View
229
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
1/20
IndependentGovernanceCommittee Basel,March20,2012
C/o Basel Institute on Governance
Steinenring 60CH - 4051 Basel
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
2/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page2
TABLEOF
CONTENTS
ExecutiveSummary.................................................... ............................................................. ..................................................31 Introduction-FIFAsGovernanceReformProjectandtheRoleoftheIndependentGovernance
Committee.......................................................... ............................................................. ..................................................42 FIFAsManagementofAllegedMisconduct............................................................................................................6
2.1 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................6 2.2 Findings.................................................................................................................................................................72.3 Recommendations............................................................................................................................................7
3 FIFAsGovernanceReformProposals.......................................................................................................................83.1 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................8 3.2 Findings.................................................................................................................................................................93.3 Recommendations............................................................................................................................................9
3.3.1 DemocraticReforms...................................................... ............................................................. .........93.3.2 ComplianceProgram..................................................... ............................................................. ......113.3.3 FinancialControls..............................................................................................................................113.3.4 Enforcement........................................................................................................................................12
4 NextSteps...........................................................................................................................................................................13
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
3/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page3
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
TheReformProcess
In2011,FIFAdecidedtosubjectitsGovernanceStructuretoanextensivereformprocess.Ithas
establishedfourTaskForces,chairedandstaffedbykeyexponentsfromwithinFIFA.Inorderto
supervisetheprocessandtomakerecommendationstotheExecutiveCommitteeandtoCongress,
FIFAhasaskedProf.PiethoftheUniversityofBasel,Switzerland,toputtogetheranIndependent
GovernanceCommittee(IGC).TheIGCconsistsof13Memberswhoareeitherexpertsfromthe
legal,thecomplianceandtheinvestigationprofessions[6],orrepresentativesofvarious
stakeholdergroupsofthefootballworld(MemberAssociations,Leagues,Clubs,Players,specialized
MediaandSponsors[7]).Inafirstcycle,theTaskForceshavedraftedarevisionoftheStatutesfor
Congress2012aswellasseveralpolicydocumentsderivedfromtheStatutes,whichareduetobe
adoptedduring2012inordertoallowthereformtobefullyimplemented.
TheIGChasassessedtheproposalscontainedinthosedraftdocumentsaswellas
recommendationscontainedinreportsbyTransparencyInternationalandProf.MarkPieth.Ithas
alsoreviewedhowFIFAhasbeendealingwithvarioustypesofallegedpastmisconduct.TheIGC
hasconstituteditself,hasgivenitselfrulesofprocedureandhasdefineditsownmandate.
GovernanceReform
Generally,theIGCissatisfiedthattheTaskForceshaveconductedathoroughanalysisofthe
GovernanceStructure.TheIGCrecommends,however,tofurtherstrengthentheGovernance
StructureofFIFAbyinsistingontransparency,accountability,professionalismandindependencein
keyareas:FirstandforemostitisfundamentalthatnomineesforseniorFIFApositionsarevetted
byanindependentNominationsCommittee,tobeputinplaceassoonaspossible,inorderto
ensurethatcandidatesforthenextelectionsfulfillthenecessarysubstantivecriteriaandethical
requirementsandthattheselectionprocessisfairandtransparent.
Detailedrecommendationsaremadeonhowtosecuretheindependenceandcompetenceofthe
ChairandtheDeputyChairoftheAuditCommittee.ItisrecommendedthattheremitoftheAudit
CommitteebeexpandedtoincludetheadditionalrolesofaComplianceCommitteeaswellasa
CompensationCommittee(newname:Audit&ComplianceCommittee).
IntheopinionoftheIGCitisfurthermorefundamentalthattheChairsoftheNomination
CommitteeandtheAudit&ComplianceCommitteehaveaseatintheExecutiveCommittee.
TheIGCismakingfurthersuggestionsrelatingtotheupgradeoftheComplianceProgram,including
theregulationofconflictsofinterest,atasklargelytobeaccomplishedduringtheyearof2012
basedonregulationsandguidelines.
Financialcontrolsareafurtherfundamentalareainneedofdetailedattention.Whereasthecentral
auditfunctionisalreadywelldeveloped,FIFAmustbeplacedinthepositiontointensifyits
financialcontrolsoverMemberAssociations.Furthermore,FIFAisinurgentneedofstreamliningitsproceduresonhostingofcompetitions,onmarketingdecisionsandondevelopmentprograms.A
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
4/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page4
newDevelopmentCommitteeshouldseetoitthatdevelopmentfundingisawardedona
transparentandfairbasisandfollowsapredefinedstrategywithallproceduresfullydocumented.
FIFAsManagementofAllegedMisconduct
TheIGChasreceiveddocumentsandhasconductedahearingonthewaysFIFAhasbeendealing
withpastmisconduct.Clearly,theexistingproceduresareintheopinionoftheIGCandthe
relevantTaskForceinsufficienttomeetthechallengesofamajorglobalsportgoverningbody.
Thishasledtounsatisfactoryreactionstopersistentallegations.Inparticular,theIGChasidentified
alackofproactiveandsystematicinvestigationofallegations.Insomeinstances,allegationswere
insufficientlyinvestigatedandwheresanctionswereimposed,theyareattimesinsufficientand
clearlyunconvincing.
