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Beyond absolutism andrelativism in transpersonalevolutionary theory
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Beyond absolutism andrelativism in transpersonal
evolutionary theoryJorge N. Ferrer
a
aCalifornia Institute of Integral Studies , 9 Peter
Yorke Way, San Francisco, CA, 94109, USA Phone:
(510) 5950408, (415) 6745500x125 Fax: (510)
5950408, (415) 6745500x125 E-mail:Published online: 04 Jun 2010.
To cite this article:Jorge N. Ferrer (1998) Beyond absolutism and relativism in
transpersonal evolutionary theory, World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm
Research, 52:3-4, 239-280
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604027.1998.9972709
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Beyond AbsolutismandRelativismin
Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory
JORGEN FERRER
California InstituteofIntegral S tudies,9Peter Yorke W ay,SanFrancisco,
CA 94109 US A.
Tel.:
510) 595-0408,
415)
674-5500x125;
Fax:
415)
674-5555,
E-mail:
JorgeNF@ aol.com
(Received Decem ber10, 1997;acceptedJanuary 6, 1998)
This paper critically examines
Ken
Wilber's transpersonal evolutionary
theoryin thecontextof thephilosophical discourseofpostm odernity.The
critique focusesonWilber's refutation ofnon-absolutistandnon-universal-
ist approachesto rationality, truth,andm orality suchascultural relativ-
ism, pluralism, constructivism
or
perspectivismunder
the
charges
of
being epistemologically self-refuting
and
morally pernicious. First,
it is
suggested that Wilber offers
a
faulty dichotomy between
his
absolutist-
universalist metanarrativeand a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar
relativism. Second,
it is
shown that Wilber's argum ents
for the
self-refuting
and pernicious nature of other non-absolutist approaches are bothfal-
lacious
and
distorting. Finally,
the
problematic consequences
of
absolutist
discourse
for
academic
and
cross-cultural dialogue
are
pinpointed. Taking
Wilber's treatment
of
Nagarjuna's thinking
as a
paradigm atic example,
it is
suggested that absolutist thinking both usually leads
to
"bad" hermeneutics,
and potentially hinders genuine dialogue among people and traditions
holding different world views.
KEYWORDS: absolutism, relativism, evolution, transpe rson al, d ialogue ,
Wilber
The last two decades of Western philosophical debates have been
increasingly dominated by an implacable assault on the principles
of modernity, or the so-called fundamental Enlightenment para-
digm. Although there is not a unified postmodern theory, virtually
all postmodern thinkers have developed the following two inter-
related lines of attack against the legacy of modernity (see, e.g., Best
and Kellner, 1991; Docherty, 1993; Rosenau, 1992): (1) the rejection
of any form of absolute and universal standards of rationality, truth,
WorldFutures,1998, Vol.
52, pp.
239-280
1998
OPA (Overseas Publishers Association)
N.V.
Reprints available directly from
the
publisher Published
by
license u nder
Photocopying permittedbylicense only theGordonandBreach Publishers imprint.
PrintedinIndia.
239
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240 JORG E N FERRER
and value; and (2) the critique of any privileged picture, metanar-
rative or "Big Story" about human beings and their place in history
and the cosmos.
1
As Lyotard (1974) put it in his often quoted
dictum, postmodernity can be characterized by an "incredulity
toward metanarratives." According to many contempo rary thinkers ,
metanarratives have historically not only claimed universal status,
bu t also functioned as legitimization devices of ethical and epistemic
judgments and practices. The absolutist character of metanarratives
has been fiercely criticized for being totalizing, imperialistic, and
logocentric. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against these
totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the funda-
mental Enlightenment project to find untouchable or absolute
foundations for human knowledge and morality. This lack of ulti-
mate foundations has been often portrayed as potentially leading to
a situation of utter perplexity, enervating anxiety, meaningless rela-
tivism, and even banalized nihilism (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Crook,
1991;
Carr, 1992).
2
If there are no transhistorical and transcultural
foundations for our knowledge and morality, the enemies of post-
modernism argue, then the only route open to us is one leading to
both a self-refuting epistemological relativism an d a pernicious moral
anarchy. This is, paraphrasing Habermas (1987, p. 300), the di-
lemma of the postm odern era: How to navigate between the Scylla of
a totalitarian and unattainable absolutism and the Charybdis of a
self-contradictory and morally repugnant relativism.
Interestingly enough, this postmodern predicament finds strik-
ing parallels in the history of evolutionary philosophical thinking.
Ever since the rise of Darwinism, many of the debates on biological
and human evolution have orbited around the conflict between
defenders of an uni-linear, universal, and frequently pre-given evolu-
tionary process (Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) and proponents
of multiple, undeterministic, and often purposeless evolutionary
pathways (Spencer, Morgan, Bergson, Monod, etc.) (Bowler, 1989).
In the same vein, the perpetual quarrels between scientists and
religious partisans of various sorts (creationists, finalists, etc.) about
the nature and purpose of evolution usually derived from similar
points of divergence (e.g., Barlow, 1995). However, it was in the
discipline of cultural anthropology where the dichotomy between
absolutist and relativism in the context of evolutionary thinking
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ABSO LUTISM AND RELATIVISM 241
emerged at its best. Since the critique of the classic evolutionary
standpoint by Franz Boas and his pupils, but especially after the
publication of Peter W inch's seminal
The Idea of aSocial Scienceand
its Relation toPhilosophy
(1958), philosophers and anthropologists
have arduously disputed both the universality and evolutionary
superiority of the mode of rationality characteristic of the West
(absolutist/universalist thesis), and the illegitimacy of making such
transcultural comparative jud gm en ts due to the relativity and in-
comm ensurability existing among multiple "rationalities" and "forms
of life" (relativist/pluralist thesis) (see Wilson, 1970; Finnegan and
Horton , 1973; Hollis and Lukes, 1982). In the eyes of their respective
antagonists, of course, the universalists appeared "imperialistic"
and "ethnocentric," and the relativists look "irrational," "nihilistic,"
and "amoral." It soon became evident, however, that both extreme
positionsradical universalism and radical relativismentailed
unb earab le implications for ou r m odern ideals of justice, democ-
racy, and equality among human beings. On the one hand, the
commitment to radical universalism traps us in the conceptual
straitjacket of dogmatic superiority and intolerance towards other's
values and ways of life, so painfully evident in the historical
justification of colonialism and imperialism. O n the other hand , the
acceptance of radical relativism builds unbridgable gaps among
cultures tha t now "live in different worlds," not only positing
apriori
obstacles to cross-cultural communication, but also preventing the
critique of any historically o r culturally accepted form of life (includ-
ing organized slavery, systematic genocide, ritualistic cannibalism,
or institutionalized torture). In the light of these difficulties, it
should not be surprising that an increasing number of anthropo-
logists, philosophers, and social scientists are today intentionally
seeking a middle way between these excesses that honors their
insights while avoiding their dangers (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Tam biah,
1990;
Fay, 1996). As in contemporary philosophy, then , the agenda
of modern anthropology and evolutionary philosophical thinking
is to transcend these pernicious dualisms and move beyond
absolutism and relativism.
It is in this context that I want to discuss here the most recent
work in transpersonal evolutionary theory as proposed by Ken
Wilber (1995a) in his massive Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. The Spirit of
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242 JORGE N FERRER
Evolution.
3
One m ann er to read W ilber's (1995a)
Sex, Ecology,
Spirituality (SES
thereafter) is as a response to the relativist threat
seemingly inherent in the postmodern critique of modernity. In
the introduction of
SES,
Wilber presents this work as the first part
of a trilogy
(TheKosmos Trilogy)
aimed at the bold and colossal
task of identifying and systematizing the general evolutionary pat-
terns embedded in the various branches of human knowledgethe
"patterns of existence" (p. 32)with the Maimonidean purpose of
providing us with an "orienting map of the place of men and
women in relation to Universe, Life, and Spirit" (p. ix). Specifically,
Wilber (1995a) offers his trilogy as an example of how this type of
integrative work can be done in our fragmented postmodern era.
