Erasmus University Rotterdam · Governing Climate Change: Global Cities and Transnational Lawmaking...

Governing Climate Change: Global Cities and Transnational Lawmaking

Besturen van klimaatverandering: mondiale steden en transnationaal recht

Thesis

toobtainthedegreeofDoctorfromthe

ErasmusUniversityRotterdambycommandoftherectormagnificus

Prof.dr.H.A.P.Pols

andinaccordancewiththedecisionoftheDoctorateBoard

ThepublicdefenceshallbeheldonThursday5October2017at13.30

JoleneLinShuwenSingapore

DoctoralCommitteePromotor: Prof.dr.E.HeyOthermembers: Dr.A.Arcuri

Prof.dr.J.E.NijmanProf.dr.J.Scott

Table of Contents Abbreviations1 Introduction,ScopeandTheoretical

Framework

1. Introduction

2. TheSubjectMatterofthisThesis:TheLawmakingRoleofCitiesinTransnationalClimateChangeGovernance

2.1TheFocusonGlobalCities 8 2.2DefiningTransnationalClimateChange

Governance10

2.3ResearchQuestions

3. Methodology

4. ChapterOutline 18 2 TheoreticalFramework

1. Introduction

2. TheoreticalOverview

2.1TransnationalRegimeComplex 21 2.2Orchestration 27 2.3TransnationalLaw 29 2.4TheDisaggregatedStateand

TransgovernmentalNetworks31

2.5TheGlobalCity

3. Conclusion 39 3 TheRiseoftheCityinInternational

Affairs

1. Introduction

2. UrbanParticipationinInternationalLegalandPoliticalProcesses

2.1CitiesImplementingInternationalLaw 44 2.2CityDiplomacy 48 2.3CitiesDevelopingIndependentStrategiesto

ManageGlobalThreats52

2.4GlobalOrganizationsandGlobalAims

3. TheGlobalUrbanAgenda

3.1Livable,Competitive,WellGoverned,andBankable

3.2MakeCitiesandHumanSettlementsInclusive,Safe,ResilientandSustainable

4. Conclusion 65 4 CityActiononClimateChange

Introduction 67

2. London,theUnitedKingdom

2.1London’sMitigationPoliciesandProgrammes 70 2.2Adaptation:Implementationatthelocal

authoritylevel

3. MexicoCity,Mexico

3.1StrongMayoralCommitmenttoTackling 76

ClimateChange 3.2TheProAirePrograms

4. NewYorkCity,TheUnitedStatesofAmerica

4.1PLANYC:ASustainabilityandClimateChangeBlueprintforthe“CitythatNeverSleeps”

4.2OneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity

5. Rotterdam,theNetherlands

5.1UrbanClimateMitigation 89 5.2ReducingtheCarbonFootprintofEurope’s

LargestPort90

5.3ALeaderinClimateAdaptation

6. Seoul,SouthKorea 6.1Korea’sLowCarbonGreenGrowthVision 95 6.2“AGlobalClimate-FriendlyCityby2030”

7. Conclusion 98 5 TransnationalUrbanClimate

GovernanceviaNetworks–thecaseofC40

1. Introduction

2. ABriefIntroductiontoTransnationalMunicipalNetworksintheAreaofClimateChange

3. C40

3.1TheOriginsofC40 107 3.2RelationshipwiththeClintonClimate

Initiative109

3.3Membership 111 3.4Networks,SummitsandWorkshops 114

3.5Partnerships3.5.1PartneringthePrivateSector3.5.2Cooperationwithothertransnationalmunicipalnetworks3.5.3C40-WorldBankPartnership

116117

4. Conclusion 121 6 CitiesasTransnationalLawmakers

1. Introduction 1232. SoftLawandVoluntaryStandards

2.1SoftLawversusHardLaw 126 2.2VoluntaryStandards

3. TheWorkingsofUrbanClimateLaw

3.1PromotingReflexivity 133 3.2Normdiffusion 136 3.2.1Learning 137 3.2.2Imitation 141 3.2.3Competition 142 3.3TheRoleofNormEntrepreneurs

4. TheInteractionbetweenUrbanClimateLawandtheUNFCCCRegime

4.1Reframingtheproblem 146 4.2Urbanclimatelawasameansofdiffusing

UNFCCCnorms148

4.3MRVandTransparency

5. Conclusion 153 7 ANormativeAssessmentofUrban

ClimateLaw

1. Introduction 155

2. EvaluatingUrbanClimateLawintheTransnationalRegimeComplexContext

2.1Coherence 157 2.2Determinacy 161 2.3EpistemicQuality 163 2.4Accountability 165 2.5Sustainability 167 2.6Fairness

3. ReflectingontheSignificanceofCitiesfortheStudyofInternationalLaw

3.1ChallengingStatistConceptionsofInternationalLaw

3.2RecognizingtheImpactofInternationalLawonCities3.3CriticalEvaluationffff

173 175

4. Conclusion 179 8 Conclusion

1. Introduction

2. TheResearch

2.1SummaryofthisThesis 181 2.2ResearchQuestionsandAnswers 183 2.3LimitationsofthisThesis

3. ImplicationsoftheResearch

3.1ContributiontoExistingLiterature 187 3.2PracticalImplications

4. AvenuesforFutureResearch

5. FinalRemarks 191 Bibliography 193

AbbreviationsAdHocWorkingGroupontheParisAgreement APAAsianJudgesNetworkonEnvironment AJNEAssociationInternationalesdesMairesFrancophones AIMFAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations ASEANBaselCommitteeofBankingSupervision BCBSC40CitiesClimateLeadershipGroup C40CarbonCaptureandStorage CCSCarbonDioxide CO2CarbonDioxideEquivalent CO2eChlorofluorocarbons CFCsCitiesforClimateProtection CCPCitiesforClimateProtectionCampaign CCPCCleanDevelopmentMechanism CDMClintonClimateInitiative CCICombinedHeatandPower CHPCommonButDifferentiatedResponsibilitiesandRespectiveCapabilities

CBDRRC

ConferenceoftheParties COPConnectedUrbanDevelopment CUDConnectingDeltaCities CDCConventiononBiologicalDiversity CBDConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen

Eco-ManagementandAuditScheme EMASEmissionsTradingScheme ETSEnvironmentalManagementSystem EMSEnvironmentalShippingIndex ESIEuropeanUnion EUEuropeanUnionEmissionsTradingScheme EUETSFederalBureauofInvestigation FBIFederalEmergencyManagementAdministration FEMAGreenandBlueSpaceAdaptationforUrbanAreasandEcoTowns

Greener,GreaterBuildingsPlan GGBPGreenhouseGasProtocol GHGProtocolGreenhouseGasProtocolforCities GHGCityProtocolGreenhouseGases GHGsGrossDomesticProduct GDPGrossNationalIncome GNIGrossValueAdded GVAGroupofEight G8Hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs

Hydrofluorocarbons HFCsIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange IPCCInternationalAccountingStandardsBoard IASBInternationalCompetitionNetwork ICNICLEI–LocalGovernmentsforSustainability ICLEIInternationalEmissionsTradingAssociation IETAInternationalOrganizationforStandardization ISOInternationalRelations IRLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean LACLeadershipinEnergyandEnvironmentalDesign LEEDLesbian,Gay,BisexualandTransgender LGBTLightEmittingDiodes LEDsLowCarbonCityDevelopmentProgram LCCDPLowCarbonCityLab LoCaLMeasurement,ReportingandVerification MRVMemorandumofUnderstanding MOUMultilateralAgreementonInvestment MAINationallyDeterminedContributions NDCsNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency PBLNewYorkCity NYCNewYorkCityDepartmentofParks&Recreation NYCParksNewYorkCityMayor’sOfficeofLong-TermPlanningandSustainability

NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment NYPDNon-GovernmentalOrganizations NGOsNon-StateActorZoneforClimateAction NAZCANorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement NAFTAOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

Perfluorocarbons PFCsProgramaIntegralparaelControldelaContaminaciónAtmosférica

ProgramaparaMejorarlaCalidaddelAireenelValledeMéxico

ProAire

Public-PrivateInfrastructureAdvisoryFacility PPIAFReductionofEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation

RegionalGreenhouseGasInitiative RGGIRegulationNo.1907/2006oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilontheRegistration,Evaluation,AuthorisationandRestrictionofChemicals

RotterdamCaptureandStorageDemonstrationProject ROADRotterdamClimateInitiative RCISevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome SARS

TechnicalBarrierstoTradeAgreement TBTAgreementThePeople’sMovementforHumanRightsLearning PDHREUnitedCitiesandLocalGovernments UCLGUnitedNations UNUnitedNationsConferenceonHousingandSustainableUrbanDevelopment

HabitatIII

UnitedNationsConferenceonHumanSettlements HabitatIIUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme UNDPUnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization

UNESCO

UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme UNEPUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange

UNFCCC

UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgramme UNHabitatUnitedNationsIndustrialDevelopmentOrganization UNIDOUnitedStatesConferenceofMayors’ClimateProtectionAgreement

UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency USEPAWesternClimateInitiative WCIWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopment WBCSDWorldHealthOrganization WHOWorldTradeOrganization WTO

Chapter1:Introduction,ScopeandTheoreticalFramework

1. Introduction

On12December2015,whenFrenchForeignMinister,LaurentFabius,announcedthatanewclimatechangeagreementhadbeensigned,cheerseruptedinthenegotiationhallandelsewherearoundtheworld.1Stateshadfinallyconcludedmorethantwodecadesofdifficultmultilateralnegotiations.2However,thereshouldbenoillusionsthatweareontracktoavertingdangeroushumaninterferencewiththeclimatesystem.3As“[noted]withconcern”intheParisdecision,basedonthemitigationpledgesthatstatessubmittedinadvanceoftheConferenceoftheParties(COP)inParis,globalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionlevelswillreach55gigatonnesin2030.4Thisfarexceedsthe40gigatonneslimitnecessarytoholdtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetobelow2degreeCelsiusabovepre-industriallevels.5WhiletheParisAgreementrequiresstatestoprogressivelyratchetuptheirclimatemitigationtargets,6itwouldnotbewisetorelyonstatesalonetoaddressclimatechange.Solvingacomplexprobleminacomplexglobalsocietywillrequireactionbeyondwhatstatescanshoulder.Tacklingclimatechangerequirespragmaticdeliberationinvolvingmultiplesourcesofknowledgeandexperience,notsimplythetop-downinvolvementof“increasinglydetachedand

1FionaHarvey,“Parisclimatechangeagreement:theworld’sgreatestdiplomaticsuccess”,14December2015,online:http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations(accessedon1July2016).2FordiscussionoftheParisAgreement,seee.g.DanielBodansky,‘TheLegalCharacteroftheParisAgreement’(2016)ReviewofEuropeanCommunityandInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,DOI:10.1111/reel.12154;ChristinaVoigt,‘TheComplianceandImplementationMechanismoftheParisAgreement’(2016)ReviewofEuropeanCommunityandInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,DOI:10.1111/reel.12155.3Article2oftheUnitedNationsConventiononClimateChange1771UNTS163(UNFCCC)statesthattheultimateobjectiveofthetreatyisthestabilizationofgreenhousegasconcentrationsintheatmosphereatalevelthatwouldpreventdangerousanthropogenicinterferencewiththeclimatesystem;Suchalevelshouldbeachievedwithinatimeframesufficienttoallowecosystemstoadaptnaturallytoclimatechange,toensurethatfoodproductionisnotthreatenedandtoenableeconomicdevelopmenttoproceedinasustainablemanner.YaminandDepledgearguethatthisobjectiveisakintoanenvironmentalqualitystandard;FarhanaYaminandJoannaDepledge,TheInternationalClimateChangeRegime:AGuidetoRules,InstitutionsandProcedures(CambridgeUniversityPress2004),pg.61.4Para.17,Decision1/CP.21:AdoptionoftheParisAgreement,UNFCCC,ReportoftheConferenceofthePartiesonitstwenty-firstsession,heldinParisfrom30Novemberto13December2015.5Ibid.6Article4(3)oftheParisAgreementstates:“EachParty’ssuccessivenationallydeterminedcontributionwillrepresentaprogressionbeyondtheParty’sthencurrentnationallydeterminedcontributionandreflectitshighestpossibleambition,reflectingitscommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities,inthelightofdifferentnationalcircumstances.”(Emphasismine).

under-resourceddiplomatsparalyzedbygeopoliticalpowerplays,hiddenvaluesystems,orzero-sumdistributionalcalculations.”7 WhilegovernmentdelegateswereinmarathonnegotiatingsessionstryingtoconcludetheParisAgreement,banks,corporations,thinktanks,consultancies,andvariousotherorganizationswereholding“sideevents”atmultiplevenuesacrossParis.8AttheClimateSummitforLocalLeaders,mayorsfromaroundtheworldgatheredtodiscussclimatechangeandtohighlightthesignificantrolethatcitiesplayinreducingGHGemissionsandincreasingsociety’sresiliencetotheimpactsofclimatechange.Attheendofthesummit,thecityleadersdeliveredadeclarationintendedto“demonstratetheirgloballeadershiponclimatepolicies”.9MayorswhosignedtheParisCityHallDeclarationundertookcommitmentsto“[a]dvanceandexceedtheexpectedgoalsofthe2015ParisAgreement”and“deliverupto3.7gigatonsofurban[GHG]emissionsreductionsannuallyby2030–theequivalentofupto30%ofthedifferencebetweencurrentnationalcommitmentsandthe2degreeemissionsreductionpathwayidentifiedbythescientificcommunity”.10FollowingtheParisCityHallDeclaration,theLima-ParisActionAgenda(FocusonCities)proposedaFiveYearVisiontoaccelerateclimateactionincities.11Theaimisthat,bytheyear2020,“localactionandpartnershipsshouldbethenewnormglobally”.12InaninterviewwiththeFinancialTimes,themayorofParis,AnneHidalgo,said,“[cities]aremorepractical;wehavethecapacitytoactfasterandthedecisionsareclosertoreality.Wecanmobilizeallactors,publicandprivate…[whichis]morecomplicatedforthestate.”13

MayorHidalgo’sopinioncapturestheessenceofhowcitiesperceiveandsituatethemselveswithinthecontemporaryglobalefforttogovernclimatechange.Citiesdonotclaimtobesimplyimplementersofinternationalclimatepolicy;they

7JoostPauwelyn,RamsesWesselandJanWouters,‘InformalInternationalLawmaking:AnAssessmentandTemplatetoKeepitBothEffectiveandAccountable’inJoostPauwelyn,RamsesWesselandJanWouters(eds),InformalInternationalLawmaking(OxfordUniversityPress2012),pg.526.8FordetailsoftheofficialsideeventscoordinatedbytheUNFCCCsecretariataswellaseventsindependentlyorganizedbyobserverorganizationsrelatingtotheclimatechangenegotiationprocess,seeUNFCCC,SideEventsandExhibitsOneStopShop,online:http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ngo/items/9325.php#Side%20events(accessedon1July2016).9ClimateSummitforLocalLeaders:CitiesforClimate(4December2015),online:http://climatesummitlocalleaders.paris(accessedon1March2016).10ParisCityHallDeclaration:AdecisivecontributiontoCOP21,online:http://climatesummitlocalleaders.paris/content/uploads/sites/16/2016/01/CLIMATE-SUMMIT-LOCAL-LEADERS-POLITICAL-DECLARATION-PARIS-DEC-4-2015.pdf(accessedon1March2016).11Lima-ParisClimateAgenda,“CitiesandRegionsLaunchMajorFive-YearVisiontoTakeActiononClimateChange”,online:http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/cities-subnationals/lpaa-focus-cities-regions-across-the-world-unite-to-launch-major-five-year-vision-to-take-action-on-climate-change/(accessedon1March2016).12Lima-ParisClimateAgenda,“A5-YearVision”,online:http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/544092/lpaa-five-year-vision.pdf,pg.4(accessedon1March2016).13MichaelStothard,‘Mayorscallformorepowerstofightclimatechange’FinancialTimes(4December2015).

havepositionedthemselvesascentralparticipantsandstakeholdersoftheglobalclimategovernanceeffortintheirownright.14Whileearlyeffortsbycitiestoaddressclimatechange(1990s-early2000s)weremainlyconcernedwithdrivinglocalactioninthefaceofnationalrecalcitranceandstalemateininternationalnegotiations,citiestodayaimtoplayaprominentroleinglobalclimatechangegovernanceincludingtheformalinternationallawmakingprocess–theUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC).15

Theambitiontotakeonaglobalrolemaybeviewedasanaturalextensionoftheincreasinglysignificantparticipationofcitiesinmulti-levelclimategovernancearrangements,particularlyintheEuropeanUnion(EU).WithintheEU,citiessuchasSouthampton(UnitedKingdom)andMunich(Germany)areleadingintermsoftheirdevelopmentoflocalclimatechangestrategiesaswellastheiractiveengagementinclimateprotectionnetworkssuchasClimateAllianceandEnergyCities.16AsauthoritywithintheEUhasnotonlyshiftedupwardsfrommemberstatestoEuropeaninstitutionsbuthasalsodisperseddownwardstosub-nationallevels,municipalnetworkscooperatewitheachothertoincreasetheirinfluenceandsolicitEUfunding.17Atthesametime,thesenetworkscanhelptheEuropeanCommissionimplementEUpoliciesthroughtheexchangeofbestpracticesandthepromulgationofstandardswhichmembercitiesarerequiredtoimplement.18Inbrief,citieshaveevolvedfrombeing“passiveimplementers”to“activeco-decisionmakers”intheEUclimategovernancecontext.19Theirexperienceofworkingacrossvariouslevelsofgovernanceandcooperatingthroughnetworkstodevelopandimplementgovernanceinitiativeshascreatedfertilegroundfor“up-scaling”theseeffortstothetransnationallevel. Asglobalgovernors,i.e.“authoritieswhoexercisepoweracrossbordersfor

14MicheleAcuto,‘Thenewclimateleaders?’(2013)39ReviewofInternationalStudies835.15Itshouldalsobenotedthatearlierurbanclimateactioneffortsprimarilyfocusedonwaystolinkclimatechangetoissuesalreadyonthelocalagendasuchasimprovingairquality.Sincethe2000s,therehavebeenshiftsincities’climategovernanceagendastowardstheneedtoscalelocalizedactionsandimpactsuptothegloballevelinordertoachieveaggregateglobaleffects;HarrietBulkeley,‘CitiesandtheGoverningofClimateChange’(2010)35AnnualReviewofEnvironmentandResources229.16Intermsofnumberofmembers,ClimateAllianceclaimstobethe“largestEuropeancitynetworkdedicatedtoclimateaction”;ClimateAlliance,“AboutUs”,online:http://www.climatealliance.org/about-us.html;EnergyCitiesisaEuropeannetworkoflocalauthoritiesfocusesonenergytransitionandsustainableenergy.Amongstitskeyobjectivesis“torepresent[localauthorities’]interestsandinfluencethepoliciesandproposalsmadebyEuropeanUnioninstitutionsinthefieldsofenergy,environmentalprotectionandurbanpolicy”;EnergyCities,“MainObjectives”,online:http://www.energy-cities.eu/-Association,8-(accessedon1March2016).17KristineKernandHarrietBulkeley,‘Cities,Europeanizationandmulti-levelgovernance:Governingclimatechangethroughtransnationalmunicipalnetworks’(2009)47JournalofCommonMarketStudies309,pg.313.18Ibid.19KristineKernandArthurP.J.Mol,‘CitiesandGlobalClimateGovernance:FromPassiveImplementerstoActiveCo-Decision-Makers’inMaryKaldorandJosephE.Stiglitz(eds),TheQuestforSecurity:ProtectionWithoutProtectionismandtheChallengeofGlobalGovernance(ColumbiaUniversityPress2013),pg.288.

purposesofaffectingpolicy”20,citieshavecreatednetworksthatconnectthousandsofcitiesacrosstheglobe.Thesenetworksoperateacrossthepublic-privatedivide,formingpartnershipsandcooperatingwithotheractors,betheymultinationalcorporations,globalnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)orphilanthropicfoundations.21Theyseektodistilanddisseminateauthoritativeandcredibleinformationtotheirmembercitiesthroughouttheworld.ThenetworksalsoaggregatetheinfluenceofcitiessothattheyhaveamoreprominentcollectivevoiceininternationalforumssuchastheUNFCCC. Therearefourtransnationalnetworksworkingintheareaofcity-focusedandcity-drivenclimategovernance:ICLEI-LocalGovernmentsforSustainability(ICLEI),UnitedCitiesandLocalGovernment(UCLG),theWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChangeandtheC40CitiesClimateLeadershipGroup(C40).Throughthesenetworks,citiesaroundtheworldcreatephysicalandvirtualplatformstosharebestpracticesandexperience.Theyutilizeinformationandcommunicationtechnologiestocreatecollectiveknowledgeaswellasenhancetransparency,whichinturnfosterslegitimacy.22Foreaseofreference,thisthesiswillrefertothesetransnationalnetworksofcitiesascitynetworks. Briefly,ICLEIcoordinateslocalgovernmentrepresentationinseveralUNprocessesrelatedtoAgenda21andtheHabitatAgenda.23IthasobserverstatusattheUNFCCCandhasbeenaleadingadvocateforgreaterrecognitionoftheroleoflocalandsubnationalgovernmentsintheinternationalclimatechangeregime.24UCLG’sstatedmissionis“tobetheunitedvoiceandworldadvocateofdemocraticlocalself-government”anditfacilitatesprogrammesandpartnershipstobuildthecapacityoflocalgovernments.25UCLG’sglobalagendaincludesdisasterriskreduction,the2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment,waterandsanitation,andclimatechange.26ThethirdnetworkistheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange,foundedinDecember2005bythemayorofKyoto(Japan)soonaftertheKyoto

20DeborahD.Avant,MarthaFinnemoreandSusanK.Sell(eds),WhoGovernstheGlobe?(CambridgeUniversityPress2010),pg.2.21SeediscussioninChapter5.22AnexampledrawnfromChapter5isthecarbonnClimateRegistry.Thisisanonlinereportingplatformthatallowssubnationalgovernmentstopubliclyreporttheirclimateactions.AnyonewithanInternetconnectioncangainaccesstothecarbonClimateRegistrytomonitorwhetheracityhasfulfilleditsclimateactioncommitments.Suchtransparencymechanismsallowthemedia,civilsocietyandcitizenstoplayaquasi-monitoringandenforcementfunction.Onitswebsite,carbonnClimateRegistryisdescribedas“designedastheglobalresponseoflocalandsubnationalgovernmentstowardsmeasurable,reportableandverifiableclimateaction”;online:http://carbonn.org(accessedon1July2016).23ICLEI,“Recognizing,engagingandresourcinglocalgovernments”,online:http://www.iclei.org/activities/advocacy.html(accessedon1July2016).24ICLEIatCOP21,online:http://www.iclei.org/activities/advocacy/cop21.html(accessedon1July2016).In2010,theCancunAgreementsrecognizedlocalandsubnationalgovernmentsas“governmentalstakeholders”oftheUNFCCCregime;Decision1/CP.16TheCancunAgreements:Outcomeofthework.25UnitedCitiesandLocalGovernment,online:https://www.uclg.org/en(accessedon1July2016).26Ibid.

ProtocolenteredintoforceinFebruary2005.27ThenetworkreceivestechnicalandstrategicsupportfromICLEI.28Sincetheadoptionofthe2012SeoulDeclarationofLocalGovernmentsonEnergyandClimateMitigation,theWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChangehasbeenrelativelyquietandprimarilyinvolvedinsupportingothernetworks(e.g.ICLEI)andinitiativessuchastheCompactofMayors(whichwillbediscussedindetaillater).29Finally,C40canbedescribedasbeingthemostwellknownnetworkofcitiesaddressingclimatechange.C40hasrapidlygainedprominencebecauseofitsuniquefocusonglobalcitiesandclimatechange(whiletheotherthreenetworksaddressclimatechangeasoneofmanyissueareasthattheyworkin)aswellasthepartnershipsithasfosteredwithhigh-profileorganizationssuchastheWorldBankandtheClintonFoundation.30ThisthesiswillfocusonC40becauseitsglobalcitymembershipandmodusoperandirendersitwellsuitedforastudyofhowglobalcitiesengageinhybridpublic-privategovernancearrangementsinaddressingclimatechangeandhowthesearrangementsproducenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards. TheUnitedNations(UN)hasalsoembracedtheurbanagenda.Forexample,insupportoftheabove-mentionedFiveYearVision,theUNhasformeda“sub-nationalactionhub”thatwillentailawidemobilizationofUNagenciestohelpcitiesandregionsincreasethescaleandnumberofclimateactionsandplans.31CitiesarealsoworkingdirectlywithinternationalorganizationsliketheUNHumanSettlementsProgramme(UN-Habitat)andtheWorldBanktoaddressclimatechangeaspartofalarger,multi-prongedurbansustainabledevelopmentagenda.32Indoingso,citiesareengagingintransnationalrelationsthatbypassstatesandforgingadirectlinkbetweenthelocallevelandinternationalorganizations.

2. TheSubjectMatterofthisThesis:TheLawmakingRoleofCitiesinTransnationalClimateChangeGovernance

Whilethereisalargebodyofliteratureon“citiesandclimatechange

governance”thatcontinuestogrowrapidly,fewscholarshaveconsideredthelegaleffectandnormativerelevanceofcities’governanceactivities.33Thisthesisaimsto

27WorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange,online:http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/home.html(accessedon1July2016).28Ibid.292012SeoulDeclarationofLocalGovernmentsonEnergyandClimateMitigation,online:http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/fileadmin/Documents/Seoul/2012_SeoulDeclaration_ofLocalGovernments_onEnergyandClimateMitigation.pdf(accessedon1July2016).30SeediscussioninChapter5.31Lima-ParisClimateAgenda,“CitiesandRegionsLaunchMajorFive-YearVisiontoTakeActiononClimateChange.”TheUNagenciesincludetheUNEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP),theUNDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),UN-Habitat,theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO),theWorldBankandtheUNIndustrialDevelopmentOrganization(UNIDO).32Forexample,theLowCarbon,LivableCitiesinitiativeseestheWorldBankeschewingthetraditionalapproachofmultilateralcooperationandbypassingthestatetoworkdirectlywithcityofficials;seediscussioninPart3ofChapter3.33Oncitiesandclimatechange,seeforexample,MicheleM.BetsillandHarrietBulkeley,‘TransnationalNetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:TheCitiesforClimateProtection

fillthisgapintheliteraturebyexaminingtheemergenceofcitiesasactorsthatareproducingandimplementingnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthattranscendstateboundariestosteerthebehaviorofcitiestowardsreducingGHGemissionsanddevelopinglowcarbonalternativesforthefuture.Thesenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsimposelimitationsonhowcitiesdevelopbyrequiringthemtotakeclimaterisksintoaccountandtoconsciouslydeveloppractices,policiesandregulationstoreducetheiremissionsofharmfulGHGsfrom,forexample,landfills,transportationsystemsandbuildings.Onthisbasisoftheimpactoreffectthatvoluntarystandardsandpracticeshaveoncitiesandtheirauthorities,itcanbearguedthattheyconstitutenormativeproducts.

Inthisthesis,Iadoptapluralisticconceptionofwhatconstituteslawandthereforeusethetermlawinabroadersense.34Itincludesstatementsandguidelinesthatarenot,strictlyspeaking,partoflawbutwouldbeconsideredpartofabroadernormativeorlegalprocess.Thedividebetweenlawandnon-lawhasbeenthesubjectoflong-standingdiscourseamongstlegaltheoristsandIdonotintendtodelveintothatdebate.Thisthesissituatesitselffirmlywithinthetraditionthateschewsabinaryconceptionoflaw(i.e.aninstrumentiseitherlaworitisnot)andregardslegalnormativityasaslidingscaleofvaryingdegreesofnormativity.35Withinthistraditionarethe‘lawasprocess’schoolandtheNewHavenschoolofinternationallaw.FormerpresidentoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeRosalynHiggins,forexample,isaproponentof‘lawasprocess’andhasarguedthat“[i]nternationallawisnotrules”or“accumulatedpastdecisions”butacontinuousprocessfromtheformationofrulestotheirrefinementthroughspecificapplicationbyvariousactorsincludinggovernments,multinationalcorporations,international

Program’48InternationalStudiesQuarterley471;HarrietBulkeleyandMicheleBetsill,‘RethinkingSustainableCities:MultilevelGovernanceandthe'Urban'PoliticsofClimateChange’(2005)14EnvironmmentalPolitics42;UteCollier,‘LocalauthoritiesandclimateprotectionintheEuropeanUnion:Puttingsubsidiarityintopractice?’(1997)2LocalEnvironment39;GardLindseth,‘TheCitiesforClimateProtectionCampaign(CCPC)andtheframingofLocalClimatePolicy’9LocalEnvironment325;RenskedenExter,JenniferLenhartandKristineKern,‘GoverningclimatechangeinDutchcities:anchoringlocalclimatestrategiesinorganisation,policyandpracticalimplementation’(2014)LocalEnvironment:TheInternationalJournalofJusticeandSustainability;JoyeetaGupta,RalphLasageandTjeerdStam,‘NationalEffortstoenhancelocalclimatepolictintheNetherlands’(2007)4EnvironmentalSciences171;HeleenLydekeP.MeesandPeterP.J.Driessen,‘Adaptationtoclimatechangeinurbanareas:Climate-greeningLondon,Rotterdam,andToronto’(2011)2ClimateLaw251.34Onlegalpluralism,seee.g.,PaulSchiffBerman,GlobalLegalPluralism:AJurisprudenceofLawbeyondBorders(CambridgeUniversityPress2014);BalakrishnanRajagopal,‘TheRoleofLawinCounter-hegemonicGlobalizationandGlobalLegalPluralism:LessonsfromtheNarmadaValleyStruggleinIndia’(2005)18LeidenJournalofInternationalLaw345;GuntherTeubner,‘’GlobalBukowina’:LegalPluralismintheWorldSociety’inGuntherTeubner(ed),GlobalLawWithoutaState(DartmouthPublishingCompany1997);Foracritiqueofthelackofcontinuitybetween“globallegalpluralism”andtheolderanthropologicalandsocio-legalaccountsoflegalpluralism,seeWilliamTwining,“NormativeandLegalPluralism:AGlobalPerspective”(2010)DukeJournalofInternationalandComparativeLaw473-517.35Forabinaryconceptionoflaw,seeJanKlabbers,‘TheRedundancyofSoftLaw’(1996)65NordicJournalofInternationalLaw167.

courtsandtribunals.36AccordingtotheNewHavenschool,lawmakingisa“processofauthoritativedecisionbywhichmembersofacommunityclarifyandsecuretheircommoninterests.”37Itisabroadsocialphenomenondeeplyembeddedinthepracticesandbeliefsofasocietyandshapedbyinteractionswithinandamongstsocieties.38Adoptingtheseconceptionsofinternationallawmaking,thisthesisarguesthatwhencitiesconstructandimplementnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards,theyaremakingandimplementinglaw.Theemergenceofcitiesasjurisgenerativeactorsinthecontextoftransnationalclimatechangegovernanceisthefocusofthisthesis.39

Theparticipationofcitiesintransnationallegalprocessesinvitesustoreexaminetheoriesofinternationallawmakingthatpositthestateastheonlylegallyrelevantactorininternationalaffairs.Fromaclassicalinternationallawperspective,acitydoesnothaveinternationallegalpersonalityasitisdeemedtobeapartofthestateinwhichitisphysicallyandjurisdictionallyembedded.Therefore,accordingtoclassicalinternationallaw,theactionsofcitiesareattributablesolelytotheirstates.IfRotterdamundertakestoreduceitsGHGemissions,itsimplycountstowardstheNetherlands’internationallegalobligationstomitigateclimatechangeanddoesnothaveindependentrelevanceforthepurposesofpublicinternationallaw.Thenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatcitiesdevelopandconveythroughtheirtransnationalnetworksarealsonotrecognizedtobeinternationallaw,astheyarenotamongstthetraditionalsourcesidentifiedinArticle38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.

However,inthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury,internationallawscholars(andthosestudyinglawandglobalizationmoregenerally)increasinglyrecognizethatweinhabitaworldofmultiplenormativecommunities.Afterglobalization,privatizationandtradeliberalizationsweptthroughtheworldinthe1980sand1990s,regulationandstandardsettinghaveceasedtobetheexclusivedomainofstatesandinternationalorganizations.Businessactors,professionalassociationsandNGOshavebecomeinvolvedindevelopingandimplementingregulatoryinitiativesandvoluntarycodesofconduct,forexample.40Ofcourse,these36RosalynHiggins,ProblemsandProcess:InternationalLawandHowWeUseIt(ClarendonPress1995),pgs.2-3.37HaroldD.LasswellandMyresS.McDougal,JurisprudenceforaFreeSociety:StudiesinLaw,ScienceandPolicy(MartinusNijhoffPublishers1992),pg.xxi.38Levitoffersanaccountof“bottom-upinternationallawmaking”inwhichlawmaking“isaprocesswherebypracticesandbehaviorsgelaslaw”andbothpublicandprivateactors“joinwithotherssimilarlysituatedinavocation(althoughoftenquitedistantinlocation)toshareexperiencesandstandardizepracticestowardssharedgoals”;JanetKovenLevit,‘Bottom-upInternationalLawmaking:ReflectionsontheNewHavenSchoolofInternationalLaw’(2007)32YaleJournalofInternationalLaw393,pg.409.39StevenWheatleyargues,“thedefiningcharacteristicofanon-state‘jurisgenerative’actorisitscapacitytoestablishinternationalgovernancenormsthatframethecontextforactionbystates,corporateentitiesandindividuals”.Further,itcanbesaidthatnon-stateactorsexercisepoliticalauthority,anactivitytraditionallyassociatedwiththestate,whentheirjurisgenerativeeffortshavepracticaleffect;StevenWheatley,‘Democraticgovernancebeyondthestate:thelegitimacyofnon-stateactorsasstandardsetters’inAnnePetersetal(eds.),Non-StateActorsasStandardSetters(CambridgeUniversityPress2009),pg.220.40SeePart2ofChapter6fordiscussion.

normshavevaryingdegreesofimpact,“butithasbecomeclearthatignoringsuchnormativeassertionsassomehownot‘law’isnotausefulstrategy”.41Accordingly,whatweseeemergingareapproachestointernationallawdrawnfromlegalpluralismandtransnationalism.Throughitsexaminationofcitiesasanemergingnormativecommunityinthesphereoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance,thisthesisseekstocontributetothelargerdiscussionsabouttheevolvingnatureofthestateandinternationallawmakingprocessesinaworldofincreasingglobalpluralistgovernance.42

Thisthesisisalsolikelytobeofinteresttoscholarsofclimatechangepolicy.Asmentionedearlier,therealreadyexistsanabundantliteratureoncitiesandclimatechange.Therearenumerousstudiesontheopportunitiesandbarriersthatcitiesfaceinmitigatingandadaptingtoclimatechange,comparativecasestudies,andanalysisofurbanparticipationinhybridgovernanceinitiatives.43However,tothebestofmyknowledge,nonehaveconsideredtheroleofcitiesasnorm-settersandthelegalmeaningoftheclimategovernanceactivitiesinwhichcitiesengage.Nonehavealso,tothebestofmyknowledge,consideredtheinteractionbetweenthenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatcitieshavegeneratedandareputtingintoeffectandtraditionalsourcesofclimatelawsuchastheCOPdecisionsoftheUNFCCCandtherecentlyconcludedParisAgreement.Thisthesisthereforeattemptstoshedlightonthetransnationallawmakingdimensionoftherolethatcitiesplayingoverningclimatechange.Ihopethatthisthesiswillenrichourunderstandingofacomplexworldprolificwithclimatechangegovernanceexperimentsthatinvolvemanypublicandprivateactors.

2.1TheFocusonGlobalCities

ThousandsofcitiesaremembersofnetworksliketheC40,theCovenantofMayorsforClimateandEnergy44,CarbonNeutralCitiesAlliance45,andEurocities4641PaulSchiffBerman,‘APluralistApproachtoInternationalLaw’(2007)32YaleJournalofInternationalLaw301,pg302.42Fordiscussionofpluralistglobalgovernance,seeGrainnedeBurca,RobertO.KeohaneandCharlesSabel,‘NewModesofPluralistGlobalGovernance’(2013)45NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics723.43InadditiontotheworkslistedinFootnote33,seee.g.MelissaPowers,‘USmunicipalclimateplans:whatrolewillcitiesplayinclimatechangemitigation’andElizabethSchwartz,‘Localsolutionstoaglobalproblem?Climatechangepolicy-makinginVancouver’inLocalClimateChangeLaw:EnvironmentalRegulationinCitiesandOtherLocalities(BenjaminRichardsoned,EdwardElgarPublishing2012);MikaelGranbergandIngemarElander,‘LocalGovernanceandClimateChange:ReflectionsontheSwedishExperience’(2007)12LocalEnvironment537;BenjaminJ.DeangeloandL.D.DannyHarvey,‘Thejurisdictionalframeworkformunicipalactiontoreducegreenhousegasemissions:CasestudiesfromCanada,theUSAandGermany’(1998)3LocalEnvironment111.44TheEuropeanCommissionlaunchedtheCovenantofMayorsforClimateandEnergyaftertheadoptionoftheEUClimateandEnergyPackagein2008tosupportlocalauthoritiesintheimplementationofclimatemitigationandsustainableenergyplans.MembersoftheCovenantofMayorsareeligibleforfundingopportunitiesavailedbytheCommitteeofRegionsandtheEuropeanInvestmentBank.TobecomeamemberoftheCovenantofMayors,alocalauthoritymustgiveaformalundertakingtoprepareabaselineemissionsinventory,submitasustainableenergyactionplanandsubmitanimplementationstatusreportatleastonceeverysecondyearaftersubmissionof

tonameafew.Thesenetworkshaveemergedtofacilitatetheexchangeofideas,informationandbestpracticesamongstcities.Somenetworksalsoseektogivecollectiverepresentationtourbaninterestsandengageinpoliticaladvocacyattheinternationallevel(e.g.ICLEI)andattheregionallevel(e.g.Eurocities).Manymid-sizedcitiesaremembersofmultiplenetworksand,atsomepoint,maydecidetoconsolidatetheirresourcesandfocusonparticipatinginnetworksthatconferthemostbenefits.47Manycitiesarenotlikelytohavetheresourcestoparticipateintransnationalnetworksthataregearedtowardsscalingupcityclimateactionstothegloballevel.Forexample,avice-mayorofamid-sizedcityinGreecesharedinaninterviewthathercityparticipatedinmanynetworks.In2016,themayor’sofficedecidedthatitwasapriorityforthecitytobecomeamemberofEurocities,theregionalnetworkthatistheactivelobbyistforurbaninterestsattheEUlevel.48Theannualmembershipfeeoffifteenthousandeurosisconsideredheftyforacityofitssize.Thecity’sgovernmentthereforedecidedtowithdrawfromallnetworksthatrequiremembershipfeesinordertopayforEurocitiesmembership.Assuch,aworkingassumptionIadoptedatanearlystageofresearchforthisthesisisthatnotallcitieshavethemotivationand/ortheresourcestobecomegloballyrelevantactorsinclimategovernance.

Basedondesktopreviewsoftheexistingliteratureandempiricalfindingsdrawnfromfieldvisitsandinterviews,itbecameclearearlyoninmyresearchthatthecitiesthatareproactiveleadersintheclimatechangearenatendtobecitiesthat

thesustainableenergyactionplan.Signatoriesfacethepossibilityofsuspensioniftheyfailtosubmittherequisitedocumentswithinestablisheddeadlines.SeetheCovenantofMayorsforClimateandEnergy,“CommitmentDocument”,online:http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/IMG/pdf/CoM_CommitmentDocument_en.pdf(accessedon1July2016).45TheCarbonNeutralCitiesAllianceisaprojectoftheUrbanSustainabilityDirectorsNetwork,whichisa“peer-to-peernetworkoflocalgovernmentprofessionals”fromcitiesacrossNorthAmerica.On27March2015,themayorsof17majorcities(nearlyhalfofwhichareUScitiesincludingBoston,WashingtonDCandNewYorkCity)announcedthelaunchofthisalliancewhichwillworkwithmembercitiestoachievethegoalofreducingtheirGHGemissionsbyatleast80%by2050orsooner.SeeCarbonNeutralCitiesAlliance,online:http://usdn.org/public/page/13/CNCA(accessedon1July2016).46Eurocitiesworksacrossarangeofareasincludingenvironmentalsustainability,socialcohesionandculture.Its“objectiveistoreinforcetheimportantrolethatlocalgovernmentsshouldplayinamultilevelgovernancestructure”andtorepresenttheinterestsofmunicipalauthoritiesattheEUlevel.TheEurocitiesprojectteammonitorsrelevantEUfundingcallsandprovidememberswithfundingforecasts,briefsandopportunitiestofindprojectpartners.EurocitiesalsoworkswithEUinstitutionsandnationalgovernmentstoensurethatEUlegislationcanbeproperlyimplementedatthelocallevel.SeeEurocities,online:http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about_us(accessedon1July2016).47Acutoandhiscolleagueshavemadeasimilarobservation.Theyarguethatthevastnumberofnetworkspresentscitygovernmentswiththedilemmaofdecidingwheretheyshouldfocustheirnetworkingefforts,bearinginmindthatthemorenetworksacityparticipatesin,thegreatertheburdenplacedonanalreadystretchedmunicipalgovernmentforcommunication,reportingandcollaborativeengagement;MicheleAcuto,MikaMorissetteandAgisTsouros,‘Citydiplomacy:TowardsMoreStrategicNetworking?LearningwithWHOHealthyCities’(2016)GlobalPolicyDOI:10.1111/1758-5899.12382.48InterviewNo.7.

commandsignificantpoliticalandeconomicresources.Thesecitiesareoftenhubsofglobaltrade,transnationalcapital,andculturalflows.Inotherwords,thecitiesthatareleadingthecurrentwaveofurbanclimateactionarewhatSaskiaSassencallsglobalcities.Sassendefinestoday’sglobalcitiesas“(1)commandpointsintheorganizationoftheworldeconomy,(2)keylocationsandmarketplacesfortheleadingindustriesofthecurrentperiod–financeandspecializedservicesforfirms,and(3)majorsitesofproduction,includingtheproductionofinnovations…”Accordingtothismodel,thereisnosuchthingasasingleglobalcityortheglobaleconomy.49Globalcitiesmustinteractwitheachotherinordertofulfilltheroleofcoordinatingandprovidingservicestomultinationalcorporationsandevenwholeeconomiesthatareincreasinglytransnational.Suchinteractionsamongstcitiescreate“inter-urbannetworks”or“circuitsthatcrisscrosstheworld…thatconnectspecificareas,mostofwhicharecities”.50ForSassen,‘globalcity’isnotadescriptivetermforadistinctiveurbanform:“Itisananalyticconstructthatallowsonetodetecttheglobalasitisfilteredthroughthespecificsofaplace,itsinstitutionalorders,anditssocio-spatialfragmentations.”51Inotherwords,giventhattheglobalizationprocessescreateglobalcitieswhich,inturn,areterritorialspacesinwhichtheprocessesofglobalizationunfoldandaffectlocalcommunities,theglobalcityisatheoreticalprismthroughwhichtheconnectionsbetweencitiesandglobalizationcanbestudied.52

Inexaminingtheriseofcitiesastransnationalgovernanceactorsinthisthesis,IhavebroadlyadoptedSassen’sconceptionoftheglobalcityandchosentofocusontheroleofglobalcitiesingoverningclimatechangebecausethesearethecitiesthatareseekingtoassertthemselvesasgloballyrelevantactors.Thischoicealsohasthebenefitofcircumscribingthescopeofthisthesissoastoensurethattheresearchagendaisafeasibleandrealisticonegiventheconstraintsoftimeandresources.2.2DefiningTransnationalClimateChangeGovernance

Throughoutthisthesis,Iwillrefertotheconceptoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Tograspthisconceptrequiresustoengagewithitsthreecorecomponents-transnationalism,climatechangeandgovernance–whichprovidearichvocabularytoexploreandanalyzetheinvolvementofmultipleactors(apartfromstatesandinternationalorganizations)ingoverningclimatechange.Iwill

49SaskiaSassen,CitiesinaWorldEconomy(4thedn,SagePublications2012),pgs.7,111.50Ibid,pg.111.Differentcircuitswillincludedifferentcountriesandcities.Thecircuitfortheglobalcoffeetrade(includingtradingcoffeeasacommodity,sellingitasaconsumerproduct,andcoffeefuturestrading,forexample)involvescitiesandcountriesthataredifferentfromthoseinthecircuitforthebiofuelsproductionandsale.Sassenpointsoutthattheproliferationofcircuitsisnotsolelydrivenbyeconomicforces.Non-governmentalorganizationsworkingforlabourrightsandenvironmentalprotectionalsocreateanddevelopnetworks(Sassen,CitiesinaWorldEconomy,pg.113).51Ibid,pg.x.52TheconceptoftheglobalcitywillbeelaborateduponinChapter2.

brieflysketchouthoweachcorecomponentinformsmyunderstandingoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance.

Transnationalism:Transnationalismiswellestablishedinthefieldofinternationalrelationsasthestudyof“contacts,coalitionsandinteractions”thatbridge,extendoroccuracrossstateboundaries.53Bydefinition,transnationalphenomenainvolvenon-stateactors(suchasNGOs,businesses,charities,andreligiousorders)andsub-stateactors(suchasprovincesandmunicipalities).54Whileinternationalaffairsinvolverelationsbetweenstates,transnationalrelationsoccurbetweenstatesandnon-stateactorsastheyinteractacrossstateborders.55

Whathasbeenofgrowinginteresttoscholarsoftrasnationalisminrecentyearsarenovel,hybridgovernancearrangementsthatemergewhenvariousgroups,includingbusinessassociations,NGOs,andsometimesgovernmentrepresentatives,worktogethertodrawuprulestoinducemoreresponsiblebusinessbehaviour.56Thepluralityofactorsinvolvedinthesemulti-stakeholderpartnershipshasincreasedand,asthisthesiswillshow,citiesnowparticipateinsomeoftheseinitiativesaspartnersalongsidestatesandinternationalorganizations.AnexampleistheUN-supportedCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAlliancewhichbringscities,multilateralfinancialinstitutions,privateinvestors,businessesandpolicymakerstogethertocreateandimplementrecommendationsonhowtomobilisegreaterflowsofcapitalinto“climate-smart”infrastructure.57Transnationalhybridinitiativeshavebeenthesubjectofaflorishingbodyofscholarship,whichneedstobeunderstoodagainstthebackgroundofawiderdebateontheriseof“privateregulation”insocial,economicandenvironmentalgovernance.58Itshouldbenoted

53Inthe1970s,inanattempttochallengethedominantstate-centricviewofworldaffairs,JosephNyeandRobertKeohanesoughttobringattentiontothetransnationaldimensionsofworldaffairs.Defining“transnationalrelations”as“contacts,coalitionsandinteractionsacrossstateboundariesthatarenotcontrolledbythecentralforeignpolicyorgansofgovernments”,NyeandKeohaneeditedaspecialissueofInternationalOrganizationdevotedtotheorizingtheimpactoftransnationalrelationsontheinterstatesystem.Theyalsoadvocatedaworldpoliticsparadigmthatbroadenstheconceptionofactorstoincludenon-stateactorsandsub-unitsofgovernments;Jr.NyeJosephSandRobertO.Keohane,‘TransnationalRelationsandWorldPolitics:AConclusion’(1971)25InternationalOrganization721.54HarrietBulkeleyandothers,TransnationalClimateChangeGovernance(CambridgeUniversityPress2014),pg.5.Onreligiousorganizationsastransnationalactors,seeJeffHaynes,‘Transnationalreligiousactorsandinternationalpolitics’(2001)22Thirdworldquarterly143;oncitiesastransnationalactors,seeMicheleAcuto,‘GlobalCitiesasActors:ARejoindertoCalderanddeFreytas’(2009)29SAISReviewofInternationalAffairs175.Onregionsengaginginparadiplomacy,seeforexample,HubertRiouxOuimet,‘FromSub-stateNationalismtoSubnationalCompetitionStates:TheDevelopmentandInstitutionalizationofCommercialParadiplomacyinScotlandandQuebec’(2015)25RegionalandFederalStudies109.55Bulkeleyandothers,ibid.56See,forexample,LucW.FransenandAnsKolk,‘GlobalRule-SettingforBusiness:ACriticalAnalysisofMulti-StakeholderStandards’(2007)14Organization667.57CitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAlliance,‘TheBangkok-JohannesburgBlueprint’,online:http://www.citiesclimatefinance.org/2015/12/the-bangkok-johannesburg-blueprint/(accessedon1July2016).58StefanoPonteandCarstenDaugbjerg,‘Biofuelsustainabilityandtheformationoftransnationalhybridgovernance’(2015)24EnvironmentalPolitics96,pg.100.Ontheriseofprivateregulation,

that,nontheless,statesremaincentraltotransnationalprocesses.AsSaskiaSassen’sworkhasdemonstrated,thestateremainsacentralpoliticalentityandcontributestoitsownevolutionthroughitsactivecollaborationwithandenablingoftransnationalforces.59

Inthelegalacademy,theconceptofthetransnationalhasgainedtractionaslawyersgrapplewiththeimpactofglobalizationonthewaysinwhichlegalnormsaregenerated,diffusedandappliedacrossjurisdictions.Inordertounderstandhowtransnationallawworks,onemustunderstandtransnationallegalprocess,whichHaroldHongjuKohdefinesas“thetransubstantiveprocess…wherebystatesandothertransnationalprivateactorsusetheblendofdomesticandinternationallegalprocesstointernalizeinternationallegalnormsintodomesticlaw”.60Thesedefinitionshelpcapturetheessenceofcontemporarylegalorderingwherebylegalnormsapplyacrossbordersandareconveyedthroughtransnationalprocesses.61

Thisthesisseekstocontributetothetransnationallawliteraturebywideningitsanalyticalambittoincludesub-stateactorssuchascities.AsIwillarguelaterinthisthesis,traditionalconceptionsoftransnationallawsuchasKoh’sadoptthe“statesversusprivateactors”dischotomy.Assub-stateentities,citiescannotbeaccuratelydescribedasbeingprivateactorsbecause,inmanyways,theirinterestsandmodesofbehavioursharegreatersimilaritywithstatesratherthanprivateactorssuchasNGOsandbusinesses.Nijmanhasarguedthat,inconstitutingtheiridentitiesasglobalactors,citiesimitatetheforeignpolicyandinternationallawpracticesofstatessuchasestablishingforeignaffairsofficesandmodellingUCLG,theglobalorganizationoflocalgovernmentsthataimstorepresenttheworld’scitiesattheinternationallevel,ontheUN.62Oneofthecentralclaimsofthisthesisisthattheuniquestatusofthecityasasub-stateactoroughttoberecognizedbothinpracticeandinlegalscholarshipinorderformorenuancedtreatmentoftheroleofcitiesintransnationallegalorderingtooccur.

ClimateChange:Thereisabodyofsoundscientificevidenceforinternationalactiontoaddressthecausesandimpactsofclimatechange.AccordingtotheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)’sFifthAssessmentReport,weknowwithmorethan95%certaintythathumanactivityisresponsible

seeforexample,TimButheandWalterMattli,TheNewGlobalRulers:ThePrivatizationofRegulationintheWorldEconomy(PrincetonUniversityPress2011).59“Thenationalisstilltherealmwhereformalizationandinstitutionalizationhaveallreachedtheirhighestlevelofdevelopment”but“thenationalisalsooftenoneofthekeyenablersandenactorsoftheemergentglobalscale”;SaskiaSassen,Territory,Authority,Rights:FromMedievaltoGlobalAssemblages(PrincetonUniversityPress2008),pg.3.60HaroldHKoh,‘WhyTransnationalLawMatters’(2005-6)24PennStateInternationalLawReview745,pgs.745-6.61GregoryShaffer,‘ATransnationalTakeonKrisch’sPluralistPostnationalLaw’(2012)23EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw565,pg.577;alsoseeGregoryC.Shaffer(ed)TransnationalLegalOrderingandStateChange(CambridgeUniversityPress2014).62JanneE.Nijman,‘RenaissanceoftheCityasGlobalActor:TheRoleofForeignPolicyandInternationalLawPracticesintheConstructionofCitiesasGlobalActors’inGuntherHellmann,AndreasFahrmeirandMilosVec(eds),TheTransformationofForeignPolicy:DrawingandManagingBoundariesfromAntiquitytothePresent(OxfordUniversityPress2016).

fortheincreaseinglobalaveragetemperature.63TheemissionofGHGs,particularlycarbondioxide,isthedominantcauseoftheobservedwarmingsincethemid-20thcentury.64Economicandpopulationgrowtharethemostimportantdriversofincreasesincarbondioxideemissions,mainlyfromtheburningoffossilfuels.Duetohumanactivity,theatmosphericconcentrationsofcarbondioxide,methaneandnitrousoxidehaveallincreasedsince1750.65Citiescurrentlyaccountforover70%ofglobalenergyuseandarethereforeakeysourceofGHGemissions.66The“carbonfootprint”ofcitieswillcontinuetoincreaseifeffortsarenottakentocontrolandreduceurbanemissionsasurbanizationisontherise.67By2050,thenumberofpeoplelivingincitiesisexpectedtoincreaseby2.5to3billionrelativeto2009.68

Sincethe2009UNFCCCCOPinCopenhagen,thetargettolimitaverageglobaltemperaturerisetonomorethan2degreeCelsiusabovepre-industriallevelshasbecomefirmlyentrenchedininternationalclimatepolicydiscourse.69IntheParisAgreement,signatorystatescommittedtostrengthentheglobalresponsetoclimatechangeby“holdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetowellbelow2°Cabovepre-industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels,recognizingthatthiswouldsignificantlyreducetherisksandimpactsofclimatechange.”70DeepcutsinglobalGHGemissionsarerequiredtoachievethisgoal.Infact,haltingtheglobalaveragetemperatureriseatanylevelwillrequirenetzeroglobalcarbondioxideemissionsatsomepointinthefuture.TheIPCC,UNEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)andUNFCCChaverepeatedlyemphasizedthatthelongerwewaittobendthecurrentlyincreasingcurveofglobalemissionsdownwards,thesteeperwewillhavetobendit.71Limitingglobalwarmingtobelow2degreesCelsius“necessitatesaradicaltransition(deepdecarbonizationnowandgoingforward),notmerelyafinetuningofcurrenttrends”.72

63T.F.Stockerandothers,IPCC,2013:SummaryforPolicymakersinClimateChange2013:ThePhysicalScienceBasis.ContributionofWorkingGroupItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(CambridgeUniversityPress,2013),pg.15.64Ibid,pg.17.65Ibid,pg.11.66CambridgeInstituteforSustainabilityLeadership,CambridgeJudgeBusinessSchoolandICLEI,ClimateChange:ImplicationsforCities(KeyFindingsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeFifthAssessmentReport)(2014),pg.5,online:www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/ipcc(accessedon1July2016).67Ibid.68Ibid.69Fordiscussionofthehistoryofthe2degreesCelsiustarget,seeSamuelRandalls,‘Historyofthe2Cclimatetarget’(2010)1WIREsClimateChange598.InthefirstparagraphoftheCopenhagenAccord,signatoriespledgethat“[t]oachievetheultimateobjectiveoftheConventiontostabilizegreenhousegasconcentrationintheatmosphereatalevelthatwouldpreventdangerousanthropogenicinterferencewiththeclimatesystem,weshall,recognizingthescientificviewthattheincreaseinglobaltemperatureshouldbebelow2degreesCelsius…enhanceourlong-termcooperativeactiontocombatclimatechange”;Decision2/CP.15.70Article2(1)(a)oftheParisAgreement.71UNFCCC,Reportonthestructuredexpertdialogueonthe2013–2015review:Notebytheco-facilitatorsofthestructuredexpertdialogue(FCCC/SB/2015/INF1,4May2015),pg.11.72Ibid.

Inthisthesis,myframingbroadlypresentsclimatechangeasanenvironmentalproblemcausedbysocio-economicdisruptions.Thesolutionsrequirefundamentaleconomicandsocialtransformationsuchthatclimatechangegovernancemusttakeplaceatmultiplescalesofgovernanceandinvolvemanyactors.Thisincludescitiesandtheirgovernmentsimplementingsolutionsatthesubnationallevelandscalinguptheiractionsthroughtransnationalcooperation.Ingeneral,climateactioncanbedividedintotwomaincategories:mitigationandadaptation.MitigationreferstomeasurestoreduceGHGsourcesandremoveGHGsfromtheatmosphere.73Examplesincludeimprovingtheenergyefficiencyofbuildingssothattheyuselesselectricityandplantingtreestoabsorbatmosphericcarbon.TheIPCCdefinesadaptationas“[a]djustmentinnaturalorhumansystemsinresponsetoactualorexpectedclimaticstimuliortheireffects,whichmoderatesharmorexploitsbeneficialopportunities.”74Examplesincludestrengtheningacity’sdefencesagainstfloodingrisksandimprovingthequalityofroadsurfacestowithstandhighertemperatures.Mitigationandadaptationmeasurescanoftenleadtosynergies.75Forexample,increasingtreecoverinacitynotonlymitigatesclimatechange.76Italsocoolsthecity,reducingthelikelihoodofheatstrokeascityinhabitantsfacehottersummers.Increasingacity’streecoveralsodeliversarangeofotherbenefitsincludingimprovedairqualityandmorebiologicaldiversity.77

Governance:Atthemostgenerallevel,governancemaybeunderstoodas“issuesofsocialcoordinationandthenatureofallpatternsofrule”.78Thislevelofgeneralityanddefinitionalflexibilityisoneofthestrengthsofthegovernanceconceptasitallowsfortheexplorationofphenomenathatdonotfitwellintoestablishedcategories.However,suchabroaddefinitionalsooccasionallymakesitdifficulttodefinewhat,exactly,constitutesgovernance.Further,therearemultipledefinitionsofgovernanceintheliterature.Forexample,MichaelZurnetal.definegovernanceasthesumofregulations,policyprocessesandstructures,whicharedesignedtoremedyapublicproblemviaacollectivecourseofaction.79PattbergandStripplewouldconsidergovernanceasamatterofshapingtheconductofactorsthroughtheestablishmentofnewnormsandpracticessuchascarbonreporting.80Forthepurposesofthisthesis,IadoptAndonovaetal.’sdefinitionof(transnational)governance:“whennetworksoperatinginthetransnationalsphereauthoritatively

73IPCC,“ClimateChange2007:WorkingGroupII:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability”,Glossary,online:https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/annexessglossary-a-d.html74Ibid.75See,forexample,AMICA,online:http://www.amica-climate.net/about_amica.html(accessedon1July2016).76KentonRogersandothers,ValuingLondon'sUrbanForest:ResultsofLondoni-TreeEcoProject(TreeconomicsLondon,2015).77Ibid,pgs.45-50.78MarkBevir,TheSAGEHandbookofGovernance(SAGEPublishing2011),pg.1.79MichaelZurnetal,“Introduction”inHandbookonMulti-levelgovernance(HenrikEnderlein,SonjaWaltiandMichaelZurneds,EdwardElgarPublishing2010),pg.2.80PhilippPattbergandJohannesStripple,‘Beyondthepublicandprivatedivide:remappingtransnationalclimategovernanceinthe21stcentury’(2008)8InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements367.

steerconstituentstowardpublicgoals”.81Therearethreeelementstothisdefinitionthatareworthnoting.First,itisconcernedwithrealizingpublicgoals.Secondly,steeringconnotesthedirectiveandintentionalnatureofgovernanceprocesses.Thirdly,governanceisregardedasauthoritative,definedas“theabilitytoinducedeferenceinothers”.82 Insummary,transnationalclimatechangegovernanceoccurswhensub-stateactors,privateactors,statesandinternationalorganizationsengageincross-bordercooperation,therebyformingtransnationalnetworkstotransmitknowledge,bestpracticesandexpertise.Transnationalclimatechangegovernanceseekstoauthoritativelysteerandhaveaconstrainingimpactonthebehavioroftargetactors.Whennorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsemerge,itcanbearguedthattransnationalclimatechangegovernancetakesonanormativedimension.Basedonapluralisticconceptionoflawmaking,theproductionofnormsandvoluntarystandardsthatareusuallyadoptedandimplementedthroughpracticescanbeviewedaslaw.TransnationalclimatechangegovernanceisspecificallyconcernedwithconstrainingtheGHG-emittingbehavioroftargetactors,withthegoaloflimitingaverageglobaltemperaturerisetonomorethan2degreeCelsiusabovepre-industriallevelsinmind.Itisalsoconcernedwithbuildingtheresilienceofcommunitiestotheimpactsofclimatechangesuchasincreasedfloodrisks.2.3ResearchQuestions Summingupthediscussionsofar,thecentralclaimofthisthesisisthatcitiesarebeginningtoperformlawmakingfunctionsinthecontextoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Throughtransnationalnetworksthatformimportantlinkagesbetweencitygovernments,states,internationalorganizations,businesses,andcivilsociety,citiesarecreatingandimplementingnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsacrossnationalboundaries.Theimpactoftheirnormativeoutputistosteerthebehaviorofcitiestowardsmitigatingclimatechangeandadaptingtoitsunavoidableimpacts.Further,themulti-level,multi-actorpartnershipsinwhichcitiesparticipateactivelytodaytranscendthepublic/privatedivideandthetraditionalstricturesof“domestic”(internal)versus“international”(external).Assuch,thetransnationalgovernanceactivitiesofcitiesalsopointtothereconfigurationofthestateinmoderntimes–fromamonolithic,unitaryentitytoamutable,variegatedoneinaglobalsystemdenselypopulatedbynetworksofcomponentsofthestate(forexample,networkscomprisingofjudges,antitrustenforcementagencies,andcentralbanks).83 Toexamineandestablishtheaboveclaims,thefollowingquestionsguidethisresearchagenda:81LilianaB.Andonova,MicheleM.BetsillandHarrietBulkeley,‘TransnationalClimateGovernance’(2009)9GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics52,pg.56.82Avant,FinnemoreandSell,pg.9.Deferencetoauthoritycantakevariousforms.Inthepresentcase,theauthorityof“climateleaders”hastendedtocreatenewpreferencesorpersuadedothercityleaders/mayorstosharetheleaders’viewsonclimatechangeandthepossiblesolutions.83SeeAnne-MarieSlaughter,ANewWorldOrder(PrincetonUniversityPress2005).ThispointwillbefurtherexploredinChapter7.

1. Whatrecentdevelopmentssuggesttheriseofcitiesininternationalaffairs?

2. Whathavecitiesbeendoingtogovernclimatechangeandwhichofthese

governanceactivitiesgeneratenormativeeffectstransnationally?

3. Howdothenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsgeneratedbycitiesandtransmittedbytheirnetworksleadtocitiesreducingtheirGHGemissionsandincreasingtheirclimateresilience?

4. Howdothenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsgeneratedbycitiesand

transmittedbytheirnetworksrelatetothoseoftheUNFCCCregime?

5. Docitiesmakeapositivenormativecontributiontotheglobalconstellationofclimatechangegovernanceactivities?

Thesequestionsarecomplementedbysub-questionsineachchapter.3.Methodology Inthefirstphaseofresearchforthisthesis,ImappedoutthedevelopmentoftheUNFCCCregimeandthewiderclimatechangeregimecomplexinordertoidentifyandsituatetheemergenceofafocusoncitiesintheclimatechangediscourseamongstpolicy-makers,practitioners,andresearchers.84Incarryingoutthismappingexercise,Ireliedon(1)reportsandstudiespublishedbyinternationalorganizationsincludingtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),WorldBankandUNFCCC,(2)secondaryliteratureincludingacademicjournalarticlesandtreatises,and(3)literaturepublishedbyICLEI.Asmentionedearlier,ICLEIhasbeenaleadingadvocateforgreaterrecognitionoftheroleoflocalandsubnationalgovernmentsattheUNFCCC. Inthesecondphaseofresearch,Iconductedanextensivedesktopreviewoftheliteraturetoidentifythereasonsfortheemergenceofcitiesasactorsintransnationalclimategovernanceand,morebroadly,ininternationalaffairs.Theliteraturereviewincludedacademicjournalarticles,monographs,leadingnewspapersandmagazinessuchasTheFinancialTimes,TheGuardian,EconomistandForeignPolicy.Icarefullystudiedtheworkingpapersofresearchinstitutesandpolicythinktanksasasourceofemergingtrendsandnewthinkingaboutcitiesandglobalaffairs.AnothersourceofmaterialsformydesktopreviewwastheresearchpublicationsofinternationalorganizationssuchastheWorldBank,UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeandtheOECD.Finally,Iscrutinizedthepressreleasesandotherpubliclyavailablematerialsthatcitiesandcitynetworkshaveproducedinordertoevaluatehowcitiesandtheirnetworksusecertainlanguagetoconstructtheiridentitiesasresponsibleglobalactorswhoareimportantpartnersintheglobal

84RegimecomplextheorywillbeexplainedinChapter2.

efforttoaddressclimatechange.Forexample,C40’swebsitestatesthatcitiesareonamissionbecauseofthebeliefthat“thebattletopreventcatastrophicclimatechangewillbewonorlostinourcities”.85Attheendofthisphase,basedoninsightsIderivedfromtheliteratureandempiricaldata,Idevelopedatheoreticalaccountoftheemergenceofcitiesasactorsininternationalaffairs. Inthethirdphaseoftheresearch,Ifocusedonidentifyingglobalcitiesthatarewidelyrecognizedasproactivefrontrunnersintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Theaimwastoincludeachapterinthisthesisonwhatglobalcitiesaredoinglocallytoaddressclimatechangesoastogroundthediscussioninthisthesisineverydayreality,andtoshedlightontheconnectionsbetweenthelocalandthegloballevelsofgovernance.Iidentifiedthesecitiesbasedonareviewoftheliterature,andpubliclyavailabledataoncarbonClimateRegistrywhichenablessubnationalgovernmentstopubliclyreporttheirclimateactionsonaregularbasis.CasestudiespublishedbyC40,ICLEIandregionalcitynetworkssuchasCitiesDevelopmentInitiativeforAsiaalsoconstitutedausefulsourceofinformationforidentifyingclimatefrontrunners.86ThechoiceofglobalcitiesthatarefeaturedinChapter4wasalsodictatedbytheavailabilityofinformationintheEnglishlanguageandsomedegreeoffamiliaritywiththebroadersocialandlegalcontextsinwhichthesecitiesfunctioned.Ialsoconductedsemi-structuredinterviewswithcitygovernmentofficials,consultantswithextensiveexperienceworkingwithcitiesonclimatemitigationandadaptationstrategies,currentandformerstaffatC40andICLEItobetterunderstandhowtheseglobalcitieswereaddressingclimatechange.Theseinterviewsweresemi-structuredinnaturesoastoallowforflexibility.Eachinterviewbeganwithseveraltailoredquestionstounderstandthespecificperspectiveandexpertiseoftheinterviewee.Theinterviewswereprimarilyconductedbyvideocalls,whilesomewereconductedface-to-face.Beforeeachinterviewcommenced,intervieweeswereinformedthattheirresponseswouldbeincludedinthisthesisandtheirpersonalanonymitywillbeprotected.Atranscriptwouldbeproducedaftereachinterview,andIwouldseekclarificationofanyissuesbyemailcorrespondence.Alistoftheinterviewsisincludedattheendofthisthesis. Thefourthphaseoftheresearchwasfocusedonthenetworkscreatedbycitiestodiffusebestpractices,normsandinformation.Icarriedoutanextensivedesktopliteraturereviewtoidentifythemostactiveandprominentnetworksthatoperatedtransnationallyandtoanalyzehowthesenetworksservedasmechanismsforthedisseminationofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsamongstglobalcitiesandtheirgovernments.Icarriedoutsemi-structuredinterviewswithcurrentandformerstaffofC40andICLEI,aswellasemployeesofvariousentitiesthatworkinpartnershipwithC40andICLEItogainabetterunderstandingofthedifferencesbetweenthenetworksandC40’smodusoperandi. Inthefifthstageoftheresearch,Ifocusedonuncoveringthenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatglobalcitiesweredevelopingandimplementingthroughtheirnetworks.IcarriedoutadesktopreviewofmaterialsavailableontheInternet,andsecondaryliteratureintheformofacademicresearch85C40,online:http://www.c40.org(accessedon12December2016).86CitiesDevelopmentInitiativeforAsia,online:http://cdia.asia(accessedon2July2016).

articlesandmonographs.Ithenconductedsemi-structuredinterviewswithprogramofficersresponsibleforimplementingthesepracticesandstandards,andcitygovernmentofficialswithformalresponsibilitiesforclimatechangepolicy.BasedontheempiricaldataandtheinsightsIdrewfromtheliteratureonnormdiffusion,voluntarystandards,andsoftlaw,Idevelopedatheoreticalaccountofhowcitieswereemergingasjurisgenerativeactorsintransnationalclimatechangegovernance. Inthefinalstageofmyresearch,Isoughttotakeabird’seyeviewandreflectonthebroadertheoreticalimplicationsoftheriseofcitiesaslawmakingactorsintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.

4.ChapterOutline

Thisthesiscomprisesofeightchapters,includingthisintroductionandtheconclusion.ChapterTwosetsoutthetheoreticalframeworkofthisthesis.Itwillsetoutthetheoriesofregimecomplexityandtransnationallegalordering,Anne-MarieSlaughter’stheoriesofthedisaggregatedstateandtrans-governmentalnetworks,andSaskiaSassen’stheoryofglobalcitieswhichIcombinetocreateaframeworkforconceptualizingthenatureoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance,theemergenceofcitiesinthisgovernancespace,andtolaythegroundforsubsequentanalysisaboutcitynetworks.ChapterThreesituatestheemergenceofcitiesasparticipantsintransnationalclimatechangegovernancewithinthebroadercontextofhowcitiesincreasinglyparticipatedirectlyandindependentlyininternationalaffairsandglobalpolitics.Itstartsoutbydescribinginstancesofcitiesdevelopingwhatappeartobetheirownindependentforeignandsecuritypoliciesdespitethefactthatsuchpolicyareashavetraditionallybeenconsideredthecoredomainsofcentralgovernmentsandstates.Itthenconsidersinstancesofcitiesimplementinginternationallawdespitenon-ratificationbytheirstate.Finally,thechapterdiscussesthepracticesofinternationalorganizationsliketheWorldBankthatempowercitiestoexerciseagencyinglobalgovernance.

ChapterFourexamineswhatfiveglobalcities-London,MexicoCity,NewYorkCity,RotterdamandSeoul-aredoingtoaddressclimatechange.Thesecitiesareinternationallyrecognizedbypolicy-makers,cityplanners,themedia,internationalorganizationsandresearcherstobe‘climatefrontrunners’.Byexaminingthegovernancepracticesofthesefivecities,thischapterprovidesadetaileddescriptiveaccountofcitiesassociallaboratoriesforclimategovernanceexperimentsandtheinter-connectionsbetweenactors,practicesandinstitutionsthatblurthedividebetweenpublicandprivate,localandinternational.

ChapterFivepositsthatcitiesdonotactalone.Theyformnetworkstoaggregatetheirbargainingpowervis-à-vissellersoflow-carbontechnologies,facilitatecooperation,developvoluntarystandardsandconveynorms.Thesenetworksoftenestablishimportantlinkswithotheractorsatotherscales(e.g.,regionalorganizationssuchastheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)).Thenetworkstructureanditslinkswithactorsatmultiplegovernancelevelsprovidechannelsforcitiestodiffusenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.C40

isthemostprominentnetworkofglobalcitiescommittedtoaddressingclimatechange,andisthesubjectofdetailedanalysisinthischapter.

Drawingonthedescriptiveandanalyticalexaminationinthepreviousthreechapters,ChapterSixadvancestheargumentthatcitiesareemergingastransnationallawmakers.Icointhetermurbanclimatelawtorefertothevoluntarystandards,normsandpracticesthataredevelopedbycitiesandimplementedthroughtheirnetworks.Thechapteridentifiesthepromotionofreflexivityandnormdiffusionasthetwomainpathwaysofinfluencethatarecriticalforsteeringcitiestowardsclimatemitigationandlow-carbondevelopment.ThechapteralsoexamineshowurbanclimatelawrelatestotheUNFCCCregime,andarguesthaturbanclimatelawhasbeendeliberatelydesignedtosupportandreinforcetheUNFCCCregime.Consequently,thereislittledivergenceinthenormsandpracticesofcitiesandthoseoftheUNFCCCregime.

ChapterSevenevaluatesthecontributionofurbanclimatelawtotheoverallperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexusingsixnormativecriteriaproposedbyKeohaneandVictor.87Itthentakesastepbacktoconsidersomebroadquestionposedbytheriseofglobalcitiesintheinternationalsystem,forexample,howtheriseofthecitychallengescertainentrenchednotionsaboutthenatureofthemodernstateandwhethertheemergenceofanotheractorthreatenstocausefragmentationoftheinternationallegalorder.

ChapterEightconcludesthisthesiswithaseriesofreflections.Iwillconsidertheimplicationsofthisresearchfortheoristsandpractitioners,thelimitationsoftheresearchandsuggestavenuesforfurtherresearch.

87RobertO.KeohaneandDavidG.Victor,‘TheRegimeComplexforClimateChange’(2011)9PerspectivesonPolitics7.

Chapter2:TheoreticalFramework

1. Introduction

Inordertogeneratearicherunderstandingoftheemergenceofcitiesasgovernorsand,morespecifically,lawmakingactorsintheareaoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance,Ihavefounditusefultoadoptaneclecticanalyticalframeworkthatdrawsupondiversetheoreticalperspectives.Analyticaleclecticismproceedsonthebasisofapragmaticethos.Itissaidthattheresearcherwhoadoptsananalyticaleclecticapproachissearchingformiddlerangetheoreticalargumentsthatpotentiallyspeaktoconcreteissuesofpolicyandpractice.1Drawingupondiversetheoreticalperspectivesguardsagainstexcessivesimplificationthatcanarisewhenonetriestoapplyasingletheoreticallenstoexplainmessy,real-worldsituations.Inotherwords,analyticaleclecticisminvitesustorefrainfrombeing“intellectuallyaggressivehedgehogs”2andtoembracethepossibilitiesthatopenupfromdrawingupontheoriesandnarrativesdevelopedindifferentresearchtraditions.Itshould,however,benotedthatanalyticaleclecticismisnotatossedsaladofresearchmethodsandtheoreticalconstructsinthesensethat“everythingmatters”.Eclecticscholarshipoughttoengagewiththewell-organizedresearcheffortsofcommittedadherentsofvarioustraditionsinanintegratedframeworkthatiscapableofgeneratingmorecomprehensiveanddeeperanalysisofaconcreteissue.3

Thischapterprovidesthetheoreticalunderpinningsforthethesisbybringingtogethertheoriesfromvariousdisciplinesincludingpoliticalscience,law,internationalrelationsandsociologytohelpframetheparticipationofcitiesintransnationalclimatechangegovernanceprocesses.Transnationalregimecomplextheoryprovidestheframingoftransnationalclimatechangegovernanceasaspacethatisdenselypopulatedwithmanyinstitutionsthatperformpotentiallyover-lappingfunctions.Citiesareemergingwithinthisspaceasoneofmultiplegovernanceactors.Afterintroducingtheregimecomplextheory,thechaptermovesontobrieflyexplainthetheoryoforchestration,whichisprimarilyprescriptiveabouthowtheinternationalsystemoughttomanagethedisadvantagesandmaximizethebenefitsofinstitutionalfragmentation.Whileregimecomplextheorytendstoemphasizetheproblemsofruleinconsistencyandruleconflictthatcanarisewhentherearemultipleinstitutionsgoverninganissuearea,orchestrationtheoryemphasizesthebenefitsofinstitutionalmultiplicitysuchasthepotentialformutuallearningandexperimentingwithdifferentgovernanceapproaches.

1RudraSilandPeterJ.Katzenstein,‘AnalyticEclecticismintheStudyofWorldPolitics:ReconfiguringProblemsandMechanismsacrossResearchTraditions’(2010)8PerspectivesonPolitics411.2Ibid,pg.414.3Ibid,pg.415.

Transnationallawprovidesanalternativetheoreticalframeworkforanalyzinghowstatesandnon-stateactorsareinvolvedinmakingandimplementinglawthathaseffecttransnationally.Theshiftfromastate-centricviewofinternationallawisnecessaryinordertoconsidertheroleofsub-stateactorssuchascitiesandtheirlocalgovernmentsingoverningclimatechangeatthegloballevel.AnneMarieSlaughter’stheoryofthedisaggregatedstateandtransgovernmentalnetworksservesasapointofdepartureinthisthesisforconceptualizingthepossibilityofcitiesasentitiesthatarecapableofparticipatingintransnationalgovernanceprocesses.Thisthesisalsoborrowstheideaoftransgovernmentalnetworksandadaptsittounderstandcitynetworksasatoolofgovernanceinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Finally,thebodyofliteraturethattheorizestheglobalcityasanactorinworldaffairsisanimportantcornerstoneofthetheoreticalframeworkforthisthesisbecauseitisuponthisfoundationalideathatIdevelopmyargumentthatcitiesareemergingaslawmakingactors.

2. TheoreticalOverview2.1TransnationalRegimeComplex

Fromthemid-1990sonwards,patternsofinstitutionalizationinglobalgovernancechanged.Effortstodevelopnewcomprehensiveandintegratedinternationalregimesfailed,whileestablishedonesbegantofragment.Forexample,intensivenegotiationsamongstOECDmembersoverathree-yearperiodonwhatwastobeaMultilateralAgreementonInvestment(MAI)eventuallycollapsed.4Apartfromsubstantialdisagreementamongstthenegotiatingstates,aglobalcoalitionofenvironmentalanddevelopmentNGOs,citizengroupsandgovernmentsofdevelopingcountriessuccessfullyputpressureonOECDgovernmentstowithdrawfromthenegotiations.5

AfterthecreationoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),officialshadhopedtostartwhatisnowknownastheDohaRoundofnegotiationsduringtheSeattleWTOministerialtalksinNovember1999.6Theobjectiveofthesenegotiationswastolowertradebarriersandthereforefacilitateglobaltrade.

4ThedocumentsrelatingtotheMAInegotiationsbetween1995and1998canbefoundinanonlinedatabase;OECD,“MultilateralAgreementonInvestment:DocumentsfromtheNegotiations”,online:http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm(accessedon1July2016).5ThosewhoopposedtheMAIarguedthat,amongstotherthings,theagreementwouldleadtoa“racetothebottom”inenvironmentalandlabourstandards.See,forexample,AndreaDurbinandMarkVallianatos,TransnationalCorporateBillofRights-NegotiationsforaMultilateralAgreementonInvestment(MAI)(FriendsoftheEarth,1997),online:https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43203.html;MartinKhor,NGOsMountProtestsAgainstMAI(ThirdWorldNetworkFeatures,1998),online:https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209-bwi-wto/43217.html(accessedon1July2016).Fordiscussion,seeforexample,EricNeumayer,‘MultilateralAgreementonInvestment:LessonsfortheWTOfromthefailedOECD-negotiations’(1999)46WirtschaftspolitischeBlätter618.6WorldTradeOrganization,“TheDohaAgenda”,online:https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm(accessedon1July2016).

