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Macroprudential and Monetary Policy Dilemmas in a
Small Open Economy
Júlia Király and Attila Csajbók
MNB
Lecture in the National Bank of Serbia
Belgrade
May 31, 2012
Motivation: Why Hungarian monetary policy had to be
procyclical during the crisis?
4
6
8
10
12
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Jan-0
8
Apr-
08
Jul-
08
Oct-
08
Jan-0
9
Apr-
09
Jul-
09
Oct-
09
Jan-1
0
Apr-
10
Jul-
10
Oct-
10
Jan-1
1
Apr-
11
Jul-
11
Oct-
11
percentpercent
GDP-growth (seasonally adjusted data, yearly changes)
Base rate (right-hand scale)
2
• The monetary policy framework in Hungary
• Macroprudential policy
• FX-lending: magnitude and key drivers
• Monetary policy in the presence of FX-lending
• Implications for institution design
Overview
3
• IT since 2001 (with wide ER bands until 2008, free float afterwards)
• Open economy: Exports+Imports~200% of GDP (Poland: 20-30%)
• Trade oriented towards EU: 75%, of which 55% Eurozone
Exchange rate channel strong
• Financial intermediation: deepening, but still lower than in Eurozone + a large part FX-denominated
Interest rate channel weaker
: Strong reliance on the ER channel
The monetary policy framework
4
5
IT was successful in bringing down inflation…
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan/93
Jul/
93
Jan/94
Jul/
94
Jan/95
Jul/
95
Jan/96
Jul/
96
Jan/97
Jul/
97
Jan/98
Jul/
98
Jan/99
Jul/
99
Jan/00
Jul/
00
Jan/01
Jul/
01
Jan/02
Jul/
02
Jan/03
Jul/
03
Jan/04
Jul/
04
Jan/05
Jul/
05
Jan/06
Jul/
06
Jan/07
Jul/
07
Jan/08
Jul/
08
Jan/09
Jul/
09
Jan/10
Jul/
10
Jan/11
Average inflation before IT:17.8
Average inflation after introducing IT: 5.4 %
6
…but not in stabilizing inflation around the MNB’s target(s)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
% %
Consumer
price index
Year-end
targets
Medium term
inflation
7
Exchange rate band inconsistent with IT
150
170
190
210
230
250
270
290
310
330
350
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
HU
F/E
UR
Volatile risk premium: 5-year CDS-spread
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Jan-0
8
Mar-
08
Jun-0
8
Sep-0
8
Dec-0
8
Mar-
09
Jun-0
9
Sep-0
9
Dec-0
9
Mar-
10
Jun-1
0
Sep-1
0
Dec-1
0
Mar-
11
Jun-1
1
Sep-1
1
Dec-1
1
Mar-
12
basispoints
8
9
Volatile CDS spread – due to high vulnerability
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Net external debt/GDP(%)
Gross public debt/GDP(%)
HU
LV
ET
LT
PL
BL, RO
SK
SL
CZ
Volatile risk premium + „fear of floating”?