Pushing post-modern ja rg on to its limits, we could say that what
Wilber is proposing is a meta-metanarrative: A privileged meta-
frmework able to adequately situate or correct the rest of metanar-
ratives about human existence and its place in the cosmossuch as
the Christian, Darwinian, M arxist, Buddhist, Jung ian , e tc.
4
Further-
more, as is the case with all metanarratives, this "Big Story" is not
presented as one more perspective of cosmic and human evolution,
but as an all-embracing framework possessing privileged status over
all local and rival stories. As Wilber points out, the problem with
contemporary holistic paradigms is that they are not holistic
enoug h, and the purpo se of hisTrilogyis to show the bigger picture
(in Schwartz, 1995, p. 41).
Two other intertwined objectives are pursued by Wilber in
SES:
The first is to carry forward what he considers to be the true task
of postmodernity, i.e., the integration of the Big Three (We, I, and it;
or the Good, the Beautiful, and the True), whose differentiation
defined the m odern perio d, and whose presen t state of dissociation
is, for Wilber, lurking behind most of the maladies besetting the
twentieth-century, such as the ecological crisis, ethnocentric imperi-
alism, or egocentric narcissism (see Wilber, 1995a, pp. 148-149;
390-394; 1996, p. 337). The second is to fight the "flatland,"
Wilber's term for the currently prevalent Western world view char-
acterized by a lack of qualitative distinctions, interiority, and spiri-
tuality. This world view must be challenged, Wilber (1996) writes,
not only because "Only by rejecting flatland can the Good and the
True and the Beautiful be integrated" (pp. 336-337), but also
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 243
in order to dispel the "aperspectival madness" (nothing is better
than anything else) which Wilber attributes to every non-absolutist
and non-universalist account of rationality, truth, and valuesuch
as cultural relativism, pluralism, perspectivism, multiculturalism,
constructivism, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and contex-
tualism.
5
It is not my purpose in this paper to argue against or in favor
of the specific vision of reality that Wilber presents in his book.
6
My purpose is merely to show that the arguments he offers for the
rejection of non-absolutist approaches do not stand serious scrutiny,
and that certain non-absolutist positions should therefore be re-
garded as viable alternatives to his absolutist-universalist scheme
in both transpersonal theory and evolutionary thinking.
7
In addi-
tion, I want to suggest what I believe are certain problematic con-
sequences of absolutist thinking for the practice of genuine and
undistorted dialogue among different peoples and traditions.
To this end, I will first elucidate the philosophical stance espoused
by Ken Wilber in
SES.
Second, I will claim that the arguments he pres-
ents against non-absolutist approaches have important and insur-
mountable shortcomings. On the one hand, I will argue that Wilber
offers a "faulty dichotomy" between his absolutist-universalist scheme
and a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar relativism. On the
other hand, I will show that Wilber's arguments for the self-refuting
and pernicious nature of every non-absolutist approach are both
fallacious and distorting. In
brief,
I will give an account of how
non-absolutist views can be posited without falling in self-contradictory
aporias or "aperspectival madness." Finally, I will explore the poten-
tially hazardous consequences of absolutist positions for academic
dialogue and cross-cultural understanding. Taking Wilber's treatment
of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example, I
will suggest that absolutist thinking frequently hinders genuine dia-
logue between people and traditions holding different world views.
I . ABSOLUTISM IN AN AGE OF POSTMODERNISM
As mentioned above, the overall goal of
Sex,Ecology, Spirituality
(SES)
is to offer an o rienting m ap of the place of men and women
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244 JORGE N FERRER
in the universe. In this section, I want to show how this map is laid
out from the absolutist position known as the pe rennial philosophy.
Before proceeding further, however, it may be necessary to
say some words here about my use of the term "absolutism," instead
of the more in vogue "objectivism," to refer to Wilber's position
throughout this paper. As is well known, absolutism has been a
term in disuse in Western philosophy for the last decades. Recently,
for example, Bernstein (1983) encouraged the substitution of
objectivism for absolutism in the classic dichotomy "absolutism-
relativism." Bernstein (1983) argued that, since all human knowl-
edge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and app rox imate,
absolutism is "no longer a live option" (p. 12). Therefore, he pro-
posed to use objectivism to refer to all forms of foundationalist
philosophy standing in opposition to relativist, contextualist or
skeptical views of reason , know ledge, and value. However, a lthough
both absolutism and objectivism have been applied in contrast to
relativist doctrines, these two terms should not be used as inter-
changeable. In short, while objectivism claims that our knowledge
of the world, even if imperfect and app roxim ate, is warranted by the
existence of a pre-given reality that exists "out th ere " independen tly
of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, absolutism maintains the
existence of ultimate, transcendental or eternal truths and values
embedded in human nature, the universe, or both.
The reason I am emphasizing this distinction here is because
I believe that, in the context of transpersonal theory, to use the
term objectivism is profoundly confusing and misleading for at
least the following two reasons: First, to accuse an absolutist
transpersonal theoristsuch as Wilberof being objectivist is
inaccurate because he or she may be defending the identity
between human deepest subjectivity and the ultimate nature of
objective reality. After all, this is the central claim of the perennial
philosophy, according to which: "At the highest levels, world
andself,outer reality and inner reality, coincide as the 'ground' of
all that is" (Rothberg, 1986, p. 3). Or, in Wilber's (1993b) own
words: "The core insight of the psychologia perennis is that our
'innermost' consciousness is identical to the absolute and ultimate
reality of the universe" (p . 22). Second, we should also remem ber that
one of the most basic tenets of transpersonal theory is precisely
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 245
that self-identity can expand to include other aspects of life and
cosmos
(Grof,
1985, 1988; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993a). But then,
in transpe rsona l studies it is not clear how to coherently dem arcate
between what is objective and what is subjective because what once
were "objects" of knowledge can become, temporarily or perma-
nently, part of an individual's "subjectivity". As I see it, this dis-
mantlement of the subject-object organization of phenomena
strongly suggests that Cartesian epistemic categories such as objec-
tivism or subjectivism do not have either explanatory descriptive
power to account for transpersonal events.
The critical issue in transpersonal epistemology, then, is not the
"objectivity" of transpersonal knowledge claims, but their ontologi-
cal and epistemic status in relation to rival proposals (e.g., does
the archetypal-astrological paradigm have epistemic privilege over
Wilber's evolutionary model? Can indigenous forms of spirituality
be legitimately subordinated to the hierarchical framework of the
perennial philosophy? Or are all these approaches different but
equally valid ways in which spirituality can be cultivated and lived?).
We will briefly return to these crucial questions at the end of this
article; here I am merely pointing out that, since the nature of
transpersonal phenomena renders objectivism meaningless, we
need to recover the term absolutism to refer to any transpersonal
theory claiming to be paradigmatic for the rest and/or to depict
"how things really are ."
8
1 . The Perennial Philosophy
There is no doubt that the idea of a perennial philosophy
philosophia
perennis)has been differently articulated thro ug hout
the history of Western ph ilosophy. Th e search for an universal, per-
manent, and all-encompassing philosophy can be traced to the
Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria or the Platonic-Christian
synthesis of St. Augustine. However, it is not until the Renaissance
that we find the term "perennial philosophy" explicitly used
in philosophical circles (Loemker, 1973). More precisely, it was
Agostino Steuco (1497-1546), bishop of Kisamos and librarian of
the Vatican, who coined this term to refer to the
prisca theologia
or
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246 JORGE N FERRER
philosophia priscorium of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical
system based on a synthesis of Platonic principles and Christian
doctrines. Thus, the modern notion of a perennial philosophy
should be regarded as a product of the ecumenical interest of the
Neoplatonic tradition in the Renaissance (Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni
Pico della Mirndola, Nicolas de Cusa, Agostino Steuco, etc.) in
finding unity and harmony amidst the multiplicity of conflicting
world views (Schmitt, 1966).