However,thisdidnothappenbecausetheSeattlemeetingcollapsedinthefaceofanti-globalizationproteststhatescalatedintoriots,looting,andtheuseofteargastoquelltheprotesters.7Negotiationsonthepackageofagreements–knownastheDohaDevelopmentAgenda–eventuallycommencedin2001butWTODirector-GeneralPascalLamysuspendednegotiationsinJuly2006duetoirreconcilabledifferencesbetweenWTOmembers.8Sincethen,effortshavebeenunderwaytoresumenegotiationsbutthereislittleoptimismaboutachievingabreakthrough.9TheimpasseintheDohaRoundhascalledthemultilateralapproachintoquestion;somearguethatWTOmembershiphasgrownsolargeandtheissuesthathavebeentakenonaresocomplexsuchthatitisalmostimpossibletoreachconsensus.10

Afinalexamplewouldbetheinternationalclimatechangenegotiations.AtthefirstUNFCCCCOPheldinBerlinin1995,memberstatesagreedthattheabsenceoflegallybindingGHGemissionreductiontargetsrenderedtheUNFCCCarelativelyweaklegalinstrument.11Theythereforeagreedtonegotiateaprotocolthatwouldincludebindingtargets.12ThisledtotheKyotoProtocol,whichwasadoptedon11December1997.13Inlinewiththeprincipleofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities(CBDRRC),theKyotoProtocolrequireddevelopedcountriestoadoptbindingtargetsbutdevelopingcountrieswerenotrequiredtodoso.WithoutemissiontargetsimposedonChinaandotherrapidlydevelopingcountries,theUSCongressstronglyopposedtheKyotoProtocolandrefusedtoratifyit.14WithoutUSratification,theprotocolcouldonlyenterintoforce

7JohnVidal,‘RealbattleforSeattle’TheGuardian(5December1999);InfluentialenvironmentandhumanrightsgroupsfromboththeGlobalNorthandGlobalSouthcondemnedhowthetalkswerebeingconducted.Theyallegedthatgenuineconcernsabouttheeffectsofanotherroundoftradeliberalizationontheenvironment,jobsandculturalissuesweresubordinatedtopureeconomicinterestsandgovernmentsofThirdWorldcountriesweremarginalizedduringthetalks.8WorldTradeOrganization,“TheDohaAgenda”.9Seeforexample,Jean-PierreLehmann,‘Endthecharadeintalksonglobaltrade’TheFinancialTimes(24August2011).Lehmannsuggeststhat“…theDoharoundshouldbeburied.Somesuggestitshouldbedeclareddead.Butithasbeendeadforsometimeandthecorpseisputrefying:soaburial,awake,andsomeappropriatewordsoffarewell.”Foralesspessimisticview,seeJagdishBhagwati,‘FromSeattletoHongKong’(2005)12ForeignAffairs,online:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-12-01/seattle-hong-kong(accessedon3July2016).10Seeforexample,RazeenSally,‘TheEndoftheRoadfortheWTO?AsnapshotofinternationaltradepolicyafterCancun’(2004)5WorldEconomics1;AlanBeattie,‘Themultilateralapproachiscalledintoquestion’TheFinancialTimes(15November2005).11UNFCCCDecision1/CP.1,preamble.12Ibid.131997KyotoProtocoltotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,2303UNTS148.TheindividualtargetsforAnnexIpartiesarelistedinAnnexBoftheKyotoProtocol.14TheByrd-HagelResolution(USSenateResolution98),105thCongress,1stsession,25July1997,statesthat“theexemptionforDevelopingCountryPartiesisinconsistentwiththeneedforglobalactiononclimatechangeandisenvironmentallyflawed”andthedifferentiatedtreatmentofAnnexIpartiesandnon-Annexparties“couldresultinseriousharmtotheUnitedStateseconomy,includingsignificantjobloss,tradedisadvantages,increasedenergyandconsumercosts,oranycombinationthereof”.TheSenatepassedtheresolutionunanimously(95-0);CouncilonForeignRelations,Byrd-HagelResolution,online:http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/byrd-hagel-resolution/p21331(accessedon12August2015).Fordiscussion,seeDanielA.Farber,‘ClimatejusticeandtheChinaFallacy’(2009)15HastingsWest-NorthwestJournalofEnvironmentalLawandPolicy15.

in2005.15Further,withouttheparticipationoftheUS,oneoftheworld’slargestGHGemittersaswellasaglobalsuperpower,theKyotoProtocolregimewashamperedfromtheoutset.Thenegotiationsforthepost-Kyotoframework,whichfinallyculminatedintheParisAgreement,havebeensimilarlyfraughtwithdifficultiesasdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesstruggledtofindaccommodationovercrucialissuessuchasfinancialassistancetothedevelopingcountriestocopewithclimatechange.16

Againstthisbackgroundofdispersedpower,disparateinterestsamongststates,andtheinertiaofestablishedinternationalorganizations,newalternativegovernancearrangementsstartedtoemergefromthe1990sonwards.Oneofthesenovelgovernancearrangementshasbeentermedregimecomplex.Asoriginallydefinedintheinternationalrelationsscholarship,aregimeisasetofimplicitorexplicitprinciples,norms,rules,anddecision-makingproceduresaroundwhichactors’expectationsconvergeinanissueareasuchasclimatechange.17Aregimecomplexemergeswhenanissueareaisnolongergovernedbyasingleregime.Instead,therelevantrulesarefoundinanumberofregimesthatoverlapintheirscopeandsubjectmatter.Intheirpioneeringarticle,RaustialaandVictordefinearegimecomplextobe“anarrayofpartiallyoverlappingandnonhierarchicalinstitutionsgoverningaparticularissue-area”.18Theissueofoverlaphasbeena15PursuanttoArticle25,theKyotoProtocolcouldonlyenterintoforceuponratificationby“notlessthan55PartiestotheConvention,incorporatingPartiesincludedinAnnexIwhichaccountedintotalforatleast55percentofthetotalcarbondioxideemissionsfor1990ofthePartiesincludedinAnnexI”.WithouttheUS–theworld’slargestGHGemitteratthattime-onboard,itwasonlyafterRussiaratifiedtheagreementthattheKyotoProtocolfinallyenteredintoforceon16February2005.Russia’sratificationwasallegedlytheresultofabargainstruckwiththeEUconcerningRussia’saccessiontotheWorldTradeOrganization.AndreyIllarionov,PresidentVladimirPutin’stheneconomicpolicyadviser,wentasfarastocharacterisetheKyotoProtocolasan“economicAuschwitz”forRussiaand“anassaultonscience,economicgrowthandhumanfreedom”.However,despiteinternaldisagreements,oncethedecisionwasmadeatthepoliticallevel,RussiadepositeditsinstrumentofratificationwiththeUNwithinweeks;YuliaYamineva,‘ClimateLawandPolicyinRussia:APeasantNeedsThundertoCrossHimselfandWonder’inErkkiJ.Hollo,KatiKulovesiandMichaelMehling(eds),ClimateChangeandtheLaw(Springer2013),pg.553-554.16Forasampleoftheliteratureonthenegotiationsforthepost-KyotoProtocolframework,seeMeinhardDoelle,‘TheLegacyoftheClimateTalksinCopenhagen:HopenhagenorBrokenhagen?’(2010)1CarbonandClimateLawReview86;MatthieuWemaere,‘StateofPlayofInternationalClimateNegotiations:OntheRoadtoCopenhagen’(2009)4CarbonandClimateLawReview497;RichardBlack,‘WhydidCopenhagenfailtodeliveraclimatedeal?’BBC(22December2009);FrancescoSindico,‘TheCopenhagenAccordandtheFutureoftheInternationalClimateChangeRegime’(2010)1RevistaCatalanadeDretAmbiental1;HarroVanAsselt,FrancescoSindicoandMichaelaMehling,‘GlobalClimateChangeandtheFragmentationofInternationalLaw’30Law&Policy423;LavanyaRajamani,‘TheCancunclimateagreements:readingthetext,subtextandtealeaves’(2011)60InternationalandComparativeLawQuarterly499;RemiMoncel,‘UnconstructiveAmbiguityintheDurbanClimateDealofCOP17/CMP7’(2012)12SustainableDevelopmentLaw&Policy6;PilitaClark,‘Climatetalksstruggleintoovertime’FinancialTimes(13December2014);PilitaClark,‘UNclimateagreementreachedinmarathonsession’FinancialTimes(14December2014).17StephenD.Krasner,‘StructuralCausesandRegimeConsequences:RegimesasInterveningVariables’(1982)36InternationalOrganization185,pg2.18KalRaustialaandDavidG.Victor,‘TheRegimeComplexforPlantGeneticResources’(2004)58InternationalOrganization277,pg.279.Orsinietalhaveproposedanalternativedefinitionofa

coreconcernofregimecomplextheory.Theexistenceofmultipleinstitutionscanleadtoregimeshifting,wherebyactorsmoveissuestoforumsthatmostsuittheirstrategicinterests.19Furthermore,whentwoormoreregimescreaterulesthatgovernthesameissue,thereistheriskofinconsistentrules.Ruleinconsistencycreatesuncertaintyandcostsforinstitutionsandtheirmembers,particularlyforinter-governmentalorganizationsthatadministerlegallybindingrules.Internationallegalscholarshiponproliferationofinstitutionstendstofocusonthequestionofcoherenceor,viewedfromadifferentangle,on“fragmentation”,whichisunderstoodaspotentialfor“conflictsbetweenrulesorrule-systems,deviatinginstitutionalpracticesand,possibly,thelossofanoverallperspectiveonthelaw”.20

KeohaneandVictorhaveofferedabroaderdefinitionofaregimecomplexinthecaseofclimatechange,wherebyaregimecomplexcomprisesofacollectionoflooselylinkedregimesthatare“sometimesconflicting,usuallymutuallyreinforcing”(myemphasis).21Thisdefinitiondepartsfromthetraditionalonethatemphasizesoverlapintheregimes.KeohaneandVictorarguethat,inthecaseofclimatechange,thediverseinterestsamongststatesmakesitmorelikelythataregimecomplexemergesinsteadofasingle,integratedandcomprehensiveregimeformanagingclimatechange.22KeohaneandVictor’smappingoftheregimecomplexforclimatechange,inlinewithtraditionalregimecomplextheory,focusesonstatesandinternationalorganizations.Subsequently.AbbotthascontendedthatKeohaneandVictor’sconceptionoftheclimatechangeregimecomplexprovidesanincompletepictureofglobalclimatechangegovernancebecauseitexcludesarangeofgovernanceinitiativesthatinvolvenon-stateactors(suchasenvironmentalNGOs,

regimecomplex.Intheirview,RaustialaandVictor’sdefinitionhas“severalambiguousfeaturesthatimpedefurtheranalysis”.Theythereforedefinearegimecomplexas“anetworkofthreeormoreinternationalregimesthatrelatetoacommonsubjectmatter;exhibitover-lappingmembership;andgeneratesubstantive,normativeoroperativeinteractionsrecognizedaspotentiallyproblematicwhetherornottheyaremanagedeffectively”;AmandineOrsini,JeanFrédéricMorinandOranYoung,‘Regimecomplexes:Abuzz,aboom,oraboostforglobalgovernance?’(2013)19GlobalGovernance27,pg.29.19Fordiscussion,see,forexample,LaurenceR.Helfer,‘RegimeShiftingintheInternationalIntellectualPropertySystem’(2009)7PerspectivesonPolitics39;LaurenceR.Helfer,‘RegimeShifting:theTRIPSAgreementandNewDynamicsofInternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking’(2004)29YaleJournalofInternationalLaw1.20MarttiKoskenniemi,FragmentationofInternationalLaw:DifficultiesArisingfromtheDiversificationandExpansionofInternationalLaw:ReportoftheStudyGroupoftheInternationalLawCommission(UNGeneralAssembly,A/CN4/L682,2006),para.8.Simmaarguesthatfragmentationisnotacrisisbutasignofthegrowingmaturityoftheinternationallegalorder;BrunoSimma,‘FragmentationinaPositiveLight’(2004)25MichiganJournalofInternationalLaw847.DupuyandVinualesareoftheviewthatthechallengeisnotoneoffragmentationbutoneof“integration”wherebydifferencesinlegalinterpretationareresolvedbythedevelopmentofprinciplescapableofintegratingdifferentsolutionswithinacommonframework;Pierre-MarieDupuyandJorgeEVinuales,‘TheChallengeof"Proliferation":AnAnatomyoftheDebate’inCesareRomano,KarenJAlterandYuvalShany(eds),TheOxfordHandbookofInternationalAdjudication(OxfordUniversityPress2014),pg.148-9.21RobertO.KeohaneandDavidG.Victor,‘TheRegimeComplexforClimateChange’(2011)9PerspectivesonPolitics7,pg.7.22Ibid.

technicalexpertsandbusinessassociations)andoperatetransnationally.23Inadvancingthenotionofatransnationalregimecomplexforclimatechange,AbbottrefinesKeohaneandVictor’sconceptionbyaddingthetransnationaldimension,i.e.theinvolvementofprivateactorsandsub-stateactorsindevelopingandimplementinggovernanceinitiativesthatoftenhavecross-bordereffects.Thus,atransnationalregimecomplexforclimatechangeincludesinternationalorganizationsandtreatybodiessuchastheUNFCCCsecretariat,WorldBankPrototypeCarbonFund,MontrealProtocolonSubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayer,aswellasprivateandhybrid(public-private)governanceinitiativessuchastheWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopment,AsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetwork,andtheInternationalEmissionsTradingAssociation.24Inthisthesis,IadoptAbbott’sconceptionofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexasaframeworkfordescribingandanalyzingtheinvolvementof23KennethW.Abbott,‘Thetransnationalregimecomplexforclimatechange’30EnvironmentandPlanningC:GovernmentandPolicy571,pg.574.24TheUNFCCCSecretariatdescribesitsfunctionsasfollows:“Initsearlyyears,themaintaskofthesecretariatwastosupportintergovernmentalclimatechangenegotiations….Currently,amajorpartofourworkinvolvestheanalysisandreviewofclimatechangeinformationanddatareportedbyParties.”;UNFCCC,“TheSecretariat”,online:http://unfccc.int/secretariat/items/1629.php(accessedon1April2016).TheWorldBankPrototypeCarbonFundisthefirstcarbonfundintheworld.Itsmissionistopioneeremissionstradingonaglobalscale.SinceitbecameoperationinApril2000,thefundhasbeenactiveinpromotingtheKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanismandJointImplementation;CharlotteStreck,‘WorldBankCarbonFinanceBusiness:ContractsandEmissionReductionsPurchaseTransactions’inDavidFreestoneandCharlotteStreck(eds),LegalAspectsofImplementingtheKyotoProtocolMechanisms:MakingKyotoWork(OxfordUniversityPress2005),pg.370.TheMontrealProtocolonSubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayer1522UNTS3(1987)isdesignedtoreducetheproductionandconsumptionofsubstancesthatdepleteozoneinthestratosphere.Ozonedepletingsubstancesincludechlorofluorocarbons(CFCs)andhydrochlorofluorocarbons(HCFCs).CFCsandHCFCsarealsogreenhousegases.Hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs)andperfluorocarbons(PFCs)areusedassubstitutesforCFCsandHCFCsinsomeapplicationsbecausetheydonotdepletetheozonelayer.However,thesesubstitutes(i.e.HFCsandPFCs)aregreenhousegasesthattheKyotoProtocolaimstoreduce.Thus,theregulatorychoicesanddecisionsoftheMontrealProtocolregimehaveimplicationsforclimatechangegovernanceandtherespectivetreatysecretariatshavetakenstepstowardscoordinationandinformationsharing.SeeUNFCCC,“MethodologicalIssuesRelatingtoHydrofluorocarbonsandPerfluorocarbons”,online:http://unfccc.int/methods/other_methodological_issues/items/2311.php(accessedon1August2016).TheWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopment(WBCSD)bringstogethercompaniesthatseektodevelopandimplementsolutionstoaddressenvironmentalandsustainabilitychallenges.WBCSDhasanumberofmajorprojectsrelatedtocities.Forexample,ithasissuedasetofSustainableMobilityIndicators,whichprovidescitieswithadiagnostictooltoassesstheirperformanceandtodevelopsustainableurbanmobilityplans;WBCSD,“TheEuropeanCommissionendorsesWBCSDsetofindicatorstohelpcitiesadvancesustainablemobility”,online:http://www.wbcsd.org/the-european-commission-endorses-wbcsd-set-of-indicators-to-help-cities-advance.aspx(accessedon20August2016).TheAsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetwork’smissionistobuildurbanclimatechangeresilienceinBangladesh,India,Indonesia,thePhilippines,ThailandandVietnamthroughpartnershipsandcollaborationwithlocalandinternationalstakeholders;ACCRN,online:http://acccrn.net/about-acccrn(accessedon1August2016).TheInternationalEmissionsTradingAssociation(IETA)isacoalitionofcompaniesthatsupportmarket-basedsolutionstoclimatechange.ItsmembersincludeBankofAmericaMerrilLynch,BP,RioTinto,andAmericanElectricPower;IETA,online:http://www.ieta.org/Our-Members(accessedon1August2016).

citiesandtheirnetworksinglobalclimatechangegovernance.UnlikeKeohaneandVictor,Abbott’sdefinitionopensuptheconceptualspacethatisnecessaryforconsideringalargercastofactors,apartfromstatesandinternationalorganizations,ingoverningclimatechange.Italsopaysmoreattentiontothecausesandeffectsofhavingmultipleregimesinvolvedinclimatechangegovernanceandhowexistingregimesinteract,butitdownplaysthetraditionalfocusonoverlappingnormsandrules.25Atthesametime,becauseAbbott’sdefinitionbuildsupontraditionalregimecomplextheory,itallowsmetodrawonarichbodyofliteratureoninstitutionalmultiplicitythatoffersrelevantinsightsabouttransnationalclimatechangegovernanceeventhoughregimecomplextheorywasdevelopedwithstatesinmind.

Forexample,regimecomplextheoryidentifiesthebenefitsanddrawbacksofhavingmultipleactorsinvolvedingovernance.Onadvantages,KeohaneandVictorarguethatregimecomplexesofferflexibilityacrossissuesandadaptabilityovertime.Onflexibility,theysuggestthatwhenthereisnorequirementthatallrulesbeboundwithinasingleinstitution,itopensupthepossibilityofadaptingrulesfordifferentcoalitionsofactorsandtofine-tunetheapplicationofrulesfordifferentconditions.26AsIwilldiscussinChapter6,flexibilityhasbeenanadvantagethatpermitscitiestocreatenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthataremoreresponsivetourbanneedsandinterests.Thisincreasesthelikelihoodofcitiesadoptingthesenormsandvoluntarystandards,therebyexpandingthereachoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance.

KeohaneandVictorfurtherarguethatregimecomplexesmaybemoreadaptablethanregimesandcanthereforerespondmoreeffectivelytochangingsocialandpoliticalcircumstances.Internationalorganizationstendtobeslowinrespondingtochange;tomeetlegitimacyconcerns,decisionswithininter-governmentalorganizationsliketheUNFCCCaremadebyuniversalvotingrules.27Asitisoftenimpossibletoobtaintheunanimityofsomanycountrieswithdiverginginterests,inertiasetsinandrenderstheregimeinquestionincreasinglyobsolete.KeohaneandVictorarguethatregimecomplexes(anditscomponentparts)maybeabletoadaptmorereadilyincomparisonbecausetheyarenothamperedinthewaythataninternationalregimeis.Theyalsoarguethataregimecomplex,withmultiplesitesofauthority,hastheconditionstoallowthefreemarketofideasandpracticestoflourish.Theassumptionisthattheinvisiblehandwillleadtoabetterdistributionofgovernancefunctionswithintheregimecomplex.

25Youngarguesthatregimeinteractionispromotedatanationallevelbydomesticpolicycoordinationand,attheinternationallevel,bymutuallearningandinformation-sharingbetweenregimes;MargaretA.Young,TradingFish,SavingFish:TheInteractionbetweenRegimesinInternationalLaw(CambridgeUniversityPress2011),pg,249.26KeohaneandVictor,pg.15.27Article18oftheUNFCCCstatesthateachmemberstatehasonevoteinadecision.Further,theRulesofProcedureoftheConferenceofthePartiesstatethat,whenpartiescannotreachconsensus,decisionsshouldbemadebymajorityrule.Tomlinsonpointsoutthatastheseruleshavenotbeenformallyadopted,theCOPusuallyadoptsdecisionsonlywhennopartyexplicitlyexpressesobjection;LukeTomlinson,ProceduralJusticeintheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange:NegotiatingFairness(Springer2015),pg.157.

Thedrawbacksofinstitutionalmultiplicityareprimarilythoseofconflictingnormsandtransactioncosts.Whenvoluntarystandardsarecreatedtosatisfyanunmetdemandforruleguidance,conflictbetweenpotentiallyoverlappingrulesisnotamajorconcerngiventhattherearefew,ifany,existingruleswithwhichnewrulesmayconflict.28However,whentherearemultipleinstitutionsdevelopingandimplementingnorms,standardsandpracticeswithinaregimecomplex,thereremainsthepossibilityofinefficientduplicityandincreasedtransactioncostsofcomplyingwithdifferentschemes.Inthevoluntarycarbonmarket,forexample,asofDecember2008,therewerealreadyatleastthirteendifferentprogrammesofferingvoluntaryGHGaccountingstandardsandmethodologies.Asthevariousprogrammesofferdifferentinterpretationsandlevelofguidanceabouttheaccountingstandards,thishascausedsomeconfusionamongstbuyersofcarboncreditsandprojectdevelopersabouttheappropriatestandardtouse.ThishasledtoharmonizationeffortstofostermoreconsistencyandtransparencyamongstvoluntaryGHGprogrammeaccountingstandards.29Ihavearguedelsewherethattheproliferationofvoluntarystandardstocertifythesustainabilityofbiofuelsproductioncreatesunnecessaryduplicityandharmonizationofglobalstandardsisnecessarytoreducetransactioncosts.302.2Orchestration

Orchestrationhasbeenproposedasawayofmanagingthedisadvantagesandmaximizingthebenefitsofinstitutionalfragmentation.31Whileregimecomplextheorytypicallytreatstheco-existenceofmultiplegovernanceactorswithoverlappingmandatesasathreattoeffectivegovernancebecauseofredundancy,conflictandinconsistency,orchestrationtheoryemphasizeshowinstitutionalmultiplicitycancreategainsfromthepoolingofresources,mutuallearningandspecialization.Inapioneeringwork,orchestrationissaidtotakeplacewhenaninternationalorganization“enlistsandsupportsintermediaryactorstoaddresstargetactorsinpursuitof[internationalorganization]governancegoals.Thekeytoorchestrationisthatthe[internationalorganization]bringsthirdpartiesintothe

28Greenarguesthat,becauseofdissentamongststatesabouttheroleofemissionstradingandthustheutilityofgreenhousegasesaccountingstandards,theissueofaccountingmethodologieswastakenofftheinternationalagendaanddeprivedtheUNFCCC,theinternationalactormostlikelytotakeonsucharole,ofthepoliticalmandatetodoso.ThisthencreatedanopeningforprivateactorstodeveloptheGreenhouseGasProtocol(GHGProtocol)whennoaccountingstandardsexisted;JessicaGreen,‘PrivateStandardsintheClimateRegime:TheGreenhouseGasProtocol’(2010)12BusinessandPoliticsArticle3.29Fordiscussion,seeMichellePassero,‘TheVoluntaryCarbonMarket:ItsContributionsandPotentialLegalandPolicyIssues’inDavidFreestoneandCharlotteStreck(eds),LegalAspectsofCarbonTrading:Kyoto,CopenhagenandBeyond(OxfordUniversityPress2009),pgs.525-527.30JoleneLin,‘TheEnvironmentalRegulationofBiofuels:LimitsoftheMeta-StandardApproach’(2011)5Carbon&ClimateLawReview34.31KennethW.Abbott,‘StrengtheningtheTransnationalRegimeComplexforClimateChange’(2014)3TransnationalEnvironmentalLaw57.

governancearrangementtoactasintermediariesbetweenitselfandthetargets,ratherthantryingtogovernthetargetsdirectly.”32

AnalternativedefinitionbyHaleandRogeremphasizestherelationshipbetweenorchestrationandtransnationalgovernance.Theydefineorchestrationtobe“aprocesswherebystatesorintergovernmentalorganizationsinitiate,guide,broaden,andstrengthentransnationalgovernancebynon-stateand/orsub-stateactors.”Thetransnationalgovernanceliterature,whichfocusesonprivatecertificationschemessuchastheMarineStewardshipCouncilandstandard-settingbodiessuchastheInternationalAccountingStandardsBoard(IASB),tendstotreattheseentitiesasstand-alonegovernanceactorsandpaylittleattentiontotheirinstitutionalcontext.Orchestrationtheory,incontrast,placestheanalyticalfocusonthewiderrelationalcontextinwhichgovernanceactorsoperate.Ithighlightshowinternationalorganizationsshapethecapacitiesandagendasoftransnationalgovernanceactors.Thisanalyticalviewpointisadoptedinthisthesis,particularlyinmydiscussionoftheinteractionbetweentheC40andtheWorldBankinChapter5.

TheintermediariesinorchestrationgovernanceareoftenNGOsbutmayalsoincludebusinessorganizationsandtransgovernmentalnetworks.Whensub-stateactors,suchaselementsofnationalbureaucraciesandcitymayors,workwiththeircounterpartsacrossborders,theyformtransgovernmentalnetworks.33Thesenetworksareattractiveintermediariesbecausetheyareabletobypassthehigherlevelsofnationalgovernments.Theyarealsousuallycomposedofpolicyexpertsfromnationalregulatoryagencies,whocommandtechnicalexpertiseandcontrolofnationalbureaucracies.34KennethAbbottetalpointoutthatintermediariesvoluntarilyparticipateinorchestrationbecausetheysharetheinternationalorganization’sgovernancegoalsandvalueitsmaterialandideationalsupport.35Atthesametime,wheninternationalorganizationsprovidesupporttointermediaries,thisstrengthenthegovernancecapacitiesoftheseintermediarieswhileprovidinginternationalorganizationsameanstoinfluencetheiragendaandactivities.36Materialsupportwouldincludefinancialandadministrativeassistancetostrengthentheintermediary’soperationalcapacitytopursuegovernancegoals.Ideationalsupportwouldincludetechnicalexpertise,formalrecognitionandendorsement.Endorsementoftheintermediary’sactivitiesincreasesitslegitimacyandthesocialauthoritythatitcanbringtobearontargetactors.AnexampleofendorsementisthesupportthatGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncilresolutionshavegiventotheKimberleyProcesscertificationschemeforblooddiamonds.37Endorsementcanalsobelegal,aswhentheWTOacceptsthatconsistencywith

32KennethW.Abbottandothers,‘Orchestration:globalgovernancethroughintermediaries’inKennethW.Abbottandothers(eds),InternationalOrganizationsasOrchestrators(CambridgeUniversityPress2015),pg.4.33Seediscussionin“TheDisaggregatedStateandTransgovernmentalNetworks”below.34Ibid.35Abbottandothers,pg.6.36Ibid.,pg.14.37Fordiscussion,seeVirginiaHaufler,‘Orchestratingpeace?Civilwar,conflictmineralsandtheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’inKennethW.Abbottandothers(eds),InternationalOrganizationsasOrchestrators(CambridgeUniversityPress2015).

standardsadoptedbytheCodexAlimentariusCommissionsatisfiesinternationaltradelaw.38

InChapter5,IexaminetheWorldBank’sdeepeningpartnershipwithC40throughthelensoforchestrationtheory.TheBankprovidestechnicalcapacity-buildingopportunities,arangeofspecializedadvisoryservicesandexclusivefundingchannelstofacilitateactionbyC40members.C40waschosentobeanintermediarybecauseitsharestheWorldBank’sgovernanceobjectiveoftacklingclimatechangeincitiesaspartofabroaderagendaofsustainableurbandevelopment.Further,theclimatesolutionsthatC40espousesarerootedinthenormsofliberalenvironmentalism,whichpredicateinternationalenvironmentalprotectiononthepromotionandmaintenanceofaliberaleconomicorder.39ThiscommitmenttoliberalenvironmentalismalignswellwiththeunderlyingphilosophyoftheWorldBank’sStrategicFrameworkthatguidesthebank’soperationalresponsetonewdevelopmentchallengesposedbyclimatechange.40Inbrief,theWorldBank’spartnershipwithC40isanexampleoforchestrationbyaninternationalorganizationthatplaysasignificantroleinthetransnationalregimecomplexforclimatechangeby,amongstotherthings,conveningandendorsinganintermediary’surbanclimategovernanceefforts.2.3TransnationalLaw PhilipJessupfamouslycoinedtheterm“transnationallaw”inhisStorrsLecturesatYalein1955ashelookedforaconcepttocapturethelegalregulationofactionsandeventsthattranscendstateboundariesandwhichcanaccommodatepublicandprivateinternationallaw.41Jessup’snewtermalsoencompassedlegalrelationshipsamongstindividuals,corporations,internationalorganizationsaswellasstates.42Thus,itwasasearlyasthe1950sthatscholarsbegantopointoutthatthetraditionalstate-centricconceptionofinternationallawinadequatelycapturedtherealityofmultipleactorsinteractingandforminglegalrelationshipsthatoperatedacrossstateboundaries.38Fordiscussion,seeManfredElsig,‘Orchestrationonatightleash:stateoversightoftheWTO’inKennethW.Abbottandothers(eds),InternationalOrganizationsasOrchestrators(CambridgeUniversityPress2015).39Fordiscussion,seeStevenBernstein,TheCompromiseofLiberalEnvironmentalism(ColumbiaUniversityPress2001).40UnderthisStrategicFramework,theWorldBankGroupcommitstoprovidenewadaptationfinancingtovulnerablecountries,sharelessonstoimprovethemonitoringofclimate-relatedfinance,promotethedevelopmentofcarbonmarketsandpilotnewinitiativestosupportthedevelopmentanddisseminationofnewenergytechnologies.Thekeyassumptionsthatunderpinthisframeworkare(1)thattheWorldBankwillbeableto“maintaintheeffectivenessofitscoremissionofsupportinggrowthandovercomingpovertywhilerecognizingtheaddedcostsandrisksofclimatechange”and(2)thatthebasictenetsofamarketeconomy,economicgrowth,andenvironmentalprotectionareallcompatible.SeeDevelopmentandClimateChange:AStrategicFrameworkfortheWorldBankGroup(WorldBank,WashingtonDC,2008),pg.xii,online:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16459433/development-climate-change-strategic-framework-world-bank-group(accessedon2April2016).41PhilipJessup,TransnationalLaw(YaleUniversityPress1956),pg.1.42Ibid.

HaroldKoh’sinfluentialworkintroducedthenotionofthe“transnationallegalprocess”asapredicateof“transnationallaw”.43Kohdefinestransnationallegalprocessas“thetheoryandpracticeofhowpublicandprivateactors–nationstates,internationalorganizations,multinationalenterprises,non-governmentalorganizations,andprivateindividuals-interactinavarietyofpublicandprivate,domesticandinternationalforatomake,interpret,enforce,andultimately,internalizerulesoftransnationallaw.”44AccordingtoKoh,therearefourdistinctivefeaturesofthetransnationallegalprocess.First,it“breaksdowntwotraditionaldichotomiesthathavehistoricallydominatedthestudyofinternationallaw:betweendomesticandinternational,publicandprivate”.45Secondly,thetransnationallegalprocessisnotstate-centricinnature:“theactorsinthisprocessarenotjust,orevenprimarily,nation-states,butincludenonstateactorsaswell.”46Thirdly,theprocessisdynamic.“Transnationallawtransforms,mutates,andpercolatesupanddown,fromthepublictotheprivate,fromthedomestictotheinternationallevelandbackdownagain.”47Finally,itisanormativeprocess.Theconceptofthetransnationallegalprocess“focusesnotsimplyuponhowinternationalinteractionamongtransnationalactorsshapeslaw,butalsoonhowlawshapesandguidesfutureinteractions:inshort,howlawinfluenceswhynationsobey.”48ThecruxofKoh’stheoryofthetransnationallegalprocessis,infact,internalizationthroughinteraction.49Statesandnon-stateactorsobeyinternationallawasaresultofrepeatedinteractionwithotheractorsintheinternationalrealm.“Astransnationalactorsinteract,theycreatepatternsofbehaviorandgeneratenormsofexternalconductwhichtheyinturninternalize.”50Throughaniterativeprocessofinteractionandinternalization,“internationallawacquiresits‘stickiness’.”51 BuildingfromKoh’stheoryofthetransnationallegalprocess,GregoryShaffer,alongsideotherscholars,hasdevelopedanempirical,socio-legalframeworktoanalyzetheeffectsoftransnationallawonnationallegalsystemsandtoexplainthefactorsdeterminingtheextent,location,andlimitsoftransnationallyinducedlegalchange.52Shafferdefinestransnationallawtobe“lawinwhichtransnationalactors,betheyinstitutionsornetworksofpublicorprivateactors,playaroleinconstructinganddiffusinglegalnorms.”53Legalnormsare,inturn,definedas

43MayaSteinitz,‘TransnationalLegalProcessTheories’inCesareRomano,KarenJAlterandYuvalShany(eds),TheOxfordHandbookofInternationalAdjudication(OxfordUniversityPress2014),pg.341.44HaroldHongjuKoh,‘TransnationalLegalProcess’(1996)75NebraskaLawReview181,pg.184.45Ibid.46Ibid.47Ibid.48Ibid.49Steinitz,pg.345.50Koh,pg.204.51Koh,pg.204.52GregoryC.Shaffer(ed)TransnationalLegalOrderingandStateChange(CambridgeUniversityPress2014).53GregoryC.Shaffer,‘TransnationalLegalProcessandStateChange’(2012)37LawandSocialInquiry229,pg.235.

“normsthatlayoutbehavioralprescriptionsissuedbyanauthoritativesourcethattakewrittenform,whetherornotformallybindingorbackedbyadisputesettlementorotherenforcementsystem.”54Thesourceofthelegalnormmaybeaninternationaltreaty,privatecertificationscheme,oraforeignlegalmodelpromotedbytransnationalactors.InanarticlefortheinauguralissueofthejournalTransnationalEnvironmentalLaw,GregoryShafferandDanielBodanskywroteabouttheunilateralnatureofsometransnationallegalprocesses.55SuchunilateralismusuallyoccurswhenstateshavelittlechoicebuttoadopttheregulatorystandardsofdominantmarketactorssuchastheUSandEU.Theregulationofchemicalsisacaseinpoint.TheEUpassedaregulationin2006knownasREACH,whichcreatednewandmorestringentrequirementsforchemicalsintendedforsaleintheEU.56Thiscreatedpressureonexportingstatestoimprovetheirregulationandproductionmethods,andratchetedupchemicalsregulationbeyondtheEUwithoutanyinternationaltreaty.57 Inthisthesis,Idrawonthesetheoriesofthetransnationallegalprocessandtransnationallawtoconceptualizetheroleofcitiesastransnationalactorsinvolvedinthecreationanddiffusionofnormspertainingtoclimatemitigation.Chapter4,forexample,describeswhatfiveglobalcitiesaredoingtotackleclimatechange.Itcanbeviewedassimplyanaccountoflocalclimateaction.However,fromthetransnationallawperspective,localclimateactionispartofaniterativeprocessofcreatingandimplementinglegalnormsthathavetransnationalsignificance.Localclimateactionispartofthedynamicprocesswherebylegalnormspercolateuptotheinternationallevelanddowntothecitylevel,andbetweenthepublicandprivate.Chapter5isdevotedtoexaminingtheC40networkasthehorizontalinfrastructurethroughwhichcitiescreateanddiffusenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards,andChapter6exploresanimportantaspectoftransnationallawthattendstobeunderappreciatedintheliterature:theinteractionbetweentransnationallawandinternationaltreaty-basedlaw.2.4TheDisaggregatedStateandTransgovernmentalNetworks Inabookbythatname,Anne-MarieSlaughterdescribesANewWorldOrderinwhichglobalgovernanceinawiderangeofareassuchasfoodsafetyandhumantraffickingisconductedbynationalgovernmentofficialswhocooperatewithoneanotherthroughcross-bordernetworks.58Operatingacrossstateborders,thesenetworksaretransnationalinnatureandtheyaremostlymadeupbygovernment

54Ibid.,pg.234.55GregoryC.ShafferandDanielBodansky,‘Transnationalism,UnilateralismandInternationalLaw’(2012)1TransnationalEnvironmentalLaw31.56RegulationNo.1907/2006oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilontheRegistration,Evaluation,AuthorisationandRestrictionofChemicals(REACH).57Fordiscussion,seeJoanneScott,‘FromBrusselswithlove:ThetransatlantictravelsofEuropeanlawandthechemistryofregulatoryattraction’(2009)57AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw897;YoshikoNaiki,‘AssessingPolicyReach:Japan’sChemicalPolicyReforminResponsetotheEU’sREACHRegulation’(2010)22JournalofEnvironmentalLaw171.58Anne-MarieSlaughter,ANewWorldOrder(PrincetonUniversityPress2005).

officials.59Slaughterusestheterm“transgovernmental”tocapturethesetwocharacteristicsofthenetworks.60AnneMarieSlaughterarguesinANewWorldOrderthattransgovernmentalnetworks,unlikeformalinternationalorganizationswhichareoftenparalyzedbypolitics,havetheexpertise,flexibility,andinclusivenesstosolveglobalcollectiveproblems.61Shefurtherarguesthat,onceatransgovernmentalnetworkadoptsasetofstandardsorrules,thedomesticimplementationbynationalregulatorslendtheserules‘hardpower’andmakethemeffective.62Moreover,regulatorsthatparticipateinatransgovernmentalnetworkareusuallygovernmentofficialswhoareultimatelyaccountabletotheirdomesticconstituencies.Hence,intermsofaccountabilityandlegitimacy,transgovernmentalnetworksarepreferableto“amorphous‘globalpolicynetworks’…inwhichitisneverclearwhoisexercisingpoweronbehalfofwhom.”63

Slaughterusestheterms“horizontal”and“vertical”toconnotewhetheraparticularnetworkonlyconnectsactorsatasinglelevelofgovernance(forexample,atthenationallevel),inwhichcasethenetworkishorizontal.Averticalnetworkisonethatconnectsactorsatdifferentgovernancelevels(forexample,atthelevelsofthecity,thestateandsupranationalorganizations).64Horizontaltransgovernmentalnetworksmaybecategorizedaccordingtotheirmainfunction(informationsharing,enforcementandharmonization)althoughthereisoftenfunctionaloverlapinthesenetworks.Informationnetworks,asthenamesuggests,facilitatetheexchangeofinformationandexperience.65Further,thesenetworksoftenactivelycollectanddistillinformationintoacodeof“bestpractices”forachievingadesiredregulatory

59Forexample,theBaselCommitteeofBankingSupervision(BCBS)ismadeupofthecentralbankgovernorsfromtwenty-sevencountriesandtheEuropeanCentralBank;BaselCommitteeMembership,online:http://www.bis.org/bcbs/(accessedon8July2016).AnotherexampleistheAsianJudgesNetworkonEnvironment(AJNE)whichseekstofacilitatejudicialcapacity-buildingthroughsharinginformationandexperience;AJNE,online:http://www.asianjudges.org(accessedon8July2016).60Slaughter’sworkontransgovernmentalnetworkshasitsintellectualrootsinthe“transgovernmentalrelations”approachpioneeredbypoliticalscientistsRobertKeohaneandJosephNyeinthe1970s:RobertO.KeohaneandJosephSNye,PowerandInterdependence:WorldPoliticsinTransition(TBSTheBookServiceLtd1977);RobertO.KeohaneandJosephSNye,‘TransgovernmentalRelationsandInternationalOrganizations’(1974)27WorldPolitics39.61Slaughter,pg.167.62Slaughter,pg.168-9.FordiscussionofhowtheEU,advertentlyandsometimesinadvertently,institutionalizesand“hardens”voluntarystandardsandinformalbestpracticesbyembeddingthemindomesticlaw,therebyshapingthedynamicsoftransnationalnormdiffusionprocesses,seeAbrahamNewmanandDavidBach,‘TheEuropeanUnionasHardeningAgent:SoftLawandtheDiffusionofGlobalFinancialRegulation’(2014)21JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy430.63Slaughter,pg.4.64AnexampleofaverticalnetworkexistsbetweennationalcourtsandtheEuropeanCourtofJusticeintheEU.Fordiscussionoftrans-judicialnetworks,seeElaineMak,JudicialDecision-MakinginaGlobalisedWorld:AComparativeAnalysisoftheChangingPracticesofWesternHighestCourts(Firstedn,HartPublishing2013),pgs.83-95.65AnexampleisthePharmaceuticalInspectionCo-operationScheme,whichprovidesfortheexchangeofinformationamongsthealthauthoritiesongoodmanufacturingpractices,andalsoundertakeseffortstoharmonizetechnicalstandardsandproceduresregardinginspectionofthemanufactureofmedicinalproducts;PharmaceuticalInspectionCo-operationScheme,online:http://www.picscheme.org/role.php(accessedon8April2016).

objective.Enforcementnetworksaremostcommonlyestablishedamonglawenforcerssuchaspoliceofficersandcustomsauthorities.Thefocusofenforcementnetworksisonenhancingcooperationamongdomesticregulatorstoenforcenationallawsinthefaceoftransboundaryillicitactivitysuchasillegalwildlifetrafficking.66Finally,harmonizationnetworkstendtoarisewhenregulatorsworktogethertoseekconvergenceoftheirregulatorypoliciesandstandards(suchasproductsafetystandards).TradeagreementssuchastheWTOandtheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)oftenrequireharmonization,“resultinginharmonizationnetworksofcountriesmovingtowardasinglestandard.”67

InSlaughter’svision,thesetransgovernmentalnetworkswillnotreplacetheexistinginfrastructureofinternationalinstitutions,butwillcomplementandstrengthenthem.Insomecases,transgovernmentalnetworksemergebecausestatesfailtoreachinternationalconsensusandthereforeareunabletodevelopcommonrulesandcoordinateresponsestochallengesposedbyglobalization.Incompetitionlaw,forexample,ChengsuggeststhattheabandonmentoftheSingaporeagendaintheWTO(whichincludedcompetitionpolicy)ledtheinternationalcompetitioncommunitytofocusonvoluntaryconvergencethroughtransgovernmentalnetworks.68Assuch,transngovernmentalnetworkscanservetofillgovernancegapsand,throughcooperationamongstgovernmentofficials,createthedegreeofconsensusthatcouldleadtoatreaty-basedregulatoryregimeifthatisadesiredoutcome.

Transgovernmentalnetworksmayalsobeamoreeffectivegovernancemechanism,comparedtoatreaty-basedregulatoryframework,becausetheyharnessthebenefitsofthenetworkform,namelyspeedandthelackofbureaucraticformality.Simmonsarguesthat,inthecaseofinternationalfinance,itsnaturenecessitatesthatgovernancebecarriedoutmostlythroughtransgovernmental

66Slaughter,pgs.55-58.TheASEANWildlifeEnforcementNetwork,forexample,seekstopromotecooperationandcollaborationbetweennationallawenforcementagencies,customsagencies,thepolice,andprosecutorstoenforcewildlifetraffickinglaws;ASEANWildlifeEnforcementNetwork,online:http://environment.asean.org/the-asean-wildlife-enforcement-network-asean-wen/(accessedon8April2016).Fordiscussionabouttheroleofenforcementnetworksinenvironmentalgovernance,seeMichaelFaure,PeterDeSmedtandAnStas(eds),EnvironmentalEnforcementNetworks:Concepts,ImplementationandEffectiveness(EdwardElgarPublishing2015).67Slaughter,pg.59.Thereisthegeneralviewthatregulatoryconvergenceisbeneficialfortradebecauseitreducesthecostsofcomplyingwithdifferingproductstandards.However,foracriticalviewofhowharmonizationlowersregulatorystandardsconcerningdrugsafetyandmakesthestatemorevulnerabletocapturebycommercialinterests,seeJohnAbrahamandTimReed,‘Tradingrisksformarkets:Theinternationalharmonisationofpharmaceuticalsregulation’(2001)3Health,Risk&Society113.68ThomasK.Cheng,‘ConvergenceandItsDiscontents:AReconsiderationoftheMeritsofConvergenceofGlobalCompetitionLaw’(2012)12ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw433,pg.435.TheInternationalCompetitionNetwork(ICN)iswidelycreditedtobethemostimportantagentofregulatoryconvergenceincompetitionpolicyinthepastdecadeandissaidto“[exert]itsgreatestinfluencethroughtherecommendedpracticesandotherworkproductsproducedbyitsworkinggroups”;Cheng,pg.443.

networks:“Formal,protractednegotiationswouldberapidlyovertakenbytechnologicalchange,financialinnovation,andothermarketdevelopments.”69 Underlyingthisvisionofaworldordermadeupofnetworksisamajorshiftinthinkingabouttheinternationalsystem.Slaughterarguesthatthestateisdisaggregatinganditscomponentgovernmentalinstitutions–regulators,judgesandevenlegislators-arereachingouttotheirforeigncounterpartsandcreatingtransnationalnetworks.70Insteadofthinkingoftheinternationalsystemascomprisingofstatesas“unitaryentitieslikebilliardballsorblackboxes”71,recognizingthedisaggregationofstatespromptsustothinkoftheinternationalsystemasamorecomplexlandscapemadeupofinternationalorganizations,states(intheirunitaryform),networksmadeupofpartsofastate(forexample,thejudiciary),andprivateactors.InSlaughter’sview,statescanbedisaggregated,butalsoactascompletelyunitaryactorswhennecessary(forexample,whendecidingtogotowar).72 Slaughterarguesthattransgovernmentalnetworksare“akeyfeatureofworldorderinthetwenty-firstcentury,buttheyareunderappreciated,undersupported,andunderusedtoaddressthecentralproblemsofglobalgovernance”.73Shemakestheclaimthatthesenetworksshouldbe“embraced”as“thearchitectureofanewworldorder.”74However,itshouldbenotedthatothercommentatorshaveexpressedreservationsaboutthewaysinwhichtransgovernmentalnetworkssignalashifttowardsglobalgovernancebyexpertsactingoutsidetheconstraintsofdomesticpoliticalstructuresandthenormalforeignaffairsprocesses.75PhilipAlstonarguesthattheformationofthesenetworks“suggestamoveawayfromarenasofrelativetransparencyintothebackroom”leadingto“thebypassingofthenationalpoliticalarenastowhichtheUnited

69BethA.Simmons,‘TheInternationalPoliticsofHarmonization:TheCaseofCapitalMarketRegulation’(2001)55InternationalOrganization589,pg.592.70AlsoseeKalRaustiala,‘TheArchitectureofInternationalCooperation:TransgovernmentalNetworksandtheFutureofInternationalLaw’(2002)43VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw1:Insteadofdisappearing,thestateis“disaggregatingforpurposesofcooperation:domesticofficialsarereachingouttotheirforeigncounterpartsregularlyanddirectlythroughnetworks,ratherthanthroughstate-to-statenegotiationofthekindthatdominated20thcenturycooperation”;pg.10.71Slaughter,pg.5.72Ibid.,pg.19.73Ibid.,pg.1.74Ibid.,pg.213.75Inadditiontotheviewsexpressedintheremainderofthisparagraph,alsoseeDavidKennedy,‘ThePoliticsoftheInvisibleCollege:InternationalGovernanceandthePoliticsofExpertise’(2001)5EuropeanHumanRightsLawReview463;Pierre-HuguesVerdier,‘TransnationalRegulatoryNetworksandTheirLimits’(2009)34TheYaleJournalofInternationalLaw113.Verdierarguesthattheexistingscholarshiphastendedtodownplayconflictsofinterestwithintransgovernmentalnetworks.Hepointsoutthatmostofthescholarshipprovideshighlydetailedandoptimisticaccountsofsuccessfultransgovernmentalnetworksbutofferfewaccountsofnetworksthathavefailedintheirmission.Thereisalsolimiteddiscussionoftheuseoftransgovernmentalnetworksbypowerfulstatestoimposetheirpreferredstandardsonlesspowerfulstatesorthefailureoftransgovernmentalnetworkstopreventnon-adherencetotheirstandards.Afterall,transgovernmentalnetworksareintrinsicallyhamperedfromeffectivelyaddressingenforcementproblemsbecausetheydonothavemonitoringandenforcementcapabilities;pgs.121-122.

Statesandotherproponentsoftheimportanceofhealthydemocraticinstitutionsattachsomuchimportance.”76AlstonalsoraisesaninterestingpointthatSlaughter’sanalysisbringstotheforetwokeyissues:“Theyare:(i)whatisthenatureoftheglobalagendainaglobalizedworld?and(ii)whosetsandimplementsthatagenda?”77InSolPicciotto’sview,transgovernmentalnetworksresultinthedispersalofpoliticsintofunctionalarenasand“[appear]toallowparticularissuestoberegulatedinadepoliticized,technocraticmanner,bymangersorprofessionalswhoaredirectlyaccountabletotheir‘customers’.”78Finally,StephenToopearguesthatnetworksarenodifferentfromregimesinthattheyarealsositesofpowerthatarecapableofexclusionandinequality.Operatingoutsidetherealmofpublicscrutiny,thesenetworksmaybeevenlessaccountablethansomestatesinToope’sview.79

Inresponsetothesecritiques,Slaughterhasarguedthataccountabilityoftransgovernmentalnetworkshastobefosteredatthenationalandgloballevels.80Further,inordertodeveloporadaptaccountabilitymechanisms,shearguesthatdistinctionsmustbedrawnbetweennetworksthatoperateinexistinginternationalorganizations,withintheframeworkofanexecutiveagreement,oroutsideanypreexistingformalframework.81Finally,sheproposesasetofpotentialglobalnormsgoverningmembersoftransgovernmentalnetworksintheirrelationswithoneanother.82Theyincludeglobaldeliberativeequality,legitimatedifference,positivecomity,checksandbalances,andsubsidiarity.83Thesenormsaremeanttosetthegroundrules,whichmayberedundantwhenanetworkismainlyengagedininformationexchangebutwhichwillbenecessarywhennetworksengageinharmonizationandenforcementactivities.84 Viewingtheinternationalsystemthroughtheprismofdisaggregatedstateshasallowedmetoidentifyfeaturesoftheclimatechangegovernancelandscapethatremainhiddenfromatraditionalstatistperspective.Themostprominentrevelation

76PhilipAlston,‘TheMyopiaoftheHandmaidens:InternationalLawyersandGlobalization’(1997)8EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw435,pg.441.77Ibid,pg.439.78SolPicciotto,‘FragmentedStatesandInternationalRulesofLaw’(1997)6SocialandLegalStudies259,pg.273.79StephenToope,‘EmergingPatternsofGovernanceandInternationalLaw’inMichaelByers(ed),TheRoleofLawinInternationalPolitics:EssaysinInternationalRelationsandInternationalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2001),pgs.96-97.80Anne-MarieSlaughter,‘TheAccountabilityofGovernmentNetworks’(2001)8IndianaJournalofGlobalLegalStudies346.SeeVerdier,whoquestionswhetherdomesticpoliticalconstraintsoperateasintendedinthecontextofinternationalregulatorycooperation.Hefurtherarguesthatifdomesticpoliticalconstraintsweretoactasaccountabilitymechanismsforindividualregulatorsinvolvedinatransgovernmentalnetwork,thentheseregulatorswillbeboundtodomesticinterestsratherthantosomesharedsenseofregulatorycommongood.Domesticinterestsarealsolikelytocausedisagreementonissuessuchaswhichrulestoadopt,attemptstodiluteorresiststandardsortoavoidcompliance;pgs.126-130.81Slaughter,ibid,pg.349.82Anne-MarieSlaughter,‘DisaggregatedSovereignty:TowardsthePublicAccountabiiltyofGlobalGovernmentNetworks’(2004)39(2)GovernmentandOpposition159.83Ibid,pgs.174-186.84Ibid,pg.175.

hasbeenhowmuchsub-nationalgovernanceactivitywasoccurring.Forexample,city-levelgovernmentofficialsandmayorshavebeenreachingouttotheirforeigncounterpartsandcreatinginformationnetworksthatarebeginningtoplayaroleinthegenerationanddiffusionofpracticesandnorms.Usingtheliteratureonthedisaggregatedstateandtransgovernmentalnetworksasapointofdeparture,Iconceptualizetransnationalcitynetworksasavariantoftransgovernmentalnetworks.Unliketransgovernmentalnetworks,transnationalcitynetworksconstituteaformofdisaggregationalongtheverticallevelsofgovernment.However,liketransgovernmentalnetworks,transnationalcitynetworkshaveemergedasatoolofgovernance.Citiesandtheirgovernmentsareusingthesenetworkstosupplementgovernancegapsinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexandpushformoreconcertedclimatemitigationandadaptationeffortsatthelocallevel.Theyarealsousingnetworkstodevelopanddisseminatestandardsandpracticesthatarespecificallytailoredtomeeturbanneeds.Thecritiquesoftransgovernmentalnetworksserveasabasisforreflectinguponthelimitationsoftransnationalcitynetworksandissuesofaccountabilityandtransparencythatmayarisewhenthesenetworksgrowintheirreachandnormativeinfluence.Finally,thequestionsthatPhilipAlstonhasposedconcerningthecontentsoftheglobalgovernanceagendaandwhosetsitserveasadeparturepointformyenquiryinChapter3intotheurbansustainabledevelopmentagendaandtheroleoftheWorldBankinshapingandimplementingit.2.5TheGlobalCity

Globalcitytheorydevelopedinthelate1980sasscholarssoughttounderstandhowtheworldeconomywasbeingtransformed.Drawingupontraditionalurbantheory(whichexaminedhowcitiesrelatedtothehigherlevelsofgovernmentwithindomesticpoliticalsystems)andworldsystemstheory(whichanalyzedhowstateswereboundinunequalstructuralcore-peripheryrelationshipsusinganeo-Marxistframework),JohnFriedmannpublishedhis‘WorldCityHypothesis’in1986.85Friedmannunderstoodthecityineconomicterms-citieswere“basingpoints”and“organisationalnodes”oftherapidlychanginggeographyofglobalcapitalisminthelasttwentiethcentury–andsoughttoanalyzethe“spatialorganizationofthenewinternationaldivisionoflabour.”86This“newdivisionoflabour”,Brennerexplains,islargelytheresultofthemassiveexpansionintheroleoftransnationalcorporationsintheproductionandexchangeofcommoditiesgloballysincethelate1960s.87“Whereastheoldinternationaldivisionoflabourwasbaseduponrawmaterialsproductionintheperipheryandindustrialmanufacturinginthecore,the[newdivisionoflabour]hasentailedtherelocationofmanufacturingindustriestosemi-peripheralandperipheralstatesinsearchofinexpensivesources

85JohnFriedmann,‘TheWorldCityHypothesis’(1986)17DevelopmentandChange69.86Ibid.87NeilBrenner,‘GlobalCities,GlocalStates:GlobalCityFormationandStateTerritorialRestructuringinContemporaryEurope’(1998)5ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy1,pg.5.

oflaborpower”.88Meanwhile,businessservicesbegantoconcentratethemselvesinurbancenters,andthese“uppertiercities”evolvedtobecomemajornodesoffinancialplanningandcorporatedecision-making,andthereforethe“centralbasingpointsfortheworldwideactivitiesof[transnationalcorporations]”.89Curtisargues“Friedmann’skeycontributionwastoplacecitiesbackontheagendaofinternationalpoliticaleconomy,showinghowtheinternallifeofcities…couldonlybeunderstoodbyreferencetotheirconnectionsattheinternationallevelandthefunctionsthattheyfulfillfortheglobaleconomy.Atthesametime,theglobaleconomycouldonlybeproperlyunderstoodbyreferencetotherolethatcertaincitiesplaywithinit.”90

The1990switnessedtheaccelerationofeconomicglobalizationandadvancesininformationandcommunicationtechnologies.Againstthisbackground,SaskiaSassenproduced‘TheGlobalCity’whichhasbecomeaseminalworkontheconnectionbetweencertainkeymetropolisesandthebroaderprocessesofglobalization.91Sassenarguesthat,alongsidethespatialdispersalofeconomicactivitiesandtheincreasingdigitizingofeconomicactivitiessuchasbanking,wasthespatialconcentrationofhighlyspecializedprofessionalfirmsandtop-levelmanagement.Thisprocessofspatialconcentrationand,consequently,theconcentrationofmaterialfacilitiesoccurredincities.Sassenexplainsthat“[a]ttheheartofthisdeepstructuraltrendisthefactthateventhemostmaterialeconomicsectors(mines,factories,transportsystems,hospitals)todayarebuyingmoreinsurance,accounting,legal,financial,consulting,softwareprogramming,andothersuchservicesforfirms.Theseso-calledintermediateservicestendtobeproducedincities,nomatterthenonurbanlocationofthemineorthesteelplantthatisbeingserviced”.92

Globalcitiesstandoutincomparisontoothercitiesbecausetheyareabletohandlethemorecomplexneedsoffirmsthathaveglobalsupplychainsorhaveoperationsinmultiplejurisdictions.Sassenpositsthatthereisnosuchthingasasingleglobalcity.93Aglobalcitycanonlyexistalongsideotherglobalcities,connectedbynetworksthatcrisscrosstheworld.Eachnetworkmayincludedifferentcitiestoservevariousglobaleconomyneedsandprovideservicestomultinationalcorporations.Forexample,thecircuitfortheglobalcoffeetrade(includingtradingcoffeeasacommodity,sellingitasaconsumerproduct,andcoffeefuturestrading,forexample)involvescitiesdifferentfromthoseinthecircuitforlegalservices.Sassenpointsoutthattheproliferationofcircuitsisnotsolelydrivenbyeconomicforces.Non-profitorganizationsworkingforlabourrightsandenvironmentalprotectionalsocreateanddevelopglobalcitynetworks.94

88Ibid.89Ibid.90SimonCurtis,‘GlobalcitiesandthetransformationoftheInternationalSystem’(2011)37ReviewofInternationalStudies1923,pg.1930.91SaskiaSassen,TheGlobalCity:NewYork,London,Tokyo(PrincetonUniversityPress1991).92SaskiaSassen,CitiesinaWorldEconomy(4thedn,SagePublications2012),pg.110.93Ibid,pgs.7,111.AlsoseeSaskiaSassen,‘TheGlobalCity:IntroducingaConcept’(2005)XIBrownJournalofWorldAffairs27,pg.34.94Sassen,CitiesinaWorldEconomy,pg.113.

AsSassenexplainsinherlaterwork,usingtheterm‘globalcity’wasaconsciousdecisiontodepartfromthe“olderhistoricaltermworldcity”.95ForSassen,‘globalcity’isnotadescriptivetermforadistinctiveurbanform:“Itisananalyticconstructthatallowsonetodetecttheglobalasitisfilteredthroughthespecificsofaplace,itsinstitutionalorders,anditssociospatialfragmentations.”96Inotherwords,giventhattheprocessesofglobalizationcreateglobalcitiesandglobalcities,inturn,areterritorialspacesinwhichtheprocessesofglobalizationunfoldandaffectlocalcommunities,theglobalcityisatheoreticalprismthroughwhichtheconnectionsbetweencitiesandglobalizationcanbestudied.

Mostglobalcityresearchersfocusontheglobaleconomy.97However,therearetwostrandsofscholarshipthatdepartfromthisfocusontheservicingofglobalcapitalandmeetingthecorporateneedsofmultinationalcorporations.Onestrandseekstounravelthe‘darkside’oftheglobalcityphenomenon–extremesocialinequalityandmarginalizationofthepoorwithinglobalcitiesaswellasthedetrimentalimpactofaglobalcityontherestofthecountryinwhichitislocated(e.g:theimpactofLondon’s“globalcity-ness”ontherestoftheUnitedKingdom).98Theotherstrandofscholarshipmakestheclaimthattheglobalcityhasbecomeanactorinworldaffairs.99Acuto,forexample,seekstohighlighttheagencyofglobalcities:“Admittingthatcertaincities(ifnotallcities)performfunctions,arecapableofinnovationandretaindegreesofcontrol,implies,inmyview,alogicalcorollary:globalcities,duetotheirpresenceaslociofpurposiveactionwithintheglobalsystemandasarticulatorsofglobalflows,arenotonlyplacesbutalsoparticipantsinworldaffairs”.100Acutofurtherpointsoutthatthisisanimportantanalyticalsteptotakebecauserecognizingthecapacityofglobalcitiestoactpermitsconsiderationoftheirpotentialroleinsolvingglobalgovernancechallenges.101Arguingthatthetimehascometoreexaminewhatitmeanstobeandtogovernaglobalcityas“manylocalgovernmentsofGlobalCitiesaroundtheworld…havebrokentheinstitutionalchainsofmunicipalpoliticsandhavebecomeglobalactors”,Ljungkvist’sTheGlobalCity2.0offersarichtheoreticalexaminationofthepoliticalagencyofcitiesinrelationtoforeignandsecurityaffairsthatexplainstheir

95SaskiaSassen,‘Foreword’inMarkM.Amen,KevinArcherandMartinM.Bosman(eds),RelocatingGlobalCities:FromtheCentertotheMargins(Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers2006),pg.ix.96Ibid,pg.x.97Foroverviewofthisbodyofcontemporaryscholarship,seeMicheleAcuto,‘FindingtheGlobalCity:AnAnalyticalJourneythroughthe'InvisibleCollege'’(2011)48UrbanStudies2953,pgs.2964-2967.98See,forexample,DoreenMassey,WorldCity(PolityPress2007).99See,forexample,KentE.CalderandMarikodeFreytas,‘GlobalPoliticalCitiesasActorsinTwenty-FirstCenturyInternationalAffairs’(2009)29SAISReviewofInternationalAffairs79;MicheleAcuto,GlobalCities,GovernanceandDiplomacy:TheUrbanLink(Routledge2013);YishaiBlank,‘LocalismintheNewGlobalLegalOrder’(2006)47HarvardInternationalLawJournal263;JanneE.Nijman,‘RenaissanceoftheCityasGlobalActor:TheRoleofForeignPolicyandInternationalLawPracticesintheConstructionofCitiesasGlobalActors’inGuntherHellmann,AndreasFahrmeirandMilosVec(eds),TheTransformationofForeignPolicy:DrawingandManagingBoundariesfromAntiquitytothePresent(OxfordUniversityPress2016);KristinLjungkvist,GlobalCity2.0:FromStrategicSitetoGlobalActor(Routledge2016).100Acuto,‘FindingtheGlobalCity:AnAnalyticalJourneythroughthe'InvisibleCollege'’,pg.2967.101Ibid,pg.2968.

increasingparticipationinglobalpolitics.102 Thisthesistapsonthelargeandbroadresearchprogrammeonglobalcitiesasapointofdepartureforconceptualizingcitiesasactorsandtheinvolvementofcitiesintheprocessesofglobalization.Inparticular,theglobalcityscholarshiphasbeenimportantinshapingmyunderstandingofhowcertaincitiesarecapableofparticipatinginglobalclimategovernanceprocessesbecauseoftheirabilitytoforgetransnational,networkedrelationsandwhyglobalcitieswanttobeactorsinworldaffairs(includingthegovernanceofclimatechange).Thishascreatedthebasicfoundationformyexplorationofcitiesastransnationallaw-makingactorsinthecontextofclimatechangegovernance.

3. Conclusion

Thischapterhassetouttheoverarchingtheoreticalframeworkforthisthesis.Inthespiritofanalyticaleclecticism,Ihavedrawnondiversetheoreticalperspectivestocreateaframeworkforexaminingtheemergenceofcitiesasparticipantsintransnationalclimatechangelawandgovernance.ThenextchapterfocusesondescribingtheriseofcitiesasparticipantsinworldaffairsandthepracticesofinternationalorganizationsliketheUN-Habitatthataugmenttheincreasinglypopularideathatinthefaceofgraveglobalgovernancechallenges-suchasclimatechange,pandemicsandtrafficking-citiescanofferpragmaticandeffectivesolutionswhilestatesappeartobedysfunctionalandineffectual.103Thesepracticesandtheirunderlyingassumptionsabouttherolethatcitiescanplayinworldaffairsencouragecitiestoexercisetheiragencyinglobalgovernance,aswewillseeinthenextchapter.

102Ljungkvist.103See,forexample,BenjaminBarber,IfMayorsRuledtheWorld:DysfunctionalNations,RisingCities(YaleUniversityPress2014);Ljungkvist;UN-HABITAT,CitiesinAGlobalizingWorld–GlobalReportonHumanSettlements2001(Earthscan2001).

Chapter3:TheRiseoftheCityinInternational

Affairs“Inshort,globalcitiesareincreasinglydrivingworldaffairs–economically,politically,sociallyandculturally.Theyarenolongerjustplacestolivein.Theyhaveemergedasleadingactorsontheglobalstage.”1Giventhatby2050,eightoutoftenpeopleintheworldwillbelivingincities,“thebattleforamoresustainablefuturewillbewonorlostincities.”2

1. Introduction

Citieshaveexistedsincepre-historictimes.Overthelasttwothousandyears,afewcitieshaveemergedasinternationalpoliticalcenters.Theseweremostlyimperialcities,likeThebes,Babylon,Persepolis,RomeandConstantinople,whichwere“capitalsofgreatempiresandtheirconqueredterritories”.3InChina,theSpringandAutumnPeriod(771-481B.C.)wastheageofthecity-state;theareasurroundingtheYellowRiverwasdividedintohundredsofstates,mostofwhichconsistedofasinglecityanditshinterland.4Inmorerecenthistory,citiesincludingVienna,StPetersburg,AmsterdamandLondonalsoassertedsignificantsocialandpoliticalinfluenceontheinternationalstage.Thesecitieswieldedasignificantamountofpowerandinfluenceduetothestrengthandwealthoftheempiresoverwhichtheyruled.5

Urbanizationinthetwentieth-firstcenturydiffersfromthepastinitsrateandscale.In1800,whentheglobalpopulationwasaround1000millionpeople,Beijingwastheonlycityintheworldwithmorethanamillioninhabitants.6In2014,Tokyoistheworld’slargestcitywiththirty-eightmillioninhabitants.7TheUNprojectsthatby2030,theworldwillhaveforty-onemega-citieswithapopulationof

1IvoDaalder,‘ANewGlobalOrderofCities’FinancialTimes(26May2015)2WorldUrbanCampaign,ManifestoforCities:TheUrbanFutureWeWant(2012)3SiddharthaSen,‘ImperialCities’inRogerW.Caves(ed)EncyclopediaoftheCity(Routledge2005),pg.250-251.4MarkEdwardLewis,‘TheCity-StateinSpring-and-AutumnChina’inMogensHermanHansen(ed),AComparativeStudyofThirtyCity-stateCultures:AnInvestigation,Volume21ofHistorisk-filosofiskeskrifter(Kgl.DanskeVidenskabernesSelskab2000),pg.359.5KentE.CalderandMarikodeFreytas,‘GlobalPoliticalCitiesasActorsinTwenty-FirstCenturyInternationalAffairs’(2009)29SAISReviewofInternationalAffairs79,pg.81.6TChandler,Fourthousandyearsofurbangrowth:anhistoricalcensus(St.David’sUniversityPress1987),pg.656.7UN,WorldUrbanizationProspects:The2014Revision,Highlights(ST/ESA/SER.A/352)(DepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2014),online:http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf(accessedon20April2016),pg.1.

atleasttenmillioninhabitants.8In1950,one-thirdoftheworld’spopulationlivedincities.9Thisfigureisexpectedtorisetotwo-thirdsby2050.10RoodetalhavedemonstratedthatlandareaaboutfourtimeslargerthantheNetherlandsisusedtomeetthefoodandfiberneedsofthishighlyurbanizedcountry.11Thus,ruralplacesarealsoinvariablyconnectedtourbanmetropolises.Inshort,wearelivinginan“urbanage”.12

Ithasbeenarguedthatintheurbanage,cities,moresothanstates,“willbeforcedintothefrontlinesbyglobalwarming,waterinsecurity,andotherenvironmentalchallenges”.13Otherglobalgovernancechallengesincreasinglyhaveanurbanface;terrorismandethnicviolencearejusttwoexamples.Ascitiesseektoprotecttheirinhabitantsfromthreatssuchasterrorismandpandemics,theybegintoclaimpoliticalauthorityandtodevelopindependentpoliciesinrelationtoforeignaffairsandsecurity.Theseareissueareasthataretraditionallydeemedtobecoreresponsibilitiesofcentralgovernments.Further,byforgingtransnationalpartnershipsandcreatingorganizationstorepresenttheircollectiveinterestsatthegloballevel,citiesnolongerbehavelike“passiveplayersinaglobalgameplayedoutamongandbetweennationalandinternationalactors”.14Situatedattheconfluxofurbanizationandglobalization,globalcities,inparticular,areleadingthetrendofincreasinglyintenseandbroadurbanparticipationininternationalaffairs.Globalcitiesare“[demonstrating]howstatesandinternationalorganizationsarenolongertheonlyproblem-solvingunitsinworldpolitics”.15

However,theroleplayedbycitiesininternationalaffairshasreceivedverylittleattentionfrominternationallawandinternationalrelationsscholars.Fromalegalperspective,thecityhastraditionallybeenconstructedfromwithinanationallegalorder.AsJerryFrughasarguedinhisseminalworkonAmericanlocalgovernmentlaw,therehavealwaysbeentwocompetingnotionsofthecityinco-existence.16Thebureaucraticmodelpositsthecityasacreatureofthestate,subordinatetothestateandonlycapableofexercisingpowersthathavebeendelegatedtoit.Thedemocraticmodelpositsthecityasaquasi-sovereignthathaslimitedbutrealautonomy;thecityisaspaceinwhichcitizenscanpursuetheir

8Ibid.Forahelpfulgraphicalrepresentationofwherethesecitiesareandtheirprojectedpopulationchangesfrom2014to2030,seeBloombergVisualData,“AtHomeinaCrowd”,online:http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-09/global-megacities-by-2030.html(accessedon3December2016).9UN,ibid.10Ibid.11G.A.Roodandothers,TrackingtheeffectsofinhabitantsonbiodiversityintheNetherlandsandabroad:Anecologicalfootprintmodel(NetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency/RIVM,Publicationnumber500013005(Bilthoven,theNetherlands),2004).12RickyBurdettandDeyanSudjic(eds),TheEndlessCity(PhaidonPress2008).13SaskiaSassen,‘AFocusonCitiesTakesUsBeyondExistingGovernanceFrameworks’,inJosephStiglitzandMaryKaldor(eds),TheQuestforSecurity:ProtectionWithoutProtectionismandtheChallengeofGlobalGovernance(ColumbiaUniversityPress2013),pg.244.14AshAminandNigelThrift,‘Citizensoftheworld:Seeingthecityasasiteofinternationalinfluence’(2005)27HarvardInternationalReview14,pg.17.15MicheleAcuto,‘Cityleadershipinglobalgovernance’(2013)19GlobalGovernance481,pg.495.16G.E.Frug,‘TheCityAsaLegalConcept’(1980)93(6)HarvardLawReview1057.

collectivevisionofthe“commonwealth”withminimalstateinterference.17Atdifferentpointsinhistoryandindifferentplaces,oneofthesetwonotionsofthecitywouldgainascendency.Further,Frugargues,twocompetingnarrativesaboutthecity-staterelationshiphaveemergedfromthistensionbetweenthedualnotionsofthecity.18Onenarrativespeaksoftheroleofthecityasprotectorofcitizens’interestsagainsttheencroachmentofoppressivestatepower,andtheothernarrativepresentsthestateastheprotectorofminorityinterestsagainsttheabuseofpowerbymajoritarianruleincities.19Asinanysystemofgovernmentthatcomprisesofmultiplelevels,eachlevelofgovernmentwilloccasionallyseektoaggregateitspowerrelativetootherlevels.Themanagementofthesepowerrelations,anddivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenthecityandthestate,hastraditionallybeenconsideredapurelydomesticmatter,notapropermatterofconcernfortheinternationalcommunity.

Further,citieshavetraditionallybeenviewedas“policytakers”ratherthanpolicymakerswithinlargelyhierarchicaldomesticpoliticalsystems.20Asforexternalrelations,stateshavetraditionallybeenreluctanttoacknowledgethatcitiesmayhavearoletoplayoutsidethedomesticrealm.TheDutchnationalgovernment,forexample,explicitlydeniedthepossibilityoflocalgovernmentspossessingcompetencesonforeignpolicyintheearly1990s.21Thus,eventhoughscholarsofinternationallawandinternationalrelations(excepttherealists)havelongacknowledgedthatstatesarenottheonlyactorsintheinternationalsystem,andthereisanextensiveliteratureontheinvolvementofactors‘beyondthestate’-includingindividuals,multinationalcorporations,andreligiousorganizations-ininternationallawmakingandworldpolitics,citieshavenotbeenacknowledgedashavinganysignificantroletoplayintheinternationalsphere.22

Thischaptermakestheargumentthatcorrectingthisscholarlyoversightisoftimelyimportanceinlightofcontemporarydevelopments.Astheempiricalaccountinthischapterwillshow,citiesareincreasinglyparticipatinginglobal17Frug,pg.1062-75.18Frug,pg.26-53.19Ibid20SeeClausSchultze,‘CitiesandEUgovernance:policy-takersorpolicy-makers?’(2003)13RegionalandFederalStudies121,inwhichtheauthorarguesthatcitiesareincreasinglymovingfrompolicy“taker”tomaker,signalingamovetowardsmoreparticipativegovernanceintheEU.21LetteroftheMinisterofForeignAffairstotheSecondChamberofParliament,TweedeKamer,26Janaury1990,Vergaderjaar1989-1990,21300VII,nr.20.22Forasampleofthisextensiveliterature,see,forexample,PhilipAlston(ed)Non-StateActorsandHumanRights(CollectedCoursesoftheAcademyofEuropeanLaw)(OxfordUniversityPress2005);SteveCharnovitz,‘NongovernmentalOrganizationsandInternationalLaw’(2006)100TheAmericanJournalofInternationalLaw348;ElisaMorgera,CorporateAccountabilityinInternationalEnvironmentalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2009).Ontheunderappreciationoftheroleofstatecourtsininternationallaw-making,seeJanetKovenLevit,‘ATaleofInternationalLawintheHeartland:TorresandtheRoleofStateCourtsinTransnationalLegalConversation’(2004)12TulsaJournalofComparativeandInternationalLaw163.Exceptionsthatconsidertherelationshipbetweencitiesandinternationallawinclude:YishaiBlank,‘LocalismintheNewGlobalLegalOrder’(2006)47HarvardInternationalLawJournal263;LesleyWexler,‘ThePromiseandLimitsofLocalHumanRightsInternationalism’(2009)37FordhamUrbanLawJournal599;G.E.FrugandDavidBarron,‘InternationalLocalGovernmentLaw’(2006)38TheUrbanLawyer1.

governanceprocessesandinternationalaffairsinvariousways.Theyareengagingininter-citydiplomacyanddevelopingexternalrelationstopromotetradeandpoliticalstability.23Citiesarealsoindependentlyimplementinginternationaltreatiesontheirownaccord,sometimesinoppositiontothestanceadoptedbytheirstates,therebychallengingtraditionalconceptionsofhowinternationallawisinternalizedandimplementeddomestically.24Citieshavealsoformedorganizationstorepresenttheirinterestsininternationalforumsandtoachieveforeignpolicyobjectivessuchasnuclearnon-proliferation.25

The“internationalizationofcities”hasalsogainedtractionduetoashiftinthedevelopmentagendaofinternationalorganizations,particularlytheWorldBankandUN-Habitat,towardssustainableurbanization.26Thisshiftcanbedatedtothelate2000s,whichheraldedthe“DecadeoftheCity,adecadethatwillberememberedforrecognizingcitiesatthecoreofgrowthandhumandevelopment.”27Thecontemporaryglobalurbanagendahascreatedprogrammesandmechanismsthatlinkcitiesdirectlytointernationalorganizations,bypassingthestate.Theseprogrammesalsochannelresourcesdirectlytocities,whichenhancestheirpositionvis-à-visthestate.Whilethepracticaleffectsoftheseurbanprogrammesandpoliciesaremostlyexperiencedincitiesindevelopingcountriesandleastdevelopedcountries,asthesecitiesareusuallytherecipientsofaidandtechnicalassistancefrominternationalorganizations,theideologicalinfluenceoftheglobalurbanagendaisindeedglobalandcreatesanormativeenvironmentthatisconduciveforcitiestoplayanincreasinglyvisibleroleininternationalaffairs.

Nationalgovernmentsincreasinglyrecognizethatcitiescanplayameaningfulroleinmaterializingdomesticandglobalagendas,especiallyonurban,environmentalandeconomicissues.EvenanauthoritariangovernmentofacentralizedpoliticalsystemlikeChina’shasbeenencouragingofChinesecities’globalengagement.Throughthestate-organizedChinaAssociationofMayors,ChinesemayorshaverecentlyspenttimeintheUSandDenmarktolearnfromtheircounterpartsandexpertsaboutarangeofsustainabilityissues,includingpublictransportation,protectingopenspaces,andenergyconservation.28In2014,themayorsofGuangzhou,LosAngelesandAucklandsignedamemorandumof

23SeePart2.2below.24SeePart2.1below.25SeePart2.4below.26Iborrowtheterm“internationalizationofcities”fromIleanaPorras,‘TheCityandInternationalLaw:InPursuitofSustainableDevelopment’(2008)36FordhamUrbanLawJournal537.27WorldBank,SystemsofCities:HarnessingUrbanizationforGrowthandPovertyAlleviation(Washington,DC:WorldBank,2009),Foreword,pg.1.28WenHuang,‘DelegationofChineseleadersstudysustainableurbanization’GranhamGlobalInitiatives(TheUniversityofChicago)(7August2015),online:https://grahamglobal.uchicago.edu/news/delegation-chinese-leaders-study-sustainable-urbanization;Grundfos,GrundfostotrainChinesemayors(27November2014),online:http://www.grundfos.com/about-us/news-and-press/news/grundfos-to-train-chinese-mayors.html(bothwebpagesaccessedon1May2016).

understanding(MOU)topromoteeconomiccooperation.29ThiswasfollowedbythelaunchoftheTripartitePortsAlliancein2015,whichaimstofostercollaborationoninvestments,technologiesandenvironmentalpoliciesamongstthethreecities’portauthorities.30AsofFebruary2015,444Chinesecitieshaveestablished2154partnershipswithcitiesabroad.31

Byexaminingvariouswaysinwhichcitiesplayapartinglobalgovernanceprocessesandinternationalorganizations’urbanpolicy,thisthirdchapterprovidesabackdropforsubsequentanalysisoftheparticipationofcitiesintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Part2providesanoverviewoffourbroadcategoriesofactivitythatexemplifyhowcitiesareemergingasparticipantsinglobalgovernanceprocesses,usuallyadoptingpracticesandpolicypositionsthatareindependentoftheirstates.Thesefourcategoriesare:(1)acityimplementinginternationallawonitsownaccordwhenitsnationalgovernmentisreluctantorrefusestodoso;(2)citydiplomacy;(3)citiesdevelopingtheirindependentlocalandtransnationalpoliciesandstrategiestomanageglobalriskssuchasterrorism;(4)citiesformingorganizationstorepresenturbaninterestsininternationalforumsand/ortopursuegovernanceobjectivessuchaspromotingnuclearnon-proliferation.Part3examinesthenormativepolicyplatformandassociatedpracticesofinternationalorganizations,particularlyUN-HabitatandtheWorldBank,thatconstitutethecontemporaryglobalurbanagenda.Part4concludesbyprovidinganoverviewofthekeyideasadvancedinthischapter.

2. UrbanParticipationinInternationalLegalandPoliticalProcesses2.1CitiesImplementingInternationalLaw

Accordingtomostorthodoxaccountsofinternationallaw,whenastatesignsandratifiesatreaty,itexpressesitscommitmenttoupholdinganinternationalnormorsetofnorms.Subsequently,internationallawdependsondomesticlegalsystemsforimplementation.32Theactofincorporatinginternationallawintoits29XinhuaNewsAgency,LeadersfromChina,NewZealand,USseekcommonprosperityattripartitemeeting(16May2016),online:http://china.org.cn/world/2016-05/16/content_38460907.htm(accessedon1May2016).30PortofLosAngeles,PortsofLosAngeles,AucklandandGuangzhouEstablishTripartitePortsAlliance(11June2015),online:https://www.portoflosangeles.org/newsroom/2015_releases/news_061115_tripartite.asp(accessedon1May2016).31DanyangWang,‘AnalyzingChina's'CityDiplomacy'’Yicai(21May2015),online:http://www.yicai.com/news/4620833.html(accessedon1May2016).32“Attheheartofanychapteroninternationallawandnationallawisalwaysanexplanationofthetwotheoriesofmonismanddualism”;RosalynHiggins,ProblemsandProcess:InternationalLawandHowWeUseIt(OxfordUniversityPress1994),pg.205-6.Monismisatheorypositingthatalllaw,includinginternationallaw,ispartofasingleuniversallegalorder.Therefore,internationallawexistsalongsidethevariousbranchesofdomesticlaw(forexample,labourlawandcompanylaw).Dualismenvisagesinternationallawanddomesticlawastwodistinctspheres.Inorderforinternationallawtobecomepartofadomesticlegalsystem,itmustbe“transformed”intodomesticlegislation.Fordiscussion,seePeterMalanczuk,Akehurst'sModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(7threvisededn,Routledge1997),Chapter4.

domesticlegalandpoliticalstructures,throughexecutiveaction,legislationandjudicialdecisionsisanexpressionofastate’sinternalizationofinternationallaw.Internalizationtricklesdowntothestatelevelandfurtherdowntocitieswhenthesesub-nationalentitiesimplementfederallaw.Thus,accordingtoorthodoxaccounts,sub-stateunitshaveacircumscribedroletoplayintheinternalizationofinternationallawnorms,whichislimitedtoimplementingnationallawsandpolicies.However,theinternalizationofinternationallawcanoccurinalessrigid,bottom-upmannerthatbreaksthemonopolyofnationsoninternationallawmakingprocesses.Whenastateisreluctantorrefusestoratifyatreaty,citieshave,onoccasion,beenpointsofentryforinternationalnormsintoastatewhentheyintroducepoliciesandlegislationtoimplementinternationallaw.

