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John Darrll Shrwood
Nixons TridentNaval Power in Southeast Asia, 1968197
N AVA L H IS T OR Y & H eR IT A ge cOmmA N D | T he U.S . N av y a Nd T he v ie T N a m W
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Front Cover: Detail from Wheels DownHook Down by John Steel. Acrylic on illustration board. Navy Art Col lection.
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Nixonsrident
The U. S. Navy aNd The vieTNam War
Edward J. Marolda and Sandra J. Doyle, Series Editors
2 0 0 9
Naval Power in Southeast Asia, 19681972
John Darrell Sherwood
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Secretary of the Navys Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History
Dr.JohnB.Hattendor(Chair)
Dr.CharlesC.ChadbournIII
LieutenantGeneralGeorgeRonaldChristmas,USMC(Ret.)
RearAdmiralWilliamJ.Holland,USN(Ret.)
Ms.ChristineG.HughesCaptainWilliamSpencerJohnsonIV,USN(Ret.)
Dr.J.P.London
TeHonorableRobinB.PirieJr.
Mr.FredH.Rainbow
AdmiralJ.PaulReason,USN(Ret.)
Dr.JamesR.Reckner
Dr.CliordL.Stanley
Dr.WilliamL.Stearman
CaptainChanningM.Zucker,USN(Ret.)
Published by
NavalHistory&HeritageCommand
805KidderBreeseStreetSE
WashingtonNavyYard,DC20374-5060
www.history.navy.mil
BookdesignbyDeanGardeiandGwynnFuchs
U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE
Use of ISBN
TisistheOcialU.S.Governmenteditionothispublicationandishereinidentiedtocertiy
itsauthenticity.Useo978-0-945274-58-2isorU.S.GovernmentPrintingOceEditionsonly.
TeSuperintendentoDocumentsotheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOcerequeststhatany
reprintededitionclearlybelabeledasacopyotheauthenticworkwithanewISBN.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Sherwood,JohnDarrell,1966
Nixonstrident:navalpowerinSoutheastAsia,19681972/JohnDarrellSherwood.
p.cm.(TeU.S.NavyandtheVietnamWar)
ISBN978-0-945274-58-2(alk.paper)
1.VietnamWar,19611975Aerialoperations,American.2.VietnamWar,19611975
Navaloperations,American.3.UnitedStates.NavyHistoryVietnamWar,19611975.4.Nixon,
RichardM.(RichardMilhous),19131994.I.itle.
DS558.8.S5432008
959.7043450973dc22 2008004087
TepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstherequirementsorpermanenceestablishedbytheAmericanNational
StandardorInormationSciencesPermanenceoPaperorPrintedLibraryMaterials(ANSIZ39.48-1984).
ForsalebytheSuperintendentoDocuments,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOce
Internet:Bookstore.gpo.gov;Phone:tollree866-512-1800;DCarea202-512-1800;Fax:202-512-2104
Mail:StopIDCC,Washington,DC20402-0001
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CoNTeNTS
Introduction 1
AirOperationsinLaos 5
ProtectiveReaction 23
BluntingtheEasterOensive 35
MiningHaiphongHarbor 45
TeWarAgainsttheMiGs 53
Linebacker 61
Conclusion 75
Sidebars
Intruder 10
AdmiralTomasHinmanMoorer 28
FromTanhHoatoSarajevo 62
WalleyeV-GuidedBomb 64
NavalBombardment:IntotheLionsDen 68
TeAuthor 78
Acknowledgments 78
SuggestedReading 79
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SoutheastAsia.
ChrisR
obinson
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Johnson.Itwas,asArmyhistorianS.L.A.Marshall
laterexplained,apotentialmajorvictoryturned
intoadisastrousdeeatthroughmistakenestimates,
lossonerve,andatidalwaveodeeatism.Ater
et,JohnsonlookedorawayoutoVietnamthat
didnotinvolveurthermajorcombatoperations
againstNorthVietnam.
AnnouncinginMarch
thathewouldnotrunin
theupcomingelection,
Johnsoncalledorpeace
talkswithHanoitoend
thewar.Healsohalted
navalandairattackson
NorthVietnam,except
intheareajustnorth
otheDemilitarized
Zone(DMZ),theborder
areabetweenNorth
andSouthVietnam.On
31October1968,he
orderedacessationo
allbombingoperations
againstNorthVietnam.RichardM.Nixon,
electedtothepresidency
thatsameNovember,
alsowantedtoend
Americaninvolvement
inVietnam.Buthe
didnotwanttobe
therstAmerican
presidenttoloseawar.Onceelected,hesoughtto
achievethisgoalopeacewithhonorthroughVietnamizationaprogramdesignedtowithdraw
U.S.groundorcesromSouthVietnamandturn
overthecountrysdeensetotheVietnamese.
Americanairandnavalpowerwouldcoverthis
withdrawalbyprovidingtheARVNwithair
andnavalgunresupport.Americanairpower
wouldalsolimittheowoCommunistsupplies
On31January1968,theNorth
VietnameseArmy(NVA)andViet
Cong(VC)guerrillaslaunchedaspec-
tacularoensiveinSouthVietnam.
Fiveothecountryssixmajorcities,36oits44
provincialcapitals,and64oits245districtcapitals
wereattackedthatday.
Asappersquadeven
penetratedthegrounds
otheU.S.Embassy
inSaigon.Temedia
broadcastimageso
combatattheembassy
andinotherkeycities,
causingtremendous
psychologicalshockor
theAmericanviewing
public.Ultimately,
U.S.andArmyothe
RepublicoVietnam
(ARVN)troopskilled
orcapturedmosto
theenemycombatants
inSaigoninthenextewdays.Alliedtroops
quelledmostothe
ghtingintheresto
thecountrybyMarch,
killingover58,000NVA
andVCtroopsinthe
process.TeARVN
suered4,954dead,and
theAmericans,3,895.ItwouldtakeNorthVietnam
ouryearstorebuildaorcecapableomountingasimilaroensive,andtheVietCongneverrecovered.
Despitesueringovervetimesasmanymilitary
casualtiesastheallies,NorthVietnamwonthe
etOensiveinastrategicsense.Teshockand
intensityothesurpriseattackcreatedatragicsense
odeeatismormanymembersotheAmerican
publicandespeciallyorPresidentLyndonB.
iNTrodUCTioN
PresidentRichardM.Nixon,16June1972.
NHCLFile
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2
tothesouththroughLaosinacampaigncalled
CommandoHunt.DuringCommandoHuntandtheinterdictioneortsthatprecededit,U.S.AirForce
andNavyaircratdroppednearlythreemillion
tonsobombsonthissmall,landlockedcountry.
Inthehistoryowarare,onlyGermanyandJapan
inWorldWarIIhadbeenthetargetomorebomb
tonnage.
AlthoughoensivebombingagainstNorth
Vietnamociallystoppedbetween1968and1972,
theUnitedStatesconductednumerousprotec-
tivereactionstrikesagainstNorthVietnameseairdeenseswhenthesedeensesreduponor
otherwisethreatenedU.S.aircratconductingaerial
reconnaissanceorpassingoverNorthVietnam
intransittoLaos.Over1,000protectivereaction
strikeswerelaunchedin1970alone.Duringone
suchoperationinDecember1971,200AirForce
andNavyplanesstrucktargetsasarnorthasthe
20thparallel(just75
milesromHanoi)inthe
biggestbombingraido
thatperiodProudDeep
Alpha.
Temostintenseyear
otheairwarwas1972.
Duringthatyear,North
Vietnamlaunchedamajor
attackthatemployed
massesoregularground
troops,tanks,andartillery
againstSouthVietnam.
Intheso-calledEaster
Oensive,theenemy
hopedtocrushtheSouth
Vietnamesearmedorces
andbringthewartoa
sudden,violentconclu-
sion.Onlyasmallnumber
oAirForceghterplanes,
ahanduloArmyand
Marineadvisors,andthe
NavycarriersintheGul
oonkinwereonhandto
aidtheSouthVietnamese
instemmingtheCommunistonslaught.Intheend,
navalairpowerprovedvitalinstoppingtheoensivebecauseotheNavysabilitytoconcentratecarriers
oVietnam.Inamatteroaewshortweeks,the
NavyscarrierpresenceintheGuloonkinjumped
romtwotosixattops.Navyaircratewthe
majorityostrikesduringthecriticalearlydaysothe
oensive.Navysuraceshipsalsooeredbeleaguered
SouthVietnamesegroundorcesneartheDMZ
criticalgunresupportagainstNorthVietnamese
armoredcolumnsmovingdownthecoast.
Oncetheinvasionwaseectivelyhalted,navalaircratandwarshipscarriedthewartoNorth
Vietnam.DuringOperationPocketMoney(May
1972January1973),navalaviatorsminedHaiphong
harborandothermajorportsinNorthVietnam.
InLinebackerI(AprilOctober1972),Navyplanes
andwarshipsresumedcombatagainstNorth
Vietnamandstruckmanyormerlyo-limittargets
A-7 Line MaintenancebyrellaKoczwara,1976.Oilonmasonite.ConsideredoneotheNavysworkhorsesotheVietnamWar,thelightattackA-7aircratplayedakeyroleinbothLinebackeroperationsandtheminingoHaiphongharbor.Armamentconsistedoone20-mmmultibarreledcannonandupto15,000poundsobombs,rockets,ormissiles.
NavyArtcollection
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orthersttimeinthewar.Navalaviatorsought
theirmostintenseair-to-airduelswithenemy
MiGsduring1972,andwarshipsbravederce
enemyretoattacktargetsosignicancealongthe
NorthVietnamesecoastline,includingtargetsin
Haiphong.Inall,enemyrehit16U.S.Navyships
during1972thedeadliestyearothewarorthe
Navysgunresupportorce.
Tenallarge-scaleair/suraceoperationo
thewarwasLinebackerIINixonsamousB-52
bomberassaultagainstHanoiandHaiphongin
December1972.Tisoperationultimatelycon-
vincedtheNorthVietnamesetoagreetoapeace
settlement.Asinnearlyeveryearlieraircampaign
othewar,navalaviatorstooktotheskiesduring
LinebackerII,bombingtargetsinHanoiand
HaiphongaswellaspavingthewayorAirForce
B-52sbyattackingsurace-to-airmissile(SAM)sites
andotherairdeensepositionsinNorthVietnam.
NavalaircratalsoreseededNorthVietnamese
harborswithminesduringLinebackerIIand
destroyedenemypatrolboats.Finally,navalgunre
supportshipsstruckavarietyoimportanttargets
alongtheheavilydeendedNorthVietnamcoastline.
Tisnavalpowerprovedcriticalduringtheend
gameotheVietnamWarandcontributedmightily
towardstheachievementothePresidentsgoalo
peacewithhonor.
AB-52takesoromGuam.
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HoChiMinhrail.
ChrisRobinson
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hecourseotheVietnamWarchanged
dramaticallyortheU.S.Navybetween
31Marchand31October1968.During
thatperiod,PresidentJohnsondrasti-
callyscaledbackandthenhaltedallair,naval,and
artillerybombardmentoNorthVietnam.His31
Octoberorderhaltedoensiveoperationsnotonly
againstNorthVietnamproperbutagainsttargets
withintheDMZalongthe17thparallelbetween
NorthandSouthVietnamandwaters12nautical
milesromthecoast.
TeJointChiesoSta(JCS)immediately
directedthatallnavalgunresupportshipsinthe
Guloonkinbewithdrawnsouthothe17th
parallel.Tesuraceactionorceincludedthree
cruisersand22destroyers.SinceOctober1966,
theseshipshadattemptedtostemtheowomuni-
tionsandsuppliestoSouthVietnambybombarding
roadsandbridgesashoreanddestroyingwaterborne
logisticscrataspartoOperationSeaDragon.
