International Crises, 1945-1975: The UN Dimension Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher

International Crises, 1945-1975: The UN Dimension

Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher

The UN involvement in international crises: 1945-1975

Two research questions• 1) What is the relationship between the

attributes of international crises and the extent, substance and effectiveness of UN intervention

• 2)Under what conditions this intervention is more likely to lead to favorable outcomes

• Data on 160 crises from the International Crisis Behaviour Project

Third party intervention

• Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself. (Young)

• Istitutional sources of third party intervention: global, regional, security organizations, major powers and lesser actors.

• Third party intervention can act in two ways• 1)Can make direct positive contribution, such

as providing an agenda, helping reaching agreements and timing

• 2)Can work to weaken constraints on the primary parties, by certifying the benefits of an agreement, providing insurance against the risk of agreement failure, etc,

• Third party intervention occurs at the level of the international crisis as a whole.

Research focus and general findings

• 1) Level of UN involvement in terms of the specific organs which take active role(Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary General)

• 2) Extent to which resolute action or non-resolute action was undertaken

• 3) Effectiveness of the UN in abating the crisis, preventing hostilities or contributing to crisis termination

• UN acted in 59% of 160 crises, was effective in crisis abatement in 18% of the total(one third of the total crises in which acted as a third party)

• UN intervention was more important during the more critical years so was its effectiveness in abatement of crises

• 1945-62 : average of 2.78 interventions per year (bipolar period)

• 1963-75: average of 4.15 (polycentric period)

Total Number of Crises Number of Crises in which UN active UN Active as % of total Number of Crises in which UN effective UN effective as % of total1945 2 2 100 1 501946 3 1 33 1 331947 8 4 50 2 251948 9 7 77 3 331949 3 0 0 0 01950 3 3 100 0 01951 3 3 100 1 331952 1 0 0 0 01953 5 3 60 0 01954 2 1 50 0 01955 6 2 33 1 171956 4 3 75 1 251957 7 3 43 0 01958 8 5 63 2 251959 4 1 25 0 01960 7 4 57 1 141961 11 5 45 2 181962 6 2 33 1 171963 10 5 50 2 201964 8 5 62 0 01965 6 6 100 2 331966 2 2 100 0 01967 2 2 100 1 501968 7 6 86 0 01969 6 3 50 1 171970 5 3 60 1 201971 5 3 60 2 401972 3 1 33 0 01973 6 2 33 1 171974 2 2 100 1 501975 6 6 100 1 17

160 95 59 28 18

Hypothesis on crises attributes and UN intervention

• Hp 1: The more serious the international crisis the more likely it is the UN intervention

• Seriousness of crisis: • 1)Violent Crisis triggers (violent events that

triggered a crisis for the initial crisis actor)• 2)Gravity of threat to Values• 3)Number of Crisis Actors• 4)Extent and severity of violence• 5) Superpower involvement

• The more violent the crisis triggers, the graver the threat to actor values, the larger the number of crisis actors, the more extensive and severe the violence employed, the higher the level of superpower involvement the more likely it is that the UN will become involved.

Hypotesis on UN intervention and Crises outcomes

• Hp 2: The more active the UN is in an international crisis, the more likely it is that outcomes will be favorable to the participants and the international system in general

• Favorable outcomes:• 1) Termination in agreement (achievement of formal

or semi-formal agreement)• 2) Satisfaction with outcome • 3)International Tension(reduction of long-run tensions

among the parties)

Unintended Consequences

• The more active the UN is in an international crisis, the more likely it is that outcomes will be indecisive

• The more active the UN is in an international crisis, the more likely it is that the duration of the crisis will be extended

Type of Crisis trigger and UN activity

Gravity of threat and UN activity

Crisis management technique and UN activity

Extent of violence and UN activity

Severity of violence and UN activity

Number of Crisis Actors and UN activity

Extent of superpower involvement and UN activity

UN activity and form of crisis outcomes

UN activity and form of crisis outcome

UN activity and escalation or reduction of tensions

UN activity and substance of outcome

UN activity and duration of crisis

• 1) Violent triggers: 46% of all crises• 2) UN intervened in78% of all crises involving

threat to existence• 3) Violent CMT in 60% of all crises• 4) UN was active in 29 of 32 cases of full-scale

war(effective in 13)• 5) The larger the number of actors the greater the

likelihood of UN intervention• 6) The higher the involvement of superpowers the

higher the intervention of UN• 7) UN was more effective with High-level activity in

most serious crises

Findings on outcomes• 1) The 48% of crises ended in agreement, and

were more likely to do so the crises with UN intervention.

• 2) The 60% of crises showed reduction in tension with no clear relationship with UN intervention

• 3) High-level UN activity was more likely to lead to compromise. (compromise=23% of crises)

• 4) The higher the level of UN activity the longer the duration of the crisis

• “While the UN appeared to have generated agreements , it displayed a very mixed record as a crisis manager.”