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DOWNS’ MODEL OF ELECTIONS

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Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.

a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.

a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.

a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions1. A single dimension of alternatives.2. Voters.

a. prefer the candidate that is closer to their ideal point more than one farther away (as before).

b. Many voters (many ideal points) will be represented with a frequency distribution.

The dotted line indicates the median.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions3. Candidates (can exceed two)

a. Represented by letters.b. Move across the spectrum to maximize their

chance of election.

A B C

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

A. Assumptions4. Vote using plurality rule, not majority rule.

a. Def: the candidate with the most votes wins.

A has a plurality A has a majority

If a candidate wins a majority, then it wins a plurality.

However, if a candidate wins a plurality, it may or may not win a majority.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

5. Ideologya. Downs argues candidates adopt ideologies to

simplify their message to voters.b. Since candidates want to appear responsible and

reliable, they won’t jump each other.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model1.

Who votes for A?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model1.

Who votes for A?Who votes for B?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model1.

Who votes for A?Who votes for B?Who votes for C?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model1.

Who wins?C because he/she receives the largest area.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

Same model, just moved to the right.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be B’s best response?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be B’s best response?Perhaps to move right to increase his/her area.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be A’s best response?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be A’s best response?Perhaps to move right as well.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

What would be A’s best response?Perhaps to move right as well.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

B. Action in The Model2.

Now A wins, because B takes away more votes from C than from A.

What happens to B?1) B gets caught in the center and looses.

Does the candidate closest to the median win?a. No, the median voter theorem does not apply, because we

are not using two candidate, majority rule.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

C. Discussion1. Downs argues that, "Parties formulate policies in

order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.“ Does this seem reasonable?

a. Anne Lewis, former chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee, said “parties exist for two purposes: to govern and to win elections.”

b. Do candidates really change policies to get elected?2. Can mom-and-pop candidates win elections?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

C. Discussion3. What is ideology according to Downs?

a. a simplified message to voters that helps` party candidates get elected (i.e. a sales pitch).

4. Does that seem reasonable?5. What is the role of responsibility and reliability in

Downs analysis?a. They prevents candidates from radically changing

positions.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

C. Discussion6. Why are there two dominant parties in the United

States, but many parties in other countries?Italy

PSI PCI MFI CS Dem Rep CD

Key: PSI – Socialists, PCI – Communists, MFI – fascists, CS – Christian Socialists, CD -- Christian Democrats.

Note: Downs says it has to do with multimodal electorates,but perhaps it has to do with plurality rule in singlemember districts.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

C. Discussion7. If Downs is correct, why don’t candidates fully

converge toward the median?8. Is a single dimension of alternatives reasonable? 9. Who is more likely to abstain from voting, voters on

the extremes or voters in the middle?10. Other thoughts?

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem:

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.

Rep: Bush.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.

Rep: Bush, Robertson.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections1. 1988Dem: Dukakis, Jackson, Hart, Gore, Gephardt.

Rep: Bush, Robertson, Dole.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections2. 1992Dem: Clinton, Paul Tsongas, Tom Harkin.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections2. 1992Dem: Clinton.

Rep: Bush (incumbent). Ind: Ross Perot

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections3. 2000Dem: Gore.

Rep: Bush. Reform: Buchanan

Green: Nader

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

D. Presidential Elections4. 2008Dem: Obama, Clinton, Edwards.

Rep: McCain, Romney, Huckabee, Paul.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

E. Preference Restrictions1. A single dimensional model rules out certain

preference orders.a. Consider three voters, and three candidates

(A,B,C).A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A

A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A

A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A

A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A

A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A

A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A

There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

E. Preference Restrictions1. A single dimensional model rules out certain

preference orders.a. Consider three voters, and three candidates

(A,B,C).A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A

A A A A A A A A B A A B A A C A A CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A

A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC C C C C B C C C C C A C C B C C A

A B A A B A A B B A B B A B C A B CB C B B C C B C A B C C B C A B C BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A

A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB A B B A C B A A B A C B A A B A BC B C C B B C B C C B A C B B C B A

A C A A C A A C B A C B A C C A C CB B B B B C B B A B B C B B A B B BC A C C A B C A C C A A C A B C A A

There are 216 possible orderings, 36 of which are displayed here.

Roughly 2/9ths of these orders, displayed in red, cannot be placed on a line.

Pick one of the red.

Downs’ Model of Popular Elections

Point: Assuming a single dimensional model limits the type of voting orders individuals can have.