Aterthebombinghalt,theJCSauthorizedonly
twotypesowarshipstooperatenorthothe20th
parallel:searchandrescue(SAR)destroyers(to
rescuedownedaviators)andpositiveidenticationradaradvisoryzone(PIRAZ)ships.Teoriginal
unctionothePIRAZsystemwastomaintain
constantsurveillanceotheairspaceoverthe
easternregionsoNorthVietnamandtrackall
hostileandriendlyaircratinthisspace.By1967,
theSeventhFleetsaskForce77operatedthree
PIRAZshipsRedCrown,situated25milesrom
themouthotheRedRiver;Harbormaster,located
southoRedCrown;andathirdshiptothenorth
otheRedRiverdeltaandbeganusingtheseshipstodirectNavyandAirForceghtersagainst
NorthVietnameseMiGs.WiththenewSPS-48
radars,PIRAZshipscouldcovernotonlytheGul
oonkinbutmuchotheoverlandareasoNorth
VietnamandcouldvectorU.S.ghtersromallser-
vicestohostileaircratpracticallyromthemoment
oaMiGstakeo.Teseships,inshort,provided
theU.S.NavyandAirForcewithsignicantsitu-
ationalawarenesswithrespecttoenemyaircrat
movement,andwouldbeathornintheenemysside
ortheremainderothewar.
TeNavy,however,wouldbeorbiddenrom
strikingtargetsinNorthVietnamormosto
the19681972period.Instead,itwouldocus
thebulkoitsaviationassetsoninterdictingthe
owotroopsandsuppliesthroughLaostoSouth
Vietnamacampaigndesignedtoacilitateaneven-
tualAmericanwithdrawalromSouthVietnam.
AshistorianJamesH.Willbanksexplainedthe
situation,Johnsonsbombinghaltmadeitclearthat
therewasnolightattheendothetunnel,andthat
itwastimetoendthewarinSouthVietnamone
wayortheother.
Asaninterdictionzone,Laoshadbeeninthe
Navyscrosshairssinceearly1964whenNavyRF-8
aerialreconnaissanceplanesbeganyingoverthe
countryinOperationYankeeeam.Laoshadbeen
usedasasupplyrouteortheNorthVietnamese
since1959whenworkersstartedconstructing
aseriesotrailsthroughthecountrytoprovide
logisticalsupportorthewarintheSouth.Tetransportationsystem,whichAmericansdubbed
theHoChiMinhrail,beganasaseriesolinked
trailsorporters,packanimals,andbicycleriders.
Duringitsrstyearooperation,2,000personnel
andover31tonsomilitaryequipmenthadmade
the100-miletripdownthetrail.
Beginningin1964,theNorthVietnamesetrans-
ormedtheHoChiMinhrailromasystemo
ootandbikepathsintoanetworkoroadscapable
ohandlingmotorizedvehicles.Asaconsequence,throughputquadrupledbetween1963and1964,
andby1966,thetrailconsistedo820milesoair-
weatherroads.woyearslaterin1968,upto10,000
trucksweremovingdownthesystematanyone
time.Almostallmovementwasbyaseriesoshort
shuttlesratherthanlong-distancehauling.Drivers
maneuveredtheirtrucksoverthesameroutesnight
air operaTioNS iN LaoS
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6
aternight,becomingintimatelyamiliarwiththe
terrain.TeyotendrovetheSoviet-manuactured
GAZ-63,asmallour-wheeldrivetruckwitha
70-horsepowerengineandamaximumspeedo
just41milesperhour.ooperate,maintain,and
deendtheowotraconthetrail,NorthVietnam
ultimatelystationedover100,000truckdrivers,
bikeriders,porters,engineers,laborers,antiaircrat
gunners,andmedicaltechniciansinLaos.
Terstconcertedairinterdictioncampaign
againstthetrailbeganinDecember1964.Ina
jointNavyAirForceoperationnamedBarrelRoll,
Americanaircratewoverlikelyinltrationroutes
andattackedCommunistsupplyvehiclesorother
targetsoopportunity.ByMarch1965,SeventhFleet
aircrathadcarriedouthalothe43BarrelRollmis-
sions.Tatsamemonth,thesouthernLaotianpan-
handlewasseparatedromtheBarrelRolloperational
areainnortheasternLaosanddesignatedSteeliger.
TeSteeligerinterdictionzonewasaruggedarea
dominatedbyjunglesandsteepmountains,ranging
rom1,800tomorethan5,000eetinheight.Because
vehiclescouldaccessthisregiononlyromVietnam
viaalimitednumberopasses(BanKarai,inlower
NorthVietnam;MuGia,inthenorthernpanhandle
oNorthVietnam;andBanRaving,justeastand
slightlynorthotheDMZ),plannersbelievedthese
areasrepresentedthebestplacestoocusinterdiction
eorts,andbymid-1965NavyandAirForcepilots
wereyingover1,000Steeligersortiesamonth
againsttargetsintheseso-calledchokepoints.
DespiteAmericasincreasingcommitmenttoair
interdictioninLaos,theNorthVietnamesecontinued
transportingsuppliesthroughthatcountry,oten
inltratingover4,500menand300tonsosupplies
amonthtoorcesghtinginSouthVietnam.We
werehitrequentlybyAmericanairplanes,recalled
TanMinhSon,aNorthVietnamesedriver.I
tenoutoahundredtrucksarrivedsaely,thatwas
agreatvictory.oputevenmorepressureonthe
NorthVietnameselogisticssystem,theUnitedStates
launchedanewcampaigncalledigerHoundin
1965.Itwasdesignedtoconcentratemoreairpower
onasectionotheHoChiMinhrailcontiguous
withSouthVietnam.ByMay,igerHoundstrikes
haddestroyedanestimated3,000buildings,1,400
BicyclescapturedontheHoChiMinhrail.Cyclistsregularlyhauled300-poundloads.Vietnam
Archive,TexasTechUniversit
y
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trucks,numerousbridges,andmorethan200
antiaircratsites.Still,suppliescontinuedto
owsouth.TeAirForceintroducednew
technologiessuchasgunships(rsttheAC-47
andlatertheAC-130)capableoloiteringor
longperiodsotimeoverareasandunleashing
massiveamountsorepowerontargets.
ButasU.S.interdictiontechnology
improvedsotoodidtheNorthVietnamese
transportationeort.Roadconstruction
mushroomedrom80kilometersduring
the196667dryseasontomorethan306
kilometersbyAugust1968.Conscripted
Laotianlaborersdidmostotheconstruction,
usinghandimplementsandworkingatnight
toavoidbombattacks.Whereverpossible,
theVietnameseconstructedroadsunder
treecanopies,makinggooduseonatural
camouage.
Teyalsoplantedbushesandconstructed
trellisworksobamboosaplingstocover
exposedportionsoroads.Finally,inaclimate
plaguedbymonsoonweatherromMayto
October,theselaborersbecamemastersin
solvingdrainageproblemsviacorduroying,gravel-
ingshortsections,installingculverts,andcreating
drainageditches.
ocountertheseandothermeasures,theU.S.developedasystemosensorscalledIgloo
White.Teideaoriginatedromacollectiono
classiedreportsauthoredbyadistinguished
grouposcientistsknownastheJasonDeense
AdvisoryPanel.TeJasonstudypointedoutthat
theAmericanbombingcampaignagainstNorth
VietnamromMarch1965toNovember1968,
knownasRollingTunder,washavingnorealeect
deterringNorthVietnamssupportothewarin
theSouthandadvisedthatairassetsinsteadbeocusedmoreonmilitaryinterdiction.Inparticular,
theJasonsrecommendedtheconstructionoa$1
billionbarrierconsistingobarbedwireences,
mineelds,resupportbases,andsensorsalong
theDMZandalesserbarrierominesandsensors
onlyalongtheborderbetweenSouthVietnamand
Laos.PresidentJohnsontookanimmediateliking
totheidea.InterdictionoeredhimandDeense
SecretaryRobertMcNamaraalimitedandcareully
controlledoperationdesignedtochangethepolicy
oNorthVietnamratherthandestroythatcountrys
inrastructure(thattheprogrammightlaywasteto
LaosdidnotdeterMcNamaraandhisplanners).
Workonthebarriersystembeganinthesummer
o1967.TejobocreatingtheDMZbarrierellto
theU.S.Marines.ManyMarineleadersresentedhavingtodevotescarcecombatresourcestobuild-
ingwhatsomeconsideredamodernMaginotLine
thattheenemycouldbypass.Enemyattacksagainst
Marinepositions,thesiegeoKheSanh(oneothe
linesstrongpoints),andultimatelytheetOensive
o1968continuallydisruptedtheconstruction
projectandeventuallycausedittogrindtoahalt.
HiddenStorageAreaontheHoChiMinhrail.Tisundergroundstorageareawassowellcamouagedthatitwasnotounduntilaroad-wideningbulldozerslicedintothebank.Notetheruinedbicyclewheelinrontotheopening;Hanoiusedeveryavailablemeansotransport,rombicyclestotrucks.
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8
TeLaotianoperation,however,enduredbecause
thesensorscouldbelaidbyaircrataloneanddid
notrequirealargecommitmentogroundorces.
NavyOP2Epatrolplanes,Navyhelicopters,
andAirForcehelicopters(laterF-4s)droppedover
20,000sensorsalongpartsotheHoChiMinh
railnetwork.Mostsensorswereeitheracoustic
orseismic.Teacousticsensors,derivedromtheNavysantisubmarinesonarbuoy,coulddetect
vehiclesoundsandhumanvoices.Seismicsensors
detectedgroundvibrationsromvehicles.Allthe
sensorscameincylindricalhousingsandcontained
low-poweredradiosortransmittingtheinorma-
tionviarelayplanestotheInltrationSurveillance
Center(askForceAlpha)atNakhonPhanomAir
BaseinnorthernTailandanintelligenceusion
centermannedbyabout400AirForcepersonnel.
Teaveragesensorlastedabout45daysandcostapproximately$619,withmoreexpensivemodels
costingasmuchas$2,997.
AirForceEC-121sandlaterQU-22Bsew
tracks24hoursadayabovetheHoChiMinhrail,
pickingupsignalsromthesensorsandrelayingthe
inormationtothesurveillancecenterinTailand.
woIBM360-65computerscollectedandstored
thesensordataorusebythetargetanalysts.Tese
analystsqueriedthedatabaseconstantly,andwhen
worthwhiletargetswereound,theycontactedan
airbornebattleeldcommandandcontrolcenter,
amodiedC-130.TisplaneinturndirectedAir
ForceorNavyplanesguidedbyon-siteorwardair
controller(FAC)aircrattothetargets.ByMay1970,
seventy-twosensorstringsmonitoredtheroadsandtrailsoLaos.WewiredtheHoChiMinhraillike
adrugstorepinballmachine,andweplugitinevery
night,explainedoneAirForceocerassigned
toaskForceAlpha.Beore,theenemyhadtwo
thingsgoingorhim.Tesunwentdownevery
night,andhehadtreestohideunder.Nowhehas
nothing.Whenthesystemworkedcorrectly,strike
aircratmightbeonthesceneveminutesater
beingdetectedbythesensors.
TerstmajortestothesensorsystemoccurrednotinLaosbutatKheSanh,SouthVietnam.During
theenemys1968siegeotheMarinebase,theAir
Forcedroppedsensorstomonitortroopmovements
aroundtheareaandusedtheNakhonPhanom
surveillancecentertoanalyzethedata.Tesystem
workedbetterthanexpected.Forinstance,onthe
nighto34February,sensorsindicatedthepresence
OP-2ENeptune.BetweenFebruary1967andJuly1968,theNavydeployedtheseaircrattoTailandtolaysensorsalongtheHoChiMinhrail.