Acitymaychoosetoimplementaninternationaltreatybecauseitwishestoexpressitscosmopolitanidentitybysignalingitsmembershipoftheglobalcommunity.33Acitymayalsoalreadyhaveastrongdomesticcommitmenttothesubjectmatteroftheinternationaltreatyandchoosestoimplementtheinternationaltreatysothatitcanserveasafocalpointandprovidewidelyrecognizedindicatorsforguidance.34Forexample,acitythatiscommittedtoaddressingclimatechangemaychoosetoimplementtheParisAgreementsothatitservesasafocalpointforthecity’sactionsandpolicies.ThetwodegreeCelsiustargetandtheNationallyDeterminedCommitments(NDCs)(knownastheIntendedNationallyDeterminedCommitmentsbeforetheParisAgreementcameintoforceon4November2016)provideaframeworkofindicatorsforthecitytomeasureitsperformance.ThecitycanchoosetoexceedtheNDCofitsstate,itcanendorsethetemperaturetargetinitsclimatepoliciesandactionplans,oritcanpledgetheequivalentofanNDCandreportitsemissionsinthesamewaythatmemberstateswillbedoingpursuanttotheParisAgreement;theCompactofMayorsprovidescitieswiththeplatformfordoingso.35Acitymayelecttoimplementatreatyorbaseitspoliciesoninternationallegalnormstoexpressitscriticismofnationalpolicy.36TheUKcityofYorkoffersaninterestingexample.AtatimeofstrongresistancetotheHumanRightsActinthecountry,thecityintentionallychosetoframeitslocalpoliciesintermsofinternationalhumanrights.37Yorkalsowelcomedrefugeesinordertomitigateincreasinglyseverenationalmigrationpolicies.38Behindvariouspossiblemotivationstoimplementinternationallaw,theextenttowhichaninternationalissuebecomespartofacity’sagendawilldependheavilyonthe33DanKoon-hongChan,‘Citydiplomacyand“glocal”governance:revitalizingcosmopolitandemocracy’(2016)29Innovation:TheEuropeanJournalofSocialScienceResearch,DOI:10.1080/13511610.2016.1157684.34AlsoseediscussionontheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomenbelow.35TheCompactofMayorsisdiscussedindetailinChapter5.36LesleyWexler,‘TaketheLongWayHome:Sub-FederalIntegrationofUnratifiedandNon-self-executingTreatyLaw’(2006)28MichiganJournalofInternationalLaw1.37EsthervandenBergandBarbaraOomen,‘TowardsaDecentralisationofHumanRights:theRiseofHumanRightsCities’inThijsvanLindertandDoutjeLettingaLettinga(eds),TheFutureofHumanRightsinanUrbanWorld:ExploringOpportunities,ThreatsandChallenges(AmnestyInternationalNetherlands2014),pg.14.38Ibid.

strengthandinfluenceofconstituencydemands,interestgroupadvocacyandlobbyingactivities,andlocalofficials’responsiveness.39

Atthisjuncture,Igivetwoexamplesofcitiesimplementingtreatiesontheirownaccordandtherefore“bringinginternationallawhome”despitenon-ratificationbytheirnationalgovernment.40TheUShadsignedtheKyotoProtocolon12November1998.41However,oneyearaftertheWhiteHousecameunderthecontroloftheRepublicanPartyfollowingthepresidentialelectionsin2000,theBushadministrationwithdrewtheUSsignaturefromtheKyotoProtocolonthebasisofscientificuncertaintyandunfairness.42ManylocalofficialsintheUSdidnotsharePresidentBush’soppositiontotheKyotoProtocol.OnthedaythattheKyotoProtocolbecamelawforthecountriesthathadsignedandratifiedit,theMayorofSeattleGregNickelslaunchedtheUSConferenceofMayorsClimateProtectionAgreementwherebysignatorycitiespledgedtosurpasstheGHGreductiontargetsuggestedfortheUSintheKyotoProtocol(i.e.7%reductionfrom1990levelsby2012)aswellasurgetheUSCongresstopasslegislationthatwouldestablishanationalemissionstradingsystem.43Asof14December2015,1060citiesacrossallAmericanstateshavesignedtheAgreement,therebyinternalizinganinternationallawinstrument,theKyotoProtocol,withintheUSdespitenon-ratificationbythefederalgovernment.

In1981,women’srightsactivistsreachedaremarkablemilestonewhentheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW)enteredintoforce.44Asummaryofthetreaty’sobjectivescanbefoundinArticle3,whichrequiressignatorystatesto“takeinallfields,inparticularinthepolitical,social,economicandculturalfields,allappropriatemeasures,includinglegislation,toensurethefulldevelopmentandadvancementofwomen,forthepurposeofguaranteeingthemtheexerciseandenjoymentofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsonabasisofequalitywithmen.”45USPresidentCartersignedCEDAWin1980,butsubsequentadministrationseitherhavefailedornottriedtosecureratificationofthetreatybytheSenate.46ManyopponentsofCEDAWratificationareconcernedthatthetreatythreatensAmericannormsandvalues,39HeidiHobbs,CityHallGoesAbroad:TheForeignPolicyofLocalPolitics(SagePublishing1994),pg.5.40Iborrowtheterm“bringinginternationallawhome”fromHaroldHKoh,‘The1998FrankelLecture:BringingInternationalLawHome’(1998)35HoustonLawReview623.41UNFCCC,“StatusofRatificationoftheKyotoProtocol”,online:http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php(accessedon1May2016).42GregKahn,‘TheFateoftheKyotoProtocolundertheBushAdministration’(2003)21BerkeleyJournalofInternationalLaw548,pg.551-559;JulianBorger,‘Bushkillsglobalwarmingtreaty’TheGuardian(29March2001),online:http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews(accessedon1May2016).43USConferenceofMayorsClimateProtectionAgreement,online:https://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm(accessedon1May2016).441249U.N.T.S.13.45Ibid46LuisaBlanchfield,TheU.N.ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW):IssuesintheU.S.RatificationDebate(CongressionalResearchService,28June2011),online:https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40750.pdf,pg.1.

particularlythoseconcerningthestructureofthefamily,47abortion,48andfamilyplanning.49Oftenusingprovocativelanguage,CEDAW’scriticshavehighlightedthetreaty’schallengetoaconceptionofwomenasobliged,firstandforemost,totheirhouseholds.50

Aswiththecaseofclimatechange,citieshavenotacquiesced.AsResnikandcolleaguesputit,“…afewwentbeyondexpressivestatementsandaimedtoturn‘transnational’lawinto‘local’law”.51In1998,SanFranciscopassedalocalordinancetoimplementCEDAW.52ThecitycommitteditselftotheCEDAWtechniqueoflawmakingthroughself-reflectiveenquiryabouttheeffectsofequalitynormsacrossalldomains.Specifically,itstrivesto“[r]eviewfederal,stateandlocallawsandpublicpoliciestoidentifysystematicandstructuraldiscriminationagainstwomenandgirls”andultimatelyensurethat“[e]erythingthathappenstoSanFranciscowomenandgirlswillbeinterpretedandacteduponusingtheCEDAWconceptualframework,analysisandlanguage.”53SanFranciscohasinspiredothercities–Portland(Oregon)andBerkeley(California)–topasssimilarlegislation.In2013,anNGOlaunchedthe“CitiesforCEDAW”campaignwhichaims“to‘makethegloballocal’byharnessingthepowerofcitiesandpromotingtheadoptionofCEDAWasamunicipalordinanceincities…inordertocreateaframeworkforimprovingthestatusofwomenandgirls”.54

Thereisagrowingtransnationalmovementof“HumanRightsCities”ascivilsociety,citiesandinternationalorganizationstrytorealizetheachievementofhumanrightsatthelocallevel.Throughtheircomments,declarationsandstatements,UNsupervisorybodiesandregionalinstitutionshaveexplicitlyrecognizedtheroleoflocalauthoritiesingivingeffecttohumanrights.55Humanrightscitiescanbedefinedas“citiesthatexplicitlyrefertohumanrightsnormsintheiractivities,statementsorpolicy.”56VandenBergandOomenhaveshownthattherearemanyapproachesthatcitiescantaketoimplementinternationalhumanrights.SomecitiesusethemethodologydevelopedbytheNGOknownasThe

47Ibid,pg.13.48Ibid,pg.15.49Ibid,pg.158.50JudithResnik,JoshuaCivinandJosephFrueh,‘RatifyingKyotoattheLocalLevel:Sovereigntism,Federalism,andTranslocalOrganizationsofGovernmentActors(TOGAs)’(2008)50ArizonaLawReview709,pg.724.51Ibid.52FordiscussionofSanFrancisco’sordinance,seeStacyLairaLozner,‘DiffusionofLocalRegulatoryInnovations:TheSanFranciscoCEDAWOrdinanceandtheNewYorkCityHumanRightsInitiative’(2004)104ColumbiaLawReview768.53CityandCountyofSanFrancisco,DepartmentontheStatusofWomen,“CEDAWActionPlan”,online:http://sfgov.org/dosw/cedaw-action-plan(accessedon1May2016).54CitiesforCEDAW,“ImplementingCEDAWasalocalordinance”,online:http://citiesforcedaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Fact-Sheet-on-Implementing-CEDAW-as-a-Local-Ordinance.pdf(accessedon1May2016).55SeediscussioninAntoineMeyer,‘LocalGovernmentsandHumanRightsImplementation:TakingStockandaCloserStrategicLook’(2009)6PaceDirittiUmani7,pgs.11-13.56VandenBergandOomen,pg.13.

People’sMovementforHumanRightsLeaning(PDHRE).57KeyaspectsofPDHRE’smethodologyincludehumanrightseducation,theformationofasteeringgroupinthecity,thedevelopmentandimplementationofactionplans,andevaluationofactivitiestofosterawarenessandpromoterealizationofhumanrightsbyvariousstakeholdersinsociety.HumanrightscitiesthathaveputthismethodologyintopracticeincludeRosario(Argentina),Graz(Austria),andNagpur(India).58Somecities,likeUtrechtintheNetherlands,basetheirpoliciesonthegeneralideaofhumanrightsandseektoincorporateallinternationalandregionalhumanrightsinstrumentsintheirlocalpolicies.59Intheirconclusion,VandenBergandOomensuggestthat“[i]nreferringtointernationalhumanrightsasabasisfortheirpolicies,citiescanalsodemarcatetheirautonomy,andbecomepartofapowerfulnetworkofglobalactorsinsteadofbeingsubservienttothenationstates.Thisprocessof‘glocalization’alsoentailsanewtypeofcitizenshipthatstraddlesthelocalandtheglobal.”60

2.2CityDiplomacy

Diplomacyispredominantlyperceivedtobetherealmofinter-staterelations.TheOxfordEncyclopediaoftheModernWorld,forexample,definesdiplomacyas“theformalizedsystemofproceduresortheprocessbywhichsovereignstates,usuallythroughambassadorsorotherrepresentatives,conducttheirofficialrelations.”61Withindiplomaticstudies,anicheliteratureontheconceptof“paralleldiplomacy”or“paradiplomacy”considersthepossibilityofanumberofexternalrelations“tracks”runningacrosscountries.62Accordingtotheparadiplomacyconcept,thesetracksdonotonlyinvolvetraditionaldiplomaticactorssuchastheStateDepartmentortheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Sometrackswillconstitutetheexternalrelationsofsub-nationalactors.Theliteratureonparadiplomacytendstobefocusedonregions,provincesandstateswithinfederalistsystems.63Thediplomaticroleofcities,letaloneglobalcities,hasreceivedlittleconsiderationtodate.57PDHRE,“HumanRightsCities–apracticalwaytolearnandchartthefutureofhumanity”,online:http://www.pdhre.org/projects/hrcommun.html(accessedon1May2016).58Ibid.59GemeenteUtrecht,MensenrechteninUtrecht:hoegeeftUtrechtinvullingaaninternationalemensenrechtenverdragen?Eenstedelijkezoektochtnaarsocialerechtvaardigheid(2011),online:https://www.utrecht.nl/fileadmin/uploads/documenten/2.concern-bestuur-uitvoering/BIS/Mensenrechten_in_Utrecht__juni2011_.pdf(accessedon1May2016).60VandenBergandOomen,pg.15.61PeterStearns(ed)OxfordEncyclopediaoftheModernWorld(OxfordUniversityPress2008).62See,forexample,AlexanderSKuznetsov,TheoryandPracticeofParadiplomacy:SubnationalGovernmentsinInternationalAffairs(Routledge2014);IvoD.Duchacek,DanielLatoucheandGarthStevenson(eds),PerforatedSovereigntiesandInternationalRelations:Trans-SovereignContactsandSubnationalGovernments(GreenwoodPress1988);CarlosR.S.MilaniandMariaClotildeMeirellesRibeiro,‘InternationalRelationsandtheParadiplomacyofBrazilianCities:CraftingtheConceptofLocalInternationalManagement’(2011)8BrazilianAdministrationReview21.63See,forexample,HansJ.MichelmannandPanayotisSoldatos(eds),FederalismandInternationalRelations:TheRoleofSubnationalUnits(OxfordUniversityPress1990);HubertRiouxQuimet,‘FromSub-stateNationalismtoSubnationalCompetitionStates:TheDevelopmentandInstitutionalization

Sincethemid2000s,however,therehasbeenincreasingdiscussionofinter-citydiplomacy.In2006,theClingendael(NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelations)launchedapilotprojecttoprovideanoverviewoftheburgeoninglandscapeofdiplomaticdevelopmentstakingplaceatthelevelofcities.64Thisprojectdefinedcitydiplomacyas“theinstitutionsandprocessesbywhichcitiesengageinrelationswithactorsonaninternationalpoliticalstagewiththeaimofrepresentingthemselvesandtheirintereststooneanother”.65Fromthispointofview,diplomacyisnotconfinedtoambassadorialandpoliticaladvocacyactivitiesbutalsoencompassestradefacilitationandculturalexchange.ItshouldbenotedthatUnitedCitiesLocalGovernments(UCLG)’sCommitteeonCityDiplomacy,Peace-buildingandHumanRights,establishedin2005,define“citydiplomacyasthetooloflocalgovernmentsandtheirassociationsforpromotingsocialcohesion,conflictprevention,conflictresolutionandpost-conflictreconstructionwiththeaimofcreatingastableenvironment,inwhichthecitizenscanlivetogetherinpeace,democracyandprosperity”.66Thisdefinitionemphasizestheroleofcitiesinconflictresolutionandpeacebuilding.ThiscommitteemergedwiththeDecentralizedCooperationCommitteein2010.67Thenewentity,knownastheCommitteeonDevelopmentCooperationandCityDiplomacy,hasabroadermandateofpromotingdevelopmentcooperation,achievingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(whichwerereplacedbytheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsin2015)andadvisingUCLGontheroleofcitiesinpreventingviolentconflicts.68

InsomeregionssuchasEastAsiaandEurope,therehasbeenariseininter-citydiplomaticactivitiestoachievearangeofobjectivesincludingeasinglong-standingpoliticaltensionsandtradepromotion.69Forexample,inApril2014,themediareportedthatTokyo’sgovernorwouldvisitBeijingattheinvitationofitsmayortohelp“healJapanandChina’sbruisedrelations”.70OntheagendawasTokyosharingitsexperienceoftacklingairpollution(whichisaseriousproblemin

ofCommercialParadiplomacyinScotlandandQuebec’(2015)25Regional&FederalStudies109;MichaelKeating,‘Regionsandinternationalaffairs:Motives,opportunitiesandstrategies’(1999)9RegionalandFederalStudies1.64RogiervanderPluijmandJanMelissen,CityDiplomacy:TheExpandingRoleofCitiesinInternationalPolitics(ClingendaelInstitute,1April2007),online:http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/city-diplomacy-expanding-role-cities-international-politics(accessedon20December2016),pg.11.Alsoseethe‘ShanghaiConsensusontheRoleofCitiesinInternationalRelations’,online:http://www.clingendael.nl/news/shanghai-consensus-cities-international-relations(accessedon20December2016).65Ibid,pg.5.66TheHagueAgendaonCityDiplomacy,13June2008,online:http://www.peaceprize.uclg.org/documents-of-interest.html(accessedon3April2015).67UCLG,“CommitteesandWorkingGroups:DevelopmentCooperationandCityDiplomacy”,online:https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/structure/committees-working-groups/development-cooperation-and-city-diplomacy(accessedon3December2016).68Ibid.69OutsideEuropeandEastAsia,inter-citydiplomacyhasalsobeenrecognizedforitsroleinbuildingpeaceintheMiddleEast;see,forexample,EuropeanCommission,PalestinianandIsraeliMayorspraiseroleofcity-to-citydiplomacyinMiddleEastpeaceprocess(1June2007),online:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_COR-07-73_en.htm(accessedon3April2016).70‘Tokyogovernortomake'citydiplomacy'visittoBeijing’TheStraitsTimes(15April2014).

theChinesecapital)and,inturn,learningmoreaboutorganizingtheOlympicsGamesfromtheBeijingmayoralty.Underlyingthisagendaofsharingbestpracticesandinter-citylearningisthequestbyBeijingandTokyoto“helpimproveJapan-Chinarelationsbybuildingontheseexchanges”.71AsecondexampleisthatoftheTaipeicitygovernment.Asectiononthecitygovernment’swebsiteisdevotedtodocumentingthe“citydiplomacy”thatTaipeiengagesintoenhance“theattitudeandvisionoftheglobalcitythatTaipeihasbecome”.72AnotableinitiativeistheTaipei-ShanghaiCityForum,whichservesasaplatformforadvancingcity-to-citytiesamidstcontinuingdeepdivisionsinrelationsbetweenTaiwanandthePeople’sRepublicofChina.73Theforum,whichhastakenplaceannuallysince2010,focusesonculturalandeconomicissues,andrarelytouchesonpoliticalmatters.74

Athirdrecentexampleofcitydiplomacyconcernsthereactionofcitiesaroundtheworldtothepassageofanti-gaylegislationinStPetersburg,Russia.On30January2013,theHuffingtonPostandothernewsagenciesreportedthatVenice’sCityCouncilhadvotedtosuspenditsrelationshipwithStPetersburgafterthecitypassedanti-gaylegislationthatviolatesglobalnormsconcerninglesbian,gay,bisexualandtransgender(LGBT)rights.75Thelawcriminalizes“publicactionaimedatpropagandisingsodomy,lesbianism,bisexualism,andtransgenderismamongminors”.76Thosechargedwithbreakingthelawwillbefinedfrom5,000to500,000Russianrubles(approximately68to6781euros).77Accordingtonewsreports,theVeniceCityCouncilvotedtosuspendits2006culturalcooperationagreementwithStPetersburgandtosuspendculturalexchangeaslongastheanti-gaylegislationremainedinforce.78AsNijmanhaspointedout,insteadoftheItalianstaterespondingtothehumanrightsviolationbyanothermemberstateoftheCouncilofEurope,thisisacaseofanItaliancityupholdingglobalhumanrightsnorms.79Venice’sactionspromptedcitizensinothercitiessuchasMelbourne

71Ibid.72TaipeiCityGovernment,“CityDiplomacy”,online:http://english.sec.gov.taipei/np.asp?ctNode=84311&mp=101002(accessedon1May2016).Thisstatementisindicativeofhowsomecitiesviewexternalrelationsasameansofdemonstratingitsglobalcitystatus.73RussellFlannery,‘TaipeiMayorReadyTo'DanceWithWolves'InShanghaiNextWeek’Forbes(14August2015);PichiChuang,‘Taipeimayorwon'tpubliclyback'OneChina',Shanghaiforumatrisk’Reuters(30July2015).74‘TaipeiMayorKoWen-jetovisitShanghaiaftervoicing'respect'for'oneChina'consensus’SouthChinaMorningPost(5August2015).75GlennishaMorgan,‘VeniceToCutTiesWithSt.PetersburgOverAnti-GayLaw’HuffingtonPost(30January2013),online:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/venice-st-petersburg-anti-gaw-propaganda-law_n_2576044.html(accessedon1May2016).76MiriamElder,‘StPetersburgbans'homosexualpropaganda’TheGuardian(12March2012),online:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/12/st-petersburg-bans-homosexual-propaganda(accessedon1May2016).77Ibid78Morgan.79JanneE.Nijman,‘RenaissanceoftheCityasGlobalActor:TheRoleofForeignPolicyandInternationalLawPracticesintheConstructionofCitiesasGlobalActors’inGuntherHellmann,AndreasFahrmeirandMilosVec(eds),TheTransformationofForeignPolicy:DrawingandManagingBoundariesfromAntiquitytothePresent(OxfordUniversityPress2016),pg.1.

(Australia),LosAngeles(US),andManchester(UK)tourgetheircitygovernmentstosuspendtheirtwin-citystatuswithStPetersburg.80TheresponseofMelbourne’scitygovernmentisalsonoteworthyfromacitydiplomacyperspective.WhilethecitycouncildecidedagainstsuspendingMelbourne’srelationshipwithStPetersburg,itjustifieditsdecisiononthebasisthatmaintainingtherelationshipwithStPetersburgwouldallowMelbournetomoreactivelyadvocatefortherevocationoftheanti-gaylaw.81

ThecitiesofIstanbul(Turkey)andMelbourne(Australia)haveexpressedcommitmenttobusiness-orientedcitydiplomacy.TheGreaterIstanbulMunicipality’sOfficeforExternalRelationscooperateswiththeIstanbulChamberofCommercetoorganizebusinessdelegationtripsabroad.82ItalsoprovidesadvisoryservicestosupportforeigninvestorsinIstanbul.83Melbournehasan“InternationalEngagementFramework”,endorsedbythecity’scouncilinApril2010,whichindicatesthepriorityareasforthecity’sinternationalrelationsandtheamountofresourcesthatoughttobedevotedtoeachpriorityarea.84Itisnoteworthythattheframeworksetsoutthatthecityoughttodevote50%ofitscitydiplomaticresourcesto“buildingprosperity”whichisdefinedas“[increasing]exportandinwardinvestmentinMelbourne’skeyindustrysectors,includingeducation,tourismandservicessector”,20%towardsincreasinginter-citylearning,20%tosupportingcommunityandculturalprogrammesand10%towardsparticipationininternationalgovernance.85MelbourneisalsotheonlyAustraliancapitalcitycounciltooperateanoverseasbusinessrepresentativeofficeinTianjin,China,tostrengthentradelinksbetweenthetwocities.86 AfinalexampleisthatoftheEuropeanNetworkofLocalAuthoritiesforPeaceintheMiddleEast.ThisnetworkofcitygovernmentsorganizesmanylobbyingactivitiessuchaselectionmonitoringandaimstokeeptheMiddleEast

80ClaireBigg,‘SisterCitiesRampUpRussiaBoycottOverAntigayLaw’RadioFreeEurope(19July2013),online:http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-sister-cities-gay-law/25051513.html(accessedon1May2016);‘ManchestertouseStPetersburglinkto'pressureRussia'’BBCNews(2August2013),online:http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-23536652(accessedon1May2016).81BeauDonelly,‘Melbournewon'tsevertieswithsistercityoveranti-gaylaws’TheWeeklyReview(2July2013),online:http://www.theweeklyreview.com.au/uncategorized/1611790-melbourne-wont-sever-ties-with-sister-city-over-anti-gay-laws/;JasonDowling,‘LordmayortacklesRussiaovergayrights’TheAge(7March2013),online:http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/lord-mayor-tackles-russia-over-gay-rights-20130306-2flqg.html(bothaccessedon1May2016).82‘CityDiplomacyandIstanbul’TurkishReview(1August2013).83Ibid.84CityofMelbourne,Ourinternationalstrategy-Melbourne:Doingbusinessglobally(2014),online:http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/business/doing-business-globally/Pages/melbourne-doing-business-globally.aspx(accessedon1May2016).85Ibid,pg.1.86MelbourneOfficeTianjin,online:http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/business/doing-business-globally/international-programs/Pages/melbourne-office-tianjin.aspx(accessedon1May2016).

peaceprocessontheinternationalagenda.87ProposedbytheAssociationofPalestinianLocalAuthoritiesandtheUnionofLocalAuthoritiesinIsrael,thenetworkalsoservesasaforumforIsraeli-Palestinianmunicipaldialoguewithcontributionsfromforeigncities(includingRome,BarcelonaandCologne).88Cooperationisbasedontri-lateraldevelopmentprojectsintheareasofculture,youth,theenvironmentandmunicipalmanagement.89

Astheabovediscussionindicates,economicactivitydrivesquiteafewinstancesofmoderninter-citydiplomacy.Thisisnotunexpected.InEurope,VenetianandByzantinecommercialdiplomacydatesbacktotheearlyMiddleAges.90Fromthetwelfthcenturyonwards,commercebecameacrucialtopicofdiplomaticnegotiations.91Today,citydiplomacywithaneyetowardstradeandestablishingeconomiccontactcanbeexplainedbydecliningcentralgovernmentmoniesforcitiesandtheconsequentneedforcitiestogenerateindependentsourcesofincome.Whiledecentralizationandthedevolutionofpoliticalauthorityfromhigherlevelsofgovernmenttocitiesleadtomunicipalgovernmentshavingmoreautonomytoestablishtradeanddiplomaticlinkswithothercities,decentralizationalsoofteninvolvesthestateandprovincialgovernmentdelegatingmoreresponsibilitiestocitieswithoutincreasingthecities’budgets.92Thiscanleadtofaileddecentralizationinsomeinstances.93Inotherinstances,citiesmanagetoavoidlocalbankruptcyandfilltheircoffersbysuccessfullyattractingforeigninvestmentandcreatingmarketsforthebusinessesthatresideintheircities.94Politicalactivitiesrepresentanewdirectionforcitiesastheyventurebeyondtheirpoliticalboundariestomakestatementsonmorefar-reachingissuessuchashumanrightsandnucleardisarmament.

2.3CitiesDevelopingIndependentStrategiestoManageGlobalThreats

87AlexandraSizooandArneMusch,‘Citydiplomacy:theroleoflocalgovernmentsinconflictprevention,peace-buildingandpost-conflictreconstruction’inArneMuschandothers(eds),CityDiplomacy:Theroleoflocalgovernmentsinconflictprevention,peace-building,post-conflictreconstruction(VNGInternational,TheHague2008),pg.17.88ChrisvanHemert,‘Acasestudyincitydiplomacy:theMunicipalAllianceforPeaceintheMiddleEast’inArneMuschandothers(eds),CityDiplomacy:Theroleoflocalgovernmentsinconflictprevention,peace-building,post-conflictreconstruction(VNGInternational,TheHague2008),pg.166.89Ibid.90Stearns.91Ibid.92Thegoalofdecentralizationistodisperseauthorityandresponsibilitytolowerlevelsofdecision-making.Intheory,thetwomainbenefitsofdecentralizationareallocativeefficiencyandimprovedgovernance.Fordiscussion,seeMarkTurner,DavidHulmeandWillyMcCourt,Governance,ManagementandDevelopment:MakingtheStateWork(PalgraveMacmillan2015),chapter8.ForanexcellentdiscussionoftheIndianexperiencewithdecentralization,seeSharmilaL.MurthyandMayaJ.Mahin,‘ConstitutionalImpedimentstoDecentralizationintheWorld'sLargestFederalCountry’(2015)26DukeJournalofComparativeandInternationalLaw79.93Ibid.94EarlH.Fry,‘StateandLocalGovernmentsintheInternationalArena’(1990)509TheAnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience118,pgs.122-123.

Citiesfacemanyglobalriskssuchasinfectiousdiseasesandterrorism.95Thissectionfocusesoncounterterrorismeffortsbecauseitisinthisareathatcitieshavedevelopedsophisticatedresponses.AccordingtoHankSavitch,nearlythree-quartersofincidentslabeledasaterrorattackworldwide,andfouroutofeveryfiveofitssubsequentcasualties,occurincities.96Savitcharguesthatthecomplexityoftheurbanlandscapemakesitidealforhidingterroristplots.97Denselypopulatedcitiesalsofacilitateextensivelossoflivesanddamagetoproperty,generatingstrongsymbolicmeaning,fearandanxiety.Counter-insurgencyexpertDavidKilcullenbelievesthatcitiesarethetarget:“Thegoalistoshut[cities]downforaslongaspossible,separatepeoplefromoneanother,breakdowncommunities,andpushthemintomentalfortresses”.98Thebreakdownoftrustincommunitiesfacilitatesfurtherexploitation. Whileterrorismhastraditionallybeenperceivedtobeamatterofnationalsecurity,increasingly,globalcitiesareactingautonomouslyastheydevelopandinstitutionalizetheirownlocalandtransnationalcounterterrorismstrategies.99NewYorkCity,thecitythatwasattheheartoftheSeptember11attacks,offersaprimeexampleofhowaglobalcityhasforgedaheadwithinternationalizingitsmunicipalpolicingstrategyandformingtransnationalpartnershipsbasedonthebeliefthatcities“mustserveasthefrontlineofhomelandsecurity”andcannotrelyonthefederalgovernmenttoprovideadequateprotection.100 TheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(NYPD)isthelargestmunicipalpolice

95Ontherisksofepidemicsandinfectiousdiseasesthataglobalcityfaces,seeLanceSakerandothers,Globalizationandinfectiousdiseases:Areviewofthelinkages(UNDP/WorldBank/WHOSpecialProgrammeforResearchandTraininginTropicalDiseases,2004);HarrisAliandRogerKeil,‘GlobalCitiesandtheSpreadofInfectiousDisease:TheCaseofSevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome(SARS)inToronto,Canada’(2006)43UrbanStudies491;RogerKeilandHarrisAli,‘GoverningtheSickCity:UrbanGovernanceintheAgeofEmergingInfectiousDisease’(2007)39Antipode846.96HankV.Savitch,CitiesinaTimeofTerror:Space,Territory,andLocalResilience(Routledge2008),pgs.3-7.97Ibid.98RobertMuggah,‘Isurbanterrorismthenewnormal?Probably’WorldEconomicForum,Davos2016(17January2016),online:https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-urban-terrorism-is-the-new-normal-probably/(accessedon5May2016).99KristinLjungkvist,GlobalCity2.0:FromStrategicSitetoGlobalActor(Routledge2016),pgs.77-78.AfewhoursaftertheeventsofSeptember11,NewYorkCityMayorRudolphGiulianiandNewYorkGovernorGeorgePatakijointlygaveapressconference.MayorGiulianiindicatedthatitwasnotuptohimorthecityofNewYorkbuttotheUSPresidenttotakechargeofthesituationandrespond.AsLjungkvistnotes,thisisnotsurprisingbecause,uptillthen,counterterrorismwasdeemedtobeafederalconcern.Thisperceptionwouldeventuallyshift,aswillbenotedlaterinthischapter.100Foranarticulationofthisview,seeforexample,EbenKaplan,‘NewYorkSpursCounterterrorismEfforts’CouncilonForeignRelations(28December2006),online:http://www.cfr.org/world/new-york-spurs-counterterrorism-efforts/p12312;themissionstatementoftheNewYorkPoliceDepartmentCounterterrorismUnitsstate“BuiltupontherealizationthattheCitycouldnotrelysolelyonthefederalgovernmentforitsdefense,theCounterterrorismBureauwascreated.”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml(bothwebsitesaccessedon3May2016).

departmentintheUS.101Withabout36,000officersand15,000supportstaff,thedepartmentistwicethesizeoftheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI),whichisthefederalcounter-terrorismagency.102PriortotheSeptember11attacks,theNYPDfocusedalmostsolelyoncrimereductionbutaftertheattacks,thedepartmentwasfundamentallyreorganizedandcounterterrorismwasmadeoneoftheNYPD’skeypriorities.103AnentirelynewCounterterrorismBureauwascreatedin2002,andtheexistingintelligencedivisionwasrevamped.TheCounterterrorismBureauemploys250full-timeofficers,ofwhichabouthalfofthemarepartoftheNewYorkJointTerrorismTaskForcewiththeFBIandotherfederallawenforcementagencies.104Theseofficershavesecurityclearancethatgivesthemaccesstonationalandinternationalsourcesofintelligenceandtoinvestigationsconductedoverseas.105ThroughtheNewYorkJointTerrorismTaskForce,NYPDofficershavebeenabletointerrogateterroristsuspectsinAfghanistanandPakistanandtoconductinterviewsatGuantanamoBay.106TheCounterterrorismBureauprovidessomelevelofcounterterrorismtrainingforallNYPDofficerssuchasrecognizingsuspiciousbehaviorandtheuseofgearthatprotectsagainstbiological,chemicalandradioactiveweapons.107TheCounterterrorismBureauismostvisiblewhenitcarriesoutmassivedeploymentofheavilyarmed,paramilitary-styleunitsathighprofilelocationsaroundthecity.AccordingtoNussbaum,NYPDleadersstressthatthesedeploymentsarenotrandombutdrivenbyintelligenceandhaveproventobeeffective.108 InadditiontotheestablishmentoftheCounterterrorismBureau,undertheleadershipofMayorBloombergandPoliceCommissionerRayKelly,significantresourcesandexpertisewereputintorevampingtheNYPD’sintelligencedivisionintoone“thatrivalsthesecurityservicesofmanysmallcountries...”109Thedivisionisstaffedbyapproximatelyeighthundredpeople.Abouthalfofthedivisionfocusesspecificallyonterrorism,whiletheotherhalffocusesoncriminalactivitysuchasdrugtraffickingandgangviolence.110ThedivisionhasanInternationalLiaisonProgrammewherebyNYPDdetectivesaresenttoliveinEurope,theMiddleEastandSoutheastAsiawheretheyserveastheNYPD’sliaisontothatcountry’slawenforcementandintelligencecommunity.111Theseofficersarenotarmedanddo

101OfficeofJusticePrograms,BureauofJusticeStatistics,latestdataavailable:2008;seeBrianReaves,CensusofStateandLocalLawEnforcementAgencies,2008(USDepartmentofJustice,July2011),pg.4,online:http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=249(accessedon3May2016).102BrianNussbaum,‘ProtectingGlobalCities:NewYork,LondonandtheInternationalizationofMunicipalPolicingforCounterTerrorism’(2007)8GlobalCrime213,pg.218.103Ljungkvist,pg.78.104Ibid.105Ljungkvist,pg.75.106Ibid.107Nussbaum,pg.219.108Nussbaum,pg.220.109Ibid.110Ljungkvist,pg.72.111ThisprogrammeisfundedbytheNewYorkCityPoliceFoundation,anon-profitgroupthatisbackedbyprivatemultinationalcorporationssuchasJPMorgan,GoldmanSachsandBarclays;

notbecomedirectlyinvolvedininvestigationsandenforcementactionsintheirhostcountries;theirprimaryobjectiveisintelligencegathering.112SincetheinceptionoftheInternationalLiaisonProgramme,therehasbeenaseniorNYPDofficeratthesceneofmostterroristattacksintheworld,suchastheonesinIstanbul,Madrid,andJakartatoassesshowtheattackmightberelevanttoNewYorkCity.113ItisnoteworthythattheNYPD’soverseasexpansionhasbeendrivenmainlybythedesiretoworkaroundandbypasstheFBI.TheneedforNewYorkCitytodevelopitslocalcounterterrorismcapabilitieshasbeenrationalizedonthebasisthatthefederalgovernmenthasprovenincapableofprotectingthecityandthatthecity’sgovernmenthastostepinandtakeupindependentresponsibilityofprovidingsecurityforitscitizens.114 Itcanbearguedthat,regardlessofwhetherterrorismisperceivedtobealocalorinternationalthreat,mostcitiesdonothavetheresourcesortheautonomytoaddressitatthegloballevel.TheUS$200millionthatNewYorkCityspendsannuallyoncounterterrorismalonevastlyexceedsthebudgetsofmostcities.115Assuch,NewYorkCityisanoutlier.Thismaywellbethecase,butitdoesnotdetractfromthemainpointadvancedhere,i.e.,thatthereareahandfulofglobalcities,ofwhichNewYorkandLondon116areexamples,thathavedevelopedsophisticatedlocalandtransnationalcounterterrorismcapabilitiesindependentoftheirnationalgovernments.Further,anumberofcitiessuchasChicagoandLosAngeles,inspiredbyNewYorkCity,areincreasinglydevelopingtheirautonomouscounterterrorismcapabilities.117

2.4GlobalOrganizationsandGlobalAims

InExpandingGovernmentalDiversityinGlobalGovernance:ParliamentariansofStatesandLocalGovernments,Algerprovidesanoverviewofinterstateorganizationsofcitiesandlocalgovernmentsto“challengereaderstorealizethatglobalgovernanceisevermorecomplicatedanddoesnotonlyinvolvetheUNsystemandorganizationsinvolvedintheUNsystem”.118Heclassifies“globalorganizationsoflocalauthorities”accordingtofivefoci:“generalpurpose,largercities,environmental,peace,andlanguage”.119

http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/programs/international-liaison-program/(accessedon5December2016).112NewYorkCityPoliceFoundation,“InternationalLiaisonProgram”,online:http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/programs/international-liaison-program/(accessedon5December2016).113Ibid.114Ljungkvist,pg.107.115Kaplan.116SeeJonCoaffee,Terrorism,RiskandtheGlobalCity:TowardsUrbanResilience(AshgatePublishing2009)foradetailedstudyofLondon’sresponsestoterrorisminthe1990s.117Kaplan.118ChadwickF.Alger,‘Expandinggovernmentaldiversityinglobalgovernance:ParliamentariansofStatesandLocalGovernments’(2010)16GlobalGovernance59,pg.60.119Ibid,pg.63.

GeneralPurpose:AnexampleisUCLG,whichaimsto“increasetheroleandinfluenceoflocalgovernmentsinglobalgovernance”andfacilitatesprogrammesandpartnershipsthatbuildthecapacitiesoflocalgovernments.120Sinceitscreationin2004,UCLGhasadvocatedforaformaladvisoryroleforlocalgovernmentwithintheUN.OneoftheobjectivesadoptedatUCLG’sFoundingCongressis“renewinganddeepeningourpartnershipwithUnitedNationsandtheglobalcommunity,andbuildinganeffectiveandformalroleforlocalgovernmentasapillaroftheinternationalsystem”.121Indeed,itcanbearguedthatUCLGwonthehighestaccoladeofrecognitionastheunifiedvoiceofcitiesworldwidewhenthe2004ReportofthePanelofEminentPersonsonUnitedNations-CivilSocietyRelations(theCardosoReport)madethespecificrecommendationthat“theUnitedNationsshouldregardUnitedCitiesandLocalGovernmentsasanadvisorybodyongovernancematters.”122

Largercities:Createdin1985,Metropolis(WorldAssociationoftheMajorMetropolises)bringstogethercitiesandmetropolitanregionswithmorethanamillioninhabitants.123Itsmissionistoserve“asaninternationalforumforexploringissuesandconcernscommontoallbigcitiesandmetropolitanregions”.124MetropolisalsomanagesthemetropolitansectionofUCLG.AsofOctober2014,ithas139activemembersacrossallgeographicalregionsincludingDubai,Jakarta,Madrid,MexicoCity,MoscowandToronto.125

Environmental:ICLEIisoneoftheworld’slargestorganizationoflocalgovernments.Itsmembershipin2012included12mega-cities,100super-citiesandurbanregions,450largecitiesand450smallandmid-sizedcitiesin84countries.126Formedin1990bytheInternationalUnionofLocalAuthoritiesandtheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)torepresenttheenvironmentalconcernsoflocalgovernmentinternationally,thenetworkwasformerlyknownsimplyastheInternationalCouncilforLocalEnvironmentalInitiatives.However,inorderto

120UCLG,“AboutUs”,online:http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about(accessedon18April2016).121UCLG,“InternationalAgenda”,online:http://www.uclg.org/en/issues/united-nations-advocacy(accessedon18April2016).122Wethepeoples:civilsociety,theUnitedNationsandglobalgovernance(PanelofEminentPersonsonUN-CivilSocietyRelations,UNGeneralAssembly,Fifty-eighthsession,Agendaitem59:StrengtheningoftheUnitedNationsSystem,DocA/58/817,11June2004),pg.20.FordiscussionabouttheCardosoReport,seePeterWilletts,‘TheCardosoReportontheUNandCivilSociety:Functionalism,GlobalCorporatism,orGlobalDemocracy?’(2006)12GlobalGovernance:AReviewofMultilateralismandInternationalOrganizations305123Metropolis,“Mission”,http://www.metropolis.org/mission(accessedon18April2016).124Ibid.125Metropolis,“ListofActiveMembers”,online:http://www.metropolis.org/sites/default/files/pdf/list_of_active_members.pdf(accessedon18April2016).126ICLEI,ICLEI-LocalGovernmentsforSustainabilityCorporateReport2011/12(2012),pg.7,online:www.iclei.org(accessedon3December2016).Megacitiesarecitieswithapopulationofatleast10millionpeople.InICLEIterminology,asupercityhasapopulationofonetotenmillionpeople,alargecityhasahundredthousandtoonemillionpeople,andacityortownhasuptoahundredthousandpeople.

highlightthenetwork’sapproachof“look[ing]beyondmereenvironmentalaspectsandembrac[ing]widersustainabilityissues”,theICLEIcouncilrenamedtheassociationICLEI–LocalGovernmentsforSustainability.127Amongstotherthings,ICLEIworkstopromotebiodiversityconservationandresourceefficiencyatthelocallevel.128ItsCitiesBiodiversityCenterworkscloselywiththeConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD)secretariattoorganizecapacity-buildingeventsforcitiesandside-eventsparalleltoCOPs.Onresourceefficiency,ICLEIfocusesonhelpingcitiesbettermanagetheirnaturalresourcessuchaswaterandsoil.ICLEIrepresentsitsmembersinmajorsustainabilityforumssuchasUN-Water,theInternationalWaterAssociationandUNHabitat.129

Peace:MayorsforPeacewasestablishedin1982bythen-mayorofHiroshimawhoproposedanewProgramtoPromotetheSolidarityofCitiestowardtheTotalAbolitionofNuclearWeaponsatthesecondUNSpecialSessiononDisarmamentheldattheUNHeadquartersinNewYork.130Theorganizationaimstopromotetheabolitionofnuclearweapons;its2020VisionCampaignhastheambitiousgoalofabolishingnuclearweaponsbytheyear2020.1316,649citiesaremembersofMayorsofPeaceasof1April2015.132Theroleofcitiesinconflictprevention,peace-buildingandpost-conflictreconstructionhasalreadybeendiscussedwithinthecontextofcitydiplomacy.

Language:Foundedin1979,theAssociationInternationalesdesMairesFrancophonesorTheInternationalAssociationofFrancophoneMayors(AIMF)bringstogethermayorsandofficialsfromcitieswhereFrenchistheofficiallanguageoriswidelyused.133ItsmembersincludeSiemReapandPhnomPenh(Cambodia),EdeaandGaroua(Cameroon),Brazzaville(Congo),ParisandLille(France),Montreal(Canada),GenevaandLausanne(Switzerland)andHanoi(Vietnam).134AIMF’sprogramsaimtobuildcapacityamongstlocalofficials,assistcitiesinraisingfundstoprovideessentialpublicservices,providepolicytrainingandtoolstoimprovelocalfinancesandencourageheritageconservationincities.135

127ICLEI,“WhoisICLEI”,online:http://www.iclei.org/iclei-global/who-is-iclei.html(accessedon3December2016).128Ibid.129Ibid.130MayorsforPeace,“AboutUs”,online:http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/outlines/index.html(accessedon3December2016).1312020VisionCampaign,online:http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/en/about-us.html(accessedon3December2016).132MayorsforPeace,“MemberCities”,online:http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/membercity/map.html(accessedon3December2016).VanderPluijmandMelissenpointoutthat,despitethewidespreadsupportthatMayorsforPeaceenjoys,“themayorshavenotbeenabletostoptheprocessofnuclearproliferationinvariouscountriesaroundtheworld”;pg.21.133AIMF,“Quisommes-nous?”,online:http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=107(accessedon3April2016).134AIMF,“Listedesmembres”,online:http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=40(accessedon3April2016).135AIMF,“Programmes”,online:http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=13(accessedon3April2016).

Theseexamplesarehardlyexhaustive,butprovideaflavorofthewiderangeoforganizationsthatcitieshavecreatedtopursuecommonaims.Theseorganizationsareglobalinreachandoftenseektotackleglobalchallengessuchasenvironmentalprotectionandgenderequality;theyareexamplesofhowcitiesareorganizingthemselvestorepresenttheirinterestsorpursuesharedobjectives.

3. TheGlobalUrbanAgenda

Twointernationalorganizationsplayakeyroleinsettingandimplementingtheglobalagendaonurbanization:theWorldBankandUN-Habitat.Byexploringtheideasunderpinningtheirurbanpolicies,thissectionarguesthattheWorldBankandUN-Habitathavecreatedandaresustaininganideologicalnarrativethatsupportstheriseofcitiesininternationalaffairs.ThevaluesandinterestsadvancedbytheWorldBankandUN-Habitatintheirideologicalnarrativecoincidewiththoseofcities,i.e.greaterdecentralization,autonomyandultimately,aroleforcitiesinglobalgovernanceprocesses.Throughitslendingpoliciesandtechnicalassistanceprogrammes,theWorldBankisabletoputitsideasintopractice.Further,throughtheirresearch,conferencesandcapacity-buildingprogrammes,bothorganizationsareabletodisseminatetheirideaswidely,therebyexertingconsiderableinfluenceonhowcivilsociety,internationalorganizations,theprivatesectorandevencitygovernmentsviewcities.This,inturn,hasledtotangibleoutcomessuchaspublic-privatepartnershipinitiatives,programmesandpolicymechanismsthatcreatedirectlinkagesbetweenthelocalandinternationallevels,channelresourcestocitiestoenhancetheirpositionvis-à-visnationalgovernments,andengagethecityasa‘strategicpartner’inglobalgovernance.3.1Livable,Competitive,WellGoverned,andBankable

TheWorldBank,oneofthemostpowerfulmultilateraldevelopment

institutionsintheworld,hasbeeninvolvedinurbandevelopmentsincethe1970s.136WithanannualloanbudgetofaboutUS$15-20millionandabudgetofUS$25millionforresearchalone,theWorldBankhasthefinancialmeanstoputitsideologyintopractice.137Further,theBankhasconsistentlythroughoutitshistorymanagedto“appropriatekeyaspectsofthedebates,inflectthemtosuititsownagendas,andendorseitspositionssuchthattheybecome…theofficial,conventional,orcommonsenseviewssuchthateveryoneelsefollowssuituntilanewdebatearises.”138Thus,theWorldBank’srepresentationsoncitiesandurbanizationhavehegemonicinfluenceintheinternationalcommunity;theycreateanideologicalplatformthatpromotesthelinkagesbetweencities,globalizationanddevelopment,andinsomeways,supporttheriseofcitiesininternationalaffairs.136EdwardRamsamy,WorldBankandUrbanDevelopment:FromProjectstoPolicy(Routledge2006),pgs.2-3.137TheWorldBankisthelargestsourcesofofficialfinanceforurbandevelopment;ChristineKessides,Citiesintransition:WorldBankurbanandlocalgovernmentstrategy(Washington,DC:TheWorldBank,2000),pg.58.138Ramsamy,pg.78.

Sincethe1970s,theWorldBank’surbanagendahasshifteditsemphasisfromproject-basedlending(toimprovelivingconditionsinslumsettlements)tomacroeconomicmanagementinthe1980sand1990sandeventuallytowardsprivatization.AtthecoreofRamsamy’sremarkablestudy,“TheWorldBankandUrbanDevelopment”,liestheargumentthattheshiftsintheBank’surbanpolicywerenotpurelytheresultsoftechnocraticdecision-makingbasedontechnicalevaluationsofprojects,butresponsestogeopoliticalandintellectualtrendsbothwithinandoutsidetheBank.139Currently,inspiteofreferencestocivilsociety,sustainability,and“propoorpolicies”,theBank’surbanpolicyretainstheconservativeorientationassociatedwithneo-liberalismandmarketfundamentalism.140

TheBank’slatesturbanandlocalgovernmentstrategy,publishedin2009,anditsearlierstrategythatwaspublishedin2000,containmanyneo-liberalpolicyrecommendations.InitsCitiesinTransitionstrategy(2000),thebanksetsforthitsvisionofsustainablecities.Initsview,inordertobesustainableandfunctional,acitymustbe“competitive,wellgovernedandmanaged,andfinanciallysustainable,orbankable.”141Thestrategydefines“bankability”as“financialsoundnessinthetreatmentofrevenuesourcesandexpenditures–and,forsomecities,alevelofcreditworthinesspermittingaccesstothecapitalmarket.”142Itgoesontostatethat“[f]orpotentiallycreditworthycities,theBank’surbanassistanceshouldbegearedtohelpingthemaccessthecapitalmarket…CreativeandflexibleformsofBankGroupsupportwillbeespeciallyimportantwherecentralgovernments,oftenwisely,donotwishtocontinueprovidingsovereignguaranteestosubnationalgovernmentsafterdecentralization.”143

Since2000,theWorldBankhasbeenpromotingasuiteofmeasurestofacilitatelocalgovernments’accesstointernationalfinancialmarkets.144TheBanklaunchedamajorprogramme,“CapitalMarketsattheSub-NationalLevel”,in2000toprovideofficialswithtechnicalassistancetoimprovetheircities’capacitytoaccesscapitalmarketsandheldamajorconferenceinNewYorkonsubnationalgovernmentfinancing.145In2013,theWorldBankandthePublic-Private139Ramsamy,pg3.140Iprefertoavoidusingtheterm“WashingtonConsensus”becauseitspopularcontemporaryusagetoconnoteadogmaticcommitmenttothebeliefthatthemarketoffersthesolutiontoeverypolicyissueisawidedeparturefromitsoriginalmeaning.Fordiscussion,seeJohnWilliamson,‘WhatShouldtheWorldBankThinkabouttheWashingtonConsensus?’(2000)15TheWorldBankResearchObserver251;JohnWilliamson,AShortHistoryoftheWashingtonConsensus(PapercommissionedbyFundaciónCIDOBforaconference“FromtheWashingtonConsensustowardsanewGlobalGovernance,”Barcelona,September24–25,2004),online:https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf(accessedon3May2016).141Kessides,pg.8.142Ibid,pg.11.143Ibid,pg.12.144Forcomprehensivediscussionofthetheoryandpracticeofsub-nationallending,seeMilaFreireandothers(eds),SubnationalCapitalMarketsinDevelopingCountries:FromTheorytoPractice(TheWorldBankandOxfordUniversityPress2004).145Detailsoftheconference,WorldBank:GlobalConferenceonCapitalMarketsDevelopmentattheSubnationalLevel(NewYorkCity,15-18February2000),canbefoundhere:http://www.ce-

InfrastructureAdvisoryFacility(PPIAF),atrustfundthatishousedwithintheWorldBank,launchedtheCityCreditworthinessAcademytoworkwithdevelopingcitiestoimprovetheircreditratingsandsecureprivatesectorfinancingforinfrastructureprojects.146Interestingly,theCityCreditworthinessAcademyispartoftheWorldBankGroup’sLowCarbon,LivableCitiesInitiative,whichfocusesonimprovingcities’planningandfinancingcapabilitiessothattheycanbetterimplementlow-carbondevelopmentstrategies.Theconceptofbankabilityhasthereforebeendeployedtoenhancecities’abilitytomitigateandadapttoclimatechangeaswell.

Ononehand,itcanbearguedthattheseinitiativestoimprovecities’creditworthinessandaccesstocapitalmarketsempowercitiesandincreasetheirindependencefromhigherlevelsofgovernment.Fromamacroperspective,theseinitiativesconstituteprocessesthatfacilitatethedisaggregationofthestateandtherescalingofglobalpolitics,therebycreatingspaceforcitiestoincreasetheirinvolvementininternationalaffairs.Ontheotherhand,andfromalessoptimisticviewpoint,theWorldBank’surbanstrategywillprimarilyaffectthefutureofcitiesindevelopingcountries,whicharetheprimaryrecipientsofWorldBanktechnicalandfinancialassistance.ThisraisestheconcernthattheWorldBankwilldestroythediversityofcitiesinthequesttocreatesocialconditionsthatfacilitateglobalcapitalism.147Inthislineofthinking,ascitiesincreasinglybecome“privatecities”,thatis,“[cities]thatenvisioncitypowerprincipallyasamechanismforpromotingprivateeconomicdevelopment”148,theycreateanetworkofsub-nationalauthoritiesandspacesthatprimarilyservetheneedsofthetransnationalcapitalistclassattheriskofdisenfranchisingthelesswell-offsectorsofurbansociety.149

TheWorldBankhasalsobeenastaunchadvocateofdecentralization,whichhasbeenpromotedasanimportantaspectofthe‘goodgovernance’paradigm.Initscurrentmanifestation,‘goodgovernance’hascometorefertotheinstitutionalconditionsthatwillenableawell-functioningmarketforgoodsandservicestoemerge.150Itisstronglyassociatedwiththeneo-liberalcommitmenttofreemarketsandprivatization.Astheconcentrationofpowerandresourcesinthehandsofcentralgovernmentsisseenasasignificantsourceofmarketdistortion(e.g.duetobureaucraticredtapeandcorruption),decentralizationofpowerandauthorityis

review.org/00/1/wb1_factsheet.html(accessedon1May2016).146CityCreditworthinessInitiative:APartnershiptoDeliverMunicipalFinance:online:http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment/brief/city-creditworthiness-initiative(accessedon1May2016).147Fordiscussion,seeFrugandBarron;JanneE.Nijman,‘TheFutureoftheCityandtheInternationalLawoftheFuture’inSamMullerandothers(eds),TheLawoftheFutureandTheFutureofLaw(TorkelOpsahlAcademicEPublisher(Oslo,Norway)2011),pgs.217-218.148FrugandBarron,pg.4.149Transnationalcapitalistclassisdescribedas““comprisedoftheownersoftransnationalcapital,thatis,thegroupthatownstheleadingworldwidemeansofproductionasembodiedprincipallyinthetransnationalcorporationsandprivatefinancialinstitutions”;B.S.Chimni,‘InternationalInstitutionsToday:AnImperialGlobalStateintheMaking’(2004)15EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw1,pg.4.150Porras,pg.553.

seenasanessentialsteptowardsachievinggoodgovernance.151Atthesametime,citiesareperceivedtobelevelofgovernmentthatisclosesttothepeople.152Theassumptionisthatdecentralizationwillbringdecision-makingclosertolocalcommunities,createbureaucraciesthatarelocallyaccountableandthereforemoreresponsivetotheneedsofthepeople,andcreateeffectivewaystocountercorruption.153Thisthinkingonthepartofinternationalorganizationscoincideswiththecampaignbycitiesformoreautonomy.Basingtheirargumentsonthedemocraticpotentialofcitiesandontheclaimthatcitygovernmentisthelevelofgovernmentthatisclosesttothepeopleandthereforemostresponsivetotheirneeds,organizationslikeUCLGhavebeenadvocatingforgreaterautonomyforcitiesaswellasmoredecentralization.154Thenexusofvaluesandinterestshasledtocitiesandinternationalorganizationscooperatingtopromotedecentralizationandsubsidiarity(aprincipleborrowedfromEUlaw).155Oneoftheconsequenceshasbeentheembracebyinternationalorganizationsofthecityasa“partner”andanalternativeinterlocutortothestate.Thislaysthegroundworkforcitiestoclaimandassertpoliticalauthorityintheglobalorder.

3.2MakeCitiesandHumanSettlementsInclusive,Safe,ResilientandSustainable156

TheUNsystemofficiallyrecognizedthechallengesofurbanizationforthefirsttimewhenthefirstConferenceonHumanSettlementswasheldinVancouverin1976.157Thisconference(HabitatI)resultedinthecreationoftheUNCommissiononHumanSettlementsandtheUNCentreforHumanSettlements(whichservedasthesecretariatoftheCommission).158From1978to1996,thesetwoentities,“withmeagerfinancialandpoliticalsupport”,struggledtoaddresstheproblemsofrapidurbanization,especiallyinthedevelopingworld.159ThesecondConferenceon

151Porras,pg.554.152See,forexample,Kessides,pg.35;MuhammadAmjadSaqib,‘Introduction’inSyedMubashirAliandMuhammadAmjadSaqib(eds),DevolutionandGovernance:ReformsinPakistan(OxfordUniversityPress2008),pg.1.153Saqib,ibid.AlsoseeUNDevelopmentProgramme,DecentralisedGovernanceforDevelopment:ACombinedPracticeNoteonDecentralisation,LocalGovernanceandUrban/RuralDevelopment(April2004),online:http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/decentralised-governance-for-development-a-combined-practice-note-on-decentralisation-local-governance-and-urban-rural-development/DLGUD_PN_English.pdf(accessedon20May2016).154UCLG,“AboutUs”,online:https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about(accessedon20May2016).155OnthesubsidiarityprincipleinEUlaw,seeAntonioEstella,TheEUPrincipleofSubsidiarityanditsCritique(OxfordUniversityPress2002).156UN,“Transformingourworld:the2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment”,SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),Goal11,online:https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11(accessedon1May2016).157UNHabitat,“AboutUs”.158Ibid.159Ibid.

HumanSettlements(HabitatII)tookplaceinIstanbulin1996,resultingintheHabitatAgenda,whichcontainedoverahundredcommitmentsandsixhundredrecommendations.160TheconceptofsustainabledevelopmentisattheheartoftheHabitatAgenda,whichUN-Habitatwastaskedtoimplement.Eventually,in2002,theUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedaresolutionthattransformedtheCommissionanditsCentreforHumanSettlementsintowhatisnowknownastheUNHumanSettlementsProgrammeorUN-Habitat.ThisResolutionalsorecognizedUN-HabitatasasubsidiaryorganoftheGeneralAssembly161andthefocalpointforallhumansettlementsmatterswithintheUNsystem.162UN-Habitat’smandateistopromotesociallyandenvironmentallysustainabletownsandcities.163

InpreparationfortheConferenceonHousingandSustainableUrbanDevelopment(HabitatIII)thattookplaceinQuito,EcuadorinOctober2016,therehasbeenarenewedglobalcommitmenttotheconceptofsustainableurbanization.164LedbyUN-HabitatanddrivenbyarangeofpartnersincludingNGOs,privatefoundations,localauthoritiesandnationalgovernments,theWorldUrbanCampaignisaglobalplatform“topromotedialogue,sharing,andlearningaboutoururbanfuture”aheadoftheHabitatIIIconference.165InitsManifestoforCities,theCampaigncalledontheinternationalcommunitytorecognizethatthecurrentmodelsofurbanizationaresocially,environmentallyandeconomicallyunsustainableandthatanewparadigmisneededtoachieveamoresustainablefuture.166ThismessageisreinforcedintheWorldCitiesReport2016,theglobalflagshipreportonsustainableurbandevelopmentlaunchedbyUN-HabitatinMay2016.167

Sustainableurbanizationenvisions“equitable,resilient,livable,creativeandproductivecities”andwillincorporatemeasuresforpovertyreduction,environmentalpreservation,andgoodgovernance.168Inaddition,sustainableurbanizationcallsforthereductionoftheecologicalfootprintofcitiesthrough“integratedandholisticurbandevelopmentpolicies,effectiveandparticipatory160UnitedNationsConferenceonHumanSettlements(HabitatII),TheHabitatAgenda(UNDocA/Conf195/14,7August1996).161Para.A1,UNGeneralAssembly,56/206StrengtheningthemandateandstatusoftheCommissiononHumanSettlementsandthestatus,roleandfunctionsoftheUnitedNationsCentreforHumanSettlements(Habitat)(UNGeneralAssembly56thSess,AgendaItem102,A/RES/56/206,26February2002).162ParaB1,ibid.163UN-Habitat’smandateissetoutinvariousUNdocuments,includingResolution56/206andtheIstanbulDeclarationonHumanSettlements(HabitatII)andtheHabitatAgenda.Fordetails,seeUN-Habitat,“MandateandRolewithintheUNSystem”,online:http://unhabitat.org/about-us/history-mandate-role-in-the-un-system/(accessedon1May2016).164HabitatIII,“AboutHabitatIII”,online:https://www.habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda(accessedon1May2016).165UN-Habitat,WorldUrbanCampaign,online:http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/world-urban-campaign/(accessedon1May2016).166ManifestoforCities:TheUrbanFutureWeWant,pg.5.167UN-Habitat,“UN-HabitatlaunchestheWorldCitiesReport2016,UrbanizationandDevelopment:EmergingFutures”,online:http://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-launches-the-world-cities-report-2016/(accessedon1May2016).168ManifestoforCities:TheUrbanFutureWeWant,pg.6.

planningandmanagement…andtheuseofmethodologiesandtoolstotrackurbansustainabledevelopment.”169Itisbelievedthatthepromotionoftheruleoflawisessentialtothesuccessofsustainableurbandevelopment.Inthisregard,ruleoflawincities,otherwisereferredtoasurbanlawinthepolicyliterature,includespromotingaccountabilityandtransparencyaswellasparticipationbycitizensinpublicdecision-makingprocesses.170ThisinturnwillhelpsecuretherightsofcitydwellersandthekeyprinciplesoftheNewUrbanAgenda.

TheNewUrbanAgendaistheoutcomedocumentagreeduponattheHabitatIIIconference.171TheimplementationoftheNewUrbanAgendaisenvisionedtocontributetothe“implementationandlocalization”ofthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment,otherwiseknownastheSustainableDevelopmentGoals,particularlyGoal11(whichissetoutastheheadingofthissection).172TheAgendaisunderpinnedbythreeprinciples.Thefirstprincipleisto“[l]eavenoonebehind”,whichentailsaddressingsocialinequality,povertyandprovidingequitableaccesstophysicalandsocialinfrastructureinthecity.173Thesecondprincipleistoachievesustainableeconomicdevelopmentthroughenhancingproductivity,innovationandcompetitiveness.174Thethirdprincipleistofosterecologicalandresilienthumansettlementsby,amongstanumberofthings,protectingbiodiversityandaddressingclimatechange.175TheAgendaaffirmstheneedforstrengthenedurbangovernance,“withsoundinstitutionsandmechanismstoempowerandincludeurbanstakeholders…”176Italsocallsforthestrengtheningofmunicipalfinanceandlocalfiscalsystems,andsupportsthecreationoflegalandregulatoryframeworkstofacilitatemunicipalborrowingfrompublicandprivatesources.177Mechanismstosupportexpandedborrowingbycityauthoritiesincludedevelopingmunicipaldebtmarkets,andestablishingregional,nationalandsubnationaldevelopmentfunds.178Onaddressingclimatechange,theNewUrbanAgendasetsoutsomepointsthatare

169Ibid.170Urbanlawisdefinedas“thecollectionofpolicies,laws,decisionsandpracticesthatgovernthemanagementanddevelopmentoftheurbanenvironment”;UN-H1.Anotherusefuldefinitionofurbanlawisthatitreferstoa“anexpansivedisciplinethatconsidersarangeoftraditionallegalquestions–localgovernmentauthority,judicialreviewofregulatoryprocessesandindividualrights,amongothers–astheyinformthelifeofcities”;NestorM.Davidson,‘WhatisUrbanLawToday?AnIntroductoryEssayinHonoroftheFortiethAnniversaryoftheFordhamUrbanLawJournal’(2013)40FordhamUrbanLawJournal1579,pg.1588.Davidsonalsonotesthat,intheUS,urbanlawhasfadedasadisciplineinrecentyearsbecausemuchofthesubjectmatterthatwouldbeconsideredurbanhasshiftedtootherareassuchasplanninglaw,criminaljusticeandtaxlaw.171UnitedNationsConferenceonHousingandSustainableUrbanDevelopment(HabitatIII),DraftoutcomedocumentoftheUnitedNationsConferenceonHousingandSustainableUrbanDevelopment(HabitatIII),Doc.A/CONF.226/4*,29September2016,online:https://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda(accessedon25November2016).AnnexedtothisdocumentistheNewUrbanAgenda:QuitoDeclarationonSustainableCitiesandHumanSettlementsforAll.172Ibid,Para.9,PreambleoftheQuitoDeclaration.173Para.14(a),QuitoDeclaration.174Para.14(b),QuitoDeclaration.175Para.14(c),QuitoDeclaration.176Para.15(c)(ii),QuitoDeclaration.177Para.139,QuitoDeclaration.178Ibid.

worthnoting.Paragraph75statesacommitment“to[encouraging]national,subnationalandlocalgovernments…todevelopsustainable,renewableandaffordableenergy,energy-efficientbuildingsandconstructionmodes;andtopromotingenergyconservationandefficiency,whichareessentialtoenablethereductionofgreenhousegasandblackcarbonemissions…”179Paragraph79setsoutanexplicitcommitmentinsupportoftheParisAgreement.ItstatesthatsignatoriestotheQuitoDeclarationcommitthemselves“topromotinginternational,national,subnationalandlocalclimateaction,includingclimatechangeadaptationandmitigation,andtosupportingtheeffortsofcitiesandhumansettlements…tobeimportantimplementers.Wefurthercommitourselvestosupportingbuildingresilienceandreducingemissionsofgreenhousegases…SuchmeasuresshouldbeconsistentwiththegoalsoftheParisAgreementadoptedundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,includingholdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetowellbelow2°Cabovepre-industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels.”180 TheNewUrbanAgenda,liketheearlierHabitatAgenda,willprovideguidancetostates,citygovernments,civilsociety,privatefoundations,andinternationalorganizationsintheirthinkingaboutcities,urbanizationandsustainabledevelopment.ThereareanumberofobservationstobemadeabouttheUN-HabitatandtheNewUrbanAgendainrelationtotheemergenceofcitiesininternationalaffairs.TheHabitatIIIprocesshasincreasedthevisibilityandprominenceofcitiesnotjustassitesofurbanizationprocessesbutalsoasstrategicpartnerstoachievetheglobaldevelopmentagenda.Sincethelate2000s,internationalorganizations,privatefoundations,andotheractorshavecreatedmultipleplatformsandprogrammestoworkwithcitygovernmentsonarangeofissues.181InMarch2004,theUNEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)launchedaninitiativeknownastheInternationalCoalitionofCitiesagainstRacism.182Thisinitiativeestablishedanetworkofcitiesinterestedinsharinginformationandexperienceinordertoimprovetheiranti-discriminationpolicies. ThedescriptionoftheInternationalCoalitionofCitiesagainstRacismonUNESCO’swebsiteisnoteworthybecauseofwhatitrevealsabouttheofficial179Para.75,QuitoDeclaration.180Para.79,QuitoDeclaration.181WhiletherehasbeenasurgeofinterestonthepartofUNagencies,theEUandtheWorldBankincitiessincethe2000s,itoughttobeclarifiedthattherearepartnershipsbetweeninternationalorganizationsandcitiesthatpre-datethisrecentsurgeofinterest.Forexample,theWorldHealthOrganization’s(WHO)EuropeanHealthyCitiesnetworkhasbeeninoperationforovertwenty-fiveyears.Initsfirstphaseofimplementation(1987-1992),thenetworkwasdesignedtoserveasasociallaboratoryfortestinghealthinitiativesatthelocallevelandprovidingfeedbacktoWHOandstates;MicheleAcuto,MikaMorissetteandAgisTsouros,‘Citydiplomacy:TowardsMoreStrategicNetworking?LearningwithWHOHealthyCities’(2016)GlobalPolicyDOI:10.1111/1758-5899.12382,pg.3.182UNESCO,InternationalCoalitionofCitiesagainstRacism,online:http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/fight-against-discrimination/coalition-of-cities/(accessedon1May2016).

thinkingonthegovernancepotentialofcities.Thewebsitestates:

Theinternationalconventions,recommendationsordeclarationselaboratedattheupstreamlevelneedtoberatifiedandimplementedbytheStates.Atthesametime,itisextremelyimportanttoinvolveactorsonthegroundincludingthetargetsofdiscriminations,tomakesurethatthoseinstrumentsareappliedtorespondtoconcreteproblems.UNESCOchosecitiesastheprivilegedspacetolinkupstreamanddownstreamactions.Theroleofcityauthoritiesaspolicy-makersatthelocallevel,isconsideredhereasthekeytocreatedynamicsynergies.183

Bybypassingthestate,UNESCOisseekingmoreeffectiveandresponsivedomesticimplementationofinternationallaw.OncetheNewUrbanAgendaisunderway,itcanbearguedthatsuchinitiativeswillexpandinnumberandscope,creatingyetmorespaceandopportunitiesforcitiestoasserttheirroleinglobaldevelopmentandinternationalaffairs.

ItwasmentionedearlierthattheNewUrbanAgendaaffirmsacommitmenttodecentralization,subsidiarityandlocalself-governance.TheAgendaalsocallsforcitiestoworkwiththeprivatesectorandtoimprovetheirfiscalsystems.Byreaffirmingcommitmenttotheseideas,theNewUrbanAgendathrowsnormativeweightbehindthepolicydiscourseaboutharnessingthebenefitsandminimizingtheillsofurbanization,andbyextension,theindispensablerolethatcitieswillplayintheglobalquestforsustainableurbandevelopment.Inotherwords,UN-Habitat’sideologyonsustainableurbanizationverycloselyresemblestheWorldBank’surbanstrategy.WhileUN-Habitattriestopaymoreattentiontopovertyalleviationandsecuringhumanrightssuchastherighttocleanwaterandtherighttoshelter,thereisstrikingconsensusbetweentheNewUrbanAgendaandtheBank’sstrategy.

4. ConclusionThischapterconcludesPartIofthisthesis,whichaimstoprovidearich

foundationforexploringtheroleofcitiesingoverningclimatechange.Thischapterdrewfromawidevarietyofempiricaldataandsecondaryliteraturetomaketheclaimthatcitiesareontheriseininternationalaffairs.Asglobalizationandurbanizationcontinuesapace,citieshavesoughttoplayaroleinglobalgovernanceprocesses.Often,citiesaremotivatedtodosobecausetheyareatthefrontlineofglobalgovernancechallengessuchasterrorismandpandemics.Insomecases,citiesseektoengageindiplomacytofacilitatetrade,culturalexchangeandmakepronouncementsonissuessuchasLGBTrights.

Asfortheurbanpoliciesofinternationalorganizations,wesawinthischapterthepivotalrolethattheWorldBankplaysinshapingthedevelopmentofcitiesandthepolicydiscourseabouttheroleofcitiesinthequestforsustainabledevelopment.Throughitstechnicalassistance,lendingpoliciesandresearch,theWorldBankisabletoexercisesignificantinfluenceontheinternational183Ibid.

community’sthinkingaboutcities,globalization,anddevelopment.TheBankadvocatesdecentralizationandtheprincipleofsubsidiarityaspartofits‘goodgovernance’paradigmfordevelopment;citiesareseenasthelevelofgovernmentthatisclosesttothepeopleandthereforemostsuitedforfacilitatingdemocraticparticipationingrassrootsdecision-makingprocessesanddevelopingmechanismsforaccountability.Incontrast,centralgovernmentsareseenasdistantbureaucraticmachineriesthataredetachedfromthelivesofthepeopleandthereforeunabletorespondtotheirneedsandaspirations.Assuch,theWorldBankandotherinternationalorganizationsareincreasinglybypassingthestateandworkingdirectlywithcitiestoachieveglobalgovernanceobjectivessuchasclimatemitigationandcounteringdiscrimination.Itisinthiscontextthatcitieshavethespaceinwhichtheycanengagedirectlyingovernancepartnershipsinvolvingcivilsociety,multinationalcorporationsandinternationalorganizations.Itisalsointhiscontextthatcitiesareproactivelytakingmeasurestorespondtoclimatechangeandformingnetworkstosharebestpractices.Throughthesenetworks,citiesarealsodevelopingnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthattranscendnationalboundariestosteermunicipalgovernmentsandotheractorstowardsclimatechangemitigationandlow-carbondevelopmentinthecitiesoftodayandthefuture.

Chapter4:CityActiononClimateChange

1. Introduction

Inthepreviouschapter,theanalysisshowedhowglobalcitiesarebeginning

toexerttheirpresenceininternationalaffairsthroughactsofinter-citydiplomacyandimplementationofinternationallawontheirownaccord.Globalcitiesarealsobeginningtoemergeasgovernanceactors,anditisintheareaofclimatechangethatcitieshavebeenparticularlyactive.Todate,overtwothousandcitieshavespecificplanstoscaleuptheireffortsatclimateadaptationaswellasstrategiesforGHGemissionreductions.1Thesecitiesdonotactalone.Theyworkinpartnershipwithventurecapitalists,researchlaboratories,universitiesaswellaswithothercities.2Urbanpartnershipsareoftenbothlocalandtransnational,andblurtheboundariesbetweenprivateandpublic.

Thischaptershowcaseswhatfiveglobalcities-London,MexicoCity,NewYorkCity,RotterdamandSeoul-aredoingtoaddressclimatechange.Theseglobalcitieshaveconsciouslystyledthemselvesas‘climatefrontrunners’.Throughtheirproactiveclimatechangepoliciesandstrategies,theyhavegainedwidespreadrecognitionbypolicy-makers,urbanplanners,themedia,internationalorganizationsandresearchers.Theaimofthischapterisnottoprovidedetailedcasestudiesoracomprehensiveaccountofeachcity’smitigationandadaptationefforts.Thischapteralsodoesnotpurporttoanalyzehowandwhyvariouscitiesdifferintheirlawsandpolicies.3Instead,thischapteraimstoprovideanoverview

1UnitedNationsClimateSummit2014,“MayorsatUNclimatesummitannouncepledgestowardsmajorcarboncutsincities”,online:http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/mayors-un-climate-summit-announce-pledges-towards-major-carbon-cuts-cities/(accessedon15November2016).2Forexample,CleanTechDeltaisaDutchinitiativethatbringstogetherthecitygovernmentsofRotterdamandDelft,thebusinesssector,researchinstitutionsandlaboratoriestosupportthedevelopmentofcleantechnologiesintheDelft-Rotterdam-Drechtstedenregion.CleanTechDeltadescribesitselfasa“triplehelixorganization”,referringtotheconceptoftheTripleHelixofuniversity-industry-governmentintheknowledgesociety;InterviewNo.8.ForaconciseoverviewoftheTripleHelixconcept,seeStanfordUniversity,TheTripleHelixConcept,online:http://triplehelix.stanford.edu/3helix_concept(accessedon15June2016).3Whyacitydoesordoesnotimplementainitiativeorpolicyisoftendictatedbylocalpoliticsandotherhighlylocalizedfactors.AsoneofthecitygovernmentofficialsIinterviewedputsit,“Citiesarepoliticalentitiesattheendoftheday.Theyhavetorespondtolocalpoliticaldemandsandlocalelectoralcycles.Municipalgovernmentscannotimplementpoliciesiftheydonothavethesupportofthekeystakeholders”;InterviewNumber1.InterviewNo.9gavetheexampleoftherecentNewYorkCityCouncil’sapprovaltolevya5-cent(UScurrency)levyonplasticbags.ThatNewYorkCityhasbeenrelativelylateinintroducingataxtoreducetheuseofplasticbags“isnotforthelackoftrying.Wehavefacedalotofpoliticalpush-back”.TheWallStreetJournalalsoreportedthatthedeliberationsonthis5-centfeelevyintheNewYorkCityCouncilwasunusuallyheated,andthe“28-20votetoapprovethebillcameonlyafterafiercedebatecenteringonloftythemesofregressivetaxation,incomeinequalityandenvironmentalpolicy.”;MaraGay,‘NewYorkCityCouncilApproves5-CentFeeonPlasticBags’TheWallStreetJournal(6May2016).

thatwillgivereadersasenseofwhatglobalcitiesaredoing‘ontheground’withintheirterritoriestogovernclimatechange.4

Anappreciationofthelocalizedpracticesandpracticalaspectsofglobalcityactiononclimatechangeisimportantinatleasttworespects.Oneofthekeyideasthisthesisseekstoadvanceisthatthepractices,policiesandstrategiestakenatthelocallevelbearwidersignificanceandcontributetowardstransnationalclimatechangegovernancewhenglobalcitiesseektoscaleuptheiractionsandpursuecooperationthroughcross-bordernetworks.Inthischapter,oneobservestheintertwinedconnectionsbetweenurbaninstitutionsandglobalorganizations,betweenlocalpracticesandtransnationalnorms.Insomecases,therearecausalconnectionsbetweenpracticesatthelocalandgloballevels,whichbringstomindKoh’sconceptofthetransnationallegalprocesswherebynormsandpracticesare‘uploaded’and‘downloaded’fromtheinternationaltolowerlevelsofgovernanceandviceversa.Further,itcanbeobservedthatanumberofcommonalitiesunitetheseclimatefrontrunnerglobalcities.Thefeaturesthatthesecitiesshareincludevisionaryleadershipbyamayorwhoisabletosecure‘buy-in’fromthecity’sadministrativeagencies,theprivatesector,civilsocietyandothermajorstakeholders;publicsupportforstrongclimateactionandmorebroadly,creatingamoresustainableandlivablehome;andactiveparticipationinglobalnetworkssuchastheC40,whichisthefocusofChapter5.5Thishelpsputintoperspectivetherolethatglobalcitiescanplayinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Whileallcities,largeandsmall,mayseektocontributetotheglobalefforttomitigateclimatechange,onlyaselectfewglobalcitieswiththemoney,administrativeresources,politicalwillandcosmopolitanvisionofthecommongoodwillbeactiveparticipantsintransnationalgovernanceandrule-makingprocesses.

2. London,theUnitedKingdom

Withapopulationof8.4millioninmid-2013,LondonisthemostpopulouscityinEurope,drawingvastnumbersofpeoplefromtherestoftheUKandtheworld.6London’seconomy,heavilydominatedbythefinancialsector,contributes

4Thus,aconsciouschoicehasbeenmadetohighlighteachcity’smostnotableclimatestrategies,policiesregulationsratherthanseekconsistencyinthetypeofinformationprovidedforeachglobalcityfeaturedinthischapter.5Fordiscussiononthemotivationaleffectsofcityparticipationinnetworks,seeTaedongLeeandChrisKoski,‘MitigatingGlobalWarminginGlobalCities:ComparingParticipationandClimateChangePoliciesofC40Cities’[2014]JournalofComparativePolicyAnalysis:ResearchandPractice,DOI:10.1080/13876988.2014.910938,pg.15.

6OfficeforNationalStatistics(UnitedKingdom),PopulationEstimatesfortheUK(2013),online:http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-northern-ireland/2013/sty-population-estimates.html(accessedon1October2016);EuropeanCommission,Eurostat,“StatisticsonEuropeanCities”,online:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Statistics_on_European_cities(accessedon3October2016).

20%tothecountry’snationaloutput(measuredbyGrossValueAdded(GVA)).7Londonisalsowidelyconsideredtobeoneoftheworld’sgreatcities;Itis“..thecityofEmpire,themostmulticulturalcityintheworld,acentreoffinancialglobalization.”8Atthesametime,Londonhasasizablecarbonfootprint:thecityemitsasmuchGHGsasGreeceorPortugal,9whichbringshomethepointthateffectiveclimatepoliciestoreducetheGHGemissionsofacitycanhaveasmuchimpactasaddressingthoseofacountry.