TheIGCrecommendsthatthemostimportantproposalsmadebytheTaskForceEthicsCommittee
beimplementedassoonaspossible:especiallytheseparationofaninvestigatoryandan
adjudicatorychamberaswellastherightoftheinvestigatorychambertosetproceduresinmotion
propriomotu,i.e.theindependentabilityoftheEthicsCommitteetoinitiateinvestigations.TheIGC
stronglyrecommendsthattheChairsandtheDeputyChairsofthejudicialbodiesbestaffedassoon
aspossiblebytrulyindependentpersonsofhighstandingandexpertise.Theywillapplythe
substantiverulesinforce.Theproceduresneedtobeadaptedasdescribedimmediatelyafter
Congress2012inordertobeoperationaltodealwithallallegationswithintheexistingjurisdiction
ofthejudicialbodies.Whereasthesubstantiveruleswillnotberetroactive,proceduresand
organizationalmeasureswillbeapplicabletopastbehavior.TheIGCwillreviewtheCodeofEthics
asdraftedbytheTaskForce.Thejudicialbodiesmustbegivenadequateresourcesbothinternally
and,ifnecessary,throughcontractingofoutsideexpertsinordertobeabletocarryouttheir
responsibilities.
1 INTRODUCTION-FIFASGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECTANDTHEROLEOFTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCE
COMMITTEE
FIFAhaschangedconsiderablyovertheyears.Ithasevolvedfromasmallorganization,primarily
regulatingthegameoffootball,toanimportanteconomicenterprise;itstournamentsattractthe
attentionofbillionsoffansandspectators.Countriesaroundtheworldareinterestedinhostingthe
WorldCup.FIFAschallengeistoadaptitsgovernancestructuretoitschangingsocialandeconomic
significance.Thecorrespondinginternaldiscussion,particularlyaddressedatthe2002Congressin
Seoul,startedsometimeago.Sincethen,onamanageriallevel,significantstepshavebeentakento
upgradeoperationalstructuresandprocessestowardthestandardsoflargecorporationsor
internationalorganizations.However,FIFAcontinuedtobepubliclycriticizedforitslackofgood
governanceandtransparency,reinforcedbyasequenceofallegationsandincidentsofmisconduct
byfootballofficials.Asaconsequenceofrecentallegationsaroundthehostingdecisionsforthe
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
5/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page5
WorldCup2018and2022andthecampaignofapresidentialcandidate,FIFAsubmittedproposals
tothe2011Congressinrelationtogovernanceandtransparency.TheCongressapprovedthose
proposals,therebyinitiatingfurtherstepstowardsareformofitsgovernance.InAugust2011,
TransparencyInternationalpublishedahigh-levelreportwithrecommendationsonhowtobuild
integrityandtransparencyatFIFA1.AlsoinAugust,FIFAmandatedProf.MarkPiethtoanalyzethe
existinggovernancestructure,toexpressanopiniononitsstandardandtomakerecommendations
forimprovements.TheresultingreportwasdeliveredtoFIFAonSeptember19,2011andwas
subsequentlymadepublic2.InOctoberandDecember2011respectively,theFIFAExecutive
Committeeformallyratifiedagovernancereformproject.Attheheartofthisprojectwasthe
establishmentoffourinternalTaskForces,supervisedbyanexternal,independentbody(Annex1:
StructureofReformProcess&CompositionofTaskForces).TheTaskForceRevisionofStatutes,
chairedbyExecutiveCommitteeMemberDr.TheoZwanziger,wasappointedtoreviewtheFIFA
Statutes,withaviewtointegraterecommendationsontheimprovementofgovernance.Chairedby
EthicsCommitteeChairmanClaudioSulser,theTaskForceEthicsCommitteewasappointedto
reviewtheFIFACodeofEthicsandstrengthenthepowersandindependenceofthejudicialbodies.
TheTaskForceTransparency&Compliance,chairedbyNewZealandFAPresidentFrankvan
Hattum,wasmandatedtolookintothegeneralprocedureforconflictsofinterest,improving
internalcontrolmechanisms,increasingthetransparencyofFIFAdevelopmentprogramsandthe
commercializationofFIFAsrights,aswellasexploringconfidentialreportingmechanismsandthe
statusofthecompliancefunction.TheTaskForceFootball2014,chairedbyFranzBeckenbauer,
lookedatallaspectsofmodern-dayfootballwithaviewtoimprovethegameatalllevels.
Inaddition,FIFAcametotheconclusionthatitsgovernancereformprojectneededtobesupervisedbyanindependentgroupofgovernanceexpertsandstakeholderrepresentativesthe
IndependentGovernanceCommittee(IGC).InNovember2011,FIFAaskedProf.MarkPiethto
establishagroupofindependentgovernanceexpertsandstakeholderrepresentatives.Aftera
thoroughandintensivesearchandselectionprocess,includingduediligenceoncandidates,Prof.
Piethpresentedagroupof13personstoformoftheIGC;theExecutiveCommitteeofFIFA
acknowledgedinitsDecembermeetingthecompositionandindependentroleoftheIGC(Annex2:
CompositionofIGC).
TheIGChelditsfirstmeetingonJanuary1819,2012.Thefirsttaskwastodefinepurposeand
powersoftheCommitteeaswellastoestablishproceduralrulesandafinancingmechanism
guaranteeingtheoperationofthecommitteewhilemaintainingitsindependence.TheIGCdecided
thattheworkoftheTaskForceFootball2014shouldnotformpartofitsremit.Theoutcomewasa
Charter,statinginteralia-thepurposeandpowersoftheIGC.Followingitsfirstmeeting,theIGC
informedFIFAofitsCharterandFIFAacknowledgedthedocumentonJanuary27,2012.TheIGC
Charterwasmadepublicthereafter3.
1http://transparency.org/content/download/62590/10026882http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/FIFA/governing_fifa_mark_pieth.pdf3http://www.baselgovernance.org/gov/governance-in-sports/fifa/independent-governance-committee-charter/
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
6/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page6
TheIGCheldasecondmeetingonFebruary2123,2012.Thismeetingwasdedicatedto
understandinghowFIFAhandledvarioustypesofallegedmisconductandtoreviewingthereform
proposalsbytheTaskForces.