N H C L F i l e
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oover2,000troopsnearMarinehilloutpostsoutside
othebase.Usingthisinormation,artilleryand
airpowerpoundedthearea,thwartinganintended
attackontheMarines.Overall,sensorshelpeddirect
theemploymentoover100,000tonsomunitions
atKheSanhandkillanestimated1,288North
Vietnamesetroops.TesuccessotheKheSanh
sensornetworkpromptedplannerstodevelopamore
comprehensivesystemosensorsinLaosandmakeit
thecenterpieceotheairwaraterPresidentJohnson
orderedanendtothebombingoNorthVietnamin
November1968.
Teresultingcampaign,CommandoHunt,
lastedthroughApril1972.Itwasthelongestair
interdictioncampaigninthehistoryowarare.Te
mostintensiveportionsothemultiyearcampaign
ellduringtheNovemberAprildryseasonbecause
itwasthenthattheNorthVietnamesemovedthe
mosttrucksalongthenarrowdirtroadsotheHo
ChiMinhrail.Lessercampaignsweremounted
duringtheMayOctoberwetseason.
Terstphaseotheprogram,CommandoHunt
I,ociallybeganduringtheNovember1968April
1969dryseasonandsoughttoclosemajorchoke-
pointssuchastheroadsleadingtotheMuGiaor
BanKaraipasses.InthersttendaysoDecember
1968,therewereover2,000trucksmovingtowards
theMuGiaPass.Tetruckswouldstop1,200metersromtheborderandenterLaosatnight.
NavyandAirForceaircratattemptedtoimpede
thisowotracbyeitherattackingthetrucks
directlyatertheyenteredLaosorblockingtheroad
withdebriscausedbybombblasts.
Sincemosttrucksmovedatnight,theNavys
sophisticatednight,all-weatherA-6attackplanewas
vitaltothecampaign.TeSeventhAirForce,which
hadresponsibilityorallCommandoHunttarget-
ing,authorizedtheNavysA-6stoparticipateinanoperationcalledCommandoNailon13December
1968.SeventhAirForcepresentedtheNavysSeventh
Fleetcarrierorce,askForce77,withalistotargets
approvedbytheU.S.EmbassyinLaos.F-77then
selectedspecictargetsoritsCommandoNail
missionsandorderedA-6stotakeradarscopepho-
tographyothetargets.TeA-6sthenconducteda
daylightraidonthetargets(usuallystretchesoroads)
toveriytheaccuracyothemeasurementstakenby
photographyandconrmthattheycouldachieve
bombhitswithin1,000metersoatarget.Onlyater
thesestepsweretakencouldA-6sbeginlaunching
CommandoNailstrikesinthetargetareasatnightor
inbadweather.Tesystem,however,wasnotwithout
itsaws.Terigoroustargetconrmationprocess
delayedtheexecutionomissions,whichcausedthe
SeventhAirForcetoassignlessdesirabletargets
toF-77.Multipleraidsonthesamelocationsalso
alertedtheNorthVietnamesetotheprogram,giving
themplentyotimetocomeupwithalternateroutes
andbypasses.
Amoreexibleapproachtonighttargeting
involvedtheuseotheA-6sairbornemovingtarget
indicator(AMI).TeAMIradarcoulddetect
targetsmovingatspeedsgreaterthanvemiles
perhourandintheoryrepresentedtheperecttool
ornightarmedreconnaissancemissions.Strict
rulesoengagement,however,preventedtheNavy
romtakingulladvantageothesystem.A-6s
rstneededtoconrmvisuallytheexistenceo
thetargetbydroppingaresbeorethey,orthe
accompanyingpouncerA-7CorsairIIorF-4
PhantomIIplanes,couldattackthetrucks.Tese
ares,ocourse,alertedNorthVietnamesetrucks
tothepresenceotheA-6sandcausedthemtostopimmediately.Oncestopped,atruckcouldnolonger
bedetectedbyAMI,renderingthewholesystem
useless.
Athirdnightandall-weathertargetingsystem
wasCombatSkyspot.Usingground-basedradars,
SkyspotcontrollersvectoredAirForceandNavy
attackplanestotheirtargetsandtoldthepilots
exactlywhenandwheretodroptheirordnance.
Smoke,haze,dust,darkness,andoliage,however,
otenobscuredthetargetzones,makingbombdamageassessmentdicult.ByJune1969,more
than10percentotheNavysoverallstrikeeort
againstLaosconsistedoCombatSkyspotsorties.
Interservicecoordinationimprovedovertime
astheNavybeganequippingitsSkyspotaircrat
withAirForceAPN-154beacons,makingiteasier
orAirForcegroundcontrollerstotracktheNavy
continued on page 12
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IN THE STEPHEN COONTS NOVELFlight of the Intruder,
pilot Jake Graton apologizes or the A-6s ungainly
appearance when he rst shows it to his new girlriend,
Callie: Not exactly beautiul, with that blunt nose,he remarks. Flies great though. Other naval aviators
were less complimentary, calling it a tadpole or a
fying drumstick. In part, because o its distinct lack
o visual appeal, the A-6 is one o the least acclaimed
aircrat o the Vietnam War. Yet, this pioneering plane
proved its worth or the Navy many times over, not only
in Vietnam but in Desert Storm two decades later. With
its tremendous bombload, its ability to operate at night
and in poor weather, and its capacity to loiter or long
periods o time over targets, this aircrat excelled in
aerial interdiction, mine-laying operations, and many
other strike missions.The requirements or the A-6 grew out o the Navy
and Marine Corps experiences during the 1950s.
During the Korean War, slower propeller-driven attack
aircrat, such as the AD-1 Skyraider, were much more
eective in the close air support and battleeld air
interdiction role than aster jet ghters because they
had more endurance and could carry bigger payloads.
Though the Skyraider would continue fying in
Vietnam, the Navy recognized it needed a new attack
plane that could fy as ast as a jet, loiter over targets
or a long time, carry lots o ordnance, and operate in
all weather and at night.Most o the major U.S. military aircrat builders
competed or the contract, but the Navy chose
Grumman. The companys model had a 53-oot
wingspan and a 54-oot, 9-inch length. A ully loaded
A-6 could carry as much ordnance as a World War
IIera B-17 bomber. However, with its wings olded,
the planes wingspan could be cut in hal or relatively
easy storage on a carrier.
A second unique design trait o the A-6 was its side-
by-side seating conguration or the pilot and bombar-
dier navigator (BN). Unlike the F-4, where the navigator
sat behind the pilot, the A-6s side-by-side seatingarrangement made the BN more o a team equal as
opposed to the guy in the backseat. And this equality
was vital, or the pilot depended on the navigator not
only to accurately deliver ordnance but also to help him
control the aircrat.
Another unique eature was DIANE (Digital
Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment). The
system included ground-mapping radar, track radar,
an analog computer, and an inertial navigation
system. The A-6 could attack preselected locations
or targets o opportunity without the crew having to
look outside the cockpit. The BN managed DIANEand, without talking, could relay steering instructions
to the pilot through a Visual Display Terminal (VDT).
As Charlie Carr, a Marine A-6 BN, said, DIANE really
put the BN into the game. Not surprisingly, the A-6
emerged as one o the Navys most popular aircrat
or naval fight ocers. Roger Lerseth even created a
special cover or his notebook in Naval Flight Ocer
School that read: Think A-6!!!
The power plant o the A-6 consisted o two Pratt
and Whitney J-52 turbojet engines. While the plane
could not exceed the speed o sound, its engines
produced 9,300 pounds o thrust, enough to fy theplane at speeds o 648 miles per hour (0.851 Mach).
The J52-P0408, introduced in 1972, increased the
thrust to 11,200 pounds with no signicant change in
engine size, shape, or weight.
Grumman delivered the rst production A-6s to the
Navy in February 1963. The rst A-6s to see action in
Vietnam belonged to Attack Squadron (VA) 75. During
its 1965 tour, the squadron dropped 25 percent o Air
Wing 7s ordnance, despite the act that the wing had
greater numbers o A-4s and F-4s.
A crowning achievement or the A-6 occurred on
18 April 1966. On that night, a fight o two A-6Asrom VA-85 executed a surprise attack on the Uong Bi
thermal power plant located approximately 12 miles
northeast o the seaport o Haiphong. Making radar
system deliveries, the Intruder placed 26,000 pounds
o ordnance on target. So many bombs landed on
the target that Hanoi Radio claimed that B-52s were
responsible.
Like many new aviation technologies, the A-6
suered rom a variety o maintenance ailments early
on in its combat history. Heat, humidity, salt air, and
the shock o catapult assisted launches and tailhook
arrested landings all took a toll on the sophisticatedavionics package o the A-6A, leading to requent
downings o aircrat. Almost without exception,
an A-6 would make one fight and have to go to the
hanger or maintenance, recalled Kent L. Lee, the
skipper oEnterprise (CVAN 65) in 1967.
Naval leaders questioned whether the A-6s should
be employed en-masse in large daytime air attacks,
the so-called Alpha strikes, or be used in ones and10
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twos at night or in bad weather against high value,
heavily deended targets. Ultimately, those arguing
or the piecemeal approach won out. We preer goo
(night and bad weather conditions) became one o the
slogans o the A-6 community.Following the 1968 bombing halt against North
Vietnam, the emphasis o A-6 operations shited to
Laos, where the aircrat proved itsel as an interdic-
tion workhorse or night and bad weather missions in
search o enemy vehicles. The fiers called it trolling
or trucks and oten boasted o getting saddle sores
like old cavalrymen rom fying such long missions.
A-6s proved particularly eective during the 1972
battle o An Loc. With their ability to loiter at length
over the target area and their sizable bombloads,
the A-6 became a avorite o Air Force orward air
controllers over the battleeld. Ater hearing that aninbound fight o A-6s rom VA-75 was carrying 42
Mk-82 500-pound bombs (14 per aircrat), one FAC
exclaimed, Jesus Christ, Im in heaven. Ive got my
own B-52 raid!
The precision delivery capability o the A-6 was also
vital during the mining o Haiphong harbor in 1972.
The Navy intended to sweep the mines ater the war,
so accurate delivery was o paramount importance.
NARAK-54021
A Constellation A-6 Intruder drops a load o Snakeye bombs on targets in North Vietnam. The retarder tail o these
bombs allowed low-level, high-precision attack while avoiding bomb-ragment damage to delivery aircrat.
C
The our Mk-52 mines carried by each A-6 in the
operation added 8,000 pounds o extra weight, but
they still delivered their ordnance with great precision.
In Linebacker II, A-6s attacked enemy surace-to-air
missile (SAM) sites, paving the way or the massive AirForce B-52 raids.
A-6s few 35,443 combat sorties during the
Vietnam War and suered 51 lossesa relatively
high loss/sortie ratio when compared to other Navy
aircrat. Overall, 1.4 Intruders were lost or every
1,000 sorties fown compared to 1.0 or A-4s, 0.7
or F-4s, and 0.6 or A-7s. Maintenance problems
were partly to blame. As one fier explained, Nothing
can touch the Intruder when all the black boxes are
working, but in Vietnam it was a rare day indeed
when an A-6 few with all systems unctioning per-
ectly. Another actor was the diculty o its mission.Intruders few some o the Navys most dangerous
missions, oten against SAM sites and other heavily
deended targets.
During the First Gul War, the A-6 continued to
serve as one o the Navys workhorse strike aircrat,
fying over 4,071 sorties and scoring a number o suc-
cesses, including sinking several Iraqi minelayers and
patrol boats. The Navy retired its last A-6 in 1997.
Two Constellation
A-6 Intruders.
