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7/31/2019 Fuelling The Violence
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FUELLING HEVIOLENCEOil Companies and Armed
Militancy in Nigeria
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
Oil companies such as Shell and Chevron have unded armedmilitant groups in the volatile Niger Delta region o Nigeria since at
least 2003 and paid protection money to other hostile groups ordecades, according to US embassy cables and other sources. Armed
militants cut Nigerias oil production by more than a quarter in2006.1 Oil companies and the Nigerian government have used
payments and contracts to paciy the militants. Yet these practiceshave uelled the confict in the Delta, which claimed an estimated1,000 lives a year.2 Despite repeated promises over the past decade,
oil companies have continued making these harmul payments.
Ex-militant leaders have recently been awarded lucrativegovernment and oil company contracts worth millions o dollars.
In 2012 the government plans to spend over $405 million on
its amnesty programme or militants, more than it spends onchildrens basic education.3 Yet the underlying problems o poverty,unemployment, environmental devastation and political grievances
that stirred militancy in the Deltas creeks remain unresolved.
Summary
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
In the dense mangrove swamps
o Delta State, a group o perhaps
300 militant and well-armed Ijaw
youths last month was able to shut
down over 40 percent o Nigerias oil
production, costing over [one billion
US dollars] to date.4
So begins a US embassy cablesent in the name o Ambassador
Harold F. Jeter on 17 April 2003.
According to the cable, these militants,based in the village o Okerenkoko in
Warri southwest, were armed with new
assault ries and rocket-propelled gre-nade (RPG) launchers and [were] aided
by a eet o ast speedboats. They
were believed to possess sophisticat-ed weapons including armor-piercing
artillery in their arsenal.5
Ambassador Jeters cable was sent dur-
ing national elections widely marred byrigging and political violence. The local
oil city o Warri had been at the epicen-
tre o a recurrent political and ethnicconict between the Ijaw, Urhobo and
Itsekiri ethnic groups. The main source
o unding or the conict was oil bun-kering, the tapping o crude oil rom
pipelines and other inrastructure or
sale on the black market.6 Ethnic mili-tia ought each other and government
orces to control the highly proftable
trade in stolen oil.
Oil companies played a signifcant role
in the resulting conict which displacedthousands and killed an estimated 500
people.7 US embassy cables suggest
that Shell and Chevron, the main opera-tors in the area, provided regular pay-
ments, contracts and one-o fnancialsettlements to local Ijaw militants. Ac-
cording to a cable sent in Ambassador
Jeters name:
many o these [Ijaw] youths have
been used to receiving direct
payments rom the oil companies
to rerain rom vandalizing oilinstallations or threatening oil
companies personnel. Disbursed
under the guise o a community
guard or watch program, these
payments average the equivalent
o $300 per month.8
Te Warri crisis
Nigerian military stop and search residents inWarri, 2003. Photo by George Osodi.
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
At the time, $300 would have sustained
each militant with quality weapons
and supplies or several weeks.9 Thecable does not speciy how many pay-
ments were awarded, nor does it say
how many militants were paid or when.Yet a cable sent under Ambassador
Jeters successor, John Campbell,
suggests that these fnancial relation-ships were already well entrenched:
the oil companies have poured
money into select villages/clans
to buy protection or placate local
populations. Over three decades
that money has piled up guns in the
hands o Delta villagers.10
Whilst Shell and Chevron were not the
only source o income or Warri militants,
company payments exacerbated theconict and risked involving the compa-
nies in gross human rights abuses. TheWarri crisis also impacted heavily on oil
operations. According to a UK govern-
ment memo released to Platorm underthe Freedom o Inormation Act, Shell
reported:
125 community related disruptions,
1200 production days and 3.9 millionbarrels lost in 200311
In March that year, the humanitarian
impact o the Warri crisis reached the
companies gates. Thousands o dis-placed locals, primarily rom the Itsekiri
ethnic group, converged on Chevrons
Escravos terminal to escape rom aseries o ethnic raids. Chevron airlited
2,000 people, mainly Itsekiris, to saety.