2 FIFASMANAGEMENTOFALLEGEDMISCONDUCTThissectionsummarizesthereviewbytheIGCofFIFAsmanagementofvarioustypesofalleged
misconductandrelatedfindings.Specificrecommendationsregardingthestrengtheningofthe
correspondingpolicies,structuresandprocessesareincluded.
2.1 METHODOLOGY
TheIGCinvitedFIFAtoexplainhowallegationsrelatingtothemostprevalenttypesofallegations
werehandledinthepast.FIFArespondedtothisrequestbyproducingadocument,summarizing
thehandlingofthemostrecentincidentsarounda)theallegationsbyLordTriesman,b)theso-
calledQatarwhistleblower,c)allegationsregardingthebiddingprocedurefortheFIFAWorld
Cupsin2018and2022,d)misconductattheCaribbeanFootballUnion(CFU)meetinginTrinidad&
Tobagoande)theISLcase.Ineachcase,theexplanationsbyFIFAweresupportedbythedisclosure
ofextensivewritten,confidentialdocumentation,including-interalia-relevantinternaland
externalcorrespondence,reports(e.g.theFootballAssociationreportsonallegationsofmisconduct
inrelationtotheFootballAssociations2018WorldCupBid)anddecisionsbytheFIFAEthicsCommittee.TheIGCalsoreceivedacopyofthefullreportbytheFreehGroupInternationalEurope,
AG,relatingtotheCFUmeetingonMay1011,2011inTrinidad&Tobago.Althoughrequested,
FIFAdidnotdisclosetotheIGCacopyofthedismissalofcriminalproceedingsbytheprosecution
oftheCantonofZugintheISLcase.Astwoconcernedpartieshaveappealedagainstthepublication
ofthedocument,FIFAsassessmentledtotheconclusionthatitislegallynotinapositionto
disclosethedocumenttotheIGCforthetimebeing.TheCouncilofEuropeencounteredsimilar
difficultieswhentheyaskedtheprosecutionofficeandthecourtsofZugtodisclosetheISL
documents,towhichtheymadereferenceintheirreportofMarch20124.Theprosecutionoffice
andthecourtsofZugdidnotdisclosethedocument,partlyorentirely,totheCouncilofEuropeand
noinformationwassharedwiththeCouncilofEuropebythecourtsofZug,whichwasnotalreadyknowntotheIGC.TheIGCreaffirmsitsinsistenceonthespeedypublicationoftheISLdocument.
Inadditiontoreviewingthelisteddocuments,theIGCheldahearingonFebruary21,2011with
ClaudioSulser(ChairmanoftheFIFAEthicsCommittee),RobertTorres(MemberoftheEthics
Committee),MarcoVilliger(DirectorLegalAffairs)andChrisEaton(HeadofSecurityatthetimeof
thehearing).
ThepurposeofthedocumentreviewandtheinterviewswasforthemembersoftheIGCtogainan
understandingonhowandbywhomallegationswerehandledatallstages,i.e.fromthereceiptofa
4www.assembly.coe.int/Communication/070312_RochebloineReportE.pdf
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
7/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page7
complainttothedecisiontoinitiateaninvestigationtotheexecutionoftheinvestigationandfinally
tothedecision-makingprocessandsanctioningpracticeoftheEthicsCommittee.
2.2 FINDINGS
Overall,theanswersbyFIFAregardingthehandlingofallegedmisconductwerenotfully
satisfactorytotheIGC.Basedonthediscussionofspecificexamples,FIFAhasintheopinionofthe
IGC-shownalackofpro-activeandsystematicfollow-uponallegations.Insomeinstances,
allegationswereinsufficientlyinvestigated.AparticularproblemintheIGCsviewistheapproach
toissues,expectingacomplainttobeproducedthroughtheproperchannel,lookingtothe
complainanttoproduceevidence(whichmaybedifficultwithouttheabilityofthecomplainantto
questionparticularindividuals)andnotitselffollowinguptheseissues.WhencasesweredecidedbytheEthicsCommitteeortheAppealCommittee,theimposedsanctionsweregenerallylowand
sometimesnotproportionateordissuasive.TheIGCisalsooftheopinionthatthejudicialbodiesof
FIFAshouldhaveaccesstothenecessaryresources,especiallyforconductinginvestigations.
Overall,theIGCcametotheconclusionthattheexistingstructureandprocessesoftheEthics
Committeearenotsufficienttoproperlymanageallegationsofmisconduct.
2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Thegoalistheestablishmentofindependentandprofessionallycompetentjudicialbodiesleadby
internationallyrenownedexpertsintheirfield.Toachievethisgoal,theinvestigativeroleofthe
EthicsCommitteeshouldbestrengthened,includingtheallocationofadequateresourcestoinitiate
andconductprofessionalinvestigationsindependently.ThenewCodeofEthicsmustmakeclear
thattheEthicsCommitteeisempoweredtoinvestigateandadjudicatepastissuesorbehavior.The
IGCdoesnotrecommendintroducinganextraordinaryjudicialbodyorprocedure.Withthenew
CodeofEthics,theTaskForceEthicsCommitteehasproposedasolidfoundationforviableand
appropriatejudicialbodies.Attheheartoftherevisionistheestablishmentofa2-chambersystem
intheEthicsCommittee:aninvestigatoryandanadjudicatorychamber.Thesecondpillarofthe
revisedCodeofEthicsisthecompetenceoftheinvestigatorychamberoftheEthicsCommitteeto
initiateinvestigationspropriomotu,i.e.theabilitytoinitiateinvestigationsindependently.In
additiontobeingregulatedindetailintheCodeofEthics,theseimportantstructuraland
proceduralprinciplesshouldbelaiddownintheStatutesofFIFA.