Seizinguponitsresourcesandthedesiretoplayaleadershiproleinaddressingclimatechange,Londonhassetthehighwatermarkinurbaneffortstomitigateandadapttoclimatechange.BulkeleyandSchroederarguethatLondon’sclimatepolicyissoadvancedandwell-developedvis-à-visotherglobalcitiesbecauseofthefollowingfactors:

“[t]hedriversandmotivations…arenecessarilymultipleandcomplex,

butincludethecommitmentofcriticalindividuals,thecourageofconvictionborninpartfrominterimpolicysuccess,apositiveclimateofpublicopinion,alackofovertoppositionfromkeyinterestgroupsandtheemergenceofnewmarketopportunitiesinthecarboneconomy.”10

Those‘criticalindividuals’includetheformerMayorKenLivingstoneandhisDeputyMayor,NickyGavron(2000to2008).11Theymadeaddressingthecausesofclimatechangeoneofthemainprioritiesoftheirmayoraltyandsetambitioustargetsandpoliciesforbothmitigationandadaptation.12TheC40networkisalsoformerMayorLivingstone’sbrainchild.Sinceitsinception,thenetworkhashadmultipliereffectsacrosstheglobeandhasalsobroughtLondonsignificanteconomicbenefitsandextendedits‘softpower’.TheC40willbethesubjectofdetailed

7OfficeforNationalStatistics(UnitedKingdom),“London'seconomyhasoutperformedotherregionssince2007”,online:http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-trends/regional-economic-indicators/march-2013/sum-london.html(accessedon3October2016);FordiscussiononwhetherhavingaglobalfinancialcentrelikeLondonboostsorharmstheUKeconomy,seeHowardDavies,“DoesLondon'sfinancialcentreboostorharmtheUKeconomy?”,TheGuardian(25February2014),online:http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/feb/25/london-financial-centre-boost-or-harm-uk-economy(accessedon3October2016).8JenniferRobinson,‘MakingLondon,throughothercities’inBellSarahandPaskinsJ(eds),ImaginingtheFutureCity:London2062(London:UbiquityPress2013),pg.24.9LondonClimateChangeAgency,MovingLondonTowardsaSustainableLow-CarbonCity:AnImplementationStrategy(2007),pg.1.10H.BulkeleyandH.Schroeder,GoverningClimateChangePost-2012:TheRoleofGlobalCities-London(TyndallCentreforClimateChangeResearchWorkingPaper123,2008),pg.8.11Ibid.,pg.10;HeleenLydekeP.MeesandPeterP.J.Driessen,‘Adaptationtoclimatechangeinurbanareas:Climate-greeningLondon,Rotterdam,andToronto’(2011)2ClimateLaw251,pg.271.ItshouldbenotedthatLondonhasatwo-tiergovernmentstructure:TheGreaterLondonAuthorityistheregionalbodythatconsistsoftheMayorandanAssemblythatprovidesoversightoftheMayor’swork,andthereare33boroughsorlocalauthorities.12Ibid;alsoseeJohnVidal,“KenLivingstone,themayorofLondon,isonamissiontotackleclimatechange”TheGuardian1November2006,online:http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/nov/01/travelsenvironmentalimpact.localgovernment(accessedon3October2016).

discussioninChapter5,thesalientpointforpresentpurposesistonotethepivotalrolethatLondon,particularlyitsformermayor,playedinestablishingtheC40.

ThefollowingsectionwillfirstdiscussLondon’smitigationeffortsledbythestrategicvisionofformerMayorLivingstone,whichcontinuestoexerciseconsiderableinfluence.London’smitigationeffortsfocusonretrofittingthecity’sexistingbuildingstobemoreenergyefficient,promotingrenewableenergyand,inthelongterm,transitingtoa‘hydrogeneconomy’.ItthenexaminesLondon’sadaptationinitiatives,whicharelargelyledbytheboroughsbecauseoftheirjurisdictionalcontroloverspatialplanning.2.1London’sMitigationPoliciesandProgrammes

Duringhisfirstterm,thenMayorLivingstonedevelopedanEnergyStrategyforLondon.13ClimatechangewasattheheartofthisEnergyStrategy,whichcommittedLondontoreducingcarbondioxideemissionsby20%below1990levelsby2010asafirststeptoareductionof60%by2050.14Thisstrategyfocusedonpromotingtheuseofon-siterenewableenergygeneration(e.g.bytheuseofsolarpanels)andCombinedHeatandPower(CHP).Topromoterenewableenergyor‘decentralisedenergygeneration’,Livingstoneusedhispowersintheplanningsystem–whichincludedapprovinglarge-scaledevelopmentsanddevisingtheLondonPlanwhosetstheover-archingframeworkforspatialdevelopmentacrosstheLondonboroughs–toensurethatnewdevelopmentsincludeddecentralizedenergygeneration.15TheMayor’sOfficeandtheLondonDevelopmentAgencyalsopubliclybackedhigh-profileprojectsthatdemonstratethetechnicalfeasibilityofrenewableenergyandCHP.Livingstone’sofficealsodevelopedmulti-stakeholderpartnershipsfocusedonadaptation(theLondonClimateChangePartnership)andresearchanddevelopmentfornewhydrogentechnologies(theLondonHydrogenPartnership,establishedin2002).16SchroederandBulkeleydescribetheperiodfrom2000to2004as“oneofexperimentationwiththeformalpowersofthemayorinrelationtoenergyandtransportpolicy,andtheemergenceofapartnershipapproachtoclimategovernanceinLondon.”17 Theperiodof2004to2008wasmarkedbyevenmoreconcertedeffortstogalvanizeclimatechangeactioninLondon.ThemomentumcontinuedapacewiththeestablishmentoftheLondonClimateChangeAgencytodeliverLivingstone’sEnergyStrategybyimplementingprojectsinthesectorsthatimpactclimatechange,

13GreaterLondonAuthority,Greenlighttocleanpower:TheMayor'sEnergyStrategy(GreaterLondonAuthority,2004).14Ibid.15TheGreaterLondonAuthorityActbestowedtheMayorandtheLondonAssemblywitharangeofnewpowersthatexpandedtheMayor’sabilitytodirectlocalplanningauthorities.Fordiscussion,seeChristopherStanwell,“Devilliesinthedetailasmayorincreasespowers”,PlanningResource,online:http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/767412/legal-report(accessedon6October2016).16LondonClimateChangePartnershipwebsite:http://climatelondon.org.uk/lccp/;LondonHydrogenPartnershipwebsite:http://www.hydrogenlondon.org(accessedon6December2016).17H.SchroederandH.Bulkeley,‘Globalcitiesandthegovernanceofclimatechange:whatistheroleoflawincities?’36FordhamUrbanLawJournal313,pg.335.

especiallyintheenergy,transport,wasteandwatersectors.18The2007LondonClimateChangeActionPlansetoutingreaterdetailhowtechnicalandregulatorybarrierstopromotingrenewableenergy,energyefficiencyincommercialandresidentialbuildingsanddevelopingahydrogenenergyinfrastructurewouldbeovercome.The2007LondonClimateChangeActionPlanalsoestablishedamoreambitiouspolicygoal:“tostabilizecarbondioxideemissionsin2025at60%below1990levels,withsteadyprogresstowardsthisoverthenexttwentyyears.”19However,theActionPlanrecognizesthatthe“difficulttruthisthatinpreparingthisactionplanwehavebeenunabletopresentanyrealisticscenarioinwhichwecanachievethe2025targetsetoutabove,withoutmajornationalregulatoryandpolicychange.”20 ToensurecontinuityofLondon’sclimate-focuseddevelopmentagenda,theGreaterLondonAuthorityAct2007imposedanewstatutorydutyontheMayorofLondontocontributetowardsadaptationandmitigation.21Infulfillmentofthisduty,theMayorisrequiredtoproducestatutorymitigationandadaptationstrategiesforLondon.22Thus,whilesomeoftheabove-mentioneddriversormotivationsmayalter,thislegalrequirementtoaddressclimatechangeconstitutesafirmsubstantivebasisuponwhichfutureclimatepolicyforLondoncanbebuilt.FollowingtheremovalofLivingstoneandGavronfromofficeaftertheMay2008electionsandtheappointmentofanewConservativeMayor,BorisJohnson,itwasunclearwhetherthenewMayorwouldplacethesamedegreeofemphasisonclimatechangeandwhetherLondonwillcontinuetobeagloballeaderonclimatechange.Developmentsfrom2008to2014indicatedthatMayorJohnsondidnotdetractfromthecommitmentsmadeintheLondonClimateChangeActionPlan.ThepoliciesandstrategiesenvisionedandpursuedbytheLivingstonemayoraltywerestillimplemented,eventhoughMayorJohnsonwasnotpersonallycommittedtoaddressingclimatechangethewayhispredecessorwasandtherewasatendencybyJohnson’sofficetoemphasizethe‘businesscase’foraddressingclimatechange.23

18LondonClimateChangeAgency,pg.3.19GreaterLondonAuthority,ActionTodaytoProtectTomorrow:TheMayor'sClimateChangeActionPlan(2007),pg.19.20Ibid.21Section42,GreaterLondonAuthorityAct2007.22Sections43and44,ibid.23SeeGreaterLondonAuthority,TheMayor’sClimateChangeMitigationandEnergyAnnualReport(Withupdatedcarbondioxideemissionsfor2011andupdatedactivityfor2011-2013)(GreaterLondonAuthority,2014);Forevidenceofpersonalcommitmenttoaddressingclimatechange,seeBorisJohnson,“It’ssnowing,anditreallyfeelslikethestartofaminiiceage”,TheTelegraph,20January2013,online:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/9814618/Its-snowing-and-it-really-feels-like-the-start-of-a-mini-ice-age.html(accessedon8October2014).Foremphasisonthe‘businesscase’oftacklingclimatechange,seethesecondobjectiveofMayorJohnson’sclimatechangestrategy:“Theglobalmarketforlowcarbongoodsandservicesisaround£3trillion.Inadditiontothis,itisestimatedthatifglobalCO2emissiontargetsaremet,thismarketcouldincreasebyatleast£368billionperyearthroughto2030.Londoniswellplacedtocapitaliseonthiseconomicopportunity.TheMayorisusingLondon’sinherentstrengthsandhisclimatechangemitigationprogrammestobuildonthis”;GreaterLondonAuthority,‘DeliveringLondon'sEnergyFuture:TheMayor'sClimateChangeMitigationandEnergyStrategy’,EexcutiveSummary,

InMay2016,SadiqKhanwontheelectioncontestandreplacedBorisJohnsonasmayorofLondon.24WithinthefirstfewmonthsofKhan’smayoralty,itwasalreadyevidentthatclimatechangewouldbecomeamorecentralconcernthanithadbeenforthepreviousmayor.KeentoworkwithotherglobalcitiestoaddressclimatechangeandforLondontoreviveitsroleasaclimatefrontrunneramongstEuropeancities,SadiqKhanincreasedcontactwithC40andputhimselfupasacandidatefortheroleofViceChairontheC40SteeringCommittee.25On25July2016,C40announcedthatSadiqKhanwaselectedtotheViceChairpositionandwillrepresentEuropeancitiesalongsidethemayorofCopenhagen.26Inaddition,whileSadiqKhan’sofficehasyettopublishitsclimatechangestrategyforthecityatthetimeofwriting,KhanhasalreadymadeitclearthathewantstoestablishLondonasa“low-carbonbeacon”andwillcommitLondontobecomeazero-carboncityby2050.27Finally,itisexpectedthatSadiqKhanwillsupportmoreintegratedapproachessuchasenhancingthesynergiesbetweenclimateadaptation,expandinggreenspacesandreducingairpollution.28

2.2Adaptation:Implementationatthelocalauthoritylevel

InpursuanceofitsobligationsundertheGreaterLondonAuthorityAct2007,theGreaterLondonAuthorityissuedtheDraftClimateChangeAdaptationStrategyforLondon(AdaptationStrategy)in2008(followedbyanupdatedversionin2010).MeesandDriessennotethat“[a]lthoughfloodriskisamajordriverofadaptation,heatstresshasbecomemoreimportantaftertheheatwavesof2003and2006.”29ThisrealityisalsoreflectedintheAdaptationStrategy,whichhighlightsflooding,droughtandoverheatingasthethreemainclimatechangeimpactsthatLondonhastomanage.

AsignificantprongofLondon’sAdaptationStrategyconsistsofanUrbanGreeningProgrammetoreducetheimpactsofandpreventfurtherintensificationofLondon’surbanheatislandeffect.TheUrbanGreeningProgrammesconsistsofagreenroofpolicy,atree-plantingprogrammeandestablishingagreengridacrosstheGreaterLondonarea.30IntheAdaptationStrategy,MayorJohnsoncommittedtopg.viii.

24RobertBooth,“Labour’sSadiqKhanelectedmayorofLondon”,TheGuardian,7May2016,online:https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/07/sadiq-khan-elected-mayor-of-london-labour(accessedon10December2016).25TheSteeringCommitteeisthegoverningbodythatprovidesstrategicdirectiontotheC40network.26C40,“PressRelease:LondonMayorSadiqKhanElectedC40ViceChair”,online:http://www.c40.org/press_releases/press-release-london-mayor-sadiq-khan-elected-c40-vice-chair(accessedon1November2016).27SadiqKhanforLondon,online:http://www.sadiq.london/a_greener_cleaner_london(accessedon1November2016).28InterviewNo.12.29MeesandDriessen,pg.261.30SeeLondonClimateChangePartnership,AdaptingtoClimateChange:LessonsforLondon(GreaterLondonAuthority,2006)fordetailedconsiderationofcasestudiesthatinformedLondon’sadaptationstrategy,forexample,Linz’sandBasel’sestablishedgreenroofpolicies;seeCityof

workingwithpartners“…toincreasegreencoverincentralLondonbyfivepercentby2030andafurtherfivepercentby2050,tomanagetemperaturesinthehottestpartofLondon…increasetreecoveracrossLondonbyfivepercent(from20to25percent)by2025…[and]enablethedeliveryof100,000m2ofnewgreenroofsby2012(from2008/09baseline).”31Here,partnersincludetheboroughsthatplayacriticalroleindevelopingandimplementinglocality-specificadaptationpoliciesandinitiativesunderthebroadframeworkestablishedatthemayorallevel.

Atthelocalauthoritylevel,someboroughssuchasBarkingandDagenhamhaveissuedaPlanningAdviceNoteonGreenRoofs.32TheboroughofBarkingandDagenhamhasalsoissuedaPlanningAdviceNoteonSustainableDesignandConstructionwhich“strongly[encouragesdevelopers]toconsiderenergyefficientbuildingdesign,communityheatingandCHP,aswellasrenewableenergygenerationfromtheoutsetoftheirplans.”33Further,thePlanningAdviceNotestates“DevelopersinBarkingandDagenhamareexpectedtoachieveafurther20%reductionincarbonemissionsbeyondBuildingRegulations2006innewdevelopments.10%ofthisreductionhastobeachievedthroughon-sitegenerationofrenewableenergy.Theremainder10%canbeachievedthroughincreasedenergyefficiency,CHPorthroughfurthergenerationofrenewableenergy.”34Thus,atthelocalauthoritylevel,thereisdiscretionforboroughstobeambitiousintheirclimatechangeagendaandgobeyondstatutoryrequirements.

Londonisvulnerabletoanumberoffloodrisks:fromtheNorthSea(tidalflooding),theThamesriveranditstributariestotheThames(fluvialflooding)andfromheavyrainfall(surfacewaterflooding).35TheDraftAdaptationStrategyassessedthat“[c]urrently,thereisalowlikelihoodoftidalflooding,amediumprobabilityofriverfloodingandhighprobabilityofsurfacewaterflooding.”36However,theriskswillincreaseassealevelsrise,tidalsurgesincreaseinheight,the

LondonCorporation,GreenRoofCaseStudies(CityofLondonCorporation2011),online:http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/services/environment-and-planning/planning/heritage-and-design/Documents/Green-roof-case-studies-28Nov11.pdf(accessedon7October2016)forsuccessfulexamplesofLondon’sfledginggreenroofsinitiative.31GreaterLondonAuthority,ThedraftclimatechangeadaptationstrategyforLondon(GreaterLondonAuthority,2010),pg.12,online:https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Draft_Climate_Change_Adaptation_Strategy.pdf(accessedon10October2016).32PlanningAdviceNotesprovidedevelopersandplannersguidanceonhowaboroughseekstoimplementitsLocalDevelopmentFramework.Whiletheyarenotbindinganddonothavetobeadheredtoinapplicationsforplanningpermission,theboroughwilltakeintoaccountwhethertheseNoteshavebeenfollowedwhenitdecidesonaplanningapplication;LondonBoroughofBarkingandDagenham,“PlanningAdviceNotes”,online:http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Environment/PlanningPolicy/Pages/Planningadvicenotes.aspx(accessedon10October2016).33LondonBoroughofBarkingandDagenham,SustainableDesignandConstruction(PlanningAdviceNote5),pg.24,online:http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Environment/PlanningPolicy/Documents/PAN5SustainableDesign.pdf(accessedon10October2016).34Ibid.,pg.27.35GreaterLondonAuthority,ThedraftclimatechangeadaptationstrategyforLondon,pg.7.36Ibid.

amountandintensityofwinterrainfallincreases.Currently,floodriskinLondonismanagedprimarilybyasystemofflooddefences(walls,gatesandtheThamesBarrier)anddrainagenetworks.However,spatialplanningisalsoacriticaladaptationtool,whichinvolvesavoidingthecreationofflood-vulnerablelandusesinhigh-riskareasandusingtheplanningprocesstoreducefloodrisks.AstheLondonboroughsaretheprimarydecision-makersintheplanningprocess,theyhavepreparedarangeofspatialplanningpoliciestargetedatadaptationtoflooding.TheboroughofSutton,forexample,hasadoptedaholistic“green-blueinfrastructure”approachtomanagefloodriskstoandfromnewdevelopmentsandtopromotesustainableurbandrainagesystemstomanagesurfacewaterflooding.37ThisfirmfocusongreenandbluespaceswastheresultofSutton’sparticipationintheGreenandBlueSpaceAdaptationforUrbanAreasandEcoTowns(GRaBS)project,anetworkoffourteenpartnersdrawnfromeightEUmemberstatesthataimstoshareexperienceandbestpracticesinintegratingadaptationintoregionalplanninganddevelopment.38

3. MexicoCity,Mexico

Withnearly20millioninhabitants,3.5millionvehicles,and35,000industrialfacilities,MexicoCity’spercapitacarbonemissionsisestimatedat3.6tons,whichislowcomparedtothoseofwealthiercitieslikeLosAngeleswhichhaspercapitaemissionsof15.6tons.39MexicoCity’scarbonemissionsrepresent4.18%ofthetotalnationalemissions–arelativelysmallpercentagebecauseoftheabsenceofthepetrochemicalindustryinthecity(oneofthemainsourcesofGHGsinMexico)andincreasingdeindustrializationofthecity.40However,MexicoCity,likeotherurbancentresinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC)isagrowingsourceofGHGemissionsbecauseofurbansprawlandpopulationgrowth.41MexicoCityalso

37SeePatrickWhitter,‘LondonBoroughofSutton:Adaptationtofloodingvialocalplanningpolicies’inAleksandraKazmierczakandJeremyCarter(eds),Adaptationtoclimatechangeusinggreenandblueinfrastructure:Adatabaseofcasestudies(DatabasepreparedfortheInterregIVCGreenandbluespaceadaptationforurbanareasandecotowns(GRaBS)project.2010),online:http://www.grabs-eu.org/membersArea/files/Database_Final_no_hyperlinks.pdf(accessedon8October2016).38TheGRaBSprojectisfinancedbytheEuropeanUnion'sRegionalDevelopmentFund.Moreinformationisavailableonline:http://www.grabs-eu.org(accessedon8October2016).39PatriciaRomeroLankao,‘HowdoLocalGovernmentsinMexicoCityManageGlobalWarming?’(2007)12LocalEnvironment519,pg.520.40FabiolaS.Sosa-Rodriguez,‘Fromfederaltocitymitigationandadaptation:climatechangepolicyinMexicoCity’(2014)19MitigationandAdaptationStrategiesforGlobalChange969,pg.989.Aspeoplemoveawayfromthecoreareasofthecitytosuburbanareas,theyhavetotravellongerdistancesforworkandrecreationalpurposes.PrivateautomobileownershiphasbeensteadilyincreasingbecauseofthepoorpublictransportationsysteminMexicoCity.InLAC,emissionsfromtransportationarethefastestgrowingsourceofcarbon.MexicoCityisnoexception.41JorgelinaHardoyandPatriciaRomeroLankao,‘LatinAmericancitiesandclimatechange:challengesandoptionstomitigationandadaptationresponses’(2011)3CurrentOpinioninEnvironmentalSustainability158.

suffersfromsomeoftheworstairpollutionproblemsintheworld.42In1992,theUnitedNationsreportedthatMexicoCitywasthemostpollutedcityontheplanet.43 StudiesoftheimpactsofclimatechangeacrossMexicoindicatethatMexicoCityislikelytoexperiencethegreatesteffectsbecauseofitsexistingenvironmentalproblems(inducedbyrapidurbanization)anditssusceptibilitytoclimaticevents.44Historically,MexicoCityhasexperiencedcatastrophicfloodsandseveredroughts.Projectedchangesintemperatureandprecipitationmayincreasethefrequencyandseverityoffloodsanddroughts,increasingthecity’ssusceptibilitytorainandwastewaterfloodingandlandslidesaswellasdramaticallyreduceresidents’accesstocleandrinkingwater.Further,large-scalerapidurbanexpansion,coupledwithchangesinatmosphericemissions,hasresultedintemperaturerises,highlevelsofairpollution,andlossofecosystemservicesforMexicoCity.Sincetheearly1990s,thecity’saveragetemperaturehasrisenbyalmostfourdegreeCelsius.45Thecityalsofacessignificantchallengesmeetingthewater,sanitationandhousingdemandsofitspopulation,ofwhichsome14%liveinslumsettlementsonflood-proneareas.46Despiteitsinlandlocation,MexicoCityispronetofloodingbecauseithasnonaturaldrainageoutletandthecityislocatedonthemarshybedofwhatwasonceaseriesoflakesinavalley.47Thepoorandmarginalizedarethemostvulnerabletotheimpactsofclimatechange. ThesechallengeshaverendereditimperativeforMexicoCitytoincreaseitsclimateresilience.Inrecentyears,MexicoCityhasemergedasa‘climatefrontrunner’amongstglobalcitiesindevelopingcountries.48FormanydevelopingcountrycitieswhichgenerallyemitlessGHGscomparedtowealthycitiesindevelopedcountries,“[c]urbingcarbonemissionsmay…notbethecurrent‘localenvironmentalpriority’.Rather,thelocalprioritymaybevulnerabilityandadaptationtotheimpactsofclimatechange.”49ThishasnotbeenthecaseforMexicoCity.Unusuallyforanemergingeconomy,domesticclimatepolicydiscussionsinMexicoanditscapital,MexicoCity,havenotfocusedsolelyonimpactsand

42GalenMcKinleyandothers,TheLocalBenefitsofGlobalAirPollutionControlinMexicoCity:FinalReportoftheSecondPhaseoftheIntegratedEnvionmentalStrategiesPrograminMexico(InstitutoNacionaldeEcología,MéxicoInstitutoNacionaldeSaludPublica,México,2003),pg.6.43WorldHealthOrganizationandUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,UrbanAirPollutioninMegacitiesoftheWorld(Blackwell,Oxford1992),pg.39.44PatriciaRomeroLankaoandothers,‘InstitutionalCapacityforClimateChangeResponses:AnExaminationofConstuctionandPathwaysinMexicoCityandSantiago’(2013)31EnvironmentandPlanningC:GovernmentandPolicy785,pg.789.45Sosa-Rodriguez,pg.972.46RomeroLankaoandothers,pg.790(Table2).ThereisalsowideincomedisparitybetweentherichandthepoorinMexicoCity,whichhasaGINIcoefficientof0.56.47PriscillaConnolly,TheCaseofMexicoCity,Mexico(CasestudyreportpreparedforUnderstandingSlums:CaseStudiesfortheGlobalUrbanReport,2003),online:http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/home.htm(accessedon6November2016).48Theterm“developingcountry”isusedtorefertolowandmiddleincomeeconomies.Mexicoisclassifiedasaupper-middle-incomeeconomy(GrossNationalIncome(GNI)ofUS$4,126toUS$12,745)becauseitsGNIpercapitastandsatUS$9,940(2003data);WorldBank,online:http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico(accessedon6November2016).49RomeroLankao,pg.520.

adaptationbutalsoincludemitigationresponsibilities.50ThisisallthemoreremarkablebecauseMexicoCity,likemanymajorcitiesinrapidlyemergingeconomies,facestremendouschallengessuchashighlevelsofmigrationfromruralareasintothecityasitcontemplatesatransitiontowardsamoreclimate-friendlyandsustainablefuture.51 ThediscussionbelowwillfirstsetoutMexicoCity’sclimatepoliciesaswellasexplainthemaindriversbehindthecity’sambitionstoaddressclimatechange.Thesefactorsinclude(1)thecoincidenceofapresidency(forthecountry)andamayoralty(forthecity)beingheldbyindividualswhowerecommittedtoaddressingenvironmentalgovernanceandclimatechangeissues,(2)MexicoCity’sinvolvementintransnationalnetworksparticularlyC40,and(3)theavailabilityofexternalfundingfrominternationalorganizationsliketheWorldBankandtheKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM).ThesectionconcludeswithabriefdiscussionoftheProgramaparaMejorarlaCalidaddelAireenelValledeMéxico(ProAire)programwhichhasledtoimpressivereductionsinconventionalairpollutionandcarbonemissionsinMexicoCity.

3.1StrongMayoralCommitmenttoTacklingClimateChange

From2000to2005,AndrésManuelLópezObradorservedasthemayorofMexicoCity.Describedasavisionary,MayorObrador“didnotneedconvincingthatclimatechangewasaseriousproblemandonethatMexicoCityneededtoaddress.”52UnderMayorObrador’sleadership,MexicoCityproduceditsfirstLocalClimateActionStrategyin2004,establishingguidelinesforlocalgovernmentalagencies,theprivatesectorandcivilsocietytopromotemitigationandadaptation.53ThemitigationmeasuresfocusedonimprovingMexicoCity’spublictransportationsystem,improvingenergyefficiency,andincreasinggreenacreageinthecity.Tobuildthecity’sclimateresilience,thestrategyidentifiedthattheimmediateprioritywastoincreasepubliceducationofriskssuchasheatstrokeandenhancingearlywarningsystems. WhileMayorObradorwasresponsibleforplacingclimatechangeonthecity’sagendaandputtingtheinstitutionalframeworkinplace,itwasduringMarceloEbrard’smayoralty(2006-2012)thatMexicoCitydisplayedahighlevelofcommitmentandinvestedsignificantresourcestodevelopingandimplementinganambitiousrangeofpoliciesandprogrammestocurbthecity’sGHGemissionsandincreaseitsclimateresilience.MarceloEbrardwascommittedtoimprovingquality50SimonePulver,‘AClimateLeader?ThePoliticsandPracticeofClimateGovernanceinMexico’inDavidHeld,CharlesRogerandEva-MariaNag(eds),ClimateGovernanceintheDevelopingWorld(Wiley2013),pg.175.Mexicoistheonlydevelopingcountrytohaveenshrinedlong-termGHGemissionsreductiontargetsinnationallegislationand,infact,isthesecondcountryintheworldtodoso(thefirstbeingtheUnitedKingdom);RichardBlack,‘InsideMexico'sclimaterevolution’BBCNews(20April2012),online:http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-17777327(accessedon4November2016).51InterviewNo.10.52Ibid.53SecretaríadelMedioAmbientedelGobiernodelDistritoFederal,(MinistryofEnvironmentoftheFederalDistrict),EstrategiaLocaldeAcciónClimáticadelaCiudaddeMéxico,2004.

oflifeforhiscity’stwentymillioninhabitants,andthatincludedreducingdrug-relatedviolence,improvingaccesstoeducation,and‘greening’thecity.54AcrucialcomponentofMayorEbrard’s‘greencity’strategywastorealizetheco-benefitsofreducingMexicoCity’ssevereairpollutionandrealizingGHGemissionsreductionsatthesametime.55Astransportationandfossilfuel-basedenergyproductionarekeysourcesofcarbonemissionsandconventionalairpollutants(suchasnitrogenoxideandsulphurdioxide),aclimatemitigationstrategywillproducetheco-benefitofimprovedairquality.56 TherearetwokeyfactorsthatmotivatedMayorMarceloEbrardtoundertakeambitiousclimateaction.ThefirstfactorwasMexicoCity’sparticipationintransnationalclimatenetworks,particularlyC40andtheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange.57C40firstemergedin2005andrapidlybuiltareputationforbeinganelitegroupofleadingglobalcitiesthatarestronglycommittedtotacklingclimatechange.58MexicoCitywaskeentobepartofC40andtoproveitscredentialsasaprogressiveglobalcitythatispursuingambitiousclimateaction.C40’smembershipcriteriaarewidelyknowntobedemandingandthequesttomeetC40’smembershiprequirementsmotivatedMayorEbrard’sadministrationtopursueanambitiousclimatechangeagenda.OnceMexicoCityofficiallybecameaC40member,itcanbesaidthatfrequentinteractionswithothercitiesandparticipationinthenetworkprovidedahealthydoseofpeerpressurethataddedimpetustoMayorEbrard’sclimatechangeagenda.59 MayorEbrardwasalsoactiveinanothertransnationalnetworkknownastheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange.60ThemayorofKyoto,YorikaneMasumoto,initiatedthefoundingoftheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChangesoonaftertheKyotoProtocolenteredintoforceinFebruary2005.61Thisnetworkofmayorsseekstorepresentandadvocateforcitiesonmatterspertainingtoglobalsustainability.62MayorEbrardwasnotonlyanactiveparticipant;in2009,hewaselectedtobethechairmanoftheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange,andMexicoCityhostedthe2010WorldMayorsSummitonClimateChange.63Thiswasa54JoelJaeger,‘ReflectingonMarceloEbrard'sTenureastheMayorofMexicoCity’CouncilonHemisphericAffairs(Mexico,20September2012)FrontPage,online:http://www.coha.org/reflecting-on-marcelo-ebrards-tenure-as-the-mayor-of-mexico-city/(accessedon4November2016).55InterviewNo.10.Ontheco-benefitapproach,seeNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency(PBL),Co-benefitsofclimatepolicy(PBLReportno500116005,2009),online:http://www.unep.org/transport/gfei/autotool/understanding_the_problem/Netherlands%20Environment%20Agency.pdf(accessedon4November2016).56Ibid.57InterviewNo.10.58SeedetaileddiscussionofC40inChapter5.59Ibid.60WorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange,online:http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org(accessedon8November2016).61Ibid.62Ibid.63LocalGovernmentClimateRoadmap,“WorldMayorsSummitonClimate–MayorspushforhopeafterCopenhagen”,online:http://www.iclei.org/climate-roadmap/advocacy/global-lg-events/2010-world-mayors-summit-on-climate-mexico-city.html(accessedon8November2016).

proudmomentforMexicoCityanditsmayor.ThesummitresultedintheGlobalCitiesCovenantonClimate,otherwiseknownastheMexicoCityPact.64Morethantwohundredandfiftycitiesinfifty-sevencountrieshavesignedthepledgetoreduceGHGemissionsandundertakeadaptationmeasures,andfurthermore,torecord“…theirclimateactions…andprovideregularinformationanddatasothat[their]effortscanbemeasured,reportedandverified.”65 ThesecondfactoristhecoincidenceintimingbetweenMarceloEbrard’smayoraltyandFelipeCalderon’spresidencyofthecountry.WhenFelipeCalderonassumedofficein2006,itmarkedaturningpointinthenationaldiscourseonclimatechange.PresidentCalderonmadeclimatechangeafocusofhispresidency.HisadministrationproducedaNationalStrategyforClimateChangeoutliningthevariousmitigationandadaptationoptionsthatwouldbetakentoachieveclimateresilienceaswellasthelong-termgoalofafiftypercentreductioninGHGreductionsby2050.66ThiscoincidencehelpedcreatesynergisticenergybetweenMexicoCity’sclimategovernanceambitionsandthenationalagenda.67Forexample,thenationalgovernmentwassupportiveofMexicoCity’sambitiousclimatechangeprogramsbecauseitwasopentotheideaofthecityservingasasociallaboratorytotestpoliciesandinitiativesthatcanbescaleduptothenationallevel.Duringthe2006-2012period,thiscoincidenceindomesticpoliticsmeantthatMexicoCitywaswellplacedtotakeambitiouslocalclimatechangeactionaswellasparticipateactivelyintransnationalclimatechangegovernancethroughC40andtheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChange. In2008,MexicoCitywasthefirstmunicipalityinLACtoimplementaLocalClimateActionProgram(2008–2012).Inthisprogram,thecitysetitselftwoobjectives:First,toreducecarbondioxideequivalent(CO2e)emissionsbysevenmilliontonsduring2008to2012;andsecondly,toinitiateanintegratedandfullyfunctionalclimateadaptationprogramby2012.68Thisprogramconsistedoftwenty-sixmitigationstrategies,whichincludedprogramstoreplacethecity’sstreetlampswithenergy-efficientLightEmittingDiodes(LED)lamps,increasingtheuseofsolarenergyinhospitalsandgovernmentbuildings,buildingtheEcobussystemtotransport150,000passengersdaily,aswellasnineMetrobus(busrapidtransit)systemsandtheLine12oftheMetro(subway)totransport437,000passengersdaily,andintroducingmoresustainablewastemanagementpolicies.The

64GlobalCitiesCovenantonClimate“MexicoCityPact”,online:http://www.mexicocitypact.org/downloads/texto-original/Global%20Cities%20Covenant%20on%20Climate%20OFICIAL.pdf(accessedon8November2016).65Ibid.ThecarbonnCitiesClimateRegistryisapubliconlinedatabasethathasbeenestablishedtosupportcitiesintheirvoluntaryadherencetoArticle4;online:http://carbonn.org/(accessedon8November2016).

66Pulver,pg.184.67InterviewNo.10.68MinistryoftheEnvironmentandFederalGovernmentoftheDistrictofMexicoCity,MexicoCityClimateActionProgram2008-2012(Summary)(2008),pg.11,online:http://www.planningclimatechange.org/joomla/0_upload/PDF_unico.pdf(accessedon6November

captureanduseofbiogasattheBordoPonienteStage4landfillrepresentednearly90%oftheemissionreductionsinthewastesector,whiletheconstructionofLine12ofthecity’ssubwaysystemandanobligatoryschooltransportationprogram(wherebyeducationalinstitutionsrequiretheirstudentstotakepublictransportationtoschool)areestimatedtoberesponsibleforhalftheemissionreductionsinthetransportsector.

Thetwelveadaptationstrategiesincludedimprovingwatershedmanagement,buildingfloodprotectioninfrastructureinurbanravines,soilremediationprogramstoimprovethecity’snaturalrainwaterabsorptioncapacity,andprovidingsocialassistancetovulnerablesocialgroupssuchasdistributionoffreefoodandestablishingsheltersforthehomelessduringheatwaves.69Long-termadaptationmeasuresaremainlygearedtowardsdevelopingadaptivecapacityinruralareasthatfaceseveremarginalizationbypromotingorganicfarming,development,andnaturalresourceconservation.70ItshouldbenotedthattheLocalClimateActionProgram(2008–2012)integratesstrategiesfromthecity’sGeneralProgramofDevelopment(2006–2012)andtheGreenPlan(2006–2012).71Thesestrategiesmaynothavebeendevelopedwithclimatechangeinmind,buttheyassistinreducingthecity’sGHGemissionsandincreasingitsadaptivecapacity.In2010,MexicoCitypassedtheClimateChangeMitigationandAdaptationLawwhichauthorizesthecity’sgovernmenttotakecertainregulatorymeasuresformitigationandadaptation,authorizesthecity’sgovernmenttoregulateactionsforaddressingclimatechange,establishestheClimateChangeEnvironmentalFundtoprovidefundingforprogramsandinitiatives,establishandmanageGHGemissioninventories,andcreateacarbonemissionstradingsystem.72 In2012,MayorMarceloEbrardannouncedthatnotonlydidMexicoCitymeetitsgoalofreducingCO2eemissionsbysevenmilliontonsduring2008to2012,itsurpassedthisgoalbytenpercentwitha7.7milliontonreductionofCO2eemissionsoverthefour-yearperiod.73MayorEbrardalsoannouncedthatMexicoCitymetalltheadaptationobjectiveslaidoutintheLocalClimateActionProgram.74However,academiccommentatorshavebeenlesspositiveintheirassessmentofMexicoCity’sachievements.Sosa-Rodriguez,forexample,pointsoutthatthereislimitedinter-institutionalcoordinationandcollaborationbecauseclimatemitigationandadaptationisviewedastheresponsibilityoftheMinistryoftheEnvironment.75Further,somenationaladaptationstrategiessuchasimplementingdroughtalertsystemshaveyettobeintroducedinMexicoCity.Sosa-Rodroguezexplainsthatthe

2016).Theinformationintherestofthisparagraphistakenfromthisdocument,unlessotherwiseindicated.69Ibid,pg.18.70Ibid.71Ibid,pg.4.72RomeroLankaoandothers,pg.792.73C40NewsTeam,‘MexicoCitymeets,exceedsClimateActionProgramGoals’NationalGeographic(13September2012)Voices,online:http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/09/13/mexico-city-meets-exceeds-climate-action-program-goals/(accessedon4November2016).74Ibid.75Sosa-Rodriguez,pg.985.

“[i]dentifiedobstaclestosuccessful[mitigationandadaptation]inthecityincludealackofunderstandingofthestrategies’objectives,processandoutcomesbygovernmentalagenciesandinhabitants,…alackofparticipationandpublicawarenessaboutclimatechange.”76Theseproblemshaveresultedinpoorcoordinationandcollaborationamongtheseparticipantstoaddressclimatechangeimpacts.ItshouldalsobenotedthatafterthecurrentmayorofMexicoCity,MiguelMancera,assumedofficein2012,hesignificantlyrestructuredthecity’sadministrationandthiscontributedtoconfusionandlackofcoordinationamongstvariousagenciesthatshouldbeworkingtogethertoimplementthecity’sclimatechangestrategy.77Furthermore,problemsofcorruptionhavestoodinthewayofdevelopingthecity’smitigationandadaptationcapacity.78Theseinstitutionalandsocietalbarrierstoactionaremorecommonincitieslocatedinthedevelopingworld,andreflectbroadersocio-economicandgovernancechallenges.Thus,unlikecitiessuchasRotterdam,LondonandNewYorkwhichenjoymorestablelegalandpoliticalinstitutionstosupportclimateaction,acitylikeMexicoCityemergesasaclimatefrontrunnerinthefaceoffargreatersocialandpoliticalresistance.

3.2TheProAirePrograms

AirpollutionhasbeenacriticalissueinMexicoCityandtheauthoritiescontinuetofaceanuphillbattleinimprovingthecity’sairquality.79Sincethe1990s,aseriesofcomprehensiveairqualityimprovementprogramshaveimprovedairquality,andinrecentyears,havealsoservedasaplatformforreducingGHGemissions.Thefirstplan,ProgramaIntegralparaelControldelaContaminaciónAtmosférica(PICCA)wasinitiatedin1990andmetwithconsiderablesuccessinintroducingtwo-waycatalyticconverters,phasingouttheuseofleadedgasoline,andestablishingvehicleemissionsstandards.80Thesecondprogram,ProAireII(1995-2000)introducedrestrictionsonthearomaticcontentoffuelsandreductionofsulfurcontentinindustrialfuel.81Notwithstandingsignificantimprovementsinambientairquality,levelsofconventionalairpollutantsstillfarexceededWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO)guidelines,compellingthecitygovernmenttoextendtheProAireprogram.82WhileairqualityremainedthekeyfocusoftheProAireIII(2002-2010)program,therewasgreaterrecognitionofthelinkagesbetweenairpollution,urbanization,transportationandclimatechange.83

TheProAireIIIprogramincludeseighty-ninecontrolmeasures,whichrangefromclosingthecity’smostpollutingfactoriestobanningcarsonedayperweekinthecity´smetropolitanarea.ItsMetrobus(busrapidtransit)system,launchedin2005,isthelongestsuchsysteminLatinAmerica.Itisestimatedthat,by

76Ibid.77InterviewNo.10.78Sosa-Rodriguez,pg.986.79DavidAgren,‘MexicoCitychokesonitscongestionproblem’TheGuardian(6July2016).80McKinleyandothers,pg.6.81Ibid.82Ibid.83RomeroLankao,pg.525.

introducingcleaner,moreefficientbuses,andconvincingmanycommuterstoleavetheircarsathome,MetrobushasreducedcarbondioxideemissionsfromMexicoCitytrafficbyanestimated80,000tonsayear.84Thenewfleetofbuses,operatingonclean-burningultralowsulfurdieselfuel,makemorethan450,000tripsperday.85In2009,theMexicoCityMetrobusSystemwasawardedtheRoyFamilyAwardforEnvironmentalPartnershipsbytheJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernmentatHarvardUniversity.Theawardrecognisesoutstandingpublic-privatepartnershipprojectsthatenhancesenvironmentalqualitythroughtheuseofnovelandcreativeapproaches.86Thecity’sEcobicibike-sharingprogramisalsothelargestintheLACandhasbeenreplicatedinothercitiesintheregion.TheProAireIVprogram(2011-2020)containsmeasuresacrosseightstrategyareasincludingenergyconsumption,greeningofthemunicipaltransportfleets,education,greenroofingandreforestation,capacitybuildingandscientificresearch.87In2013,thelong-termapproachandsuccessoftheProAireProgramsgarneredMexicoCitytheCityClimateLeadershipAwardintheairqualitycategory.88

4. NewYorkCity,TheUnitedStatesofAmerica

NewYorkCity(NYC)isthelargestcityintheUSandaglobalfinancialcentre.89Thecityhasapopulationofabout8.4million(asofJuly2013)thatisestimatedtoreachninemillionin2040.90NYC’shighpopulationdensityofover10,000peoplepersquarekilometre,extensivepublictransitsystem,anddominanceofthefinancialsectorinitslocaleconomyshapeitsGHGemissionspatterns.Ingeneral,NYC’stotalemissionsarehighbutitspercapitaemissionsarerelatively

84BelferCentreforScienceandInternationalAffairs,HarvardKennedySchool’sBelferCenterAnnounces2009RoyFamilyAwardforEnvironmentalPartnership,online:http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19541/harvard_kennedy_schools_belfer_center_announces_2009_roy_family_award_for_environmental_partnership.html(accessedon8November2016).85Ibid.86Ibid.TheMetrobussystemisaresultofapartnershiplaunchedbytheWorldResourcesInstituteCenterforSustainableTransport,togetherwithCEIBA(aMexicanNGO)andtheMexicoCitygovernment.TheprojectreceivedfundingfromShellFoundation,CaterpillarFoundation,HewlettFoundationandtheWorldBank.87CityClimateLeadershipAwards,“2013-TheWinners”,online:http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com/2013-city-climate-leadership-awards-winners/(accessedon8November2016).88Ibid.89NYCusuallytakessecondplace(afterLondon)byanarrowmarginintheGlobalFinancialCentresIndex;seeLongFinance’s‘FinancialCentresFutures’Program,“TheGlobalFinancialCentresIndex13”,March2013,online:http://www.geneve-finance.ch/sites/default/files/pdf/2013_gfci_25march.pdf(accessedon9November2016).90NYCDepartmentofCityPlanning,“CurrentEstimatesofNewYorkCity'sPopulationforJuly2013”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml(accessedon11November2016);NYCDepartmentofCityPlanning,“NewYorkCityPopulationProjectionsbyAge/Sex&Borough,2010-2040”online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/projections_report_2010_2040.pdf,pg.2(accessedon11November2016).

lowcomparedtootherurbanareasintheUS.91NYC’stotalGHGemissionswereestimatedtobe61.5millionmetrictonsofCO2ein2007.92Thecity’spercapitaemissionswereestimatedtobe7.1metrictonsofCO2e-higherthanLondon’sestimated5.9metrictons,butlowerthanestimatesforSanDiego(11.1),andSanFrancisco(11.2).93AkeyreasonforNYC’srelativelylowemissionscomparedtootherAmericancitiesistheprevalentuseofpublictransportamongstNYC’sresidents.AcrosstheUS,transportationisthesecondlargestsourceofGHGemissions,accountingfor28%percentoftotalemissions.94NYCistheonlyUScitywheremorethan50%ofthepopulationdoesnotdrivetoworkandhasthehighestrateofcommutingbypublictransitacrossthecountry.95NYC’sGHGemissionsprofilecompriseslargelyofenergy-relatedCO2emissionssincethereislittleagriculturalorforestedlandwithinthecityand75percentofthemethaneproducedatthecity’slandfillsandwastewatertreatmentplantsiscaptured.96NYC’sfirstGHGemissionsinventory,completedin2007,showedthatmorethantwo-thirdsofthecity’semissionsareduetoelectricityconsumptioninresidential,commercialandinstitutionalbuildings. HurricaneSandy,themostdestructivehurricaneofthe2012Atlantichurricaneseason,causedsevereflooding,powercutsandforty-fourdeathsinNYC.Whileittook“animprobablesetoffactorscomingtogethertogiverisetothecatastrophiceffectsofthestorm”97,HurricaneSandyrepresentsafractionoftheclimaterisksthatNYCfaces.TheNYCPanelonClimateChangehasprojectedthat,by2050,sealevelscouldriseupto30inches.98ThiswillposeasignificantthreattoNYC’smanylow-lyingneighborhoodsduringstormsandtidalflooding.Thepanelalsopredictsthat,by2050,therewillbeanincreaseinthemostintensehurricanes

91LilyParshallandothers,TheContributionofUrbanAreastoClimateChange:NewYorkCityCaseStudy(CasestudypreparedforCitiesandClimateChange:GlobalReportonHumanSettlements2011),pg.6.

92CityofNewYork,“InventoryofNewYorkCityGreenhouseGasEmissions(2007)”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/emissions_inventory.pdf(accessedon11November2016).

93Parshallandothers,pg.7.94UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(USEPA),“NationalGreenhouseGasEmissionsData”,online:http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html(accessedon11November2016).95Parshallandothers,pg.7.96Ibid.97PLANYC,“TheRisksweFace:SandyanditsImpacts”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/sandy-impacts.shtml(accessedon11November2016).98TheinformationincludedinthissentenceandtherestofthisparagraphisdrawnfromPLANYC,“TheRisksweFace:ClimateChange”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/climate-change.shtml(accessedon11November2016).TheNewYorkCityPanelonClimateChangeproducesupdated,peerreviewedlocalprojectionsfortheclimaterisksthatNYCfaces.TheMayor’sofficesinchargeofsustainabilityandresiliencerelyontheclimatescienceprovidedbytheNewYorkCityPanelonClimateChangeandthereisfrequentinteractionbetweenthemayor’sofficesandthePanel;InterviewNo.9.

occurringintheNorthAtlanticBasinandheatwavescouldtripleinfrequencyduetothecity’sdensebuiltenvironmentandtheurbanheatislandeffectthatcausestemperaturesinNYCtobeuptosevendegrees(Fahrenheit)higherthaninsurroundingareas.AccordingtotheNYCPanelonClimateChange,thereisaninetypercentprobabilitythatNYCwillexperiencemorefrequentheavydownpours. ThediscussionbelowsetsoutthepoliciesandmeasuresthathavebeenimplementedsinceNYC’sthen-MayorMichaelBloombergdecidedtotakeconcertedactiononclimatechangeinhissecondterm(2005-2013).PLANYCisacomprehensiveplanoutliningtheMayor’svisionforamoresustainablecityand,forthefirsttime,setaGHGemissionsreductiongoalforNYC.SincethelaunchofPLANYC,thecityhaspassedmorethanahundredlawsandregulationstoaddressclimatechange.99Ashasbeenobservedabouttheothercitiesdiscussedinthischapter,acrucialelementbehindacity’sabilitytoundertakeambitiousclimateactionishigh-levelpoliticalleadership.NYCisnoexception,withthen-MayorBloombergactingas“thechampionoftheclimatechangeissueforthecity,guidingtheoverallprocesswithgreatforesightandcourage.”100 SucceedingMichaelBloombergin2014,thecurrentmayorofNYCisBilldeBlasio.MayordeBlasiocampaignedonaplatformfocusedontacklingNYC’sgrowingincomeandsocialinequality.101Therefore,hisagendasofar,whiledemonstratingaveryhighlevelofcommitmenttomitigationandbuildingthecity’sclimateresilience,isbuiltonabroadunderstandingofsocial,environmentalandeconomicsustainability;tacklingclimatechangehasbecomeoneoffourcoreissuesinsteadofthemainfocusofhismayoraltyasithadbeenforMichaelBloomberg.102

4.1PLANYC:ASustainabilityandClimateChangeBlueprintforthe“CitythatNeverSleeps”

Asearlyasthemid-1990s,policyexpertsandscientistswereproducingstudiesthatwarnedoftheclimatevulnerabilitiesthatNYCfacedandhowclimatechangewoulddriveupriskssuchasheat-stressmortalityandmosquito-bornediseases.103However,thesewarningswereignoredbytheGiulianimayoraladministration(1994-2001)whichtookthepositionthat“…thatifactionwasindeednecessary,itcouldbedelayed,becauseclimatechangewasalong-termproblem.”104 WhentheBloombergmayoraladministration(2002-2013)tookoffice,its99NewYorkCityCouncil,ComprehensivePlatformtoCombatClimateChange(2014),online:http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/climateagenda.pdf(accessedon11November2016).100KatherineBagleyandMariaGallucci,‘HowMayorMichaelBloombergThoughtBigonClimate’ScientificAmerican(20December2013),online:http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/bloomberg-climate-plan-genesis-excerpt/(accessedon11November2016).101Fordiscussion,seeforexample,GeorgePacker,‘BilldeBlasio'sVision’TheNewYorker(12August2013).102SeediscussionbelowaboutMayordeBlasio’sclimateagenda.103CynthiaRosenzweigandWilliamSolecki,‘Chapter1:NewYorkCityadaptationincontext’(2010)1196AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademyofSciences19,pg.20.104BagleyandGallucci,ibid.

firsttermwasconsumedbytheaftermathoftheterroristattacksonSeptember11,2001.105However,accordingtoBagleyandGallucci,MayorBloomberg’sinterestinclimatechangestartedtoincreaseinthemid-2000s.MayorBloombergwasalsoconcernedabouthowNYCwasgoingtocopewithninemillionresidentsinthenearfuturegiventhatthedenselypopulatedcity’stransportation,housingandpublicspaceswerealreadyundersignificantstrain.106Bloomberg’sadministration,alongsideovertwenty-fivecityagencies,begantheprocessofdevelopingastrategyforhowNYCwastoprepareforitsgrowingpopulation,becomemoreresilient,andreduceitscarbonfootprint.ThisprocessculminatedinthepublicationofPLANYC. ReleasedinApril2007,PLANYCisacomprehensiveprogramofactioncomprisingofonehundredandtwenty-seveninitiativesinthekeyareasofland,water,transportation,energy,airquality,andclimatechange.107ThekeyobjectivesofPLANYCare,interalia,“tocreatehomesforalmostamillionmoreNewYorkerswhilemakinghousingandneighborsmoreaffordableandsustainable,ensureallNewYorkerslivewithinatenminutewalkofapark,andreduceenergyconsumptionandmakeourenergysystemscleanerandmorereliable.”108Inrelationtoclimatechange,thegoalisa30%reductionofGHGemissionsby2030from2005levelsandto“[i]ncreasetheresiliencyofourcommunities,naturalsystems,andinfrastructuretoclimaterisks.”109AcentralobjectiveofPLANYCwastheestablishmentofaninter-agencytaskforcethatwouldidentifyclimaterisksandimplementadaptationstrategiesacrossagencies.110Otherobjectivesincludeupdatingthecity’sFederalEmergencyManagementAdministration(FEMA)100-yearfloodplainmaps,documentingthecity'sfloodplainmanagementstrategiestosecurediscountedfloodinsuranceforNewYorkers,andamendingthebuildingcodetoaddresstheimpactsofclimatechange. TheMillionTreesNYCcampaignisoneofthePLANYCinitiatives:itaimstoplantamilliontreesinNYCby2017.Thecampaignisapublic-privatepartnershipbetweentheNYCDepartmentofParks&Recreation(NYCParks)andanon-profitgroup,theNewYorkRestorationProject.111Sinceitslaunch,public,privateandnon-profitorganizationshaveorganizednearlyfourthousandcitizenvolunteerstoplant

105Ibid.106Ibid.107PLANYC,“AboutPLANYC”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/about/about.shtml(accessedon11November2016).108Ibid.109Ibid.On7July2008,MayorBloombergannouncedalong-termplantoreduceenergyconsumptionfrommunicipalbuildingsandoperationsandagoalofreducingGHGemissionsby30%by2017.ItwasestimatedthatthiswouldreduceNYC’sannualoutputofGHGsbynearly1.7millionmetrictons;RosenzweigandSolecki,pg.21.

110Ibid.111LisaFoderaro,‘AsCityPlantsTrees,SomeSayaMillionAreTooMany’TheNewYorkTimes(18October2011),online:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/nyregion/new-york-planting-a-million-treestoo-many-some-say.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0(accessedon11November2014).

treesacrossthecity.112OneaspectoftheMillionTreesNYCcampaigndirectstheplantingofnearlyfourhundredthousandtreestoestablishtwothousandacresofnewforestonNYCparklandandotherpublicopenspaces.Theaimistocreatemulti-level,ecologicallyfunctioningforeststhatwillprovidethecitywithnumerousbenefitssuchasfilteringpollutionfromthelocalatmosphere,storingandsequesteringcarbondioxide,andtrappingrainwaterduringheavystorms.AccordingtothePLANYC2014progressreport,theMillionTreesNYCcampaignis27percentaheadofschedule,havingplantedover830,000trees(ofoveronehundredandtwentyspecies)andheldnumerouseventstoteachNewYorkershowtocareforthetrees. PLANYCstandsoutforthreereasons:First,itisacomprehensivestrategythatintegratesclimatechange,environmentalprotectionandremediation,populationplanning,transportationmanagementandmanyotheraspectsthatgotowardsmakingacityatrulysustainableonethatisalsoenjoyableandexcitingtolivein.Manycitiesandstatesproduceclimateactionplans,whichasthenamesuggests,focusonclimatechangeandthenseektoimplementtheinitiativesby‘mainstreaming’themacrossvariouspolicyareassuchashousingandtransportation,usuallywithadegreeofdifficultybecausetheagenciesresponsibleforthesepolicyareasviewclimatechangeasthesoleresponsibilityoftheenvironmentalagency.113Toalargeextent,this‘siloeffect’wasavoidedbygettingallthecityagenciesinvolvedinthedevelopmentofPLANYC,aprocessthatwouldhavebeenanimportantlearningexperienceforthecityservantswhowouldeventuallybearthebulkoftheresponsibilityforthestrategy’seventualimplementation.Further,then-MayorBloombergsawtheimportanceofestablishinganewofficededicatedtooverseeingthedevelopmentofPLANYC.EstablishedbyLocalLaw17of2008,theMayor’sOfficeofLong-TermPlanningandSustainability(OLTPS)workswithallothercityagenciesto“developandcoordinatetheimplementationofpolicies,programsandactionstomeetthelong-termneedsofthecity,withrespecttoitsinfrastructure,environmentandoverallsustainabilitycitywide,includingbutnotlimitedtothecategoriesofhousing,openspace,brownfields,transportation,waterqualityandinfrastructure,airquality,energy,andclimatechange”andtracktheprogressofPLANYC.114 Secondly,NYCdependedheavilyonlegislativeactiontoimplementPLANYC.Morethanahundrednewlawshavebeenintroducedandmanymoreamendedto112P.TimonMcPhearsonetal,‘AssessingtheEffectsoftheUrbanForestRestorationEffortofMillionTreesNYContheStructureandFunctioningofNewYorkCityEcosystems’(2010)3CitiesandtheEnvironment1,pg.2.113Onthesamepoint,seediscussioninEdoardoCroci,SabrinaMelandriandTaniaMolteni,AComparativeAnalysisofGlobalCityPoliciesinClimateChangeMitigation:London,NewYork,Milan,MexicoCityandBangkok(WorkingPaperNo.32)(TheCenterforResearchonEnergyandEnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicyatBocconiUniversity,2010),pg.29.Foranexampleofacityfacingsuchdifficulties,seediscussiononMexicoCityinthischapter.Fordiscussionofthesiloeffecthinderingclimateactionatthestateorprovinciallevel,see,forexample,JoleneLin,'ClimateGovernanceinChina:Usingthe“IronHand”’inLocalClimateChangeLaw:EnvironmentalRegulationinCitiesandotherLocalities,BenjaminJ.Richardson(ed.),EdwardElgar,2012.114TheNewYorkCityCouncil,LocalLaw17of2008:CreationandimplementationofacomprehensiveenvironmentalsustainabilityactionplanforNYC,section2.

updateNYC’shistoriczoningregulationsandaddressrelativelynovelissuessuchaselectriccarchargingstations.115Inrelationtoadaptation,thelanduseplanningprocessandregulationsintheZoningResolution(whichisthecity’szoningpolicydocument)havebeenrecognizedaspowerfultoolstoimplementadaptationmeasures.Forexample,twoamendmentstotheZoningResolutionimposeminimumrequirementsforlandscapingandplantinginyardsandincreaserequirementsforplantingstreettrees.116Theamendmentsaimtoincreasethecity’svegetatedandpervioussurfacestoassistinstormwatermanagement.Onthemitigationfront,anexamplewouldbetheGreener,GreaterBuildingsPlan(GGBP)legislativepackageenactedinDecember2009toreduceenergyconsumptionandincreaseenergyefficiency.117TheGGBPpackageconsistsofLocalLaw85(NYCEnergyConservationCode),LocalLaw84(EnergyandWaterBenchmarking),LocalLaw87(EnergyAuditsandRetro-commissioning)andLocalLaw88(LightingUpgradesandSub-metering).118 Thirdly,itisclearthatvastamountofresourcesarebeingdevotedtotheimplementationofPLANYC,aluxurythatmanyothercitiessimplycannotafford.InAprileachyear,aPLANYCprogressreportispublishedandmadeavailabletothepublic.Eachprogressreporttypicallyrunsintomorethanahundredpagesandincludesahighlydetailedchecklistandstatusupdateonthevariousinitiatives.The2014PLANYCprogressreport,forexample,providesanupdateonmorethanfourhundredspecificmilestonesthatincludelaunchingaconsumereducationcampaignonfloodinsurance,workingwithpipelineoperatorstoexpandthecity’snaturalgassupply,supportingtheHealthandHospital’sCorporationefforttoprotectpublichospitalemergencydepartmentsfromflooding,fortifyingallmarinasandpiers,andimplementingeconomicrevitalizationprogramsforareasdevastatedbyHurricaneSandy.119Inaddition,LocalLaw17of2008requirestheOLTPStoissueanupdatetoPLANYCeveryfouryears.Theplanwasupdatedin2011toincludefivemoreinitiatives.120AfterHurricaneSandy,morefederalfundingwasmadeavailableto

115NYCenactedthefirstcomprehensivezoningresolutioninthecountryin1916.Itisthereforeregardedasapioneerinthisfieldofzoningpolicy,which“determinesthetypesofusespermittedindifferentdistrictsandtherelationshipsamongthosedistricts”;EdnaSussmanetal,‘ClimateChangeAdaptation:FosteringProgressthroughLawandRegulation’(2010)18NewYorkUniversityEnvironmentalLawJournal55,pg.64.116Ibid,pg.66.117PLANYC,“Greener,GreaterBuildingsPlan”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/plan/plan.shtml(accessedon11November2016).118“Locallawsthatconflictwithstatestatutesareexpresslynotauthorizedunderthehomerulepowersoflocalgovernment.Further,locallawsthatareauthorizedunderthehomerulepowersmayneverthelessbepreemptedifthestatelegislaturechoosestooccupythatparticularfieldofregulation”;Sussmanetal,pg.132.Thus,theextenttowhichNYCcanuselocallawstoimplementPLANYCissubjecttolimitationsimposedbyfederalandstatelaw.

119TheCityofNewYork,ProgressReport2014:AGreener,GreaterNewYork/AStronger,MoreResilientNewYork(2014),online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_Web.pdf(accessedon13November2016).120Ibid.,pg.5.

NYCtorepairandrestoretheaffectedareasand,intheprocess,implementclimateresiliencemeasuresandimprovetheenergyefficiencyofnewbuildings.121

4.2OneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity

SinceMayorBilldeBlasiotookoffice,theOLTPSnowcomprisesoftheMayor’sOfficeofRecoveryandResiliency(responsibleforclimateresilience)andtheOfficeofSustainability(responsibleforthecity’smitigationefforts).FollowingHurricaneSandy,theBloombergadministrationhaddrawnupadetailedrecoveryplanknownasAStronger,MoreResilientNewYork.ThisplanoutlinedaUS$3.7billioninitialphaseofthirty-sevencoastalprotectioninitiativesdesignedtoprotectvulnerableneighbourhoodsandinfrastructurefromstormsurgeandsealevelrisebyincreasingcoastaledgeelevationsandimprovingcoastalmanagement.122UnderMayordeBlasio’sleadership,PLANYCandAStronger,MoreResilientNewYorkhavebeenincorporatedintotheflagshipstrategyofhisnewadministration,OneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity. Asmentionedearlier,MayordeBlasio’smayoralcampaignfocusedontacklinginequalityinNYC.InOneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity,MayordeBlasiostatesthatthisblueprintforthecity’sdevelopmentwill“embraceequityascentraltothatwork.”123OneNewYorkisbuiltonfourpillars:jobgrowth/economicdevelopment,reducingsocialinequality,reducingthecity’senvironmentalandcarbonfootprint,andimprovingthecity’sresiliencetotheimpactsofclimatechange.124NYChassetitselfthegoalofreducingitsGHGemissionsby80%(froma2005baseline)by2050.125TheOneNYC2016ProgressReportshowsthatthecityhasbeenmakinggoodstridestowardsachievingthetargetsandimplementingthenumerousinitiativesoutlinedinOneNewYork.126 Thereareconcernsthatthecurrentmayoraltyistryingtodotoomuchandthereforelosingthedisciplinetoactconcertedlyonclimatechange.127However,at121InterviewNo.9;ForinformationaboutthefederalfundsNYCreceivedtorepairandrestoreareasaffectedbyHurricaneSandy,see“NYCRecovery:CommunityDevelopmentBlockGrantDisasterRecovery”,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/html/home/home.shtml(accessedon13June2016).122TheCityofNewYork,pg.58.123OneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity,online:http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf,pg.3(accessedon13June2016).124Ibid,pgs.5-7.125On19September2014,justdaysaheadoftheUNClimateSummitheldinNYCon23September2014,theNYCCouncilannouncedacomprehensivepackageoflegislationandpolicieswhich,interalia,setanew,moreambitioustargetofreducingthecity’sGHGemissionsby80%(froma2005baseline)by2050andcommitstopassingnewlegislationtorequirethecitytobuild“zerocarbon”buildings;NewYorkCityCouncil,ComprehensivePlatformtoCombatClimateChange.TheGHGemissionsreductiongoalhasbeenincorporatedintoOneNewYork:ThePlanforaStrongandJustCity.126OneNYC2016ProgressReport,online:http://www1.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC-2016-Progress-Report.pdf(accessedon13June2016).127InterviewNo.9.

thesametime,itisrecognizedthatNYCismarkedlyaheadofmanyothercitiesasaclimatefrontrunnerbecauseoftheearlyandambitiousstartthattheBloombergadministrationhadgiventhecity.128Furthermore,theMayor’sOfficeofRecoveryandResiliencyandOfficeofSustainabilitypresentlyconstituteafull-timestaffofaroundfiftypeople.129Thisrepresentsasignificantamountofhumanresourcesdevotedtoaddressingclimatechange,whichputsNYCintheenviablepositionofbeingabletocontinuedevelopingandimplementingambitiousandinnovativeurbanclimategovernancesolutions.Finally,duringdeBlasio’smayoralty,NYCcontinuestoactivelyparticipateinC40and100ResilientCities(anetworkpioneeredandfinanciallysupportedbytheRockefellerFoundation).130EmployeesoftheMayor’sOfficeregularlyparticipateinC40workshopstoshareNYC’sexperiencesandbestpractices.131NYC’sinteractionswithotherglobalcitiesonissuesofclimatechangetakeplaceprimarilythroughthesetwonetworksandsuchengagementisviewedasanimportantcomponentofNYC’scontributiontowardsglobalclimategovernanceefforts.132

5.Rotterdam,theNetherlands

Foracitywithapopulationsizeofabout620,000,Rotterdamhashighemissions.133In2014,thecityemitted30,414kilo-tonnesofcarbondioxide134,makingitoneofthehighestcarbondioxideemittingcitiesinEurope.135Withinthenationalcontext,theRijnmondeconomy(RijnmondistheconurbationsurroundingRotterdam)isresponsiblefor8.5%oftheNetherland’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)whilealsogeneratingabout18%ofthecountry’stotalcarbondioxideemissions.136AsignificantportionofRotterdam’semissionsareport-related–whichisnotsurprisinggiventhatRotterdam’sportisthelargestinEurope,withatotalcargothroughputof430milliontonsin2010.137Usingvesselmovementstoestimateshipping-relatedemissionsinports,ithasbeenshownthatshipping-relatedemissionsinRotterdamrepresent10%oftheshippingemissionsinall128Ibid.129Ibid.130Ibid.131Ibid.132Ibid.133CityofRotterdam,FactsandFigures2013,online:http://www.rotterdam.nl/Clusters/Stadsontwikkeling/Document%202014/Informatiepunt%20Arbeidsmarkt/ZigZag2013-Engels-DEF.pdf(accessedon13June2016).134RotterdamClimateInitiative,CO2Monitor2014,version1.0(10June2015),pg.1(onfilewithauthor).135DanielHoornweg,LorraineSugarandClaudiaLorenaTrejosGomez,‘Citiesandgreenhousegasemissions:movingforward’(2011)20EnvironmentandUrbanization1,pg.6.136CityofRotterdam,InvestinginSustainableGrowth:RotterdamProgrammeonSustainabilityandClimateChange2010-2014(CityofRotterdam),pg.25.137OlafMerkandTheoNotteboom,TheCompetitivenessofGlobalPort-Cities:ThecaseofRotterdam/Amsterdam-theNetherlands(OECDRegionalDevelopmentWorkingPapers2013/06,2013),pg.21.RotterdamisalsothelargestportforSwitzerland,thesecondlargestinAustria,andisanimportantportforcentralEuropeancountries,suchasSlovakRepublic,HungaryandtheCzechRepublic;ibid,pg.31.

Europeanports.138EffortstomanageRotterdam’sport-relatedGHGemissionscanthereforehaveasignificantglobalimpact,arealizationnotlostonRotterdam’scitygovernmentwhospearheadedtheWorldPortsClimateInitiative. ThefollowingsectionwillfirstdescribethecityofRotterdam’sclimatemitigationinitiatives,followedbyanaccountoftheportofRotterdam’sclimatemitigationefforts.Withregardtoport-relatedeffortstoaddressclimatechange,particularemphasiswillbeplacedonRotterdam’sfoundingroleintheWorldPortsClimateInitiative,avoluntaryeffortundertakenby55oftheworld’slargestportstoindividuallyandjointlyworktogethertoreducetheclimateimpactsofportoperationsandtheglobalshippingindustry.ThefocusthenshiftstoRotterdam’sinnovativeandambitiousadaptationeffortsthathaveearneditthereputationasaleading,ifnottheleading,“climate-proof”deltacity. AcommonthreadthatrunsthroughallofRotterdam’sclimateinitiativesisthesignificantrolethatC40participationplayedinmotivatingRotterdamtotakeambitiousclimatechangeactionand,furthermore,totakealeadershiproleontheglobalstageintheareasofport-relatedmitigationandbuildingresilienceindeltacities.Itshouldalsobenotedthatin2013,Rotterdamwasselectedtoparticipateinthe100ResilientCitiesprogram,pioneeredbytheRockefellerFoundationtoempowercitiestodevelopresilience.139Resilienceisunderstoodas“[t]hecapacityofindividuals,communities,institutions,businesses,andsystemswithinacitytosurvive,adapt,andgrownomatterwhatkindsofchronicstressesandacuteshockstheyexperience.”140BecomingamemberofthisprogrammarkedaturningpointinRotterdam’sclimatechangestrategy.Intheprocessofdevelopingitsresiliencestrategy,thecitygovernmentbegantoapproachclimatemitigationandadaptationaspartofabroaderattempttobuildthecity’sresilience.141Assetoutinitsresiliencestrategy,Rotterdam’svisionisthatin2030,thecitywillbeonewhere“theenergyinfrastructureprovidesforanefficientandsustainableenergysupply”and“climateadaptationhaspenetratedintomainstreamcityoperations.”142Thinkingintermsofresiliencehashelpedthecitycreatesynergisticlinksbetweenclimatechange,socialinclusion,health,andahostofotherdimensionsthatmakeupthefabricofacity’slife.143

5.1Urbanclimatemitigation

ComparedtootherDutchcitieslikeAmsterdam,Rotterdamhadalatestartinaddressingclimatechange.144In2002,theKlimaatcovenant,anationalmulti-level138Ibid.pg.61.139100ResilientCities,‘FirstResilientCitiesAnnouncedbyRockefellerFoundation’,online:http://www.100resilientcities.org/blog/entry/33-resilient-cities-announced#/-_/(accessedon1July2016).140GemeenteRotterdam,RotterdamClimateInitiative,and100ResilientCities,‘RotterdamResilienceStrategy’,pg.18.141InterviewNumber11.142RotterdamResilienceStrategy,pg.24.143SeePart3.2.1ofChapter6formorediscussionaboutRotterdam’sresiliencestrategy.144JoyeetaGupta,RalphLasageandTjeerdStam,‘NationalEffortstoenhancelocalclimatepolictintheNetherlands’(2007)4EnvironmentalSciences171,pg.174.

arrangementinvolvinglocalgovernment,provincesandseveralministrieswaslaunched.145TheKlimaatcovenantprovideslocalauthoritiesadditionalfundingtargeteddirectlyatclimatechangemitigation;thesesubsidieswereinstrumentalinsteeringRotterdamtowardsdevelopingaclimatepolicyandbuildingcapacitytoimplementspecificmeasures.Withnationalfunding,Rotterdamhasimplementedsome20projects;theseprojectsrangefromawarenessraisingamongstcityofficialsontheimpactsoftheircommutinghabitstotheuseofresidualindustrialheatinhousingprojects.146 TacklingclimatechangeroseonRotterdam’spoliticalagendaafterrepresentativesofC40andtheClintonClimateInitiative(CCI)madeacompellingcaseduringanofficialvisittothecityinthemid-2000s.147Theyconvincedthecity’smayoratthattime,IvoOpstelten,thatRotterdamhadtoprioritizeclimateadaptationandthatthecitycouldmakeanimportantcontributiontowardsclimatemitigationbyfocusingonitsport’scarbonfootprint.148Intheprocess,Rotterdamwaswellplacedtoshareitsexperienceandknowledgewithotherglobalportcities.C40invitedRotterdamtojointhenetwork,andthisgavetheadditionalimpetusthatmotivatedOpstelten’sgovernmenttoactonclimatechange.149Soonafter,theRotterdamClimateInitiative(RCI)waslaunchedin2006.150RCIbringstogetherthePortofRotterdamAuthority,theregionalenvironmentalprotectionagency(DCMRRijnmond),thecitygovernment,andDeltalinqs(anorganizationthatrepresentsthebusinessandindustrysectorofRotterdam)todevelopandimplementRotterdam’sclimatechangestrategy.151MayorOpsteltencommittedthecitytoatargetof50%reductionofcarbondioxideemissionsin2025comparedto1990.152TheRotterdamClimateOffice,anagencytaskedwithimplementingtheRCI,wasthefirstofitskindintheNetherlands.153

5.2ReducingthecarbonfootprintofEurope’slargestport

145OECD,‘CompetitiveCitiesandClimateChange’(CompetitiveCitiesandClimateChange,Milan,Italy,9-10October2008),pg.142.UndertheKlimaatcovenantframework,subsidiesamountingtosome36millioneurosweremadeavailablefortheinitialfiveyears.Thisprovidedforseveralhundredlocalclimateassessmentsandmorethan250municipalimplementationplans.Thesecondphaseoftheschemewaslaunchedin2008,andincludedanother35millioneurosofsubsidiesupto2011;‘CompetitiveCitiesandClimateChange’,pg.147.146InterviewNumber11;Gupta,LasageandStam,pg.175.MostoftheseclimateinitiativesalsoaimtoimproveRotterdam’sairquality,whichismuchpoorercomparedtotherestoftheNetherlandsduetoemissionsfromindustriesintheportareaandfromport-relatedtransport,highpopulationdensity,andlimitedamountofgreenspaces.Populationexposuretoparticulatematter(PM2.5)inRotterdamis50%higherthanintheaverageOECDportregion;seeMerkandNotteboom,pg.11.147InterviewNumber11.148Ibid.149Ibid;Gupta,LasageandStam,pg.176.150RotterdamClimateInitiative,online:http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl(accessedon28September2014).151Ibid.152RotterdamClimateInitiative,online:http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/en/50procent-reduction(accessedon28September2014).153MeesandDriessen,pg.272.

Industryandenergy-generatingfacilitiesintheportareaareresponsiblefornearly90%ofRotterdam’scarbondioxideemissions.154Rotterdamwillnotbeabletomeetits“50%by2025”targetwithoutsignificanteffortstoreduceport-relatedemissions.Inthisrespect,sincelate2000s,theportofRotterdamhasinvestedsignificantlyindevelopingitscapabilitiesinenergyefficiency,productionofrenewableenergyandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS),therebyearningitselfaninternationalreputationasamodel“greenport”.155Theport’skeyenergyefficiencyinitiativeliesinthedevelopmentofGHG-neutralnetworks,inparticular,asystemthattransmitsheatamongstthefirmsoperatingintheportareaviaapipeline.Intheareaofrenewableenergy,in2009,theportsignedanagreementfortheextensionofwindmillparksthatwilldoubletheproductionofwindenergyfrom151MWto300MWbetween2009and2020.156Further,since2007,therehavebeenongoingexperimentstouseon-shoreelectricityforinlandbarges.Rotterdam’sportisalsoworkingwithaconsortiumofprivatefirmstodeveloptechnologiesandknowledgethatwouldallowforthecaptureandstorageofcarbondioxideundertheNorthSea.157TheRotterdamCaptureandStorageDemonstrationProject(ROAD)isoneofthelargestCCSdemonstrationprojectsintheworld.158 WhileRotterdamwas(andremains)keentoaddresstheclimateimpactofportandshippingactivities,italsohadtokeepanotherimportantconsiderationinmind–thatis,anymeasurestoimprovetheport’senvironmentalperformanceshouldnothinderitscompetitiveness.AsFentonpointsout,“[t]hismeantcooperationwithotherportsandstakeholderswouldbeessential,asindividualactionsbyalonefirst-moverpotentiallyriskedgeneratingnegativesocio-economicimpacts,whilstmovingenvironmentalproblemselsewhere.Otherportsfacedsimilarchallenges,makingcollectiveactionessentialandwin-winsolutionsdesirable...”159Consequently,RotterdamapproachedC40andCCItorequestsupportindevelopingaprogrammeforworldportstoaddressclimatechangeaswellasbuildpoliticalsupportinlargeportcitiesforsuchclimateinitiatives.160ThismarkedthebeginningofapartnershipbetweenRotterdamandC40todevelopaWorldPortsClimateConferenceandDeclaration,whichhassincecontinuedfulfillingitsagendaastheWorldPortsClimateInitiative.161TheconferencetookplaceinRotterdamon9-11July2008;representativesfrommanyoftheworld’slargestports,shippingcompanies,terminaloperators,fuelsuppliers,environmentalNGOS154RotterdamClimateInitiative,CO2Monitor2014,version1.0(10June2015),pg.1.155Ibid.,pg71.156Ibid.,pg71.157Rotterdam,pg.27.158Ibid;RotterdamCaptureandStorageDemonstrationProject,online:http://road2020.nl/en/(accessedon1October2015).159PaulFenton,‘Theroleofportcitiesandnetworks:reflectionsontheWorldPortsClimateInitiative’(ShippinginaChangingClimate–Liverpool18-19June2014),pg.7.160Ibid.161TheInitiativecontinuesundertheauspicesoftheInternationalAssociationofPortsandHarbours,which,interalia,organizesbiannualconferences,maintainsadedicatedwebsite,disseminatesinformation,developsprojectssuchastheEnvironmentalShippingIndex(ESI);WorldPortsClimateInitiativewebsite,online:http://wpci.iaphworldports.org(accessedon1October2014).

participated.TheconferenceculminatedintheadoptionoftheWorldPortsClimateDeclaration,wherebyportspledgedtousetheDeclarationto“guideactiontocombatglobalclimatechangeandimproveairquality”.162

5.3ALeaderinClimateAdaptation

NearlyhalfoftheNetherlandsliesbelowsealevel,renderingthecountryhighlyvulnerabletosealevelrisesandotherimpactsofclimatechange.Adaptationisthereforeapertinentreality,particularlyfordeltacitieslikeRotterdam.Inthespiritofinnovationandturningrisksintoopportunities,Rotterdamhasdevelopedandimplementednumerousadaptationmeasuresthathaveearnedthecitybothnationalandglobalrecognitionasaleaderinclimateadaptation.163 RotterdamisoneofonlythreecitiesintheNetherlandstohaveaclearadaptationgoal,whichistobe“100%climateproofin2025”.164TheRotterdamClimateChangeAdaptationStrategyexplainsthattheterm“climateproof”hasatwo-prongedmeaning:(1)thatby2025,thecitywouldalreadyhavetakenmeasures“toensurethateveryspecificregionisminimallydisruptedby,andmaximallybenefitsfrom,climatechange”and(2)thatthecityauthoritieswill“structurally[take]intoaccountthelong-termforeseeableclimatechangeinallspatialdevelopmentofRotterdam”.165Intermsoftheinstitutionalframework,the“RotterdamClimateProof”programmeispartoftheRotterdamClimateInitiativeandwasestablishedwithabudgetof31millioneurosforthefirstfouryears(2008-2012).166Thattherearesix“RotterdamClimateProof”staffdedicatedtoadaptationplanningisratherunusualandsymbolizesthepoliticalimportanceattachedtotheclimateprogramme.167

ThebasisofRotterdam’sadaptationstrategyistobuilduponitscurrentsystemforthesupplyofurbanwaterandfloodprotection,whichconsistsofstormsurgebarriersanddikes,canalsandlakes,sewersandpumpingstations.However,theinnovationofRotterdam’sapproachliesinthecity’sattempttointegrateadaptationprojectsintotheurbanlandscapeandimprovequalityoflifeforthecity’sresidents.“Watersquares”,suchastheBellamypleinwatersquare,serveas162WorldPortsClimateDeclaration,online:http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/data/docs/about-us/Declaration.pdf(accessedon1October2016).163Inthefirstsystematicsurveyoftheclimatemitigationandadaptationactivitiesofthe25largestmunicipalitiesintheNetherlands(populationover100,000),denExteretalidentifyRotterdamasoneoffourbest-performingcities(alongsideAmsterdam,TilburgandTheHague).Furthermore,Rotterdamistheonlycityrecognizedforitsinnovativeandeffectiveadaptationactivities(e.g.,floodmanagement,stormwaterstorageandadaptivebuildingpractices);RenskedenExter,JenniferLenhartandKristineKern,‘GoverningclimatechangeinDutchcities:anchoringlocalclimatestrategiesinorganisation,policyandpracticalimplementation’(2014)LocalEnvironment:TheInternationalJournalofJusticeandSustainability,pg.6.164CityofRotterdam,RotterdamClimateChangeAdaptationStrategy(2013).TheothertwocitiesareTheHagueandTilburg;seeRenskedenExter,JenniferLenhartandKristineKern,pg.7.165CityofRotterdam,ibid.,pg.22.166RotterdamClimateProof(2009AdaptationProgramme),online:http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/documents/RCP/English/RCP_adaptatie_eng.pdf(accessedon3October2016).167MeesandDriessen,pg.275.

bothwaterstoragefacilitiesaswellasattractivepublicspacesforresidentstospendleisuretime.IntheEendragtspolderdistrict,extrawaterstoragehasbeenintelligentlycombinedwitharowingcourseandothersportfacilities.168Thecityhasalsoincreasedtheamountofnaturalvegetationandfloratocombattheurbanheateffect,a‘noregretsmeasure’whichhasalsoimprovedairqualityandmadeRotterdamamoreattractiveplacetoliveandworkin.169Rotterdam’sapproachofleveragingmore‘greensolutions’toprotectresidentialareasratherthanimplementhigh-technologyandcostlysolutionshashadstrongappealtootherdeltacitieswhicharekeentolearnfromRotterdam’sexperience.170 Finally,Rotterdamisalsothefounderof“ConnectingDeltaCities”(CDC),anetworkwithinC40’sWaterandAdaptationInitiativethatenablesdeltacitiestoshareknowledgeandbestpracticesindevelopingtheiradaptationstrategies.171AmongsttheglobalcitiesthatarevulnerabletorisingsealevelsandareCDCmembersareJakarta,NewOrleans,London,Melbourne,CopenhagenandTokyo.CDClinkscitiesatthepolicylevelthroughbilateralMOUsandLettersofIntentbetweentheCDCcities.TofacilitatetheflowofinformationbetweentheCDCcities,asmallsecretariathasbeeninstalledinRotterdam.