Shell also evacuated dozens o peoplerom its Escravos owstation by helicop-
ter, and reportedly came under fre romarmed militia.12
In subsequent years Shell has remainedcentral to the dynamics o conict in
the Delta. Independent investigations
between 2003 and 2011 by Shell secu-rity consultants WAC Global,13 Amnesty
International,14 the Financial Times,15 and
Platorm16 have all highlighted that Shell
has awarded contracts to groups re-sponsible or, or linked to, human rights
abuses in the Niger Delta. Platormsreport ound that rom 2005 to 2010,
Shells routine contracts and payments
to armed militants uelled a range oconicts. In Rumuekpe town, a major
artery o Shells eastern operations, Shell
awarded contracts worth over $57,000to armed gangs who ought over control
o the area.17
The resulting conict ledto the complete destruction o the town,
where it is estimated that at least 60
people were killed.
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
The exact amount o Shells overall pay-
ments to militant groups in the Delta is
uncertain, but the scale and extent othese payments is substantial. Shell se-
curity spending data leaked to Platorm
reveals that globally, the company spent$127 million on so-called Other security
costs in 2008, accounting or over 40%
o Shells security spending. In Nigeria,Shell spent an estimated $65 million
on government security orces and $75
million on Other security costs in 2009.Note that this does not include an esti-
mated $200 million in annual commu-
nity development unds that have otenbeen distributed to groups that threaten
Shell operations.18 Shell appears to haveturned a blind eye to vast amounts o
unexplained security spending in Nige-
ria, during a period o intense violentconict in the Delta.
Capital expenditure 10%
$32,500,000
Other 37%
$127,000,000
Staff costs 14%
$48,500,000
Third Parties 29%
$99,000,000
Contractors 10%
$35,000,000
Severence 0.3%
1,000,000
Figure 1. Shell Global Security Spending by Category 2008
Source: Shell Total Security Spend $343mm
http://platformlondon.org/2012/08/19/data-leak-reveals-shell%E2%80%99s-deep-financial-links-to-human-rights-abusers-in-nigeria/http://platformlondon.org/2012/08/19/data-leak-reveals-shell%E2%80%99s-deep-financial-links-to-human-rights-abusers-in-nigeria/7/31/2019 Fuelling The Violence
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
Shell has repeatedly pledged toend its cash payments to local
communities and militant groups.
In a letter to Human Rights Watch inAugust 2003 Shell claimed to be clamp-
ing down on these practices:
SPDC [Shell] Managing Director
Ron van den Berg circulated an in-
ternal memo to all sta stating that,
eective immediately, There shall be
NO Cash Payments to communities
other than those specifed or legiti-
mate business reasons.19
Three months later, a US embassy cable
reported that Shells practice o oering
fnancial benefts to settle communitygrievances was still routine:
In order to molliy local unhappiness
over the deployment o military
troops at the various reopened Shell
sites, Shell community liaison ofcers
have been oering new contracts to
various communities, according to
local NGOs.20
In December 2003, a leaked internalreport by security analysts WAC Global
ound that Shells distribution o cash
and contracts in the Delta was a promi-nent trigger or conict.21 Shell largely
dismissed the report, but claimed that
they would change their operating,security and community development
strategies.22 However, as violenceerupted in 2004 between rival militant
actions led by Ateke Tom and Asari
Dokubo in the western Delta, Shell keptup regular payments to paciy these
militant groups.23
A letter released to Platorm under the
Freedom o Inormation Act suggeststhat Shell continued with business as
usual. Between 19 and 21 July 2004, the
UK High Commissioner to Nigeria, Rich-ard Gozney, took helicopter tours over
Shells acilities. Shells Mutiu Sunmonu,
who was then General Manager o Pro-duction in the eastern region, brieed
Gozney on local community issues. Shell
promised: Big rules or the uture nocash payments, new rules or contrac-
tors (not to issue pay-os), no ghost
workers.24 However, the Foreign Ofce
noted that:
the new Head o Community
Development spoke in terms [o]
achieving these in the uture SPDC
[Shell] have stated in the past that
this policy was already in place25
Broken promises
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
Almost a year ater Shell committed itsel
to a policy o NO Cash Payments,
Shell repeated the same empty promiseword or word.