InordertoimprovetheabilityofFIFAtohandleallegationsatallstagesoftheprocedure,theIGC
makesthefollowingspecificrecommendations,whichshouldbeimplementedassoonaspossible:
ThenewCodeofEthicsshouldbeputintoforcebytheExecutiveCommitteefollowing
Congress2012,afterdetailedreviewbytheIGC.Whereasthesubstantiveruleswillnotbe
retroactive,proceduresandorganizationalmeasureswillbeapplicabletopastbehavior;
TheChairsandDeputyChairsoftheInvestigatoryChamberandtheAdjudicatoryChamber
shouldbeindependentinaccordancewiththeproposeddefinitiontobeincludedinthe
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
8/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page8
FIFAStatutes;inadditiontheyshouldmeetthenecessaryprofessionalrequirements
applicabletoallmembersofthejudicialbodiesassetoutintheproposedCodeofEthics;
TheinitialcandidatesforthosepositionsshouldbeselectedandproposedbytheIGC;
ThecandidatesshouldbeelectedbythecompetentFIFAbodyandstarttheirfunctionsas
soonaspossible;
TheEthicsCommitteeshouldbegiventhecompetencesandresourcestodischargeits
purpose.Specificallytheinvestigatorychambershoulddrawupabudgetatitsown
discretioninordertoconductprofessionalinvestigationswithinternalorexternal
resources;
TheSecretariatoftheEthicsCommitteeshoulddirectlyreporttotheChairsoftheinvestigatorychamberandtheadjudicatorychamberrespectivelyandshouldbe
independentfrommanagement;
Inordertosystematicallymanagecomplaintsandallegationsofallkinds,aunified
confidentialreportingmechanismshouldbeestablished,whichiseasilyaccessibletothe
public.
3 FIFASGOVERNANCEREFORMPROPOSALS3.1 METHODOLOGY
TheFIFATaskForcesstartedtheirworkbasedontherecommendationscontainedinthereports
byProf.PiethandTransparencyInternational,aswellasproposalsbyFIFAsstatutoryauditor,
KPMG.TheTaskForces(TFStatutes,TFTransparency&Compliance,TFEthicsCommittee)held9
meetingsintheperiodfromNovember2011toFebruary2012.TheBaselInstituteonGovernance
undertookthetaskofanobserveronbehalfoftheIGC.TheIGCreceivedallpreparatorymaterial
forthemeetingsaswellastheminutes.ThosemeasuresguaranteedatransparentworkprocessandinformationflowtotheIGC.TheIGCmetwiththePresidentofFIFAonFebruary22,2012to
discussthegovernancereformproject.
TheworkproductbytheTaskForcesisasetofproposalsfortherevisionofvariousexisting
constitutionalandpolicydocuments(e.g.Statutes,CodeofEthics,OrganizationRegulations)aswell
asproposednewdocuments(e.g.FIFACodeofConduct,RegulationsGoverningCandidaturesfor
theOfficeofFIFAPresident).TheIGChassummarizedandprioritizedtheproposalscontainedin
thevariousdocumentsandgroupedthemalong4majorgovernancetopics:a)DemocraticReforms,
b)ComplianceProgram,c)FinancialControlsandd)Enforcement.IGCsassessmentsofthe
documentsleadtoadditionaloramendedrecommendations.ThekeyproposalsbytheIGChavebeendiscussedwiththeChairmenoftheTaskForcesandagreementhasbeenreachedtoalarge
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
9/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page9
extentonthefinalrecommendations.AppendedisaredlinedversionoftherevisedStatutesas
proposedbytheTaskForces,includingtheadditions/amendmentsbytheIGC(Annex3:DraftFIFA
Statutes).
3.2 FINDINGS
TheTaskForceshavethoroughlyworkedthroughtheinitialrecommendationscontainedinthe
reportsbyProf.Pieth,TransparencyInternational,andproposalsbyKPMG.Theyhavesometimes
expandedthescopebeyondpureorganizationalgovernancetopicstoincludespecificFIFA-internal
issues,suchasthecompositionoftheIFABandtheallocationofExecutiveCommitteeseatstothe
Confederations.TheIGCisoftheopinionthatthoseadditionalproposalsbytheTaskForcesdonot
compromisetheorganizationalgovernancereform.However,theIGCdoesnotcommentonproposalsofaratherpoliticalorfootball-technicalnature.
ThemajoradditionsoramendmentsbytheIGCtotheproposalsoftheTaskForcesaimat
strengtheningindependence;i.e.theestablishmentofjudicialbodies(seeSection1)and
supervisorybodies(seeSubsections3.3.1.1,3.3.1.2,3.3.3and3.3.42)withindependentmembers.
OtherimportantIGCrecommendationsrelatetotransparencyofinformation,traceabilityof
decision-makingandimprovementoffinancialcontrols.
Giventhecomplexityofthetaskandinordertoefficientlystarttheimplementationofthe
governancereformproject,theIGCstronglyrecommendstofocusinafirstphaseonthemost
importantrecommendationsandtoincludeintheFIFAStatutestheunderlyingprinciplesandcompetences.AtthesametimeandsimilartotherecommendationscontainedinSection1,theIGC
stronglyadvisestoimplementsomeofthecornerstonesofFIFAsnewgovernanceimmediately,i.e.
bydecisionoftheCongress2012.
3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Groupedalong4majortopics,thissectionpresentsthoseIGCrecommendations,whicharedirectly
relevanttotheStatutesofFIFA.