Throughout the history of philosophy, the term "perennial phi-
losophy"
philosophia perennis)
has also been used as a synonym
for Scholasticism and Thomism; as the final goal of philosophy
by Leibniz; as the regulative ideal of philosophical practice by
Jaspers; and as a world philosophy, synthesis of East and West, by
Radhakrishnan (Collins, 1962; Loemker, 1973). Common to all
these conceptions, however, is the idea that a philosophical curre nt
exists that has endured through centuries, and that is able to
harmoniously integrate all traditions in terms of a "single Truth"
which underlies the ap pa ren t plurality of world views. According to
the defenders of the perennial philosophy, this unity in human
knowledge stems from the existence of a single ultimate reality
which can be directly accessed by the human mind under certain
special conditions.
As is well known, the idea of a pe renn ial philosophy was popu lar-
ized in the twentieth century by Aldous Huxley (1945), who in his
book by the same title defined it as "the metaphysics that recognizes
a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and
minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to,
or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's
final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent
Ground of all being" (p. vii). What characterized Huxley's peren-
nialism, as well as the one of the so-called traditionalists such as
Ren Guenon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy or Frithjof Schuon (see
Borella, 1995; Quinn, 1997), was the conviction that the "single
Tru th" of the peren nial philosophy can be found at the heart of the
mystical teachings of the world contemplative traditions. Although
with different emphases, all these authors claimed that while the
exoteric beliefs of the religious traditions may be assorted and
occasionally even incom patible, their esoteric or mystical dimension
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 247
reveals an essential unity that transcends all doctrinal pluralisms.
9
And this is so, the traditionalists argued, because mystics of all ages
and places are individuals who are able to transcend the different
conceptual schemes provided by their cultures, languages, and doc-
trines,
and consequently have access to a direct, unm edia ted ap pre -
hension of reality(gnosis).
10
In sum, the traditionalists maintained not only the existence of a
contemplative consensus about the ultimate natu re of reality, but also
the absolute truth of such a vision, i.e., that it depicts "the way things
really are" once divested from individual and cultural projections. In
its general form, then, the perennialist thesis includes two different
knowledge claims: A descriptive claim, that affirms the homogeneity
of the message of the contemplative traditions; and a normative or
epistemological claim, that maintains the absolute truth of that
message (cf., Griffiths, 1991). Although I cannot develop this poin t
here, it is important to note that the evaluation of these two claims
may require different testing procedures. The examination of the
former claim, for example, may involve hermeneutic comparative
analyses of the different mystical texts, as well as interviews and dia-
logues among representatives of the living traditions. In con trast, th e
assessment of the latter may entail epistemological analyses of the
cognitive value of mysticism, and, in my opinion, personal involve-
ment in certain forms of spiritual inquiry (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1994).
But, what is the "single Truth " about which all contemplative trad i-
tions supposedly agree? According to the modern defenders of the
mystical version of the perenn ial philosophy, such as Huston Smith
(1976, 1987, 1989), Frithjof Schuon (1984), and Seyyed Hossein
Nasr (1989, 1993), the doctrinal core of the perennial phi-
losophy is the belief that Spirit, Pure Consciousness or th e U niversal
Mind is the fundamental essence of both human nature and the
totality of reality. In the perennialist view, that is, Spirit is the
ontologically primary foundation of the cosmos.
Briefly, the other major principles derived from this primor-
dial Truth are involutionary cosmology, hierarchical ontology and
axiology, and hierarchical epistemology (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1986;
Smith, 1976, 1989; Nasr, 1989, 1993; W ilber, 1977, 1990, 1993a;
Quinn, 1997): (1)Involutionary cosmology, or the postulate that the
physical universe is the result of a process of emanation, restriction
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248 JORGE N. FERRER
or involution of Spirit. In o ther words, Spirit is prior to ma tter, and
matter has evolved from It. (2)
Hierarchical ontology and axiology,
o r
the vision of reality as composed of different layers or levels of
being that are hierarchically organized (e.g., matter, mind and
spirit)the so-called Great Chain of Being. In this hierarchy, the
higher levels are those closer to Spirit, and are regarded as more
real, more causally effective, and more valuable than the lower.
That is, Spirit is more real and better than mind and matter. And
(3)hierarchical
epistemology,
or the theory of knowledge according to
which knowledge of the higher realms of the hierarchical ontology
is more essential, reveals more about reality, and is therefore
authoritative upo n knowledge of the lower ones. Tha t is, knowledge
of Spirit (contemplation, gnosis)is m ore true and valuable than
knowledge of the m ental an d physical levels (rational and empirical
know ledge, respectively).
To sum up, the perennial vision maintains that reality is orig-
inated by, and ontologically the same as, a simultaneously imma-
nent and transcending Spiritidentical in essence to human
innermost consciousnessthat constitutes the ultimate referent for
what can be regarded as real, true, and valuable.
2.
Ken Wilber's Evolutionary Perennialism
Through his many works, Ken Wilber has identified himself as
a modern translator and defender of the perennial philosophy,
championing untiringly the perennial doctrines in the transpersonal
arena during the last two decades (1977, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1993a).
11
His latest work is not an exception. As Wilber (1997) has recently
stressed, however, there is a fundamental difference between his
"neoperennialism" and the traditional versions of the perennial phi-
losophy. In contrast to the merely involutionary accounts of most
traditions, Wilber (1997) claims that a more adequate description
of the perennial Truth today should necessarily incorporate the
notion of evolution. As Walsh (1995) rightly pointed out, the aim of
Wilber's recent work "is to trace evolutionphysical, biological,
and humanand to set it within the context of the perennial phi-
losophy" (p. 18). Following thinkers like Hegel, Aurobindo, or
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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 249
Teilhard de Chardin, then, Wilber (1997) proposes an evolutionary
perennialism
that holds that:
(...) there is still That One, or the timeless and absolute Spirit of
which the entire universe is but a manifestation, but that world of
manifestation is not now devolving away from Spirit, it is evolving
toward Spirit. God does not lie in our collective past, God lies in our
collective future; the Garden of Eden is tomorrow, not yesterday; the
Golden Age lies down the road, not up it. (p. 63)
What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the
traditional perennial philosophy should be complemented with a
special type of
teleological
evolutionism. Teleological evolutionism is
the view that cosmological, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic processes
are ultimately directed towards a prede term ined goal. In the classic
evolutionary perennialist view, this pre-given goal is generally
equated with Spirit
itself.
For traditional evolutionary perennialists
like Te ilhard de C hard in or Aurobind o, that is, Spirit is not only th e
beginning, but also the end-point of evolution. Spirit is both the
Alpha and the Omega of all cosmological and evolutionary pro-
cesses. It is important to note here that, in contrast to these phi-
losophers, Wilber (1995a, 1997) does not believe that this Omega
point (Spirit) towards which the evolutionary process is directed will
ever be reached in the world of time and space and form. Since
Spirit is timeless and formless, Wilber (1997) convincingly argues,
It will never be reached at any point in time, but can only be
realized "by stepping off the cycle of time and evolution altogether"
(p .
280). Still, it should be noted here that Wilber (1995a) regards
Spirit as the final cause, pull, and telos of the entire cosmic and
human evolutionary process.
It is certainly one of Wilber's great accomplishments to have given
the perennial vision higher contemporary finesse and explanatory
power than any other traditional or modern account. In my opinion,
this is due not only to the incorporation of the notion of evolu-
tion, but also to the adoption of two conceptual frameworks: One
modern, structuralism, and the other postmodern, constructivism.
Against an evolutionary background, these two frameworks allow
Wilber to accommodate, somewhat artificially I believe, both the
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250 JORG E N FERRER
plurality of human forms, and some modern epistemological
insights within the universalist vision of the perennial philosophy.
On the one hand, the adoption
o
structuralismpermits him to house
cultural differences within a universalist view of consciousness and
reality. For example, defending a perennialist view of spirituality,
Wilber (1995a) proposes that the diversity of experiences, symbolic
expressions, and cultural forms found in the various contemplative
traditions stems from the existence of surface structures, culturally
and historically situated manifestations of an underlying universal
sequence of deep structures which ultimately constitute one path
and one goal for human spiritual evolution: "Common deep struc-
tures with culturally situated surface structures seem to me to steer
a course between 'no similarities at all' and 'mostly or only one
common core'" (1995a, p. 604, note. 16).