6.Seoul,SouthKorea

ThelargestcityandcapitalofSouthKorea,Seoulishometo25%ofthecountry’spopulation.172Thecity’s10.4millionresidentslivewithin605squarekilometres,makingSeouloneofthemostdenselypopulatedcitiesintheworld.173Itisalsoawealthycitythathasprosperedgreatlysincethe1960saftertheKoreanWarendedandthecountrybeganaprocessofreconstruction.Inthisregard,itshouldbenotedthatinthe1960s,“[SouthKorea]waspoorerthanBoliviaandMozambique;today,itisricherthanNewZealandandSpain,withapercapitaincomeofalmost[US]$23,000”.174Assuch,amongstAsiancities,Seoulisintheuniqueandenviablepositionofhavingthefinancialresources(aswellaspoliticalleadershipandimpressiverecordoftechnologicalinnovation)toundertakeambitiousclimatechangeaction.ToindicatetheextentofSeoul’sresources,thecity’sadministrativebody,theSeoulMetropolitanGovernment,hadanoperatingbudgetofUS$18.4billionin2010.175

168CityofRotterdam,pg.28.169Ibid.,pg.29.Alsosee,‘CanRotterdambecometheworld'smostsustainableportcity?’CNN(26August2013).170ConnectingDeltaCitiesnewsletter,“InternationaldeltaconferenceinRotterdam”,online:http://www.deltacities.com/newsletter/international-delta-conference-in-rotterdam?news_id=66(accessedon1October2016).171ConnectingDeltaCities,online:http://www.deltacities.com/about-c40-and-cdc(accessedon1October2016).172SeoulMetropolitanGovernment,“Ranking”,online:http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php(accessedon20October2016).173Ibid.174MarcusNoland,‘SixMarketstoWatch:SouthKorea’[2014]ForeignAffairs175SeoulMetropolitanGovernment,“Ranking”,online:http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php(accessedon20October2016).

However,likemanycitiesthathaveenjoyedrapideconomicgrowth,Seoulhasseriousenvironmentalproblemssuchassevereairpollution.176Seoulisalsohighlyvulnerabletotheimpactsofclimatechange,particularlyrisingtemperaturesandtheurbanheatislandeffect,increasedrisksofflashfloodsandrainstorms.177ResearchhasshownthatSeoulhasregistereda1.5degreeCelsiustemperatureincreaseinaperiodofjustthirtyyears,twoandahalftimesmorethanthetemperatureincreaseofthesurroundingruralareas.178ThedailymortalityratesforSeoulasaresultofincreasedheatrangesfrom2.7to16.3percent.179Sincethemid-2000s,Seoulhasattractedglobalattentionforits“low-carbongreengrowth”policiesandprogramsasthecitycommitsitselftoreducingitssignificantGHGemissionsandadaptingtoclimatechange.In2009,SeoulhostedthethirdSummitoftheC40LargeCitiesClimateLeadershipGroup,aneventthat“…gavevisibilitytoSeoul’sandKorea’sclimatechangeinitiativeswhileatthesametimeapplyingpressureonthecityandthenationtoperform”.180WhileSeoul’scommitmenttoaddressingclimatechangeisverymuchinfluencedbynationalpoliciesandlaws,itsinvolvementintransnationalclimatechangenetworkshasprovidedvaluableaccesstoinformationabouthowothercitieswereperformingandtolearnfromtheirexperiences.InthewordsofDeputyMayorofSeoulKimSangBumduringaninterviewattheC40MayorsSummitinJohannesburg(4-6February2014),“[w]henSeoulhostedtheC40MayorsSummitin2009,wehadlittletonoexperiencewithhowtoimproveenergyefficiencyinbuildings”andsharingknowledgewithotherC40citiesgaveSeoultheconfidencetoimproveitsenergyefficiency.181 ThefollowingdiscussionproceedsbyfirstbrieflysettingoutthenationalcontextforSeoul’sclimatechangeinitiativesbecauseSeoulhasbeenthedefactonationallaboratoryforthecountry’sclimatechangepoliciesandprogrammes.Korea’sclimatechangestrategyplacesaheavyemphasisontechnological

176Inadditiontohighvolumesoftrafficemissionsthatisacommoncauseofpoorairqualityinhighlycongestedcities,SeoulisbadlyaffectedbythedustcloudsfromMongoliaandChinawhicharriveannuallyandengulfthecityinfineyellowdust;see,forexample,AlexKirby,“Asia’sduststormmiserymounts”,BBCNews,31March2004,online:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3585223.stm(accessedon20October2016).177HLeeandJGOh,‘IntegratingClimateChangePolicywithaGreenGrowthStrategy:ThecaseofKorea’inBryceWakefield(ed),GreenTigers:ThePoliticsandPolicyofClimateChangeinNortheastAsianDemocracies(WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars(AsiaProgramSpecialReport)2010),pg.18.178BarryMunslowandTimO'Dempsey,‘GlobalisationandclimatechangeinAsia:theurbanhealthimpact’(2010)31Thirdworldquarterly1339,pg.1343.179Ibid.180MirandaA.Schreurs,‘Multi-levelGovernanceandGlobalClimateChangeinEastAsia’5AsianEconomicPolicyReview88,pg.100.AcutoarguesthatthehostingofkeyC40eventsbyTokyo(in2008),Seoul(in2009),andHongKong(in2010)isanindicationofhowkeyglobalcitiesinAsiaprogressivelygainedprominenceintheC40network,possiblyinfluencingthenetwork’spaceandagenda;Acuto.Michele,‘Thenewclimateleaders?’(2013)39ReviewofInternationalStudies835,pg.853.181C40SummitVideoBlogSeries:KimSangBum,DeputyMayorofSeoul–“sharingknowledgewithothercitiesisoneofthebenefitsofC40”,online:http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/c40-summit-video-blog-series-kim-sang-bum-deputy-mayor-of-seoul-sharing-knowledge-with-other-cities-is-one-of-the-benefits-of-c40(accessedon20October2016).

advancement,fosteringresearchanddevelopment,andcapitalinvestmentinclimate-proofinfrastructure.AsignificantproportionofresourceshasinevitablybeenchanneledtoSeoul,thecountry’smostadvancedandpopulouscity.Thus,anunderstandingofthenationalclimatepolicywouldshedlightonSeoul’sapproach.Atthesametime,thecity’smetropolitangovernmentandmayoractivelyparticipateinnumerouspan-AsianandtransnationalcityclimatechangenetworkswhichexerciseastrongmotivationalinfluenceonSeoul’squesttoreinventitselfasa“globalclimate-friendlycity”(atermborrowedfromitsLowCarbonGreenGrowthMasterPlan).ThesectionthendescribesSeoul’smitigationandadaptationprogrammes,someofwhichhavegarneredinternationalawardsandrecognition.

6.1Korea’sLowCarbonGreenGrowthVision

Asanon-AnnexIpartytotheKyotoProtocol,KoreadidnotfaceanyinternationallegalobligationstoreduceitsGHGemissions.However,sincethenegotiationsoftheKyotoProtocol,theKoreaneconomyhasgrownandthecountrynowhasahigherpercapitaGDPthanapproximatelyhalfoftheAnnexIparties.182Itisalsotheworld’sfifteenth-largestsourceofemissions.183Inthenegotiationsforthepost-2012climatechangelegalregime,itwasassumedthatKoreawillberegardedasadevelopedcountryandexpectedtoundertakebindingGHGreductioncommitmentsjustlikeitsdevelopedcountrycounterparts.184Inthiscontext,undertheParisAgreement,KoreahaspledgedtoreduceitsGHGemissionsby37percentof‘businessasusual’estimatesby2030.185

Koreaembarkedonanational‘greengrowth’strategyasaresponsetoclimatechangeandthe2008globalfinancialcrisis.InAugust2008,PresidentLeeMyung-baklaunchedtheLowCarbonGreenGrowthvision.InitiallyformulatedasaUS$38.5billion‘GreenNewDeal’tolifttheKoreaneconomyoutofrecession,theLowCarbonGreenGrowthstrategywassubsequentlyreframedasthenation’svisiontoguidedevelopmentforthenextfiftyyears.186ThisvisionhassincebeenimplementedviatheNationalStrategyforGreenGrowth,theFiveYearGreenGrowthPlan(2009-2013)andanarrayofinstitutionalprogramstoensureinter-ministerialcooperationandeffectiveimplementationatthelocallevel.187

The“greengrowth”strategyalsoaimstoreduceKoreandependenceonenergyimports,whichaccountfor86%ofthecountry’sprimacyenergysupply,and182CentralIntelligenceAgency(US),“TheWorldFactbook”,online:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html(accessedon20October2016).183RSJonesandBYoo,Achievingthe“lowcarbon,greengrowth”visioninKorea(OECDEconomicsDepartmentWorkingPapersNo964,2012),pg.8.184JHLee,JohnMLeitnerandMinjungChung,‘TheRoadtoDohathroughSeoul:TheDiplomaticandLegalImplicationsofthePre-COP18MinisterialMeeting’(2012)12JournalofKoreanLaw55,pg.66.185SubmissionbytheRepublicofKorea,“IntendedNationallyDeterminedContribution”,online:http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Republic%20of%20Korea/1/INDC%20Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf(accessedon2November2016).186JonesandYoo,pg.6.187Ibid.,pg.5.

toimprovequalityoflifeforKoreansbyreversingsomeoftheworstenvironmentaldegradation.188However,theemphasisisongreentechnologiesasnewenginesofgrowthandjobcreationforaneconomyfacingrapidpopulationageingandslowinggrowth.AsMatthewselaborates,

“[w]hatisdistinctiveaboutKorea’sapproachto[greengrowth]isthatitisanindustrialstrategy…framedaroundthepromotionofkeytechnologiesandindustriesthatareviewedasprovidingthegrowthenginesforthenextstageofKorea’sdevelopment,andasexportplatformsforthe21stcentury,aswellasmeanstoreducecarbonemissions.Althoughclimateobjectivesarementionedprominently,itisfundamentallyanindustrialupgradingstrategy…”189

Since2008,therehasbeenasharpincreaseininvestmentsbyKoreanfirmsin“greenindustries”.Accordingtoagovernmentsurvey,investmentbythethirtylargestbusinesseswasthreetimeshigherin2010thanin2008.ThisamountedtoUS$13.7billionoverthethree-yearperiod(1.5%of2009GDP).Themajorinvestmentareaswererenewableenergy,next-generationelectricequipment,andgreencars.Koreaisnowtheworld’ssecond-largestproduceroflithiumrechargeablebatteriesandLEDdevices.EconomistsareoftheviewthatitisstilltooearlytoassesstheimpactoftheGreenGrowthStrategyoneconomicgrowth.190However,forcurrentpurposes,thesalientpointisthatSeoulbenefitsfromastrongnationalpoliticalandbusinessconsensusonthevalueof‘greengrowth’andtacklingclimatechange,renderingiteasiertofosterprivate-public,multi-stakeholderpartnershipstoimplementitsclimatechangeprograms.

6.2“AGlobalClimate-FriendlyCityby2030”

SeoulwasthefirstcityinKoreatoestablishitsclimatemitigationandadaptationstrategy,whichisknownasthe“MasterPlanforLowCarbonGreenGrowth”.ThekeyfeaturesofSeoul’sLowCarbonGreenGrowthMasterPlanare:191

• By2030,thecityaimstoreduceGHGemissionsby40%from1990levels,reduceenergyconsumptionby20%,andincreaserenewableenergyuseby20%;

188Ibid.TheFourMajorRiversRestorationProject,hailedasamajorclimatechangeadaptationprojecttomitigatefloodrisksandtorestorewaterquality,hasbeencontroversialbecauseofitsambiguousenvironmentalbenefits:seeJamesCard,“Korea’sFourRiversProject:EconomicBoostorBoondoggle?”,YaleEnvironment360,21September2009,online:http://e360.yale.edu/feature/koreas_four_rivers_project_economic_boost_or_boondoggle/2188/(accessedon22October2016).189JohnA.Mathews,‘Greengrowthstrategies-Koreaninitiatives’44Futures761,pg.762.190Kang,Jin-gyuandHongseok,pg.13.191TheinformationbelowisreproducedfromtheMasterPlan,acopyofwhichcanbefoundonline:http://planning.cityenergy.org.za/Pdf_files/world_cities/asia/city_of_seoul/Seoul%20Climate%20Change%20Action%20Plan.pdf(accessedon22October2016).

• By2030,allnewbuildingswillberequiredbylawtoattain‘‘green’’buildingcertification;

• By2030,buildingsolderthan20yearswillberequiredtoundergomandatoryenergyauditing;

• By2030,allpublictransportationwillrelyonelectricandother“green”vehicles;

• By2020,theaimistoincreasebikeridershipto10%andpublictransportusageto70%;

• By2020,allstreetlightingandindoorlightinginpublicbuildingswilluseLED;

• Seoulwillreviseitsurbanplanninglawstopromotetheadditionof11squarekilometresgreenspacetothecity;

• By2030,SeoulaimstoinvestUS$2billioninresearchanddevelopment(R&D)ofselectedgreentechnologiesandsupporteventualcommercialization.Thesetechnologiesare:Nextgenerationhydrogenfuelcell,photovoltaiccell,“smartgrid”technologies(theuseofinformationtechnologiesinbuildingstomaximizeenergyefficiency),LEDlighting,electriccars,urbanenvironmentalrestorationsystems,waste-to-energytechnologies,andclimatechangeadaptationtechnologies.Inaddition,themetropolitangovernmentwillestablishpartnershipsandplatformsforbusiness,academiaandotherstakeholderstofacilitateR&D.Thesepartnershipsandplatformsextendfromthecity-leveltotransnationalresearchconsortiumssuchastheGlobalCCSInstitute.192

TheMasterPlanalsoidentifiesfivefocalareasforadaptation:infectiousdiseases(certaindiseaseinfectionrateswillincreasebecauseofthewarmerclimate),risingurbantemperaturesandheatwaves,significantfluctuationsinwatersupplyrangingfromdroughttoflooding,anddisruptionstoecosystems. WithinashortspanoffiveyearssincetheannouncementoftheMasterPlanin2009,animpressivenumberofhigh-profileclimateprojectshavebeensuccessfullyimplemented.Threeprojectsthathavereceivedinternationalattentionbecausetheyshowcasebestpracticesandfeasibilityarebrieflydescribedbelow.Theseexampleshavebeensharedatinternationalconferences,workshops,publicationsanddatabasessuchasConnectedUrbanDevelopment,C40andICLEI–LocalGovernmentsforSustainabilityofwhichSeoulisamember.193

HydrogenFuelCells:Seoulhasbeenincreasingitscapabilitiestogeneratemorepowerfromhydrogenfuelcells.Thecityaimstomeet10%ofitstotalenergyneeds192TheGlobalCCSInstitute’smissionistoacceleratethedevelopment,demonstrationanddeploymentofcarboncaptureandstorage.ItisheadquarteredinMelbourne,Australiawhereitwasestablishedin200withinitialfundingfromtheAustraliangovernment;online:http://www.globalccsinstitute.com(accessedon22October2016).193SeoulisafoundingcityofConnectedUrbanDevelopment(CUD).CUDbringscities,businesspartnersandNGOstogetherinaglobalplatformcommittedtotheuseofinformationandcommunicationstechnologyinurbaninfrastructuretoreducecarbonemissions(online:http://www.connectedurbandevelopment.org).

fromhydrogenfuelcellsby2030–enoughpowertosupplysome400,000households.By2014,Seoulhasopened29fuelcellpowerstations.Itissupportingthedeploymentoffuelcellsincommercialbuildingswithacombinationofsubsidies,technicalsupportandlow-interestloans.Thisprojectqualifiedasafinalistinthegreenenergycategoryofthe2013CityClimateLeadershipAwards,whichconferglobalrecognitiononcitiesthataredemonstratingleadershipinaddressingclimatechange.194

Car-FreeDays:ThisprogramhaseffectivelyreducedSeoul’sannualcarbondioxideemissionsbytenpercent–about2milliontonsofcarbondioxideeveryyear–bykeeping2millioncarsofftheroad.Driverscanselectonedayaweekastheir‘nodrivingday’onawebsite(www.no-driving.seoul.go.kr)andreceiveanelectronictag.Onceregisteredinthisprogram,public-sectorparticipantsqualifyforincentivessuchasafivepercentdiscountontheannualvehicletax,afiftypercentdiscountonchargesleviedbythecity’scongestionchargingscheme,andfreeparking.Privateparticipantsqualifyfordiscountsonfuel,carmaintenancecosts,andfreecarwashes.ThecitymonitorscompliancethroughRadioFrequencyIdentificationthatdetectstheelectronictagsonparticipatingvehicles.195

StarCityRainwaterProject:StarCityisamajorrealestatedevelopmentprojectwithmorethan1,300apartmentunitsinGwangjin-gu,adistrictinSeoul.In2007,arainwaterharvestingsystemwithacatchmentareaof6,200squaremetersofrooftopand45,000squaremetersofterracewasinstalled.Thesystemcollectsupto100millimetersofrainwater,whichisusedforgardeningandpublictoilets.TheStarCityrainwaterharvestingsystemhasproventobeahighlyeffectiveadaptationresponsetotherisksofflooding,andinthelongrun,willreduceenergyconsumptionforwatertreatmentandconveyance.ThesuccessofStarCitymotivatedthecity’smetropolitangovernmenttopassaregulationin2004thatrequiresallnewpublicbuildings,newtownprojectsandlargeprivatebuildingstoinstallrainwaterharvestingsystems.Thecentraldisasterpreventionagencylocatedinthecitygovernmentheadquartersmonitorsthewaterlevelsinallwatertanksandifrequired,issuesorderstobuildingownerstoemptytheirrainwatertanksinanticipationofheavyrainfall.196

194Thisparagraphisderivedfromtheinformationfoundonthe2013CityClimateLeadershipAwardsfinalistswebpage,online:http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com/seoul-hydrogen-fuel-cells/(accessedon22October2016).195ThisparagraphisderivedfromtheinformationfoundontheC40casestudysection,“SeoulCar-FreeDayshaveReducedCO2Emissionsby10%Annually”,online:http://c40.org/case_studies/seoul-car-free-days-have-reduced-co2-emissions-by-10-annually(accessedon22October2016).196ThisparagraphreliesontheinformationfoundinMYHan,JSMunandHJKim,‘AnExampleofClimateChangeAdaptationbyRainwaterManagementattheStarCityRainwaterProject’(3rdIWARainwaterHarvestingManagementInternationalConference,Gyeongnam,GoseongCounty,RepublicofKorea,20-24May2012),online:http://www.iwahq.org/ContentSuite/upload/iwa/Document/session%20a%2001.pdf(accessedon22October2016).

7.Conclusion

Inthischapter,welearntaboutthepolicies,strategiesandprogramsthatfiveglobalcities-London,MexicoCity,NewYorkCity,RotterdamandSeoul–haveputinplaceinresponsetotherisksofclimatechangeaswellastoreducetheirGHGemissions.Asmuchofthechapterpaysattentiontolocalcircumstancesandefforts,itiseasytogetlostinthedetailsandlosesightofhowthischapterfitsintothelargernarrativeofthisthesis.Thus,thisconclusionwillhighlightafewsalientpointsthatarisefromtheprecedingdiscussionandrelatethemtothecentralanalysisoftheemergenceofglobalcitiesasgovernanceactorswhoarebeginningtoexercisinglaw-makingfunctionsinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex. First,thepurposeofthischapterwastoinformthereaderoftheextentandtypeofgovernanceactivitiesglobalcitiesaroundtheworldareengagingin.Fromtheoutset,MayorLivingstoneofLondonrecognizedthatcitiesoughttolearnfromoneanother,inspireandsupporteachother’sefforts,andintheprocessofrepeatedinteractions,cultivatenormsandpracticesconcerningurbanclimatemitigationandadaptation.ThatcitiescouldplayameaningfulroleinaddressingaglobalenvironmentalproblemlikeclimatechangeevenwhenstatesappearedincapableoftakingconcertedactionisanormthatbegantoemergeduringLivingstone’smayoralty.Itsoonbecameinternalizedbycityofficialsandotheractors,andgainedtransnationaltractionespeciallyasaresultofC40’spublicrelationscampaigns,aswewillseeinthenextchapter.Eventually,ithasbecomeanormwithinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Inthisregard,thelocalinfluencedtheglobal,justastheglobalagendashapedthelocalone. Secondly,afactorthathasenabledcitiestogovernclimatechangeistheresourcesmadeavailablebytransnationalactorsincludinginternationalorganizations,privatefoundationsandglobalenvironmentalNGOs.Forexample,MexicoCity’sMetrobusSystemproject,whichhassignificantlyimprovedairqualityandreducedGHGemissionsinthecity,enjoyedthesupportofWorldResourcesInstitute(aleadingglobalenvironmentalNGO)andfundingfromtheWorldBank,ShellFoundationandCaterpillarFoundation.197Theavailabilityoffinancialsupportfromexternalpartieswill,ofcourse,beparticularlyrelevantforlesswealthycities.However,evenforwealthiercitiessuchasRotterdamintheNetherlands,supportfromtransnationalactorshasalsomadeadifference.Forexample,RotterdamapproachedC40toinitiateaprogramforportstoaddressclimatechangebecauseitdidnotwanttogoatitaloneattheriskofitsportlosingitscompetitiveadvantage.Thecity’sinvolvementinRockefellerFoundation’s100ResilientCitiesprogramalsosignificantlyshapedandhashadlastinginfluenceonRotterdam’sstrategicapproachandprogramsonclimatemitigationandadaptation.InthecaseofSeoul,thecityhadthefinancialresourcesbutlackedthepolicyandtechnicalknow-how.Participationinatransnationalnetwork,theC40,helpedittogaincriticalknowledgeandovercomeitslearningcurvemorequicklythanitwouldotherwise

197SeeFootnote85ofthischapter.

have.198Bylendingfinancialandtechnicalassistancetocities,globalcivilsocietyactors,privatefoundationsandinternationalorganizationshelpshapethetransnationalclimategovernanceagendabyspreadingpolicyconceptssuchasresilience.Theyalsoexerciseconsiderableinfluenceonacity’slowcarbondevelopmentchoiceswhentheydecideontheprojectsthatwouldreceiveinternationalfundingorotherwise.Assuch,technicalandfinancialassistanceisnotneutralandfreefromideologicalinfluencesandpolitics. Finally,thischaptercapturessomeoftheinnovativeexperimentationthatiscurrentlyhappeningincitiesacrosstheworld.Theseexperimentscontributetowardstransnationalclimatechangegovernancewhenglobalcitiesseektoscaleuptheiractions,pursuecooperationanddevelopharmonizedstandardsthroughcross-bordernetworks.Inthenextchapter,weturnourattentiontoonesuchnetworkthathasbecomehighlyinfluentialinthetransnationalclimatechangegovernancelandscapewithinashortspanoftime–theC40.

198InterviewNumber1,onfilewithauthor.

Chapter5:TransnationalUrbanClimateGovernanceviaNetworks–thecaseofC40

1. Introduction

Intheirattemptstogovernclimatechange,citieshavefoundithelpfulto

establishnetworksthroughwhichtheycanfacilitatepolicylearninganddevelopnewgovernanceapproaches.1Theinformationandcommunicationsrevolutionhasmadesuchnetworkingeasier,moreaffordableandquicker.Thesenetworksconnectcityofficialsacrosstheworld-theyarethereforecross-borderandtransnationalinnature.2Transnationalmunicipalnetworksalsoserveasconduitsthroughwhichcitiescancreateandimplementurban-specificnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatsupportandcomplementtheinternationallegalregimeonclimatechange.Inaddition,thesenetworkshaveformedlinkagesandpartnershipswithnationalauthorities,internationalorganizations,multinationalcorporationsandcivilsociety.Theythereforealsoperformthefunctionoflinkingcitiestootheractorsinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Bydisseminatingknowledgeabouturbanclimatechangepracticestoothergovernanceactorsthroughthesenetworks,citieshavethepotentialtoshapethenormsandpracticesofotheractors.3

Thisthesis,however,isnotconcernedwithcitiesbroadlyspeakingbutwithglobalcitiesthatcommandsignificanteconomicandpoliticalresourcesandwhichareleadingthecurrentwaveofurbanclimateaction.Assuch,thischapterfocusesonC40,whichhasbecomewidelyrecognizedastheleadingnetworkofglobalcitiesaddressingclimatechangewithinadecadeofitsfoundingin2005.4C40positions1Bouteligierpointsoutthatsuchnetworksallowfortheconceptualizationofcities,traditionallylinkedtolocalpolicies,asactorsinglobalgovernance;SofieBouteligier,‘Inequalityinnewglobalgovernancearrangements:theNorth-Southdivideintransnationalmunicipalnetworks’(2013)26Innovation:TheEuropeanJournalofSocialScienceResearch251,pg.252.2Thatcitiesareformingnetworkstoaddressclimatechangeisconsistentwiththetrend(thatemergedinthe1990s)ofcitiesactivelyformingnetworkstoaddresscommonenvironmentalproblemssuchasairpollutionandbiodiversityloss.Thistrendismostlyascribedtochapter28ofAgenda21,whichrecognizestheroleoflocalauthoritiesinthepromotionofsustainabledevelopmentandadvocatesexchangeandcooperationbetweenthem;Agenda21:ProgrammeofActionforSustainableDevelopment,U.N.GAOR,46thSess.,AgendaItem21,UNDocA/Conf.151/26(1992),online:https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf(accessedon10July2016).3Tolynotesthatthehorizontalandverticalrelationshipsfosteredbyatransnationalcitynetwork“maypermitcitiesasignificantroleinthediffusionofbothtechniquesandnorms,importantfunctionsofgovernanceandpolitics”;NoahJ.Toly,‘TransnationalMunicipalNetworksinClimatePolitics:FromGlobalGovernancetoGlobalPolitics’(2008)5Globalizations341,pg.344.4C40alsoenjoyssignificantcoveragebyhighlyrespectedglobalmediaoutlets;see,forexample,‘Greeningtheconcretejungle’TheEconomist(3Septermber2011),online:http://www.economist.com/node/21528272;ReneVollgraaffandJaniceKew,‘CitiesAlmostDoubleClimateActionsOver2Years,C40Says’Bloomberg(5February2014),online:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-05/cities-almost-double-climate-actions-over-two-years-c40-says.html;AlisonKemperandRogerMartin,‘Citiesarebusinesses'bestalliesinthebattle

itselfasagatheringofthetopechelonoftheworld’smajorcities,a“spaceofengagement”forcitiesgatheredtoexchangeexpertiseandknowledgeonclimatechangeaswellasacatalystrepresenting(aswellascreatingmore)connectionsamongstmajorcities.5Inseekingtopresentcitiesassignificantactorsintheglobalresponsetoclimatechange,C40hasemphasizedtheglobalnatureofitscitiesbecauseglobalcitiesarewidelyunderstoodtobeofpivotalimportanceintheglobaleconomyandenjoyahigherstatuscomparedtoothercities.6C40seekstosupporttheUNFCCCregimebutalsounderpinsitslegitimacyontheclaimthatcitiesareforgingaheadwithpracticalandinnovativeclimatemitigationandadaptationmeasureswhileinternationalclimatenegotiationshaveproceededataglacialpace(atleastuntiltheCOPinParisinDecember2015).7OneofC40’scentralmessagesisthat“citiesactwhilestatesonlytalk”.AsformerchairmanofC40andcurrentUNSpecialEnvoyonCitiesandClimateChange,MichaelBloomberg,hasputit,“[c]itiesarewhereyoudeliverservices.Federalgovernmentsandstategovernmentssitaroundtalkingandpassinglawsorrecommendationsthatdon’thaveanyteeth”.8

C40seekstoplaytheroleofaknowledgebrokerinthetransnationalclimatechangegovernancearena.C40’saspirationisthat,throughitsroleasaninformation-sharingplatform,individualglobalcitieswillbeempoweredwithtechnicalknowledge,sharedresources,andtechnologythatthecitieswouldnotbeabletoobtainontheirown.Throughsuchempowerment,globalcitieswillbebetterplacedtoengageinpolicyexperimentationandimplementtransformativeclimatemitigationandadaptationprojects.AnotherkeyaspectofC40’sgovernancemodeistofacilitatecorporationbetweenitsmembercitiesandothertransnationalactors.Thisincludesestablishingandcoordinatingpublic-privatepartnershipswithmultinationalcorporationslikeSiemens,NGOssuchastheWorldResourceInstitute,

againstclimatechange’TheGuardian(14October2014),online:http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/oct/14/cities-businesses-best-allies-battle-against-climate-change(allthreearticlesaccessedon23December2014).Further,C40hasbeenputforwardaspartofa“CoalitionoftheWorkingbetweencountries,companiesandcities”toinjectenergyintotherepeatedlystalledmultilateraleffortsandpromptpracticalactioninthehighlyinfluentialandauthoritativereportoftheOxfordMartinCommissionforFutureGenerations,“NowfortheLongTerm”(OxfordMartinSchool,October2013),online:http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf(accessedon30November2016).5Theterm“spaceofengagement”isfromKevinR.Cox,‘Spacesofdependence,spacesofengagementandthepoliticsofscale,or:lookingforlocalpolitics’(1998)17PoliticalGeography1.6MicheleAcuto,‘Thenewclimateleaders?’(2013)39ReviewofInternationalStudies835,pg.841.Leehassoughttoquantitativelytestthehypothesisthatglobalcitiesaremorelikelytobecomemembersoftransnationalclimatechangenetworksbecause,inadditiontotheireconomicinterestsregardingclimatechange,“theyprovideunderlyingconditionsfacilitatinginformationsharinganddiffusion”ashubsofinternationaleconomicandpolicyinteractions;TaedongLee,‘GlobalCitiesandTransnationalClimateChangeNetworks’(2013)13GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics108,pg.109.7SofieBouteligier,Cities,NetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:SpacesofInnovation,PlacesofLeadership(Routledge2013),pg.85.8QuotedinAlexeiBarrionuevo,‘WorldBanktoHelpCitiesControlClimateChange’TheNewYorkTimes(1June2011).

andinternationalfinancialinstitutionsliketheWorldBank.9Inearly2016,C40formedapartnershipwiththeInternationalCleantechNetwork–atransnationalnetworkofcleantechnologyclusterorganizations–tocreatetheCitySolutionsPlatform.ThisPlatformservesasaforumofengagementforcleantechnologydevelopers,entrepreneursandcityauthoritiesseekingcleantechnologysolutionsforclimatemitigationandadaptation.10InadditiontoincreasingC40’scapacitytoassistitsmemberstomakeGHGreductions,thesepublic-privatepartnerships(PPPs)enhancethestatusofC40asanetworkthatisactivelyengagedwithmajorpoliticalandbusinessactorsontheinternationalstage.

Fromadifferentperspective,throughthesePPPs,internationalorganizationsareabletoenlistC40asanintermediarytoaddresscitiesinpursuitofthegoalofaddressingclimatechange.TheC40-WorldBankpartnershipisaninterestingexampleof“orchestration”,wherebytheWorldBankseekstoinitiate,steerandstrengthengovernancewithinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexby,amongstotherthings,facilitatingandendorsingC40’sgovernanceefforts.InChapter3,therewasdiscussionabouttheroleoftheWorldBankincreatingandsustaininganideologicalplatformthatpromotesthelinkagesbetweencities,globalizationanddevelopment.TheWorldBank’svisionofsustainableurbandevelopmentisthatof“competitive,wellgoverned,andbankable”cities.Inpursuitofthisvision,theWorldBankhasintroducedarangeofinitiativestofacilitatecitygovernments’accesstointernationalfinancialmarkets.Therangeofinitiativestoimprovethecreditworthinessofcitiessothattheyareabletoindependentlyraisemoneytoprovideservicesandinvestininfrastructurehasrecentlybeenextendedtoincludetheclimatechangeagenda.Aswillbediscussedbelow,theC40-WorldBankpartnershipinvolvesgivingC40membercitiespreferentialaccesstotheLowCarbon,LivableCitiesInitiative,whichprovidestrainingprogramsandtechnicalassistancetoimprovecities’financialtransparencyandplanningcapabilitiessothattheyarebetterabletoobtainfinancingfrompublicsectorinvestorsandtheprivatesector.

Finally,intherun-uptotheUNFCCCCOPinParis,C40wasactivelyinvolvedinvariouspartnershipstopromotethedevelopmentofstandardizedGHGaccountingmethodologiesforcities.ThiswillbediscussedbrieflyinthischaptertolaythegroundworkforsubsequentanalysisinChapter6,whicharguesthatglobalcities,throughanetworklikeC40,areplayingajurisgenerativefunctionatthetransnationallevel.Part2ofthischapterprovidesabriefliteraturereviewontransnationalnetworksofcitiesintheareaofclimatechange.Part3delvesintoadetaileddiscussionoftheC40,includingitspartnershipwiththeWorldBankanditsattemptstodevelopharmonizedstandardsforurbanGHGaccounting.Part4draws

9C40,“OurPartnersandFunders”,online:http://www.c40.org/partners(accessedon23October2016).10InterviewNo.8;InternationalCleantechNetwork,“CollaborationbetweenC40andICN:WhenCitiesMeetCleanTechnologies”(Copenhagen,5December2015),online:http://internationalcleantechnetwork.com/project/collaboration-between-c40-and-icn-when-cities-meet-clean-technologies/(accessedon3July2016).

concludingremarksabouttheroleofC40asanetworkthroughwhichglobalcitiesexercisegovernancefunctions.

2. ABriefIntroductiontoTransnationalMunicipalNetworksintheAreaofClimateChange

AccordingtoKernandBulkeley,transnationalmunicipalnetworkshave

threedefiningcharacteristics.First,membercitiesarefreetojoinorleavethenetwork.11Secondly,suchnetworksareoftencharacterizedasaformofself-governanceastheyappeartobenon-hierarchicalandhorizontalformsofgovernance.12Thirdly,decisionstakenwithinthesenetworksareusuallydirectlyimplementedbymembercities.13

Citiesjointransnationalnetworksbecausetheyperceivecertainadvantagessuchaslearningfromothercities,expandingtheirlinkstointernationalinstitutions,andaccesstofunding.14Inlargenetworks,itisnotuncommonfortheretobea‘coregroup’ofactivemembercitieswhilethemajorityofthemembercitiesarerelativelypassive.Inthelattercase,membershipmaybesymbolic–forexample,acitymayhavejoinedthenetworkonlybecauseneighbouringcitiesdidso.15Passivemembersalsooftenlackthefinancialandhumanresourcesrequiredtoparticipateinnetworkactivitiessuchasconferences,participatinginfundingbidsandimplementationofworkprogrammesandstandardsdevelopedbythenetwork.16Incontrast,somenetworkmembersareactivelocallyandtransnationally.17Theytakeproactivestepstodevelopthenetworkby,forexample,organizingandhostingworkshopsandfrequentlyuploadingbestpracticecasestudiesonthenetwork’sinternetdatabase.KernandBulkeley’sfindingsontransnationalcitynetworksinEuropesuggestthat“networksarenetworksofpioneersforpioneers”(pioneersreferringtoactivemembercities),andwithinanetwork,“…itiseasytodistinguishbetweenahardcoreofpioneersandaperipheryconsistingofrelativelypassivecitieswhichhavescarcelychangedtheirbehaviorsincejoiningthenetwork.”1811KristineKernandHarrietBulkeley,‘Cities,Europeanizationandmulti-levelgovernance:Governingclimatechangethroughtransnationalmunicipalnetworks’(2009)47JournalofCommonMarketStudies309,pg.309.12Ibid.13Ibid.14Ibid.;InterviewNos.2and3.15InKrause’sempiricalstudyoftwocitynetworksintheUS,ICLEIandtheUSConferenceofMayors’ClimateProtectionAgreement(MCPA),shefindsthatICLEIappearstoplayamoreeffectiveroleinpromotingGHGreductionscomparedtoMCPA.AmongstthereasonsisthatICLEIrequirescitiestoachievecertainmilestonesortargetsandtopayanannualmembershipfee,unlikeMCPA,whichoffersfreemembershipandthereisnomonitoringofcities’activities.Shesuggeststhatweaklycommittedcitiesthataremotivatedbypublic“creditclaiming”finditeasytojoinnetworkswithminimalpoliticalandfinancialcostssuchasMCPA.Insuchcases,membershipinanetworkdoesnoteffectivelysteerthecitytowardsclimateprotection;RachelM.Krause,‘Anassessmentoftheimpactthatparticipationinlocalclimatenetworkshasoncities'implementationofclimate,energy,andtransportationpolicies’(2012)29ReviewofPolicyResearch585,pgs.587,601.16KernandBulkeley,pg.327.17Ibid.,pg.326.18Ibid.pg.329.

WhilescholarslikeSassenhypothesizethatnetworksthatincludecitiesfromtheGlobalNorthandcitiesfromtheGlobalSouthgobeyondthetraditionalNorth-Southdivide,Bouteligier’sempiricalresearchonC40andMetropolis(aglobalnetworkthatcoversenvironmental,social,economicandculturalissues)showotherwise.19Briefly,thegreaterinvolvementofsomemembers(whichareusuallycitiesfromtheGlobalNorththathavethehumanandfinancialresourcestosupportactiveinvolvement)thanothersconcentratespower,“whichresultsinpowerrelationsandthepersistenceof(structural)inequalities.Theseinequalitiesrunalongdividinglinesweknowfromthepast…”20Bouteligierfindsthatthosecitiesthatareimportanttothenetworkinquestionshapetheagenda,determinechoicesregardingbestpracticesandinfluencehowproblemsandsolutionsareframed.Sheconcludesthat,aslongastransnationalmunicipalnetworksperpetuateinequalities,theywillfacedifficultiesindealingwithcontemporaryurbanizationproblemsandthereforewillultimatelyfailtomeettheirgoals.21

Finally,intheearlystageofurbanclimategovernanceinthe1990s,networkslikeICLEIfocusedonsupportingcitiesinimplementinglocalclimatepolicies.ICLEI’sCitiesforClimateProtectionProgram(CCP),establishedin1993,iswidelyrecognizedtobethefirstglobalprogramsupportingcitiesinpursuingclimateaction.22CCP’sfoundingdocumentstatesthatoneofCCP’skeyobjectiveswastoenlistonehundredmunicipalitiesworldwidethatemitonebilliontonnesofglobalCO2(fivetotenpercentoftheglobaltotal)by1995.23TojoinCCP,acityhadtopassa“localdeclaration”committingitselftoreducingGHGemissionsbymeetingfivemilestones:(1)conductingabaselineenergyandemissionsinventory;(2)adoptinganemissionsreductiontarget;(3)developingalocalactionplan;(4)implementingpoliciesandmeasures;and(5)monitoringandverifyingoutcomes.24BetsillandBulkeleyarguethat“[b]oththemilestoneframeworkandtheuseofquantificationreflecttheCCPprogram’semphasisontheneedtoevaluateperformanceandimprovelocalaccountability.”25Further,“…throughadheringtotheCCPprogramframeworkandparticipatinginitsactivities,memberssharebothnormativegoals,thatclimatechangeisaproblemandcanbeaddressedlocally,andacommitmentto

19Ibid.20Bouteligier,‘Inequalityinnewglobalgovernancearrangements:theNorth-Southdivideintransnationalmunicipalnetworks’,pg.263.21Ibid,pg.264.22ICLEI,“ConnectingLeaders:Connect.Innovate.Accelerate.Solve.”,online:http://incheon2010.iclei.org/fileadmin/templates/incheon2010/Download/Media_and_Press_Downloads/Connecting_Leaders-www.pdf(accessedon3December2016).23ICLEI,“CitiesforClimateProtection:AnInternationalCampaigntoReduceUrbanEmissionsofGreenhouseGases”,15February1993,pg.2,online:http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ICLEI_WS/Documents/advocacy/Bonn_2014/ADP2.5-Support_Files/ICLEI_TheBirthofCCP_1993.pdf(accessedon3December2016).24ICLEI,MunicipalLeader’sDeclarationonClimateChangeandtheUrbanEnvironment,Article2(Thisdeclarationisfoundasanappendixto“CitiesforClimateProtection:AnInternationalCampaigntoReduceUrbanEmissionsofGreenhouseGases”,ibid).25MicheleM.BetsillandHarrietBulkeley,‘TransnationalNetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:TheCitiesforClimateProtectionProgram’48InternationalStudiesQuarterley471,pg.478.

aparticularpolicyapproachbasedonthemeasurementandmonitoringofgreenhousegasemissions.”26Othernetworks,includingC40,havesubsequentlyembracedthisapproach.GordonpointsoutthatyoungernetworkslikeC40seektosurpassthelimitationsoftheoldernetworksby“[shifting]theemphasistowardscoordinatingandscalingcityclimatepolicywiththeaimofachievingaggregateeffect,encouragingthediffusionofideasandpractices,andofferinganalternative(albeitintersecting)architectureofglobalclimategovernance.”27 ThissummaryofsomeofthekeyfindingsabouthowtransnationalcitynetworksperforminrealityprovidesanintroductoryplatformforthediscussionaboutC40tofollow.Likeothertransnationalcitynetworks,C40isconcernedaboutlaggardcitiesthatdonotcontributeproactivelytoachievingthenetwork’smission.Asavoluntarytoolofgovernance,transnationalcitynetworksdependheavilyonpersuasion,mutualbenefitandreciprocitytoencouragethespreadofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsamongstmembercities.Aswillbeseeninthediscussionbelow,C40seekstoreducedisparitiesinthecommitmentandperformanceofitsmembercitiesbybeingveryselectiveinitsmembershipandprovidingadditionalsupporttolessactivecities.28Transparencymechanismsarealsoviewedasameanstoencouragepassivecitiesintoactionasthesereportingplatformsprovidevariousstakeholders,includingcitizensandcivilsocietygroups,themeanstomonitorandholdtheircitiesaccountable.29Secondly,oneofthekeyissuesraisedaboveistheNorth-Southdivide.Itisnotsurprisingthatthesocio-economicconditionsinGlobalSouthcitiesrestricttheircapabilitiestoparticipateasactivelyastheirGlobalNorthcounterpartsinatransnationalcitynetwork.ThesalientresponseisnottolamentthepotentialmarginalizationoftheGlobalSouthcities,buttoidentifywaystocreateinclusionandequitableparticipation.First,theprincipleofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities(CBDRRC)isafoundationalpillaroftheinternationalclimatechangeregimeandisregardedaskeytoensuringequitableandfairtreatment.BytakingtheCBCRRCprincipleintoaccountintheir norm-setting actions, C40recognizestheneedformoredevelopedandwealthiermembercitiestoassisttheeffortsofpooreranddevelopingcities.30CitieswithmoreresourcesareexpectedtotaketheleadinorganizingandhostingC40eventsandsomecitiesgofurtherbysubsidizingthetravelandaccommodationarrangementsofparticipantsfromlesswealthycities.31Secondly,mayorsserveonarotatingbasisonC40’sSteeringCommitteetoprovideoverallstrategicdirection.32ThemayorsonthecommitteerepresentvariousgeographicalregionstoensurefairrepresentationofallC40cities.Finally,ithasbeennotedthat,inorderfornetworkslikeC40tosucceed,theinteractionsamongstmembercitiesmustbepursuedinaspiritofmutualrespect,appreciationofthe26Ibid.27David.J.Gordon,‘Betweenlocalinnovationandglobalimpact:cities,networks,andthegovernanceofclimatechange’(2013)19CanadianForeignPolicyJournal288,pg.293.28SeediscussioninSection3.3below.29Ibid.30SeediscussioninSection4.2ofChapter6.31InterviewNo.1.32C40,online:http://www.c40.org/about(accessedon1November2016).

differencesamongstglobalcities,andasharedcommongoaltoaddressclimatechange.33ItcanbearguedthatarticulatingthesevaluesasguidingprincipleswillgosomewaytowardscreatingafirmernormativebasisforovercomingsomeoftheNorth-Southinequalities.

3. C40

ThispartofthechapterexplorestheoriginsofC40,followedbyabriefdescriptionofitsmembershipandgovernancestructure.ThediscussionthenturnsitsfocusontoC40’sclimateprogramsandinitiativestoshedlightonthewaysinwhichC40seekstofulfillitsroleoffacilitatingcollaborationamongstglobalcitiesandhowthesecities,inturn,useC40toexerciseagencyandinfluenceinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.ThepartnershipbetweentheC40andtheWorldBank,andC40’sattemptsatdevelopingaGHGaccountingstandardwillalsobeexaminedhere.

3.1TheOriginsofC40

On3-5October2005,attheinitiativeofthen-MayorofLondon,KenLivingstone,theGreaterLondonAuthorityconvenedatwo-dayWorldCitiesLeadershipandClimateSummit.34ThismeetingofeighteenmajorcitieswascarefullytimedtocoincidewiththeGroupofEight(G8)SummitinGleaneagles,Scotland,theannualgatheringoftheleadersoftheworld’smajorpowerstoaddressmajoreconomicandpoliticalissues.35“Livingstone’soriginalideawasmuchinparallelwiththatyear’sG8…astheGroupgatheredthelargesteconomies,hegatheredthelargestcities,where‘large’wasnotjustameasureofsizebutofimportance.”36Thus,Livingstone’svisionwasoneof“theeliteofcorecities”that,becauseofsheerpopulationandglobalprominence,wouldleadtheurbanresponsetoclimatechange.37OriginallyknownastheC20,thecitiesthattookpartinthenetwork’sinauguralsummitincludedBarcelona,Beijing,Berlin,Brussels,Chicago,London,Madrid,MexicoCity,NewDelhi,NewYork,Paris,Philadelphia,Rome,SanFrancisco,SaoPaulo,Shanghai,Stockholm,Toronto,andZurich.38

TheC20ClimateChangeSummitCommuniquethatwasissuedatthecloseoftheWorldCitiesLeadershipandClimateSummitgivessomeinsightintohowthe33InterviewNo.1.34TheSummitwasconvenedinpartnershipwithICLEIandtheClimateGroup,aninternationalnon-profitgroupfoundedin2004thatworkswithstates,citiesandbusinessestodevelopclimatefinancemechanismsandlow-carbonbusinessmodels;online:http://www.theclimategroup.org(accessedon27November2016).35ForanalysisoftheroleoftheG8ininternationalrelations,seeNewDirectionsinGlobalPoliticalGovernance:TheG8andInternationalOrderintheTwenty-FirstCentury(JohnKirtonandJunichiTakaseeds,Ashgate2002).36GreaterLondonAuthoritypoliticalofficer,quotedinAcuto,pg.854.37Acuto,pg.854.38GreaterLondonAuthority,‘Mayorbringstogethermajorcitiestotakeleadonclimatechange’,online:https://www.london.gov.uk/media/mayor-press-releases/2005/10/mayor-brings-together-major-cities-to-take-lead-on-climate-change(accessedon27November2016).

foundersenvisionedtheroleofthenetworkintheglobalresponsetoclimatechangeaswellasitsgoalsintheshortandlongterm.First,thedeclarationrefersto“theC20LargeWorldCities.”39“TheC20citiesrecognize[their]roleaslargecitygovernments”andthatC20willworkwithICLEIthatrepresents“citiesofallsizes.”40IntheCommunique,thesizeofthepopulationsthattheC20citiesrepresentisthemainbasisfordifferentiatingC20citiesfromothercitiesandsub-nationalgovernmentsandistheprecursortosubsequentattemptstohighlighttheglobalstandingofC40citiesinthenetwork’sbrandingstrategy.

Secondly,intheCommunique,C20portrayscitiesasindispensiblepartnersintheglobalefforttotackleclimatechangebecausecitiesarebothasignificantcauseandasolutiontotheproblemofclimatechange.TheCommuniquestatesthatcitiesareasignificantsourceofGHGs“fromcars,trucks,industries,manufacturing,buildingsandwaste”andare“growinginsignificanceasmoreoftheworld’spopulationresidethere.”41Atthesametime,“[l]argecitieshavesizeableeconomiesthatareidealmarketstoincubate,develop,andcommercialisegreenhousegasreducingandadaptationtechnologies,includingthosetoimproveenergyefficiency,wastemanagement,waterconservation,andrenewableenergy.”42Thus,largecitiesareconceivedasbeinguniquelyplacedintheglobaleconomytodevelopinnovativeclimatesolutionsthatstraddlethepublic-privatedivideandserveassociallaboratoriesforresearchanddevelopment.Onarelatednote,C40endorsestheIPCC’sfindingsthatlargercitiesconsumetwo-thirdsoftheworld’senergyandareresponsibleformorethanthree-quartersofglobalGHGemissions.43Withthisendorsement,C40portraysitsmembersasbeingresponsibleglobalstakeholdersthataimtodosomethingtoreducetheircontributiontoclimatechangeandthatC40itselfplaysacriticalrolebyfacilitatingwhatcurrentchairmanofC40,EduardoPaes,calls“citydiplomacy.”44“Byengagingincitydiplomacy,mayorsandcityofficialsexchangeinformationandexperience.Theyfacilitatethespreadofnewtechnologiesandaccesstoinnovativepublicpolicies.Creativeideasandprojectsinonecitycanbereplicatedinanother,andthatexchangeofknowledgeistakingplace,farfromlengthyandpoliticallychargedtreaties”(emphasisadded).45

39C20ClimateChangeSummitCommunique(5October2005).40Ibid.41Ibid.42Ibid.43C40,‘EndingClimateChangeBeginsintheCity’,online:http://www.c40.org/ending-climate-change-begins-in-the-city;IPCC,‘ADPTechnicalExpertMeeting:UrbanEnvironment,StatementbyRenateChrist,SecretaryoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange’(Bonn,10June2014),online:http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/unfccc/sbsta40/140610_urban_environment_Christ.pdf(bothresourcesaccessedon29November2016).44OnC40’sendorsementofthelatestIPCCreport,“ClimateChange2014:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability”whichshowedthatmanyclimatechangerisksareconcentratedinurbanareas,seeC40,“MayorPaes,“IPCCreporthighlightsneedfor‘citydiplomacy’tospurclimateaction”,online:http://c40.org/blog_posts/mayor-paes-ipcc-report-highlights-need-for-city-diplomacy(accessedon30November2016).45EduardoPaes,‘C40CityDiplomacyAddressesClimateChange’,TheHuffingtonPost(10December2013),online:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eduardo-paes/c40-city-diplomacy-addresses-climate-change_b_4419898.html(accessedon30November2016).

TheCommuniquesetsout6specificactions:46 Action#1:Committoworktogethertosetambitiouscollectiveandindividual,targetsforreducinggreenhousegasemissions;Action#2:Committoensurethatwehavehighlyeffectiveagenciesorprogramsdedicatedtoacceleratinginvestmentsinmunicipalandcommunitygreenhousegasemissionsreductionsandadaptation;Action#3:Committodevelop,exchange,andimplementbestpracticesandstrategiesonemissionsreductionsandclimateadaptation;Action#4:Committodevelopandsharecommunicationsstrategiesthatsensitizecitizensandstakeholderstoclimatechangeissues;Action#5:Committocreatesustainablemunicipalprocurementalliancesandprocurementpoliciesthatacceleratetheuptakeofclimatefriendlytechnologiesandmeasurablyinfluencethemarketplace,includingproductscontaininggreenhousegasessuchascertainCFCsnotcoveredbytheUNFCCC;Action#6:Meetagainwithin18monthsinNewYorkCitytomeasureourprogressandreportbacktotheUN.The2007NewYorkCitySummitcommuniqué,the2009SeoulSummitdeclaration,the2011communiqué,reflectedthesameaims:tobeacatalystforclimateactionincitiesaroundtheworld,todemonstratethatcitiesaretakingupresponsibilityforclimatechangeandareuniquelyplacedtocraftinnovationsolutions,andtourgenationalgovernmentstoempowercitiestoundertakeclimateactions.473.2RelationshipwiththeClintonClimateInitiative

AfterC20realizedthatitsambitionsexceededitsinstitutionalcapacity,thenetworktookstepstofindapartnerthatitcouldworkwithtoaugmentits

46C40,“MayorPaes,“IPCCreporthighlightsneedfor‘citydiplomacy’tospurclimateaction”,online:http://c40.org/blog_posts/mayor-paes-ipcc-report-highlights-need-for-city-diplomacy(accessedon30November2016).47The2011communiquéalsoservedasasubmissiontotheRio+20UNConferenceonSustainableDevelopmentasC40wantedtohighlightthelinkbetweencities’climateactionsandwidersustainabilitygoals(e.g.globalenvironmentalprotectionandpovertyeradication);C40,‘C40CitiesClimateLeadershipGroup(C40)CommuniquéandResolutionfortheRio+20UNConferenceonSustainableDevelopment’(3June2011),online:http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/blog_posts/c40-cities-climate-leadership-group-c40-communiqué-and-resolution-for-the-rio20-un-conference-on-sustainable-development(accessedon30November2016).

resources.On1August2006,C20signedaMOUwiththeClintonFoundation.UndertheMOU,thefoundation’sClintonClimateInitiative(CCI)wouldserveasC20’sdeliverypartnerand“utilizetheglobalinfluenceofPresidentClintonandtheskillsthatithasdevelopedinglobalmobilizationtoconfrontcrisessuchasAIDStohelpinitiateprogramsthatdirectlyresultinsubstantialreductionsin[GHGs].”48TheMOUstatesthatCCI’seffortswouldinclude,first,organizingaconsortiumthataggregatesthepurchasingpowerofcitiestobuyenergysavingproductsandtechnologiesatlowerprices.49ThisideaissimilartotheClintonFoundation’sAIDSInitiativetotalqualitymanagementapproachthathassubstantiallyloweredAIDSdrugpricesformembersofitspurchasingconsortium.50Secondly,CCIwillmobilizeexpertsfromtheprivatesectortoprovidetechnicalassistancetocities.51Thirdly,CCIwouldcreateanddeploycommonmeasurementtoolsandinternet-basedcommunicationsystemstoassistcitiesincreatingemissionsbaselines,measuringtheeffectivenessofmitigationprogramsandsharingbestpractices.52CCIalsocommittedtoraisefundstosupporttheC20agenda,whichmadecitieslikeMelbourneperceiveparticipationinC20tobemorebeneficialandmeaningfulcomparedtoothertransnationalcitynetworksthatlackthefinancialresourcestoundertakeambitiousaction.53 TheEnergyEfficiencyBuildingRetrofitProgram(EEBRP)exemplifiesthemodeofcooperationbetweenC20andCCI.Asmentionedearlier,underthetermsoftheMOU,CCIcommittedtoorganizingaglobalprocurementprocessthatwouldenableC20citiestopurchaseenergy-savingtechnologiesatpreferentialprices.CCI

48MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweentheLargeCitiesClimateLeadershipGroupandtheWilliamJClintonFoundation,pg.2;Alsosee,“PressRelease:PresidentClintonLaunchesClintonClimateInitiative”,1August2006,online:https://www.clintonfoundation.org/main/news-and-media/press-releases-and-statements/press-release-president-clinton-launches-clinton-climate-initiative.html(accessedon27November2016).49MOU,ibid.50JeremyYoude,GlobalHealthGovernance(PolityPress,2012),pg85;MarilynChase,“ClintonFoundation,UnitaidStrikeDealsonPriceCutsforAIDSDrugs”,29April2008,online:http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120943380712251563(accessedon27December2016).51MOU,pg.1.52Ibid.Thesoftwaretool,developedtogetherwithMicrosoftandICLEI,enablescitiestoimplementacommonmeasurementsystemforGHGs,accessdatafromaroundtheworldandconductwebinarswithothercities.KnownasHEAT,whichstandsforHarmonizedEmissionsAnalysisTool,thissoftwarewascreatedbyICLEIandthenfurtherdevelopedasanonlinetoolbyMicrosoftandCCI;seeICLEI,‘ICLEIHEATsoftwaregoesinternational’(23May2007),online:http://www.iclei.org/details/article/iclei-heat-software-goes-international.html;andMicrosoftNewsCenter,‘ClintonFoundation,MicrosofttoDevelopOnlineToolsEnablingtheWorld’sLargest40CitiestoMonitorCarbonEmissions’(17May2007),online:http://news.microsoft.com/2007/05/17/clinton-foundation-microsoft-to-develop-online-tools-enabling-the-worlds-largest-40-cities-to-monitor-carbon-emissions/(bothresourcesaccessedon29December2016).53CityofMelbourneCouncilMeeting,AgendaItem5.3,C20:LargeCitiesClimateLeadershipGroup,4July2006,pg.2,online:https://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/AboutCouncil/Meetings/Lists/CouncilMeetingAgendaItems/Attachments/2006/EC_53_20060704.pdf(accessedon27December2016).

designedtheEEBRPtooperateasa“matchmakingconsortium”.54Onthedemandside,EEBRPgivescitiesassistancetoprocureservicesforretrofittingtheirbuildingsforenergy-savingandefficiencypurposes.55Onthesupplyside,companiesthatsellenergyefficiencyservicesandtechnologiesareinvitedtosupplythepotentiallylargemarketofcitiesontheconditionsthattheyfollowglobalbestpracticesandarewillingtoprovidetheirservicesatreducedprices.56Thecitiesareundernoobligationtobuyfromthesecompanies,andfinalpurchasingdecisionsaremadeindependentlyofCCI.57Asforthecorporations,thetermsoftheirparticipationintheEEBRPdifferineachcase.58Ultimately,theguidingprincipleistocreatethemarketconditionsthatareconducivetoenablingcitiesandcorporationstoworktogethertodelivertransformative,large-scaleretrofittingprojectsthathavethepotentialtosignificantlyreduceurbanGHGemissions.TheEEBRPhasbeenasuccess.Withinafewyears,theconsortiummanagedtoinitiatemorethantwohundredandfiftyprojectstoretrofitbuildingsforenergyefficiencyintwentycities.59

TheC20soonexpandedtoincludethirteenmorecities,andwasrenamedC40.However,assetoutintheMOUwiththeClintonFoundation,thegroupintendedtocontinueasa“smallassociationoflargeandleadingcities.”603.3Membership

TobecomeamemberofC40,acityhastomeetcertainconditions.Therearethreetypesofmembershipcategories:61Megacities(formerlyParticipatingCity):

Population:Citypopulationof3millionormore,and/ormetropolitanareapopulationof10millionormore,eithercurrentlyorprojectedfor2025.

GDP:Oneofthetop25globalcitiesrankedbycurrentGDPoutput,atpurchasingpowerparity,eithercurrentlyorprojectedfor2025.

54MikaelRoman,‘Governingfromthemiddle:theC40CitiesLeadershipGroup’(2010)10(1)CorporateGovernance:TheInternationalJournalofBusinessinSociety73,pg.76.55Ibid.56Ibid.57Ibid.58Ibid.59Roman,pg.81.60MOU,pg.1.61MikeMarinello,C40AnnouncesNewGuidelinesforMembershipCategories(C402012),online:http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/press_releases/images/25_C40_20Guidelines_20FINAL_2011.14.12.original.pdf?1388095701(accessedon27December2016).

InnovatorCities(formerlyAffiliateCity):

CitiesthatdonotqualifyasMegacitiesbuthaveshownclearleadershipinenvironmentalandclimatechangework.

AnInnovatorCitymustbeinternationallyrecognizedforbarrier-breakingclimatework,aleaderinthefieldofenvironmentalsustainability,andaregionallyrecognized“anchorcity”fortherelevantmetropolitanarea.

ObserverCities:

Ashort-termcategoryfornewcitiesapplyingtojointheC40forthefirsttime;allcitiesapplyingforMegacityorInnovatormembershipwillinitiallybeadmittedasObserversuntiltheymeetC40’sfirstyearparticipationrequirements.

Alonger-termcategoryforcitiesthatmeetMegacityorInnovatorCityguidelinesandparticipationrequirementsbut,forlocalregulatoryorproceduralreasons,areunabletoapproveparticipationasaMegacityorInnovatorCityexpeditiously.

OnlymegacitiesareeligibleforC40governanceandleadershippositions,forexample,servingastheC40chair.C40MegacitiesincludeBangkok,Cairo,Chicago,Paris,LondonandNewYork.62InnovatorCitiesincludeOslo,Rotterdam,SanFrancisco,andSantiago,whileObserverCitiesincludeBeijing,Nairobi,ShanghaiandSingapore.63 ToobtainaswellasmaintainitsC40membership,acitydoesnothavetofulfillanyformalperformance-basedobligations.However,asnotedabove,acitythatisseekingC40membershiphastobeginasanObserverCityandissubjecttowhatiseffectivelyaone-yearprobationperiod.Duringthisperiodandthereafter,acityisexpectedtodemonstrate“seriouscommitment”toaddressingclimatechangeandthatthecitywillexperiencedemonstrablebenefitsfromparticipatinginC40.64Thedecisiononwhetheracityobtainsmembershiplieswiththenetwork’sboardofdirectors,whichexaminesthecity’strackrecordandpotentialforambitiousclimatechangeactionaswellasitsabilitytocontributetoC40’swork.65

C40membershipcriteriaarenotpubliclyavailable,butitiswidelyknownthatC40hasdemandingstandardsbecauseitwantstobeselectiveand,toacertain

62C40,“C40CitiesMakeaDifference”,online:http://www.c40.org/cities(accessedon27December2016).63Ibid.SingaporejoinedC40asanobservercityinMarch2012.Singaporewasinvitedtobepartofthenetworkasrecognitionofitsgoodtrackrecordonbalancingeconomicgrowthandsustainabledevelopment.AsSingaporeisacity-state(andnotacity),itparticipatesinC40asanobserver;Bouteligier,Cities,NetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:SpacesofInnovation,PlacesofLeadership,pg.35.64InterviewNo.5.65Ibid.

extent,anexclusiveclub.66C40hasindicatedthatinthelongrun,itplanstomovetowardsclearlyarticulatedandformalperformance-basedmembershipstandards.67TheCompactofMayorsisanagreementamongstcitynetworks-includingC40,ICLEI,andUCLG-whichwaslaunchedatthe2014UNClimateSummit.68Asasignatory,C40activelyencouragesitsmembercitiestocommittotheCompactofMayors.Assuch,itislikelythatinthenearfuture,C40citieswillmeetorexceedthecompliancerequirementsoftheCompactofMayors.TocommittotheCompactofMayors,acitywillfirsthavetoregisteroneitheroftheCompact’sreportingplatforms:carbonnClimateRegistryorCDP.69ItshouldbenotedthatCDPisalreadytheofficialreportingplatformforC40cities.Secondly,withinoneyearofitsregistration,acitymustcreateaGHGinventorywithabreakdownofemissionsforthebuildingsandtransportationsectors.ThisGHGinventorymustbecompiledusingtheGHGProtocolforCities(seediscussioninPart3.5Partnershipsbelow).Thecityisalsorequiredtoidentifyitsclimaterisks.BothitsinventoryandriskprofilemustbereportedviaCDPorcarbonnClimateRegistry.Withintwoyearsofitsregistration,thecitymustupdateitsGHGinventorytoincludeemissionsfromitswastesector.ItalsohastosetaGHGreductiontargetandconductaclimatevulnerabilityassessment.Again,alltheinformationmustbereportedononeofthereportingplatforms.Withinthreeyearsofitsregistration,thecityisrequiredtodeliveranactionplanthatshowshowitwillmeetitsGHGreductiontargetanditsadaptationchallenges.Uponcompletingalltheserequirements,acitywillbecertified“compliant”andreceiveacertificationlogothatmaybepubliclydisplayedonlineandinprintedmaterials.Anew“compliant”badgewillbeissuedtothecityeachyearthatitmaintainscompliancethroughannualreporting.

C40hastheformalpowertowithdrawmembershipfromcitiesthataredeemedtobeunder-performing.However,askingacitytoleaveC40isperceivedtobeaseriousanddrasticmeasureandthishasnotyetbeendone.70Instead,theboardofdirectorsusuallyengagesininformaldiscussionswiththeunder-performingcity,whichisexpectedtotakeactionforimprovement.71AccordingtotheClimateActioninMegacities2.0survey,theglobalaverageis137actionsperC40membercity.Basedonresponsesreceivedfromfifty-threeC40cities,North

66InterviewsNos.2,7,8,10.67C40andARUP,ClimateActioninMegacities(C40CitiesBaselineandOpportunities,Volumne2.0,February2014)(2014),pg.7.68LaunchedattheClimateSummitinNewYorkCityon23September2014,theCompactofMayorsisahigh-profileinitiativebythethreemajortransnationalcitynetworksforclimatechangethatexisttoday-theC40,ICLEIandUCLG-inpartnershipwithUN-HabitatandMichaelBloomberg(inhiscapacityastheUNSecretary-General’sSpecialEnvoyforCitiesandClimateChange);CompactofMayors,online:http://www.compactofmayors.org(accessedon1July2016).69ThecarbonnCitiesRegistryisaglobalreportingplatformlaunchedinNovember2010attheWorldMayorsSummitonClimateinMexicoCitytoallowcitiestoreporttheirgoalsandactionstothepublic;online:www.carbonn.org;CDPcollectsanddisclosesenvironmentalinformationofmajorcompaniesandcitiesaroundtheworld;online:www.cdp.net.TheinformationintherestofthisparagraphisdrawnfromtheFullGuidetoCompliancefortheCompactofMayors(July2015),online:http://www.compactofmayors.org/history/(accessedon1July2016).70InterviewNo.5.71Ibid.

AmericancitiesarereportingthemostactionacrossC40(at175actionspercity)andEastAsiancitieshaveimplementedthelowestnumberofactions(77percity).Further,notallC40citieshavedevelopedaclimatechangeactionplanwithdiscernibleorcomparablequantitativetargets.723.4Networks,SummitsandWorkshops

InestablishingC40,Londonwantedtocreateaplatformforcitiestogain

accesstoinformationaboutclimate-relatedpolicies.Nothavingthatknowledgeitselfwhenitwantedtogobeyondnationalclimatepolicies,LondonbecamekeenlyawareofhowaccesstoinformationwasacrucialfirststepandthatitcouldhavesavedmuchtimeifanetworklikeC40existedwhenitneededsuchinformation.73Thus,withinC40,workshops,summitsandconferencestakeplaceonaregularbasistofacilitatetheexchangeofideasandbestpracticesaswellasbuildpersonalinteractions(inadditiontovirtualones).

ThebasicinfrastructureofC40ismadeupofissue-specificnetworks.C40currentlyhas16networksinareassuchasAdaptationandWater;Energy;FinanceandEconomicDevelopment;MeasurementandPlanning;SolidWasteManagement;Transportation;UrbanPlanningandDevelopment.74WhenacitybecomesamemberofC40,adetailedanalysisisconductedtodeterminethecity’simmediateprioritiesandpreferences.Basedonthisanalysis,thecitywillchoosetojoinspecificnetworksthatcatertoitsinterests,forexample,indevelopingsolidwastemanagementsolutionsorimprovingthecity’ssustainabletransportationoptions.Acitywilltypicallyjoinfourorfivenetworks;itisdiscouragedfromjoiningtoomanynetworksastheassumptionisthatacitythatisinvolvedintoomanynetworkswillhaveitsresourcesstretchedtoothinlytogainorcontributeoptimally.75

Intheearlystages,C40selectedasetofissuesthatservedasthefocalpointofthesenetworks.Theseissueareasarethoseinwhichcitygovernmentsaremostlikelytohavethepowertoactsuchaswastemanagementandenergyefficiency.76Assuch,therewillnotbeanetworkonelectricitygenerationbecausecitiesusuallydonothavethepowerstodecideonthesourcesofitselectricity.Networkshavealsoemergedduetodemandfrommembercitiesorattheirinitiative.Thereisadirectorwhoprovidesoversightofallthenetworks,inadditiontoateamofmanagers.77Eachnetworkhasamanagerthatisresponsibleforitsday-to-dayoperations,organizesmeetingsandworkshopsforthecitiesthatarepartofthat72Shenzhen,forexample,hasatargetofreducingitscarbondioxideemissionsby21%perunitofGDPbetween2010and2015whileMilanaimstoreduceitscarbondioxideemissionsby20%by2020(comparedwithitsemissionsin2005).Sydneyaimstoreduceby70%by2030(comparedwithitsemissionsin2006).BangkokandCairo,ontheotherhand,donothaveemissionsreductiontargets.ThedatarelieduponinthisfootnoteisfoundatC40,online:http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/cities(accessedon29December2016).73Bouteligier,pg.92.74C40,‘Networks:ConnectingCitiesonTopicsofCommonInterest’,online:http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/networks(accessedon30December2016).75InterviewNo.5.76Ibid.77C40,‘OurTeam’,online:http://www.c40.org/our_team(accessedon30December2016).

network,promotesnewideas,andgathersresourcestomeettheneedsofthemembercities.Insomenetworks,themanageralsoservesastheliaisonpersonwithexternalpartners.Forexample,withintheAdaptationandWatercategory,theC40CoolCitiesNetworkwaslaunchedin2012inpartnershipwithGlobalCoolCitiesAlliance,anon-profitorganizationthatpromotesresearchandpolicyawarenessofsolutionstoreducetheurbanheatislandeffect.78MembersoftheC40CoolCitiesNetworkincludeTokyo,NewYorkCity,AthensandToronto.79

Onceeverytwoyears,allC40citiescometogetherforthesummit.Aflagshipeventforthenetwork,theC40summithasbeendescribedasbeing“likealow-keyversionofaheadsofstatesummit.”80Atthesummits,mayorspresenttheir“ground-breakingprojects”,forgestrategicpartnerships,andannouncenewinitiativestothepublic.81Forexample,JohannesburghostedtheC40summitin2014duringwhichtheClimateActioninMegacities2.0Reportwasformallylaunched.82AquantitativesurveyofwhatC40citieshavedonetoreduceGHGemissionsandimproveclimateresilience,thereportprovidesabasisformeasurementandevaluationaswellasservesasapublicrelationstooltopromoteC40’smessagethat“citieshavethepower,theexpertise,thepoliticalwillandtheresourcefulnesstocontinuetotakemeaningfulaction.”83DuringtheC40summitinJohannesburg,RotterdammayorAhmedAboutalebshowcasedhiscity’sadaptationprojectssuchasthefloatingpavilionandtheStadshavensre-developmentproject.84Healsopresentedthebook,ConnectingDeltaCities:ResilientCitiesandClimateAdaptationStrategies,whichshowcasessomeoftheactivitiesandprojectsinitiatedundertheauspicesofConnectingDeltaCities,asmallnetworkofcitieswithinC40’sWaterandAdaptationInitiative.85Asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,Rotterdamisthefounderofthisnetworkandoperatesasecretariattosupportthenetwork’sactivities.Finally,

78C40,‘CoolCities’,online:http://www.c40.org/networks/cool_cities.Ontheurbanheatislandeffect,seeUSEPA,‘ReducingUrbanHeatIslands:CompendiumofStrategies’,online:https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/basicscompendium.pdf(Bothsourcesaccessedon30December2016)79C40,ibid.80AnitaPowell,‘Mayors’C40summitgivesmegacityleadersachancetograbtheglobalspotlight’,TheGuardian,7February2014.81C40Summits:LondonSummit(2005),NewYorkSummit(2007),SeoulSummit(2009),SaoPaoloSummit(2011),JohannesburgSummit(2014).ThenextSummitwillbeheldinMexicoCityin2016.82C40Blog,‘AugustRewind:PlenaryVideosfromtheC40MayorsSummit’,online:http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/august-rewind-plenary-videos-from-the-c40-mayors-summit(accessedon1June2016).83C40Blog,‘ClimateActioninMegacitiesVersion2.0’,online:http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/CAM2(accessedon1June2016).ThisreportshowsthatinthetwoyearssinceC40lastsurveyeditsmembersin2011,thetotalnumberof‘actions’takenbyC40citieshasnearlydoubledto8,068acrossarangeofsectorsincludingtransportation,wastemanagement,outdoorlightingandwater;C40andARUP,ClimateActioninMegacities(C40CitiesBaselineandOpportunities,Volumne2.0,February2014),pg.6.84RotterdamClimateInitiative,‘RotterdammayorAboutalebtoJohannesburgfordeltacityC40MayorsSummit’,31January2014,online:http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/news/rotterdam-mayor-aboutaleb-to-johannesburg-for-delta-city-c40-mayors-summit?news_id=2053(accessedon1June2016).85Ibid.

mayorAboutalebalsoscheduledameetingwiththemayorofDurbantodiscusspotentialopportunitiesinreducingGHGemissionsfromthemaritimetransportandlogisticssectors.86

TheC40workshopsaremorefocusedonspecificthemesofamoretechnicalnaturesuchasreducingtrafficcongestionincitiesandmunicipalwastetreatment.87InNovember2010,HongKonghostedamajorinternationalconferenceonclimatechange,ClimateDialogue:LowCarbonCitiesforHighQualityLiving.88AC40workshopwasorganizedaspartoftheinternationalconferenceanditsfocuswasontheenhancementofenergyefficiencyinbuildingsandgreentransportation(particularlythedevelopmentofelectricvehicles).89Morethanahundredparticipantsattendedtheclosed-doorworkshop,includingpropertydevelopers,electricitygenerationcompanies,carmanufacturers,researchinstitutes,andofficialsfromcitiesaroundtheworld.90

3.5Partnerships3.5.1PartneringthePrivateSector

Fromtheoutset,C40soughtpartnershipswiththeprivatesectorandnonprofitorganizationsliketheClintonClimateInitiative,whichare“committedtoabusiness-orientedapproachtoclimatechange”,toimplementmarket-basedsolutionstoclimatechange.91Inthisregard,C40espousesaneo-liberalenvironmentalapproach.92ThesepartnershipsarecrucialtoC40’squesttobeacatalystforurbanactiononclimatechange.Manycityauthoritieshavelimitedresourcesandtheimplementationofclimateactionsrequiressignificanttime,moneyandhumanresources.ThepartnershipsthatC40hasforgedhelpovercome

86Ibid.87Forexample,WorkshoponTransportandCongestion(London,December2007),DeltasinTimesofClimateChangeConference(Rotterdam,September2010),WorkshoponLowCarbonCitiesforHighQualityLiving(HongKong,November2010),BusRapidTransitWorkshop(Jakarta,November2013),SolidWastesNetworksWorkshop(Milan,October2014).88Duringthismonth,HongKongwasabuzzwithclimatechangeconferencesandevents.Alongsidethismajorinternationalconferencewerenumeroussideeventsincludinglecturesbyworld-renownedclimatescientists,receptionshostedbytheUS,BritishandSwedishconsulates,andaclimatelawconferenceattheUniversityofHongKong.Fordetails,seeClimateDialogue,“PressKit06:SideEvents”,online:http://civic-exchange.org/materials/event/files/20101103-1106%20Climate%20Dialogue/20101103-1106_ClimateDialogue_SideEvents.pdf(accessedon1June2016).89ClimateDialogue,‘PressKit04:ConferenceProgramme’,online:http://civic-exchange.org/materials/event/files/20101103-1106%20Climate%20Dialogue/20101103-1106_ClimateDialogue_ProgrammeDetails.pdf(accessedon1June2016).90Ibid.91BruceLindsey,CEOoftheClintonFoundation,quotedinMicrosoftNewsCenter,‘ClintonFoundation,MicrosofttoDevelopOnlineToolsEnablingtheWorld’sLargest40CitiestoMonitorCarbonEmissions’(17May2007).92Bouteligier,Cities,NetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:SpacesofInnovation,PlacesofLeadership,pg.99.

theconstraintsthatmembercitiesface.Forexample,theMOUssignedwithenergyservicecompanies(e.g.Siemens)andenvironmentalconsultancies(e.g.Arup)allowC40citiestopurchaseproductsandservicesatpreferentialprices.93ArupconductsUrbanLifeWorkshopsforC40citiesthat,todate,havefocusedonenergy,wasteandwaterstrategies.TheseworkshopsallowC40citiestotaponArup’stechnicalexpertiseandpolicyconsultingindevelopingclimateactionplansandprograms.94

Aspartoftheircollaboration,C40andSiemenslaunchedtheCityClimateLeadershipAwardsin2013toconferrecognitionon“globalcitiesdemonstratingexcellenceinurbansustainability.”95In2014,aseven-memberpanelconsistingofarchitects,formermayors,representativesfromtheWorldBank,C40andSiemensnominatedthirtyfinalistsandselectedtenwinners.96Aneleventhprize–theCitizen’schoice’wasselectedbypublic(online)vote.Theawardsprocessalsoservesasaplatformforidentifyingandcataloguinginnovativecasestudiesthatothercitiescanlearnfrom.

3.5.2Cooperationwithothertransnationalmunicipalnetworks

C40alsocooperateswithothertransnationalmunicipalnetworkstoachieveitsgoals.ThedevelopmentoftheGreenhouseGasProtocolforCities(GHGCityProtocol)isagoodillustrativeexample.Briefly,GHGaccountingprovidesadetailedandreplicablereportoftheGHGemissionsgeneratedbyaspecificactor.Justasfinancialaccountscanbekeptattheleveloftheproject,firmorcountry,GHGaccountingcantakeplaceatdifferentlevels.GHGsaregenerallymeasuredandreportedatthenational,firm,facilityorprojectlevels.97Inthelate2000s,C40andICLEIrecognizedthatcitiesdidnothaveaninternationallyacceptedmethodologyforcalculatingandreportingGHGemissionsatthecitylevel.Thereweremanystandardsavailabletocities,noneofwhichwereconsideredcompleteintheircoverage.TheydifferedintermsofwhatemissionsourcesandGHGsareincludedintheinventory,howemissionssourcesaredefined,andhowtransboundary93ClintonClimateInitiative,‘PresidentClintonannounceslandmarkprogramtoreduceenergyuseinbuildingsworldwide’(NewYork,16May2007),online:https://www.clintonfoundation.org/main/news-and-media/press-releases-and-statements/press-release-president-clinton-announces-landmark-program-to-reduce-energy-use.html(accessedon30December2016).94Arup,‘TacklingClimateChangewiththeC40’,online:http://www.arup.com/Homepage_Archive/Homepage_C40.aspx(accessedon30December2014).95SiemensandC40(jointpressrelease),‘C40&Siemenskickoff2014CityClimateLeadershipAwards’(Munich/NewYork,21January2014),online:http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2014/infrastructure-cities/ic201401006.htm&content[]=IC&content[]=CC&content[]=Corp(accessedon30December2016).96CityClimateLeadershipAwards,online:http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com(accessedon30December2016).97Foranexampleofproject-levelaccounting,seeGlobalEnvironmentalFacilityGHGaccountingmethodologies,online:https://www.thegef.org/gef/ghg-accounting(accessedon1June2016).FordiscussionabouttheGreenhouseGasProtocolwhichcalculatesandreportsGHGemissionsatthefirmlevel,seeJessicaGreen,‘PrivateStandardsintheClimateRegime:TheGreenhouseGasProtocol’(2010)12BusinessandPoliticsArticle3.

emissionsaretreated.98Theseinconsistenciesmadeitdifficulttocomparetheperformanceofcities,raisedquestionsaboutthequalityofthedata,andhinderedthecapacityofthirdpartiestoactaswatchdogs.99Thus,C40andICLEIdecidedtoworktogethertodevelopagloballyacceptedandharmonizedstandardsuchthat“byusingthe[protocol],citieswillalsostrengthenverticalintegrationofdatareportingtootherlevelsofgovernment,andshouldgainimprovedaccesstolocalandinternationalclimatefinancing.”100

InJune2011,C40andICLEIsignedanMOUtobegindevelopingtheGHGCityProtocol.Ayearlater,thepartnershipwasexpandedtoincludeWorldResourcesInstitute,theWorldBank,UNEPandUN-HABITAT.101AdraftoftheGHGCityProtocolwasreleasedinMarch2012forpubliccomment.Afterthepubliccommentperiodended,thedraftprotocolwasupdatedandthentestedinthirty-fivecitiesworldwide.ThecitiesthatpilottestedtheGHGProtocolin2013includedKyoto,Tokyo,BuenosAires,Lima,LondonandStockholm.Duringthesameperiod,sixin-personstakeholderconsultationworkshopswereheldinBeijing,SaoPaulo,London,DaresSalaam,NewDelhi,andJakarta.Over150cityofficials,researchers,andpractitionersprovidedfeedbackonthepilotGHGCityProtocol.Afterrevisions,thedraftprotocolwentthroughasecondroundofpubliccommentinJulytoAugust2014.ThefinalversionoftheGHGCityProtocolwaspublishedinDecember2014.102TheGHGCityProtocolwillbefurtherdiscussedinthenextchapterasatypeofvoluntarystandard.