3.3.1DEMOCRATICREFORMS3.3.1.1 Audit&ComplianceCommittee
AnAudit&ComplianceCommitteeshouldbeestablishedwiththetypicalsupervisoryroleofan
AuditCommittee,andtheadditionalresponsibilitiesforaComplianceProgramaswellas
Compensation&Benefits.Thisincludesthefollowingprimarysteps,whichshouldbeimplemented
assoonaspossible:
TheChairandtheDeputyChairoftheAudit&ComplianceCommitteeshouldbe
independentinaccordancewiththedefinitiontobeincludedintheFIFAStatutes;in
additiontheyshouldmeetthenecessaryprofessionalrequirementsapplicabletoall
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
10/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page10
membersoftheAudit&ComplianceCommitteeassetoutintheproposedOrganization
Regulations;
TheinitialcandidatesforthosepositionsshouldbeselectedandproposedbytheIGC;
ThecandidatesshouldbeelectedbythecompetentFIFAbodyandstarttheirfunctionsas
soonaspossible;
TheAudit&ComplianceCommitteeshouldbegiventhecompetencesandresourcesto
dischargeitspurpose;itshoulddrawupabudgetanddecideonthesupportofexternal
adviceatitsowndiscretion.TheCommitteeshouldberesponsiblefortheselectionofthe
externalauditors(seesubsection3.3.3)andforexaminingtheannualauditreportand
recommendations;
IntheareaofCompliance,theStatutesshouldbeamendedbytheresponsibilityoftheAudit
&ComplianceCommitteetoestablishandmonitorabestpracticeComplianceProgram.The
HeadoftheComplianceFunction(ComplianceUnit)shouldhavedirectaccesstotheChair
oftheAudit&ComplianceCommittee.Inaddition,theAudit&ComplianceCommittee
shouldhaveaccesstocomplaintsandallegationsfiledundertheconfidentialreporting
mechanismandshouldreceiveregularupdates;
IntheareaofCompensation&Benefits,theAudit&ComplianceCommitteeshouldhavethe
followingmainresponsibilities:
DefinetheoverallCompensation&BenefitsstrategyofFIFA;
DecideontheCompensation&BenefitsofthePresident,theExecutiveCommittee
Members,theSecretaryGeneralandtheIndependentMembersofStanding
Committees;
Transparency:TheCompensation&Benefits(includingallelementssuchasregular
&variablecompensationcomponents,benefits,pensionfundcontributions,
severance/terminationregulationandpayments)oftheabovelistedpositions
shouldbeindividuallyandannuallyreportedtotheCongress;
Regulationsshouldbeadoptedcontainingthestrategyandcriteriafor
Compensation&Benefits;
3.3.1.2 ExecutiveCommittee
Inordertosupporttheirsupervisoryfunction,theChairsoftheAudit&ComplianceCommitteeand
theNominationCommitteeshouldparticipateinthemeetingsoftheExecutiveCommittee;they
shouldthereforehaveaseatintheExecutiveCommittee.
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
11/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page11
3.3.1.3 TermsofOffice
SlightlydifferingfromthesuggestionsoftheTaskForces,theIGCproposestheintroductionofthe
followingtermsofoffice:
President: 2termsof4years
ExecutiveCommittee: 2termsof4years
Judicialbodies: 1termof6years
ChairmenofStandingCommittees: 1termof8years
Retroactiveeffect:Thecurrenttermsofaffectedofficialsshouldcontinue;uponexpiration
ofasecond4-yearterm,only1additional4-yeartermcanbeadded;
Inaddition,theStatutesshouldstatethestaggeredboardprincipleandshouldlaythe
foundationforanimpeachmentprocedurebytheNominationCommittee(tobefurther
regulatedonpolicylevel)incaseanofficialprovestobeunfitforofficeduringhis/herterm
ofoffice.
ContrarytotheTaskForces,theIGCisnotproposinganagelimit;theproposedtermsofoffice,the
impeachmentprocedureandtheintegritychecksshouldservethepurposeofensuringefficient
corporatebodies.
3.3.2COMPLIANCEPROGRAMTheStatutesshouldbeamendedbytheresponsibilityoftheAudit&ComplianceCommitteeto
establishandmonitorabestpracticeComplianceProgramandtooverseetheCompliancefunction.
During2012,therelatingpoliciesandproceduresneedtobereviewedbytheIGCbeforeenactment
bytheExecutiveCommittee.Thepoliciesneedtoaddressinteralia-thefollowingtopicsina
consistent(i.e.thesameruleforofficialsandemployees)anddetailedway:
Conflictsofinterest
Gifts&hospitality
Confidentialreportingmechanism
Responsibilitiesandresources
3.3.3FINANCIALCONTROLSThebiggestriskareasintermsoffinancialcontrolsareDevelopmentPrograms,decisionsrelating
tothehostingoftheFootballWorldCup,commercialdecisions(e.g.marketing&TVrights),theuse
offundsbyMemberAssociationsand,Compensation&Benefits.Thelatterareashouldinafirst
stepbeaddressedbytherecommendationsinsubsection3.3.1.1.Fortheotherareas,theIGC
recommendsthefollowinginitialmeasuresinordertoimprovetraceabilityandtransparencyof
decisions:
DevelopmentPrograms:InaccordancewiththeproposaloftheTaskForces,aDevelopment
CommitteeshouldbeestablishedtakingalldecisionsregardingDevelopmentProgramsbasedonaclearlydocumentedandcommunicatedstrategy.Allrequestsfordevelopment
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
12/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page12
fundsandtherelatingdecisionsshouldbeproperlydocumented.Theuseoffundsshouldbe
tightlycontrolled(e.g.throughauditsbyFIFAandtherequirementforauditedfinalreports
byrecipientsoffunds)andpubliclydisclosed.TheFIFAStatutesshouldbeamended
accordingly.