Accordingly, Wilber (1995a) plots the transpersonal territory into
four types of hierarchically laddered realms or dee p structures. The
psychic (or nature mysticism: the realm of OBEs, vibrations, Kun-
dalini, chakras, etc.); the subtle (or deity mysticism: the realm of
luminosity and archetypal forms, of God, etc.); the causal (or
formless mysticism: the realm of pure consciousness, emptiness,
nothingness, the Void, etc.); and, finally, the nondual (nondual
mysticism: beyond being and non-being, where "emptiness is form,
and form is emptiness," the world as expression of Spirit, etc.).
According to Wilber (1995a), these four types of mysticism "can
most definitely be found cross-culturally. Nobody is denying that
a Buddhist will interpret the luminosity as the Sambhogakaya, the
Christian will interpret it perhaps as an angel or Christ himself,
a Jungian will interpret it as an archetypal emergence, and so on"
(p .
621, note. 58). In other words, although very specific arche-
typal visions and deities (different surface structures) can be ob-
served in different traditions, all of them belong to the same level
of spiritual development, i.e., the subtle level, the realm of the
archetypal manifestations (the same deep structure). In sum, hu m an
spirituality is ultimately universal, as constituted by an evolutionary
hierarchy of deep structures. Contextual factors only shape and
determine the situated manifestations and interpretation of these
deep structures and the level of spiritual evolution attainable in
each tradition.
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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 251
On the other hand, Wilber (1995a) adds to the perennial vision
severalconstrudivist principles inspired in Vrela, Thompson, and
Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm, such as the rejection of the
representation paradigm, the emancipation from the constraints of
a pre-given reality, or the idea of "enacted worldspaces" (intersub-
jectively shared worlds of referents that are disclosed in the process
of the mutually codetermined evolution of consciousness and the
world). Wilber should certainly be c redited for having extend ed the
scope of the enactive paradigm from its original confinement in
the monological sensoriomotor world to dialogical mental and
translogical spiritual realms. I should point out here, however, that
Wilber's inclusion of these modern epistemological insights occurs
under the shadow of an absolutist-universalist scheme that sab-
otages the enactive paradigm. According to Wilber (1995a), al-
though the different worldspaces are not pre-given but enacted,
their unfolding follows a still pre-given evolutionary pattern gov-
erned by a spiritual telos: "The deep structures are given, but the
surface are not." (Wilber, 1996, p. 212). Of course, the unnecessary
subordination of the enactive paradigm to a uni-linear sequence of
pre-given evolutionary stages (or deep structures) betrays the very
raison
d tre
of this paradigm , which was not only devised to p rovide
a "middle way or entre-deux between the extremes of absolutism
and nihilism" (Vrela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 238), but
also developed in the context of a view of "evolution by natural
drift" that is undeterministic and inimical to any pre-given evolu-
tionary path.
In sum, Wilber should be credited for having 'softened' and
actualized the perennial vision, there by allowing for much more
diversity, variety, and creative novelty than any traditional account.
However, by retaining an absolutist/universalist core in his notion
of deep structure, Wilber still runs the risk of falling prey to the
several dangers intrinsic to absolutist thinking. In the next two
sections, we will examine in more detail the nature of these pitfalls.
Here, what should be clear is that, for Wilber, underlying all app arent
contextual diversity and undeterminism, the re exists a pre-given and
universal evolutionary process that determines the deep structure of
world views, social structures, and human psychospiritual develop-
ment. This evolutionary process is driven by a dynamic telos-Spirit
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252 JORGE
N
FERRER
that, although never reachable
in the
world
of
form,
is the
ultimate
origin,
end, and
ground
of all
that exists.
II . FIGHTINGTH FLATLAND
In this section,
I
want
to
explore
the
arguments Wilber offers
throughout
the
entireSESagainst non-absolutist accounts
of
knowl-
edgeandvalue.In short, I will argue that Wilber's strategycom-
prises
the
following
two
moves:
(1) to
create
a
faulty dichotomy
between his absolutist-universalist vision and a vulgar relativism;
and
(2) to
depict
all the
alternatives
to his
absolutist vision
as
both
self-refuting,
i.e.,
they canno t
be
stated w ithout falling
in
contradic-
tions; and pernicious, i.e., they inevitably lead to a "flatland" in
which
no
qualitative contrasts
can
consistently
be
made
(a
situation
of "aperspectival madness"). This section discusses
in
detail
the
fallacious nature
of
these
two
moves.
1 . TheFallacyof theFaulty Dichotomy
W ilber's first move against non-absolutist appro aches
is to
create
a faulty dichotomy between
his
absolutist scheme
and a self-
contradictory and pernicious relativism. Central to Wilber's argu-
ment
is the
conflation
of all
non-absolutist approaches into
an
artificially constructed "vulgar relativism," so that the reader gets
the impression that
one has to
choose between eitheradopting
absolute/universal standards or falling into
the
clutches
of a self-
refuting and nihilistic relativism inwhichno knowledge claimsor
qualitative distinctions
can
coherently
be
made.
The nature
of
this move
is
more evident than ever
in his
discussion
of the
types
of
constructivism. Wilber (1996) claims that,
"Faced with this discovery o f'n o t pregiven ,'atheoristcanthen take
one
of two
routes through this
new and
confusing postmodern
landscape, where nothing is foundational" (p. 61, hisemphasis).
The first route
is one
leading
to a
self-contradictory extreme
con-
structivism, which holds that
all
world views
are
arbitrary,
all
truth
relative,and no universal truths exist, whileat once defending the
universal validity
of its own
approach. Wilber pinpoints, rightly
I
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 253
believe, that this form of constructivism is jus t a form of nihilism
rooted in egocentric narcissism. The second route is a moderate
constructivism, which Wilber (1996) identifies with his own approach ,
and that "simplyinvestigates the actualhistory and unfolding of these
world views, not as a series of merely arbitrary flailings-around, but
rather as an evolutionary o r developmental pattern , governed in pa rt
by the currents of evolution it se lf (p. 63 , his emphasis). As we have
seen, for Wilber, the deep structures of this evolutionary pattern are
still pre-given, that is, they follow a pre-determined sequence that
inversely recaptures the steps of involution.
The crucial flaw in this argumentation is that a non self-
contradictory constructivism does not need to be subordinated to
any pre-given evolutionary schemeand this is, I believe, the
crux of Vrela, Thompson, and Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm.
However, Wilber's naked dichotomization renders possible only
two options: Either pre-given evolutionary world views or totally
arbitrary ones; either universalism ornihilistic "aperspectival mad-
ness;" either absolutism
or
self-contradictory relativism. There is
nothing new about this move. For example, in spite of the numer-
ous studies clarifying the different varieties of relativism,
12
abso-
lutist philosophersout of either ignorance or malicehave sys-
tematically employed this argument to attack any non-absolutist
account of truth and value. The purpose behind positing dichot-
omies that do not exhaust the possibilities is well known by phi-
losophers and logicians. In their classic study on fallacies, for
example, Fearnside and Holther (1959) pointed out that: "The as-
sumption that there is no middle ground is a favorite weapon of
persons desiring to force others to take sides in black-white terms
even though the problem is not simple and though its fair solution
requires an evaluation of several possibilities" (p. 30).
To conclude this section, it appears that Wilber suffers from, and
helps to spread, the philosophical affliction that Bernstein (1992)
called the "Cartesian Anxiety," that is, "the anxiety that unless we
can specify a firm foundation for our knowledge claims, unless we
can appeal to clear determinate ahistorical criteria for deciding
what is true and false, correct and incorrect, then the only alterna-
tive is to fall into the abyss of a self-refuting relativism where
'anything goes'" (p. 309).
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254 JORGE N. FERRER
2. Refuting the Argum ent for Self-Refutation
Once the false dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativ-
ism is artificially constructed, the second move logically follows: A
sustained attack of the "wrong" pole under the charges of
self-
refutation and "aperspectival madness." In this section, I will con-
sider the legitimacy of the charge of self-refutation with which
Wilber (1995a, 1996) attempts to dismiss all non-absolutist ap-
proaches, such as cultural relativism, constructivism, pluralism,
and other contextualist accounts of truth and morality. The next
section will deal with the second charge, that of "aperspectival
madness."