Speaking at an event in London in Feb-ruary 2012, Sunmonu, now Managing
Director o Shell Nigeria, confrmed the
companys lack o progress:
you do not know who is a militant
and who is a genuine contractor.
So there could be cases in the past
where you have thought you were
employing, you know, a genuine,
bona fde contractor, and yet he is
probably a militant or a warlord.26
Sunmonus statement illustrates a stun-
ning ailure o due diligence. Under the
UN Framework or Business and HumanRights, Shell has a duty to avoid hu-
man rights violations regardless o howchallenging the external environment.
In conict-zones like the Delta, this duty
requires heightened due diligence andenhanced preventative measures to
ensure that company conduct does not
worsen conict and abuses.27 Shells
decade o broken promises and lack o
compliance with international standardsexposes the company to legal, reputa-
tional and fnancial risks.
Nigerian Joint Task Force soldier guardingChevron acilities in the Niger Delta. Photoby Sophie Evans.
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
In order or Chevron to operate itsgas plant in Escravos during intense
fghting between insurgents and the
Nigerian military, the oil company didbusiness with one o the main command-
ers o the Movement or the Emancipa-
tion o the Niger Delta (MEND), knownas Government Tompolo. From late
2006, MEND had launched devastating
attacks on oil company inrastructureand personnel.28 Despite this, Chevron
developed a close working relationshipwith Tompolo and his army o MEND
militants. Tompolos base was located at
Camp Five, along the river supply routeto Chevrons gas plant. A cable sent on
8 February 2008 describes how Chevron
had contact on security matters with themilitants via phone and text messages.29
Chevron admitted it maintains
regular contact with members o
Tom Polos militant organization,
going so ar as to occasionally call
militants beore river-borne supply
convoys pass by militant camps to
make sure the situation is stable
enough or the convoy to arrive
at Escravos intact.30
The relationship between Chevron andTompolo went beyond coordinating river
supply convoys. In Escravos, Chevrons
construction workers were housed alongthe river in dozens o houseboats. On a
tour o the area, US ofcials noticed that:
clearly visible on one o the
house boats was the name,
Tom Polo Limited.31
When asked about the origin o theboat, Chevron claimed:
they didnt have much choice;
in addition to his militant activities
Tom Polo was a local businessman
and his houseboat went through the
same vetting process as those rom
other companies.32
That Tom Polo Limited sailed through
Chevrons vetting process highlightsserious ailings in Chevrons basic proce-
dures. The company had been renting
houseboats rom a prominent MENDcommander, whose militants had slashed
Nigerias oil production and kidnapped
oil workers in attacks on the industry.33
Regular contact
Ibori ties:Tompolo was not the only controversial
gure benetting rom oil company
contracts. James Ibori, the notoriously
corrupt ex-governor o Delta State,
owned a company that leased Chevron
several o the houseboats in Escravos.
At the time, Ibori aced over 100 counts
o corruption in Nigeria.34 In April 2012,
Ibori was sentenced to 13 years in pris-
on ater pleading guilty at Southwark
Crown Court in London to 50 million
worth o raud.35
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
The business links between Chevron
and Tompolo demonstrate the wider
privatisation o militancy in Nigeria.Lack o governance and harmul corpo-
rate practices have encouraged the rise
o powerul militant leaders and armedgroups, and have rewarded violence. Mil-
itant leaders have been enriched by gov-
ernment and company payouts. In March2012, the Nigerian government gave
Tompolo ofcial backing by awarding his
company, Global West Vessel SpecialistAgency, a contract worth $103 million to
secure the waterways o the Delta. Other
ex-militant leaders have beneftted romsimilar contracts. 36
Masked MEND militants in the Delta.
Photo by George Osodi.
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
As armed militancy spread across theDelta, oil companies became increas-
ingly involved with militant groups in
order to regain access to acilities closedor damaged by the conict. In 2003, the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (NNPC) reportedly paid $55,000 tomilitants in Escravos or permission to
repair a pipeline which runs to the north-
ern refnery in Kaduna.38 According to
US cables, Chevron planned to negoti-
ate with armed Ijaw militants who killedscores o people when they attacked and
razed over 40 Itsekiri villages and several
oil installations.39 The US governmentwas quick to point out the dangers o
such moves:
any compromise with the Ijaw
militants will only enhance their
power and status and will whet
their appetite or more money and
control o the local area.40
Chevron used local security contracts
to keep opponents and youth groupsunder control. As a US embassy cable
confrmed:
Chevron-Texaco, like other
companies, oten pays idle youth to
serve as home guards protecting
the companys acilities in the area.