3.5.3C40-WorldBankPartnership

AmongstC40’spartnerships,itsrelationshipwiththeWorldBankisarguably

itsmostsignificantoneasitgivesC40membercitiesaccesstothemultilateralfinancialinstitution’sresourcesincludingfinancingforlow-carboninfrastructureprojectsanditscapacity-buildingprograms.TherelationshipbetweentheWorld98GreenhouseGasProtocol,GlobalProtocolforCommunity-ScaleGreenhouseGasEmissionInventories,pg.19,online:http://carbonn.org/fileadmin/user_upload/cCCR/GPC/GHGP_GPC.pdf(accessedon1July2016).99Fordiscussionabouttheproblemsofincompleteandincompatibledatacollectionmethods,seeAngelHsuandothers,‘Trackclimatepledgesofcitiesandcompanies’(2016)532Nature303.100GreenhouseGasProtocol,LaunchofFirstGlobalStandardtoMeasureGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromCities(2014),online:http://www.ghgprotocol.org/Release/GPC_launch(accessedon30December2016).101GreenhouseGasProtocol,‘AbouttheGHGProtocol’,online:http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp(accessedon30December2014).WorldResourcesInstituteisanenvironmentalNGOthathadworkedwiththeWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopment(acoalitionoftwohundredmultinationalcorporationscommittedtosustainabledevelopment)todevelopanemissionsaccountingtoolforcompaniesknownastheGHGProtocolCorporateStandard.ThisCorporateStandardhasgainedglobalacceptance,partlyduetoitsadoptionbytheInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)in2006asthebasisfortheISO14064-1standard(SpecificationwithGuidanceattheOrganizationLevelforQuantificationandReportingofGreenhouseGasEmissionsandRemovals).102ThisaccountoftheprocessbehindthefinalpublicationoftheGHGProtocolstandardisdocumentedontheGHGProtocolwebsite;online:http://ghgprotocol.org/GPC_development_process(accessedon30December2016).

BankandC40canbetheorizedasoneoforchestration,atermcoinedbyKennethAbbottandhiscolleaguestorefertoasituationwherebyaninternationalorganization(theWorldBankinthepresentcase)supportsandendorsesanintermediaryactor(C40inthepresentcase)toaddresstargetactors(globalcities)inpursuitoftheinternationalorganization’sgovernancegoals.103Orchestrationisintendedtobemutuallybeneficial.Intermediariesvoluntarilyparticipateinorchestrationbecausetheyvaluetheideationalandmaterialsupportofferedbytheinternationalorganization.Atthesametime,internationalorganizationsengageinorchestrationbecausetheuseofintermediarieshelpstoovercometheirresourceconstraints,whicharesignificantrelativetothedemandsoftheirgovernancetaskseveninthecaseofawell-fundedorganizationliketheWorldBank.

C40andtheWorldBankbegancooperationin2009withinawiderpartnershipwithEcos(aSwissenvironmentalconsultancy),theCityofBaselandtheSwissStateSecretariatforEconomicAffairstodeveloptheCarbonFinanceCapacityBuildingProgram.104PremisedonthebeliefthatcitiesindevelopingcountriescanbenefitfromtheKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM),theCarbonFinanceCapacityBuildingProgramaimedtoincreasetheabilityofcitiestodevelopandimplementCDMprojectsandthereforebenefitfromclimatefinance.Theprogramadopteda‘learningbydoing’approachinfourpilotcities.DaresSalaam,Jakarta,QuezonCity,SaoPaolowereselectedaspilotcitiesandtheCDMprojectsthereservedascasestudiesforothercitiesindevelopingcountries.105Amongstthefourcities,allareC40membersexceptQuezonCity.ItshouldthereforebenotedthatC40’scollaborationwithexternalpartnersgeneratesbenefitsforcitiesoutsidethenetworktoo.

InJune2011,C40deepeneditscollaborationwiththeWorldBank.Bothinstitutionsannouncedthelaunchofanewpartnershiptoaddressthetwomainstructuralissuesthathinderedcitiesfromgainingaccesstocarbonfinance.106Pursuanttothispartnership,C40andtheWorldBankagreedtocooperatetodevelopaconsistentapproachforcityclimateactionplans.Atthattime,therewerestandardizedmethodologiesforclimateactionplansatthenationallevel,butnoneexistedforthecitylevel.Thelackofastandardizedmethodologyforcity-levelclimateactionplansmadeitdifficultforinvestorstoassessthefinancialviabilityofurbanclimateactionproposalsandthereforereluctanttofundthem.C40andtheWorldBankagreedtoworktogethertodevelopamethodologysothatcitieswouldbebetterplacedtoattractprivatesectorinvestmentsfortheirlow-carbon

103SeediscussiononorchestrationinChapter2(Section2.2).104WorldBankInstitute,‘CarbonFinanceCapacityBuildingProgram’,online:http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/about/topics/carbon-finance-capacity-building(accessedon30December2016).105WorldBankInstitute,‘CarbonFinanceCapacityBuildingProgram’(WashingtonDC,2011),online:http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/document/carbon-finance-capacity-building-program(accessedon30December2016).106C40andtheWorldBank(jointpressrelease),‘C40andWorldBankFormGroundbreakingClimateChangeActionPartnership’,online:http://www.c40.org/press_releases/press-release-c40-and-world-bank-form-groundbreaking-climate-change-action-partnership(accessedon30December2016).Theinformationcontainedintherestofthisparagraphisdrawnfromthissource.

developmentprograms.C40andtheWorldBankalsocommittedtoworkingtogethertodevelopacity-levelGHGaccountingprotocol,andtheWorldBankwasinvitedtojoinICLEIandC40todeveloptheGHGCityProtocol.Inaddition,C40agreedtoidentifyandworkwithnationalgovernmentsandprivatesectorinvestorswhoareinterestedtoprovideprojectfinancinginC40cities.TheWorldBankcommittedtoidentifyingopportunitiesamongstsourcesofconcessionalfinance,developriskmanagementinstrumentsaswellasengagetheprivatesectorviatheInternationalFinanceCorporation.

TheC40-WorldBankpartnershiphasgrowninscaleandambition,culminatingintwoinitiativesthatwereannouncedatthe2014ClimateSummithostedbyUNSecretaryGeneralBanKiMoonon23September2014.107TheCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAllianceandtheCityCreditworthinessPartnershipseektohelpcitiesimprovetheircredit-worthiness,providecitieswithtechnicalassistanceandtransactionalsupport,andcatalyzecapitalflows,particularlythemobilizationofprivatecapital,tocitiestoincreaseinvestmentinlow-carbonandclimate-resilientinfrastructure.108

Throughorchestration,theC40andWorldBankhavecreatedaglobal-localrelationshipthatfacilitatescitiesinbypassingthestateanddirectlyengagingwithothertransnationalactorswhenitcomestogoverningclimatechange.ThroughinitiativesliketheCityCreditworthinessPartnership,C40membercitieshavedirectaccesstotheWorldBank’sexpertiseincarbonfinanceandfundingopportunities.Formanycities,theaccesstosuchresourcesisvitalbecauseclimatefinancingisrelativelynewtomanycitygovernmentsindevelopedanddevelopingcountriesalike.109Manycitygovernmentofficialsdonothavesufficientknowledgeaboutclimatefinance,donotknowwhatfundingopportunitiesforclimateprojectsareavailable,andthereisagapbetweenthe“languageusedbyinvestors”andthatusedbycitygovernments.110Cityauthoritiesthereforefaceobstaclesinsecuringfundingforlarge-scaleclimatemitigationandadaptationprojects.111Aspartnershipssuch107ThesummitinNewYorkwaswidelyhailedasasuccessingalvanizingpublicopinioninfavourofstrongclimateactionaheadoftheCOPsinLimaand,moreimportantly,PariswheretheinternationalcommunitywasexpectedtoconcludeanagreementthatwouldincludeGHGemissionreductiontargetsfordevelopedanddevelopingcountriesalike.Fordiscussion,seeMichaelJacobs,‘FivewaysBanKi-moon'ssummithaschangedinternationalclimatepoliticsforever’TheGuardian(24September2014);‘Whyclimatechangeisbackontheagenda’TheEconomist(22September2014).108ClimateInitiativesDatabase,‘CityCreditworthinessPartnership’,online:http://climateinitiativesdatabase.org/index.php/City_Creditworthiness_Partnership.AccordingtotheWorldEconomicForumandWorldBank,thereisenormousunmetdemandforinvestmentsinlow-carbonandclimate-resilienturbaninfrastructureinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.MorethanUS$1trillionperyearisneededtofinancetheinfrastructuregap,whichisattributabletoanumberofreasonsincludinglackofcapacityatthemunicipalleveltoformulateprojectswithadequatebusinessplansandinadequatelevelsofmunicipalcredit-worthiness(whichlimitaccesstolow-costcapital);ClimateSummit2014,‘TheCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAllianceActionStatement’,pg.3,online:http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/07/CITIES-Cities-Climate-Finance-Leadership-Alliance.pdf(bothsourcesaccessedon13December2016).109InterviewNo.4.110Ibid.111InterviewNo.2.

asthatbetweentheC40andWorldBankbypassnationalgovernmentsandempowercitiestobemorefinanciallyindependent,thishasgivenrisetomixedresponsesonthepartofnationalgovernments.Somenationalgovernments,SouthAfricabeingagoodexample,arekeentoencouragetheircitiestoissuegreenbondsandexplorealternativesourcesoffinancingtopursuelow-carbondevelopment.112Othernationalgovernmentsarelessenthusiasticduetopoliticalreasonsandfinancialrisks.113Giventhatthesedevelopmentsareveryrecentandunfoldingrapidly,itistooearlytoassesshowstatesreacttobeingbypassedbyorchestrationeffortsexcepttonotethatwecanexpectarangeofresponses,whicharehighlycountry-specific,andthatthecurrenttrendofbuildingcapacityforurbanclimatefinancewillcontinueapaceforsometimebecauseofthemomentumcreatedbythemobilizationofvastresourcesfrominternationalfinancialinstitutions,developmentagencies,supranationalauthoritiesliketheEuropeanUnion,andtheprivatesector.114AttheUNFCCClevel,ExecutiveSecretaryChristianaFiguereshasshownappreciationofthebenefitsoforchestrationeffortsandembracesthenotionthatpolycentric,multi-actorgovernanceultimatelyreinforcesandstrengthensthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.115Inthenextchapter,thecomplementaritybetweenurbantransnationalclimatechangegovernanceandtheUNFCCCregimewillbefurtherexploredfromtherule-makingperspective.

4. ConclusionThischapterhasexaminedhowglobalcities,inseekingtoscaleuptheir

climategovernanceeffortsandtolearnfromeachother,havefounditbeneficialtoformanetwork.TheC40isnotonlyahorizontalnetworkthatconnectscityofficialsaroundtheworld.Ithasalsocreatedsignificantlinkagestoprivateactorssuchas

112Ibid.113Whenamayorisawell-knownindividualwithpotentialaspirationsatthenationallevelofpolitics,his/hercity’sattempttofinancehighprofileprojectswithinternationalsourcesmaycausetensionswiththecentralgovernment.ArecentexampleisthecityofDakar,whichwasreadyinFebruary2015toissuethefirstmunicipalbondinWestAfricaaftermanyyearsofpreparationbuttheissuancewasblockedbytheSenegalesegovernment;seeSamBarnard,Climatefinanceforcities:Howcaninternationalclimatefundsbestsupportlow-carbonandclimateresilienturbandevelopment?(OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,WorkingPaper419,2015),pg.20.114SincethelaunchoftheCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAlliance,therehasbeenaproliferationofurbanclimatefinancecapacity-buildingprogramsandrelatedinitiatives.AworkinggroupundertheauspicesoftheCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAlliancehasbeenputtogethertocarryoutamappingexerciseofallknownurbanclimatefinancinginitiatives(InterviewNo.2).Oneofthelatestinitiatives,launchedinearly2016,istheLowCarbonCityLab(LoCaL)’sMatchmakerprogram,whichaimstoconnectinvestorswithurbanmitigationprojects;online:http://local.climate-kic.org/projects/matchmaker/(accessedon20June2016).115Thisviewfindsresonancewithorchestrationtheory,ratherthanregimecomplextheorywhichtendstoseesuchmultiplicityasaproblemthatthreatensgovernanceeffectivenessthroughincoherence,redundancyandconflict.SeetheaddressbyChristianaFigueres,ExecutiveSecretaryoftheUNFCCCattheC40CitiesMayorSummitinJohannesburg,5February2014,online:http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/20140502_c40_check.pdf(accessedon1June2016).

globaltechnologycompaniesandengineeringfirms,prominentfoundationsliketheClintonFoundation,andinternationalorganizationsincludingUN-HabitatandtheWorldBank.Theselinkagesservetoconnectcitiesdirectlytoglobalactorstoengageinclimategovernance.ThroughtheC40network,citiesarealsoabletodevelopstandardsandpracticesthatareuniquelysuitedtomeettheirneedsandprioritiessuchastheGHGCityProtocol.Whenstandardsandnormsarecreatedbycitiesandimplementedthroughtransnationalnetworks,itcanbearguedthataspecificformofgovernance–lawmaking–hastakenplace.Thefollowingchapterwillmaketheargumentthatcities,throughnetworkslikeC40,arebeginningtoplayalawmakingroleintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.

Chapter6:CitiesasTransnationalLawmakers

1. Introduction Akeythemethathasemergedfromtheforegoinganalysisisthatglobalcitiesaresitesofinnovativeclimategovernance.Importantly,globalcitiesarenotjustaimingtoreduceGHGemissionslocally.Inlinewiththeemergingtrendofcitiesplayinganincreasinglyvisibleroleininternationalaffairs,globalcitiesaimtoscaleuptheirclimateactionstogenerateworldwideimpactandtoplayaroleingoverningclimatechangeatthegloballevel.Thishasledtotheformationofnumerouscitynetworks,ofwhichthemostprominenttransnationalnetworkofglobalcitiesfocusingonclimateactionisC40.Throughreiterativeinteractionandfrequentcooperationwithintheirnetwork,globalcitiesdevelopandinternalizecertainnorms,definedasrulesthatset“astandardofappropriatebehaviourforactorswithagivenidentity”,1andareimbuedwithaqualityof“oughtness”thatsetsthemapartfromotherkindsofrules.2

Inthepresentcase,thenormsare:First,thatclimatechangeisaglobalproblembutcanandmustbeaddressedlocallybycities.Secondly,thatlarge,globalcitiesarenotonlyasourceoftheproblembecauseoftheirhighlevelsofGHGemissionsbutalsoasourceofsolutions.AsAnneHidalgo,themayorofParissaidinaninterviewwiththeFinancialTimes,“[cities]aremorepractical;wehavethecapacitytoactfasterandthedecisionsareclosertoreality.Wecanmobilizeallactors,publicandprivate…[whichis]morecomplicatedforthestate.”3Thirdly,thatcitiescanbestreducetheirGHGemissionsandembarkonlow-carbongrowthbycommittingtoapolicyapproachbasedonmeasurement,monitoringandreportingoftheirGHGemissions.Basedonthisnormativefoundation,globalcitieshavecooperated(throughC40)withotheractorssuchasGHGaccountingconsultancies,developmentbanksandcivilsocietytodeveloppracticesandvoluntarystandardstoenableglobalcitiestoreducetheirGHGemissionsintheshorttermandmakethetransitiontowardslow-carbondevelopmentinthelongerterm.Irefertothesenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsdevelopedbyglobalcitiesandimplementedthroughtheirtransnationalnetworksasurbanclimatelaw. Urbanclimatelawisnotableinatleastthreerespects.Fromtheviewpointofenvironmentaleffectivenessandfulfillingoneofthekeyobjectivesofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex(i.e.climatemitigation),urbanclimate1MarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkink,‘InternationalNormDynamicsandPoliticalChange’(1992)52InternationalOrganization887,pg.891.2Whatis“appropriate”isdeterminedbyacommunityorasociety,whichraisesthequestionofhowmanyactorsmustshareinthecollectiveassessmentofarulebeforeitcanbecalleda“norm”;M.Finnemore&K.Sikkinksuggestthat,basedonempiricalstudies,wecanexpectanormtoreachtippingpointwhenatleastone-thirdofthetotalstatesinthesystemadoptthenorm.Further,whichstatesadoptthenormisanimportantfactor.“Criticalstates”arethosewhosenon-adoptionwillcompromisetheachievementofthesubstantivenorm;ibid,pg.901.SeediscussioninPart3onnormdiffusionbelow.3MichaelStothard,‘Mayorscallformorepowerstofightclimatechange’FinancialTimes(4December2015).

lawcanmakeanimportantcontributiontowardsreducingcities’GHGemissions,whichconstituteasizeableshareofglobalemissions(estimatedtobe37-49%).4Fromatheoreticalperspective,understandinghowurbanclimatelawfitswithinthebroadertransnationalclimatechangegovernancelandscapeandinteractswithothernormativeinstitutions,particularlytheUNFCCCregime,providesuswithnovelinsightsaboutthelawmakingrolethatcitieshaveinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Finally,thisstudyofurbanclimatelawcanmakeacontributiontothebodyofliteratureonsoftlaw,specificallyvoluntarystandardswhichtendtooccupyacentralpositionintheworldofsoftlawsolutions.Voluntarystandardsarecharacterizedbyvoluntaryparticipationintheconstructionandimplementationofthenormsandpractices.Participantsarefreetoleavethevoluntaryschemeanytimeandthereisanabsenceof“policepowerasawaytoinduceconsentandcompliance”.5Inthepasttwodecades,industryandgovernmentshaveincreasinglyturnedtovoluntaryschemestoaddresssocialandenvironmentalexternalities.Therehasthereforebeenaproliferationofvoluntaryschemesthatpromulgatecodesofconduct,standardsandindicatorstoaddressissuesrangingfromdeplorablelabourconditionsintheglobalgarmentindustrytothedeleteriousenvironmentaleffectsoflarge-scalebiofuelsproduction.6Thischapterarguesthaturbanclimatelawconstitutesanoveltypeofvoluntarystandardandthediscussioninthischapterseekstoexpandtheanalyticaldiscourseofvoluntarystandardsbyconsideringtheroleofsubnationalactorsincreatingandimplementingvoluntarystandards.

TounderstandhowurbanclimatelawcanleadtocitiesreducingtheirGHGemissions,thischapteridentifiestwokeypathwaysofinfluencethatarecriticalforshapinghowcitiesviewtheirinterestsandalignthemwiththeoverarchingobjectivesofreducingGHGemissionsintheshorttermanddevelopinglow-carbonalternativesforthefuture.Thesepathwaysofinfluenceinvolvethepromotionofreflexivityincitiesandnormdiffusion.Attheheartoftheconceptofreflexivityisthatactorsconstantlyreflectupontheirsocialpracticesandhavethecapacitytomakeadjustmentstothosepracticesinlightofnewinformation.7Inthislineofthinking,voluntarystandardsareregulatorytoolsthatuncovernewinformationforcities,whichcanthenreflectandactupontheinformationbyadjustingtheirpracticesaccordingly.Suchinformationwillidentify,forexample,themostcost-

4CambridgeInstituteforSustainabilityLeadership,CambridgeJudgeBusinessSchoolandICLEI,ClimateChange:ImplicationsforCities(KeyFindingsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeFifthAssessmentReport)(2014).5JohnKirtonandMichaelJ.Trebilcock,‘Introduction:hardchoicesandsoftlawinsustainableglobalgovernance’inJohnKirtonandMichaelJ.Trebilcock(eds),HardChoices,SoftLaw:VoluntaryStandardsinGlobalTrade,EnvironmentandSocialGovernance(Routledge2004),pg.9.6Fordiscussion,seeforexample,ArthurP.J.Mol,‘Environmentalauthoritiesandbiofuelcontroversies’(2010)19EnvironmentalPolitics61;CharanDevereauxandHenryLee,BiofuelsandCertification:AWorkshopatHarvardKennedySchool(DiscussionPaper2009-07,Cambridge,Mass:BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs,2009);AllisonLoconto,‘Assemblinggovernance:theroleofstandardsintheTanzanianteaindustry’(2015)107JournalofCleanerProduction64;EthicalTradingInitiativeBaseCode,online:http://www.ethicaltrade.org(accessedon1July2016).7SeediscussioninPart3.1below.

efficientclimatemitigationopportunitiesavailabletothecity.8Thesecondpathwayofinfluenceisconcernedwithhowthenormsofurbanclimatelawaredisseminatedandbecomewidelyadoptedwithinafairlyshortperiodoftime.Irefertoprominenttheoriesofdiffusiontoofferanaccountofhowurbanclimatelawreachesa“tippingpoint”afterwhichit“cascades”throughthetransnationalcitynetworkandleadstoclimateaction.9

AsforthequestionofhowurbanclimatelawfitswithinthebroadertransnationalclimatechangegovernancelandscapeandrelatestotheUNFCCCregime,thischapteradvancestheclaimthat,inmanykeyrespects,urbanclimatelawhasbeendeliberatelydesignedtosupportandreinforcetheUNFCCCregime.Infact,urbanclimatelawinteractswiththeUNFCCCrulesandinstitutionsinstrategicwaysthataremutuallyreinforcing.Iusetheterm“coupling”torefertothedeliberateefforttoalignurbanclimatelawinwayssuchthatitsnormsandpracticescomplementandstrengthentheUNFCCCregime.ThefirstexampleofcouplinginvolvescitiesreframingtheissueofclimatechangeinwaysthatsidesteppedthecontentiousissuesthatobstructedtheUNFCCCnegotiationsandcreatedgridlock.Byreframingtheproblemandpromulgatingurbanclimatelawbasedonanalternativeframeworkofideas,citiescreatedasetofinstitutionsthatcomplementedtheUNFCCCregimebyprovidinglesscontroversialwaysofpromotingGHGreductionsandreachingactorsthat,dependingontheirlocation,werenotboundbytheKyotoProtocol.Inthesecondexampleofcoupling,urbanclimatelawreinforcestheUNFCCCregimebyservingasameansfordiffusingthenormsunderpinningtheUNFCCCframework.IillustratethispointbyreferencetotheC40’sadherencetotheprincipleofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities(CBDRRC),whichisacornerstoneoftheinternationalclimateregime.MythirdexampleistheGlobalMayors’Compact,whichdeliberatelyreplicatesfeaturesofthepost-2020internationalclimateagreement,especiallythepledge-and-reviewapproachandMonitoring,ReviewandVerification(MRV).Inthiscase,couplingalsoallowscitiestoserveassociallaboratoriesforgeneratingexperienceandknowledgeofnewnormsandpracticesthatareemergingfromtheParisAgreement.

IarguethatcouplingnotonlybenefitstheUNFCCCregimebutalsosupportsthedevelopmentofurbanclimatelawbyconferringlegitimacybyassociationandimplicitendorsementbytheUNFCCCregime.Theanalysisoncouplingalsorespondstothebroadercriticismsagainstsoftlawbydemonstratingthatthesoftlawgeneratedbycitiesisanimportantcomplementtohardlawthatcanfacilitate

8See,forexample,theLowCarbonCityDevelopmentProgramAssessmentProtocolthatisdesignedtohelpcitiesplan,implement,monitorandaccountforlowcarboninvestmentsandmitigationactions;WorldBank,“TheLowCarbonCityDevelopmentProgram(LCCDP)Guidebook:ASystemsApproachtoLowCarbonDevelopmentinCities(English)”,online:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/24089839/low-carbon-city-development-program-lccdp-guidebook-systems-approach-low-carbon-development-cities(accessedon1July2016).9Forexample,FinnemoreandSikkink;ZacharyElkinsandBethA.Simmons,‘OnWaves,ClustersandDiffusion:AConceptualFramework’(2005)598AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience33.

experimentationatmultiplesitesandlevelsofgovernance,generateknowledge(throughexchangeofgoodpractices,forexample),buildtrust,andtransformnorms.10Further,softlawandhardlawnotonlysupportandcomplementoneanother,buttheinteractionbetweenthemcanresultinanoverallexpansionofgovernanceandauthority.

Thischapterproceedsinfiveparts.Followingthisintroduction,Part2providesabriefoverviewoftheliteratureonsoftlawandvoluntarystandards.Part3advancestheargumentthat,throughtheirnetworks,citiesdevelopandimplementlawthatfollowscertainpathwaysofinfluencethatcaneventuallyleadtothereductionofGHGemissions.Thesepathwaysofinfluenceinvolvethepromotionofreflexivityincitiesandnormdiffusion.InPart4,IarguethatcitiesplayanimportantroleinstrengtheningtheUNFCCCregime’snormativeinfluence.UrbanclimatelawinteractswiththeUNFCCCrulesandinstitutionsinstrategicwaysthataremutuallyreinforcing.Asaresult,thereisnotonlyalackofconflictbetweenthetwosetsofrules–thereis,infact,complementaritythatcontributestothecoherenceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Part5drawsanumberofconclusionsonthesignificanceofurbanclimatelawandtheroleofcitiesasrule-makers.

2. SoftLawandVoluntaryStandards

2.1SoftLawversusHardLaw Intheclassicalinternationallawtradition,internationallegalrulesaretakentobethosethatflowfromtheformalsourcesidentifiedinArticle38oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.Assuch,“hardlaw”wouldcompriseoftherulescreatedbyinternationalconventions,internationalcustomand“generalprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations.”11Theterm“softlaw”isusedtorefertolegallybindinginstruments“whichareonlysoftlyenforced(forexample,withnocourtstoresortto)aswellasinstrumentswhichareinthegreyzoneofnormativity,betheysoftlybindinginsomerespectsonly,orintheprocessofbecominglawaspartoftheformationofcustomaryinternationallaw.”12Thus,softlawwouldincludearangeofinternationalinstrumentsandcommunicationsrangingfrom

10Thislineofargumentfindscommonalitywiththoseofconstructivistscholarswhofocuslessonthebindingnatureoflawattheenactmentstageandmoreontheeffectivenessoflawattheimplementationstage,andwhostresshowsoftlawcan“facilitateconstitutiveprocessessuchaspersuasion,learning,argumentationandsocialization”,DavidMTrubek,PatrickCottrellandMarkNance,‘SoftLaw,HardLawandEUIntegration’inGráinnedeBúrcaandJoanneScott(eds),LawandnewgovernanceintheEUandtheUS(HartPublishing2006),pg.75.11Article38(1),theStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.Itshouldbenotedthatthislistofnotexhaustive.Article38(2)states“[t]provisionshallnotprejudicethepoweroftheCourttodecideacaseexaequoetbono,ifthepartiesagreethereto.”12JoostPauwelyn,‘IsitInternationalLaworNot,andDoesItEvenMatter?’inJoostPauwelyn,RamsesWesselandJanWouters(eds),InformalInternationalLawmaking(OxfordUniversityPress2012),pg.129.

informalunderstandingsorconversationstomemorandaofunderstanding,diplomaticletters,protocols,codesofconductandinformalagreements.13

Thisbroadoverviewof“hardlaw”and“softlaw”glossesovertheconsiderabledisagreementintheliteratureonthedefinitionofsoftlawandwhatfallsintothiscategory.Therulesofrecognitionofinternationallawarenotbrightlinerulesandarebecomingmorevagueas“internationallawisincreasinglyseenasacontinuumbetweenlawandnon-law,withformallaw-ascertainmentnolongercapableofcapturinglegalphenomenaintheinternationalarena.”14Someinternationallegalscholarsuseasimple“binding/non-binding”binarytodistinguishhardfromsoftlaw.15Fromapositivelegalscholar’sviewpoint,theconceptof“softlaw”islogicallyflawedbecauselawis,bydefinition,ofabindingnatureandtherecannotbenon-bindinglaw.16ProperWeil,forexample,lamentsthe“blurringofthenormativitythreshold”andarguesthat“thethresholddoesexist:ononesideoftheline,thereisbornalegalobligationthatcanbereliedonbyacourtorarbitrator,thefloutingofwhichconstitutesaninternationallywrongfulactgivingrisetointernationalresponsibility;ontheotherside,thereisnothingofthekind.”17 Constructivistscholars,incontrast,focuslessonthebindingnatureoflaw.Theyaremoreinterestedinhowrulesactuallyoperateinpractice.Forthesescholars,whatissalientiswhetherandhowthosewhoadheretonorms,rulesandstandardscometoacceptandregardthemasauthoritative.18BrunnéeandToope,forexample,argue“Weshouldstoplookingforthestructuraldistinctionsthatidentifylaw,andexamineinsteadtheprocessesthatconstituteanormativecontinuumbridgingfrompredictablepatternsofpracticetolegallyrequiredbehavior.”19Constructivistscholarsalsoarguethatformallybindingrulesarenotnecessarilymoreeffectivethanrulesofanon-bindingnature.AsKalRaustialapointsout,weshoulddistinguishbetweeneffectivenessandcompliance:

“[c]omplianceasaconceptdrawsnocausallinkagebetweenalegalruleandbehavior,butsimplyidentifiesaconformitybetweentheruleandbehavior.

13ChristineChinkin,‘NormativeDevelopmentintheInternationalLegalSystem’inDinahShelton(ed),CommitmentandCompliance:TheRoleofNon-bindingNormsintheInternationalLegalSystem(OxfordUniversityPress2003),pgs.25-31.14Jeand'Aspremont,‘FromaPluralizationofInternationalNorm-MakingProcessestoaPluralizationofOurConceptofInternationalLaw’inJoostPauwelyn,RamsesWesselandJanWouters(eds),InformalInternationalLawmaking(OxfordUniversityPress2012),pg.195.15SeeJanKlabbers,‘TheRedundancyofSoftLaw’(1996)65NordicJournalofInternationalLaw167forargumentationinfavourofretainingthebinaryconceptionoflaw.WolfgangH.ReinickeandJanMartinWitte,‘Interdependence,Globalization,andSovereignty:TheRoleofNon-bindingInternationalLegalAccords’inDinahShelton(ed),CommitmentandCompliance:TheRoleofNon-bindingNormsintheInternationalLegalSystem(OxfordUniversityPress2003),pgs.75-76.16JanKlabbersarguesthatlawcannotbe“moreorlessbinding”andtherefore,theconceptofsoftlawislogicallyflawed,ibid,pg.181.17ProsperWeil,‘Towardsrelativenormativityininternationallaw’(1983)77AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw413,pgs.415,417-8.18Trubek,CottrellandNance,pgs.80-81.19JuttaBrunneeandStephenJ.Toope,‘InternationalLawandConstructivism:ElementsofanInteractionalTheoryofInternationalLaw’(2000)39ColumbiaJournalofTransnationalLaw19,pg.68.

Tospeakofeffectivenessistospeakdirectlyofcausality:toclaimthataruleis“effective”istoclaimthatitledtocertainbehaviorsoroutcomes,whichmayormaynotmeetthelegalstandardofcompliance.”

ThedefinitionoflegalizationininternationalrelationsproposedbyKennethAbbottandDuncanSnidaloffersanotheralternativeforunderstandingthedistinctionbetweenhardlawandsoftlawwithoutresortingtothenarrowconceptualizationofferedbyclassicalinternationallawandthe“binding/non-binding”dichotomy.AbbottandSnidaldefinelegalizationininternationalrelationsasvaryingacrossthreedimensions–(i)precisionofrules,(ii)obligationand(iii)delegationtoathird-partydecisionmaker.20Hardlaw“referstolegallybindingobligationsthatareprecise(orcanbemadeprecisethroughadjudicationortheissuanceofdetailedregulations)andthatdelegateauthorityforinterpretingandimplementingthelaw.”21Internationaltradelawissaidtocomeclosesttothisidealtypeofhardlaw.22InAbbottandSnidal’sdefinition,“therealmof‘softlaw’beginsoncelegalarrangementsareweakenedalongoneormoreofthedimensionsofobligation,precision,anddelegation.Thissofteningcanoccurinvaryingdegreesalongeachdimensionandindifferentcombinationsacrossdimensions.”23Theyemphasizethatsoftlawisashorthandtermtorefertothis“broadclassofdeviationsfromhardlaw”andthatsoftlawcomesinmanyvarieties.24

Somescholarshavequestionedthecharacterizationoflawintermsofthesethreeattributes(precision,obligationanddelegation)onthebasisthatlawencompassesmorethantheselargelytechnicalandformalcriteria.25However,forpresentpurposes,AbbottandSnidal’sdefinitionishelpfulintermsofdelineatingsome‘indicators’oflegalizationwhich,inturn,defineacontinuumonwhichinternationaltreatyrules,voluntaryrules,andcodesofconductcanbesituated.Fromthisviewpoint,wecansaythatstates,privateactorsandcivilsocietyhaveincreasinglyusedawiderangeofnormativeinstrumentsthathavearelativelyharderorsofterlegalnatureintermsofprecision,obligationanddelegationtopursuetheirobjectives.

2.2VoluntaryStandards

Standardsarenormsselectedasamodelbywhichpeople,actionsorproductscanbejudgedandcompared,andwhichprovideacommonlanguageforthejudges,theevaluatedandtheiraudiences.26Standardsaddresstechnicaland

20KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal,‘HardandSoftLawinInternationalGovernance’(2000)54InternationalOrganization421,pg.424.21Ibid,pg.421.22GregoryShafferandMarkA.Pollack,‘Hardvs.SoftLaw:Alternatives,Complements,andAntagonistsinInternationalGovernance’(2010)94MinnesotaLawReview706,pg.715.23AbbottandSnidal,pg.422.24Ibid.25See,forexample,MarthaFinnemoreandStephenJ.Toope,‘Alternativesto"Legalization":RicherViewsofLawandPolitics’(2001)55InternationalOrganization743.26StefanoPonteandEmmanuelleCheyns,‘VoluntaryStandards,ExpertKnowledgeandtheGovernanceofSustainabiltyNetworks’(2013)13GlobalNetworks459,pg.461.

compatibilityissuesbyoperatingastoolsofsimplificationandspecification.27Voluntarystandardscanbefoundacrossmanydomainsofcontemporaryeconomies,includingtourism,construction,andmining.28Inrecentyears,voluntarystandardshavegainedprominenceasameanofaddressingaproductoranindustry’simpactonthenaturalenvironment.Inforestry,forexample,voluntarystandardshavefilledthegovernancegapcausedbytheinabilityofgovernmentstocometoagreementonhowbesttoprotectforestsfromunsustainableuse.29Theincreasingpopularityofvoluntarystandardshasgeneratedanextensiveliteratureexaminingtheeffectivenessofvoluntarystandards,30theirlegitimacy31,andtheirpotentialtoworkintandemwith“relativelyhard”institutionstoachieveecologicallyandsociallysustainablepracticesinvarioussectorssuchasforestry,shippingandfoodproduction.32

Beforeproceedingfurthertoconsidersomeofthevoluntarystandardsliterature,Iliketonotethatasignificantamountoftheresearchonvoluntarystandardsispremisedonthepublic/privatedichotomy.33Accordingtothis

27F.Ewald,‘InsuranceandRisk’inG.Burchell,C.GordonandP.Miller(eds),TheFoucaulteffect:studiesingovernmentality(Harvester1990).28GreenGlobe’sInternationalStandardforSustainableTourism(Version1.7)isacertificationschemethatrequirestourismagenciesandbusinessestoreportontheirsustainabilityperformancethroughouttheirsupplychains;seeGreenGlobe,online:http://greenglobe.com/green-globe-certification/.LeadershipinEnergyandEnvironmentalDesign(LEED)isa3rdpartycertificationschemefor“greenbuildings”;LEED,online:http://www.usgbc.org/articles/about-leed.FairtradeGoldandPreciousMetalsisavoluntarycertificationschemethatrequiressmall-scaleminingorganizationsanddownstreamoperatorstomeetstandardspertainingtoresponsibleenvironmentalmanagement,labourconditionsandwomen’srights;online:http://www.fairgold.org(allinternetlinksaccessedon15July2016).29Fordiscussion,seeforexample,BenjaminCashoreandothers,‘ForestCertificationinDevelopingandTransitioningCountries:PartofaSustainableFuture?’(2006)48Environment6.30Forexample,inresponsetothequestionofwhetherfairtradestandardsimprovethelivelihoodsofcoffeefarmers,researchhasshownthatthefairtradepricedoesimprovewelfareofcertifiedgrowersbutthehigherpricealonedoesnotaddressthebroaderchallengesthatthesemarginalizedfarmersface;K.Utting-Chamorro,“DoesFairTradeMakeaDifference?TheCaseofSmallCoffeeProducersinNicaragua”DevelopmentinPractice15:3/4(2005),pp.584-99.31See,forexample,GraemeAuldandLarsH.Gulbrandsen,‘TransparencyinNonstateCertification:ConsequencesforAccountabilityandLegitimacy’(2010)10GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics97;StevenBernsteinandBenjaminCashore,‘Cannon-stateglobalgovernancebelegitimate?Ananalyticalframework’(2007)1Regulation&Governance347.32See,forexample,GuySalmon,VoluntarySustainabilityStandardsandLabels(VSSLs):TheCaseforFosteringThem(RoundtableonSustainableDevelopment,OECD,2002),online:https://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/39363328.pdf(accessedon15July2016).33Forexample,AbbottandSnidal;JessicaGreen,‘PrivateStandardsintheClimateRegime:TheGreenhouseGasProtocol’(2010)12BusinessandPoliticsArticle3;TimButheandWalterMattli,TheNewGlobalRulers:ThePrivatizationofRegulationintheWorldEconomy(PrincetonUniversityPress2011);DavidVogel,‘Tradingupandgoverningacross:transnationalgovernanceandenvironmentalprotection’(1997)4JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy556.Withinthedisciplineofinternationalrelations,byandlarge,thepublicreferstothestatewhiletheprivatereferstothenon-state;PhilippPattbergandJohannesStripple,‘Beyondthepublicandprivatedivide:remappingtransnationalclimategovernanceinthe21stcentury’(2008)8InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements367,pg.372.

public/privatedistinction,onlystates(andinternationalorganizations,whichstatescreateanddelegateauthoritytoaccordingtothetraditionalprincipal-agentmodel)havetheauthoritytomakemandatoryrules.Allotheractorsbelongtothecatch-allcategoryknownas‘non-stateactors’or‘privateactors’whichhavenoauthoritytomakemandatoryrulesandthereforecreatevoluntaryrules.

Thisdistinctionisblurredwhenweexpandourconceptionofrulemakingintheglobalspheretoincludecitiesasrulemakers.Citiesarepublicinthesensethattheyexercisefunctionsofpublicadministrationbuttheyarenotstates.TheyarealsonotprivateinthesamewaythatbusinesscorporationsandNGOsare.Forexample,citiesdonotsharetheprofitmaximizationgoalthatfirmsdobydictatesoflawandculture.Further,citiesarenotnon-stateactors.Citiesaresub-stateactors.Theyarenotjustphysicallyembeddedwithintheterritoryofstates,butarealsosubjecttotheauthorityofcentralgovernments.Citiesdonothaveauthoritytomakemandatoryrulesattheinternationallevelbutitdoesnotfollowthatcitiesarethereforeprivate/non-stateactors.Inbrief,thepublic/privatedistinctiondoesnotcapturetherealityofcontemporarytransnationallawmakinginwhichthecityplaysapartbecauseofadefinitionalconflation.Thepublic/privatedefinitionconflatesmunicipalauthorities,provincialgovernments,businesses,environmentalNGOs,labourunions,privatefoundationsintoasinglecategory.Yet,asIhavesuggested,citieshaveinterestsandsharedideasabouttheiridentitythataredistinctlydifferentfromthoseof,forexample,multinationalcorporations.Ithereforeextendexistingdefinitionsandtheoreticalconceptionsofvoluntarystandardsinthediscussionbelowtoclarifythepointthatvoluntarystandardscanbecreatedbynon-stateactorsaswellassub-stateactorssuchascities.34Thisconceptualmoveisasmallcontributiontotheliteratureonvoluntarystandardsthataimstoopenuptheanalyticaldiscoursetoconsidertheroleofsub-stateactorsincreatingvoluntarystandardsandtransnationallawmorebroadly.

Forexample,inAbbottandSnidal’sconceptof“regulatorystandardsetting”,whichissaidtooccurwhenvoluntarystandardsareadoptedbyfirms,NGOsandstatesontheirownorbypartnershipsinvolvingatleasttwooutofthethreeactors,thecategoryofNGOscontainsadiversegroupofactors.35Itincludesadvocacy

34IrecognisethatscholarslikeAbbottandGreenacknowledgetheroleofsub-nationalgovernmentsinvoluntaryrulemakingbuttheyeithersubsumecitiesandotherlocalgovernmentswithinthecategoryof“non-stateactors”oridentifythetransnationalmunicipalnetwork(e.g.C40)astherelevantactor.Myaiminextendingtheirdefinitionsistoclarifythatcitiesarenotnon-stateactorsandtoemphasizethatcitiesaretheactorsmakingandimplementingtheserules.35AbbottandSnidalpointoutthattheiruseoftheterm“regulatorystandardsetting”isintendedtohighlightthatthesevoluntarystandardsadoptedbyfirms,statesandotheractorsseektogobeyondmeetingdemandsfortechnicalcoordinationandtoaddresssocialandenvironmentalexternalities;KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal,‘TheGovernanceTriangle:RegulatoryStandardsInstitutionsandtheShadowoftheState’inWalterMattliandNgaireWoods(eds),ThePoliticsofGlobalRegulation(PrincetonUniversityPress2009),pg.45.Thesevoluntarystandardsarethereforeregulatoryinnature,withregulationdefinedas“theorganizationandcontrolofeconomic…andsocialactivitiesbymeansofmaking,implementing,monitoring,andenforcingofrules”;WalterMattliandNgaireWoods,‘InWhoseBenefit?ExplainingRegulatoryChangeinGlobalPolitics’,inWalterMattliandNgaireWoods(eds),ThePoliticsofGlobalRegulation(PrincetonUniversityPress,2009).

groups,labourunions,socialmovementsand“othernoncommercialgroups”.36Isuggestthat,whilecitiescanbeaccommodatedwithinthe“othernoncommercialgroups”sub-grouping,itwouldbemoreappositetospecifythecityasanactorwithauniquecontributiontomaketowardsregulatorystandardsetting.Nonetheless,forpresentpurposes,itsufficestonotethatAbbottandSnidal’stheoryofregulatorystandardsettingaptlycapturestherulemakingactivitiesofcitiesthroughthetransnationalnetworkstheycreate.Morespecifically,citiescanberegardedastransnationalregulators. Greencoinedtheterm“entrepreneurialprivateauthority”torefertovoluntarystandards.Shespecifiesthatnon-stateactorsmaketheserulesandsetthesestandards“withouttheexplicitdelegationofauthoritybystates”.37AnumberofimplicationsfollowfromGreen’sdefinitionthataresalientinconstructingourunderstandingofurbanclimatelaw.First,entrepreneurialprivateauthorityisrestrictedtoinstancesinwhichnon-stateandsub-stateactorscreaterules,standardsandpracticesthatgoverntheconductofothers.AccordingtoGreen,thismeansthatoperationalactivitiessuchascapacitybuilding,informationsharingandthepublicationofactionplansarenotinstancesofentrepreneurialprivateauthorityastheseactivitiesdonotprescriberules.38However,Iadoptadifferentstance.Whiletheseoperationalactivitiesdonotconstituterulemaking,theyareimportantwaysinwhichthosewhoseektogovernpersuadeotheractorstofollowtheirrules.Further,theseoperationalactivitiesfallwithinthebroaderambitofgovernanceandusuallyhavenormativecontent.Ithereforeconsidertheoperationalactivitiesthatglobalcitiesengageintobeimportantandrelevantforcreatinganinstitutionalenvironmentthatisconduciveforthedevelopmentandimplementationofurbanclimatelaw.ThesecondimplicationofGreen’sdefinitionisthatthosewhowishtogovernhavetopersuadeotherstofollowtheirrulesinordertoexerciseauthority.InPartII,Iwillanalyzehowcertainleadingcitiesandtheirmayorsengagedinpersuasiontoconvinceotheractorstofollowtheirlead.Thirdly,theclaimanttoauthorityreliesonexpertisetolegitimizeitsclaimandfinally,itisabletoinducebehavioralchangeinsomerelevantactoringlobalaffairs.39 Finally,toroundupthepresentdiscussiononvoluntarystandards,itisnoteworthythatvoluntarystandardsaresopervasivethattheirexistencehasbeenacknowledgedbytheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).40TheWTO’sTechnicalBarrierstoTradeAgreement(TBTAgreement)drawsadistinctionbetweenregulationsandstandards.Whilecompliancewiththeformerismandatory,compliancewiththelatterisvoluntary.41Drawinguponthis,andupondiscussionsintheWTO’sSanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasurescommitteeonvoluntarystandards,Scottdefines“privatestandards”as“writtendocumentsadoptedbya36Ibid,pg.60.37JessicaGreen,RethinkingPrivateAuthority:AgentsandEntrepreneursinGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance(PrincetonUniversityPress2013),pg.78.38Ibid,pg.30.39Ibid,pg.36.40JoanneScott,‘ThePromiseandLimitsofPrivateStandardstoReduceGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromShipping’(onfilewithauthor),pg.8.41Ibid.

non-governmentalentitythatlaydownrules,guidelinesand/orcharacteristics,forcommonorrepeateduse,forproductsorrelatedprocessesandproductionmethods,includingtransport.”42Again,urbanclimatelawcomeswithinScott’sdefinitionofprivatestandards,savethattheterm“non-governmentalentity”,asIhaveconsistentlyargued,oughttobedisaggregatedtorefertobothnon-governmentalandsub-stateentities.

3. TheWorkingsofUrbanClimateLaw Urbanclimatelawreferstothenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsconstructedbycitiesand,throughcertainpathways,aretransmittedtransnationallyandadoptedbycitiesacrosstheworld.Beforeproceedingfurthertoexaminethepathwaysbywhichurbanclimatelawsteerscitiestowardsclimatemitigationandlong-termdecarbonizationstrategies,thissectionwillprovideabriefoverviewofthenormativeframeworkofurbanclimatelawandsomeofthevoluntarystandardsthathavebeendeveloped. Asmentionedearlier,onecandiscernthreekeynormativeideasthatglobalcitiesandtheirnetworkshavesoughttopromote.Thesenormativeideasunderpintheattemptsbyglobalcitiestoclaimaroleintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Briefly,thesethreenormsare:First,thatclimatechangeisaglobalproblembutcanandmustbeaddressedlocallybycities.Secondly,thatlarge,globalcitiesarenotonlyasourceoftheproblembecauseoftheirhighlevelsofGHGemissionsbutalsoasourceofsolutionsbecauseoftheirconcentrationofhumancapitalandeconomicresources.Citiesarealsoperceivedtobemorenimblepoliticalactorsthannationalgovernments.Thirdly,thattheoptimalapproachforcitiestoreducetheirGHGemissionsandembarkonlow-carbongrowthisonebasedondatatransparency.Thisinvolvescitiesregularlymonitoring,measuringandreportingtheirGHGinventoriesandtheimpactoftheclimateactionstheyhavetaken. Basedonthissetofnorms,citieshaveworkedwithotheractorstodevelopvoluntarystandardsandrelatedpractices.TheCompactofMayorsisanexampleofavoluntarystandard.AsIbrieflydescribedinthepreviouschapter,C40andothercitynetworkscametogethertocreatetheCompactofMayors.TheCompactofMayorsisthereforea‘networkofcitynetworks’.TheCompactofMayorsoffersaformofcertificationofacity’sclimateperformance.InordertodemonstratecompliancewiththeCompactofMayors,acityhastofulfillaseriesofstepsthatculminateinthepublicreportingofitsGHGinventory,climaterisks,andanactionplanthatprovidesdetailsonhowthecityplanstoachieveitsGHGreductiontargetandimproveitsclimateresilience.RegularupdatingofitsGHGinventory,monitoringandreportingisacompliancerequirement.Inthedocument,CompactofMayors:DefinitionofCompliance,itisstated“Acompleteupdatedinventoryshallberequiredeveryfouryears,andtheinventoryyearmaybenomorethanfouryearspriortothereportingyear.”43Inaddition,“[i]nbetweenyearswheninventoriesare

42Ibid.43CompactofMayors,“CompactofMayors:DefinitionofCompliance”,online:

updated,‘off-yearreporting’,citiesshallreportalistof:(1)improvementsmadetothequalityoftheirinventory,focusingbothondataavailabilityanddataquality;and(2)areaswhereoutstandingdatachallengesexist.”44Uponfulfillingtheserequirements,acitywillbecertified“compliant”andgivenalogothatitcanuseonitspublicitymaterials.Likeallvoluntaryschemes,theCompactofMayorsdoesnothaveanypowerstoforceacitytocomplyexcepttowithholdcertificationwhenacitydoesnotmeetthecompliancerequirements.Itreliesonreputationalpressureandtheperceivedbenefitsofclimateinformationdisclosuretomotivatecitiestoparticipate.

TheGHGCityProtocolwasbrieflydiscussedinthepreviouschapterasaproductofcooperationbetweenC40,ICLEIandotheractorsincludingWorldResourcesInstitute,WorldBankandUNEP.TheGHGCityProtocolwasdevelopedbecausetherewasaneedforarobustandwidelyapplicablemethodologythatcitiescouldusetocalculateandreporttheirGHGemissions.Inotherwords,itisacompliancetoolthatadvancesthenormativegoalsofurbanclimatelaw,i.e.thatcitiesoughttopursueambitiousclimateactionbecausetheyareamajorsourceofGHGemissionsandambitiousactionoughttobeundergirdedbymonitoring,reportingandverification.ThisleadstothequestionofhowregulatorytoolssuchastheGHGCityProtocolleadtobehavioralchange.Inotherwords,howdoesdatacollectionanddisclosuresteercitiestowardsGHGemissionsabatementandclimateadaptation?Whilethepathwaysbywhichvoluntarystandardsinfluencethebehaviorofactorsarevariedandoftencontext-dependent,twopathwaysareofparticularsaliencewhenitcomestothereductionofGHGemissionsandpursuitoflow-carbondevelopmentbycities.Thesepathwayscentreonthepromotionofreflexivityamongstcityofficialsandmayors,andnormdiffusion.3.1PromotingReflexivity

Ascompliancewithvoluntarystandardsisnotmandatedbylaw,advocates

ofthesestandardsoftenusethemtopromote“reflexivity”tobringaboutpositivebehavioralchange.GuntherTeubnerproposesreflexivelawasathirdandthelateststageintheevolutionoflegalsystems.45Reflexivelaw“seekstodesignself-regulatingsocialsystemsthroughnormsoforganizationandprocedure”.46Consequently,“legalcontrolofsocialactionisindirectandabstract,forthelegalsystemonlydeterminestheorganizationalpremisesoffutureaction”.47Attheheartoftheconceptofreflexivityliestheideathat“socialpracticesareconstantlyexaminedandreformedinlightofincominginformationaboutthosevery

http://www.bbhub.io/mayors/sites/14/2015/06/Compact-of-Mayors_Definition-of-compliance-082415.pdf(accessedon1July2016).44Ibid.45GuntherTeubner,‘SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw’(1983)17LawandSocietyReview253.EricOrtsappliedthisconcepttoregulation;EricW.Orts,‘ReflexiveEnvironmentalLaw’(1995)89NorthwesternLawReview1227.46GuntherTeubner,ibid,pgs.254-255.47Ibid.

practices”.48Accordingly,theaimoflawsthatincorporatethereflexiveconceptistocreateproceduresandincentivesthatinduceactorstoassesstheiractions(hencethereflexivity)andadjustthemtoachievesociallydesirablegoalssuchasreducingGHGemissions,ratherthandictatingwhattodoinallcases.Itisforthisreasonthatinenvironmentallaw,forexample,theemphasisonreflexivityhasledtoanotabletrendof“proceduralisation”.49

Theuseofenvironmentalmanagementsystems(EMSs)isaprimeexampleofreflexiveregulation.AnEMSmaybedescribedas“aformalsetofpoliciesandproceduresthatdefinehowanorganizationwillmanageitspotentialimpactsonthenaturalenvironmentandonthehealthandwelfareofthepeoplewhodependonit”.50OrganizationswithanEMStypicallyadoptawrittenenvironmentalpolicy;identifyaspectsoftheiractivities,productsandservicesthathaveadeleteriousimpactontheenvironment;setgoalstoimprovetheirenvironmentalperformance;assignresponsibilityforimplementingtheinitiativestomeetthetargets;andhaveaprocessforevaluatingandrefiningtheEMSforfurtherimprovementinthefuture.Inthismanner,anEMSputskeyprocessesinplacetofosteriterativelearning.51ThereareseveralEMSmodels,butthemostinfluentialmodelbyfarisISO14001developedbytheInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO).52EMSsthatrequirethird-partycertificationsuchastheISO4001standardandtheEuropeanUnionEco-ManagementandAuditScheme(EMAS)areroutinelyused,particularlyintheautomobileindustry.53ResearchhasshownthatfirmsadoptEMSsforreasonsincludingregulatorypressure54,enhancementoftheircorporateimage,55andstewardshipmotivatedbyenvironmentalvaluesandcommunityrelationships.56ReviewsofEMSprogramsfromvariousindustrieshavefoundmixedevidenceofimprovedenvironmentalperformance.Forexample,ZieglerandRenningsfound

48AnthonyGiddens,TheConsequencesofModernity(PolityPress1990),pg.38.Arelatedconceptisreactivity;theideaunderlyingthisconceptisthat“individualsaltertheirbehaviorinreactiontobeingevaluated,observedormeasured”;WendyNelsonEspelandandMichaelSauder,‘RankingsandReactivity:HowPublicMeasuresRecreateSocialWorlds’(2007)113AmericanJournalofSociology1.49JuliaBlack,‘ProceduralisingRegulation:PartI’(2000)20OxfordJournalofLegalStudies597.50RichardAndrewsetal,‘EnvironmentalManagementSystems:History,Theory,andImplementationResearch’inC.CoglianeseandJenniferNash(eds),RegulatingfromtheInside:CanEnvironmentalManagementSystemsAchievePolicyGoals(ResourcesfortheFuture2001),pg.32.51TheUSEPAdescribesthesystemasa“repeatingcycle”thatallowscontinuousimprovementtooccur;online:http://www.epa.gov/ems/learn-about-environmental-management-systems#what-is-an-EMS(accessedon10January2016).52DanielJ.Fiorino,TheNewEnvironmentalRegulation(MITPress2006),pg.102.53ToshiH.Arimura,AkiraHibikiandHajimeKatayama,‘Isavoluntaryapproachaneffectiveenvironmentalpolicyinstrument?Acaseforenvironmentalmanagementsystems’(2008)55JournalofEnvironmentalEconomicsandManagement281,pg.282.54NicoleDarnall,WhyUSfirmscertifytoISO14001:aninstitutionalandresource-basedview(BestPaperProceedingsofthe2003AcademyofManagementConference,Seatlle,Washington,2003).55AndreasZieglerandKlausRennings,DeterminantsofEnvironmentalInnovationsinGermany:DoOrganizationalMeasuresMatter?ADiscreteChoiceAnalysisattheFirmLevel(ZEWDiscussionPaperNo04-30,Mannheim,2004).56JohnCaryandAnnaRoberts,‘ThelimitationsofenvironmentalmanagementsystemsinAustralianagriculture’(2011)92JournalofEnvironmentalManagement878,pg.881.

thatEMScertificationdidnotsignificantlyaffectenvironmentalinnovationandpollutionabatementbehavioratGermanmanufacturingfacilities.57BasedonJapanesefacility-leveldata,ArimuraetalfindthatISO4001implementationwaseffectiveinreducingnaturalresourceuse,solidwastegenerationandwaterwastage.58AstudyoftheFinnishpulpandpaperindustryconcludedthatthegreatestpositiveimpactofEMSsarisewhenthesystemidentifiespreviouslyunknownareasofenvironmentalimprovementforthefirm.59ItappearstobethecasethatEMSscanpromoteeffectivelearningthatleadstoincrementalimprovement,butitisnotlikelytogiverisetomajorinnovationsthatrequiresubstantialinvestment.60ItcanbearguedthatEMSsshouldthereforebepartofasuiteofregulatorytoolsanditisinsufficienttorelysolelyonEMSstomanageenvironmentalexternalities.Usedalongsidetraditionalenforcementmechanisms,EMSscanleadtoimprovedenvironmentalperformanceovertime.

ManyofthevoluntarystandardsandcompliancetoolsthataimtohelpcitiesreducetheirGHGemissionsareavariationoftheEMS.TotakepartintheCompactofMayors,citygovernmentofficialsarecommittedtoundertakeamulti-yeariterativeprocessthatwillunlocktheinformationrequiredforself-reflection,andidentifyweaknessesandpreviouslyunknownopportunitiesforGHGemissionsabatement.61Inotherwords,compliancewiththeCompactofMayorsisaboutfollowingaguidedprocessofdatacollectionandassessmentthatwillinducecitygovernmentstoassesstheirexistingpoliciesandprograms,andadjustthemtoachieveGHGreductionandclimateresiliencetargets.Cities,throughtheirnetworks,havealsodevelopedtheaccountingandreportingtoolsthattheyneedtopromotereflexivity.GlobalonlinereportingplatformslikecarbonnClimateRegistryallowcitygovernmentofficialstoeasilyperusethevastdatabaseofcityinitiatives.Theyareabletotrackhowtheircounterpartsareperforming.Benchmarkingagainsttheperformanceofothercitiescanbeanimportantcomponentofreflexivelearning.62Theuseofacommonsetofstandardstoaccountandreportcity-wideGHGemissionsiscrucialforpromotingreflexivitybecausebenchmarkingandtrackingcanbedoneeffectivelyonlywhenthedatareportedbycitiesiscomparable.Hence,thepromulgationoftheGHGCityProtocolissignificantintermsofstrengtheningreflexivityasapathwayofinfluencebywhichcitiessteertheirbehaviortowardsattainingclimatemitigationandadaptationobjectives.Finally,thereareonlineGHGinventorytoolssuchasClearPaththathavebeendevelopedbycities,throughthenetworkICLEI,andaremadeavailablefreeofchargetocitygovernments.63Thishelpstoovercomethecostsbarriertoeffectivedatacollection,whichisexpensive.

57ZieglerandRennings.58Arimura,HibikiandKatayama.59MikealHildenandothers,EvaluationofEnvironmentalPolicyInstruments:ACaseStudyoftheFinnishPulpandPaperandChemicalIndustries(Helsinki:FinnishEnvironmentalInstitute,2002),pg.113. 60Ibid.61InterviewNo.6.62InterviewNos.4and6.63ClearPathcomplieswiththeGHGCityProtocolandacitycanuseittoreportdirectlytocarbonnClimateRegistry;online:http://www.clearpath.global/features/(accessedon12July2016).

Forexample,monitoringtheimplementationoftheUN’sSustainableDevelopmentGoalsisestimatedtorequireUS$1billioninaidassistancetosupportdatacollectionindevelopingcountriesalone.643.2Normdiffusion

Theoriesofdiffusionofferanimportantaccountofhownormsandvoluntarystandardseventuallybecomewidelyadoptedbyacommunity.Accordingtothesetheories,“normentrepreneurs”–suchasinternationalorganizations,transnationaladvocacynetworksandepistemiccommunities–playanimportantroleinpersuadinga“criticalmass”ofrelevantactorstoembraceanewnormandbecome“normfollowers”.Whena“tippingpoint”isreached,wecanexpectthenormto“cascade”throughtherestofthecommunityandbecomewidelyadoptedwithinafairlycircumscribedperiodoftime.65Diffusionoccursintheabsenceofformalorcontractualobligations.Inotherwords,theactorinquestion(e.g.astateorcity)doesnothaveanyformalcommitmentstowardsagovernmentoraninternationalorganizationtoimplementthenorminquestionunlikecasesofharmonizationorcoercionininternationalpolitics.66Briefly,harmonizationreferstotheconsciousmodificationofpoliciesbygovernmentscommittedtotransnationalstandardsthattheyhavehadahandincrafting.67Statesareprimarilymotivatedtoengageinprocessesofinternationalharmonizationwhentheproblemthatneedstobesolvedcannotbeaddressedwithoutcollectiveaction.68Anothermotivationforharmonizationistoreducebarrierstothefreemovementofgoods,capitalandpeople.69Coercionoccurswhenstates,internationalorganizationsorprivateactorsuseasymmetricalpowerrelationshipstodictatepoliciestoothers.70Economicorpoliticalconditionalityaremorecommonformsofcoercionthantheuseofmilitaryforce.TheEU,forexample,influencesthedomesticpoliciesofCentralandEasternEuropeancountriesbylinkingtheopeningoftheaccessionnegotiationstopoliticalreformsaimedatimprovingtheprotectionofhumanrights.71Incontrasttoharmonizationandcoercion,diffusionisaprocesswherebypolicy-makersmake64JessicaEspeyetal, ��DataforDevelopment:��ANeedsAssessmentforSDGMonitoringandStatisticalCapacityDevelopment(SustainableDevelopmentSolutionsNetwork,2015),online:http://unsdsn.org(accessedon1July2016).65FinnemoreandSikkink,pg.895.66HelgeJörgens,‘GovernancebyDiffusion:ImplementingGlobalNormsthroughCross-NationalImitationandLearning’inWilliamM.Lafferty(ed),GovernanceforSustainableDevelopment:TheChallengeofAdaptingFormtoFunction(EdwardElgar2004),pg.252.67MichaelHowlett,‘BeyondLegalism?PolicyIdeas,ImplementationStylesandEmulation-BasedConvergenceinCanadianandU.S.EnvironmentalPolicy’(2000)20JournalofPublicPolicy305,pg.308.68Jörgens,pg.251.69Ibid.70FarizioGilardi,‘TransnationalDiffusion:Norms,IdeasandPolicies’inWalterCarlsnaes,ThomasRisseandBethA.Simmons(eds),HandbookofInternationalRelations(2ndedn,SagePublishing2012),pg.461.71Ibid.AlsoseeFrankSchimmelfennigaandUlrichSedelmeierb,‘Governancebyconditionality:EUruletransfertothecandidatecountriesofCentralandEasternEurope’(2004)11JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy661

independentdecisionsbutdotakepolicychoicesinotherjurisdictionsintoaccount.72

Therearemyriaddiffusionmechanismsbutmostmechanismscanbegroupedinthreebroadcategories:competition,learningandimitation.73Briefly,competitionwouldinvolvecitiesinfluencingoneanother’spolicychoicesastheycompetetoattracteconomicresources.Learningoccurswhenpolicy-makerslookacrossjurisdictionalborderstowardsothercitiesinsearchforeffectivesolutionstodomesticproblems.Imitationtakesplacewhenanormisadoptedbecauseitssociallyconstructedmeaningmattersmorethanitsobjectiveconsequences.Itshouldbenotedthatthesecategorizationsareadoptedasananalyticalschematicbuttheyarebynomeansmutuallyexclusive.CityAmaychoosetoadoptavoluntarystandardbecauseitwantstobeperceivedasbeingaresponsibleglobalcitizen(imitation).Thecity’spolicymakersmayhavealsoevaluatedcasestudiesandconcludedthatadoptingCityB’spracticesislikelytodeliversignificantbenefits(learning).CityA’spolicymakersmayalsotakeintoaccountthatimplementationofaparticularvoluntarystandardwillenhancethecity’s“brand”asanenvironmentallyprogressiveandattractiveplacetoliveandworkin,thusmakingthecitymoreattractivetoglobaltalent.74Whilethismaybedescribedasaformofcompetitivebehavior,itisnotcompetitionasistypicallyunderstoodintheliterature.75Inthepresentcase,learningandimitationbestexplainhowurbanclimatelawhasbecomewidelyadoptedamongstcities.3.2.1Learning Learningcanbecharacterizedasaprocessofrationalandproblem-oriented‘lessondrawing’.Policymakersfocusonthemeritsandoutputsofacertainpolicy,andtheirmotivationforadoptingthepolicyinquestionisitsperceivedcapacitytoimproveregulation.76Letustake,forexample,ChinesepresidentXiJinping’sannouncementduringhisvisittoWashingtonDCinSeptember2015thatChinaplanstoimplementanationalemissionstradingscheme(ETS)by2017.77Precedingthedevelopmentofanationalscheme,thecentralgovernmentinBeijingauthorizedtheestablishmentofpilotETSsinsevenprovinces.Thecentralgovernment

72ElkinsandSimmons,pg.35.Gilardiemphasizesthatdiffusionisnotthesameasconvergence:“diffusionistheprocessthatleadstothepatternof[policy]adoption…[while]convergencecharacterizestheoutcomeoftheprocess”;Gilardi,pg.455.73Adiffusionmechanismis“asystematicsetofstatementsthatprovideaplausibleaccountofwhythebehaviorofAinfluencesthatofB”;DietmarBraunandFarizioGilardi,‘Taking'Galton'sProblem'Seriously:TowardsaTheoryofPolicyDiffusion’(2006)18JournalofTheoreticalPolitics298,pg.299.74IdaAndersson,‘‘Greencities’goinggreener?Localenvironmentalpolicy-makingandplacebrandinginthe‘GreenestCityinEurope'’(2016)6EuropeanPlanningStudies1197;MihalisKavaratzisandG.J.Ashworth,‘CityBranding:AnEffectiveAssertionofIdentityoraTransitoryMarketingTrick?’(2005)96Tijdschriftvooreconomischeensocialegeografie506.75SeediscussioninPart3.2.3below.76RichardRose,‘WhatisLesson-Drawing?’(1991)11JournalofPublicPolicy3.77DemetriSevastopuloandPilitaClark,‘Xi,ObamaandthePoperaiseclimatehopes’FinancialTimes(25September2015).

deliberatelychosesevenprovincesthatareatdifferentlevelsofeconomicandindustrialdevelopmentsothatemissionstradingunderdifferentconditionscanbetestedandbetterunderstood.78Theprovincialauthoritiesresponsiblefordesigningandimplementingthepilotschemesweregivenconsiderableleewaytoadoptdifferentapproachestoregulatorydesignissuessuchasthechoiceofeconomicsectorsincludedinthepilotschemeandthemethodsofallocatingallowancestoregulatedentities.79Atthesametime,Chinesegovernmentofficialsandresearcherslookedcloselyattheexperiencesofotherjurisdictions,notablytheEuropeanUnionEmissionsTradingScheme(EUETS),whichistheoldestandlargestemissionstradingschemeglobally.80

ItcanbearguedthatwhenChinesepolicymakersusetheinformationgatheredfromtheexperienceoftheEUETSandthepilotschemestoupdatetheirunderstandingofhowemissionstradingworksinpractice,theirunderstandingwillshifttowardswhatthepilotexperimentshavedemonstrated.81However,theextentofthisshiftinbeliefswilldependontheconsistencyoftheinformationreceivedandthestrengthoftheChinesepolicymaker’spriorconvictions.82Thisleadstomynextpointthatlearningseldomoccursina“neat”andrationalmanner.Likeeveryoneelse,policymakersareboundedbycognitivelimitsorrelyonmultiplestrategiestocopewithcognitiveconstraints.83HerbertSimon,theeconomistbehindthetheoryofboundedrationality,arguedthatindividualsdonotseektomaximizebenefitfromaparticularcourseofactionastheyarenotcapableofassimilatingalltheinformationnecessarytodoso.Eveniftheycouldgainaccesstoallthenecessaryinformation,thehumanmindisnotabletoprocesstheinformationproperlyandnecessarilyadoptscertain‘shortcuts’andrestrictions.84Thus,whenacity’splannersengageinlearning,itmaysimplybeacaseofadoptingacertainstandardbecauseinformationaboutitismosteasilyaccessible.Theymayalsobemorekeen

78ZhongXiangZhang,CarbonEmissionsTradinginChina:TheEvolutionfromPilotstoaNationwideScheme(CentreforClimateEconomic&Policy(AustralianNationalUniversity),CCEPWorkingPaper1503,2015),pg.11,online:https://ccep.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/events/attachments/2015-04/paper_by_professor_zhang.pdf(accessedon1July2016).AlsoseePilitaClark,‘The‘blackhole’ofChinesecarbontrading’FinancialTimes(13May2014).79Zhang,ibid.80Fordetailedoverview,seeEuropeanCommission,EUETSHandbook,online:http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf(accessedon1July2016).81Gilardi,pg.465.82Agoodindicationthat“lessondrawing”hasoccurredisthatalltheChinesepilotschemeshaveonefeatureincommon–theyallincorporatemechanismstoaddresssupply-demandfluctuationsandresultingpricevolatility,asignificantproblemthathasadverselyaffectedtheperformanceoftheEUETS.83FiskeandTaylorfamouslycharacterizedthesocialperceiverasa“cognitivemiser”;SusanT.FiskeandShelleyE.Taylor,SocialCognition(1stedn,Addison-WesleyPublishing1984).Inthe1991revisededitionoftheirclassictext,theysuggestedthatthecognitivemisermetaphoroughttobereplacedwithoneofthe“motivatedtactician,afullyengagedthinkerwhohasmultiplecognitivestrategiesavailableandchoosesamongthembasedongoals,motivesandneeds”;SusanT.FiskeandShelleyE.Taylor,SocialCognition(McGraw-Hill1991),pg.13.84ItiswidelybelievedthatSimonfirstusedtheexpression“boundedrationality”inhis1957work;HerbertSimon,ModelsofMan(Wiley&Sons1957).

toadoptpoliciesandpracticesfromjurisdictionswhichtheyaremorefamiliarwith(e.g:similarculturalattributessuchasthelanguageitspeoplespeakandthecountry’scolonialorigins).85Inthislineofthinking,theChinesechosetolearnfromtheEU’sexperiencenotonlybecauseitwasrationaltodoso,butbecauseinformationandaccesstoEUETSpolicymakerswasreadilyavailableasaresultoftheEU’sactiveclimatediplomacyaimedatdeveloping“aglobalnetworkofemissionstradingsystems”86thatwillfunctionasaglobalcarbonmarket.87

Inthecaseofurbanclimatelaw,learningisanimportantnormdiffusionmechanismthatisfacilitatedbyanumberoffactors.InMexicoCity,forexample,whencitygovernmentofficialsexploredarangeofsolutionstoreducetrafficcongestionandimprovepublictransportationwithinthecitytoreduceGHGemissionsandconventionalairpollutants,theofficialslookedtoothercitiesknowntohavesuccessfullyaddressedthesameproblemsuchasBogotáinColombia.88WhenitcametoeffortstomakeMexicoCitymorebike-friendly,theylookedtoAmsterdamintheNetherlands.89Inotherwords,theytriedtolookforinstancesofbestpractices.Inthepastfewyears,thenumberoforganizationsthatproducecasestudiesofurbanclimatemitigationandadaptationbestpracticesthataremadeavailableatnocosthasgrownexponentially.90Formanycitygovernments,theissueisnotthelackofinformationaboutbestpracticesbuthowtoevaluateanddecideonthebestpracticethatwillbemostsuitableandeffectivefortheircity.91 InitiativessuchasC40’sConnectingDeltaCitiesnetworkalsoplayanimportantroleinfacilitatingthelearningprocessasameansofdiffusingurbanclimatelaw.ThroughtheConnectingDeltaCitiesnetwork,Rotterdam’ssustainabilityadvisorsworkedcloselywiththeircounterpartsinHoChiMinhCitytodeveloptheVietnamesecity’sresiliencestrategytomanagefloodrisks.92Throughthiscooperativeprocess,thenorms,practices,methodologiesandvoluntarystandardsthatconstituteurbanclimatelawwerediffusedfromonecity(Rotterdam)toanother(HoChiMinhCity)acrosscontinents.

Officialaidandtechnicalassistancefromnationalgovernmentsalsoplayaroleinprovidingmoreinformationaboutcertaincitiesoverothers,andtherefore85ElkinsandSimmons,pgs.44-45.86EuropeanCommission,QuestionsandAnswersontherevisedEUEmissionsTradingSystem(2008),online:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-796_en.htm?locale=en(accessedon1July2016).87Fordiscussion,seeKatiKulovesi,ElisaMorgeraandMiquelMunoz,‘EnvironmentalIntegrationandtheMultifacetedInternationalDimensionsofEULaw:UnpackingtheEU’s2009ClimateandEnergyPackage’(2011)48CommonMarketLawReview829.88InterviewNo.6.89Ibid.90JunichiFujinoetal,CityChampions:Scaling-upTransformativeSustainabilityInnovations(IGESDiscussionPaperpreparedfortheInternationalForumforSustainableAsiaandthePacific,2016),pg.4,online:http://pub.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/6671/attach/CTF_ISAP_Paper_070716_final.pdf(accessedon1July2016).91Ibid.92C40,‘WithHelpfromRotterdam,HoChiMinhCitylaunchesClimateAdaptationStrategy’,online:http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/with-help-from-rotterdam-ho-chi-minh-city-launches-climate-adaptation-strategy(accessedon1July2016).

influencethelearningprocess.Forexample,overtheyears,thegovernmentsoftheNetherlands,theUnitedKingdomandJapanhaveprovidedMexicowithtechnicalassistanceforenvironmentalprotectioninitiatives.93Throughcapacity-buildingprogrammes,MexicoCityofficialsbecameacquaintedwithexamplesfromcitiesinthesecountriesandarethereforemorelikelytolearnfromthesecities.94Learningcanalsobefacilitatedbyofficialbilateralcooperationbetweencities.Forexample,Singapore’sCentreforLiveableCitieshashostedgovernmentofficialsfromChinesecitieswhospentuptothreemonthsinSingaporelearningaboutitsurbangovernancestrategieswiththegoalofascertaininghowthesestrategiescanbetransplantedtocitiesinChina.95

Non-profitorganizationsalsoinfluencehowlearningproceedsasanormdiffusionmechanism.TheHewlettFoundation,forexample,isanAmericanprivatefoundationthatawardedapproximatelyUS$400millionofgrantsin2015tosolveenvironmentalandsocialproblems.96IthasactivelysupportedcivilsocietyorganizationsandthegovernmentofMexicoCitybyprovidinggrants,carryingouttrainingprogrammesandlendingexpertisetohelpthecitytackleitsairpollutionproblemandmitigateclimatechange.97Inthismanner,HewlettFoundationhasintroducedmanybestpracticesfrommajorAmericancitiessuchasLosAngelesandSanFranciscotoMexicoCity’spublicofficialswhohavedrawnlessonsandincorporatedsomeofthesepracticesandpoliciesintheirdomesticstrategies.98

TheRockefellerFoundationestablishedthe100ResilientCitiesprogram,whichadoptsaholisticapproachtowardstacklingclimatechangebyaddressingitaspartofthenumerous,inter-connectedphysical,socialandeconomicchallengesthatcitiesface.99Itpromotestheideaofresilience,whichincorporatesadaptationtotherisksofclimatechange,reducingsocialinequality,andasociety’scyber-securitypractices(cyberresilience).100Whenacitybecomesamemberofthe100ResilientCitiesprogram,theRockefellerFoundationprovidesitagrantwhichpaysthesalaryofthecity’sChiefResilienceOfficerwhohasoverallresponsibilityforspearheadingandcoordinatingthecity’sresilienceinitiatives.101ThecityofRotterdamisoneofthefirstcitiestojointhe100ResilientCitiesprogram.102Today,ithasaprogressiveandambitiousresiliencestrategythatinvolvesnumerousstakeholdersincludingthecity’ssocialwelfareagency,theenvironmentandwaterresourcesdepartment,schools,museums,smalltomid-sizedbusinesses,andcleantechnologyconsortiums.Accordingtooneofthecity’ssustainabilityadvisorswhohasworkedonclimate93InterviewNo.6.94Ibid.95CentreforLiveableCities(Singapore),‘ShanghaiOfficialsShareThoughtsonSingaporeStint’,online:http://www.clc.gov.sg/Training/trainingprogrammes.htm(accessedon1July2016).96TheHewlettFoundation,online:http://hewlett.org/about-us(accessedon1July2016).97InterviewNos.6and10.98Ibid.99100ResilientCities,online:http://www.100resilientcities.org/#/-_/(accessedon1July2016).100Ibid.101Ibid.102100ResilientCities,‘FirstResilientCitiesAnnouncedbyRockefellerFoundation’,online:http://www.100resilientcities.org/blog/entry/33-resilient-cities-announced#/-_/(accessedon1July2016).

adaptationandsubsequentlyresiliencesincethemid2000s,joining100ResilientCitiesprovedtobeaturningpointforRotterdam’sclimatechangestrategy.103Priortojoiningtheprogram,Rotterdam’sfocuswasonadaptationtofloodingandotherwater-relatedrisks.However,“joining100ResilientCitieswasverysignificantintermsofchanging[citygovernmentofficials’]attitudesfromfocusingonwateradaptationtothinkingmorebroadlyabouthowwecandesignpublicspacestobeclimate-proof.ThisthinkinghelpedtoconnectclimateadaptationtospatialdesigninRotterdam.Resiliencegaveusanewlenstolookatconnectingpoliciesandintegratingpolicyfieldsinthiscity.”104Togainfamiliaritywiththeconceptofresilience,Rotterdam’scityofficialsfoundthe100ResilientCitiesreadingmaterials,researchtoolkits(suchastheCityResilienceFramework105)andworkshopsveryhelpfulforovercomingtheinitiallearningcurveandtriggeringnewthinkingabouttheapplicationoftheresilienceconceptinRotterdam.1063.2.2Imitation

Imitationoccurswhenamayoremulatesapolicyoradherestoanormtomaximizehis/hercity’sreputationorhis/herpersonalreputation.Inthislineofthinking,normsmaybeunderstoodascommonpracticeswhosevaluetoanactorstemsfromtheirprevalenceinacommunity.107Thepredominantbenefitofnormadherenceisreputational;adheringtothenormandtherebyjoiningagrowingmajorityofactorsconfersadegreeoflegitimacyuponthecityanditsmayor.108Forexample,afterapersonalvisitbyrepresentativesoftheClintonClimateInitiativeandC40,akeyfactorthatconvincedthemayorofRotterdamtostarttakingconcertedactiononclimatechangewasthepotentialreputationalgain.109Itwas,inpart,astrategicdecisionforRotterdam,arelativelysmallglobalcity,toleverageonparticipationinC40tobuilditsreputationasaglobalcitythatisinthesameleagueasNewYorkCityandLondonwhenitcomestoaddressingclimatechange.Accordingtotheworldpolityschool,statesenterintointernationalhumanrightstreatiestosignaltheiradherencetoglobalculturalnormsthatareperceivedtobe‘universal’,‘advanced’and‘modern’.110Inasimilarmanner,urbanclimatelawperformsanexpressivefunctionwhenglobalcitiessignuptotheCompactofMayors.CommittingtotheCompactsignalsacity’sadherencetothenormsunderpinningambitiousclimateactionthatareperceivedtobe‘progressive’and‘global’.ThecumulativeeffectofmanycitiessigninguptotheMayors’Compactis

103InterviewNo.11.104Ibid.105100ResilientCities.106InterviewNo.11.107ElkinsandSimmons,pg.39.108Ibid.109InterviewNo.11.110DidemBuhari-Gulmez,WorldPolitySchool(OxfordBibliographies2014),online:http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0019.xml(accessedon1July2016).

analogousto“peerpressure”amongstcitiesandthreepossiblemotivationsforrespondingtosuch“peerpressure”arelegitimation,conformityandesteem.111

Analternative(andnotmutuallyexclusive)explanationbasedontheassumptionthatpolicy-makershavealessinstrumentalistattitudetowardsnormsisthattheychoosetoadoptthenormbecauseofabeliefinitsappropriateness.Thelogicofappropriatenessmeansthat“[a]ctioninvolvesevokinganidentityorroletoaspecificsituation.”112Fromaconstructivistperspective,actorscangenuinelychangetheirunderstandingofappropriatenessthroughdiscursiveinteractionthatgeneratesknowledge,particularlyso-called“rhetoricalknowledge”,thatisknowledgethatisofferedorcreatedindialogueandemployedinpracticalreasoning.113C40andorganizationsthatseektoinstillparticularaspectsofurbanclimatelawrecognizetheimportanceofdiscursiveinteractionandtheroleitplaysinshapingglobalcities’understandingofthosenormsandpractices.Forexample,C40organizesregularworkshopsandweb-basedseminars(webinars)tocreateopportunitiesforcityofficialstointeractandgenerate“newthinking”.114 MatchmakerisanewinitiativeoftheLowCarbonCityLab,apublic-privatepartnershipthataimstoleveragetwenty-fivebillioneurosworthofclimatefinanceforcitiesby2050.115Itaimstobeaplatformthatintroducesinvestorsandcityadministrationstoeachotherwiththeobjectiveofhelpingcitiessecurefundingfortheirclimatemitigationandadaptationprojects.116Withinitsfirstyearofoperation,Matchmakerhasorganizedanumberofworkshopsaroundtheworldtobringrepresentativesofcities,developmentbanks,sovereignfunds,commercialbanks,andcivilsocietytogethertoshapeemergingclimatefinancepracticesandstandards.117Theunderlyingassumptionisthatnormadoptionandadherenceismuchmorelikelywhentheactorinquestionbelievesinitsappropriateness.118Thus,withinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex,variousactorscreateforumsforengagementanddiscursiveinteractionamongstcities.Theseforumsthereforeplayanimportantroleinfacilitatingthediffusionofurbanclimatelawbylearningandimitationamongstcities.3.2.3Competition

Ininternationalrelations,regulatorycompetitionissaidtooccurwhenstatesstruggletoshapepolicydevelopmentsattheinternationalleveltoaccordwiththeir111FinnemoreandSikkink,pg.903.112JamesG.MarchandJohanP.Olsen,‘TheInstitutionalDynamicsofInternationalPoliticalOrders’(1998)52InternationalOrganization943,pg.951.113SeediscussioninChap3;onrhetoricalknowledge,seeFrancisJ.MootzIII,‘NaturalLawandtheCultivationofLegalRhetoric’inWillemJ.WitteveenandWibrenVanderBurg(eds),RediscoveringFuller:EssaysonImplicitLawandInstitutionalDesign(AmsterdamUniversityPress1999),pgs.442-48.114InterviewsNos.5,6,8,10,11.115LowCarbonCityLab,online:http://local.climate-kic.org/(accessedon1July2016).116Ibid.117InterviewNo.2.118ThisisaconclusionIdrewfrommyobservationsofaMatchmakerworkshopinprogress(Bonn,5July2016).

nationalpolicypatternsandlegaltraditions.Inthislineofthinking,thestate(orgroupofstates)thatmanagestosignificantlyshapearegulatorypolicyaccordingtoitspreferenceswillyieldthemostbenefitsasthatstatewillhavetheleastamountofpoliticalandeconomicadjustmentstoundertakeinresponsetothenewrule.Conversely,thestatesthathavetomakethebiggestpoliticalandeconomicadjustmentstothenewrulewillbedeemedtobeatadisadvantage.119Normdiffusionoccurswhenastate(orgroupofstates)managestosuccessfullyassertitsregulatoryinfluencesuchthatitsproposedruleornormbecomesthenormtobewidelyadoptedintheinternationalcommunity.