The core of Wilber's attack against non-absolutist approaches
rests in the argument for self-reflexivity or self-refutation. When
considering cultural relativism, for example, Wilber (1995a) claims
that its adherents "maintain that all diverse cultural values are
equally valid, and that no universalvalue jud gm en ts are possible.
But that judgm en t is itself a universal jud gm en t. It claims to be
universally true that no jud gm en ts a re universally true" (p . 29, his
emphasis). Therefore, h e continues, "this type of obscurantism (...)
is profoundly self-contradictory" (p. 29; see also pp. 526-528,
note. 26). Wilber (1995a) applies the same line of argumentation
adnauseumto critique non -hierarchical app roaches (p. 25), plural-
ism (p. 28; p. 574, note. 26), perspectivism and post-structuralism
(p.188), multiculturalism (pp . 199-204), constructivism (pp .599-601,
note. 16), and deconstructivism (p. 721, note. 4).
As is well know n, the charge of self-refutation is the classic
argument against relativism used by virtually all absolutist philoso-
phers even since Plato's quarrels with the Sophists.
13
In its general
form, the argument runs as follows: Relativism (or constructivism,
contextualism, etc.) is self-refuting because it cannot be stated con-
sistently without becoming some form of absolutism (or objectiv-
ism, universalism, etc.). That is, to say that all views are relative
(or constructed, contextual, etc.) renders the relativist thesis either
relative itself or claiming to be an exception to its own logic. If the
relativist thesis does not have absolute and universal value, the
absolutist philosopher argues, then ther e is no reason to consider it
more valid than any oth er view. Conversely, if the relativist thesis is
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 255
claimed to have absolute value, it either contradicts itself or falls
into what Mandelbaum (1982) called the "self-excepting fallacy."
Before proceeding to show the fallacious na ture of this argumen-
tation, I should add an important point here to avoid serious
misund erstand ings of my position in this article. I totally agree with
Wilber, Taylor, and many others, in that a vulgar relativism main-
taining that "everything is the same as everything else, and that no
distinctions can be therefore made between what is good or bad,
righ t or wrong, true or false" is bo th blatantly self-contradictory and
morally repulsive. And it is probable that some of Wilber's targets
are guilty of these charges and well deserve the harsh reprimand
they receive at his hands.
1 4
Furthermore, I also agree with these
authors on the significance and inevitability of making qualitative
distinctions in human lifeand, in the next section, I will be giving
a brief account of how these contrasts can be made without falling
into the extremes of absolutism and vulgar relativism.
T he p roblem with Wilber's p resen tation , however, is that it forces
the reader to mistakenly believe that one can only "take one of two
routes:" Absolutism/universalism or a self-contradictory vulgar rela-
tivism. In other words, Wilber consistently omits to mention that
many alternatives to absolutism, such as certain types of pluralism,
perspectivism, pragmatism, and moderated forms of relativism and
constructivism, are not necessarily inconsistent.
15
What all these
approaches have in common is not to be self-refuting, but to
challenge absolutist, universalist, and objectivist beliefs in the exis-
tence of transcultural and transhistorical standards of rationality,
truth, and morality. As Adorno (1979) already warned, to inter-
pret this denial as a self-refuting positive theory is both fallacious
and question-begging. In short, what I am suggesting here is that
the self-refuting nature of m ost non-ab solutist appro aches only emerges
when they are either believed to ha ve absolutist purpo ses or judged from
standards (notions ofabsolutetruth, rationality, etc.) only appro priate in an
absolutist domain of
discourse. In other words, these approaches are
self-refuting onlywhen they are supposed to have an absolutist
agenda, i.e., to make absolutist claims.
16
The imputation of purposes alien to non-absolutist approaches is
a com mon strategy employed , with more o r less awareness, by most
absolutist philosophers. The neo-pragmatist Rorty (1989), for
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256 JORG E N FERRER
example, after rejecting self-refuting forms of vulgar relativism
("every belief is as good as every other"), challenged the assump-
tion that philosophy is a search for the Truth, and that human
inquiry is aimed at the discovery of "underlying structures,"
"culturally invariant factors," or "biologically determined patterns."
(p.
36). And when the absolutist philosoph er depicts his position as
self-contradictory, he Responded tha t this ph ilosopher is "projecting
his own habits of thought up on the pragm atist when he charges with
[vulgar, self-refuting] relativism" (p. 44). Because, Rorty (1989)
argued, the absolutist philosopher "thinks that the whole point of
philosophical thought is to detach oneself from any particular com-
munity and look down at it from a m ore universal standpoint. When
he hears the pragmatist repud iating th e desire for such a stand poin t
he cannot quite believe it. He thinks that everyone, deep down
inside,
must
want such d etachm ent" (p. 44, his em phasis).
The persuasiveness of the argum ent for the self-refuting na ture
of non-absolutist approaches, then, rests on the acceptance of an
absolutist domain of
discourse. However, human discourse can have
different purposes apart from arguing for the absolute truth or
falsehood of knowledge claims, viewpoints, or paradigms. For ex-
ample, when Meiland (1980) considered the claim that if rela-
tivism is
only
relatively true, then we have no reason for taking it
seriously, he pointed out that this statement presumes that only
that which is purely absolute or objective is worth expressing. By
bringing evidence contra universals and absolutes, relativists may
be attempting to rationally persuade the non-relativist of the rela-
tivity of
all
conceptual frameworks,
including
the relativist one. This
appears to be, for example, the path taken by Goodman (1978),
who emphasized the local (versus universal) validity of relativist
knowledge claims. Stated in this way, then, the relativist thesis,
far from being self-refuting, is rather "self-exemplifying" (Smith,
1993).
Alternatively, Meiland (1980) continued, relativists may be
merely presenting their position because they have a psychological
need to express the way they see the world. Furthermore, I should
add, they may be appealing to the reasonableness, appropriateness,
and even 'truthness' of the relativist thesis without operating in the
domain of a bivalent theory of truthaccording to which a state-
ment is either true or false (not-true), instead of having different
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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 257
degrees of 'truthness' (Negoita, 1985). In all these cases, relativism
is not self-refuting and worth expressing. N eedless to say, analogous
arguments can be made,
mutatis mutandis,
in defense of the rest
of non-absolutist approaches that Wilber attempts to dismiss under
the charge of self-refutationsuch as pluralism , perspectivism, o r
constructivism.
The idea of different domains of discourse has been further
developed by Patel (1994). In his interesting attempt to solve the
pa rado x of self-refutation in Nagarjuna's thin king, Patel (1994)
distinguished between two different universes of discourse: Argu-
mentative/systematic and dialogical/conversational.
17
In the
argu-
mentative universe of discourse, the function of statements is to assert
propositions that have a truth-falsehood value. In adialogicaluni-
verseof discourse, in contrast, propositions are not advanced as true
or false, bu t expressed with a different purpo se, such as therapeu tic,
soteriological, showing a state of affairs, or simply continuing the
philosophical conversation. According to Patel (1994), the prob lem
of the contradictory nature of self-referential statementssuch as
Nagarjuna's famous claim that hisMulamadhyamakarikascontains no
thesisappears
only
when considered in an argumentative universe
of discourse. Following Patel, one might argue that when relativists
deny the existence of absolutes, they are primarily developing an
alternative mode of dialogical discourse. However, absolutist phi-
losophers have interpreted them as positing absolutist positive
theories in an argumentative universe of discourse.
