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Orval E. Faubus Interview – JFK#1, 6/29/1967
Administrative Information
Creator: Orval E. Faubus
Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman
Date of Interview: June 29, 1967
Place of Interview: Huntsville, Arkansas
Length: 36 pages, 2 addenda
Biographical Note
Orval E. Faubus was Governor of Arkansas from 1955 to 1967. This interview focuses on
his support for John F. Kennedy during the 1956 vice presidential campaign, the 1960
presidential campaign, Robert F. Kennedy’s visit to Osceola, and Faubus’ stance on the
civil rights actions, among other topics.
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Transcript of Oral History Interview
These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room
of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character
recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts.
Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have
occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any
concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the
transcripts and the interview recordings.
Suggested Citation
Orval E. Faubus, recorded interview by Larry H. Hackman, June 29, 1967, (page
number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.
ORVAL E. FAUBUS
Table of Content
Page Topic
1 1956 vice presidential campaign
10, 16 Support for 1960 Kennedy ticket
11, 34 John F. Kennedy’s visit to Texarkana
12, 33 Robert F. Kennedy’s speech at Osceola
17 Appointment of Lawrence Brooks Hays
18 Desegregation
26, 28 Personal views on civil rights
28 Greer’s Ferry dedication
31 Little Rock incident
33 Addenda “Bob Kennedy”
34 Addenda “An Occurrence Following John F. Kennedy’s Campaign
Appearance at Texarkana”
Oral History Interview1
with
ORVAL E. FAUBUS
June 29, 1967
Huntsville, Arkansas
By Larry J. Hackman
For the John F. Kennedy Library
HACKMAN: Governor Faubus [Orval E. Faubus], do you remember when you first
met John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?
FAUBUS: Yes, I’m sure the first time I met him was at the 1956 Democratic
Convention in Chicago. Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] was
nominated for president, and then decided to leave it to the convention
to pick his running mate. It had been traditional for the nominee for president to indicate his
choice for running mate, but in this instance Mr. Stevenson did not. So a wide open race
developed for the nomination for vice president. John F. Kennedy was one of the main
contenders. There were also Estes Kefauver [Carey Estes Kefauver], Hubert Humphrey
[Hubert H. Humphrey] and others. It happened that Arkansas was one of the states that led
the drive for Kennedy. We had two members of our delegation who were pretty strong for
Kefauver, but I don’t think the Kefauver supporters numbered over five or six in the entire
delegation and perhaps didn’t constitute more than two or three votes because many
delegates had a half vote. The convention had balloted the first time. Then Arkansas, which
was near the head of the roll call, started the parade for John F. Kennedy for the nomination
of vice president.
1 The interviewee later made revisions in the text.
At one point Kennedy was within thirty seconds or a minute of having the
nomination. Seated right in front of the Arkansas dele-
[-1-]
gation was the California delegation. The California delegation, I believe was for Kefauver. I
noticed Jim Farley [James A. Farley] come by and talk to some members of the delegation.
He had also visited us; we were very friendly with Jim Farley. When it looked like Kennedy
was going to get the nomination, state after state went for him, and his votes began to pile up
rapidly. At one point 50 percent, or perhaps 2/3 of the California delegates were on their feet
clamoring to go for Kennedy. I think the one man who kept John Kennedy from getting the
vice presidential nomination was James Roosevelt from California, who was with the
California delegation. He stood up and stopped the clamor for recognition within the
California delegation. He said, “Now, just hold on, don’t stampede, just stay quiet. Hold the
lines.” Roosevelt was holding the delegation for Kefauver. Then Tennessee voted and, of
course, went for Kefauver, although there’d been a split in the delegation as some of the
Tennessee delegates weren’t too happy with Kefauver.
HACKMAN: Right, I’ve heard that.
FAUBUS: We had information that even the Tennessee delegation might not go
for Kefauver. And if it didn’t, then, of course, the stampede would be
for Kennedy completely.