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12
planes.Teradiocommunicationslinkbetween
thecarriertaskgroupsandSeventhAirForcealso
becamemoreeectiveovertime,allowingormore
coordinationwithrespecttoordnanceloadsand
missionchanges.
TeNavyaircratoperatedprimarilyunder
directionoAirForceFACsandenteredand
departedLaosviaaspecialNavyightcorridor
establishedjustbelowtheDMZinSouthVietnam.Inthebeginning,aircrewswerenotassignedtargets
priortolaunchandinsteadcheckedinwithanAir
ForceairbornecontrolplaneinLaostobegiven
targetsoopportunity.Overtime,coordination
procedureswereworkedoutbetweenF-77and
theSeventhAirForce,andaschedulingsystem
developedthatacilitatedtheexchangeodataon
targets,routes,andweapons.Ater1November
1968,F-77normallyassignedtwoorthreeattack
carriers(CVAs)toYankeeStationinsupportotheinterdictioncampaign.DuringCommandoHuntI,
Navyaircratewapproximately24percentoall
strikesortiesorthecampaign,whichtranslatedto
morethan3,282strikesortiespermonth.
CommandoHuntII,whichbeganinMay1969and
coincidedwiththeonsetothewetseason,soughtto
hamperNorthVietnameseeortstorepairbombed
andwashedoutroads.Forthersttime,ghter-
bombersconductedarmedreconnaissanceattacksin
designatedree-rezonesareasdeterminedtobe
uninhabitedbycivilians.Navyaircratcontinuedto
seedriversandlandrouteswith500-poundMk-36
and1,000-poundMk-40mines.Dependingonthe
ringmechanismsemployed,theseairdropped
bottomminescouldbesettorespondtomagnetic
inuences,seismicvibrations,orboth.
Inadditiontominingoperations,Navyplanesew
89AMIsortiesinJune1969,buttheprogramwas
discontinuedinJulyasaresultoanalmostcomplete
lackoidentiablemovingtargetsontheLaotianroad
system.DuringCommandoHuntII,Navyplanesew
approximately2,000attacksortiesamonthintoLaos,
whichrepresented32percentoallU.S.sorties.
AsthedryseasoninLaoscommencedinlate
1969,plannersbegantoscaledownCommando
Huntoperations.TeNovember1969April1970
CommandoHuntIIIcampaignemphasizeddaytime
strikesagainstroadsandnightattacksagainst
antiaircratsites.NavyA-6aircratparticipatedina
subordinateoperationoCommandoHuntIIIcalled
CommandoBolt.Anarrayooursensorstrings,
eachwiththreetosixsensorsspaced660eetapart,
deployedalongheavilyusedroads,monitoredtrac.
Astruckstraveledalongtheroads,thesurveillance
centerestimatedthespeedandsizeotheconvoyandusedacomputertodeterminewhenthetrucks
wouldpassbythenextsensorstring.Testrike
controllerthenradioedthisinormationtoA-6s,
andaNavybombardiernavigatoredtheinorma-
tionintotheA-6scomputer,whichinturntoldhim
thecourse,altitude,andspeednecessarytolaythe
planesbombsrightontheconvoy.Teeectiveness
oCommandoBoltremainsunclearduetodicul-
tiesinobtaininggood,post-strikeintelligenceor
nightoperations.TroughoutCommandoHunt,thebestinterdic-
tionweaponwastheAirForceAC-130gunship,
aconvertedcargoplanearmedwith7.62-mm
miniguns,20-mmVulcanGatling-styleguns,
40-mmBoorsautomaticguns,andonthePAVE
AEGISmodel,a105-mmhowitzer.Tesensorarray
andmassiverepowerotheplanesimplydwared
AnaerialviewoaheavilybombedportionotheHoChiMinhrailinLaos,16January1970.
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thoseothetypicalAirForceorNavytacticaljet.
DuringCommandoHuntIII,orinstance,AC-130s
demolished822outothe2,562vehiclesdestroyed
duringthecampaign,or32percentalmostthe
samenumberovehiclesdestroyedbyallNavyA-4s,
A-6s,andA-7combined.
DuringCommandoHuntIII,B-52sdeposited
380,000bombsontheLaotianlandscape,causing
tremendouslandslides,alteringthecourseorivers,
atteningmountains,andtransormingrugged
junglesintomoonscapes.Chemicaldeoliants
strippedhugeswathsorainorestbare.Yetdespite
thisdestructionandtechnologicalwizardry,the
numberoenemyantiaircratsitesactuallyincreased
duringthecampaignrom445sitesinNovember
1969to607inApril1970.AirForceChieoSta
MichaelRyanlamentedthathowevergreatthetoll
invehiclesonthetrail,trucksparkedondocksatHaiphongorsomeotherNorthVietnameseport
presentedaneasiertargetthanthoseskittering
underneathajunglecanopy.AdmiralUlysses
S.GrantSharp,CommanderinChie,Pacic
(CINCPAC),duringtheearliercampaigninLaos,
expressedsimilarconcerns:Althoughitcouldmost
certainlyslowdownNorthVietnameseinltration
intotheSouthbymakingtheirlinesocommunica-
tionlonger,itcouldnotstoptheowaltogether.
Tereweretoomanyotherlinesocommunicationavailable.Sharpinsteadrecommendedintensive
miningoHaiphongandotherminorportsalong
thecoastoNorthVietnamanideathatpolitical
authoritiesrejecteduntil1972.
RecognizingthattheLaotiancampaignwasa
loser,theNavybegantoslowlyscaledownits
commitmentstherein1970.Duringthecourseothe
campaign,theaveragenumberoCVAsontheline
atYankeeStationdroppedrom3.0to2.7andnally
2.0.TeNavyalsobegantoassignitsoldest,least
capableshipstotheeorttosaveitsmoremodern
shipsorotherColdWarcommitments.
TestoryotheShangri-La(CVS38)typied
theNavysdesiretodeployitsolderplatormsto
SoutheastAsiaater1968.Originallycommissioned
in1944,Shangri-Lareceivedtwomajoroverhauls
duringthecourseotheColdWarbutby1970su-
eredrommanyailmentsandidiosyncrasies.While
trainingoJacksonvilleoraVietnamdeploymentin
January1970,theshipsueredarethatkilledone
Sailorandinjuredtwo.InVietnam,oneoitspropel-
lershatsstoppedunctioning,compellingittoleave
thelineornearlyamonthorepairs.Fivedaysater
itsreturntoVietnam,on29July,itsueredasteering
casualtywith14oitsaircratairborne.Teaircrat
hadtodiverttoDanangtoland,andtheshipceased
launchingstrikesoranotherdaywhilerepairswere
made.Shangri-Lasmanytroubleshelpedreducethe
numberoNavystrikesortiesinLaosinJune1970to
just1,286.
AlmostassoonasShangri-La arrivedonstation
inMarch1970,demandorNavystrikeassetsbegan
toincrease.Duringthenighto31March1April,
SouthVietnamwitnessedsomeotheheaviest
ghtinginsixmonths.Communistorcesshelled
morethan150targets,includingthreeprovincial
capitals,andoverrantwoARVNoutposts.Athird
Shangri-La (CVS38),commissionedin1944,wasoneotheNavysoldestcarriersin1970.
Mk-36DestructorMine.Tesemagnetic-inuenceminesdetonatedwhentrucksdrovenearthem.
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14
carrier,America(CVA66),joined
Shangri-La andBon Homme
Richard(CVA31)inAprilto
augmentthecarrierpresenceinthe
Guloonkin,andtheninMay,a
ourth,Oriskany(CVA34),arrived
onstation.
On1May1970,U.S.andSouth
Vietnameseorceslaunchedathree-
prongedattackintoCambodian
borderregionsnorthwestoSaigon
thattheCommunistshadbeenusing
assanctuariesormanyyears.By4
May,thealliedoensivehadkilled
orcapturedover3,000NVAandVC
troops.Moresignicantly,itgained
much-neededtimeortheallies,
accordingtohistorianJamesH.
Willbanks.Communistorceswere
unabletolaunchsignicantattacks
romCambodiaintoSouthVietnam
ortwoyears.SeventhAirForce
ghter-bombersandB-52sprovided
mostothetacticalairsupportorthe
CambodianincursionwhileNavy
assetsbasedintheonkinGulocusedonLaos.
LieutenantJamesMcBride,anA-4piloton
Shangri-La,ewhisrstcombatmissionduringthistenseperiod.Temissionwasaour-planestrike
intheLaotianpanhandle,aruggedareadominated
byjunglesandsteepmountains.Hisightusedthe
NavycorridorjustbelowtheDMZtoenterLaos.
Bythetimetheightcrossedthebeach,theywere
spreadoutinacombatormationwiththeaircrat
200eetawayromeachother,scanningtheskiesor
hostileMiGs.OnceoverLaos,theleadplane,own
byLieutenantRayLodge,madecontactwithanAir
ForceFAC.TeFACinormedtheightthattherewasa
suspectedtruckstorageareabelowhimandthat
hewouldmarkitwithaWillyPetewhitephos-
phorusrocket.Whenitreactswithoxygen,white
phosphorusproduceslargeamountsosmokeand
toxicgarlic-smellingumes.AirForceFACplanes
usedwhitephosphorusthroughoutthewartomark
targetsduringdaylighthours.Becausevisibilitywas
goodonthe11th,Rayspottedthesmokeimmedi-
atelyandthenledtheightalongaridgeline,comingintowardsthetargetromthenorth.Lodgepickled
hisbombsorst.McBridethenmadearun,40
degreesromhisightpathsoasnottopresenta
goodtargetoranyantiaircratgunnerbelow.
Irolledtheplaneoveronitsletwing90degrees,
pointedthenosetoa45degreeangleodive,and
aimedthegreencircleothebombingsightslightly
downrombelowwhereRaysbombshadhit.With
a45-degreediveangleset,450knotsoairspeed
building,andmyaltimeterunwindinglikecrazy,myscanwentrapidlybetweenthebombsightandight
instruments.Atapproximatelythedesired7,000
eetoaltitude,Ipressedthebombreleasebutton
onthecontrolstickandeltmyloadodestruction
comeotheaircrat.Instantaneously,Ipulledback
onthesticktogetthedesired4gsoorcedeortto
climbquicklyoutodanger.WhenIlookedovermy
AnA-4SkyhawklaunchesromthedeckoShangri-La.
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shoulderatthetarget,Icouldseewherethebombs
hadhitandexploded.Myheadwentquicklyback
intothecockpittocheckmyinstrumentsandthen
outsideagaintoscanorRaysaircrat.
Assquadronpolicydictated,Raydroppedallohisordnanceontherstpassinordertominimize
hisexposureoverhostileterrain.
OncetheA-4shadmadetheirruns,theFAC
orbitedthetargetandinspectedtheresults.Much
tothepleasureotheNavypilots,hereportedseeing
secondaryres,agoodindicationthattheteamhad
hitsometrucks.Iteltgoodcomingbacktothe
Shang,Jimwroteinhisdiarythatevening.We
reachedourtarget,scoredgoodhits,andoundour
waybacktotheshipwithplentyotimetospare.Teentiremissionromstarttonishlastedonly
1.6hours.
BytheendoCommandoHuntIV(May
September1970),U.S.tacticalairactivityhad
diminishedtoanaverageo417sortiesperday.Poor
weatherandalackotargetscontributedtothis
decline,butthemainreasonoritwerecutbacks
orderedbytheJointChiesoSta.Frommid1970
tomid1971,theJCSauthorizedonly14,000ghter/
attacksortiespermonthinSoutheastAsia:10,000,
AirForce;2,700,Navy;and1,300,Marine.