In addition, discourse (both argumentative and dialogical)
may not be necessarily the ultimate context for the discussion of
knowledge claimsand especially transpersonal ones. In this vein,
Rothberg (1994) pointed out that once the epistemological claims
of the spiritual traditions are taken seriously into account, to assume
"discourse as theuniversal horizon of knowledge" (p. 9, his em -
phasis) could be deeply misleading. Furthermore, Rothberg (1994)
continued, arguments for self-contradiction such as Habermas'
"performative paradox" (to question discourse is self-refuting
because it assumes discourse) are only legitimate if one presumes
the impossibility of going beyond the structures of communicative
rationalityand this assumption is precisely what most spiritual
traditions challenge Ro thberg (1994) suggested that a possible
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258 JORG E N FERRER
complementary model to discourse could be found in Kremer's
notion of "concourse" (1992a,b, 1994, 1996). In contrast to the
Habermasian-like discourse, where the different validity claims
(comprehensibility, propositional truth, truthfulness, and right-
ness) are redeemed through the suspension of action, and engage-
ment in linguistic elucidation and argumentation, Kremer coined
the term "concourse" to refer to a more holistic, embodied, and
egalitarian mode of knowledge-sharing and resolution-making in
which not only rational argumentation, but also ritual, silence,
story-telling, humor, theater, dance and other arts are taken into
consideration in the search for consensus. According to Kremer
(1994),
"While it is tru e tha t we are always cha lleng ed to reflect ou r
resolutions in language, this does not mean that language is the
sole arbiter of truth" (p. 33). On the contrary, he added: "The
knowing of the body, the knowing of the heart, the knowing which
comes from states of shifted awareness are all valuable processes.
Even thou gh every consensus will have to withstand the challenges
posed in verbal, rational discourse, the words of resolution will
have to withstand the challenges from all other human dimen-
sions of experiencesomatic, sexual, emotional, and spiritual"
(1994, p. 33).
In sum, there aretw oparadigm s of hum an comm unication aimed
at the resolution of validity claims: Discourseargumentative and
dialogicaland concourse. Since the practice of dialogue incorpo-
rates extra-linguistic elements such as attention to the silences be-
tween words, to the language's rhythm, and to the timbre and tone
of voice (Bhm, 1990), I suggest that the dialogical mode of dis-
course should be considered a bridge between argumentative dis-
course and "concourse ." In o the r words, I believe tha t the shift from
an argum entative to a dialogical mo de of discourse in contem porary
philosophy (Bernstein, 1983) is paving the way for the recognition
of "concourse" as a necessary corrective for the limitations of
linguistic modes of rationality and resolution-making.
To conclude this section, although vulgar relativism is obviously
self-contradictory, the validity of this charge against most non-
absolutist approaches assumes an absolutist universe of argumenta-
tive discourse. However, both the existence of absolutist standards
(of reason, truth, and value), and the exclusive or privileged
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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 259
legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is pre-
cisely what is denied or put into question by these approaches.
Furthermore, the contradictory problems seemingly implicit in
self-referential propositions do not necessarily emerge in either a
dialogical universe of discourse or in a model of "concourse." But
the n, the arg um ent for self-refutation agains t relativism is well-
founded onlyif relativism, the view that it is trying to discredit is
mistaken (that is, if there really exist absolute standards of reason,
knowledge, and value). Once it is revealed that the hid den premises
of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist appro ache s p re -
suppose its conclusion, this reasoning becomes what logicians call a
syllogistic fallacy. This is why a non-absolutist philosopher such as
Fuchs (1992) can tranquilly point out that "The methodological
horror of relativism and its paradoxes scares and occupies only
those who still search for safe epistemic foundations" (p. 30).
3. Abso lutism or Aperspectival Madness ?
The second charge made by Wilber against the different varieties
of non-absolutism is that they lead to what he calls "aperspectival
madness," i.e., a situation in which no qualitative distinctions can
consistently be made because no perspective can be regarded as
having advantage over any other (e.g., see 1995a, pp. 721-722,
note. 4; 1996, pp. 192-193). Wilber illustrates the potentially
pernicious nature of non-absolutist stances by mentioning, for
exam ple, that Paul de M anan early Am erican deconstructionist
had been a Nazi sympathizer (1995a, p. 722, note. 4).
Again, I believe that what is lurking behind this reasoning is the
belief that the rejection of absolute standards ineluctably leads to
moral nihilism and anarchy. However, it cannot be repeated too
often that the absence of absolute or universal standards does not
m ean that there are no standards at all, or that any value jud gm en t
is arbitrary. Non-absolutists philosophers are well aware of the
dangers of falling in what Sm ith (1988) called the Egalitarian Fallacy,
i.e., to assert "that, unless one jud gm en t can be said or shown to be
[objectively, absolutely] more 'valid' than another, then all judgments
must be 'equal' or 'equally valid'" (p. 98). In the same line, modern
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260 JORG E N FERRER
cultural anthropologists have warned us against this faulty reason ing.
According to Robbins (1993), for example, the flight from ethno-
centrism should not lead anthropologists into the "relativistic fallacy,"
the morally intolerable "idea that it is impossible to make moral
judgm ents about the beliefs and behaviors of others" (p. 9). Actually,
I do not know of any serious contemporary philosopher who holds
the view that any belief or practice should be regarded as good as any
other so I fail to discern who are the real targets of Wilber's critique
of the view that "It's all relative, so there is no better and worse, and
no stance is better than another" (Wilber, 1996, p. 193).
On occasions, Wilber (1995a) appears to accept the possibility of
relative value judg m en ts. For exam ple, in discussing multicultural-
ism, he states that: ".. .sliding contexts do not in any way prevent
some contexts from be ing still
relatively better
than less encompassing
contexts. Thus, that everything is relative does not mean nothing is.
better; it means some things are, indeed, relatively better than
others, all the time" (pp. 202-203, his emphasis). However, it
should be noted here that these statements are m ade in the context
of an absolutist-universalist framework in which what is
moreencom-
passing
and holistic is judg ed to be absolutely m ore valuable than
what is mo re simple. For Wilber, tha t is,relatively bettercontexts are
necessarily moreencompassing contexts. In fact, Wilber (1995a) con-
tinues his discussion on multiculturalism: "By failing to see the
definiteness
of
relative
judgm ents and thus being totally disoriented
and lost in aperspectival spacethey miss the
integral
pa rt, the
universal-integral
pa rt, of their own stance, and thus they all too
often regress into a riot of idiosyncratic differences tha t destroys the
integrity of their own position" (p. 203; his emphasis). Once again,
Wilber's inability to envision non self-refuting alternatives to univer-
salism is conspicuous: Contextual and relative value jud gm en ts are
accepted, but only when subordinated to his absolutist-universalist
schem e. Otherwise, there is no escape from self-contradictory
aporias and "aperspectival madness."
However, a world without moral absolutes or universals is not
necessarily a "flatland" in which "nothing can be said to be deeper
or higher or better in any meaningful sense" (Wilber, 1995a, p . 24).
This line of argumentation, apart from falling into the several
fallacies mentioned above, blatantly ignores the possibility of
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 261
historically em bedded hum an values. Jud gm en ts about what is
better or worse can be legitimately made either on pragmatic/
contextual grounds such as local adequacy, applicability, etc. or
resolved in a situation of "concourse" where we not only rationally
consider abstract moral postulates, but also openly listen to the
voice of our bodies, our emotions, and our spirits (Kremer, 1992b,
1994).
For example, Rorty (1989) argued that qualitative distinctions
can be justified, not from an absolute or transhistorical standpoin t,
but on the grounds of the practical advantages of a certain posi-
tion or way of being. These qualitative preferences, Rorty (1989)
stressed, a re "not built into us by hum an na ture. It is jus t the way
welive now " (p. 44 , his em phasis). And con tra cultural solipsisms,
Bernstein (1991) pointed out that, although each tradition has its
own standards of rationality, cross-cultural qualitative jud gm en ts are
possible because we can exam ine bo th how a tradition fulfills its own
standards of rationality, and how successful it is in m eeting the chal-
lenges of rival traditions. Therefore, "The rational superiority of a
tradition can be vindicated without (falsely) presu pposing that the re
are universally ne utra l, ahistorical standards of rationality. T he re is
not 'rationality as such'" (p. 91). A similar point has been made by
Hoy (1994) in his critique of Habermas' universalism: "To criticize
one comm unity or set of social practices, we do no t need to im agine
some ideal standpoint that is independent of any contingent con-
crete stand point. M ore substantively, we may ju dge that community,
not from outside our own standpoint (since there is no such out-
side),
but from the standpoint of other communities, or otherself-
unders tand ings, that we know to be, or to have been, viable" (p. 203).