Anothervarietyofregulatorycompetitioncanbedefinedasaprocesswherebyrulesareselectedandde-selectedthroughcompetitionbetweendecentralized,rule-makingentities,whichcanbestatesorotherpoliticalunitssuchasregions.120Thecompetitiveprocessisexpectedtoyieldanumberofbeneficialoutcomes.First,itpromotesdiversityandexperimentationamongstthecompetingjurisdictionsinthesearchforeffectivelaws.121Secondly,whenusersoftherulesareabletoexpresstheirpreferenceforsomerules(andnotothers),itpromotestheflowofinformationonwhatworksbetterinpractice.122Finally,itcanbearguedthatregulatorycompetitionleadstothecontentofrulesbecomingmoreeffectivelytailoredtomeettheneedsofusers.123InthemodelsetoutinCharlesTiebout’sseminalarticle“APureTheoryofLocalExpenditures”,localgovernmentscompetetoattractresidentsbyofferingdifferentpackagesoffacilitiesandpublicservicesthataremadeavailableatdifferenttaxrates.124Theresidentisassumedtopickthecommunitythatoffersthepublicgoodsandservicesthatsuitshisorherpreferencesbest.Theendresultistomaximizethewelfareofresidentsaswellasmaintaindiversityamongstjurisdictions.WhileTiebout’smodelwasconcernedwiththeprovisionofpublicgoodsandservicesbylocalgovernments,lawscanalsobeviewedasatypeofpublicgood.Thediffusionofnormsoccurswhen,forexample,jurisdictionslearnfromoneanother,seektoexporttheirnormsandpractices,andputselectednormsintopractice.

Itcanbearguedthatbothvariantsofregulatorycompetitiondescribedabovedonotexplainhowurbanclimatelawisdiffusedacrossglobalcities.Tothebestofmyknowledge,thereisscantevidenceofglobalcitiesactivelyseekingtoinfluencethecontentofurbanclimatelawatthetransnationallevelinordertosecurefirst-moveradvantage.Thereisalsolittleevidencethatglobalcitiesareseekingtoofferdifferentversionsofurbanclimatelawinordertoattractresidents119K.Kern,H.JörgensandM.Jänicke,Thediffusionofenvironmentalpolicyinnovations:Acontributiontotheglobalisationofenvironmentalpolicy(WZBdiscussionpaperFSII01-302,Berlin:SocialScienceResearchCenter(WZB),2001),pgs.4-5;K.Tews,P.BuschandH.Jörgen,‘Thediffusionofnewenvironmentalpolicyinstruments’(2003)42EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch569.120SimonDeakin,‘IsregulatorycompetitionthefutureforEuropeanintegration?’(2006)13SwedishEconomicPolicyReview71,pg.74.121SimonDeakin,LegalDiversityandRegulatoryCompetition:WhichmodelforEurope?(WorkingPaperNo.323,Cambridge:CentreforBusinessResearch,UniversityofCambridge,2006),pg.4.122Ibid.123Ibid.124CharlesM.Tiebout,‘APureTheoryofLocalExpenditures’(1956)64(5)TheJournalofPoliticalEconomy416.

andbusinesses.Certainly,thereisdiversityinthepracticesandregulationstoaddressclimatechangeinglobalcitiesacrosstheworld.However,thisdiversityisattributabletotheneedforglobalcitiestolocalizeandadapturbanclimatelawtosuitdomesticneedsandcircumstancesratherthentothedynamicsofregulatorycompetition.

3.3TheRoleofNormEntrepreneurs Normentrepreneursplayanimportantroleinpromotingnormsandstrategicallyprovidinginformationonpolicytools.Transnationalchannelsofcommunicationprovidenormentrepreneurswiththebasicplatformtodisseminateknowledgeaboutnewpolicyinstruments,institutionsandinformationon“bestpractices”thatissufficientlyabstracttodiffuseandbeadaptedtodifferentpolitico-institutionalsettings.125Oneoftheimportantthingsthatnormentrepreneursdoistoraiseawarenessoftheproblemorthe“wrong”thatnewnormsorstandardsareintendedtoaddress.

ItisnotdifficulttoseehowmayorslikeMarceloEbrardofMexicoCityandKenLivingstoneofLondonactedasimportantnormentrepreneurswhentheymadetacklingclimatechangeafocusoftheirmayoralty.126AschairpersonoftheWorldMayorsCouncilonClimateChangeandthemayorofthefirstcityintheLACregiontoadoptGHGreductiontargetsandaclimatestrategy,MarceloEbrardwasinastrongpositiontopersuadeothercities,particularlythoseintheLACregion,toadoptsomeofthepoliciesthathiscityhadimplementedandthenormsunderlyingurbanclimateaction.KenLivingstone’sofficedevelopedanenergystrategythatcommittedLondontoreducingcarbondioxideemissionsby20%below1990levelsby2010asafirststeptoareductionof60%by2050.Themayor’sofficealsopubliclybackedhigh-profileprojectsthatdemonstratedthetechnicalfeasibilityofrenewableenergies,aswellasdevelopedmulti-stakeholderpartnershipsforresearchanddevelopmentofnewhydrogentechnologies.Duringthisperiod,climatechangewashighontheglobalpoliticalagendaandtherewasagreatdealofpublicconcernaboutthestalemateininternationalnegotiations.ByspearheadingthedevelopmentofLondon’sfirstclimatechangestrategy,Livingstonesoughttodemonstratethepotentialthatcitieshavetoaddressclimatechangeandtodevelopanewnormativenarrativethatcitiesoughttoaddressclimatechangebecausecitiesareamaincontributingsourcetoclimatechangebutarealsocapableoffindinginnovativesolutions.ByfoundingwhatisnowtheC40network,Livingstonecreatedanimportanttransnationalmechanismforthediffusionofthenormsandpracticesthatleadtourbanclimatemitigationandadaptation.

TransnationalcitynetworkslikeC40arealsoimportantnormentrepreneurs.AsdiscussedaboveaswellasinChapter5,C40hassetupnetworkstomakeinformationonbestpracticesavailabletoitsmemberstoencouragelearning.Itfurtherfacilitateslearningbysupportingtheseissue-specificnetworksinorganizing

125LukasHakelberg,‘GovernancebyDiffusion:TransnationalMunicipalNetworksandtheSpreadofLocalClimateStrategiesinEurope’(2014)14GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics107,pg.114.126TheinformationintherestofthisparagraphisdrawnfromChapter4.

webinarsandworkshopstodisseminateideasandprovideforumsforcityofficialstolearnfromeachother.C40’sresearchteamalsogeneratesoriginalresearch,policyrecommendations,andcasestudiesthatincreasetheavailabilityofinformationandthusfacilitatelearning.ItcanalsobearguedthatC40fostersimitationasanormdiffusionmechanismbyprovidinginformationonpeercityperformanceinaddressingclimatechangeandincreasingtransparency.Morespecifically,C40integratestheadoptionofaclimatestrategyandregularreportingintoitsbenchmarkingsystem.CitymemberscancomparetheirresultsviatheCDPwebsite,theC40website,andtheClimateActioninMegacitiessurvey.Throughthepracticeofbenchmarking,C40seekstoenhancetheperceptionthatadoptingalocalclimatestrategyisappropriateandcommendable.Further,bymakinginformationabouttheperformanceofcitymemberseasilyaccessible,C40enablesitsmembersandinterestedpartiestoidentifyandplacepressureonthegovernmentsoflaggardcities.

Theabovediscussionconsideredhowcities,throughtheirnetworks,createurbanclimatelawwhichincludesnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardssuchastheGHGProtocolforCitiesandtheMayors’Compact.ThesestandardsleadtothereductionofurbanGHGemissionsthroughtwokeymechanisms:promotingreflexivityandnormdiffusionprocesses.Throughthesepathwaysofinfluence,thenormscreatedbycitiesandtransmittedviatransnationalcitynetworksarechangingthebehaviorofcitiesthathaveelectedtoadoptthem.Whilecitiesareunabletocreatemandatoryrulesattheinternationallevel,citiesareundoubtedlyengagedintransnationalvoluntaryrulemaking.UrbanclimatelawalsointeractswiththeUNFCCCrulesandinstitutions.ThenextsectionarguesthattheinteractionbetweenurbanclimatelawandtheUNFCCCregimehavemutuallyreinforcingeffectsandresultsinanoverallexpansionofgovernancewithinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Inthisway,thereisnoconflictbetweenurbanclimatelawandtheinter-stateUNFCCregime.Onthecontrary,weseebothtypesofauthoritylinkedinstrategicanddeliberateways.

4. TheInteractionbetweenUrbanClimateLawandtheUNFCCCRegime Theemergenceofurbanclimatelawcanbeviewedaspartofaconstellationof“governanceexperiments”thathaveemergedinresponsetotheinadequaciesoftheUNFCCCtreatyregime.127CitieshavethereforehadtheopportunitytosurveytheproblemswiththeUNFCCC’sresponsetoclimatechangeandtheissuesthatthetreatyregimehasnotbeenabletoaddress.ItcanbearguedthatcitieshavethensoughttotakeadifferenttackattheclimatechangeproblemanddevelopalternativesolutionstoaddressaspectsofclimatechangethattheUNFCCCregimehasstruggledto.Atthesametime,citiesarenotapathetictotheroleoftheUNFCCCingoverningclimatechangeand,infact,lobbyformorerobustandambitiousaction

127SeediscussioninChapter2.

bystates.128Thishasledtocoupling,wherebyurbanclimatelawisdeliberatelydesignedtocomplementandstrengthentheUNFCCCregime.

IarguethatcitieshavetakenadifferentapproachtowardstheclimatechangeproblembyreframingtheissueandpromulgatinganalternativesetofrulesandpracticestothoseoftheUNFCCCregime.ThevoluntarystandardspromulgatedbycitiesandtheirnetworksaffecttheevolutionofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexaswellasreinforcetheUNFCCCregimebyservingasameanstodiffusetheauthorityoftheUNFCCregime.Inthisview,citiesprovideadditionalvenuesfortheuseandadoptionoftheUNFCCCnorms.129IwillillustratethispointlaterwithreferencetotheC40’sadherencetotheCBDRRCprinciple,whichisacornerstoneoftheUNFCCCandtheKyotoProtocol.C40’sadherencetotheprincipleisdefacto,notdejure,asitisnotlegallyboundbytheinternationalclimatechangetreaties.Byvoluntarilyadoptingthisprinciple,andapplyingittoitsmembercities,C40isindirectlyexpandingtheauthorityoftheUNFCCCregime.IusetheGlobalMayorsCompactasthethirdillustrativeexampleofcoupling.Citieshavemadeaconcertedefforttoensurethatcity-levelgovernanceeffortscomplementinternationaleffortstodevelopMRVpracticessuchthaturbanclimatelawandtheUNFFCCregimemutuallyreinforceandsupportthedevelopmentofanemergingnormoftransnationalclimatelaw.4.1Reframingtheproblem

Theearlystagesofclimategovernancewereguidedbyadominantdefinitionoftheproblemsharedbytheinternationalcommunity–thatclimatechangeisacollectiveactionproblemonaglobalscaleandthereforerequiredmultilateraltreaty-makingbasedonnegotiationsthatinvolvedallstates.130Thisthinkingwasreinforcedbyinfluentialideassuchasthe“matchingprinciple”proposedbyButlerandMacey,whichholdsthatthelevelofjurisdictionalauthorityshouldmatchthescaleoftheharmbeingregulatedtoensurethatallofthecostsoftheactivityareinternalizedwithinthejurisdictionsoastopreventfree-riding.131Inrelationtoglobalenvironmentalproblemslikeclimatechange,the“matchingprinciple”callsforinternationalregulation.Adler,followingButlerandMacey,arguesthatclimatechangepresentsanunequivocalcaseforactionatthenationalandinternationallevels.132Accordingly,citieshadlittle,ifany,contributiontomaketowardsaddressingtheproblem.Aconfluxoffactorssubsequentlycreateda“policy

128ICLEI,‘LocalGovernmentClimateRoadmap’,online:http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1197(accessedon1July2016).129ThislineofargumentwasinspiredbythediscussiononhowprivateauthoritymayaffecttheevolutionofaregimecomplexinJessicaGreenandGraemeAuld,‘UnbundlingtheRegimeComplex:TheEffectsofPrivateAuthority’(2016)TransnationalEnvironmentalLaw,DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S2047102516000121(publishedonline:20May2016).130Seediscussioninchapter2.131JonathanR.MaceyandHenryN.Butler,‘ExternalitiesandtheMatchingPrinciple:TheCaseforReallocatingEnvironmentalRegulatoryAuthority’(1996)14YaleLawandPolicyReview23,pg.25.132JonathanH.Adler,‘JurisdictionalMismatchinEnvironmentalFederalism’(2005)14NewYorkUniversityEnvironmentalLawJournal130,pg.175-6.

window”forcitiestoassertthemselvesonthegovernancelandscapeandsuccessfullyprojectauthority.133AsdiscussedinChapters3,amongstthesefactorswere(1)theeffortsbytheWorldBank,UN-Habitat,UNESCOandvariousotherinternationalorganizationstoenlistcitiesas“partners”toaddressahostofgovernancechallengesincludingracism,genderdiscriminationandpublichealthincityslumsettlementsand(2)theglobaltrendofpoliticaldecentralizationanddevolution.Asresponsibilitiesforprovidingservicestocitizenshavebeenpassedonfromnationalgovernmentstoprovincialgovernmentsandontocityauthorities,citieshaveexperiencedstrainontheirresourcesbutareemboldenedintheirclaimstoauthorityatthesametime. Takingadvantageofthepolicywindow,citiesreframedtheclimatechangeprobleminwaysthatallowedthemtocarveoutameaningfulroleforthemselves.First,citiesassertthatclimatechangerequiresamulti-levelgovernancesolution–andthatincludestheinternationallevelaswellasthelocallevel.Citiesaccountfor37-49%ofglobalGHGemissionsandurbaninfrastructureaccountsforover70%ofglobalenergyuse.134Accordingly,citiesplayacriticalroleinglobalclimatepolicyasitisincities“wherethestruggletomitigateclimatechangewillbeeitherwonorlost”.135Secondly,citieshavesoughttoredirectthefocusfromemissionreductionstounderstandingtheirsources.Thehopeisthatthisunderstanding,gainedfromtheuseofaccountingandreportingstandards,willpromotereflexivityandpolicydiffusionleadingtofuturereductionsinGHGemissions.NormentrepreneurslikeMichaelBloombergandCDP(theofficialplatformforcitiestoreporttheirclimateactions)havekeenlyreiteratedthattheultimategoalofclimateactionisredirectingoureconomiesandsocietiesontoalow-carbonpathway.Inthisregard,andthisisthethirdaspectofthereframing,citiespositionthemselvesaswellplacedtoleadtheeconomicandsocietaltransformationsastheyare“laboratoriesofdemocracy”thatcangatherimportantexperiencewithpolicyoptionsthatwillshowstate,federal,andinternationalpolicy-makersthatactionispossibleandcost-effective.136Fourthly,likemanyothertransnationalclimategovernance“experiments”,citiesandtheirnetworksadvocatethattacklingclimatechangeisorwillbeeconomicallybeneficial.137Theyattempttoshiftattentionfromthecostsofreducingemissions,whichisamajorboneofcontentionbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriesintheUNFCCCnegotiations,tothebenefitssuchaseconomicdevelopment(e.g.133Ontheconceptofapolicywindow,seeJohnKingdon,Agendas,AlternativesandPublicPolicies(Longman1995).134Leadership,SchoolandICLEI,pg.9.135UN-Habitat,‘UN-HabitatlaunchedGuidingPrinciplesforCityClimateActionPlanningattheClimateChangeConference(COP21)inParis’,online:http://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-launches-guiding-principles-for-city-climate-action-planning-at-the-climate-change-conference-cop21-in-paris/(accessedon1July2016).136Theterm“laboratoriesofdemocracy”wascoinedbyJusticeLouisBrandeistodepicttheAmericanstatesastestinggroundsforinnovativepoliciesthatcanbereplicatedbyotherstatesortranslatedtothefederallevel;NewStateIceCo.v.Liebmann(1932)UnitedStatesSupremeCourtNo.463.Ihaveco-optedthistermtorefertocitiesaspolicytestinggroundsinthecontextoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance.137MatthewHoffmann,ClimateGovernanceattheCrossroads:ExperimentingwithaGlobalResponseafterKyoto(OxfordUniversityPress2011),pg.39.

developingthecleantechnologysector)andemployment(i.e.“greeneconomy”jobs).138Finally,citiesreframetheclimatechangeissueasonepredominantlyaboutreducingGHGemissionstooneaboutthebroaderquestforsustainableurbandevelopment,i.e.,maximizingthebenefitsofurbanizationwhileminimizingitsillsaswellasimplementingthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.139TheUN-Habitathasplayedanimportantroleinthisreframingasitseekstoaddressclimatechangethroughitsspecificlensesofmanagingurbangrowthand,throughvariousprojectsandprogrammes,hasbeenencouragingandempoweringcitiestoaddressclimatechangeaspartofabroaderagendaofsustainableurbanization.140TheseinitiativesincludetheCitiesandClimateChangeInitiative,which“[builds]onUN-Habitat’slongexperienceinsustainableurbandevelopment…[tohelp]counterpartsdevelopandimplementpro-poorandinnovativeclimatechangepoliciesandstrategies”141andtheUrbanLowEmissionsDevelopmentStrategiesprojectthatprovidescitieswithtechnicalassistance“…tointegratelow-carbonstrategiesintoallsectorsofurbanplanninganddevelopment”.142

Byreframingtheproblem,urbanclimatelawpurposefullysidestepthecontentiousissuesofmitigatingemissionsandbindingtargetsthathaveobstructedtheUNFCCCregime.Inthisway,urbanclimatelawservestocomplementtheUNFCCCregimebyprovidinglesscontroversialwaysofpromotingGHGemissionreductionsandreachingactorsthat,dependingontheirlocation,maynothavebeenboundbytheKyotoProtocol.4.2UrbanclimatelawasameansofdiffusingUNFCCCnorms TheCBDRRCprincipleliesattheheartoftheinternationalclimatechangeregime.Sincethestartoftheclimatedialogue,thisprinciplehasunderpinnedtheinternationalcommunity’seffortstoaddressclimatechange.AttheSecondWorldClimateConferencein1990,countriesdeclaredthatthe“principleofequityandcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilityofcountriesshouldbethebasisofanyglobalresponsetoclimatechange.”143TheCBDRRCprincipleisarticulatedinArticle3oftheUNFCCC,highlightedintheKyotoProtocolandnumerousUNFCCCCOPdecisions,includingtheBaliActionPlanof2007andtheCancunAgreementsof2010.Severalstrandsofthoughtarebroughttogetherwithinthisprinciple.First,theprinciple“establishesunequivocallythecommonresponsibilityof[s]tatesto

138Hoffmanarguesthatthisintertwiningofeconomicbenefitsandclimateactionhasthepotentialtoshifttheemphasisawayfromthecostsofaddressingclimatechange;ibid,pg.121.139UNGeneralAssembly,Transformingourworld:the2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment(Resolution70/1adoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyon25September2015).140SeediscussioninChapter3.141UN-Habitat,‘CitiesandClimateChangeInitiative’,online:http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/initiatives-programmes/cities-and-climate-change-initiative/(accessedon21July2016).142UN-Habitat,‘Urbanlowemissiondevelopmentstrategies’,online:http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/initiatives-programmes/urban-low-emission-development-strategies/(accessedon21July2016).143MinisterialDeclarationoftheSecondWorldClimateConference,6-7November1990,para.5.

protecttheglobalenvironment.”144Secondly,thenotionofdifferentiatedresponsibilityisderivedfromthedifferencesinthelevelofeconomicdevelopmentandcapabilitiesamongststates,aswellasacountry’shistoricalcontributiontoclimatechangeasameasureofitsresponsibility.145

ThedistinctionbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriesiscapturedintherigidformofanAnnextotheUNFCCC;assuch,inUNFCCCparlance,“AnnexIstates”refertodevelopedcountriesandcountriesintransitionand“non-AnnexIstates”refertodevelopingcountries.BasedontheCBDRRCprinciple,theinternationalclimateregimecarvedoutaleadershiprolefordevelopedcountries.146TheUNFCCCstatesthatAnnexIpartiesshouldprovidenewandadditionalfinancialresourcestonon-AnnexIparties.Further,theyoughttofacilitateandfinancethetransferofenvironmentallysoundtechnologies.TheUNFCCCgoesontostatethattheimplementationoftheConventionbydevelopingcountrieswilldependontheeffectiveimplementationbydevelopedcountriesoftheircommitmentsrelatedtofinancialresourcesandtransferoftechnology,consideringthat“economicandsocialdevelopmentandpovertyeradicationarethefirstandoverridingprioritiesofthedevelopingcountryParties.”147ThebinaryunderstandingofdifferentiationfindsitsfullestexpressionintheKyotoProtocol,whichimposesemissionsreductiontargetsonlyondevelopedcountries.Fromtheoutset,theKyotoProtocol’sendorsementofsuchdifferentiationinfavourofdevelopingcountriesproveddeeplycontentious.148Further,thereweredivergentinterpretationsoftheCBDRRCprincipleandhowitoughttobeapplied.149 StartingwiththeBaliActionPlanof2007,whichlaunchedaprocesstoreach“anagreedoutcome”onlong-termcooperativeaction,thereweresignsthatthebinarynotionofdifferentiationwouldgivewaytoabroaderconceptthatgoesbeyondthesimpledistinctionbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.150Eventually,intheParisAgreement,“theeraofstrictbifurcationhascometoanend”151andwhatwehaveis“[enhanced]symmetryorparallelismbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.”TheParisAgreementrequiresallpartiestoprepare,reportandmaintainsuccessive“nationallydeterminedcontributions”or144LavanyaRajamani,‘ThePrincipleofCommonbutDifferentiatedResponsibilityandtheBalanceofCommitmentsundertheClimateRegime’(2000)9ReviewofEuropeanCommunityandInternationalEnvironmentalLaw120,pg.121.145Ibid.146Ibid;LavanyaRajamani,‘DifferentiationintheEmergingClimateRegime’(2013)14TheoreticalInquiriesinLaw151,pg.152.147Article4(7)oftheUNFCCC.148TheUnitedStatesrefusedtoratifytheKyotoProtocolandtheSenateunanimouslypassedtheByrd-HagelResolution(USSenateResolution98),105thCongress,1stsession,25July1997,whichstatesthattheKyotoProtocol’sexemptionfordevelopingcountriesisenvironmentallyflawedanddifferentiationcouldresultinseriousharmtotheUnitedStateseconomy.149ForarecentanalysisofdifferingapplicationsofCBDRRCsuggestedbymemberstates,seeLavanyaRajamani,‘TheReachandLimitsofthePrincipleofCommonbutDifferentiatedResponsibilitiesandRespectiveCapabilitiesintheClimateChangeRegime’inNavrozK.Dubash(ed),HandbookofClimateChangeandIndia:Development,PoliticsandGovernance(Earthscan2012).150CharlotteStreck,PaulKeenlysideandMoritzvonUnger,‘TheParisAgreement:ANewBeginning’(2016)13JournalforEuropeanEnvironmentalandPlanningLaw3,pg.7.151Ibid,pg.13.

“NDCs”.152CountriesarerequiredtoupdatetheirNDCseveryfiveyears.153Eachtime,theupdateneedstorepresent“aprogressionbeyondtheParty’sthencurrentnationallydeterminedcontribution.”154Italsoneedstotakeintoaccountthefive-yearly“globalstocktake”exercisemandatedunderArticle14oftheParisAgreementtoassess“thecollectiveprogresstowardsachievingthepurposeofthisAgreementanditslong-termgoals.”Maljean-DuboisdescribestheNDCprocessasareflectionofself-differentiation,which“istheresultofafullybottom-up(andvoluntary)processofself-determinationofnationalpledges.”155ShefurtherarguesthattheParisAgreementembodiesamoredynamicnotionofdifferentiation,wherebyeachsectiontakesadifferentapproachtodifferentiation,“carefullybalancingwhatwillbedifferentiatedandwhatwillbecommoninthepost-2020period.”156Forexample,thefinanceprovisionsarebasedonastrongversionofdifferentiation.Assuch,developedcountries“shallprovidefinancialresourcestoassistdevelopingcountryParties.”157Ontheotherendofthespectrumaretheprovisionspertainingtothetransparencyframework.Maljean-DuboispointsoutthatitisinthispartoftheParisAgreementthat“theobligationsofdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesareconvergingthemost”asall “Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions”158 even if the transparency framework takes into account parties’ different capacities. ThesedevelopmentsmarkasignificantdeparturefromthedifferentialtreatmentbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriescontainedintheKyotoProtocol. Asthebriefdiscussionaboveshows,theCBDRRCprincipleisanormativepillaroftheclimatechangeregime.Its meaning and application has changed significantly over time, and some may say that such changes constitute refinements that will bode well for the development of a comprehensive international framework on climate change. The CBCRRC principle has also been taken into account by cities in their norm-setting actions. ThepreambleoftheSeoulDeclarationissuedattheC40LargeCitiesClimateSummit2009statesthatC40citiessharetheviewthatitisnecessarytotakeimmediateactions“…basedontheprinciplesofco-existence,mutualbenefitandcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilities”.159Accordingly,“citiesindevelopedcountriesneedtoassisttheeffortsofcitiesindevelopingcountries”160andleadershipisexpectedfrommoredevelopedandwealthiercitiesthathavetheresourcesto,forexample,organizeandhostsummits,conferencesandworkshops.C40’sadherencetotheCBDRRC

152Article14(2)oftheParisAgreement;seeibid.pg.11fordiscussionontheNDCs.153Article4(9)oftheParisAgreement.154Article4(3)oftheParisAgreement155SandrineMaljean-Dubois,‘TheParisAgreement:ANewStepintheGradualEvolutionofDifferentialTreatmentintheClimateRegime?’(2016)25ReviewofEuropeanCommunityandInternationalEnvironmentalLaw1,pg.4.156Ibid,pg.2.157Article4oftheParisAgreement.158Article4(13)oftheParisAgreement.159PreambleoftheSeoulDeclaration,adoptedattheThirdC40LargeCitiesClimateSummit,Seoul,SouthKorea,21May2009.160Ibid.

principleisdefacto,notdejure,asitisnotlegallyboundbytheclimatechangetreaties.Byvoluntarilyadoptingthisprinciple,andapplyingittoitsmembercities,C40isindirectlyexpandingtheauthorityoftheUNFCCCregime.ItshouldbenotedthatthereareC40citieslocatedinstatesthathavenotratifiedtheKyotoProtocol.161Further,C40membercitiesTorontoandVancouverarelocatedinCanada,astatethatwithdrewfromtheKyotoProtocolduringitssecondcommitmentperiod.162Therefore,itcanbearguedthatpriortothesigningoftheParisAgreement,C40’sapplicationoftheCBDRRCprinciplewasawayforUNFCCCnormstocircumventrecalcitrantorreluctantnationalgovernmentsandfindarticulationwithinstatesatthesubnationallevel. Furthermore,theCBDRRCprinciplehastraditionallybeenappliedinthecontextofthemultilateralclimatechangenegotiations,butitcanhavewiderapplicationinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Forexample,ScottandRajamanihavearguedthatthefactthattheCBDRRCprincipleisa“fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime also implies…that state parties are obliged not just to interpret current obligations and fashion new ones in keeping with the CBDRRC principle, but also to take this principle into account in their unilateral actions vis-à-vis other parties.”163 C40’s endorsement of the CBDRRC principle similarly indicates the principle’s wider relevance, which in the present case constitutes horizontal applicationoftheprincipleamongstsub-stateentitiesdomesticallyandglobally.

4.3MRVandTransparency ThearchitectsoftheParisAgreementintendtousedatatransparencyasadrivingforcetobuildtrustandtocreateincentivesforpartiestoworktowardsclimatemitigationbasedondomesticallydeterminedtargetsvolunteeredonabottom-upbasis.164Article13oftheParisAgreementestablishes“anenhancedtransparencyframeworkforactionandsupport.”Thisinformation-basedmechanismembodiestheapproachwherebyGHGemissionreductiontargetsaredeterminednationallywhileMRVisorganizedattheinternationallevel.Inorderto“buildmutualtrustandconfidenceandtopromoteeffectiveimplementation”165,thetransparencyframeworkisintendedtoprovideinformationalclarityandpermittrackingofindividualstates’progresstowardsachievingtheirNDCs.EachpartyisrequiredtoregularlyprovideanationalinventoryreportofitsGHGemissionsand

161Forexample,theUS.162CanadawithdrewfromtheKyotoProtocolon15December2012;UNFCCC,“StatusofRatification”,online:http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php(accessedon1July2016).163JoanneScottandLavanyaRajamani,‘EUClimateChangeUnilateralism’(2012)23EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw469,pg.477.164ForanoverviewofdifferingopinionsonwhethertheParisAgreementrepresentsastepforwardinaddressingclimatechangegiventhat“countryspecifictargetsvolunteeredonabottom-upbasisarelesslikelytobesufficientlyambitious,intheaggregate,tomeetglobalgoals”,seeStreck,KeenlysideandvonUnger,pg.28.165Article13(1)oftheParisAgreement.

“informationnecessarytotrackprogressmadeinimplementingandachievingitsnationallydeterminedcontributionunderArticle4.”166Article13isthereforedescribedasrelyingonaformof‘namingandshaming’tonudgestatesintotakingactionnotonlyinconnectionwithmitigationandadaptation,butalsoinrelationtoassistance.167Theinformationsubmittedbystateswillbesubjecttoatechnicalexpertreview,whichwillidentifyareasofimprovementandcapacity-buildingneedsamongstotherthings.168Fromtheoutset,IndiaandChinawerestronglyopposedtoaninternationalMRVmechanismbecauseofitsperceivedintrusiveness.169Atthecruxoftheirreservationswastheextentofdifferentiationinrelationtotransparency.170Asaresult,thefinalwordingofArticle13reflectsadegreeofcompromiseandgivesassurancethatthetransparencyframeworkwillbe“implementedinafacilitative,non-intrusive,non-punitivemanner,respectfulofnationalsovereignty,andavoidplacingundueburdenonParties.”171 Theextensiverelianceoninformation-driventechniquestoimplementtheParisAgreementisthefirstofitskindininternationalenvironmentallaw.Toensurethatthisgovernanceexperimentgetsontherighttracktosuccessrequirestheenergyandcontributionofvariousactorsinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Inthisregard,urbanclimatelawcomplementsandsupportstheinformation-drivenapproachembodiedintheParisAgreement.InChapter5,IintroducedtheGlobalMayors’Compact.Briefly,itisavoluntaryschemethatcertifiescitiesthathavefulfilledthecompliancerequirements,whichprimarilyinvolveaccountingandreportingofGHGemissioninventoriesaswellasmitigationandadaptationactions.Itisnoteworthythat,atthelaunchoftheGlobalMayors’Compactatthehigh-profileClimateSummitinNewYorkCityon23September2014,itwasrepeatedlyemphasizedthatoneoftheCompact’skeyaimsisto“[d]emonstratethecommitmentofcitygovernmentsto…moreambitious,transparent,andcrediblenationalclimatetargetsbyvoluntarilyagreeingtomeetstandardssimilartothosefollowedbynationalgovernments”(emphasisadded)intherun-uptotheUNFCCC21stCOPinParisandbeyond.172Specifically,theCompactseekstohavecity-levelinitiativescomplementandsupporttheinternationalclimatenegotiationsbyadoptingthepledge-and-reviewapproachthatunderpinstheParisAgreementanddevelopingasetofMRVstandardsandpracticesthataresimilartothoseattheinternationallevel.Forexample,the“CityClimate

166Article13(7)oftheParisAgreement.167JorgeEVinuales,TheParisClimateAgreement:AnInitialExamination(PartIIIofIII)(BlogoftheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,8February2016),online:http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-iii-of-iii/(accessedon1July2016)168Article13(11)oftheParisAgreement.169AlexBarkerandPilitaClark,‘Indiaslowsprogressonambitiousclimatechangeaccord’FinancialTimes(16November2015);PilitaClark,‘COP21:ChinaaccusedofblockingprogressatParisclimatetalks’FinancialTimes(8December2015).170Vinuales.171Article13(3)oftheParisAgreement.172CitiesMayorsCompactActionStatement(IssuedattheClimateSummit2014),‘Goals,ObjectivesandCommitments’,online:http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/CITIES-Mayors-compact.pdf(accessedon1July2016).

Commitments”173thatcitiesarerequiredtopledgeuponjoiningtheCompactaresimilartotheNDCsthatstatesarerequiredtoreportpursuanttotheParisagreement.InbothcasesoftheCityClimateCommitmentsandtheNDCs,itisexpectedthatcivilsociety,journalists,andotherinterestedactorswhoareabletoscrutinizethepubliclyavailabledatawillcontributetoholdingcitiesandstatesaccountable.Thehopeisthatthepublicscrutinywillcreateincentivesforcityandnationalgovernmentstoundertakemoreambitiousactionstosecurereputationalbenefitsoravoidbeing“namedandshamed”fordeviatingfromthestandardofappropriatebehavior.Atthetimeofwriting,themodalities,proceduresandrulesthatwillunderpintheParisAgreement’stransparencyframeworkhaveyettobedetermined.ItisthereforenotpossibletoundertakeamoredetailedanalysisofMRVattheinternationallevelandatthesubnationallevelexcepttonotethattherearealreadyclearsignsthatcitiesintendtodevelopaglobaltransparencyframeworkthatwillmirrorMRVattheinternationallevelascloselyaspossible.Inthisthirdexampleofcoupling,weseehowurbanclimatelawseekstocomplementandstrengthentheinternationalclimateregime.

5. Conclusion

Thischaptersoughttoadvancetheargumentthatglobalcitiesarebeginningtoperformaroleincreatinglaw.Basedonasetofnormsthatpositthatcitiesoughttoandcanplayameaningfulroleinglobaleffortstoaddressclimatechange,globalcitieshavecooperatedwithvariousactorsincludingdevelopmentbanks,NGOsandenvironmentalconsultanciestodeveloppracticesandvoluntarystandards.Icointheterm“urbanclimatelaw”torefertothesenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardspromulgatedbyglobalcitiesandimplementedthroughtheirtransnationalnetworks. Urbanclimatelawreliesontwokeypathwaystosteerthebehaviorofcitiesandtheirgovernmentstowardsclimatemitigationandadaptationaswellasinvestinginlow-carbondevelopmentoptionsforthefuture.Thepromotionofreflexivityandnormdiffusionoftendonotproceedinalinearfashionbutconstitutereiterative,dynamicinteractionalprocessestospreadtheadoptionofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.Relyingoninsightsfromthetheoreticalliteratureandempiricalfindings,thediscussioninthischaptershowedhowcitiesandtheirgovernmentsengageinlearningandimitation,andthecrucialroleofnormentrepreneursinfacilitatingtheseprocesses. Finally,thelastpartofthischapteradvancedtheargumentthattheinteractionbetweenurbanclimatelawandtheUNFCCCregimehasbeenstrategicandmostlymutuallybeneficial.CouplingnotonlystrengthenstheUNFCCCregime;endorsementandaffirmationoftheprinciplesandpracticesoftheUNFCCCalsolendslegitimacytourbanclimatelaw.Theanalysisoncouplingalsomakesacontributiontotheenduringdebateabouttheroleofsoftlawinglobalgovernancebydemonstratingthaturbanclimatelaw,asaformofsoftlaw,playsanimportant

173CompactofMayors,online:http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/(accessedon1July2016).

complementaryroletothatoftherelativelyhardUNFCCCregimethroughnormelaboration,facilitatingexperimentationandgeneratingknowledgeaboutnovelinstitutionalpractices.Asconsistentlyarguedinthischapter,softlawandhardlawnotonlysupportandcomplementoneanother,buttheinteractionbetweenthemcanresultinasynergisticexpansionofgovernancethataddstotheoverallcoherenceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.ItcanbearguedthattheinternationalcommunitysacrificedambitionforthesakeofuniversalparticipationwhenitagreedtoputtheNDCsatthecentreoftheParisAgreement’smitigationframework.Asavoluntary,bottom-upprocess,thereistheriskthattheaggregateeffectoftheNDCswillnotbesufficienttomeetthetwodegreeCelsiustarget.Thereisalreadyevidenceofthisambitiongap,astheParisDecision“notedwithconcern”.174Assuch,itisallthemoreimportantthatotherelementsofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexhelpmaintainthemomentumandambitionthatwasseenintherun-uptoCOP-21inParisaswellassupportthedevelopmentofthenovelmechanismsthattheParisAgreementhasintroduced.IftheParisAgreementisamilestonethatmarksthebeginningofanewerafortheinternationalclimateregime,italsomarksthebeginningofanewchapterforthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Withintheregimecomplex,globalcitieshaveauniquecontributiontomake.

174Para.17,Decision1/CP.21:AdoptionoftheParisAgreement,UNFCCC,ReportoftheConferenceofthePartiesonitstwenty-firstsession,heldinParisfrom30Novemberto13December2015.

Chapter7:ANormativeAssessmentofUrbanClimateLaw

1. Introduction

Theprecedingchaptersexaminedindetailwhatfiveglobalcitiesaredoingtoaddressclimatechange,andhowglobalcitieshavecometogethertoformatransnationalnetworktoscaleuptheirclimateactionsandfacilitatethediffusionofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.Chapter6examinedthemechanismsofurbanclimatelawanditsinteractionswiththeUNFCCCnormativeframework.Thischapterendeavourstotakeastepbackfromtheintricatedetailsandconsidersome‘bigpicture’questions.ThefirstquestionIwouldliketoexploreinthischapterishowthetransnationalcooperativeeffortsamongglobalcitiesandurbanclimatelawcontributetowardstheperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex. Throughoutthisthesis,Abbott’sconceptionofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexhasbeenusedtoframethediscussionofhowmultiplegovernanceactorsandinstitutionscurrentlygovernclimatechange.AsmentionedinChapter2,Abbott’sdefinitionisarefinementofKeohaneandVictor’sconceptualizationoftheclimatechangeregimecomplexintheirarticlepublishedin2011as“alooselycoupledsystemofinstitutions…[which]arelinkedincomplementaryways.”1Inthisframing,urbanclimatelawconstitutesaregimeorinstitutionwithintheregimecomplex.KeohaneandVictoroffersixevaluativecriteriatoassessregimecomplexesnormativelyaswellasidentifysomewaysinwhichthefunctioningoftheclimatechangeregimecomplexcanbeimproved.Thesesixcriteriaare:(1)coherenceamongstregimesinthesenseofbeingcompatibleandmutuallyreinforcing;(2)accountabilitytorelevantaudiences;(3)determinacyofrulesinordertoenhancecomplianceandreduceuncertainty;(4)sustainabilityinthesenseofbeingdurable;(5)epistemicqualityinrulesand(6)fairnessinthesensethat“[institutions]shouldprovidebenefitswidely.”2Thechoiceofthesecriteriaisnotrandom;factorssuchascoherenceandtheepistemicqualityofrulesarewidelyusedasbenchmarkstoevaluatetheintegrityandsoundnessofnormativesystems.InPart2ofthischapter,thesesixcriteriawillbeusedtoevaluatetheextenttowhichurbanclimatelawcontributestowardsenhancingtheoverallperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Thekeyconclusionisthatglobalcitiesandtheirnetworksstrengthenthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex. ItshouldbeclarifiedthattheaimofPart2isnottoassesstheoverallperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex,buttoevaluatethenormativecontributionofglobalcities-throughtheircreationand

1RobertO.KeohaneandDavidG.Victor,‘TheRegimeComplexforClimateChange’(2011)9PerspectivesonPolitics7,pg.9.2KeohaneandVictor,pgs.16-17.

implementationofurbanclimatelaw–tothetransnationalgovernanceofclimatechange.AsKeohaneandVictorhavepointedout,“[w]hethertheproliferationofdifferentforumsworkingontheclimateissue–suchastheG20,theMEF,variousbilateraltechnologyandinvestmentpartnerships,andprivatesectorandNGOinitiatives–isanassetorliabilitydependsontheircontentandhowtheseeffortsarecoupled.”3IncarryingouttheassessmentinPart2,Iwillalsoelaborateuponthesixcriteriatoprovideafullerbasisforfutureregimecomplexanalysis. HavingconcludedinPart2thatglobalcitiesandtheirnetworkshaveavaluablenormativeroletoplayinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex,Part3takesastepfurtherinthemacro-levelanalysisandconsiderswhattheemergenceofcitiesastransnationallaw-makingactorsmeansforthestudyofinternationallawandinternationalrelationsmorebroadly.Whilethegrowingprominenceofcitiesontheinternationallevelhasgeneratedlivelydebateamongstsociologists,politicalscientistsandgovernancescholars,internationallawscholarshavelargelyneglectedthisdevelopment.4Itwillseemthatwhatisunfoldinginpractice–thatcitiesperceivethemselvesashavingaroletoplayinglobalgovernance,thatthetransnationalactivitiesofcitiesgeneratenormativity,andthatregimessuchastheUNFCCCrecognizecitiesasstakeholdersintheinternationalclimatechangenegotiations-isnotrelevanttointernationallaw.Thisthesishassoughttoshowthattheoppositeistrue.Forone,thetransnationalgovernanceactivitiesofcitiesoughttobeofinteresttointernationallawscholarsbecausetheseactivitiessteerbehaviorinalaw-likemanner.Further,astheanalysisinPart2ofthischapterwillshow,thenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatglobalcitieshavedevelopedandareimplementingraisequestionsofaccountability,transparencyandfairness.Thesearequestionsthatarecentraltothestudyofinternationallawintoday’sworld.Thereisthereforeacasetobemadeforinternationallawscholarstopayattentiontotheriseofglobalcitiesasrelevantactorsintheclimatechangecontextandininternationalaffairsmorebroadly.Part3willalsooffersomethoughtsonhowtheresponsesofinternationallawandpracticetotheemergenceofglobalcitiesastransnationallawmakingactorsmaycontributetowardstheongoingmultidisciplinaryconversationaboutglobalcities.Part4offerssomeconcludingremarks.

3Ibid.4Thereareafewnotableexceptions.See,forexample,YishaiBlank,‘LocalismintheNewGlobalLegalOrder’(2006)47HarvardInternationalLawJournal263;G.E.FrugandDavidBarron,‘InternationalLocalGovernmentLaw’(2006)38TheUrbanLawyer1;IleanaPorras,‘TheCityandInternationalLaw:InPursuitofSustainableDevelopment’(2008)36FordhamUrbanLawJournal537;JanneE.Nijman,‘RenaissanceoftheCityasGlobalActor:TheRoleofForeignPolicyandInternationalLawPracticesintheConstructionofCitiesasGlobalActors’inGuntherHellmann,AndreasFahrmeirandMilosVec(eds),TheTransformationofForeignPolicy:DrawingandManagingBoundariesfromAntiquitytothePresent(OxfordUniversityPress2016);JanneE.Nijman,‘TheFutureoftheCityandtheInternationalLawoftheFuture’inSamMullerandothers(eds),TheLawoftheFutureandTheFutureofLaw(TorkelOpsahlAcademicEPublisher(Oslo,Norway)2011);HelmutPhilippAust,‘ShiningCitiesontheHill?TheGlobalCity,ClimateChange,andInternationalLaw’(2015)26EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw255.

2. EvaluatingUrbanClimateLawintheTransnationalRegimeComplexContext

Akeyquestionthatarisesfromthediscussionintheearlierchaptersiswhetherthenormativeactivitiesofglobalcitiesmakeanoverallpositivecontributiontowardsthecollectiveeffortsofstatesandnon-stateactorstogovernclimatechangemoreeffectivelyandthereforebringusclosertoachievingtheobjectivesoftheParisAgreement.Intheirpioneeringarticleontheclimatechangeregimecomplex,KeohaneandVictorproposesixcriteriaasaframeworkforanalyzingtheperformanceoftheclimatechangeregimecomplexasawhole.Thissectionpositsthatitwouldbemeaningfultousethecriteriatoevaluatetheperformanceoftheindividualregimesorinstitutionswithintheregimecomplex.Thispresentsonewayofansweringthequestionofwhetherurbanclimatelaw,asoneoftheregimeswithintheclimatechangeregimecomplex,contributespositivelytotransnationalclimatechangegovernanceandwhatimprovementsmaybemade. Inthediscussiontofollow,eachcriterionwillbeelaborateduponbeforeitisusedtoevaluatesalientaspectsofthecreationandimplementationofurbanclimatelaw.ThissectionwillconcludewithasummaryoverviewbeforethediscussioninPart3aboutthebroaderimplicationsthattheriseofglobalcitiesaslawmakingactorsposesforthestudyofinternationallaw.

2.1Coherence

InKeohaneandVictor’sview,thecoherenceofaregimecomplexdependsontheextenttowhichthevariousspecificregimesare“compatibleandmutuallyreinforcing.”5Coherenceisperceivedtobeagoodthinginautilitariansense:“[w]herecompatibilitiesexisttheyencouragelinkagesthatmakeiteasiertochannelresourcesfromoneelementoftheregimecomplextoanother…”6IwillseektofurnishKeohaneandVictor’sdefinitionwithmoredetailbeforeproceedingtoevaluatetheextenttowhichurbanclimatelawcontributestowardsbuildingcoherenceintheregimecomplex. TheconceptofcoherencehasreceivedsignificantattentionintheliteratureonthefunctioningoftheEU,whichseekstoliveuptoitsself-imposedcommitmenttoensurethecoherenceofitspolicies.InterestincoherencepredatedthecreationoftheEU’ssingleinstitutionalframeworkgiventhat,withouttheunifyingframework,thepoliticalfunctioningoftheEUresteduponthelegalobligationofcoherence.7Today,Article13oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionconstitutesthelegalbasisforcoherenceinEUforeignpolicyandcoherencehasemergedasaprincipleunderstoodtoimposeaproceduralobligationonEUforeignpolicyactorstocoordinatetheirpolicies.8FromtheperspectivesoftheEuropeanCommissionand

5KeohaneandVictor,pg.16.6Ibid.7DeidreCurtin,‘TheConstitutionalStructureoftheUnion:AEuropeofBitsandPieces’(1993)30CommonMarketLawReview17,pg.27.8ClaraPortelaandKoljaRaube,(in-)CoherenceinEUForeignPolicy:ExploringSourcesandRemedies(PaperpresentedattheEuropeanStudiesAssociationBi-annualConvention,LosAngeles,April

theCouncil,acoherentEUforeignpolicyisanecessarypreconditionforeffectiveness.9Severalscholarshavepointedoutthedistinctionbetweenconsistencyandcoherence.InHillion’sview,forexample,coherencegoesbeyondtheassurancethatdifferentpoliciesdonotcontradicteachother,toseeksynergyandaddedvalueinthedifferentcomponentsofEUpolicies.10Hoffmeisteralsoarguesthatthenotionofcoherencerelatesmoretothepursuitofpositivesynergiesthansimplyavoidingpolicycontradictions.11Finally,ithasbeenarguedthatconsistencyisabinarydefinition,thatis,policiesinquestionareconsistentornot.Incontrast,wecanconceiveofaspectrumofcoherencewherebyasetofpoliciescanbemoreorlesscoherent.12Inbrief,coherencecantaketheformofalegalobligationofaproceduralnaturetoavoidinconsistenciesinasetofpolicies,butitiswidelyarguedthatcoherenceismorethanseekingconsistency.Itrelatestoseekingpositivesynergiestomaximizepolicybenefits. Recallingitsdefinition,aregimecomplexisalooselycoupledsystemofinstitutions.Itischaracterizedbytheabsenceofhierarchyamongsttheinstitutionsandthereislittle,ifany,centralcoordinationamongstinstitutions.Thus,unlikeaninstitutionalcomplexliketheEU,regimecomplexesdonothaveformalinstitutionalarrangementsandprocessesinplacetocreatecoherence.Instead,coherenceinaregimecomplexhastobeorchestratedthroughlessformaleffortsbytheactorsinvolved.Theliteratureonregimeinterplay,withitsfocusonthegoalsandmethodstoachieveintegrationinaregimecomplex,offerssomerelevantinsights.Forexample,coherencecanbeenhancedthroughtheadherencetoover-archinggoalssuchastheavoidanceofconflict,enhancingsynergy,achievingefficiencyandpromotingequity.13Coordinationthroughmarketsandnetworksaresomeofthemethodsthatcanbeemployedtocreateintegrationandcoherence.Further,MorinandOrsiniremindusthat“[t]hecreationanddevelopmentofregimecomplexesisanythingbutanaturalprocess;theyareactivelyconstructedbyagents.”Assuch,theycontendthatthemorecoherentstatesandotheractorsareintheirpoliciestowardsthespecificregimesinaregimecomplex,themorelikelyitistopromote

2009),pg.4.Article13oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionstates“TheUnionshallhaveaninstitutionalframeworkwhichshallaimtopromoteitsvalues,advancesitsobjectives…andensuretheconsistency,effectivenessandcontinuityofitspoliciesandactions.”9See,forexample,EuropeanCommission,EuropeintheWorld–SomePracticalProposalsforGreaterCoherence,EffectivenessandVisibility(CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanCouncilofJune2006COM(2006)278final,2006).10ChristopheHillion,‘Touspourun,Unpourtous!CoherenceintheExternalrelationsoftheEuropeanUnion’inM.Cremona(ed),DevelopmentsinEUExternalRelationsLaw,CollectedCoursesoftheAcademyofEuropeanLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2008),pg.17.11FrankHoffmeister,‘Inter-pillarCoherenceintheEuropeanUnion'sCivilianCrisisManagement’inStevenBlockmans(ed),TheEuropeanUnionandCrisisManagement:PolicyandLegalAspects(T.M.C.AsserPress2008),pg.161.12AntonioMissiroli,CoherenceforEuropeanSecurityPolicy:Debates,Cases,Assessments(OccasionalPapers27,TheInstituteforSecurityStudies,WesternEuropeanUnion,2001),pg.4;online:http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ027.pdf(accessedon29July2016).13SebastianOberthür,‘InterplayManagement:EnhancingEnvironmentalPolicyIntegrationAmongInternationalInstitutions’(2009)9InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements:Politics,LawandEconomics371.

“density”intheregimecomplex.14Densityreferstothenumberofconnectionsbetweentheregimes,andtheassumptionisthatthegreaterthenumberofconnectionsbetweenregimes,themorepathwaysandopportunitiesexistforthefosteringofcoherenceamongstthenormsandpracticesoftheindividualregimes. Theliteratureonregimeinteraction(denotingthatoneregimemayinfluenceotherregimes15)isalsorelevantforthestudyofcoherence.OranYoungwasoneofthefirstscholarstoidentifydifferenttypesofregimeinteractions,including“clusteredinstitutions”(whereseveralindirectlyrelatedinstitutionsarebundledtogether,ashashappenedinthe“packagedeals”thatformedtheWorldTradeOrganizationandtheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea)and“overlappinginstitutions”(wheredistinctinstitutionalarrangementsaffecteachotherinmostlyunintentionalways,forexample,thetradeandenvironmentalagreements).16StokkerefinedOranYoung’stypologybyintroducingthenotionsof“normativeinteraction”(whereoneregimemayconfirmorcontradictthenormsofanotherregime)and“ideationalinteraction”(whereoneregimemaylearnfromanother).17Theconsequencesofregimeinteractioncanincludeconflictsorsynergies,anditisthelatterthatIaminterestedinexploringforpresentpurposes. ForKristenRosendal,thereissynergywhentheaggregateeffectsoftwoinstitutionsarelargerthanthesumofeffectsproducedontheirown.18AsvanAsseltputsit,“thetermhasapositiveconnotation,associatedwithenhancingtheeffectivenessofoneorbothinteractingregimes.”19VanAsseltprovidesalistofindicatorsthatprovideatangiblewayofassessingwhetherregimeinteractioncouldleadtosynergies,whichcanbeusefullyadaptedtodeterminetheexistenceofsynergiesinaregimecomplex.20Thefirstindicatoriswhethertherearesharedprinciples,theassumptionbeingthatwhenregimesapplythesameprinciples,suchastheCBDRRCprinciple,itenhancestheregimecomplex’scoherence.Thesecondindicatoristheexistenceofcommoneconomicincentivestopromotethesametypeofactivities.VanAsseltgivestheexampleoftheGlobalEnvironmentalFacilityservingasthefinancialmechanismforanumberofmultilateralagreementstherebyprovidingcommoneconomicincentivestoaddressglobalenvironmentalproblemsincludingbiodiversitylossandclimatechange.Thethirdindicatoristheexistenceofstreamlinedmonitoringandreportingobligations.VanAsseltpointsoutthatsynergiesarecreatedwhenthemonitoringandreportingobligationsunderdifferentregimesarestreamlinedtherebyreducingdatacollectioncosts.Thefourth14JeanFrédéricMorinandAmandineOrsini,‘Policycoherencyandregimecomplexes:thecaseofgeneticresources’(2014)40ReviewofInternationalStudies303,pg.308.15H.vanAsselt,TheFragmentationofGlobalClimateGovernance:ConsequencesandManagementofRegimeInteractions(EdwardElgar2014),pg.46.16OranYoung,‘InstitutionalLinkagesinInternationalSociety:PolarPerspectives’(1996)2GlobalGovernance1,pgs.2-6.17OlavSchramStokke,TheInterplayofInternationalRegimes:PuttingEffectivenessTheorytoWork(TheFridtjofNansenInstitute,FNIReport14/2001,2001),pg.10.18KristenG.Rosendal,‘ImpactsofOverlappingInternationalRegimes:TheCaseofBiodiversity’(2001)7GlobalGovernance95,pg.97.19vanAsselt,pg.55.20Ibid,pg.56-58.Theremainderofthisparagraphdrawsfromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.

indicatoristheexistenceofsharedsupportingmeasuressuchascapacitybuildingandtechnologytransfermechanismsamongsttheregimes.Thefifthindicatoristheextentoflearningamongtheregimes. Applyingthefirstindicatorofsharednormsandprinciples,itcanbearguedthaturbanclimatelawcontributestoconsistencyandcompatibilitybecausethenormsandpracticesofcitiesareconsistentwiththegoalsofotheractorsintheregimecomplex–climatemitigationandadaptation–andthegeneraladherencetothenotionsofenvironmentalliberalism.Further,citiesactingthroughtheC40supporttheCBDRRCprinciple.AnotherexampleistheCompactofMayorsinitiative,whichisintendedtocomplementthetransparencyframeworkengenderedbytheParisAgreement.Assuch,thereisstrongadherencebyglobalcitiestoacommonprincipleoftransparencythatformsakeypillarofthepost-2020UNFCCCregime. Withregardtothesecondindicatorofwhethercommoneconomicincentivestopromotethesametypeofactivitiesexist,itcanbearguedthatclimatefinanceintheUNFCCCregimeandotherinstitutionssuchastheWorldBankanddevelopmentaidagenciesprovidecommoneconomicincentivestopursuelow-carbondevelopment,climatemitigationandadaptation.Thecommoneconomicincentivesprovidedbyclimatefinancearebeingextendedtotherealmofsustainableurbandevelopmentandglobalcitiesarebeingencouragedtoengageintransnationalclimatefinancingarrangementsintheireffortstoaddressclimatechange.Asdiscussedinearlierchapters,thevarious‘orchestration’effortsbytheWorldBankandotheractorsincludetrainingprogramstobuildthecapacityofcitygovernmentstogainaccesstosourcesofclimatefinanceand‘matchmakerworkshops’toconnectpotentialinvestorsandcitygovernmentsthatareseekingfundingforclimateprojects. Thestreamliningofreportingandmonitoringobligationscreatesfurthersynergybetweenurbanclimatelaw,climateinitiativesbyprivateactors,andtheUNFCCCregime.TheUNFCCChasaglobalplatformknownastheNon-StateActorZoneforClimateAction(NAZCA)whichtracksclimateactioncommitmentsbycompanies,cities,regionsandinvestors.21TheinformationthatcitiesreportviatheCompactofMayor,CDPandcarbonnClimateRegistryisautomaticallyincludedinNAZCA.22Thisenhancestransparency.Atthesametime,areadilyaccessibleplatformforclimatechangegovernanceactorstolearnaboutpotentialcollaborationopportunitieshasthepotentialtoenhancesynergisticcooperationandcomplementaryactionamongstglobalcitiesandotheractorsintheregimecomplex. Thefifthindicatorpointstotheextentoflearningamongtheregimes.Citiescontributetothelearningprocesseswithintheregimecomplexwhentheycooperatewithotherinstitutionsindevelopingtheirnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.ThishasbeendiscussedindetailinChapter6,andwillnotbereiteratedhere.

21NAZCA,online:http://climateaction.unfccc.int(accessedon1August2016).22NAZCA,“DataPartners”,online:http://climateaction.unfccc.int/about(accessedon1August2016).

Tosummarize,thedeminimisrequirementsofcoherenceappeartobeconsistencyandcompatibilityofthepracticesandoutputsofthevariousregimes.Synergiesamongregimesinaregimecomplexcreatecoherence,wherebysynergyissaidtoexistwhentheaggregateeffectsoftworegimesarelargerthanthesumofeffectsproducedontheirown.23Aregimecomplexcanbesaidtobemorecoherentwhenthereismoresynergyamongsttheregimeswithinit,andlesscoherentwhenthereislesssynergy.Finally,wecanuseanumberofindicatorsassuggestedbyvanAsselttogaugethelevelofsynergy,therebyalsogaugingtheamountofcoherenceinaregimecomplex.Itcanbearguedthaturbanclimatelawislargelyconsistentandcompatiblewiththenormsandpracticesofotherinstitutionsintheregimecomplex.Particularlyinrelationtosharednorms,streamlinedmonitoringandreportingobligations,andtheextenttowhichglobalcitiescontributetowardslearningwithintheregimecomplex,globalcitiescanbesaidtobeenhancingsynergiesandthereforecontributingpositivelytothelevelofcoherenceinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.

2.2Determinacy

KeohaneandVictordrawtheirdeterminacycriterionfromThomasFranck’sworkonlegitimacy.InFranck’sview,therearefourcharacteristicsofarulethatdetermineitsdegreeoflegitimacy–determinacy,symbolicvalidation,coherenceandadherence.24Totheextentthataruleexhibitsthesefourcharacteristics,theyexertaninherentpoweroverstatestocomplywiththeruleinquestion.25Ofthefourcharacteristics,Franckarguesthattextualdeterminacyis“[p]erhapsthemostself-evidentofallcharacteristicsmakingforlegitimacy.”26Textualdeterminacyrefersto“theabilityofthetexttoconveyaclearmessage”sothatthoseaddressedknowexactlywhatisrequiredofthem,whichisanessentialprerequisiteforcompliance.27“Readilyascertainablenormativecontent”isthereforeanotheraspectofdeterminacy.28 Franckarguesthattheindeterminacyofrulescanbecostlyinthesensethatindeterminacymakesiteasierforactorstojustifynoncompliance.29Conversely,amoredeterminateruleleaveslessroomforinterpretationandthereforeislessamenabletoevasivestrategiesthatareemployedtojustifynoncompliance.Franckalsopointsoutthatthedegreeofthedeterminacyofaruledirectlyaffectsthedegreeofitsperceivedlegitimacy.30Thispointisillustratedasfollows:“Arulethat

23Rosendal,pg.97.24ThomasM.Franck,‘LegitimacyintheInternationalSystem’(1988)82(4)TheAmericanJournalofInternationalLaw705,pg.712.Franckdefineslegitimacytomean“thatqualityofarulewhichderivesfromaperceptiononthepartofthosetowhomitisaddressedthatithascomeintobeinginaccordancewithrightprocess”;pg.706.25Ibid,pg.712.26Ibid,pg.713.27Ibid.28ThomasM.Franck,ThePowerofLegitimacyamongNations(OxfordUniversityPress1990),pg.52.29Franck,‘LegitimacyintheInternationalSystem’,pg.714.30Ibid,pg.716.

prohibitsthedoingof‘badthings’lackslegitimacybecauseitfailstocommunicatewhatisexpected,exceptwithinaverysmallconstituencyinwhich‘bad’hasachievedahighdegreeofculturallyinducedspecificity.Tobelegitimate,arulemustcommunicatewhatconductispermittedandwhatconductisoutofbounds. WhileFranckisconcernedwiththetextualdeterminacyofrulesfoundintreaties,resolutionsofinternationalorganizationsandsoforth,nothinginhisanalysisprecludesextendingthediscussionofruledeterminacytotherealmofvoluntarystandards.31Inacommunityorganizedaroundrules,whetheritisacommunityofstates,privateactorsorcities,complianceissecured,atleastinpart,bytheperceptionofaruleaslegitimatebythosetowhomitisaddressed.Whethertheruleisfoundincustomaryinternationallaworispromulgatedbyavoluntarycertificationschemedoesnotreallymakeadifference–thequestionofwhetherthosetowhomtheruleisaddressedwillcomplyturnsonwhethertheydeemitlegitimate.Legitimacy,inturn,ispartlydeterminedbythetextualdeterminacyoftheruleinquestion. Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapters,theGHGProtocolforCitiesandtheCompactforMayorsbothprovideuserswithdetaileduserguidelinesthatareintendedtoconferahighdegreeofspecificityontheaccountingstandardsandcriteriathatglobalcitiesarerequiredtoapply.TheCompactofMayorsalsopublishesuserguidesthataredesignedtohelpcitiesgainafirmgraspofthescopeoftheirreportingobligations,therebymakingthenormativecontentofthevoluntarystandardclearlyascertainabletocitiesthatseekcertification.32TheGHGProtocolforCitiesiscontainedinadocumentofoveronehundredandseventypages,containingdetailedinformationaboutgoalsetting,determiningtheboundariesorparametersofthecity’sGHGinventory,theaccountingmethodologiesforvarioussectors(suchaswasteandtransportation),andmethodsofverificationtoassessthecompletenessandaccuracyofreporteddata.33GHGemissionstandardsenjoyahighdegreeofdeterminacybecausetheylendthemselvestoobjectivemeasurement.Assuch,itcanbearguedthatthevoluntarystandardsandpracticesthatglobalcitieshavedevelopedandimplementedcontributepositivelytowardsdeterminacyinthetransnationalregimecomplexforclimatechangebecauseoftheirhighleveloftextualspecificityandclarityinnormativecontent.However,itshouldbenotedthatasfarasvoluntarystandardsareconcerned,epistemicqualityandscientificknowledgemaybemoreimportantconsiderations.Naikiargues,“even…[voluntary]standardsthatappeartobedeterminatemaynotbeconsideredlegitimateandcredibleiftheyarenotbasedonepistemicqualityandscientificknowledge.”34Itistothedimensionofepistemicqualitythatthediscussionturnstonext.31Naikimakesthispointinassessingthesustainablebioenergyregimecomplex;YoshikoNaiki,‘TradeandBioenergy:ExplainingandAssessingtheRegimeComplexforSustainableBioenergy’(2016)27EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw129,pg.151.32CompactofMayors,“Resources”,online:http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/tools-for-cities/(accessedon1August2016).33GreenhouseGasProtocol,GlobalProtocolforCommunity-ScaleGreenhouseGasEmissionInventories:AnAccountingandReportingStandardforCities(WorldResourcesInstitute,C40,andICLEI,2014).34Naiki,pg.152.

2.3EpistemicQuality

KeohaneandVictordonotsaymuchaboutepistemicqualityexceptthatoneaspectofepistemicqualityis“theconsistencybetween…rulesandscientificknowledge”andthatepistemicqualityofaregimecomplexbearsimportanceforitslegitimacyandeffectiveness.35Epistemicqualityisgenerallydefinedas“reliableinformationneededforgrapplingwithnormativedisagreementanduncertainty”36thatisprovidedbyexperts.Asmodernsocietiesgrapplewithcomplexriskspertainingtofoodsafety,chemicals,andthestabilityoffinancialsystems,tonameafew,theyareincreasinglydependentonexpertknowledgebecause“[o]necannotregulatewhatonedoesnotunderstand.”37Astherisksthatrequireregulationareusuallycomplexandrapidlychanging,regulatorsthemselvesneedtobehighlyskilledorrelyonexperts.38PeterHaashasexploredtheroleofexpertsinglobalenvironmentalgovernanceextensivelyinhiswork,coiningtheterm“epistemiccommunities”todescribethenetworksof“knowledge-basedexperts”thatplayarolein“articulatingthecause-and-effectrelationshipsofcomplexproblems,helpingstatesidentifytheirinterests,framingtheissuesforcollectivedebate,proposingspecificpolicies,andidentifyingsalientpointsfornegotiation.”39 Epistemicqualitybearsparticularsalienceforvoluntarystandardsbecausetheyderivepartoftheirlegitimacyfromclaimsofexpertknowledge.Withintheliteratureonvoluntarystandards,scholarswithaninstitutionalistperspectivehavefocusedmuchoftheireffortsonidentifyinghowstandardsandtheorganizationsbehindthemachievelegitimacy.40Oneofthecentraltenetsofthisbodyofliteratureisthatstandard-settingentitiesrelyonexpertisetobuildauthorityandlegitimacysuchthatstandardsaremadeouttobe“expertknowledgeintheformofrules.”41Legitimacyhasbeendefinedas“thejustificationofactionstothosewhomtheyaffectaccordingtoreasonstheycanaccept”.42Therearetwoaspectsoflegitimacy:

35KeohaneandVictor,pg.17.36AllenBuchananandRobertO.Keohane,‘TheLegitimacyofGlobalGovernanceInstitutions’(2006)20Ethics&InternationalAffairs405,pg.426.37MartinShapiro,‘Deliberative,IndependentTechnocracyv.DemocraticPolitics:WilltheGlobeEchotheE.U’(2005)68LawandContemporaryProblems341,pg.343.38IntheEU,wheretheEuropeanCommissionroutinelyconsultsaroundonethousandexpertgroupsandtherearecurrentlymorethanfortyincreasinglypowerfulEUagencies,fundamentalquestionshavebeenraisedaboutthelegitimateroleofknowledgeandexpertiseindecision-making.Criticsclaimthatgrowingexpertpowerandtheincreaseindepoliticized(andthereforepoliticallyunaccountable)expertbodieserodedemocraticgovernment;ExpertiseandDemocracy(CentreforEuropeanStudies,UniversityofOslo,ARENAReport1/14,editedbyCathrineHolst,2014),pgs.2and3.39PeterM.Haas,‘Introduction:EpistemicCommunitiesandInternationalPolicyCoordination’(1992)46InternationalOrganization1,pg.2.40StefanoPonteandEmmanuelleCheyns,‘VoluntaryStandards,ExpertKnowledgeandtheGovernanceofSustainabiltyNetworks’(2013)13GlobalNetworks459,pg.463.41BengtJacobsson,‘StandardizationandExpertKnowledge’inNilsBrunssonandBengtJacobsson(eds),AWorldofStandards(OxfordUniversityPress2002),pg.41.42MelissaS.Williams,‘CitizenshipasAgencywithinCommunitiesofSharedFate’inStevenBernsteinandWilliamD.Coleman(eds),UnsettledLegitimacy:PoliticalCommunity,Power,andAuthorityinaGlobalEra(UBCPress2009),pg.43.

input(process)andoutput(performanceandeffectiveness)legitimacy.Bodanskyexplainsthattheformer“derivesfromtheprocessbywhichdecisionsaremade,includingfactorssuchastransparency,participation,andrepresentation”,whereasthelatterconcernseffectivenessand“theresultsofgovernance.”43Kerwerpositsthatanecessary(butnotalwayssufficient)preconditionfortheeffectivenessofastandardisthatthetargetaudiencebelievesthattheexpertiseonwhichthestandardisbasedisconvincing.44

Whileexpertknowledgecanstemfrommanydisciplines,“sciencehasaninstitutionalizedmonopolyofknowledge”incontemporarysocieties.45Scienceisoftenportrayedtobeobjectiveandcapableofeliminatinguncertainty,andthereforeisusedtolendlegitimationtopolicydecisions.46However,astheliteratureonscienceandtechnologyhasshown,scienceisnotproducedinasocialvacuumanddoesnotdiscoveruncontroverted“truths”thatarethentranslatedintopoliciesortechnologies.47Infact,factsandvaluesareintertwinedanduncertaintyisaconstitutivefeatureofknowledge.Science,howeversound,cannoteliminateuncertaintyandthequestionofhowuncertaintiesaretobemanagedisanormativeone.Inspiteofthesereservationsabouttheobjectivityofscience,itremainsanimportantaspectofepistemicquality,especiallyinthecaseofclimatechange.Thereisawidespreadperceptionthatscienceisthefinalarbiterintheclimatechangedebate,andtheIPCCgoestogreatlengthtoestablishthatitprovidesassessmentsbasedonthebestavailablesciencetoguidegovernmentsoninternationalclimatepolicy.48

Indevelopingtheirnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards,citieshavereliedonthefindingsoftheIPCC.C40endorsestheIPCC’sfindingsthatlargercitiesconsumetwo-thirdsoftheworld’senergyandareresponsibleformorethanthree-

43DanielBodansky,‘LegitimacyinInternationalLawandInternationalRelations’inJeffreyL.DunoffandMarkA.Pollack(eds),InterdisciplinaryPerspectivesonInternationalLawandInternationalRelations(CambridgeUniversityPress2012),pg.330.44DieterKerwer,‘RulesthatManyUse:StandardsandGlobalRegulation’(2005)18Governance611,pg.618.Perezhasarguedthatwithdecliningtrustinexpertsandtheirprofessedexpertise,thepowerof“…expertknowledgetoprovideprivilegedaccountsofthecommongoodand,hence,toserveasasourceandarbiteroflegitimacy”hasalsodeclined.Asaresult,“thelegitimacyoftransnationalregimesisjudged,increasingly,bythenatureoftheprocessthatledtotheregimes’creation,andbythepublicaccountabilityofthosewhoimplementthem”;OranPerez,‘NormativeCreativityandGlobalLegalPluralism:ReflectionsontheDemocraticCritiqueofTransnationalLaw’(2003)10IndianaJournalofGlobalLegalStudies25,pg.28-29.45ExpertiseandDemocracy,pg.20.46ReinerGrundmann,‘Theroleofexpertiseingovernanceprocesses’(2009)11ForestPolicyandEconomics398,pgs.401-402.47See,forexample,SheilaJasanoffandBrianWynne,‘Scienceanddecisionmaking’inSteveRaynerandElizabethL.Malone(eds),Humanchoiceandclimatechange:AnInternationalAssessment(Vol1:TheSocietalFramework)(BattellePress1998);SheilaJasanoff(ed)StatesofKnowledge:TheCo-ProductionofScienceandtheSocialOrder(Routledge2004).48FordiscussionabouttheIPCC,seeforexample,NavrajSinghGhaleigh,‘ScienceandClimateChangeLaw-theRoleoftheIPPCinInternationalDecision-Making’inCinnamonCarlarne,KevinGrayandRichardTarasofsky(eds),TheOxfordHandbookofInternationalClimateChangeLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2016).

quartersofglobalGHGemissions.49Inaddition,citieshavesoughttoensurethattheirrequirementsandguidanceforcalculatingandreportingcity-wideGHGemissionsareconsistentwiththeIPCCguidelines.50Therefore,itcanbearguedthat,totheextentthatepistemicqualityreferstotheconsistencybetweenurbanclimatelawandIPCCscience,urbanclimatelawscoreswellforthiscriterion.However,itshouldalsobenotedthaturbanclimatelawdoesnotonlyvaluescientificknowledgeasasourceofepistemicquality.AsillustratedinChapters4and5,akeycharacteristicofhowcitiesandtheirnetworksfunctionistheformationofextensivepartnershipswithotheractorstotapontheirexpertiseandresources.Indevelopingstandardsandpractices,citieshavevaluedlocalknowledgeandglobalknowledge.Citieshavealsosoughttotapontheexpertiseofurbanplanners,architects,financiers,entrepreneurs,environmentalactivists,engineersanddevelopmentconsultantsindevelopingclimatesolutions.51 2.4Accountability

KeohaneandVictordrawontheconceptofaccountabilityputforthbyGrantandKeohanethat“someactorshavetherighttoholdotheractorstoasetofstandards,tojudgewhethertheyhavefulfilledtheirresponsibilitiesinlightofthesestandards,andtoimposesanctionsiftheydeterminethattheseresponsibilitieshavenotbeenmet.”52Inotherwords,theactorsbeingheldaccountable“havetoanswerfor[their]actionorinaction’concerning“acceptedstandardsofbehaviorand...theywillbesanctionedforfailurestodoso.”53Transparency,whichhasbeendefinedas“disclosureofinformationintendedtoevaluateand/orsteerbehavior”,hasbeenchampionedasameansofenhancingtheaccountabilityofinternationalenvironmentalpolicyoutcomes.54Asurbanclimatelawinvolvesgovernancebydisclosure,Iwillfocusonthenexusbetweentransparencyandaccountabilityinthissection. Inconsideringtheconsequencesoftransparencyfortheaccountabilityandlegitimacyofvoluntarycertificationprograms,AuldandGulbrandsendrawthedistinctionbetweenproceduralandoutcometransparency.Byproceduraltransparency,theymean“theopennessofgovernanceprocesses,suchasdecision-

49SeediscussioninPart1ofChapter3.50TheGHGProtocolforCitiesstatesthatit“…setsoutrequirementsandprovidesguidanceforcalculatingandreportingcity-wideGHGemissions,consistentwiththe2006IPCC(IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange)GuidelinesforNationalGreenhouseGasInventories”;pg.20.51SeediscussioninChapter5.52RuthW.GrantandRobertO.Keohane,‘AccountabilityandAbusesofPowerinWorldPolitics’(2005)99AmericanPoliticalScienceReview29,pg.29.53Ibid,atpg.30.54AartiGuptaandMichaelMason,‘TransparencyandInternationalEnvironmentalPolitics’inMicheleBetsill,KathrynHochstetlerandDimitrisStevis(eds),AdvancesinInternationalEnvironmentalPolitics(PalgraveMacmillan2014),pgs.356-7.Fordiscussion,alsoseeJuttaBrunneeandEllenHey,‘TransparencyandInternationalEnvironmentalInstitutions’inAndreaBianchiandAnnePeters(eds),TransparencyinInternationalLaw(CambridgeUniversityPress2013).

makingoradjudication.”55Ithasbeenarguedthatproceduraltransparencyisoftenusedtoimprovethelegitimacyofglobalgovernancearrangements,whichareperceivedtobelesslegitimatebecausetheyarenotsupportedbynormsofsovereigntyandstateconsent.56“Outcometransparencyconcernsopennessaboutregulatedorunregulatedbehaviors”andisconsideredimportantforidentifyingandmanagingenvironmentalproblems.57Examplesincludedomesticenvironmentallawsrequiringindustrialfacilitiestodisclosetheirpollutantdischargestothepublic,andC40requiringtheirmembercitiestoreporttheirclimateactionsonapublicregisterlikethecarbonnClimateRegistry. Whenitcomestovoluntarycertificationschemes,thetargetactorsforproceduraltransparencyandoutcometransparencyarethedecision-makersandtheregulatedactorsrespectively.Wewillbrieflyconsidereachinturn.Whenitcomestoproceduraltransparency,itisarguedthatthedisclosureofinformationaboutdecision-makingprocessesimprovesaccountabilitybecausethedisclosedinformationenablesregulatedactorsandthepublictoaskrelevantquestionsandseekanswers.58Secondly,byappealingtosharednormsofopenness,proceduraltransparencycanenhancetheacceptabilityofthecertificationschemeandtherebyincreaseitslegitimacy.59Finally,transparencycanhelpconvinceparticipantsthatdecision-makingisconductedinatransparentandfairmanner,therebyfacilitatingbuy-infrommoreparticipants.60IwillillustratethesepointsbyreferencetotheGHGProtocolforCities.Asmentionedintheearlierchapters,thevariousstakeholdersinvolvedindevelopingtheGHGProtocolforCitiestookpainstobeastransparentintheirdeliberationsanddecision-makingprocessesaspossible.ThereweremeetingsopentothepublicandextensiveconsultationwithcitiesthatwerenotofficiallymembersoftheworkinggroupbutwereanticipatedusersoftheGHGProtocol.TheinformationthatwentintothedevelopmentoftheGHGProtocolwasmadeavailableontheInternet,accompaniedbyglossariesanduserguidestomaketheinformationasaccessibletothenon-expertaspossible.Thisisimportantastheattributesofdisclosedinformationisoftencentraltothesuccessoftransparencyinitiatives.Theseattributesincludewhetherthedisclosedinformationisaccessible,comprehensive,comparableorrelevant.61 Whenitcomestooutcometransparency,theargumentisthatthedisclosureofinformationabouttheenvironmentalperformanceofcitiestothepublicandstakeholderscanenhanceaccountabilitybecausecivilsocietygroupscanholdcitiestoaccountfortheirpracticesandperformance.AsMeidingerputs,it,“[i]fa

55GraemeAuldandLarsH.Gulbrandsen,‘TransparencyinNonstateCertification:ConsequencesforAccountabilityandLegitimacy’(2010)10GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics97,pg.99.56AartiGuptaarguesthatthisisthecentralassumptionofproceduraltransparency;AartiGupta,‘TransparencyUnderScrutiny:InformationDisclosureinGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance’(2008)8GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics1.57AuldandGulbrandsen,pg.100.58Ibid.59Ibid.60Ibid.61KlausDingwerthandMargotEichinger,‘TamedTransparency:HowInformationDisclosureundertheGlobalReportingInitiativeFailstoEmpower’(2010)10GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics74.

significantamountofinformationaboutagivenpracticeispubliclyavailable,thenthatpracticebecomespotentiallyaccountabletoabroadsetofactorsandvalues,atleastinthatitissubjecttotheircriticism.”62Thus,transparencycanplayaroleinenhancingwhatKeohanehastermed“externalaccountability”,whichrefersto“accountabilitytopeopleoutsidetheactingentity,whoselivesareaffectedbyit.”63Theraisond'êtreofcertificationschemessuchastheCompactofMayorsistopromoteoutputtransparencyasameansofholdingcitiesaccountabletotheircommitments.Itistooearlytotellwhattheeffectsoftransparencyareforcitiesaddressingclimatechange,butitcanbesaidthaturbanclimatelawischaracterizedbyastrongcommitmenttotransparencyasamodeofgovernance.Giventhepositivecorrelationbetweentransparencyandaccountability,itcanbearguedthatcitiesandtheirnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsstrivetowardsaccountabilityandthereforecontributepositivelytowardsenhancingtheaccountabilityofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.

2.5Sustainability Sustainabilityofaregimecomplexisconcernedwithitsresiliencetoexternalshocksanditslong-termexistence.InKeohaneandVictor’sview,sustainabilityisanimportantcriterionbecauseactorsneedlong-termcertaintyabouttherulesofthegamesotospeak.Inthecaseofclimatechange,long-termcertaintyaboutrulesplaysaparticularlypertinentroleinachievingthegoalsofclimatemitigationandadaptationbecauseinvestors,bothpublicandprivate,willnotbewillingtospendonlong-termmitigationandadaptationstrategiesintheabsenceofclearsignalsaboutthelong-termnatureofrulesmandatingdecarbonizationandclimateadaptation.