PilotsotenoundinterdictioninLaostobeboring,butasroutineassomeothesemissions
became,dangerwasalwayspresent.During
CommandoHuntIII,enemygunnersscoredmore
than310hitsonU.S.aircratanddowned60.Many
moreaircratwerelostinaccidents.DuringtheBon
Homme Richards 1970cruise,Lieutenant(jg)Lloyd
G.Howie,FighterSquadron(VF)53syoungestpilot,
andCommanderDeanE.Kaiser,VF-53sseniorpilot
andskipper,diedinaccidents.
TesharpdeclineinU.S.airactivityduringtheJuly1970June1971periodspurredtheNorth
Vietnameseintoamassiveroadconstructioneort.
Bypasseswerebuiltaroundareashithardduring
CommandoHuntIII.TeVietnamesealsobuilt
newroads,bridges,andtransshipmentpointsin
NorthVietnamproper.OnetruckparkinHaiphong
heldover1,200vehicleswhileeightothersinthe
TeSkyhawk,orScooter,asitspilotsotencalledit,wasdesignedintheearly1950sbytheDouglasAircratCompanywiththreegoalsinmind:ithadtoyover500mph,carrya2,000-poundbombloadtoanytargetwithina460mileradius,andcostlessthan$1millionapiece.
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HanoiHaiphongareaheld5,000more.Battalion-
sizeconvoyso40to60truckswouldmoverom
theseareasdownthesystemoroadsinLaos.Area
bossesdirectedtheseconvoysthroughnumerous
bypassesandsubsegments,switchingroutesat
thelastpossiblemoment.Fromanairplane,allan
observercouldseeothiscomplexsystemwere
mainroads,notthemany,smallbypassroads
leadingintothejungleandbacktothemainroad.Withthisnewroadnetworkinplace,Seventh
AirForceplannersconcludedthattheNorth
Vietnamesewouldlaunchamajorresupply
eortortheirorcesintheRepublicoVietnam
duringthenextdryseason,thussettingthe
stageorCommandoHuntV.Tiscampaign
ocusedonsimilartypesotargetsasinearlier
campaignstrucks,roads,transshipmentpoints,
supplydumps,andrepairacilities.Teplan
allocated70percentothe14,000authorized
tacticalairsortiesorthatmonthtotheSteeliger
area.Tismassiveinvestmentoairpowercaused
enemytracintheSteeligerareatocometoa
virtualstandsti llduringtheday.Atnight,AC-130
andAC-119gunshipscameouttohammerthe
convoysonthemove,claimingover12,000vehiclesdestroyed60percentothe20,000vehicles
bombedduringthecampaign.
SeventhAirForceplannersclaimedthat
CommandoHuntVorcesprevented89percent
omaterialenteringLaosromarrivinginSouth
Vietnamandreducedtheenemysthroughputo
suppliestoaboutonethirdothepreviousdry
AnaerialphotographoantiaircratpositionsalongtheHoChiMinhrail.Tegunsaremarkedbyarrows(withinacircle)inthelowerrighthandsideotheimage.
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season.Duringthecampaign,F-77
pilotsotenewover200strikesortiesa
dayintoLaosandSouthVietnam.Ona
typicalday,thesepilotsmightmake30
roadcuts,causearoadslide,anddestroy
twotrucksplusanantiaircratgunsite.
Butstatisticsaloneailtotellthe
wholestoryothecampaign.Itwasnot
uncommonorpilotsandtheirsuperiors
toinateenemylosses.Itwasverydi-
cult,recalledGeneralWilliamMomyer,
theSeventhAirForcecommander,to
reachagoodbasisorassessmento
damagetotheenemytruckinventory,
especiallywhenclaimswereexceeding
thetotaltruckinventorybyaactoro
twoattimes.estsconductedinthe
UnitedStatesshowedthattruckshitby
munitionswererarelytotallydestroyed
unlesstheyburned.
ProblemsencounteredbytheSouth
VietnameseorcesintheLamSom719
operationoFebruaryMarch1971
underscoredtheshortcomingsothe
airinterdictioncampaigninLaos.Te
LamSom719operationwasdesigned
tocaptureechepone,theprimary
CommunisttransshipmenthubintheLaotianpanhandle.Itwasadirect
reactiontoamassiveNorthVietnamese
buildupinLaosthatoccurredinlate1970and
early1971atertheenemylostlogisticsbase
areasinCambodia.Duringthisperiod,theNorth
Vietnamesemovedtwentyairdeensebattalionsinto
Laosandovertwohundredlargercaliberguns(37-,
57-,85-,and100-mm).Over22,000combattroops
providedsecurityorthetrail,whichwasunneling
over6,000troopsamonthintoSouthVietnam.Alarmedthatthisbuildupposedadirectthreat
toQuangriProvinceinSouthVietnam,President
NixonandhisadvisorscameupwiththeLaos
invasionideaasameansocuttingtheenemys
logisticsjugular.SouthVietnamesetroopsinvaded
Laoson8February1971,buildingresupportbases
alongtheirinvasioncorridortoprovidesecurity
orthesustainedoensive.Althoughogandlow
overcastalongtheinvasionroutemadeitdicult
orAmericanairpowertosupporttheARVN
attack,theSouthVietnamesemadedecentprogress
upuntil11February,whenornoapparentreason
theystoppedattacking.Tispauseallowedthe
NVAtobringinreinorcements,includingheavy
122-and130-mmartilleryandtanks.AmericanadvisorsurgedtheSouthVietnamesecommander,
GeneralHoangXuanLam,tocommitmoretroops
andattempttodrawtheNorthVietnameseintoa
majorbattle;neveragain,theyargued,wouldSouth
Vietnamhavesomuchairpoweratitsdisposal.
Lam,earingexcessivecasualties,optedinstead
oratokenhelicopterassaultagainstchepone,
Bombsbeingbroughtuptotheightdeckjustbeoreastrike.AlliedaircratdroppednearlythreemilliontonsobombsonLaosrom1962to1973,maki
thatcountrythethirdmostbombedcountryinthehistoryowarare.
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18
ollowedbyageneralARVNwithdrawalromLaos.
Intheend,onlyhalotheoriginalinvadingorceo
15,000madeitoutoLaosduringachaoticretreat.
Overall,U.S.tacticalaircratandB-52sewover
10,000sortiesinsupportoARVNduringLamSom
719,withtheNavyproviding130strikesortiesaday
duringthetwo-monthlongcampaign.
TeinterservicerivalrybetweentheAirForce
andNavyoversortiecountsotenovershadowedthesuperbcooperationbetweenAirForceandNavyat
thewarriorlevel.AirForcepilotsdependedonRed
CrownorsituationalawarenessaboutMiGsover
NorthVietnam,andNavypilots,inturn,depended
ontheAirForceseliteSARorceswhentheywere
shotdowndeepinenemyterritory.Testoryo
LieutenantBartonSheldonCreedtypiesthecom-
radeshipbetweenthetwoservices.On13March
1971,antiaircratreintheSteeligersection
oLaosdownedaRanger(CVA61)A-7ownbyCreedoVA-113.TeaircratcaughtreandCreed
ejected,breakinganarmandalegintheprocess.An
AirForceFACimmediatelyestablishedcommunica-
tionswiththepilot.Despitestrongevidenceo
enemytroopsinthearea,anearbyrescuehelicopter
decidedtorescueCreed.Tehelicopterhovered
overtheinjuredpilotandloweredaparajumper
(PJ)within30eetothegroundwhen
smallarmsrestartedhittingtheheli-
copter,injuringsomeothecrewand
orcingtheaircrattopullup.Creeds
lasttransmittalwas,Pickmeup,pick
meupnow!Teyarehere!
SARorceslaidreonthearea,
hopingtokilltheenemytroopsnear
Creed.Fourminuteslater,anotherheli-
copterwentinwhileasecondcovered
theoperation.Groundrestruckboth
aircrat,seriouslywoundingoneo
thecopilots.Neitherhelicoptermade
itbacktobase,butbothcrewswere
rescued.TeAirForcemadeathird
rescueattempt1520minuteslater,but
couldnotlocateCreed.Teytriedagain
aterdark,evensendingaPJdownina
junglepenetratortosearchorCreed
onoot,butheoundnosignothepilot.Tenext
morningtheoriginalFACwentbackandlookedagain.
TeFACoundCreedsparachutespreadoutonthe
groundabout500metersromtheoriginalejection
site.SincenoAmericanpilottryingtoevadecapture
wouldadvertisehispresenceinthismanner,theFAC
assumedthattheparachutewasadecoyandbroke
othesearch.DeenseDepartmentinvestigators
learnedaterthewarthatCreedprobablydiedromhisejectioninjuriessoonatertherstrescueattempt.
Overall,groundrestruckthreeAirForcehelicopters
duringtheoperationandwoundedeightcrewmen.
LamSom719onlytemporarilydislodgedthe
enemyslogisticsowsouth.AtertheARVNwith-
drawal,sensorsactuallydetectedmoresouthbound
traconthetrailthanbeorethecampaign.Despite
mountingevidencethatinterdictionwasailing,
plannersinWashingtoncontinuedtotakecomort
romstatisticalmeasuresosuccess.LateintheCommandoHuntVcampaign,PresidentNixon
metwithhistopmilitaryadvisorsinSanClemente,
Caliornia,todiscusstheissue.Tegroup,whose
membershipincludedrepresentativesromthe
services,theStateandDeensedepartments,the
NationalSecurityCouncil,andCIA,concludedthat
CommandoHuntwasindeedsuccessullystemming
AnA-7ECorsairIIlandingontheightdeckoRanger(CVA61),January1968.TeA-7provedahighlysuccessulattackaircratduringthenalyearsotheVietnamWar.ItcouldyuptoMach.94andeaturedasophis-
ticatedbombingcomputerandall-weathernavigationsystem.
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theowosuppliestoSouthVietnamand,inso
doing,helpingtoprotectVietnamizationandthe
ongoingwithdrawaloU.S.orcesromSouth
Vietnam.Tegrouprecommendedthattheeort
continue.Temajorobjectiveomanyothesepoli-
cymakerswastoendtheAmericaninvolvementin
Vietnambeorethenextpresidentialelectioncycle.
TeythereoretendedtoaccentuatepositivenewssuchasthenumberotrucksdestroyedinLaos.
Telastdryseasoninterdictioneortinsouthern
LaoswasCommandoHuntVII,aslightlysmaller
campaignthanCommandoHuntVintermso
sortiesownbutmoresophisticatedthananyo
itspredecessorsintermsotacticsandtechnology.
DuringPhaseI,B-52sandtacticalghtersdropped
14,000500-poundbombsand17,100750-pound
bombsprimarilyontheMuGiaandBanKarai
passes.Tisbombingdidlittletoaecttheowo
tracintoLaos.Atersomanyyearsobombing,
thesepassesnolongercontainedanyvegetation.
Bypassescouldeasilybeconstructedinthetreeless
environment,andcratersinroadscouldbequickly
lledwithsoilromothercraters.Lackovegetationalsomeantthattheseroadsdriedmorequicklyater
arainthanthosecoveredintropicalora.
PhaseIIinvolvedthecreationothreeblock-
ingbelts:oneeachnearchepone,BanBak,and
Chavane.Asintheoriginalsensorseedingeort,
U.S.Navyaircratprovidedmuchotheordnance
usedintheinterdictioneort.NavyA-7sseeded
OV-10Broncos.OV-10orwardaircontrollersewlowandslowoverthejungleinLaos,searchingortargets.Whentheyound
anenemyconvoy,theymarkeditwithsmokerocketsandcalledinNavyorAirForcestrikeplanestobombthetrucks.
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20
thebeltswithMk-36magnetic-
inuenceminesthatdetonated
whentrucksdrovenearthem.