This is little more than payo to
youths who threaten oil company
installations with sabotage.41
The eectiveness o this strategy is ques-tionable. In May 2003, Chevrons home
guards turned against them, occupied
an oshore platorm and held sta hos-tage near the coast o Bayelsa State until
the Nigerian Navy intervened.42
Shell temporarily abandoned its opera-
tions in the western Delta in February2006, ollowing a series o attacks,
including multiple hostage takings.43
Later in July, the US government metwith Shells Vice President or Arica, Ann
Pickard, who described how Shell was
coming under pressure. The shut-downo Shells Forcados export terminal had
removed 500,000 barrels o oil per day
rom the world market, some 25% o Ni-gerias production. Shell had conducted
unmanned overights o the region,
but had been unable to ully re-enter itsacilities. US cables report that:
Shell was now compelled to
re-negotiate re-entry with MEND
characters. [Pickard] described
these interlocutors as a small group
o ideologues joined in a marriage
o convenience with militant and
criminal elements operating in
the creeks.44
The details o these negotiations are
scarce, but they illustrate how oil com-panies engaged in complicated relation-
ships with armed militant groups and
their networks in order to extract oil rom
the Delta during a time o conict.
Privatised militancy37
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
Shells relationship with militants in the
eastern Delta also caused complications.
In an interview with Platorm in 2011,a Shell manager described the compa-
nys approach:
Most o the militants, the ex-
militants, we got close to them, even
when they were militants. Relating
well with them, talking well with
them. Being kind and nice, not to
be aggressive. And with that they
have that confdence that we will not
betray them45
In practice, Shell has tried to incorporate
militants into its security arrangementsvia surveillance contracts. The Shell
manager told Platorm:
Some o them came asking orspecial surveillance services, what
they could be doing or Shell and we
said okay, its better i we entrust
some o our acilities into your hands
[so] you look ater them
We brought them close to
ourselves and using them at least
to discourage other people rom
vandalising, doing bunkering46
While proessional training and sustain-
able employment are sorely needed in
the Niger Delta, Shells security contractshave provided neither. These contracts
have uelled violent rivalry between
armed youth groups, de-stabilised com-munities and sparked communal con-
icts.47 Shell and other companies have
incentivised violence by awarding con-tracts to groups with the most coercive
power.48 A recent study by the Wilson
Centre stated that these contracts otenend up in the hands o the very groups
responsible or attacks on oil acilities.49In one example, a Shell contractor based
in the village o Ikarama in Bayelsa State
alleged that Shell awarded contracts topaciy an armed gang that was responsi-
ble or sabotaging the companys Okor-
dia maniold in February 2008.50
It is likely that Shell will fnd it hard
to extricate itsel rom these arrange-ments.51 Between 2 and 15 August
2011, the Okordia Rumuekpe trunk
line in Ikarama was attacked by local
youths urious over the companys sud-den withdrawal o their surveillance
contracts.52 In cases like this, Shells sur-
veillance contracts are simply a fg lea
or illegitimate protection payments.
A boy stands between pipelines in Okrika,Rivers State. Photo by George Osodi.
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
The routine payments to armedmilitants made by Shell, Chevron,
NNPC and other companies have
uelled violence in the Niger Delta overthe past decade. It is estimated that
the distribution o cash and contracts
by oil companies has contributed tothe killing and displacement o thou-
sands o local people in communal
and ethnic conicts.53 Company secu-
rity contracts have rewarded violence
by channelling unds towards the mostpowerul armed groups.
Every payment made by oil companiesin Nigeria should be linked to a clearly
and accurately recorded transaction. I
there is a signifcant risk that cash pay-
ments and contracts could go to armedgroups or worsen conict, the transac-
tions should stop. Hiding such payments
is not a sustainable option and will notenable companies to avoid contributing
to human rights abuses.