In other words, the rejection of universal standards does not
necessarily snares us in either the idiotic endorsement of all forms
of life ("aperspectival madness") or the ethnocentric hubris and
provinciality of thinking that our standards are to be preferred to
all others. All of us are already participating in diverse planetary
communities, and this participation allows us to criticize not only
other's standards, but also our own. By stepping outside our own
particular community and looking at our context from other con-
texts, we can practice self-criticism and open ourselves to learn and
be transformed by oth er perspectives. In this way, ethnocen trism is
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262 JORGE N FERRER
avoided while conserving grounds for cross-cultural criticism. What
is really ethnocentric, says Hoy (1994), "is the assumption that we
have become less and less context-bound, and more and more
universal. Th is Whiggish view entails tha t others will have to becom e
more like us, and is thus ethnocentric" (p. 205).
The positions of these au thors not only challenge Wilber's univer-
salist claims about a unique mode of rationality (based on Piaget's
"formal operational cognition") (e.g., see 1995a, p. 174), but also
his conviction that the absence of absolute standards leads inevi-
tably to a situation of "aperspectival madness." On the contrary, con-
tempora ry ph ilosoph ers a rgue, the lack of absolute founda tions may
lead to a pluralistic reconstruction of a philosophy embodied in
everyday practices and grounded on an open-ended dialogical
communication among human beings. Non-absolutist philosophers
simply do not find it necessary to appeal to any form of abstract
absolute or universal principles, and less to factual ones such as
W ilber's "holistic capacity," in o rder to make such evaluations. Th e
Enlightenment assumption that without absolute or universal stan-
dards,
rational criticism of others and ourselves is not possible is a
myth that must be laid to rest.
Furthermore, one might even contend that nihilism is parasitic,
no t upo n relativism, bu t up on absolutism. Nihilism results from the
failure to find absolute foundations. Although I cannot adequately
defend this thesis here, I believe that the craving for absolute and
universal standards is ultimately rooted in fears of moral anarchy,
the fear that, as Dostoyevsky put it, "If God does not exist, then
everything is permitted." This tendency can be traced to Plato,
whose doctrine of the eternal and transcendental Ideas was in
part a reaction against the individualism and vulgar relativism
dominating Greek government and commerce after the rise of
democracy. However, if one is no t involved in the self-defeating
enterprise of searching for absolutes, nihilism does not need to
em erge. This is why, I believe, some con templative traditions, such
as Madhyamaka Buddhism, regarded the grasping for absolute
foundations not only as an egoic tendency contributing to exis-
tential alienation, but also as the major obstacle for spiritual lib-
erationmore about Wilber and Madhyamaka thinking in the next
section.
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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 263
To conclude this section, it may be necessary to say some words
regarding Wilber's claim (1995a) about the inevitability of a hier-
archical ontology and axiology g rou nded in the p rinciple of "holis-
tic capacity." In
brief,
Wilber (1995a) insists that reality is not
composed of things or processes, but of holons, that is, who le/parts,
"wholes that a re simultaneously pa rts of othe r wholes" (p. 35), which
are thereby hierarchically organized. Wilber (1995a) offers two
different arguments for the inevitability of hierarchies. The first is
formal: The rejection of hierarchies is self-defeating because it
involves an implicit hierarchical ranking of non-hierarchies upon
hierarchies. To deny hierarchies, then, "is self-contradictory: it is a
hierarchy that denies hierarchy" (p. 25). The second argument is
descriptive or naturalistic: As in all domains of naturethe physio-
sphere (matter), the biosphere (life) and the noosphere (mind)
wholes emerge with more and new qualitative properties than their
parts,
and as these wholes cannot, by definition, be at th e same level
as their parts (otherwise they will be merely another part), Wilber
(1995a) maintains that hierarchies, or "ranking of eventsaccording
to their holistic
capacity
(p. 17, his emphasis), are embedded in
reality. In this hierarchical world view, he proceeds, holons (whole/
parts) with more integrative and holistic capacity are higher, deeper, and
more valuable.
As we have seen , th e first argum ent is plainly fallacious. Assuming
an absolutist argumentative universe of discourse, it turns a nega-
tion into a positive statement, and then accuses it of being self-
contradictory. As for the second argum ent, I agree with Wilber that
there are different degrees of order, complexity, and organization
in the physical and biological world, and I believe that to speak
about these differences in terms of "higher" and "lower" is a
semantic option as valid as any other. However, the adequacy of
hierarchical accounts in cognitive and moral development (the
noosphere) is currently a highly controversial and debated issue
see, e.g., Alexander and Langer (1990) for several descriptions of
non-hierarchical m odels of cognitive developm ent; Flanagan (1991)
for a critique of universal stage developmental theories of moral-
ity; and Burman (1994) for an account of some of the serious
ideological problems inherent in Piaget's cognitive developmental
model.
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264 JORGE N FERRER
Finally, about the validity of grounding qualitative distinctions in
a hierarchical ontology, it must be said that it is highly problematic
to leap without further exp lana tion from a factual level of discourse
(e.g., about what is more complex, organized and holistic) to an
axiological one (about what is more valuable). This "jump" is what
in the philosophy of ethics is known as the
naturalistic fallacy,
according to which no conclusions expressed in evaluative language
(value judgm ents ) can b e legitimately drawn from prem ises ex-
pressed in descriptive language (factual judgments). And even in
the case that it were valid to say, as I believe it is, that "values and
facts are no longer automatically divorced" (Wilber, 1995a, p. 31),
Wilber offers no non-circular argum entation for the value jud gm en t
that more holistic organizations must be regarded as absolutely
more valuable than simpler ones.
III. PRIVILEGED FRAMEWORKS, HERMENEUTICS, AND
DIALOGUE
One of die most critical issues in contemporary transpersonal
dieory is the existence of a privileged framework or paradigm able
to harmoniously unify the different competing theories that have
risen in the field during the last decades. Of course, most transper-
sonal thinkers believe that th e frameworks they hold are either m ore
encompassing or epistemically privileged upon the rest. Arguably,
the condition of modern transpersonal studies can be dien character-
ized as a "batde for the ultimate framework," i.e., the search for an
all-embracing meta-framework able to bestow their advocates with a
privileged symbolic interpretation that allows them to hierarchically
subordinate the rest of transpersonal models and theories.
Whether a consensus about an ultimate framework for transper-
sonal theory, or for human knowledge in general, will ever be
reached is obviously unknown to me. For all I know, it is quite
possible that the very idea of an single, complete, and privileged
symbolic interpretation of reality is no more than mere fiction. In
any event, what is most discouraging about this situation is the
circularity of the arguments transpersonal au thors generally employ
to refute or discredit dieir opponents. I believe that transpersonalists
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ABSOLUTISM ANDRELATIVISM 265
wouldbewisein remembering at leasttwo of the harshest lessons
philosophers
of
science learned more than twenty years
ago:
First,
that
the
persuasive power
of an
argument
is in
large part provided
by
the
conceptual framework within which
it is
made.
And
second,
that logically incompatible conceptual frameworks
can fit the
very
same evidence.
Or, put in
philosophical jarg on , that
all
evidence
is
in large part "theory-laden" (Hanson, Kuhn),
and
that
all
theories
are
"underdetermined"
by
evidence (Quine).
For
example, Wilber's
(1995a) support
of the
more advanced nature
of
Eastern
and
W estern
mysticism over shamanism
(pp.
572-57 3, note.
26), his
claim about
the non-spiritual nature
of
most Jun gian arche types
(pp.
247-249),
andhisportrayalof aplethoraofthinkersBerman, Roszak, Tarnas,
Washburn, etc.as retro-romantics
(see pp. 670-691 ,
note.
32;
p.
684, pp.751-761,
note.