F-4s,inturn,depositedwide-area
antipersonnelminestoprotect
theMk-36s.Temineeldsclosed
someblockingpointsorasmany
as41days,butothersproved
useless.TeNorthVietnamese
couldclearbeltsoantipersonnel
minesbyusingrocksattached
tostrings,andMk-36scouldbe
deusedbyhand.
Forbothphases,enemyair
deenseswereamuchmore
potentthreatthaninearliercam-
paigns.TeNorthVietnamese
redtheirrstsurace-to-air
missileinLaoson4March
1971romasite2.5mileswest
otheBanKaraiPass.On23
April,aSAMsitenearthesame
passclaimeditsrstU.S.plane
overLaos,anAirForceO-2.
DuringCommandoHuntVII(1
November197129March1972),
theNorthVietnamesebrought
eightSAMbattalionsintoSteeligerandincreasedtheir
antiaircratbatteriesrom345
to545guns.Teseimprovedair
deenseseectivelyputanendto
attacksbyslowermovingplanes
suchastheB-52,AC-119,and
AC-130intheSteeligerarea
oLaos.BeginninginDecember
1971,evenast-movingjetghters
neededmandatoryprotectionbyspecialhunter-killerSAMteams
calledIronHandights.Onthese
missions,A-4sorA-7sequipped
withShrikemissileshunted
SAMsitesbysearchingortheir
radaremissions.Whenaradar
signalwaspickedup,theShrike
ANorthVietnameseSA-2surace-to-airmissilesite.TeSA-2hadamaximumrangeoabout31miles,amaximumoperatingaltitudeo80,000eet,andspeedoMach3.5.Itusuallycarriedahighexplosivewarheado287pounds.Duringthecourseothewar,theNavydevelopedvariousmethodsordeeatingSAMs,includingdeensivemaneuvering,electroniccountermeasures,andhunter-killerteamsarmedwithantiradiationmissiles.
USAF94841
HoChiMinhrailpulverizedbybombs.
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wouldhomeinonthebeamtodestroytheradar.
TeseplanesalsocarriedMk-82500-poundbombs
oraquickvisualbackupdeliveryintheeventaSAM
litowasspotted.TeNavyotenchoseitsnest
pilotsortheIronHandmissionbecauseitrequired
tremendoussituationalawarenesstoythesemis-
sionseectively.IronHandpilotshadtobeintimately
amiliarnotonlywiththeirownsophisticated
weaponssystemsbutwithallintelligencerelatedto
SAMsitesintheirareaooperationsandtheight
tracksothestrikeaircrat.
Inadditiontoimprovingtheirairdeenses,the
NorthVietnamesealsobeganintereringwiththe
sensorstrings.Teyeventuallydiscoveredthat
aircratdroppingsensorsdovedierentlyrom
thoseonbombingmissions.Withthisinormation,
theybeganplottingandneutralizingvariousstrings.
Teyalsolearnedtothwartairborneelectricity
sensorssuchasBlackCrowbyshieldingignition
systemswithaluminumoilandcoveringengines
withmatsobananaandbambooleavestoblockhot
spotsrominraredsensors.
TethirdphaseoCommandoHuntVIInever
ullygototheground.On31March1972,the
NVAlaunchedamassivespringoensiveintoSouth
VietnamamovethatcausedtheSeventhAirForce
toabruptlyterminateCommandoHuntanddivert
allavailableairassetstothwartingthisoensive.Inpurenumericalterms,CommandoHuntVII,
likemostoitspredecessors,appearedtobeastun-
ningsuccess.TeSeventhAirForceclaimed4,727
trucksdestroyednotnearlyasmanyasthe11,009
claimedtohavebeendestroyedinCommandoHunt
V,butstillenoughtopreventanestimated84percent
othe30,947tonsosuppliesenteringLaosrom
reachingtheCommunistorcesinSouthVietnam.
However,evenwithamere5,024tonsosupplies,
alongwithsuppliesstockpiledduringtheearlierCommandoHuntcampaigns,theNorthVietnamese
werestillabletolaunchtheEasterOensive,acam-
paignthatnearlydeeatedtheRepublicoVietnam.
TroughouttheCommandoHuntcampaign,the
NorthVietnamesethwartedthemostsophisticated
Americantechnology.Teybuiltnewroadsto
bypasschokepointsandblockingpoints,employed
sapperstodiuseminesaswellassensors,and
protectedstrategicallyimportantmountainpasses
withantiaircratgunsandsurace-to-airmissiles.
Onceoverthemountains,theNorthVietnamese
movedsuppliesalonga12,000-milemazeoroads
andtrailsbarelyunderstoodbyAmericanintel-
ligenceocers.Blockingbeltsonlyservedtoslow
downtrac,notstopit,becausesomanybypasses
existedinthejunglesandorestsotheLaotian
panhandle.BytheendoCommandoHuntVII,
theVietnamesecouldalsomovesuppliesatnight
withnearimpunitybecauseenemyairdeenses
haddriventheAmericangunshipsandB-52srom
mostvitalareasotheSteeligernetwork.Between
1966and1971,U.S.intelligenceanalystsestimated
that630,000enemytroops,100,000tonsoood,
400,000weapons,and50,000tonsoammunition
madeitswayromNorthVietnamtoSouthVietnam
viatheHoChiMinhrail.
Whileultimateresponsibilityorthestrategic
ailureoCommandoHuntrestedwiththe
policymakersinWashington,whobelievedthat
aninterdictioncampaigninLaoscouldseriously
degradetheCommunistabilitytowagewarinSouth
Vietnam,boththeNavyandtheAirForcedeservea
certaindegreeoblameorsomeothecampaigns
tacticalshortcomings.Navyaircratewover
10,000sortiesorCommandoHuntVIIaloneandmanymoresortiesduringearliercampaigns.During
the1970Cambodianincursion,Navyaircratbore
muchothesortieburdenortheSteeligerregion.
Navyminingandacoustictechnologywaswidely
employedinCommandoHunt,andNavyaircrat
deployedalotothetechnology.Despitethisre-
powerandtechnology,thecampaignailedtoreduce
theowoCommunistsuppliesenoughtopreventa
majorNVAoensivein1972.
Initially,AdmiralSharpandotherNavyocersopposedinterdictioninLaosinavoroamore
concentratedminingeortdesignedtocloseallo
NorthVietnamsmajorports.Onceminingwas
rejected,however,theNavyagreedtodoitssharein
Laosandcontributelargenumbersosortiestowhat
hadbecomeAmericaslargestbombingcampaign
betweentheallo1968andthespring1972.
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U.S.bombingzonesinNorthVietnam.StrictrulesoengagementstipulatedthatNavyaircratcouldonlybombtargetsinRoutePackages2through4and6Bormuchothewar.
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heNovember1968bombinghaltended
theRollingTundercampaignagainst
NorthVietnam,butitdidnotcompletely
haltallalliedairactivitythere.In1969
alone,theSeventhAirForceandaskForce77
conductedover5,000reconnaissancemissionsover
NorthVietnam,withtheNavyying40percento
them.Initially,Navyreconnaissanceplanesewthese
Bluereemissionsunescorted.On7November
1968,however,theNorthVietnameseredonan
RA-3BSkywarriorovercentralNorthVietnam,
promptingtheNavytobeginescortingtheseights
witharmedghters.Bytheendothemonth,29
Navyreconnaissanceaircrathaddrawnhostile
reoverNorthVietnamandantiaircratrenear
VinhdownedanRA-5CVigilanteon25November.
Duringthissameperiod,theAirForcelostan
RF-4andanF-4.Inretaliationortheselosses,U.S.
aircratbombedtheresponsibleantiaircratsites.
Inkeepingwiththespiritohispeaceoensive,
PresidentJohnsondidnotusetheattacksasa
justicationorresumingthebombingcampaign
againstNorthVietnam,buthedidauthorize
Americanplanestoretaliateishotatbyantiair-
cratsitesinNorthVietnam.InDecember,thelast
monthotheJohnsonpresidency,Hancock(CVA
19)A-4smadetwoseparateShrikeattacksonNorth
VietnameseSAMsites.Intherstinstance,which
occurredonthe14th,anA-4EIronHandpilotred
aShrikeatasiteaterhavingourSAMsredat
himandhiswingman.Inthesecondincident,two
A-4EsonaBluereeescortightredtwoShrikes
proTeCTive reaCTioN
AcamouagedRA-5CromReconnaissanceAttackSquadron13taxisonKitty Hawk(CVA63)whileoperatingintheSouthChinaSea,13April1966.Originallydevelopedinthelate1950sasaMach2carrier-basedattackplanecapableocarryingnuclearorconventionalordnancetotargetsupto3,000milesaway,theRA-5wasusedmainlyorphotographicreconnais-sanceotargetsinNorthVietnamandLaos.
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24
aterbeingilluminated
byaNorthVietnamese
SAMsiteradar.
Januaryusheredin
anewyearandanew
presidentwhowanted
totakeamoreaggres-
sivestancetowards
NorthVietnam.
Moderatememberso
theCabinet,however,
earingcriticismrom
thedomesticantiwar
movement,persuaded
Nixonnottolaunchan
immediatebombing
campaignagainst
NorthVietnam.
Instead,hesettledorasecretB-52bombingcam-
paignagainstCommunistsanctuariesthatbegan
inCambodiainMarch1969.Aewweeksintothe
campaign,theNew York imes exposedit,giving
theantiwarmovementsubstantialammunitionwith
whichtoattackthenewadministration.
NixonsSecretaryoDeense,MelvinR.Laird,
traveledtoSouthVietnaminMarch1969toperson-
allyassessthesituationthere.Lairdhadopposedthe
CambodianbombingsandurgedthePresidenttostayocusedonVietnamization.AormerRepublican
senatorromWisconsin,Lairdrecognizedthat
domesticsupportorthewarintheU.S.waswaning
andthatalong-termU.S.groundcommitment
tothewarwasnotpoliticallyeasible.Duringthe
visit,aNew York imesreporteraskedhimwhya
hundredAmericanMarineshadoccupiedsomehills
inLaosoraweek.Withoutconrmingordenying
theepisode,LairdsaidthatU.S.militarycommand-
ershadthepowertolaunchprotectivereactionmissionsinordertosaeguardtheirtroops.Shortly
thereater,thiscatchphrasewouldalsobeappliedto
airstrikesagainstantiaircratsitesinNorthVietnam.
Aspromulgatedon25November1968,therules
oengagement(ROE)allowedtheNavyandAir
Forcetosendescortedreconnaissanceightsas
arnorthasthe19thparallel,andiredupon,the
escortswereauthorizedtodestroytheseweapons,
installationsandimmediatesupportingacilities.
Americanpilots,however,becamemoreaggressive
overtime,occasionallyattackingsitesthatillumi-
natedthemwithradarseveninoshotswerered.
AterbeingpaintedbyaFansongradarnearVinh
on21April,twoA-4FsromBon Homme Richard
redtwoShrikemissilesatthesuspectedsite.Bythe
summero1969,asmanyasourAirForceghters
wouldorbitoversuspectedSAMsites,readyto
attackatamomentsnoticeiareconnaissanceight
wasthreatenedorattacked.
Duringonesuchmission,theNorthVietnamese
redtwoSAMsatapairoF-105WildWeasels(the
AirForceequivalentoanIronHand)neartheMu
GiaPasson28January1970.TeWeaselsdropped
12Mk-82bombsonthesite,whichwasonthe
NorthVietnamesesideothepass.OneWeaselthen
straedanothersitenearbybutwashitbyground
re,orcingthepilotandhiselectronicwarare
ocertoeject.TeAirForcethenattemptedto
rescuethecrewwithanHH-53JollyGreenGiant
helicopter.TeVietnamesereactedbylaunching
aMiG-21,pilotedbyVuNgocDinhothe921st
FighterRegiment.Dinh,whowouldendthewar
withsixconrmedkills,crossedovertheborderin
LaosandredasingleAtollheat-seekingmissileat
thehelicopter,killingitscrewosix.TeF-105crew(AirForceCaptainsRichardJ.MallonandRobertJ.