Shell, Chevron and the Nigerian govern-
ment must prioritise the saety and se-curity o local communities over access
to inrastructure and oil extraction rates.
The limited gains o the governmentsamnesty or militants could easily beundermined unless security is based on
respect or human rights, the protection
o the environment and the peaceulresolution o social and political griev-
ances in the Niger Delta region.54
For further recommendations to arange of stakeholders visit:
http://platormlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pd
Conclusion
Shell oil barrel. Photo by Friends o the Earth.
http://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdf7/31/2019 Fuelling The Violence
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
Joe Brock, Reuters, Ex-militants pose latent1.
threat to Nigerian oil, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/nigeria-militants-
idUSLDE73317V20110406, 6 April 2011.
International Crisis Group, (2006): The Swamps2.
o Insurgency, p 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/arica/west-arica/nigeria/The%20
Swamps%20o%20Insurgency%20Nigerias%20
Delta%20Unrest.pd; also see Report o Techni-
cal Committee on the Niger Delta, vol. 1 (2008):
p 9, http://www.mosop.org/Nigeria_Niger_Del-
ta_Technical_Committee_Report_2008.pd.
The Economist, The Niger Delta: Still an oily3.
dangerous mess, http://www.economist.com/
node/21560299?src=scn/tw_ec/still_an_oily_
dangerous_mess, 11 August 2012. Others
estimate the 2012 budget or the amnesty to
be around $450m, The Wall Street Journal, Ni-
gerias Former Oil Bandits Now Collect Govern-
ment Cash, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424052702304019404577420160886588518.
html?mod=WSJ_hps_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNew
sTop#articleTabs%3Darticle, 21 August 2012.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/4.
03ABUJA718.html, 17 April 2003.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/06/5.
03ABUJA1061.html, 13 June 2003.
Human Rights Watch, (2003): The Warri Crisis:6.
Fueling Violence, http://www.hrw.org/sites/
deault/fles/reports/nigeria1103.pd, p 17 to 20.
Amnesty International, (2005): Nigeria:7.
Ten years on: injustice and violence haunt
the oil Delta, p14, http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/AFR44/022/2005/
en/63b716d6-d49d-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/
ar440222005en.pd.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/8.03ABUJA718.html, 17 April 2003.
According to an internal Shell report at the9.
time, WAC Global, Peace and Security in the
Niger Delta, p43, http://shellnews.net/2007/
shell_wac_report_2004.pd.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/08/10.
04ABUJA1486.html, 30 August 2004.
Platorm FOI request to the FCO, re 0470 avail-11.
able here: http://platormlondon.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/08/0470-Digest-or-request-
or-inormation-redacted-KS-rcd-23-Sept.pd.
Human Rights Watch, (2003): p 7 - 8.12.
WAC Global (2003): p5.13.
Amnesty International, (2005): Nigeria:14.
Ten years on, p19-22.
Dino Mahtani and Daniel Balint-Kurti,15.
Financial Times, Shell gives Nigerian work to
militants companies, http://www.t.com/cms/
s/0/0237da00-d58a-11da-93bc-0000779e2340.
html, April 2006.
Platorm, (2011): Counting the Cost:16.
corporations and human rights in the Niger
Delta, p 33-36, http://blog.platormlondon.
org/2011/10/03/counting-the-cost-corporations-
and-human-rights-abuses-in-the-niger-delta/See note 16.17.
What was not included in the fgure was18.
mentioned in a Platorm interview with ex-Shell
manager, 7 October 2011. On community
development unds, see Michael Watts, (2008):
Curse o the Black Gold: 50 years o oil in the
Niger Delta, p46. Also Adam Groves, (2009):
(Un)civil society and corporate security strate-
gies in the Niger Delta, p22 to 23, http://www.e-
ir.ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.
Human Rights Watch, (2003): p12.19.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/20.03ABUJA1908.html, 3 November 2003.
WAC Global (2003): p 5 and 14.21.
Kenneth Omeje, (2006): High stakes and Stake-22.
holders, p 78, http://books.google.co.uk/books
?id=IH0bSRZP8bEC&printsec=rontcover&sour
ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q
&=alse.