17),
only make sense
and are
compelling
if both
the
pre-trans fallacy,
and his
unilinear
and
universal evol-
utionary scheme
are
accepted. However,
the
pre-trans fallacy
in its
strong form
and the
idea
of
unilinear evolution
are
precisely some
of the notions questioned by many transpersonal thinkers (e.g.,
Armstrong,
1984, 1985;
W ashburn,
1990, 1995, 1996;
Hunt,
1995;
Grof, 1996;
Kremer, 1996a). Needless
to say,
when
the
basic
premises
of a
framework
are
challenged, retorts assuming their
validity
are
blatantly question-begging.
Although
I
cannot
go
further into this discussion here,
I
would
like
to
conclude this pape r
by
briefly pointing
out
certain potential
pitfalls
of
believing
to
have attained ultimate
or
absolute frame-
works
for
academic
and
cross-cultural dialogue.
In brief, the
first
dangeris toignore, dismissasincoherent,or simply regardasfalse
any conflicting evidence
the
absolutist philosophe r encoun ters when
confronted with other viewpoints, alien traditions
or
competing
paradigms.
The
second
is to
regard this evidence
as
partial,
or,
what
is even m ore distorting,
to
translate
it in
terms
of the
"master" code
of
the
totalizing framework.
As
it
should
be
obvious, both dangers build serious obstacles
to the
practice
of
authentic dialogue, which requires
not
only
the
willingness
and ability
to
actively listen
and
understand others,
but
also
the
openness to be challenged and transformed by their viewpoints.
Of course,
the
problem with absolutist stances
in
this regard
is
that
once
one
believes
to
have
a
more
or
less accurate picture
of how
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266 JORG E N FERRER
things really are," dialogue with people maintaining conflicting
viewpoints cannot but become an uninteresting and sterile mono-
logue. At its worst, the conflicting viewpoints are regarded as less
evolved, incoherent, or simply false. At its best, the challenges
presented are assimilated within the all-encompassing framework
defended by the absolutist philosopher. In both cases the absolutist
philosopher appears to not even
listen
to what other people are
saying, because all new or conflicting information is screened, pro-
cessed, and assimilated in terms of his or her own framework.
Therefore, a genuine or symmetrical encounter with the other in
which opposing viewpoints are regarded as real options is rendered
unlikely.
Considering Wilber's work in this context, several authors have
commented on the obstacles that his argumentative style of dis-
course raise for academic and philosophical dialogue (Kremer,
1996b; Rothberg, 1996; Zimmerm an, 1996; McDermott, 1997), and
even pointed out that "his main adaptive strategy in relation to the
challenges has been, in Piagetian terms, that of
assimilation
(Kelly
and Rothberg, 1996; their emphasis). Rather than repeating what
others have already po inted out with eloquence, I will focus here on
how some absolutist tendencies of Wilber's discourse may hinder
cross-cultural dialogue and hermeneutic understanding. To this
end, I will present Wilber's treatment of the celebrated Buddhist
philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example of the distor-
tions commonly resulting from the process of assimilating other
traditions to an absolutist metanarrative.
18
The Absolutization of Emptiness sunyata)
In short, the interpretation that Wilber offers of Madhyamaka's
thinking relies exclusively on Murti's
TheCentral Philosophy of Bud-
dhism (1955). Wilber (1995a) justifies the selection of this source by
saying that, "although not without its difficulties and occasional
inaccuracies, is nonetheless a classic in the field" (p. 692, note. 1),
and "is generally regarded as the finest treatment of Nagarjuna in
English" (p. 630, note. 2). Then, he proceeds by equating emptiness
sunyata)
with pure Consciousness (p. 539, note. 2); with Absolute
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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 267
reality (pp . 69 3-6 94 , note. 1); with th e Suchness of all Forms (p. 693 ,
note. 1); with p ure Presence (p. 696 , note. 1); and even suggests that,
once the Madhyamaka via negativa is relaxed, N agarjuna's emptiness
can be metaphorically matched with the Hindu Brahman (p. 698,
note. 1). Furthermore, Wilber (1995a) adds, the Buddhist no-self
doctrine cannot be literally applied to the Absolute, because both self
and non-self "are equally manifestations of the Primordial State,self-
cognizing Emptiness and spontaneous luminosity" (p. 706, note. 1).
Several objections can be raised about Wilber's account of empti-
ness
(sunyata):
First, Wilber omits to m ention that M urti's work
(1955), together with Stcherbatsky's writings (1962, 1968) are
unanimously regarded by m od ern Buddh ist scholars and historians
as the "absolutist" interpretation of Nagarjuna. This absolutist
interpretation, strongly influenced by nineteenth-century German
idealism (Schelling, Hegel, Kant, etc.), emerged as a reaction to the
nihilistic readings of emptiness fruit of the first Western intellectual
enco unte r with Buddh ism (e.g., Max Mller) (Tuck, 1990). M odern
commentators concur in that in order to establish convincing par-
allels between these traditions (Madhyamaka and German idealism),
Murti had to transform Nagarjuna's thinking into a version of
Advaita Vedanta philosophy that does not stand any serious analysis
of the textual and historical evidence (Tuck, 1990; Hayes, 1994).
As Huntington (1989) pointed out, for example, Murti's "Vedantic/
Kantian spectacles distort the Madhyamika's message in a much
more subtle and persuasive fashion than any nihilistic interpreta-
tion ever could, and for that reason have unfortunately done a g reat
deal to prevent us from deepening our understanding of these
texts"
(p. 27). Actually, no modern scholar of Madhyamaka philos-
ophy would quote Murti's work except to point out the inadequacy
of his interpretations, or as an historical example of the projection
of Western philosophical notions on Eastern thinking (see e.g.,
Streng, 1967, p . 76, p . 148, no te. 15; Hu ntinchon, 1989, p p . 26 -3 0 ;
Tuck, 1990, pp.4 7 - 5 3 ; Hayes, 1994, pp. 333-338).
Second, modern interpreters of Nagarjuna find any form of
absolutist account of emptiness sunyata) completely unacceptable,
and in no way grou nd ed on textua l evidence. According to Richards
(1978), for example, "It is a mistake to subsume the Madhyamika
philosophy of Nagarjuna in Advaita Vedanta a nd thereby to change
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268 JORG E N FERRER
a dialectical philosophy into an ontology. Equally it would be a
mistake to translate sunyatainto a transcendental absolute such
as Tathagata (p. 259). The point here is that emptiness(sunyata)
was explicitly devised to be a via media between absolutism and
nihilism, and the reification of any of these extremes is the worst
service one can offer to Nagarjuna's intentions. It is in the middle
way, between absolutism and nihilism, where the soteriological and
transformative power of emptiness sunyata) resides: Suffering re-
sults from the reifying tendencies of the mind towards positions and
beliefs, and liberation is attained by the avoidance of all views,
including the transformation of emptiness (sunyata)into another
theory or view of reality. In Nagarjuna's own words:
The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquish-
ing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are
said to be incorrigible.
Mulamadhyamakarihas
13: 8; in Kalupahana,
1986, p. 223)
Commenting on this passage, Candrakirti (in Sprung, 1979)
described emptiness
sunyata)
as a medicine given by a doctor (the
Buddha) for the malady of dogmatically clinging to views: "in this
sense, Kasyapa, the absence of being sunyata) is the exhaustion of
all dogmatic views. But the one for whom the absence of being itself
becomes a fixed
belief,
I call incurable" (Prasannapada, 249; in
Sprung, 1979, p. 151).
Finally, it is noteworthy, and I do not think accidental, that
Nagarjuna's opponents attempted to refute emptiness(sunyata)
with the same fallacious argument that Wilber uses against all
non-absolutist approaches, i.e., the argument for inconsistency due
to self-referentiality. In the Vigrahavyayartani (Averting the argu-
ments), Nagarjuna's opponents stated that:
1. If self-existence (svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing
thing,
Your statement, (itself) being without self-existence, is not able to dis-
card self-existence.
{Vigrahavyayartani,
I: 1-2; in Streng, 1967, p. 222)
Nagarjuna's response is well known: Emptiness sunyata) cannot
be regarded as another viewpoint simply
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