Panek)werecapturedbutneverreturnedaterthe
warandarenowpresumeddead.
TeHH-53shootdowninuriatedtheallies,but
therewaslittletheycoulddotoavengethekilling
giventheROEatthetime.MiGswouldoccasionally
ydownthesouthernpanhandleoNorthVietnam
toVinh,butavoidedanycontactwithAmerican
ghters.Inanattempttodisrupttheseights,Vice
AdmiralFredBardshar,CarrierDivision5com-mander,orderedaseriesolow-levelbarriercombat
airpatrols(BARCAPs).On27March,oneothese
patrolsalmostbaggedaloneMiGromthe921st
Regiment,buttheenemypilotspottedthetwoF-4Js
romConstellation(CVA64)andgotawaybeore
theycouldlineupashot.Tenextmorning,radar
controllersinHorne(DLG30)acquiredtwoMiGs
MelvinR.Laird,SecretaryoDeenserom1969to1973,wasakeypolicymakerduringthelatteryearsotheVietnamWar.
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headingtowardsVinhandimmediately
inormedConstellation,whichlaunched
twoF-4swithinveminutesothe
warning.
Oneotheplanes,crewedbyLieutenant
JerryBeauilierandhisradarinterceptocer
(RIO)Lieutenant(jg)SteveBarkley,expe-
riencedaradarailuresoonaterlaunch,
butHornesuccessullyvectoredthemto
twoMiGsairbornenearTanhHoa.We
gainedavisualataboutourmiles,recalled
Barkley,ajuniorRIOonhisrstWESPAC
cruise.Tewholethingendedinjusttwo
turns.TeMiGssplitatergainingsighto
theF-4sclosingattheirveoclocklow,and
oneredanAtollattheleadF-4,crewedby
CommanderPaulSpeerandhisRIOLieutenant(jg)
JohnCarter,butthemissilemissedbyawidemargin.
Beauilier,agraduateotherstopGunclass,then
splitagain,andthelowMiGreversed.Badmove,
explainedBarkley.TeyredtheirrstAIM-9Dat
lessthanonemilewithabouttendegreesothe
MiGstail.Fivesecondslaterareballeruptedin
thevicinityotheMiGstail.Beauilierthenreda
secondSidewinder.TelastviewwehadotheMiG
wasthatitwasinamesgoingdown,explained
Barkley.Beauilier,whoregrettedringthesecond
missile,laterconessedthattheMiGwasonreatertherstshot,butIwantedhimsobadlythatIshot
himagain.Terewasnowayhewasgoingtogetaway
romme.Followingtheshootdown,themoodon
boardConstellationwaseuphoric.Tiswastherst
Navy/USAF/USMCMiGkillsincethe1968bombing
halt.TeNavysnextkillwouldnotcomeuntil19
January1972.
AMiG-21.BuiltbytheMikoyan-GurevichdesignbureauintheSovietUnion,theMiG-21wasthemostadvancedghtereldedbytheNorthVietnamese.Pilotsotheseplanespreerredhit-and-run,slashingattackstodogghts.Teyreliedontheirsupersonicspeedandtheskillotheirground-controlinterceptoperatorstodirectthemquicklytoatargetandthenhelpthemescaperomtheirpursuers.
AnF-4JlandsonConstellation(CVA64),29July1974.TeF-4wasoriginallydesignedasaeetdeenseghterbutwasutilizedextensivelyinVietnamasabomberaswell.ItcouldachievespeedsinexcessoMach2andcarryupto18,650poundsoordnance,includingair-to-airmissilesandlaser-guidedbombs.Itspowerulpulse-dopplerradarwasasupremetechnologicalbreakthroughatthetime.Itcouldidentiytargetswellbeyondvisualrangeanddirectradar-guidedSparrowmissilesatMiGsupto12milesaway.
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26
Renewedinterestinprotectivereactioncame
duringthespringo1970astheNixonadministra-
tionbeganplanningortheCambodianincursion.
PresidentNixonknewthattheinvasionwouldcause
anuproaronCapitalHillandthoughtitmightbe
prudenttogothewholewayandresumebombing
NorthVietnamaswell.HenryKissinger,hisnationalsecurityadvisor,dissuadedhim,arguingthatthey
hadaullplatealready.Instead,theadministration
optedoralimitedattackagainstlogisticstargetsin
thepanhandleoNorthVietnamjustnorthothe
DMZandthenearthemainpassesintoLaos.
Teour-dayattacktookplaceduringthesame
periodastheinitialthrustsintoCambodia:14
May.SeventhAirForceplanesstrucktargetsalong
mainsupplyroadsleadingintoLaoson12May.
F-77aircratjoinedtheeorton34May,striking
supplytargetsinNorthVietnaminthevicinityo
theMuGiaandBanKaraipasses.Inall,708Air
ForceandNavysortieswereownandtwoAir
Forceplaneswerelostintheeort(anF-4andRF-4).
AdmiralJohnS.McCainJr.,CINCPACatthetime,
believedthatthestrikeswerethemostsuccessulto
dateagainsttheNorthVietnameselogisticssystem.
Teenemyhadbeencaughtbysurprise
atatimeogreatconusionoccasioned
bytheCambodianinvasion,andinthe
middleoalastditchattempttopush
suppliessouthbeoretherainyseason.
Teattacksdestroyedbetween10,000
and50,000tonsosuppliesconcentrated
alongthecorridorsleadingintoLaos.
Teselosses,alongwiththeattackson
theCambodianbaseareas,hadasigni-
cantimpactonNorthVietnamsability
toconductoperationsinSouthVietnam.
AlthoughtheCambodianincursion
andtheshootingoourstudentsby
NationalGuardsmenatKentState
Universityon4Mayovershadowedthe
airoensiveinthepanhandleoNorth
Vietnam,thepresseventuallycaught
windotheattacksanddemanded
answers.TeadministrationusedLairds
catchphrase,protectivereaction,to
justiytheattacks,eventhoughLairdwasinthe
proverbialdoghouseatthetimeorspeakingout
againsttheCambodiaattacks.
Byall1970,U.S.reconnaissanceightsbegan
compilingevidenceoanotherlogisticsandair
deensebuildupinsouthernNorthVietnam.Photos
romtheseightsindicatedashitoantiaircratartillery(AAA)concentrationsromthecoastal
areasoNorthVietnamtotheroadsandpasses
leadingintoLaos.Tisintelligencealsorevealedthat
theNorthVietnamesehaddeployed12SAMbattal-
ionssouthothe20thparallel.odestroythesenew
deenses,AdmiralTomasH.Moorer,Chairmano
theJointChiesoSta,requestedauthorityrom
theSecretaryoDeenseoraprotectivereaction
strikebelowthe20thparallel.Lairdrejectedthe
proposal,claimingthatsucharaidmightdamageNixonspeaceeorts.
On13November,theNorthVietnamesedowned
anAirForceRF-4CneartheMuGiaPass.Tenext
day,AdmiralMcCainrequestedanimmediate
protectivereactionstrikeagainstairdeensetargets
inNorthVietnamsouthothe20thparallel.Tis
requestarrivedatthesametimethatMoorerwas
AdmiralJohnS.McCainJr.arrivesontheightdeckoKitty Hawkandis
metbyViceAdmiralFredericA.Bardshar,CommanderaskForce77,5January1970.McCainservedasCommanderinChie,Pacicrom1968to1972.
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planningathree-daystrikeagainstsimilartargetsto
coincidewiththeSonayraid(anattempttorescue
alliedprisonersowarheldataprison23mileswest
oHanoi).FromtheCambodianexperienceearlier
thatyear,Nixonhadlearnedthathecoulddiuse
criticismbystagingmultiplepoliticallyunpopular
operationsatthesametime.Eveninailure,noted
AirForcehistorianWayneTompson,theSonay
raidcaughttheimaginationomanysucientlyto
bluntbarbsaimedatbombinginthepanhandle.
MoorerdelegatedplanningortheraidtoMcCain,
whodevisedatwo-daybombingoperationagainst
airdeensetargetsinNorthVietnamsoutho18
degrees,15minutesnorth.Testrikesoccurredon
21November.Onehourbeoretheattackbegan,the
UnitedStateslaunchedoneothemostdaringraids
initsmilitaryhistoryagainstSonayprison.Te
attackbeganwithadiversionaryeintbyA-6sying
inlowormationtowardsHaiphongtosimulatea
B-52raid.AirForceRF-4sdroppedaresoverHanoi,
andNavyandAirForcetacticalaircratsuppressed
enemyairdeenseswithShrikemissiles.According
tohistorianEarlilord,thesediversionarymoves
terriedtheNorthVietnameseradarcontrollers.
Oneevenannouncedthatanatomicbombhadbeen
droppedonHanoi.
Followingthisairdiversion,aU.S.ArmyRanger
teamledbyColonelArthurBullSimonsmistakenlylandedataNorthVietnamesesapperschoollocated
aquartermileromtheprison.Fityrangersengaged
theenemyinareghtbeorerealizingthatthey
wereattackingthewrongacility.Leavingscoreso
Vietnamesedead,buttakingnocasualtiesthem-
selves,theRangersremountedtheirhelicoptersand
arrivedatSonayjustsixminuteslater.Inthemean-
time,anotherHH-53helicopterhadcrash-landed
intheprison.Rangersrombothaircratsearched
thecamporPOWsbutoundnone.wenty-threeminuteslatertheywerebackintheairheadedto
Tailand.TeonlyAmericancasualtywasanAir
Forceightmechanicwhobrokehisanklewhenthe
HH-53hewasridingmadeanevasivemaneuverto
avoidanAtollmissileredbyaMiG.TeVietnamese
alsodownedanF-105WildWeasel,butitscrewwas
successullyrescued.Whiletheraidailedtorescue
anyPOWs,itdidcauseconsiderabledamagetoNorth
Vietnamesedeensesanddemonstratedtheprowess
oAmericasspecialwararecommunity.Italso
compelledtheauthoritiestomoveallprisonersto
ahanduloprisonsintheHanoiarea,givingthese
menmorecontactwithellowAmericansandboost-
ingmorale.
Tepressreportedtheraidasarenewedbombing
campaignagainstNorthVietnamandnotasarescue.
Weareconductinglimitedprotectionreactionair
strikesagainstmissileandantiaircratacilitiesin
NorthVietnamsouthothe19thparallel,Secretary
oDeenseLairdannouncedon21Novemberatrue
statementthatobscuredthemoresignicantactions
takingplaceoutsideoHanoi.TeFreedomBait
protectivereactionstrikestowhichhewasreerring
lastedonlysixhoursandcausedminimaldamage.A
totalo210Americanaircratparticipatedinthese
strikes,includingnavalairpowerromHancockand
Ranger,butpoorweathercausedbyatyphooncom-
pelledtheNavyandAirForcetorelyheavilyonradar
andLORAN(long-rangeradionavigation)bombing
duringtheraid,reducingtheaccuracyotheirbomb
deliveries.
Nevertheless,FreedomBait,alongwithSonay,
didrevealAmericasresolvetostrikeNorthVietnam
inecessary.Moreover,theexpectedhueandcry
romCongressoverFreedomBaitnevermaterial-ized,leadingAdmiralMoorertoconcludethat
therewaslittlepoliticalrisktoexpandingbombing
authoritiesintosouthernNorthVietnam.Iseeno
politicalrisksintheseauthorities,hesaid,which
arenotoutweighedbythecontinuingthreattoour
currentinterdictionandreconnaissanceoperations.