HostingoftheFootballWorldCup:Withregardtothebiddingprocedureforthehostingof
theFootballWorldCup,Article79oftheFIFAStatutesshouldexplicitlystatetheprinciples
ofintegrity,fairnessandequity.Inanextstep,thebiddingprocedureshouldbeclearly
regulatedonpolicylevel,includingrulesrelatingtocampaignsofbidders.The
correspondingpoliciesandproceduresshouldbereviewedbytheIGCbeforeenactment.
Commercialcontracts(TVrights,Marketing,i.e.licensing&hospitality,Ticketingand
Sponsoring)shouldbeputouttotender.Thebiddingproceduresshouldbetransparentand
basedonobjectivecriteria.TheIGCshouldreviewtherelatingpoliciesandproceduresin
thenextphaseofthegovernancereformproject.
FinancialcontrolsoverFIFAMemberAssociations:TheTaskForceshavemadeanumberof
specificproposals,especiallyrelatingtoreportingandauditingofFIFAMember
Associations.InordertoensuretheapplicationofFIFAsvaluesandprinciplesbyits
Members,theproposalsbytheTaskForcesneedtobefurtherdiscussedandimplemented
onapolicylevel.TheIGCshouldreviewthosemeasuresbeforeenactmentoftherelevant
policiesandproceduresbytheExecutiveCommittee.
Inordertoemphasizeindependencefrommanagement,theAudit&ComplianceCommitteeshould
selectandproposethestatutoryauditorofFIFAforelectionbytheCongress.
3.3.4ENFORCEMENT3.3.4.1 EthicsCommittee
TherecommendationsrelatingtotheEthicsCommitteearecontainedinSection1ofthisreport.
3.3.4.2 NominationCommittee
InordertoensuretheintegrityofFIFAsofficialsandkeyemployeesinlinewithFIFAsvaluesand
principles,aNominationCommitteeshouldbeestablished.Thisincludesthefollowingprimary
steps,whichshouldbeimplementedassoonaspossible:
TheChairandtheDeputyChairoftheNominationCommitteeshouldbeindependentin
accordancewiththedefinitiontobeincludedintheFIFAStatutes;inadditiontheyshould
meetthenecessaryprofessionalrequirementsapplicabletoallmembersoftheNomination
CommitteeassetoutintheproposedOrganizationRegulations;
TheinitialcandidatesforthosepositionsshouldbeselectedandproposedbytheIGC;
ThecandidatesshouldbeelectedbythecompetentFIFAbodyandstarttheirfunctionsas
soonaspossible;
TheNominationCommitteeshouldbegiventhecompetencesandresourcestodischargeits
purpose;itshoulddrawupabudgetanddecideonthesupportofexternaladviceatitsown
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
13/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page13
discretion.ItshallalsohaveaccesstointernalinvestigatoryresourcesoftheEthics
Committee;
TheNominationCommitteeshouldhaveaccesstocomplaintsandallegationsfiledunder
theconfidentialreportingmechanismandshouldreceiveregularupdatesoninformation
relevantfortheirremit;
TheremitoftheNominationCommitteeshouldincludethefollowing:
Search,selectionandproposalofindependentmembersofStandingCommittees
Checksrelatingtoprofessionalcriteriaonallofficialscoveredbysuchrequirements
IntegrityChecksonkeyofficialsandemployeesofFIFA
ThecornerstonesoftheIntegrityCheckshouldberegulatedintheFIFAStatutes:
Personalscope:Keyofficials,includingPresident,ExecutiveCommittee
Members,CommitteeMemberstobeelectedbyCongress,Finance
CommitteeMembers,Keyemployees
Temporalscope:Retroactiveforallcurrentpositionholders;upon
election/re-election
DetailedregulationofcontentandprocessoftheIntegrityCheckshouldbe
establishedbytheNominationCommitteeduring2012andacorrespondingpolicy
shouldbeadopted.TheregulationshouldbereviewedbytheIGCbeforeadoption;
Inordertoimprovetransparencyanddemocracy,allopenpositionscoveredbythe
NominationCommitteeprocedureshouldbemadepublicandapplicationscanbe
submittedtotheNominationCommittee.
4NEXTSTEPS
AftertheapprovaloftheIGCandtheTaskForcerecommendationsbytheExecutiveCommittee,the
correspondingamendmentstotheStatutesshouldbepresentedtotheCongress2012.Inaddition,
somerecommendationsrequireimmediateimplementationthroughdecisionsbytheExecutive
CommitteeandtheCongress2012respectively.
TherevisedStatutesandtheimmediateimplementationofsomeimportantcornerstonesofFIFAs
governance-e.g.thenewCodeofEthicsandindependentmembersinimportantsupervisory
bodiesandthejudicialbodies-willtriggerthenextphaseofthereformproject.Thenextphase
shouldfocusonthedetailedimplementationofthereformprojectonanoperationallevel,basedonthecorrespondingpoliciesandprocedures.TheTaskForceshavealreadystartedtoworkonsome
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
14/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page14
ofthemajorpolicies.However,thisworkneedstobereviewedbytheIGCindetailbefore
enactmentbytheExecutiveCommittee.Implementationofpoliciesandproceduresshouldbe
phasedaccordingtoworkprogresswiththeaimforfulloperationaftertheCongress2013.
_______________________
Prof.Dr.MarkPieth
ChairmanIndependentGovernanceCommittee
Disclaimer
The purposeofthisReport isto provide the Executive Committee of FIFAwith an independent
assessmentofFIFAsgovernancereformprojectincludingspecificrecommendationsregardingthe
improvement of FIFAs governance. The information forming the basis for recommendationscontained in this Report has been obtained in good faith from FIFA representatives and from
interviews with its officials and employees. The information in this Report is, in the IGCs
professional judgment, an accuratepresentationandanalysisof the informationprovided tous.
However, the authors accept no responsibility for any information that has been withheld,
knowinglyorotherwise.