0
3
6
9
12
15
80
100
120
140percentJan 2008=100
HUF/EUR exchange rate (Jan 2008=100) MNB base rate (right-hand scale)
10
• The monetary policy framework in Hungary
• Macroprudential policy framework
• FX-lending: magnitude and key drivers
• Monetary policy in the presence of FX-lending
• Implications for institution design
Overview
11
12
Types of policies aiming at financial stability
• Crisis management
• Crisis containment: handling an acute liquidity crisis, preventing creditors/depositors run
• LOLR (central bank)
• Enhancing deposit insurance (fiscal authority)
• Crisis resolution: overcoming a solvency crisis
• Portfolio cleaning, recapitalisation, closing (fiscal authority)
• Crisis prevention (prudential policies)
• Microprudential: aimed individual institutions (supervisory authority)
• Macroprudential: aiming financial stability (post-crisis an increasing role for central banks) (cross border effects)
13
Macroprudential institutional framework in Hungary
Pre-crisis
• Tri-partite system (Financial Stability Committee):
• Hungarian Financial Stability Authority (HFSA): microprudential supervision
• Central bank: macroprudential monitoring – but no policy tools
• Ministry of Finance: regulatory power
• No clear mandate for macroprudential regulation and supervision
• No proper alignment of responsibilities and tools
• Example: MNB sent regular warnings (both to the FSC and publicly) about the risks of FX lending, but this was not followed by policy action by MinFin or HFSA
• The monetary policy framework in Hungary
• Macroprudential policy
• FX-lending: magnitude and key drivers
• Monetary policy in the presence of FX-lending
• Implications for institution design
Overview
14
Household savings proved to be low – with compared with the
high government debt
BE
BG
CZ DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
HU
MTNL
AT
PL
PT
ROSI
SKFISE
UK
y = 0,4706x + 19,759R² = 0,1761
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 50 100 150
Bru
ttó á
llam
adóss
ág (a G
DP a
rányában)
Egy főre jutó GDP (EU átlaga=100; 2010)
BE
BG
CZDK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
NLAT
PL
PT
RO
SISK
FI SE
UK
NOHR
y = 0,3235x + 26,048R² = 0,3337
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 40 80 120 160 200
A háztartások nettó pénzügyi vagyona (a GDP
arányában; 2009)
Source: Eurostat
Per capita GDP Household net wealth / GDP
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
d
e
b
t
/
G
D
P
FX lending – reasons and consequences
BANKS
• Liquidity awash
• Cheap funding and cheap swaps –
lack of long term local funds
• Risk based competition („Ninja-
loans”
Cím: Minta Cím - Előadó: Minta Előadó 16
HOUSEHOLDS
• Classical dollarization
• Short planning horizon - optimism
• Gambling motive
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Romania Poland Hungary Czech
Republic
Slovakia
%
0
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
Ratio of FX loans (2005) Ratio of FX loans (2008) Interest rate differential
Currency board
All in all: lack of effective macroprudential regulation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
702002.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2003.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2004.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2005.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2006.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2007.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2008.I
.
II.
III.
IV.
2009.I
.
%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70%
Banking sector Corporate sector
General government Net external debt
Net external debt – a kind of private credit boom
(the 12-percent debt service to the GDP rate was not too high, relatively (1995: 33%))
Stylised facts on (unhedged) FX lending
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
2000Q
1
Q3
2001Q
1
Q3
2002Q
1
Q3
2003Q
1
Q3
2004Q
1
Q3
2005Q
1
Q3
2006Q
1
Q3
2007Q
1
Q3
2008Q
1
Q3
2009Q
1
Q3
2010Q
1
Q3
2011Q
1
Q3
in proportion to GDP (%)
HUF loans CHF-based loans EUR-based loans Other FX-based loans
18
FX lending – and the background
Global financial system –
foreign owned banking sector
'Fiscal alcoholism'
High rate of inflation
HIGH PUBLIC DEBT
FX lendinglending
Boom in residential lending
HIG
H E
XT
ER
NA
L D
EBT
High HUF interest rates
150% loan to deposit
ratio (L/D)
20
Why widespread FX lending is a systemic risk? Part 1: Solvency
• Banks do not have an open FX position (microprudentially may look OK), but…
• …households’ exchange rate risk can easily transform into credit risk of banks…
• … higher credit risk of the financial system gets reflected in sovereign spreads
(contingent claim on the state)
• increases funding cost for banks due to (1) their sovereign exposure or (2)
internal pricing of funds in cross-border banks (Note that this happens regardless
of their individual portfolio quality! systemic contagion )
• reinforces solvency risk (vicious circle)
The downside of borrowing in a ‘safe haven’ currency
80
100
120
140
160
180Jan 2008=100
HUF/CHF exchange rate (Jan 2008=100) HUF/EUR exchange rate (Jan 2008=100)
21
Non-performing loan ratios (NPLs) on mortgages
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2008Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2009Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2010Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2011Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
percentpercent
Mortgage loans - FX Mortgage loans - HUF
22
23
Why widespread FX lending is a systemic risk?
