybits.

• DESgeneratesfromthe64bitsinitialkeysixteen48-bitkeys,whichareK1,K2,...K16.

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InitialKeyPermutation

• Initialpermutationon56usefulbitsofkey,outputdividedintotwo28-bitvalues:C0 andD0

• Noticethatnoneoftheparitybits(8,16,...64)isusedinC0 orD0.

C0 D0

57 49 41 33 25 17 9 63 55 47 39 31 23 151 58 50 42 34 26 18 7 62 54 46 38 30 2210 2 59 51 43 35 27 14 6 61 53 45 37 2919 11 3 60 52 44 36 21 13 5 28 20 12 4

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InitialKeyPermutation

• Permutationnotrandom

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GeneratingthePer-RoundKeys

• 16rounds:rotationfollowedbypermutation• Numberofbitsshifted– Single-bitrotateleftinrounds1,2,9,and16– Two-bitrotateleftintheotherrounds

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LefthalfofKi• PermutationofCi produceslefthalfofKi• Bits9,18,22,and25discarded:24bitsleft

permutationtoobtainthelefthalfofKi:

14 17 11 24 1 53 28 15 6 21 1023 19 12 4 26 816 7 27 20 13 2

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RighthalfofKi• PermutationofDi producesrighthalfofKi• Bits35,38,43,and54discarded• Ki 48bitslong

permutationtoobtaintherighthalfofKi:

41 52 31 37 47 5530 40 51 45 33 4844 49 39 56 34 5346 42 50 36 29 32

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Example

• Whatwillbetheroundkeysiftheinitialkeyis00…00?

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DESRound

• Eachofthe16rounds

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DESRound

• 64-bitinputdividedintotwo32-bithalvesLnandRn.

• Theroundgeneratesasoutput32-bitquantitiesLn+1 andRn+1.– Ln+1 =Rn– Rn+1=Ln ⊕ mangler(Rn,Kn)

• TheconcatenationofLn+1 andRn+1 isthe64-bitoutputoftheround.

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DESRound

• Fordecryption,howtogetLn andRn fromLn+1andRn+1?– Rn =Ln+1– Ln =Rn+1⊕ mangler(Rn,Kn)

• DESisreversiblewithoutconstrainingmanglerfunctiontobereversible,duetoFeistel.– Decryptionidenticaltoencryptionwith32-bithalvesswapped.Inotherwords,feedingRn+1|Ln+1intoroundnproducesRn|Ln asoutput.

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ManglerFunction

• Input:32-bitRand48-bitK• Firststep:expandRto48bits– breakRintoeight4-bitchunks– expandeachchunkto6bitsbytakingadjacentbitsandconcatenatingthemtochunk

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ManglerFunction

• 48-bitKbrokenintoeight6-bitchunks.• ChunkioftheexpandedRis⊕ 'dwithchunkiofKtoyielda6-bitoutput.

• 6-bitoutputisfedintoanS-box,asubstitutionwhichproducesa4-bitoutput.– inner4bits:row#– outer2bits:column#

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S-box

• 8S-boxes– The4-bitoutputofeachoftheeightS-boxesiscombinedinto32bits.

• Example:S-box1

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Example

• FindbelowtheS-boxS8 ofDES.SupposingtheinputtoS8 is19,calculatetheoutput.

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PermutationofS-boxResults

• 32-bitS-boxresultsarethenpermuted.• Interpretationoftable– 1st bitofoutputofthepermutationisthe16thinputbit,the2nd outputbitisthe7th inputbit,...the32nd outputbitisthe25th inputbit.

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StrengthofDES– KeySize

• 56-bitkeyshave256 =7.2x1016 values• bruteforcesearchlookshard• recentadvanceshaveshownispossible• mustnowconsideralternativestoDES

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DESExample

• Plaintext:02468aceeca86420• Key:0f1571c947d9e859• Ciphertext:da02ce3a89ecac3b

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DESExample

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AvalancheEffectinDES:ChangeinPlaintext

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AvalancheEffectinDES:ChangeinKey(1f1571c947d9e859)

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Example

• Assumethat0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFistheinitialDESkey.SupposethatweknowE0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (0x0102030405060708)=0x0101010101010101. CalculateE0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (0x0101010101010101).

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InternationalDataEncryptionAlgorithm(IDEA)

• DevelopedbyETHZuria• Efficientinsoftware• Input:64-bitplaintext,128-bitkey• SimilartoDES,IDEAhasencryptionanddecryptionidenticalexceptforkeyexpansion.

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PrimitiveOperations

• EachprimitiveoperationinIDEAmapstwo16-bitquantitiesintoa16-bitquantity.

• Threeoperations,allreversible– bitwiseexclusiveor⊕– modifiedadd+:throwingawaycarries,oradditionmod216

– modifiedmultiply:firstcalculatingthe32-bitresult,andthentakingremainderdividedby216+1

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KeyExpansion

• 128-bitkeyto5216-bitkeys,K1,K2,...K52• First8keys:startingfromtheleft,choppingoff16bitsatatime

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KeyExpansion

• Next8keys:startingatbit25,andwrappingaroundtothebeginningwhentheendisreached

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KeyExpansion

• Next8keysaregeneratedbyoffsetting25morebits,andsoforth.

• Lastoffsetstartsatbit23,andonly4keys– 25*6mod128=22

• K50 andK51 areswapped

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IDEARound

• 17rounds,oddandevenroundsdifferent

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IDEARound

• 64-bitdatainput:treatedasfour16-bitquantities,Xa,Xb,Xc,andXd,toyieldnewversions.

• Keys:– Oddroundsuse4keys:Ka,Kb,Kc,andKd– Evenroundsuse2keys:Ke andKf

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OddRound

• Easilyreversibleindecryption– Sameoperationwithmultiplicative/additiveinversesofkeys

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EvenRound

• Evenroundisitsowninverse,samekeysfordecryption77

InverseKeysforDecryption

• Samecodecanperformeitherencryptionordecryptiongivendifferentexpandedkeys

• Inoddrounds,takeinversesofencryptionkeysandusetheminoppositeorder– E.g.encryptionkeysK49,K50,K51,andK52correspondingtodecryptionkeysK1,K2,K3,andK4

• Inevenrounds,samekeysforencryptionasdecryption

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