SecretaryLairddisagreedanddidnotapprove
Moorerssubsequentrequestorstandingauthority
tolaunchpreemptiveattackswithin19milesothe
DMZortheLaotianborder.LairdwantedtoavoidactionsthatmightendangerthePresidentspeace
initiativesorleadtomoreseriousviolationsothe
1968bombinghaltunderstandings.
During1971,AmericantrooplevelsinSouth
Vietnamdroppedrom335,794to158,119.Asthe
MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV)
historyputit,airpowerin1971literallytookupthe
continued on page 30
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Admiral Moorer listens intently to a brieng at the U.S.
Navy River Patrol Force headquarters at Binh Thuy,
South Vietnam, 23 September 1969. Moorer served
as Chie o Naval Operations rom 1967 to 1970 and
Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta rom 1970 to 1974.
THOMAS MOORER STANDS OUT as one o the ew
senior American military leaders who ought hard
with the political establishment over the conduct
o the Vietnam War. As Chairman o the JointChies o Sta rom July 1970 to July 1974, Moorer
constantly pushed or the authority to strike targets
in the Hanoi area with air power and mine Haiphong
harbor. President Nixon nally agreed to Moorers
proposals in the spring o 1972, and the war ended
eight months later on terms acceptable to the United
States. A hardliner and reactionary to some critics o
the war, Moorer is seen as patriot and a hero by many
veteranssomeone who, in the words o Deense
Secretary James Schlesinger, always put his coun-
trys interest beore anything else.
Born in Mount Willing, Alabama, in 1912, Moorer
graduated rom the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933,
completed aviator training in 1936, and then few a
variety o aircrat, including ghters, bombers, and
patrol planes. He also served on the carriers Langley
(AV 3), Lexington (CV 16), and Enterprise (CVAN 65).
Early in World War II, Japanese ghters attacked
his PBY-5 patrol plane during a reconnaissance
mission in the Southwest Pacic. Although wounded
in the thigh, Moorer landed his aircrat in the water
and got his crew o seven saely into a lie rat. A
Philippine merchant ship soon picked up the group
but was attacked by Japanese aircrat that same day.One o Moorers crew died in that attack, but Moorer
and the other survivors and many o the ships crew
managed to escape rom the vessel in a lieboat and
row to a nearby island. For his gallantry that day, the
Navy awarded Moorer a Purple Heart and a Silver
Star. He later received a Distinguished Flying Cross
or fying supplies into and evacuating wounded rom
Timor Island in October 1942.
Ater the war, Commander Moorer continued to
serve in both aviation and sta assignments and was
promoted to rear admiral in 1957. As a junior fag
ocer, Moorer worked as a strategic planner or theChie o Naval Operations. He commanded Carrier
Division 6 or 17 months in 1959 and 1960. In 1962,
Moorer received his third star and assumed command
o the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Two years later, the Navy
promoted him to ull admiral and appointed him
Commander in Chie, U.S. Pacic Fleet. In that posi-
tion, he commanded U.S. Navy orces in the Pacic
during the August 1964 Gul o Tonkin incident and
subsequent retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam.
Moorer took command o the Atlantic Fleet the ollow-
ing year, thus becoming the only ocer in the Navys
history to lead both feets.Vietnam once again became a major ocus or
Moorer when President Johnson appointed him Chie
o Naval Operations in June 1967. Privately, Moorer
opposed the land war in Vietnam or the simple
reason that we cannot aord to trade a high school
graduate or a North Vietnamese peasant. Once
committed to the endeavor, however, he argued that
the United States should ocus its eorts on the
source o Communist aggression in the region: North
Vietnam. Moorer advocated bombing Hanoi, the
enemys center o gravity, and mining North Vietnams
most important port acility, Haiphong. Moorerrejected the idea o limited war, instead avoring a
decisive application o orce and, with it, the possibil-
ity o compelling North Vietnam to end its aggression
in South Vietnam.
His arguments ell upon dea ears in the White
House, and over time, rustration set in. President
Johnsons bombing halt ollowing the 1968 Communist
Tet Oensive and then his ailure to retaliate against
AdmiralTomasHinmanMoorer
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North Korea ollowing the seizure o the intelligence-
gathering ship Pueblo (AGER 2) greatly concerned
Admiral Moorer, who was araid that America was
losing global credibility. He also worried about theNavys aging ships and inrastructure. In January
1969, he testied to Congress that 58 percent o the
feet was at least 20 years old, while only 1 percent
o Soviet navy ships were the same age. Finally, he
deeply disagreed with Secretary o Deense Robert
McNamaras habit o meddling in the selection and
assignment o fag ocers, which, Moorer argued, was
the purview o the Chie o Naval Operations.
On 2 July 1970, President Nixon appointed Admiral
Moorer as the seventh Chairman o the Joint Chies
o Sta. Moorer perceived Nixon as a kindred spirit,
someone willing to make hard choices and takesignicant risks to extricate America rom Vietnam.
Other members o the administration, however, oten
blocked his eorts to liberalize the rules o engage-
ment and resume the bombing campaign against North
Vietnam. In an attempt to counter these opponents
and gain an upper hand with the new President,
Moorer encouraged Charles Radord, a young yeoman
working or the National Security Council, to make
copies o pertinent White House policy documents or
him. When President Nixon ound out about Radords
spying in December 1971, he sent Attorney General
John Mitchell over to the Pentagon to let Moorer know
that we had the goods on him. Nixon, however,
retained Moorer as chairman because he valued him
as a ellow hardliner and a vital counterweight against
administration doves, especially Secretary o Deense
Melvin Laird.
The Communist Easter Oensive o 1972 nallygave Nixon the justication he needed to relax
bombing restrictions and turn up the heat against
North Vietnam. One o the rst moves he made
was to order the mining o Haiphong harbor, an
idea that Moorer and others in the Navy had been
advocating since the early 1960s. He also initiated
the Linebacker bombing raids against North Vietnam.
Both operations helped convince Hanoi to agree to a
peace settlement acceptable to the United States.
In addition to helping settle the Vietnam confict,
Moorer oversaw the transition o the U.S. armed
services rom a conscript-based military to an all-volunteer orce. He also managed deep cuts in the
deense budget. While he did not always prevail in
Washingtons bureaucratic battles, Moorer managed
the services with great strength and condence
during a deeply divided period in the nations history.
Appointed to a second term as JCS Chairman by
President Nixon, Admiral Moorer retired in July 1974.
He died on 5 February 2004.
Admiral Moorer examines a .50-caliber machine gun
at Binh Thuy, August 1969.
NHCLFile
Admiral Moorer and President Nixon
observe fight operations onSaratoga
(CVA 60), 17 May 1969. The two men
developed a close rapport because o their
similar views on American oreign policy,
especially as it related to North Vietnam.
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30
slackinUSoensivepower.Consequently,CINPAC
andtheJointChiesoStawereevenmorecon-
cernedaboutNorthVietnameseairdeensesnearthe
inltrationroutesintoLaosandSouthVietnam.Te
SecretaryoDeense,however,continuedtostrictly
limittheprotectivereactioneortagainstthese
targets.InJanuary,AdmiralMoorer,inanassessment
tothesecretary,statedthatenemySAMsitesin
NorthVietnamhadorcedtheU.S.todivertsigni-
cantnumbersoghteraircratromtheinterdic-
tioneorttoprotectB-52soperatinginLaosnear
theborderoNorthVietnam.Lairdnallyrelenteda
bitandallowedMoorertoexecuteextensivestrikes
againstSAMsitesinNorthVietnamon20,21,and28
February.Sixty-sevensortiesdestroyedthreemissiles
andavarietyotransportersandlaunchersinan
operationcalledLouisvilleSlugger.
However,hedidnotgiveMoorercarteblanche
authoritytostriketheNorthVietnameseanytime
hepleased.Arguingthatlimited,singlestrikereac-
tionsgavetheenemyadistinctadvantage,Moorer
persistedinpressingorcontinuousauthorities,
butLairdheldhisground,statingthatsuchauthor-
itywouldbeinappropriateoratleastpremature.
Hedidauthorizeanotherlargesingle-strikeeort
againstairdeensesintheNorthVietnamesepan-
handlecalledFractureCrossAlpha.Teoperation
destroyedeightSAMsandavarietyobuildingsand
otherinrastructure.
InadditiontoSAMs,MiGactivityincreasedin
southernNorthVietnamduring1971.InNovember,
reconnaissancerevealedmoreMiGdeploymentsto
severalaireldsinlowerNorthVietnam.Tisthreat
spurredMoorertorequestanattackagainstour
NorthVietnameseairbasesbelowthe20thparallel.
TelossotwoAirForceplanestoSAMsinearly
Decemberlenturgencytohispleasandpersuaded
LairdtoorderProudDeepAlpha,thelargeststrike
CarrierHancock(CVA19)intheGuloonkin,10April1971.
N H C L F i l e
AHancockSailortakesashortbreak
whileawaitingthereturnotheshipsaircrat,April1967.Whileonpatrol,crewmenotenworkedeighthourson,eighthourso,anddeploymentscouldlastsixmonthsorlonger.
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againstNorthVietnamsincethebombinghalt.
Over200AirForceandNavyplanesstrucktargets
ascloseas75milesromHanoi.Poorweatherover
thetargetarea,however,compelledtheNavytorely
onradar-equippedA-6AsystemsbackedbyA-7E
pathnderstodeliverordnance,whiletheAirForce
reliedonLORANbombing.Neithermethodologyproducedgoodresults.Basedonbombdamage
assessmentphotography,theAirForceestimated
thatonly25percentothebombsdroppedhitany-
whereneartheirtargets.TeNavyalsolostseveral
aircrat.InanattackonVinh,enemySAMsdowned
anA-6AromConstellation andanF-4BromCoral
Sea(CVA43).ASARhelorescuedthebombardier
navigatorotheA-6,buttheremainingcrewmen
werekilledorcaptured.
Inadditiontoemployingaviationassets,theNavyoccasionallyusedsuraceshipsagainsttheNorth
VietnameseMiGsandSAMsites.Guidedmissile
destroyersandcruiserspossessedexcellenttracking
radarsandtypicallycarriedtwotypesosurace-
to-airmissileseectiveagainstMiGghters:the
errierandthealos.TeerrierwastheNavysrst
operationalmedium-range,surace-to-airmissile.
Firstdeployedin1956,this27-oot-longmissilehad
arangeo19.8milesandwasguidedbyship-based
radar.Te31-oot-longalosmissilewasalonger
range,radar-guidedmissilethatcouldhittargetsas
aras65milesromaship.On11January,Fox (DLG
33)redtwoerriermissilesataMiG-21heading
northnearVinh,butmissed.Tiswastherstsuchmissileringbyasuracecombatantsince1968,
whenaalosromLong Beach(CGN9)downeda
MiGatarangeo59miles.
HopingtogetNavysuracecombatantsmore
involvedintheairwar,AdmiralMoorerdeviseda
planthatinvolvedusingalos-anderrier-equipped
suraceshipsintheGuloonkintocreateaSAM
environmentinwhichtolureanddestroyhostile
MiGsastheyproceededbelow20degreesnorth.
AtersecuringpermissionromLaird,Moorerexe-cutedhisplanbetween29Januaryand5February.
TeNavyailedtobaganyMiGs,butitdid
intimidateNorthVietnameseradaroperators.On3
February,Chicago (CG11)redaalosatanenemy
groundradarsitenearTanhHoa,andOklahoma
City(CLG5)launchedasimilarattackatasitenear
Vinh.Follow
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