• Long-term mortgage credits were financed mainly by
• short-term foreign funding (L/D problem, maturity mismatch) or
• domestic deposits + FX swaps
• A freeze of the FX swap market can cause serious liquidity problems
• Just like a sudden depreciation, as FX swap contracts involve daily margin call
requirements
• The central bank’s LoLR capacity in FX is limited (by reserve size)
• International cooperation of central banks (swap lines) may help
• However, this help is by no means automatic or immediate
Why widespread FX lending is a systemic risk? Part 2: Liquidity
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Dánia
Letto
.
Svédo.
Észto.
Íro.
Litvánia
Ola
szo
.
Fin
no
.
Magyaro
.
Portugália
Szlovénia
Fran
cia
o.
Ho
llan
dia
Sp
an
yo
lo.
Ausztria
Románia
Cip
rus
Németo.
Bulgária
Len
gyelo
.
Görögo.
Belg
ium
Szlovákia
Málta
Cseh
o.
Luxem
burg
%
High loan/deposit ratio = high external funding ratio
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Málta
Lettország
Cip
rus
Írország
Litvánia
Luxem
burg
Románia
Magyarország
Belg
ium
Ho
llan
dia
Észtország
Portugália
Görögország
Bulgária
Finnország
Dánia
Szlovákia
Franciaország
Svédország
Lengyelország
Ausztria
Csehország
Németország
Spanyolország
Szlovénia
Olaszország
%
The other source of funding FX lending: domestic deposits +
swaps
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20Jan-0
7
Apr-
07
Jul-
07
Oct-
07
Jan-0
8
Apr-
08
Jul-
08
Oct-
08
Jan-0
9
Apr-
09
Jul-
09
Oct-
09
Jan-1
0
Apr-
10
Jul-
10
Oct-
10
Jan-1
1
Apr-
11
Jul-
11
Oct-
11
Jan-1
2
Apr-
12
billion EUR
Net FX swap stock of the banking system
25
Recurrent turbulences in FX swap markets…
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400Jan-0
8
Mar-
08
May-0
8
Jul-
08
Sep-0
8
Nov-0
8
Jan-0
9
Mar-
09
May-0
9
Jul-
09
Sep-0
9
Nov-0
9
Jan-1
0
Mar-
10
May-1
0
Jul-
10
Sep-1
0
Nov-1
0
Jan-1
1
Mar-
11
May-1
1
Jul-
11
Sep-1
1
Nov-1
1
Jan-1
2
Mar-
12
basis points
3-month FX-swap implied yield spreads
26
…and the use of MNB FX liquidity providing instruments
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
Oct-
08
Nov-0
8D
ec-0
8Jan-0
9Feb-0
9M
ar-
09
Apr-
09
May-0
9Jun-0
9Jul-
09
Aug-0
9Sep-0
9O
ct-
09
Nov-0
9D
ec-0
9Jan-1
0Feb-1
0M
ar-
10
Apr-
10
May-1
0Jun-1
0Jul-
10
Aug-1
0Sep-1
0O
ct-
10
Nov-1
0D
ec-1
0Jan-1
1Feb-1
1M
ar-
11
Apr-
11
May-1
1Jun-1
1Jul-
11
Aug-1
1Sep-1
1O
ct-
11
Nov-1
1D
ec-1
1Jan-1
2Feb-1
2M
ar-
12
million EURmillion EUR
One-day FX swap facility 6-month FX-swap facility 3-month FX-swap facility
27
• EBCI, ESRB etc. (too late – nothing to do with the accumulated stock):
• Country specific approach is requested
• Home and host country policies should be coordinated
• Long term local currency capital markets should be developed
• Level playing field should be taken into consideration
• Bans on fx lending may become counterproductive
• Adequate liquidity buffers should be provided
• Hungary
• MNB initiated „responsible lending” regulation (LTV caps, lower for FX) in 2009,
became effective at the beginning of 2010
• New government imposed an outright ban on FX mortgages in August 2010
• These measures were absolutely necessary to increase systemic resilience but
the timing of their application (at the beginning of recovery) was procyclical
• Stock problem is not yet solved (recent government measures proved to be
counterproductive)
28
FX lemding: lessons from the crisis „learnt”
29
New mortgage lending of Hungarian banks
FX loans virtually disappeared from new lending, …
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
40
80
120
160
200
Jan-0
7
Apr-
07
Jul-
07
Oct-
07
Jan-0
8
Apr-
08
Jul-
08
Oct-
08
Jan-0
9
Apr-
09
Jul-
09
Oct-
09
Jan-1
0
Apr-
10
Jul-
10
Oct-
10
Jan-1
1
Apr-
11
Jul-
11
Oct-
11
Jan-1
2
%HUF bn
HUF FX Proportion of HUF denominated contracts (right-hand scale)
30
… but the stock is here to stay for a while
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
4 000
4 500
2012Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2013Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2014Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2015Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2016Q
1
Q2
Q3
Q4
billion Ft
Household FX loan stock - projection
• The monetary policy framework in Hungary
• Macroprudential policy