See Watts, (2008): Blood Oil: The Anatomy o23.
a Petro-Insurgency In the Niger Delta, Nigeria,
p 5, http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/Proj-
ectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/
WP/22-BloodOil_Watts.pd.
Plaorm FOI request to the FCO, reerence24.
0470-11, available here: http://platormlondon.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/0470-Digest-
or-request-or-inormation-redacted-KS-rcd-23-
Sept.pd.
See note 24.25.
Shell admits unding Niger Delta warlords,26.
Greenpeace UK blog, Ben Amunwa, http://
www.greenpeace.org.uk/blog/climate/shell-
admits-unding-niger-delta-warlords-20120502,
2 May 2012.
ENDNOES
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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human27.
Rights: Implementing the United NationsProtect, Respect and Remedy Framework,
Point 23, p 21, http://www.business-human-
rights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-
guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pd. Also
Andrea Shemberg, New Global Standards or
Business and Human Rights, presentation at
Herbert Smith LLP, 7 July 2011.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/28.
07LAGOS64.html, 2 February 2007; also see
BBC, Profle: Nigerias militant kingpin, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/arica/8068862.stm,
27 May 2009.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/29.
08LAGOS41.html#, 8 February 2008.
See note 29.30.
See note 29.31.
See note 29.32.
Joe Brock, Reuters, Ex-militants pose latent33.
threat to Nigerian oil, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/04/06/nigeria-militants-
idUSLDE73317V20110406, 6 April 2011.
See note 29.34.
BBC, Former Nigeria governor James Ibori35.
jailed or 13 years, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-arica-17739388, 17 April 2012.
The Guardian, AP Exclusive: Nigeria ex-militant36.
linked to bid, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
eedarticle/10170051, 29 March 2012. The Wall
Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB100 0142405270230401940457742016088658
8518.html?mod=WSJ_hps_MIDDLENexttoWhats
NewsTop#articleTabs%3Darticle, 21 August 2012.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/37.
08LAGOS449.html, 14 November 2008.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/07/38.
03ABUJA1138.html#, 1 July 2003.
See note 38.39.
See note 38.40.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/05/41.
03ABUJA807.html, 1 May 2003.
See note 41.42.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06LAGOS27.43.
html, 12 January 2006; http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2006/01/06LAGOS48.html,
17 January 2006.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/44.
06LAGOS1030.html#, 26 July 2006.
Platorm interview with Shell manager,45.
15 August 2011.
See note 45.46.
Examples include Dere, Nembe, Odioma,47.
Ozoro and the inter-ethnic Warri crisis between
Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekeri communities. See
Watts, (2008): p 46; and Ikelegbe, (2005): The
Economy o Conict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta
Region o Nigeria, Nordic Journal o Arican
Studies 14(2): p 220, http://www.njas.helsinki.f/
pd-fles/vol14num2/ikelegbe.pd.Anna Zalik in Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds),48.
(2011): Oil and Insurgency, p 188.
The Wilson Centre, (2011): Securing Develop-49.
ment and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and
Conict Analysis or Change, http://www.wil-
soncenter.org/sites/deault/fles/AFR_110929_
Niger%20Delta_0113.pd, p62 63.
Platorm interview with Shell contractor in50.
Ikarama, 29 September 2010.
See Groves, (2009): p 30,51. http://www.e-ir.
ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.
Reuters, Shell shuts Nigerian oil ow station52.
ater spills, http://a.reuters.com/article/invest-
ingNews/idAFJOE7720HL20110803,
3 August 2011.
Omeje, (2004): The State, Conict and Evolving53.
politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, Review o
Arican Political Economy, No. 101 p 436.
As quoted in Groves, (2008): p 27, http://
www.e-ir.ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.
For a uller discussion o community defnitions54.
o shared security, see IKV Pax Christi, SDN,
CSCR/ACCR, (2008): Local Perspectives on
Security and Human Rights in the Niger Delta,
p 4, http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/
uploads/SDN%20Publications/0804_Local_Per-
spectives_on_Security_and_Human_Rights_in_
the_Niger_Delta%5B1%5D.pd.
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