AgoodexampletoillustratetheimportanceofsustainabilityandresilienceofaregimeistheEuropeanUnionEmissionsTradingScheme(EUETS).ThevolatilityofcarbonpriceswithintheEUETSinthelastfewyearswaspartlytriggeredbytheeconomiccrisisintheEUduringtheperiod2008to2009,butpricevolatilitywasalsotakentoindicatetheexistenceofmorestructuralproblemswiththeEUETSthatthreatenedthestabilityandsustainabilityoftheregionalGHGemissionscontrolscheme.64TheEUinstitutionsanditsmemberstateshavealsobeentakingalongtimetoreachagreementonaproposaltorevisetheEUETSfortheperiod2021-2030,furtherdeepeningpessimismaboutthefutureoftheEUETS.65Today,62ErrolMeidinger,‘TheAdministrativeLawofGlobalPrivate-PublicRegulation:theCaseofForestry’(2006)17EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw47,pg.82.63RobertO.Keohane,‘GlobalGovernanceandDemocraticAccountability’inDavidHeldandMathiasKoenig-Archibugi(eds),TamingGlobalization:FrontiersofGovernance(PolityPress2003),pg.141.64See,forexample,ReginaBetz,WhatisdrivingPriceVolatilityintheEUETS?(AustralasianEmissionsTradingForum,October/November2006),online:http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/PagesfromAETFReviewOctNov06_web-2-1.pdf(accessedon1July2016).65ForastatusupdateoftheEUETSreformprocessandrelateddocuments,seeEuropeanCouncil/CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“ReformoftheEUemissionstradingscheme”,online:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/reform-eu-ets/(accessedon1July2016).

duetoaconfluenceoffactorsincludinguncertaintyaboutthefutureoftheEUETSandlowoilprices,thepriceofanEUETSallowancecontinuestobetoolowtocreaterealincentivesforindustriestoreduceGHGemissionsandinvestinlow-carbontechnologies.66ThefallinEUETSallowancepriceshasalsocreatedunanticipatedchallengesforthedeploymentofcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)technologies.TheRotterdamCaptureandStorageDemonstrationProject(ROAD)isacaseinpoint.67TheROADisajointventureprojectthatisintendedtocaptureandstoretwenty-fivepercentofitsannualthreemilliontonnesofcarbondioxideemissionsbeneaththeNorthSea.68This250megawattsCCSplantwasestimatedtocostalmost600millioneuros.69ItwastobefundedbytheEuropeanUnion,theDutchgovernment,theportofRotterdam,andindirectlybytheEUETS.In2009,theprojectdevelopersassumedthatthepriceofanallowance(equivalenttoonetonneofcarbondioxide)wouldrisefromfifteeneurostothirtyeuros.70However,thisassumptionprovedtobegrosslyincorrect,withthecurrentpriceofanallowancehoveringatseveneuros.Thiscreatedafundingdeficitofmorethanahundredmillioneuros,renderingtheROADprojectnon-viableandthereforeputonholdforyears.71Theprojectwaseventuallycompletedandatthetimeofwriting,theROADprojectonlyoperatesatafractionofitscapacityequivalenttotheamountofsubsidiesandcompensationitreceivestocoveroperatingcosts,whichexceedthecostsofcompliancewiththeEUETS.72ToquoteHowardHerzog,aleadingexpertonCCStechnology,“[b]ecauseitisalwayscheapertoemitCO2totheatmospherethantocaptureandstoreit,marketswillonlyevolveifclimatepolicyisputinplacethatforcesreductionofatmosphericCO2emissions.”73

WhiletheEUETSisahighlycomplexregulatorysystemandispronetoeconomicshocksbecauseitisamarket-basedmechanism,itssustainabilitycouldhavebeenbettersecuredifthearchitectsoftheschemehadincludedcomponentstowithstandshocks.Anexampleofsuchacomponentisamarketstabilityreserve,whichwillallowtheEUETSregulatortomaintainpricestabilitybyaddressing

66Ibid;alsoseeSaraStafanini,‘Climatetargetssufferascarbonpriceslumps’Politico(26January2016);ResearchontheimpactoftheSwedishcarbondioxidetaxandtheEUETSonproductivityintheSwedishpulpandpaperindustryhasshownthatthecarbonpriceshavebeentoolowtocreateincentivesfortechnologicaldevelopment;TommyLundgrenandothers,CarbonPricesandIncentivesforTechnologicalDevelopment(CentreforEnvironmentalandResourceEconomics,Sweden,WorkingPaper,2013:4,2013),online:http://www.cere.se/documents/wp/2013/CERE_WP2013-4.pdf(accessedon1July2016).67RotterdamCaptureandStorageDemonstrationProject,online:http://road2020.nl/en/(accessedon1July2016).68Ibid.69TseardZoethout,‘ClosingModernCoal-FiredPowerPlantsWithCCSWillSlowDownEnergyTransition’EuropeanEnergyReview(11December2015),online:http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/closing-modern-coal-fired-power-plants-will-slow-down-energy-transition/(accessedon1July2016).70Ibid.71Ibid.72InterviewNumber13.73HowardHerzog,CCSataCrossroads(GlobalCCSInstitute,FocusonCCS-OpinionLeadersSeries,September2015),pg.4.

fluctuationsinthesupplyanddemandofallowances.74DuringperiodswhenthereisasurplusofallowancesintheEUETS,theregulatorcanwithdrawallowancesandtransferthemtothemarketreserve,anddothereverseduringperiodsofscarcityofallowances.AmarketstabilityreservehasbeenapprovedaspartoftheEUETSreformpackageandwillstartoperatinginJanuary2019.75ThiswillimprovetheresilienceoftheEUETS,buttillthen,theEUETSregimesuffersasustainabilitydeficitinthisrespect. Bringingthediscussionbacktowhethercitiesandtheirnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardscontributetowardsbuildingresilienceandsustainabilityofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex,itisrelevanttorecallthediscussioninthepreviouschapteronthereinforcingnatureofthecomplementaritiesbetweentheUNFCCCregimeandurbanclimatelaw.ManykeyaspectsofurbanclimatelawhavebeendesignedtocomplementthenormsandpracticesoftheUNFCCC,whilebypassingtheissuesthathavecausedgridlockintheinternationalnegotiations.ItisrelevantthatC40declareditssupportoftheCBDRRCprinciplebecausethisreinforcesacorepillaroftheinternationalclimatechangeinstitutionalframework,therebymakingtheregimecomplexmoreresilient.

Thecommitmentthatcitieshavedemonstratedtowardsputtinginplaceaformaltransparencyframeworkbasedonthemonitoring,reportingandverificationoftheiremissionssimilartotheinternationaltransparencyframeworkundertheParisAgreementisalsonoteworthyfromasustainabilitypointofview.Byinvestingsignificantamountsofresourcesandefforttoimplementacity-leveltransparencyframework,citiesarereinforcingthemessageoftheParisAgreementtoallstakeholdersthatdata-driventransparencyandaccountabilitywillbeakeyplatformofthefutureclimateregime.Thisreducesuncertaintyaboutthefuturerulesand,itcanbeargued,willreinforcethesignaltocompanies,industriesandgovernmentstomakethenecessarypoliciesandinvestments.

Furthermore,theParisAgreementmarksamilestoneinthedevelopmentoftheclimatechangeregimecomplex,butmuchremainstobedonetooperationalizeitsmechanismsandrulesintheyearstocome.Forexample,themodalitiesandproceduresregardingtheNDCshaveyettobedecidedupon.76Alotofworkwillalsoneedtobedonepriortothefirstglobalstock-take,whichwilltakeplaceeveryfiveyearsstartingbefore2020.77Inshort,itisstillearlydaysasworkisunderwaytobuildtheinstitutionsneededtoimplementtheParisAgreement.ThroughvoluntaryschemesliketheCompactofMayorsaswellasambitiouspoliciesandprogramswithintheirjurisdictions,citieshavecollectivelycreatedasubstantialamountofclimateactionatthesubnationallevelofgovernance,whichwillgotowards

74Fordiscussion,seeforexample,KarstenNeuhoffetal,IsaMarketStabilityReservelikelytoimprovethefunctioningoftheEUETS?Evidencefromamodelcomparisonexercise(ClimateStrategies,2015).75EuropeanCouncil/CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,“ReformoftheEUemissionstradingscheme”.76UNFCCC,AdHocWorkingGroupontheParisAgreement(APA),online:http://unfccc.int/bodies/apa/body/9399.php(accessedon5August2016).77Fordiscussion,seeElizaNorthrop,CynthiaElliottandMelisaKrnjaic,4KeyQuestionsfortheDesignoftheGlobalStocktake(19May2016),online:http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/05/insider-4-key-questions-design-global-stocktake(accessedon5August2016).

supportingtheParisAgreementinitsearlystageandtheoverallsustainabilityoftheregimecomplex.2.6Fairness Finally,KeohaneandVictorincludefairnessasoneoftheevaluativecriteriabutdonotsaymuchaboutitexceptthatmultilateralinstitutionsshouldnotbeevaluatedonthebasisofwhethertheyachievethe“utopianobjective”of“reflect[ing]abstractnormativestandardsoffairness.”78Instead,fairnesssimplyreferstothenotionthatbenefitsoughttobedistributedwidelyandstatesthatarewillingtocooperateoughtnottobediscriminatedagainst.79TheimpositionofbindingGHGemissiontargetsondevelopedcountries,andnotondevelopingcountries,intheKyotoProtocolwasusedtoillustratethefairnesspoint.InKeohaneandVictor’sview,“theabsenceofbindingrulesforsomestateswasofquestionablefairness.”80 Fairnesscanbesaidtocompriseoftwokeyaspects:distributivejusticeandproceduralfairness.Whenconsideringwhetherfairnessisachievedinaparticularcontext,thequestionofdistributivejusticewouldbewhetherregimecomplexes“createsolutionsandsystemswhichtakeintoaccountsociety’sanswersto[the]moralissuesofdistributivejustice.”81Proceduralfairness,ontheotherhand,isconcernedwith“whattheparticipantsperceiveasrightprocess.”82IadoptNaiki’sargumentthatthecriterionofproceduralfairness“isdifficulttoapplyinthecontextofregimecomplexes,becausethequestioniswhetheraregimecomplexismadeundertherightprocess.Yet,regimecomplexesoftenemergewithouttherightprocessororder,andthatiswhyacomprehensiveregimewasnotyielded.”83Shesuggeststhatapossiblelineofinquiryiswhethereachregime(withintheregimecomplex)isfairintheproceduralsense,forinstance, whether a voluntary certification scheme can be said to have achieved input or process legitimacy.84 Itcanbearguedthatthenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatcitieshavedevelopedandimplementedhavebeenabletosidestepquestionsofdistributivejusticeinwaysthattheUNFCCCregimecannotbecausethelatterisintendedtobeaninternationalagreementthatsecuresuniversalparticipation.Aninternationalagreementthatfailstoaddressdevelopingcountryneedsandinterestswillbeperceivedtobeanunfairagreementthatwillberejectedbydevelopingcountriesthatmakeupthemajorityoftheinternationalcommunity.Consequently,theUNFCCCregimehashadtodealwiththeissueoflossanddamage,withclimatefinance,andpromotingtechnologytransfertodevelopingcountries,tonameafewkeyexamples.Urbanclimatelaw,incontrast,involvesaselectgroupof78KeohaneandVictor,pg.17.79Ibid.80Ibid.81ThomasM.Franck,FairnessinInternationalLawandInstitutions(OxfordUniversityPress1998),pg.8.82Ibid,pg.7.83Naiki,pg.156.84Ibid.

globalcitiesthathavevoluntarilysigneduptoasetofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.Asobligationsarenotimposeduponcitiesandcitiesarepersuadedthaturbanclimatelawonlybringspositivebenefitssuchasreputationalgainandimprovedaccesstosourcesofclimatefinance,questionsofdistributivejusticetendnottoarise.Thereisthereforelimitedopportunityforcitiestocontributetowardsaddressingcriticalissuesofdistributivejusticethat,forsome,lieattheheartoftheclimatechangedebate.Asforproceduralfairness,wehavealreadyconsideredthiswhenevaluatingtherelatedissuesofproceduraltransparencyandaccountabilityearlierandtheargumentswillnotberepeatedhere.Asconcludedearlier,itcanbearguedthaturbanclimatelawscoresrelativelywellonproceduralfairnessbecauseofitscontributiontowardsenhancingtransparencyandaccountabilityoftheregimecomplex. Tosummarizethediscussion,thequestionthatthispartofthechaptersoughttoconsideriswhetherthenormativeactivitiesofglobalcitiesmakeapositivecontributiontowardstheperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.First,inrelationtocoherence,whichreferstotheconsistencyandcompatibilityofthepracticesandoutputsofthevariousregimeswithinaregimecomplex,urbanclimatelawcanbesaidtobecontributingpositivelytowardsthecoherenceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Whatisparticularlynoteworthyisthealignmentbetweenurbanclimatelawandthenormsandpracticesofotherregimes,streamlinedmonitoringandreportingobligationsthatbuildsynergiesbetweenvariousregimesandurbanclimatelaw,andtheextenttowhichglobalcitiescontributetowardslearningprocesseswithintheregimecomplex.

Secondly,onthetextualdeterminacyofrules,thevoluntarystandardsthatglobalcitieshavedevelopedandimplementedcanbesaidtocontributepositivelytowardsdeterminacyintheregimecomplexbecauseoftheirhighleveloftextualspecificityandclarityinnormativecontent.Thirdly,totheextentthatepistemicqualityreferstotheconsistencybetweenurbanclimatelawandIPCCscience,urbanclimatelawenjoysarespectablelevelofepistemicquality.Atthesametime,globalcitiesandtheirnetworksdonotrelyonlyonscientificknowledgebutalsoconsulttheexpertiseofurbanplanners,architects,financiers,entrepreneurs,anddevelopmentconsultants,tonameafew,indevelopingandimplementingtheirpracticesandvoluntarystandards.Thisincreasestheepistemicqualityofurbanclimatelaw.Fourthly,consideringthattransparencyisanimportantaspectofaccountability,urbanclimatelawcontributespositivelytowardsimprovingtheaccountabilityoftheregimecomplexbecauseitsdominantmodeofgovernanceisunderpinnedbytransparencymechanisms.Onthefifthcriterionofsustainability,ofnotearethecomplementaritiesbetweentheUNFCCCregimeandurbanclimatelawandhowthesubstantialamountofurbanclimateactiongoestowardssupportingtheParisAgreementinitsearlystageandenhancingtheoverallresilienceoftheregimecomplex.Itisonthefinalcriterionoffairnessthaturbanclimatelawmakeslittle,ifany,positivecontributionbecausethenatureofurbanclimatelawissuchthatitpresentscitieswithlimitedopportunitiestoaddressdistributivejusticeissues.

3. ReflectingontheSignificanceofCitiesfortheStudyofInternationalLaw

Theprecedingsectionsoughttoevaluateifglobalcitiesmakeanegativeor

positivenormativecontributiontowardstheperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexandconcludedthatitwasthelattercase.Ifso,thereisagoodargumenttobemadethatcontemporaryglobalgovernanceprocessesinotherareassuchashealthcareandtacklinggenderinequalityoughttoencouragegreaterparticipationofglobalcitiesandfurtherharnessthegovernancepotentialofcitiesandtheirtransnationalnetworks.However,beforemakingsuchrecommendations,itmaybeappositetopauseandconsidersomequestionsthattheemergenceofcitiesastransnationallawmakingactorsposesforinternationallawandinternationalrelationsmorebroadly.Itistimelytoembarkonsuchcontemplationbecause,foralongtime,internationallawhashadhighlylimitedengagementwiththelively,multi-disciplinarydebateconcerningthegrowingprominenceofcitiesininternationalaffairs.Asthisthesishassoughttodemonstrate,theriseofcitiesastransnationallawmakersraisesconsiderationsthatarerelevanttothestudyofinternationallawandinternationallawscholarsareencouragednottocontinueneglectingcitiesintheirresearch.

3.1Challengingstatistconceptionsofinternationallaw

Thisthesismaybeconsideredpost-Westphalian,asitseekstomovebeyondthefocusoftheinternationallegalsystemuponstatesastheprimarysubjects.85ThestartingpointinthisthesisforexploringtheemergenceofcitiesaslawmakingactorswasadoptingtheNewHavenSchool’sapproachtointernationallaw.TherearenosubjectsorobjectsintheNewHavenSchool-onlyparticipants–andparticipants“includethoseformallyendowedwithdecisioncompetence,forexamplejudges,andallthoseotheractorswho,thoughnotendowedwithformalcompetence,maynonethelessplayimportantrolesininfluencingdecisions.”86Thisrecognitionthatmanyactors,apartfromstates,canplayaroleininternationallawmakingprocessesforeclosestheargumentaboutwhethercitiesarerecognizedtobeaclassofactorsininternationallawandhowrecognitionoughttobeconferred.8785Iusetheterm“Westphalian”torefertoaninternationalsystemthatisunderpinnedbythecentralnotionsofstatesastheprimarysubjectsandobjectsofinternationallawandthatinternationallawiscreatedonthebasisofconsentbyequalandsovereignstates;seeJamesCrawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2012),pg.287-8.86W.MichaelReisman,‘TheViewfromtheNewHavenSchoolofInternationalLaw’(1992)86AmericanSocietyofInternationalLawProceedings118,pg.122.87Onecanalsoquestionifformalrecognitionreallymatters.Aust,forexample,argues,“themorecitiesbecomeacceptedaspartnersinglobalgovernance,thelessrelevantwilltheirinformalstatus(asopposedtostatesandinternationalorganizations)beinthelongrun.”Whatmattersisthatthereisgrowingacceptanceofcitiesbyinternationalactorsandaudiences,andAustsuggeststhatthisisjustbeginningtohappenfornetworkslikeC40.Finally,heconcludesthatcitiesconstituteanemerging“newclassofactorsininternationallaw”eventhoughitisdifficultto“pin[this]downinpositivist/formalistterms”;Aust,pgs.273-5.

Bypositingthatcitiesareparticipantsintheinternationallegalorderfromtheoutset,myfocushasbeenonexaminingtheirnorm-settingpracticesandexplainingtheirsignificanceintermsofhowtheysteerthebehaviorofcitiestowardsclimatechangemitigationandadaptation.Further,MyresMcDougalandHaroldLasswell,pioneersoftheNewHavenSchoolapproach,havedefinedlawas“aprocessofauthoritativedecisionbywhichthemembersofacommunityclarifyandsecuretheircommoninterests.”88Accordingtothisdefinitionoflaw,thenormsandvoluntarystandardsthatglobalcitieshavedevelopedandsubscribedtowouldcountasinternationallawmakingastheparticipatinggovernmentsareauthoritiesmakingcollectivedecisionsontheregulationofGHGswhichtheyhavethepowertoimplementintheirjurisdictions.Thegovernmentsofglobalcitiesalsoarticulatetheircommoninterestsbysigninguptodeclarationsandotherpublicstatementsissuedatinternationalconferences,forexample.

Myresponsetoquestionssuchaswhetherthetransnationalgovernanceactivitiesofcitieschallengeourperspectivesonactorsandsubjectsofinternationallawandwhethertheycallintoquestionthetraditionaldistinctionbetweenlawandnon-lawisthatthesequestionsdonotreallygetusanywherebecauseouranswersultimatelyboildowntothejurisprudentialviewoftheinternationallegalorderthateachofusholds.Dependingonone’sjurisprudentialleanings,thestateistheonlysignificantactorontheinternationalstageoritisoneofmanyactorsalbeitaveryimportantone,oritissimplyoneofmanyparticipantsthathastheresourcesandpowertoengageininternationalaffairs.89Thus,Iwouldsuggestthatthestudyofcitiesandtheirnormativeactivitiesreinforcestheideathatinternationallawnolongerreferssolelyorevenprimarilytothelawthatgovernstherightsandobligationsofstatesinco-existenceandthattherearevarioustheoreticalconceptionsoftheinternational/transnational/globallegalorder.Internationallegalscholarshipisenrichedbytherecognitionofthesevariousschoolsofthoughtandamoveawayfromstate-centricversionsofinternationallawmaking,whichhinderthecraftingofcreativesolutionstoourglobalcollectiveactionproblemssuchasclimatechange.Bycreativesolutions,Imeansolutionsthatrecognizetheimportanceofmulti-levelgovernanceandwhichenlisttheparticipationofmultiplegovernanceactors,includingcities,totackleglobalgovernancechallengesmoreeffectively.

3.2RecognizingtheImpactofInternationalLawonCities Itshouldbenotedthat,whilecitiesareonthemarginsofinternationallawandarehardlyrecognizedasworthyofscholarlyanalysis,internationallawalreadydirectlyaffectstheworld’scitiesbyhavingdeterminativeinfluencesondecision-makingprocessesandregulationatthesubnationallevel.FrugandBarronhave88HaroldD.LasswellandMyresS.McDougal,JurisprudenceforaFreeSociety:StudiesinLaw,ScienceandPolicy(MartinusNijhoffPublishers1992),pg.xxi.89Fordiscussionofhowdifferentperspectivesoninternationallawmightshapethenarrativeoftheinternationallegalsignificanceofsubnationaleffortsataddressingclimatechange,seeHariM.Osofsky,‘MultiscalarGovernanceandClimateChange:ReflectionsontheRoleofStatesandCitiesatCopenhagen’(2010)25MarylandJournalofInternationalLaw64,pgs.75-79.

examinedhowinternationalinstitutionsandlawsarebringingthegovernmentsofcitieswithintheirregulatoryreach.90Theyarguethatinternationallawisbeginningtoplayaroleindefiningtherelationshipbetweencitiesandthestatesinwhichtheyarelocated:“Partiesnegotiatinginternationaltradeagreements,internationaltribunalsarbitratingcommercialdisputes,UnitedNations’rapporteursinvestigatingcompliancewithhumanrightsobligations,andinternationalfinancialinstitutionsformulatingdevelopmentpolicyhaveallbeguntoexpressinterestinthelegalrelationshipbetweencitiesandtheirnationalgovernments.”91Assuch,anewsetofinternationalrulesandregulationsgoverningcitieshasemergedandtheycointheterm“internationallocalgovernmentlaw”torefertoit. FrugandBarronillustratethenatureofinternationallocalgovernmentlawwithreferencetodecisionsbyinternationalarbitrationtribunalsthathavearisenfrominternationalinvestmentdisputes.Onesuchexampleisthewell-knowndecisioninMetalcladvUnitedMexicanStates.92Briefly,thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:MetalcladisaUScompanythathadpurchasedalandfillintheMexicanmunicipalityofGuadalcazar.ThedisputestartedwhenGuadalcazar’smunicipalauthoritiesdeniedMetalcladpermissiontoconstructandoperatethelandfilldespitethecompanyhavingreceivedguaranteesandreassurancesfromhigherlevelsofgovernmentthatitcouldproceedwiththelandfillproject.93Domesticlegalproceedingsfailedtodeterminethisissue.MetalcladthensoughttoresolvethedisputebybringingaclaimundertheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA).TheNAFTAarbitrationpanelruledinfavourofthecompany.Inthepanel’sopinion,Mexico’sbreachresultedfromthecentralgovernment’sfailuretostopthecityofGuadalcazarfromassertingitsexpansiveviewofitsdomesticlegalauthority.94FrugandBarronarguethat,intheextensiveliteratureonthearbitrationpanel’sdecisioninMetalclad,whatisoftenoverlookedisthefactthatthecaseturnedonadisputeaboutthescopeofcitypowerinMexico.95Intheirview,“Metalcladcraftedarulethatlimitedtheabilityofcitiestomaketheirowninterpretationsoflocalregulatoryauthority,thustakingapositiononacentralissueofMexicanlocalgovernmentlaw.”96Thus,itcanbearguedthattheconcernsraisedbytheMetalcladdecisiongobeyondtheinternationallegalsystem’scapacitytoextendthescopeofinvestorimmunityfromgovernmentalregulations.97Thedecisionalsodemonstrateshowtheinternationallegalsystemcanrestructuretherelationshipbetweencitiesandhigherlevelsofgovernmentwithinastate.98 Whileinternationallocalgovernmentlawfocusesourattentiononthewaysinwhichinternationallawcanhaveanimpactonlocaldecision-makingprocessesincitiesandthereforeshapetheeverydayurbanreality,mydeliberationsonurban

90FrugandBarron.91Ibid,pg.1.92MetalcladCorporationvUnitedMexicanStatesICSIDCaseNo.ARB(AF)/97/1;40I.L.M.36(2001).93MetalcladCorporationvUnitedMexicanStates,para.50.94Ibid.95FrugandBarron,pg.41.96FrugandBarron,pg.43.97FrugandBarron,pg.44.98Ibid.

climatelawshedlightonadifferentrelationshipbetweentheworld’scitiesandtheinternationallegalorder.Urbanclimatelawisevidencethatcitiescanexertnormativeeffectwithinthetransnationallegalorder,andthattherelationshipbetweencitiesandtheinternationallegalorderdoesnotalwayshavetobemediatedbythestate.Internationallocalgovernmentlawandurbanclimatelawtogetherprovideafullerpictureofhowinternationallawhasanimpactoncitiesandviceversa.Importantly,theabovediscussionalsoillustratestherelevanceofcitiestothestudyofinternationallaw,andbuttressestheclaimthatitistimelyforinternationallegalscholarshiptoexaminetheemergenceofcitiesastransnationalgovernanceactorsandtheimplicationsofthisdevelopment.3.3CriticalEvaluation

Whilethisthesishasconsideredtheemergenceofcitiesasinternationalactorstobeapositivedevelopment,theriseofcitiesshouldnotbepraiseduncriticallywithoutconsiderationofsomeofthelesspositiveaspects.Inthisregard,internationallawdoctrinesandscholarshipcanprovideacriticalprismthroughwhichthetransnationalgovernanceactivitiesofcitiescanbeconsidered.

Aconsequenceoftheemergenceofcitiesasinternationalactorsisthechallengeposedtotheconsent-basedstructureofinternationallaw.99IfformalinternationallawmakingprocessessuchasthatoftheUNFCCCaretoincludecitiesinnegotiationsandgivecitiesvotingrights,forexample,howwouldtheinternationalsystemupholdtherequirementofconsent?Anotherrelatedconcernisthattheinclusionofcitiesislikelytoincreasethecomplexityofinternationalnegotiations,whicharealreadyboggeddownbytheimmensedifficultiesofreachingcompromiseoncomplexissuesamongstateswithdisparateinterests.Thereareanumberofpossibilities.Onepossibilitywouldbetoreformcurrentinternationallegaldecision-makingprocessestogivecitiesgreaterparticipationrightsinthepre-decisionstages.HariOsofskyhassuggestedthatsuchreformscanincludecreatingforumsinwhichcitygovernmentscanmeetdirectlywithstaterepresentativesinvolvedinnegotiationsorinsertingprovisionsintoformalagreementsthatacknowledgetheroleofcitiesinregulatingclimatechange.AsnotedinChapter1,theCancunAgreementsrecognizedlocalandsubnationalgovernmentsas“governmentalstakeholders”oftheUNFCCCregimein2010,sothelatterrecommendationhasalreadybeentakenup.100Thesereforms,whiletheywouldcreateconnectionsbetweenurbaneffortstotackleclimatechangeandtheUNFCCCregime,wouldnotgivecitiesagenuinevoiceinthenegotiationsthatwillcontinuetotakeplaceamongstates.

AnotherpossibilitywouldinvolvemoresignificantreformthatwouldallowcitiesandotheractorsapartfromstatestoparticipateformallyininternationalclimateagreementsthatmightsupplementtheParisAgreement.OnethereforeenvisionsasuiteofagreementsundertheUNFCCCumbrella,theParisAgreement

99Aust,pg.276.100Decision1/CP.16TheCancunAgreements:OutcomeoftheworkoftheAdHocWorkingGrouponLong-termCooperativeActionundertheConvention,para.7.

beingoneconcludedbystatesandotheragreementsbeingconcludedbysubnationalgovernments,corporations,industryassociations,tonameafew.Thestructuringofsuchagreementsislikelytoraisedifficultlogisticalissuesaswellasnormativeconcernssurroundinginclusion,fairnessandaccountability.Further,thepromulgationofsuchagreementswithintheUNFCCCframeworkwouldbeconsideredrevolutionaryandperhapsevensacrilegiousintheeyesoftraditionalistswhoadheretotheWestphalianmodelofinternationallaw.

Iwouldarguethatitisimmaterialifscholarsandpractitionerschoosetoexplorethebenefitsanddisadvantagesofvariousoptionsandultimatelydecidethatthecurrentapproachtointernationallawmakingremainsthebestone.Whatisimportantisthatsuchdeliberationsoccurinthefirstplace.Thesediscussionsoughttobeencouragedtoreframethediscourseabouttheinvolvementofcitiesintransnationalgovernanceprocessesandtoexplorecreativepossibilitiesforalternativegovernancearrangementsintheinternationalsystem.Thisisnotanacademicpointastheinternationalsystemisalreadywitnessingattemptstoformallyinstitutionalizetheroleofcitiesinglobalgovernance.TheGlobalParliamentofMayors,whichdescribesitselfas“anewglobalgovernancebodyofcities”,conveneditsinauguralmeetinginSeptember2016atTheHague.101Itsmissionstatementhighlightsmanyofthethemesdiscussedinthisthesis.First,themissionstatementsetsoutthatitis“inconceivablethatnationalandinternationalbodiesdiscussanddecideonpolicyactionswithoutcitiesandtheirmayorspresentatthetable”,giventhatmorethanhalfoftheworld’spopulationlivesincities.102Inlinewiththetrendofcitiesplayinganincreasinglyactiveroleininternationalaffairs,“theGlobalParliamentofMayorsclaimstherightnotonlytobeinvolved,buttobe(withothers)agendasettersinsupranationalorganizations.”103Specifically,mayors“willcooperateoncriticalissuessuchasclimatechange,refugeecrises,pandemicdiseases,inequalityandurbansecurity…”104WhatdistinguishestheGlobalParliamentofMayorsfromtransnationalcitynetworkslikeC40isthattheformeraimstobeaninstitutionthatrepresentsthecollectiveinterestsofcitiesallovertheworldandparticipateinglobaldecision-makingprocessesonequalfootingwithstatesandinternationalorganizations.Inotherwords,itseekstobreakthemonopolythatnationalgovernmentshaveoninternationaldecision-makingprocesses.IftheGlobalParliamentofMayorsistoissuerecommendations,resolutionsanddecisions,thiswouldraiseinterestingquestionsofhowtheinternationallawmadebycitieswillinteractwithinternationallawmadebystates,andiftheformerwillbetreateddifferentlyandinwhatways.

101GlobalParliamentofMayors,PressRelease:InauguralmeetingofGlobalParliamentofMayorsinTheHague,Netherlands,TheHague/NewYork,1September2016,online:http://www.globalparliamentofmayors.org/press(accessedon25November2016).102GlobalParliamentofMayors,‘MissionStatement’,online:http://www.globalparliamentofmayors.org/mission-statement(accessedon25November2016).103Ibid.104Ibid.

Finally,theriseofglobalcitiesandtheincreasingdirectcollaboration

betweencitiesandinternationalorganizationsaredevelopmentsthatmayraiseconcernsaboutthepossibledisintegrationofthestate,fragmentationoftheinternationallegalorder,andthenegativeeffectsofdecentralization(forexample,itscontributiontoinequalitywithinglobalcities).Thethirdissue,whileveryinteresting,isonethaturbansociologistsandeconomistsarebetterplacedtoaddress.105Thefirstandsecondissuesarelikelytobeofinteresttointernationallegalscholars,anditisonthesetwoissuesthatIwillcomment.

Inthisthesis,Ihavesoughttoshowthattheinterestingquestionisnotwhethertheriseofglobalcitiescontributestothedisintegrationofthestate,butwhattheriseofglobalcitiestellusaboutthechangingnatureofthestateanditsabilitytotakeondifferentstructuralformsondifferentoccasionsandfordifferentpurposes.Inshort,theriseofglobalcitiesprovidesfodderforthedebateonthenatureofthemodernstateandweoughttocontestthesimplisticnotionthattheriseofsubnationalactorsthreatenstheintegrityofthestateasaunitaryentity.Iwouldarguethatthestateisfarfrombeingaunitaryentityatalltimes,andtherecognitionofitsmutablenaturecreatesinterestingpossibilitiesfortransnationalgovernancearrangements.

Asshowninthisthesis,whilestateshavestruggledtodevelopacomprehensiveclimatechangetreatyandtheresultinginternationalgovernancearrangementismadeupoflooselyconnectedinstitutions,transnationalnetworksmadeupofnon-stateactorsandsub-stateactorscanplayameaningfulroleinsupplementingstate-ledgovernance.Theemergenceoftransnationalcitynetworkshasnotthreatenedtosupplantstates,astherhetoricmightportray,butinamoresubtleway,strengthensandreinforcesthetransnationalclimatechangegovernanceorder.Further,itshouldbenotedthatstatesfacilitatethetransnationalforcesthatenablecitiestoengageinglobalgovernance.Statesarenotbeingambushedandtakenbysurprisebytheincreasinglyactiveroleofglobalcitiesininternationalaffairs.Instead,itcanbearguedthatnationalgovernmentshavebeenconvincedthatcitiescanplayameaningfulroleinglobalgovernance,particularlyinissueareaswhichrequirelocalizedactionsuchastacklinginfectiousdiseases,andarecreatingandsupportinginstitutionalplatformstoenlisttheinvolvementofcitiesalongsideotheractors.Therefore,whentheUN-HabitatandtheUNFCCCcreatepartnershipsandprogrammeplatformstoworkdirectlywithcities,forexample,statesoftenalsoparticipateaspartnersintheseprogrammesandmulti-stakeholder105See,forexample,RemyPrud’homme,‘Thedangersofdecentralization’(1995)10(2)WorldBankResearchObserver201;YenerAltunbasandJohnThornton,‘Fiscaldecentralizationandgovernance’(2012)40(1)PublicFinanceReview66;LocalDevelopmentLLC,TheRoleofDecentralisation/DevolutioninImprovingDevelopmentOutcomesattheLocalLevel:ReviewoftheLiteratureandSelectedCases(PreparedfortheUnitedKingdomDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(SouthAsiaResearchHub),November2013),online:http://www.delog.org/cms/upload/pdf/DFID_LDI_Decentralization_Outcomes_Final.pdf(accessedon26November2016).

partnerships.Statesalsosponsormanyofthecapacity-buildingprogramsforcitiestoactonclimatechangeandotherglobalgovernancechallenges.Forexample,thefundersoftheCitiesDevelopmentInitiativeforAsiaincludethegovernmentsofGermany,Sweden,andAustria.106Thereare,ofcourse,alsocounter-examplesofnationalgovernmentsthathavestoodinthewayoftheircitiesexercisinggreaterindependence.107Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatdomesticpoliticsweighheavilyindecisionstoholdcitygovernmentsback,ratherthanconcernsabouttheintegrityofthestateasapoliticalentity.108Thedisaggregationofthestateintoitscomponentpartsisacontemporaryreality,andIwouldarguethatitisasourceofflexibilityandresilienceratherthanasignofweaknessandfragmentation.Theabilityofthestatetodisaggregateintocomponentpartswhichseektocreatenetworksandpartnershipswiththeircounterpartsabroad(e.g.transnationalnetworksofjudges,parliamentariansandregulatorsofthefinancialservicesindustry)isevidenceoftheabilityofthestatetomutateandreconfiguretoaddressdifferentchallenges.Thisflexibilitynotonlybenefitsthestatebuttheinternationalsystemasawholebecauseglobalgovernancehasbecomeincreasinglycomplexandtheone-size-fits-allsolutionofferedbytraditionaltreaty-basedregulationbyinternationalorganizationsisnolongeradequate.Thechallengeforinternationallawisfindingwaystomaintainaccountability,fairnessandlegitimacyintheinternationalcommunityastransnationallawmakingandimplementationprocessesbecomemoreinformalandinclusiveofvariousparticipants.

Finally,itisimportanttomaintainsomecriticalperspectiveabouttherolethatcitiescanplayinglobalgovernance.Thisthesishassoughttoshedlightonrecentdevelopmentsintransnationalclimatechangegovernancethatshowthatcitiesareplayinganincreasinglyactiveroleininternationalaffairs.Ithasalsosoughttouncoverthenormativeeffectsofcities’governanceactivities.Thesearenoveldevelopmentsand,inlightoftheslowprogressininternationalclimatechangenegotiationsuptilltheParisAgreementwasconcludedinDecember2015,areasourceofhopeforthefutureofglobalclimateaction.However,thisthesisdoesnotarguethatcitiesofferapanaceaforcomplexworldgovernanceissueswhiletheinter-statesystemhasfailedtoprovideadequatesolutions.Itmustberecalledthatcitiesarealsodomesticpoliticalentities.Notwithstandingtheirglobalistaspirations,theyareabletopursueglobalgovernanceambitionsonlyiftheyhavethefinancialcapabilitiestodoso–andtheabilityofcitiestolevyandcollecttaxesisaquestionofnationalpolitics.Further,howeverintertwinedacitymaybeintheglobaleconomy,aglobalcityisstillenmeshedinanationalconstitutionalstructure,whichdictatesthestructureandsizeofacity’sgovernment.Nationallawandpoliticsalsodictatethekindofpowersthatacitygovernmenthas.Hence,itisimportanttoretainsomeperspectiveonhowmuchofachallengeglobalcitiesposetostatesandtheinternationallegalorder.Assuch,itishelpfultoconsidertheriseofcitieslessin106CitiesDevelopmentInitiativeforAsia,‘FundingandImplementation’,online:http://cdia.asia/who-we-are/funding-and-implementation/(accessedon26November2016).107SamBarnard,Climatefinanceforcities:Howcaninternationalclimatefundsbestsupportlow-carbonandclimateresilienturbandevelopment?(OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,WorkingPaper419,2015),pg.20.108InterviewsNumber2,4and5.

termsofchallengingthestatusquoandmoreintermsofalternativestostate-centrismwhenweconsidertheinternationallegalorder.

4. Conclusion

Thischaptersoughttonormativelyassessthecontributionofurbanclimate

lawtotheoverallperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexusingsixevaluativecriteriaproposedbyKeohaneandVictor:coherence,accountability,determinacyofrules,sustainability,epistemicqualityandfairness.KeohaneandVictordidnotsaymuchabouteachcriterion,leavingmuchroomforfutureelaboration.Thus,incarryingoutthenormativeassessment,Ialsosoughttofleshoutthecriteriaand,insomecases,provideillustrativeexamplesfromotherareasofclimatelawandpolicy.

Theevaluationhighlightssomestrengthsandweaknessesofurbanclimatelaw.Akeystrengthofurbanclimatelawisitscommitmenttowardstransparency.Bymakinginformationoftheirclimateactionsavailabletothepublicandthereforesubjectingthemselvestopublicscrutiny,citiesholdthemselvesaccountableandintheprocessenhancetheaccountabilityoftheregimecomplex.Whereurbanclimatelawdoesnotfareaswellisontheissueoffairness,specificallyquestionsofdistributivejustice.Bydesign,urbanclimatelawhasreframedtheclimatechangedebateandmanagedtoavoidthecontentiousissuesintheinternationalclimatechangenegotiationssuchasbindingGHGemissionreductiontargetsandfirmfinancialcommitmentsonthepartofdevelopedcountriestoassistdevelopingcountriesintheirclimatemitigationandadaptationefforts.However,thesecontentiousissuesarealsotheonesthatraisedifficultquestionsofdistributivejustice.Withouthavingtodealwiththeseissues,urbanclimatelawhascreatedasubstantialamountofclimateaction.ThisgoestowardssupportingtheParisAgreementinitsearlystageandenhancingtheoverallsustainabilityoftheregimecomplex,butitdoesnotcontributetowardsansweringissuesofdistributivejusticeandfairnessintheregimecomplex.

Finally,thechapterturnedtowardsasetofquestionsconcerningtheriseofcitiesininternationalaffairs.Thesebroadquestionsaredifficultandcomplex.Allthatthischapterhassoughttodoistodrawtogethersomesalientobservationsinresponse.Whatisclearisthatinternationallawscholarsshouldnotignoretheriseofcities.Ifanythingatall,theriseofcitiespointstointerestingpossibilitiesforthefutureofinternationallawasinternationallawscholarsrecognizethemutablenatureofthemodernstate,andthegovernanceoptionsavailedbythedisaggregationofthestate.

Chapter8:Conclusion

1. Introduction

TheUNFCCCenteredintoforcein1994,thefirstmilestoneintheinternationalcommunity’ssearchforacollectiveresponsetoclimatechange.Theattempttoachieveconsensusamongstthe197countriesthatratifiedtheUNFCCConwhatneededtobedonenexttoachievethetreaty’sobjectiveswasalwaysgoingtobedifficult.Socialcooperationhasbeenkeytothesurvivalandsuccessofourspecies,andwehomosapienshavecreatedmanymythsandfictionthathavegivenusunprecedentedabilitytocooperateflexiblyinlargenumbers.Wolvesandchimpanzeescooperateingroups,buttheycandosoonlywithalimitednumberofotherindividualswithwhomtheyshareintimatesocialbonds.Ithasbeensuggestedthathomosapienshavemanagedtocrossthecriticalthresholdandeventuallycreatecitiesandempiresofmillionsofpeoplebecauseoffiction.“Anylarge-scalehumancooperation–whetheramodernstate,amedievalchurch,anancientcityoranarchaictribe–isrootedincommonmythsthatexistonlyinpeople’scollectiveimagination.”1

Thestateisamyth,andapowerfulone.TwoSingaporeanswhohavenevermetoneanothermightrisktheirlivestosaveeachotherbecausetheybelieveintheexistenceofthestateofSingapore,itshistoryasamodernnationfreedfromimperialBritishcolonialism,andaSingaporenationalidentity.Thismyth,however,canalsostandinthewayofcollectiveaction.Oneofthemostcontentiousissuesthatmarredtheinternationalclimatechangenegotiationsforyearscanbeeasilysummarizedassuch:WhyshouldmycountryreduceGHGemissionswhenyoursisnotrequiredto?Whyshouldmycountrybeartheriskofslowereconomicgrowthwhileyoursisallowedtoburnunlimitedamountsoffossilfuelstopowerfactories,portsandhomes?Homosapienshavesingle-handedlycausedanthropogenicclimatechangewithintheequivalentofafractionofasecondinEarth’scosmichistory,andourmythshavehinderedusfromeffectivelyworkingtogethertoremedytheproblem.

However,perhapsnotallislost.Thelackofprogressintheinternationalclimatechangenegotiationshasinspiredotheractorstofindsolutions.Universitieshavebeenworkingtogetherwithventurecapitalistsandphilanthropicorganizationstodevelopcleantechnologiesforthefuture.2Engineersareworkingwithphysiciststoexplorethepotentialforairbornewindenergy,arenewableenergytechnologythatusesairbornedevices(kitesinparticular)toharnesswindpower.3Architectsandurbanplannersincorporategreenroofingandotherdesign

1YuvalNoahHarari,Sapiens:ABriefHistoryofHumankind(VintageBooks2011),pg.30.2However,thecleantechnologybubblehasburst,leadingtoasignificantslowdowninventurecapitalinvestmentincleanenergytechnologystart-upssince2009;BenjaminGaddyandVarunSivaram,‘CleanenergytechnologyinvestorsneedfreshsupportafterVClosses’FinancialTimes(26July2016).3UweAhrens,MoritzDiehlandRolandSchmehl(eds),AirborneWindEnergy(Springer2013).

featurestocoolbuildingsandreducetheurbanheateffectincities.4Somefinancialregulatorsnowrequirecompaniestodisclosetheirclimatechangerisks.5Regionsandstates(withinafederalsystem)havecreatedvoluntaryGHGemissionstradingprograms.6Thelistgoeson.Inthemidstofthisproliferationofclimatechangeresponses,citieshavealsocraftedtheiruniqueresponse.

Thisthesishasexaminedtheemergenceofcitiesasclimatechangegovernanceactors,particularlytheircontributiontowardsgeneratingnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthataimtosteercitiestowardsGHGemissionsreductionsanddevelopinglow-carbondevelopmentpathwaysforthefuture.Citieshavetranscendedmythicalstateboundariestocreatecooperativenetworksthatallowthemtomoreeffectivelylearnfromoneanother,sharebestpractices,anddiffuseideasabouthowacityoughttoberespondingtoclimatechange.Thisfinalchapterwillconcludetheresearchoverfouradditionalsections.Part2willprovideanoverviewoftheissueaddressedbythisthesis.ItwillprovideasummaryoftheresearchandanswerthefiveresearchquestionsposedinChapterOne.Itwillalsoaddresssomeofthelimitationsoftheresearch.Part3willsetoutsomeoftheimplicationsofthisresearchforenvironmentallawscholars,internationallegalscholars,andpractitioners.Part4suggestsavenuesforfurtherresearch.Part5willoffersomefinalremarks.

2. TheResearch2.1SummaryofthisThesis

ChapterOnebeginswithanaccountofhowtheinternationalclimatechangenegotiationsinParis,2015,hadsuccessfullyculminatedintheParisAgreement.Whatcaughtmyattentionwastheprominenceofmayorsandside-eventsorganizedbycitiesandcitynetworksduringCOP21andthepreparatorymeetingsleadinguptotheconference.Inrecenttimes,citieshavesoughtrepresentationattheUNFCCC.Theyhaveundertakenambitiousclimateaction,oftensurpassingthelevelofambitiononthepartofstates.Theyhavebecomeinvolvedingoverningclimatechange,notonlywithintheirurbanterritories,butalsoatthegloballevel.Whatpromptedmyinteresttoembarkonthisresearchwasthatcities’governanceactivitiesappearedtohavenormativemeaningandIwantedtobetterunderstand4SarahMurray,‘Natureisnowaweaponagainstthreatofglobalwarming’FinancialTimes(1June2016).5AnexampleistheUSSecuritiesandExchangeCommission,thoughithasrecentlybeencriticizedforitslaxenforcementofclimateriskdisclosurerules;DavidGelles,‘S.E.C.IsCriticizedforLaxEnforcementofClimateRiskDisclosure’TheNewYorkTimes(23January2016).6TheWesternClimateInitiative(WCI)andtheRegionalGreenhouseGasInitiative(RGGI)aretwoexamples.WCIisanon-profitcorporationthatprovidestechnicalassistancetosupporttheimplementationofstateandprovincialGHGemissionstradingprograms.In2014,CaliforniaandQuebeclinkedtheircapandtradeprogramsundertheauspicesofWCI.Moreinformationisavailableonhttp://www.wci-inc.org.RGGIisthefirstcapandtradeprogramintheUStoreducecarbondioxideemissionsfromtheelectricitygenerationsector.ItsmembersarethestatesofConnecticut,Delaware,Maine,Maryland,Massachusetts,NewHampshire,NewYork,RhodeIslandandVermont.Moreinformationisavailableonhttp://www.rggi.org(bothwebsitesaccessedon15August2016).

andshedlightonthislaw-makingaspectofurbaninvolvementintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Afterprovidingthiscontext,ChapterOnesetsoutthequestionsthathaveguidedthisresearch,myresearchmethodologyandabriefsummaryofthekeytheoreticalconceptsthatIwoulduse.

ChapterTwosetsouttheanalyticalframeworkofthisthesis.Itsetsoutthetheoriesofregimecomplexityandtransnationallegalordering,Anne-MarieSlaughter’stheoryofthedisaggregatedstateandtrans-governmentalnetworks,andthetheoryoftheglobalcitywhichIcombinetocreateaframeworkforconceptualizingthenatureoftransnationalclimatechangegovernance,theemergenceofcitiesinthisgovernancespace,andtolaythegroundforsubsequentanalysisofC40.

ChapterThreesituatestheemergenceofcitiesasparticipantsintransnationalclimatechangegovernancewithinthebroadercontextofhowcitiesincreasinglyparticipatedirectlyandindependentlyininternationalaffairsandglobalpolitics.Itstartsoutbydescribinginstancesofcitiesdevelopingwhatappeartobetheirownindependentforeignandsecuritypoliciesdespitethefactthatsuchpolicyareashavetraditionallybeenconsideredthecoredomainsofcentralgovernmentsandstates.Itthenconsidersinstancesofcitiesimplementinginternationallawdespitenon-ratificationbytheirstate.Finally,thechapterdiscussesthepracticesofinternationalorganizationsliketheWorldBankthathavecontributedtowardsempoweringcitiestoexerciseagencyinglobalgovernance.

InChapterFour,Iexaminewhatfiveglobalcities-London,MexicoCity,NewYorkCity,RotterdamandSeoul-aredoingtoaddressclimatechange.Thesecitiesareinternationallyrecognizedbypolicy-makers,cityplanners,themedia,internationalorganizationsandresearcherstobe‘climatefrontrunners’.Byexaminingthegovernancepracticesofthesefivecities,thischapterprovidesadetaileddescriptiveaccountofcitiesassociallaboratoriesforclimategovernanceexperimentsandtheinter-connectionsbetweenactors,practicesandinstitutionsthatblurthedividebetweenpublicandprivate,localandinternational.

ChapterFivefocusedonthemostprominentnetworkofglobalcitiescommittedtoaddressingclimatechange–C40.Inordertoscaleuptheirclimateactions,shareknowledgeandnorms,citieshaveformednetworks.Thereareatleastfourprominentcitynetworksthataddressclimatemitigationandadaptation,butC40istheonlyonethatrepresentsglobalcitiesandhasitssolefocusonclimatechange.

ChapterSixdrawsonthediscussioninthepreviousthreechapterstoadvancetheargumentthatcitiesareemergingastransnationallawmakers.Icointhetermurbanclimatelawtorefertothevoluntarystandards,normsandpracticesthatarepromulgatedbycitiesandimplementedthroughtheirnetworks.Thechapteridentifiesthepromotionofreflexivityandnormdiffusionasthetwomainpathwaysofinfluencethatarecriticalforsteeringcitiestowardsclimatemitigationandlow-carbondevelopment.ThechapteralsoexamineshowurbanclimatelawrelatestotheUNFCCCregimeinpositiveandreinforcingways.

ChapterSevenevaluatedthecontributionofurbanclimatelawtotheoverallperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexusingsixnormativecriteriaproposedbyKeohaneandVictor.Itthenproceededtotakeastep

backtoconsiderthebiggerpicture.Ireflectedonhowtheemergenceofthecityasalawmakingparticipantintransnationalgovernancemayormaynotchallengetraditionalunderstandingofinternationallawmakingandtheroleofthestateintheinternationalsystem.2.2ResearchQuestionsandAnswers

InChapterOne,IstatedfiveresearchquestionsthatIsetouttoanswerinthisthesis.Iwillbrieflyanswerthesequestionsinthissection.

1. Whatrecentdevelopmentssuggesttheriseofcitiesininternationalaffairs?

Itwasimportanttometoanswerthisquestionbecauseearlyindicationsinmyresearchsuggestedthattheemergenceofcitiesasglobalgovernanceactorsintheclimatechangecontextwaspartofabroadertrendininternationalaffairs.ChapterThreeisdevotedtoansweringthisquestion,therebyalsoprovidingthewidercontextforunderstandingtheriseofcitiesaslawmakingactorsinthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Thischapteralsosoughttoprovideanaccountoftheinvolvementofcitiesininternationalaffairstogroundmyargumentthatcontemporarydevelopmentssuggestthatitistimeforinternationallegalscholarstopaymoreattentiontocities,whichhavetraditionallybeenneglectedduetostate-centricconceptionsofinternationallawmaking.

Iidentifiedfourbroadcategoriesofactivitythatexemplifyhowcitiesareparticipatingintransnationallegalandpoliticalprocesses.Whatisuniqueabouttheirinvolvementisthatthecitieshaveadoptedpracticesandpolicypositionsindependentoforcontrarytothatoftheirstateinmanyinstances.Thesefourcategoriesare:(1)acityimplementinginternationallawonitsownaccordwhenitsnationalgovernmentisreluctantorrefusestodoso;(2)citydiplomacy;(3)citiesdevelopingtheirindependentlocalandtransnationalpoliciesandstrategiestomanageglobalriskssuchasterrorism;(4)citiesformingorganizationstorepresenturbaninterestsininternationalforumsand/ortopursuegovernanceobjectives.TwoexamplesofthefirstcategoryofactionsIcanvassedinthechapteraretheadaptationandimplementationbyAmericancitiesoftheKyotoProtocolandCEDAW,twointernationaltreatiesthattheUShasnotratified.Asforcitydiplomacy,therearemanyinstancesofbilateralinteractionsbetweencitiesindifferentstates.IprovidedafewexamplessuchasthemayorofTokyo’sofficialvisittohiscounterpartinBeijingduringaperiodofgreatSino-Japanesetensionswiththeexplicitgoalofusingcitydiplomacytodefuseofthepoliticaltensionattheinter-statelevel.

2. Whathavecitiesbeendoingtogovernclimatechangeandwhichofthesegovernanceactivitiesgeneratenormativeeffectstransnationally?

Overtwothousandcitieshavedevelopedclimatechangeactionplansto

reducetheirGHGemissionsandadapttotheimpactsofclimatechange.Inthisthesis,Ihavechosentofocusonasampleofglobalcitiestoillustratethelocal-global

connectionsinurbanclimateactions.TheglobalcitiesIfocusedoninthisresearchareRotterdam,London,NewYorkCity,SeoulandMexicoCity.Eachofthesecitiesfacesdifferentchallengesandopportunitiesinaddressingclimatechange.Forexample,RotterdamhashighGHGemissionsbecauseofindustrialactivitiesanditsport.Thecityhasthereforefocusedonreducingport-relatedGHGemissions,developinginfrastructurethatconnectsvariouspartsofthecitysuchthatheatgeneratedbythepowerplantcanbechanneledtowardsgreenhousesandhomes.AsadeltacitywithexposuretotheNorthSea,thecity’sgovernmenthastakenwateradaptationveryseriouslyanddevelopedsignificantexpertise.

Thegovernanceactivitiesthatglobalcitieshaveundertakengeneratetransnationalnormativeeffectwhentheycreatecross-bordernetworkstofacilitatethesharingofnorms,practicesandvoluntarystandards.Whilethereareanumberofcitynetworksthataddresssustainabilityandenvironmentalissuesincludingclimatechange,onlyonenetworkismadeupoflargeglobalcitiesandissolelyfocusedontacklingclimatechange.Thisnetwork,C40,isthereforethesubjectofdetaileddiscussioninChapter5.Settingupthenetworkinfrastructuretofacilitatethesharingofnormsandpracticesisnotenough.Whatisnoteworthyisthatcitieshavedevelopedformsofvoluntarycertification(e.g.theCompactofMayors),standardizedaccountingprotocolsthatcitiescanusetomeasureandreporttheirGHGemissions,andpubliclyaccessiblesystemsofdatadisclosuresothattheycanbeheldaccountablefortheircommitments.Thesevoluntarycertificationschemes,protocolsanddatadisclosuresystemsaredevelopedinpartnershipwithinternationalorganizations,globalcivilsocietyactors,statesandprivatesectorconsultancies,andaretransnationalinnature.

3. Howdothenorms,practicesandstandardspromulgatedbycitiesandtransmittedbytheirnetworksleadtocitiesreducingtheirGHGemissionsandincreasingtheirclimateresilience?

Iarguethattherearetwokeyprocessesthatplayacriticalroleinlinkingthe

norms,practicesandvoluntarystandards(whichIrefertoasurbanclimatelaw)withchangingactualpracticesontheground.Thesepathwaysinvolvethepromotionofreflexivityandnormdiffusion.Reflexivityinvolvesactorsreceivingnewinformationandadjustingtheirpracticesaccordinglytoachievedesiredobjectivessuchasincreasedproductivityattheworkplaceorimprovingenergyefficiency.Inthislineofthinking,voluntarystandardsareregulatorytoolsthatuncovernewinformationforcitiesaswellasprovideasystematicapproachthatcitiescanusetofosterself-reflectionandnewthinking.

Theliteraturehasidentifiedmanynormdiffusionmechanismsbutmostofthemcanbegroupedinthefollowingcategories:competition,learningandimitation.Ihavefoundthatcompetitionplaysanegligibleroleinshapinghownorm-settingpracticesarediffusedacrosscities,butlearningandimitationcertainlyoffercredibleexplanations.

4. Howdothenorms,practicesandstandardspromulgatedbycitiesandtransmittedbytheirnetworksrelatetothoseoftheUNFCCCregime?

WhilesomecommentatorsclaimthattheUNFCCCregimeisnotatthecoreofthe

transnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex,Iwouldargueotherwise.TheUNFCCCremainsanimportantcentralpillarofinternationalcooperationonclimatechange,andprovidesthenecessaryinstitutionalandnormativeframeworks.Whileitdoesnothaveformalauthorityoverothertransnationalgovernanceinitiatives,thelatterinitiativesrelyontheUNFCCCregimefornormativeguidanceandsettingtheglobalagendaonclimatechangeresponses.Inordertoensurethatthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplexperformswell,thatis,steersvariouscommunitiesandactorstowardsclimatechangemitigationandadaptation,itisimportanttoensurethattheindividualregimesthatmakeuptheregimecomplexdonotconflict.Thisresearchquestionwasposedwiththeseconcernsinmind. Overall,IfoundthaturbanclimatelawnotonlydoesnotcomeintoconflictwiththenormsandpracticesoftheUNFCCCregime,theformerhasbeendesignedinwaysthatcomplementandreinforcethelatter.Forexample,itisnoteworthythattheCompactofMayorsisdesignedtobethecity-levelequivalentofthetransparencyframeworkcreatedbytheParisAgreement.DuringtherunuptotheCOPinParis,theCompactofMayorssoughttohavecity-levelinitiativescomplementandsupporttheinternationalclimatenegotiationsbyadoptingthepledge-and-reviewapproachthatunderpinstheParisAgreement.Subsequently,the“CityClimateCommitments”7thatcitiesarerequiredtopledgeuponjoiningtheCompactaresimilartotheNDCsthatstatesarerequiredtoreportpursuanttotheParisagreement.Chapter6providesdetailedanalysisofhowurbanclimatelawandtheUNFCCregimearelinkedinstrategicanddeliberateways.

5. Doglobalcitiesmakeapositivenormativecontributiontotheglobalconstellationofclimatechangegovernanceactivities?

Itisnotpossibletoanswerthisquestionbyreferringtowhethercitieshave

achievedthegoalsandtargetstheyhavesetthemselvesbecausewearestillattheearlystagesofpromotingtheuptakeandimplementingurbanclimatelaw.Itissimplytooearlyforsignificantresults.However,wecanaskourselvesthequestionofwhetherurbanclimatelawcontributespositivelytotheoverallperformanceoftransnationalclimatechangegovernancebyevaluatingitusingwell-establishednormativecriteria.InChapter7,IundertookanormativeassessmentofurbanclimatelawusingthesixcriteriasuggestedbyKeohaneandVictor.Iconcludedthat,overall,globalcitiescontributepositivelyinnormativetermstotheperformanceofthetransnationalclimatechangeregimecomplex.Whileurbanclimatelawdoesnotsufficientlyengagewithissuesofsubstantivejustice,itdoescontributetotheregimecomplex’scoherence,accountabilityandsustainability.2.3LimitationsofthisThesis7CompactofMayors,online:http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/(accessedon1July2016).

Inthissection,Iwilldiscussanumberofkeylimitationstothisresearch.Thefirstlimitationofthisresearchisthatitwouldhavebenefittedfrommoreintensivefieldwork.Itwouldhavebeenfruitfultogainmoredirectandimmersiveobservationsof,forexample,howcitygovernmentofficialslearnfromoneanotherandhowtheprocessofcomplyingwiththeCompactofMayorscreatesopportunitiesforreflexivityandeventualpolicyadjustments.Forexample,inwritingPaperTiger:Law,BureaucracyandtheDevelopmentalStateinHimalayanIndia,NayanikaMathurspentnearlyeighteenmonthsworkingintheofficesofselectedIndianvillagesanddistricts.8Hersisasituatedanalysisofhowtheseeminglyinnocuouspracticesoflocalgovernmentscanhavefar-reachingconsequencesrangingfromprovisionofemploymentopportunitiestowildlifeprotection.Nonetheless,theknowledgeIgatheredfromobservingparticipantsatworkshops,theinterviewsIconducted,andliteraturereviewhasputmeingoodsteadtoanalyzethenormativeeffectsofcities’governanceactivitiesandtheorizeabouthowurbanclimatelawsteersbehaviorofcitiestowardsclimatemitigation.Iconsultedpubliclyavailabledocumentsproducedbythevariousactorsstudiedinthisresearch,treatiesandregulations,andsecondaryliteraturepublishedinacademicjournalsandrespectedmediaoutlets.Inaddition,Iinterviewedfourteenindividualswhoworkforcitygovernments,C40,privatefoundations,andclimatechangedatadisclosureplatforms.InJuly2016,Iattendedafull-dayworkshoponurbanclimateactionorganizedbyICLEIandwidelyattendedbycitygovernmentofficials.Ialsoattendedaclimatefinanceworkshopthatbroughtcityofficials,banksanddevelopmentagenciestogethertodiscusshowtoassessthefinancialviabilityofproposedclimatechangeprojects.

ThesecondlimitationofthisresearchisthatitreliesalmostexclusivelyonmaterialsavailableintheEnglishlanguage.WhilethishasnotbeenasignificantobstacletomyresearchasIhavemanagedtoobtainreliabletranslationsofforeignlanguagematerialsbyrelyingonthegoodwilloffriendsandcolleagues,thedesignofthisresearchwaslimitedbyconsiderationsoflanguageproficiency.

Thethirdlimitationofthisresearchliesintheexclusivefocusonfiveglobalcities,fourofwhicharesituatedintheGlobalNorthandenjoyhighlevelsofwealthandpoliticalstability.ItcanbearguedthatmyresearchwouldhaveyieldeddifferentfindingsifIhadexpandedmydataset,particularlytoincluderapidlygrowingmegacitiesoftheGlobalSouth.Whileitwouldhavebeenidealtodoso,Idonotthinkthatthisresearchiscompromisedbyitsfocusonthefiveselectedglobalcitiesfortworeasons.First,asIexplainedintheIntroduction,Chapter4isnotintendedtoprovidedetailedcasestudiesbuttoprovideanoverallpicturethatrevealstheconnectionsbetweenthelocalandtheglobalwhencitiesengageintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Secondly,theglobalcitiesIselectedarewidelyrecognizedasclimatefrontrunners.ExaminingtheclimategovernancepracticesofglobalcitiesintheGlobalSouthmayhaveyieldedamorecomplexandintricatepictureoftheopportunitiesandchallengesthatcitiesfaceintacklingclimatechange,butIdonotthinkitwouldyielddifferentresultsaboutcities’norm-8NayanikaMathur,PaperTiger:Law,BureaucracyandtheDevelopmentalStateinHimalayanIndia(CambridgeUniversityPress2015).

settingpracticesandengagementintransnationallawmaking,whichisthefocusofthisresearch.

3. ImplicationsoftheResearch3.1ContributiontoExistingLiterature

Thisresearchcontributestoanumberofdifferentstrandsofliterature.First,

thisresearchcontributesalegaldimensiontothelargebodyofliteratureoncitiesandclimategovernance.Thisbodyofliteraturehastendedtofocusoncitieswithinamulti-levelgovernancesystemsuchastheEuropeanUnion,onproducingsinglecasestudiesoncities,orcomparativeanalysisofafewcities.Fewscholarshaveconsideredtheroleofcitiesintransnationalclimatechangegovernanceaslawmakers,andthisresearchseekstofillthisgapintheliterature.Atthesametime,thisthesisprovidesafullerunderstandingofthegovernancecapabilitiesofcities. Theresearchinthisthesisalsocontributestotheglobalcityliterature.Theresearchonglobalcitiestendstofocusontheirnetworkednatureintheglobaleconomyandglobalcitycompetitiveness,whichisconcernedwithglobaltrade,financialflowsandinvestment,andqualityoflifethateachglobalcityoffers.Inrecenttimes,scholarslikeMicheleAcutohaveforgedanewdirectionintheresearchonglobalcitiesbyfocusingontheirroleininternationalaffairs.9InGlobalCitiesandClimateChange,Tae-dongLeecoinstheterm‘trans-localrelations’torefertotheinvolvementofcitiesininternationalaffairsandenvironmentalgovernance.10Hisworkcentersonuncoveringandexplainingwhatshapestheparticipationofcitiesintransnationalclimatenetworksandhowinvolvementinthesenetworksshapestheircapacitytoact.AnotherexampleisSofieBouteligier’sCities,NetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance.11Inherbook,SofieBouteligieranalyzestwotransnationalcitynetworks–MetropolisandC40–andexaminestheoriesofthenetworksocietyandglobalcitiesfromtheperspectiveofglobalecology.Herworkshowshowglobalcitiesperformtheroleofstrategicsitesofglobalenvironmentalgovernancebyservingashubsthatconcentrateknowledge,institutionsandinfrastructure.Theresearchinthisthesishasbenefittedgreatlyfromthisstrandoftheglobalcityliteratureandcontributestoitbyexploringthehithertounexaminedroleofglobalcitiesasnorm-generativeactors.

Thisthesisalsocontributestotheacademicdiscourseontransgovernmentalnetworksandthedisaggregationofthemodernstate.InANewWorldOrder,AnneMarieSlaughterexaminestheemergenceofsub-statenetworksasanimportantcomponentofthecontemporaryinternationallegalorder.12Shesuggeststhatinternationallawshouldnotonlyconcernitselfwithinternationalorganizations9MicheleAcuto,GlobalCities,GovernanceandDiplomacy:TheUrbanLink(Routledge2013);MicheleAcuto,‘GlobalCities:GorillasinOurMidst’(2010)35Alternatives:Global,Local,Political425.10TaedongLee,GlobalCitiesandClimateChange:TheTranslocalRelationsofEnvironmentalGovernance(Routledge2015).11SofieBouteligier,Cities,NetworksandGlobalEnvironmentalGovernance:SpacesofInnovation,PlacesofLeadership(Routledge2013).12Anne-MarieSlaughter,ANewWorldOrder(PrincetonUniversityPress2005).

andtherelationshipsamongststates.Shealsoarguesthattheconceptionofthestateasaunitaryentityisanoutdatedone.Byuncoveringhowsub-componentsofstatesformtransboundarynetworkstoaddressglobalgovernanceissues,shearguesthattheseinter-connectionsformapromisingbasisforincreasingthescopeandqualityofinternationalcooperation.IhavefoundSlaughter’sanalysisofthedisaggregatedstatetobeahelpfulwaytounderstandandconceptualizethegovernanceactivitiesofcitiesandtheirformationoftransnationalnetworks.Atthesametime,Slaughter’swork“isatestamenttotheinvisibilityofcitiestointernationallawyers.”13Slaughterdescribesjudicial,legislativeandregulatorynetworksasexamplesofsub-statenetworksbutdoesnotdiscusstransnationalcitynetworksatall.Hervisionofaninternationalworldorderbasedondisaggregatedsatesdoesnotincludetheinvolvementofcities,yetasthisresearchhassoughttodemonstrate,globalcitieshavenorm-settinggovernancepotentialwhichcanmakeavaluablecontributiontotheworldorder.Thisthesisthereforeaddstotheexistingliteratureondisaggregatedstatesbydrawingattentiontotheroleofcities.

Thisresearchalsomakesanovelcontributiontothevoluntarystandardsliterature,whichhasyettoaddressthestandardsandvoluntarycertificationschemesthatmakesupurbanclimatelaw.Therehasbeenasteadyincreaseintheuseofvoluntarystandardstoaddressenvironmentalandsocialexternalitiesacrossarangeofeconomicsectorsincludingtheglobalgarmentindustryandfoodproduction.14Thishaspromptedlegalscholarstoconsidertheregulatoryandnormativeissuessurroundingvoluntarystandardssuchastheirlegitimacy,accountabilityandtheinteractionbetweenvoluntarystandardsand‘hardlaw’legalinstruments.Thisresearchexpandsthevoluntarystandardsliteraturebysheddinglightonthevoluntarystandardsandnormspromulgatedbycitiesandtransmittedthroughtheirnetworks,whichhavehithertonotbeenstudiedfromthisperspective.

Finally,thisresearchcontributestotheemergingfieldofclimatelaw.Climatechangelaworclimatelawhasonlyveryrecentlytakenoffasadistinctareaofstudy.Ithasonlybeenamatterofdecadesthatlawyersfirstrecognizedtheemergenceofenvironmentallawasadistinctfield.Sincethen,environmentallawhasdevelopedrapidlyandnowencompassesanumberofsub-specializations,includingwaterlawandinternationalenvironmentallaw.15AsJacquelinePeelputsit,“[t]helatestbranchofthemetaphoricalenvironmentallegaltreetotakeshapeisthatofclimatechangelaw.”16Climatelawcanbedefinedasthedistinctivebodyoflegalprinciples

13G.E.FrugandDavidBarron,‘InternationalLocalGovernmentLaw’(2006)38TheUrbanLawyer1,pg.23.14SeediscussioninChapter6.15See,forexample,PhilippeCulletandothers(eds),WaterLawfortheTwenty-FirstCentury:NationalandInternationalAspectsofWaterLawReforminIndia(Routledge2011);PhilippeSandsandJacquelinePeel,PrinciplesofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw(3rdedn,CambridgeUniversityPress2012).16JacquelinePeel,‘ClimateChangeLaw:TheEmergenceofaNewLegalDiscipline’(2008)32MelbourneUniversityLawReview922,pg.923.Fordiscussionabouttherelationshipbetweenenvironmentallawandclimatechangelaw,seeChrisHilson,‘It’sAllAboutClimateChange,Stupid!ExploringtheRelationshipBetweenEnvironmentalLawandClimateLaw’(2013)25JournalofEnvironmentalLaw359.

andrulesthathaveemergedduetothegrowingvolumeandcomplexityofregulatoryactivityaroundclimatechangeatmultiplelevelsandsitesofgovernance.

KatiKulovesihasidentifiedtwotrendsinclimatelawscholarship.Thefirsttrendisgrowingrecognitionthatclimatechangehastobegovernedatmultiplelevelsandnotjustattheinternationallevel.Shearguesthat“[a]saresult,questionsconcerningtheinterplaybetweenvarioussourcesoflegalauthority,includingtheirhierarchies,synergiesandtensions,areparticularlyrelevantforclimatelawresearchandwouldarguablybenefitfromincreaseddoctrinalattention.”17Thesecondtrendrelatestotheinvolvementofmultiplenon-stateactorsinclimatechangegovernanceandtheincreasingrelianceonsoftlawinstrumentsandinformalcollaboration.18Shearguesthataccountingforthispluralityofactorsandregulatoryinstrumentsinvolvessomeimportantchallenges,“includinghowtoavoidbecomingovertlydescriptiveandretainanormativefocus.”19

Thisthesiscontributestotheemergingfieldofclimatelawbyprovidingafocusedstudyonthenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthathavethepotentialtosignificantlyalterGHGemissionspatternsandclimateadaptationpracticesatthelocallevel.Thisresearchtriestouncovertheuniquenormativecontributionthatcitiesaremakingtowardseffortstoaddressclimatechange,therebyaddingtotheincreasinglyrichfabricofclimatelaw.Further,thisresearchtakesheedoftheimplicationsofthetrendsinclimatelawscholarshipthatKulovesihasidentified,andseekstocontributetotheexistingclimatelawscholarshipbyprovidingastudythatmaintainsanormativefocusontheroleofcitiesingoverningclimatechange.3.2PracticalImplications Thisresearchofferspolicymakersandinternationalorganizationspracticalinsightintothepotentialgainsthatcanbereapedfromworkingwithcitygovernmentstoimplementurbanclimatelaw.Thenorms,practicesandvoluntarystandardsthatcitieshavedevelopedandareimplementingthroughtheirnetworkshavethepotentialtoleadtotonnesofGHGemissionsreductionandtolaythefoundationforalow-carbonfuture.

Thisresearchalsobearspracticalimplicationsforthedesignoffutureglobalregulatoryframeworks.Citiesareplayingaroleinaddressingacomplexglobalissuelikeclimatechangeandarealsoplayingaroleinimplementingglobalhumanrightsnormsatthelocallevel.Whoistosaythatcitiesandtheirgovernmentswillnotplayaroleintacklinghumantrafficking,promotingbiologicaldiversityandcombattinginfectiousdiseasesinthefuture?Thesearejustafewoftheglobalgovernancechallengesthatwefacetoday,andwhichrequireinnovativeandpracticalsolutions.Theresearchinthisthesishasdemonstratedthatglobalcities

17KatiKulovesi,‘ExploringtheLandscapeofClimateLawandScholarship:TwoEmergingTrends’inErkkiJ.Hollo,KatiKulovesiandMichaelMehling(eds),ClimateChangeandtheLaw(Springer2013),pg.32.18Ibid.19Ibid,pg.33.

arebeginningtoplayatransnationallawmakingroleintheareaofclimatechange,suggestingthepossibilitythatglobalcitiescanperformasimilarroletoaddressotherglobalgovernancechallenges.Thosewhoareplacedinchargeofdesigningglobalregulatoryframeworksinthefuturemaywishtoconsiderhowtoincorporateandleverageonthegovernancepotentialofcities.JustasglobalcitieshavecreatedC40toscaleuptheirclimateactionsandfacilitatethetransmissionofbestpractices,theymaybeinapositiontodothesameforglobalhealthforexample.

4. AvenuesforFutureResearch

Severalavenuesforfurtherresearchpresentthemselves.TheareasofresearchthatIsuggestbelowbuildupontheworkconductedinthisthesisaswellasfillgapsthathavebeenidentified.First,thisthesishasfocusedoncities,andspecificallyglobalcities,butcitiesareonlyoneofmanysubnationalentities.Othersubnationalentitiesincludeprovinces,stateswithinafederalsystem,andregions.Theseothersubnationalgovernmentscouldalsoplayaroleintransnationalclimatechangegovernance,offeringinterestingpossibilitiesforcrossingthedomestic-foreigndivideandlinkingdomesticclimatechangepolicies.InacommentaryoneffortsbyCalifornia(US)andtheBrazilianstateofAcretolinkthelatter’sReductionofEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation(REDD)programwiththeformer’scapandtradeemissionsscheme,ErnestoRoessingNetoprovidesafascinatinginsightintohowsubnationalactioncanprovideaproofofconceptthatmayinfluencethedevelopmentofREDDattheinternationallevelandsimilarinitiativesatthesubnationallevelinthefuture.20InachapteronlocalclimatechangegovernanceinChinapublishedelsewhere,Ifocusedontheroleofprovincialandprefecturalauthoritiesinwhatisessentiallyatop-downandbureaucraticnationalsystem.21WhatIfoundveryinterestingweretheincentivestructuresusedtomakelocalgovernmentofficialsperceiveGHGemissionsreductiontobeintheirinterestsinsteadofbeingamereobstructivebrakeonlocaleconomicgrowth.Theroleofsubnationalactorsinclimatechangelawandpolicynonethelessremainsunderstudiedandprovidesafertileareaforfutureresearch. Secondly,therehasbeenlimitedconsiderationintheliteratureaboutthelegalcapacityofcitiesandothersubnationalactorstoengageininternationalrelations.AsJoanaSetzerputsit,“…thegovernanceliteraturehasmadelimitedstrideswithregardtothelegalandinstitutionalbasisforinternationalclimateactionbynon-stateactors.Rescalingprocessesareoftentakenforgranted,withlittleornoconsiderationofwhethertheactorshavealegalbasisformovingacrosslevelsofgovernance.Forinstance,aretherepresentativesofsubnationalgovernmentslegallyentitledtomeetforeigndignitaries,tosignmemorandaofunderstanding(MOUs)withothersubnationalgovernmentsacrossborders,orto

20ErnestoR.Neto,‘LinkingSubnationalClimateChangePolicies:ACommentaryontheCalifornia–AcreProcess’(2015)4TransnationalEnvironmentalLaw425.21JoleneLin,‘ClimateGovernanceinChina:Usingthe‘IronHand’’inBenjaminRichardson(ed),LocalClimateChangeLaw:EnvironmentalRegulationinCitiesandOtherLocalities(EdwardElgarPublishing2012).

establishemissionstradingschemes?”22Inthisthesis,Ihavenotengagedwiththisquestionoflegalcompetenceasurbanclimatelawtakestheformofvoluntarycertificationandadoptionofbestpractices,whichdonotrequirecitiestoexerciselegalpowersandenterintoformallegalrelations.However,Setzerraisesanimportantpointthatinheraldingtheriseofcitiesasgovernanceactors,furtherresearchisneededtounderstandthelegalscopeandlimitationsofsubnationalclimateaction. Inrecenttimes,muchhasbeenwrittenaboutthepotentialfragmentationoftheinternationallegalsystem,thedemiseofthestateasitlosesitsmonopolyonauthorityandregulatorypower,andtheroleofvariousnon-stateactorsininternationallawmakingandimplementation.However,asIhavementionedearlier,verylittleconsiderationhasbeengiventotheopportunitiesandchallengesposedtothemodernstatewhenthestatedisaggregatesitselfandsubnationalentitiesemergeasactorsintransnationalgovernance.Theresearchinthisthesishasshedlightonhowcitiesareemergingasnorm-settingglobalgovernanceactorsinthecontextofclimatechange,butthisisnottheonlyareaofinternationalaffairsthathaswitnessedtheriseofcities.Inarecentlypublishedcollection,BarbaraOomenandhercolleaguesbringtogetheracademicsandpractitionerstoconsidertheimplicationsoftheriseof‘humanrightscities’,atermthatreferstocitiesthatexplicitlybasetheirlocalpoliciesonhumanrights.23Humanrightscitiesforgeallianceswithinternationalorganizationsanddevelopnewpracticesdesignedtobringabout‘globalurbanjustice’.24Itisclearthat,atleastintheareasofclimatechangeandhumanrights,urbanactorsarebecomingmoreprominentanditcanbearguedthatthistrendwillcontinueandreachotherglobalpolicyareas.Meanwhile,internationallegalscholarshipneedstokeepapacewiththesedevelopmentsandcanmakeavaluablecontributiontowardsshapingthenormativediscourse.

5. FinalRemarks

Atthestartofthisresearchproject,Ihadaninformedguessabouttheextenttowhichcitiesareinvolvedintransnationalclimatechangegovernance.Inthecourseofwritingthisthesis,Ihavelearntsomuchmore.Today,Ihaveafardeeperinsightintothearrayofclimategovernanceactivitiesthatcitiesandtheirnetworksareinvolvedinandthenormativeimpactoftheirgovernancepractices.TheinterviewsIhaveconductedandthenumerousinformalchatsIhavehadwithcityauthorities,cleantechnologystart-ups,journalistsandurbanplanners,tonameafew,haveinspiredme.WritingthisthesishascuredmeofthecynicismandpessimismthatIhavedevelopedovertheyearsaboutwhatIperceivedtobethegrossinadequacyofhumanity’sresponsetoclimatechange. Itcanbesaidthatitisachoicewhetheroneviewsaglasstumblerasbeing

22JoanaSetzer,‘TestingtheBoundariesofSubnationalDiplomacy:TheInternationalClimateActionofLocalandRegionalGovernments’[2015]4TransnationalEnvironmentalLaw319,pg.326.23BarbaraOomen,MarthaF.DavisandMicheleGrigolo(eds),GlobalUrbanJustice:TheRiseofHumanRightsCities(CambridgeUniversityPress2016).24Ibid.

half-emptyorhalf-full.WhenIfirststartedstudyingaboutlegalresponsestoclimatechangein2004asagraduateschoolresearchassistant,therewasapaucityofmaterialsandtherewascertainlynoareaofstudyknownasclimatechangelaw.TheworkingpaperthatIdraftedforaninternationalworkshophadmorequestionsthananswersinit.25Twelveyearslater,theamountofscientific,political,economicandlegaldebateonclimatechangeisstaggering.In2004,theKyotoProtocolhadnotevencomeintoforce.In2016,weareabletohavealivelydiscussionaboutthenormativegovernancethatcitiesmayoffertoaddresstheglobalproblemofclimatechange.Theglassishalffull,Iwouldsay,andIamparticularlyoptimisticaboutthecontributionthatcitieswillmaketothetransnationalgovernanceofclimatechange.

25TheLegalNatureofEmissionsTrading’,Winter2003,ResourcePaperfor“LegalNatureofGHGEmissionReductions:AnInternationalWorkshop”,jointlyorganizedbyFIELD,theWorldBankandtheEuropeanCommission.

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August2016

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