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
15/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page15
Annex1:
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
16/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page16
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
17/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page17
Annex2:
IndependentGovernanceCommittee(IGC)Members
MarkPiethChairman
Mark Pieth has served as Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Basel, Switzerland since1993. Having completed his undergraduate degree and his PhD in criminal law and criminal procedure at thisuniversity, he spent an extensive period of time abroad, most notably at the Max Planck Institute for Criminal Lawand Criminology in Germany and the Cambridge Institute of Criminology in the United Kingdom. After practicingfor a time as a private barrister ('Advokat'), he returned to his alma mater to complete his post-doctoral('habilitation') thesis on sanctioning and other aspects of criminology. From 1989 to 1993, Mark Pieth was Head of
Section - Economic and Organised Crime at the Swiss Federal Office of Justice (Ministry of Justice and Police). Inthis role, he drafted legislation against money laundering, organized crime, drug abuse, corruption and theconfiscation of assets. As a government official and later as an independent consultant, he also acquired extensiveexperience in international fora, amongst other things, serving as Member of the Financial Action Task Force onMoney Laundering (FATF), Member of the Chemical Action Task Force on Precursor Chemicals and Chair of anintergovernmental expert group charged by the United Nations with determining the extent of the illicit traffic indrugs. From the mid-1990s to the present, Mark Pieth has held a range of functions at the international level. He haschaired the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions since 1990. In spring 2004, hewas appointed by the UN Secretary General to the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Iraq Oil-for-FoodProgram. In autumn 2008, Mark Pieth joined the Integrity Advisory Board of The World Bank Group (IAB),advising the President of Bank and the Audit Committee on integrity issues.
JosLuisAstiazarn
Jos Luis Astiazarn has served as Executive President of the Spanish Professional Football League since 2005. Heis also Executive President of the Foundation of Professional Football and Vice-President of the Royal SpanishFootball Federation. Prior to his current appointments, he was Executive President of the Real Sociedad de Futboland Vice President of the first division clubs of the Spanish Professional Futball League. Mr. Astiazarn was also apracticing lawyer in the lawfirm Astiazarn y Astiazarn Abogados, specializing in civil, commercial and sports lawand courts.
Lord(Peter)Goldsmith
Lord (Peter) Goldsmith QC, PC is Chair of European and Asian Litigation at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. LordGoldsmith served as the UKs Attorney General from 2001-2007, prior to which he was in private practice as one ofthe leading barristers in London.He became Queens Counsel in 1987 and has judicial experience as a Crown Court Recorder and a Deputy HighCourt Judge. Public appointments he has held include: Chairman of the Bar Council of England and Wales, Co-Chairman of the International Bar Association Human Rights Institution, Board member of the American BarAssociation Rule of Law Initiative, Co-Chairman of the ICC Taskforce on Arbitrations Involving States andChairman of the UK Financial Reporting Review Panel. He has an active international litigation practice and is acurrent member of the British House of Lords serving on the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution.
LeonardoGrosso
Leonardo Grosso has been a FIFPro Board Member since 1994 and FIFPro President since 2010. He began hiscareer as a goalkeeper in Serie A with Genoa in 1963 before joining Serie B club Perugia in 1970. After four
seasons with Perugia he signed for SPAL Ferrara in 1974 before ending his career with Modena in Serie B in 1978.During his 15-year career he performed in over 400 league appearances in Italys two top divisions. Leonardo is a
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
18/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page18
professional lawyer, an AIC (Italian Players Union) Board Member, the President of the AIC UNLUS SolidarityFund and a member of the Board of the Fondo Fine Carriera Giocatori ed Allenatori di Calcio (a Fund for Football
Players and Coaches who ended their career). He also serves as vice-commissioner of ENPALS (a social servicesinstitute for professional athletes).
SunilGulati
Sunil Gulati is the current president of the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) and a lecturer in Economics atColumbia University. He serves as a senior advisor to the Kraft Group. Elected in March 2006, Mr. Gulati has beenone of the most influential figures in the development of US soccer over the past 30 years. Mr. Gulati served asUSSF Vice-President for six years and played a key role in major USSF decisions for many years prior to hiselection as president.
CarlosHeller
Carlos Heller has 44 years of experience in Public Management in the Cooperative Movement in Argentina. Since2005, he has been serving as President of Credicoop Bank, a cooperative banking organization that chose Mr. Helleras its General Manager when it was founded in 1979. Mr. Heller was also the first Vice Chair of the Association ofPublic and Private Banks of the Republic of Argentina, the Vice President of the International Association ofCooperative Banks and was a member of the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Popular Banks. Mr.Heller was Vice-President of the Boca Juniors Football Team, Argentinas most famous and popular team. Mr.Heller is an elected member of the National Congress for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires with a mandateuntil December 2013.
MichaelHershman
Michael Hershman is President and CEO of the Fairfax Group. He is an internationally recognized expert on mattersrelating to transparency, accountability, governance and security. The Fairfax Group has advised governments,corporations and international financial institutions on issues pertaining to the conduct of senior-level officialsand/or the entities with which they do business. In December 2006, Mr. Hershman was appointed IndependentCompliance Advisor to the Board of Directors of Siemens AG, a company with more than 400,000 employees. Mr.Hershman served as Senior Staff Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee, the Chief Investigator for theFederal Election Commission, and as Chief Investigator for a joint Presidential and Congressional Commissionreviewing state and federal laws on wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Immediately before founding theFairfax Group, Mr. Hershman was Deputy Auditor General for the Foreign Assistance Programme of the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID). Mr. Hershman is a Member of the Board of Directors and Chair ofthe Audit Committee for the Canter for International Private Enterprise. For the past ten years he has been a memberof, and Vice Chairman of the INTERPOL International Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC), and for the past 12years, he has sat on the Board of the International Anti-Corruption Conference Committee (IACC). For the past
three years, Mr Hershman has been selected as one of the one hundred most influential people in business ethics bythe Ethisphere Institute. Mr. Hershman is founder of the International Anti-Corruption Academy an InternationalOrganization located in Austria and is Chairman of the Academy Senior Advisory Board.