• FX-lending: magnitude and key drivers
• Monetary policy in the presence of FX-lending
• Implications for institution design
Overview
31
• Widespread unhedged FX lending constitues a systemic risk…
• …thus imposing a serious financial stability constraint on a monetary policy that normally operates through the ER channel, as…
• …a depreciation increases both solvency and liquidity risk in the banking sector
• In a dowturn, the room for monetary easing may become very limited
Main lesson 1: the constraints on monetary policy
32
Integrating macroprudential policy in the central bank
operational framework
1 4 3
2
Price stability goal Financial stability goal
Monetary policy tools Macroprudential tools
Macro stability goal
: primary use of tool : secondary use of tool OR ‘unintended consequence’
33
• Interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy – mechanisms are complex, currently far from well-understood
• Because of the FX debt constraint, interaction is very important and explicit in the Hungarian case
• In day-to-day policymaking, need for a ‘modus operandi’: this involves some shortcuts
• Monetary policy decision-making formally takes into account financial stability „constraints”
• Perceived financial stability risk appears in the monetary policy reaction function of the MPM - model
• Interest rate reaction to risk premium shocks depends on whether the economy is perceived to be in ‘normal mode’ (low δ) or ‘crisis mode’ (high δ)
• A systemic stress indicator (among other info) is used to decide which regime we are in
Financial stability/monetary policy interaction in the MNB’s
practice
34
Systemic financial stress indicator
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
0,80
0,90
1,00
Systemic stress indicator Critical threshold
35
• Beside contemporaneous indicator, need for more strategic assessment (how far currently we are from the stability constraint?)
• One analytical tool for this is the credit risk stress test (normally includes a substantial ER shock), sometimes in reverse stress test form („death zone estimations”)
• Regular financial stability chapter in the material for monthly rate-setting meetings + analysis of effects of macroprudential measures, if necessary
• Macroprudential policy takes into account monetary policy in some respects: e.g. in stress testing: the design of stress scenario, typical mon. pol. reaction to GDP or risk premium shock
Interaction of monetary and macroprudential policymaking in
the MNB
36
• The monetary policy framework in Hungary
• Macroprudential policy
• FX-lending: magnitude and key drivers
• Monetary policy in the presence of FX-lending
• Implications for institution design
Overview
37
• Failure of the tri-partite system in Hungary to stop the dynamic increase of unhedged FX lending
• Microprudential regulation in itself is insufficient
• Macroprudential responsibility should be explicitly stated
• It should be clearly allocated among the stakeholders (central bank, FSA, MinFin)
• In any institutional setting, the central bank has to play a key role in macroprudential policymaking
• Macroprudential tools have to be allocated where the responsibility lies
• Cross-border macroprudential coordination is important (multilateral: ESRB, bilateral: home-host)
Main lesson 2: institution design
38
Recent change of Central Bank Act:
• delegates explicit macroprudential responsibility and regulatory tools to the MNB in the areas of:
• Countercyclical buffer
• SIFI capital regulation
• Curbing excessive lending
• Containing systemic liquidity risk
Recent developments in the institutional framework
39
• Achieving price stability is necessary but not enough to achieve
economic stability: financial stability should be considered by central
banks
• Financial sector is not frictionless: procyclical behavior with
nonlinearities (credit crunch, sudden stop, overheating, fx lending…)
• Better understanding of „contagion”
• Inflation target is rather short run – macroprudential target is for
medium/long term
• Macroprudential and monetary policy may have conflicts by
construction
• A good institutional framework is of great value
Lessons from the crisis: macroprudential policy is required
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