GuillermoJorge
Guillermo Jorge is founder and managing partner of Guillermo Jorge & Asociados, a Buenos Aires based legal andconsulting firm specialized in preventing and enforcing anticorruption and anti-money laundering laws andregulation and asset recovery remedies. Mr. Jorge is also an active consultant for international organizations andLatin American governments. Mr. Jorge is serves as the Director of the on Program on Corruption Control at SanAndres University School of Law and was Drapper-Hills fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development and therule of Law at Stanford University (2009), Reagan-Fascell fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy
(2006), and fellow at the Stanford Center for Latin American Studies (2002). Recent publications includeInternational Standards against Money Laundering, in Bernd Klose (ed.), Asset Tracing & Recovery, The FraudNetWorld Compendium, 2nd Ed., Dr. Erich Schmidt-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, forthcoming, 2012; Polticas de control
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
19/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
Page19
de lavado de dinero, in Tokatlin, Juan G. (ed.), Drogas y prohibicin: una vieja Guerra, un Nuevo debate, ElZorzal, Buenos Aires, 2010; Recuperacin de Activos de la Corrupcin, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2008;
The Peruvian Efforts to Recover Proceeds from Montesinos Criminal Network of Corruption, in Pieth, M. (ed.),Recovering Stolen Assets, Peter Lang, Bern, 2008. Guillermo holds a law degree from Buenos Aires University(1995) and an LLM from Harvard Law School (2003).
Seung-TackKim
Seung-Tack Kim is the Senior Executive Vice President & COO of Hyundai Motor Company. He is the Head of theGlobal Business Division, in charge of all global business matters of one of the largest automotive companies in theworld. He first joined Hyundai Motor Company back in 1983, and is now nearing 30 years of experience in the heartof the automotive industry. He is well known for his expertise in global business planning and corporate planningboth in Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Motors. His reputation is recognized not only within the industry, but alsothroughout various areas of the business world.
JamesKlotz
James Klotz is a partner at Miller Thomson LLP, and Co-Chair of the Canadian firms International BusinessTransactions Group. Having led complex corporate and commercial transactions in more than 108 countries, he iswidely respected for his deep knowledge and practical experience in the international business arena, his area ofspecialty. International anti-corruption is a related practice area. Mr. Klotz is currently President and Chairman ofthe Board of Transparency International Canada Inc. He is also Chair of the Bar Issues Commission of theInternational Bar Association, and Vice Chair of the Anti-Corruption Committee of the American Bar AssociationsSection of International Law. He was previously Chair of the Canadian Bar Associations International Law Sectionand Chair of its Anti-Corruption Task Force. Mr. Klotz is an Adjunct Professor of International Law at OsgoodeHall Law School.
FranoisMorinire
Franois Morinire has been CEO of Groupe L'quipe - Groupe Amaury, the market leaders in sport informationsince September 2008 . Responsible for strategy, editorial content and financial results, Franois manages andoversees the development of the totality of the groups' printed media (L'quipe, L'quipe Mag, France Football,Vlo Magazine, Sport & Style, Journal du Golf, etc.) as well as its digital activities (internet, TV, mobile etc.).Before joining the Groupe L'quipe - Groupe Amaury, Mr. Morinire has been the Managing Director and later theChairman of the Executive Board of CBS Outdoor France.
LydiaNsekera
Lydia Nsekera is serving as president of the Fdration de Football du Burundi since 2004, and as a member of theInternational Olympic Committee since 2009. She holds a degree in economic and administrative sciences at theUniversity of Burundi. In addition to her roles at the Fdration de Football du Burundi and the IOC, she was amember of the NOC Women and Sport Commission (2001-2006); a member of the Organizing Committee of the5th African womens football championships (2006), a Member of the Womens Football and Futsal Commission ofthe African Football Federation (CAF) (2006-), among others. Ms. Nsekera is currently a member of theCommission d'Organisation Tournois Olympiques de football and the Commission de Football Fminin et de laCoupe du Monde Fminine de la FIFA. She is a Winner of the IOC Women and Sport Trophy (2009).
8/2/2019 First Report by Igc to Fifa Exco[2]
20/20
FIFAGOVERNANCEREFORMPROJECT
FIRSTREPORTBYTHEINDEPENDENTGOVERNANCECOMMITTEETO
THEEXECUTIVECOMMITTEEOFFIFA
AlexandraWrage
Alexandra Wrage is the president and founder of TRACE, an international non-profit membership associationworking with companies to raise their anti-bribery compliance standards. TRACE provides compliance tools andservices to its members, including more than 200 multinational companies and more than 3000 SMEs in over 130countries. Ms. Wrage is the author of Bribery and Extortion: Undermining Business, Governments and Security andthe host of the DVD Toxic Transactions: Bribery, Extortion and the High Price of Bad Business produced by NBC.She has written three compliance guidebooks and is a guest blogger on the Huffington Post. Ms. Wrage speaksfrequently on topics of international law, anti-corruption initiatives and the hidden costs of corruption and regularlywrites articles appearing in the business and legal media. She has served as Chair of the Anti-Corruption Committeeof the American Bar Associations (ABAs) International Section and Chair of the International Legal AffairsCommittee of the Association of Corporate Counsel and is a longstanding member of the Working Group for theUnited Nations Global Compact 10th Principle. Ms. Wrage, a Canadian, read law at Kings College, CambridgeUniversity.
Recommended