Governor Raymond Gary [Raymond Dancel Gary] of Oklahoma, head of that state’s
delegation, was a very good close personal friend of mine. I’d talked to him, tried to get him
to go with us for Kennedy. He had led the fight for Harriman [William Averell Harriman].
He had gotten discontented with the Stevenson people because they’d accepted a national
committeeman from his state that was contrary with him. The reason the Oklahoma
delegation didn’t go with us for Kennedy was because Gary felt that it’d be much easier to
carry Oklahoma for a man with a farm background, rather than Kennedy, because we’d
already nominated Stevenson, who, although from a farm state, had no farm background. He
was a professional and businessman from Chicago. So after considering it, Gary took his
delegation for Humphrey and Kefauver, I’ve forgotten which. When Tennessee went for
Kefauver and Oklahoma didn’t go with us for Kennedy, then Kefauver got the nomination by
a small margin.
HACKMAN: Right.
FAUBUS: But if James Roosevelt hadn’t held his delegation at that momentary
time when it looked like a majority were clamoring to go for
Kennedy—and not just his delegation, but others—then Kennedy
would have swept it. But when Roosevelt held the California delegation and then Tennessee
and Oklahoma went against Kennedy, it settled down to a tight race and Kefauver came out
with the victory.
[-2-]
Following this, when both nominees had been chosen, and Harriman and others came
on the stage with Stevenson—if you recall the pictures and the television coverage of the
Convention—they were all up there holding up their hands in a gesture of unity, and here
stood young Kennedy quietly in the aisle just back of the Arkansas delegation. So some of us
went out and said, “Go on up, you belong there, too. You’re entitled to the limelight.” We
urged him down the aisle toward the stage and he shortly appeared on the platform. He was
the last to join the group on the stage in the unity move when the battle was over.
That was my first association with John F. Kennedy. It was very pleasant, and, of
course, we were very friendly toward him. Arkansas, being from this particular section of the
country and being near the head of the roll call, contributed, I think, a great deal to John
Kennedy’s near victory in the contest for the vice presidential nomination in 1956.
HACKMAN: Well, I remember, I think Arkansas, in the first ballot had gone for
Gore [Albert Arnold Gore, Sr.].
FAUBUS: Yes.
HACKMAN: And Senator Fulbright [James W. Fulbright] at that time had
nominated, or had been asked to nominate Humphrey. I’m not sure if
he nominated.
FAUBUS: I believe he did.
HACKMAN: But, do you recall then how it came about that the Arkansas delegation
went for Kennedy on the second ballot? Had you talked with anyone
from the Kennedy people, or who had been influential in this decision?
FAUBUS: No, no one had talked to them. We just decided that’s the way we
wanted to go. Because Fulbright, without any disrespect to him, had no
influence with the Arkansas delegation. Peculiarly the Arkansas
Delegation was made up of a cross section of the state. We had some very liberal labor
leaders, Odell Smith of the Teamsters, Henry Woods who was one of their attorneys, who
was the executive secretary of McMath [Sidney Sanders McMath], in the administration in
which I had worked. We had Bob Young [Robert A. Young, III] who was head of one of the
biggest truck lines in Arkansas. We had people from eastern Arkansas, like Mayor Ben
Butler [Benjamin F. Butler] of Osceola; Harold Ohlendorf [Harold F. Ohlendorf], who is
now president of the Farm Bureau. We had people like Arthur Carter, county judge of Carroll
County; J. E. Dunlap, Jr., who is the
[-3-]
editor of a paper at Harrison; a complete cross section, and no one element dominated the
Arkansas delegation. In the beginning they were split between Harriman, Symington [W.
Stuart Symington, II], and Stevenson for the presidency with three delegates, I believe being
for Kefauver for the presidential nomination. No one, I’m sure, I know I didn’t, had talked to
any of the Kennedy People. We just decided that Kennedy was the best candidate for us and
the one with whom to win in the coming presidential race.
HACKMAN: I was wondering if Senator McClellan [John L. McClellan] or
Congressman Oren Harris had been at all for Kennedy or against
Kennedy, do you recall what their feelings were at that time? Or did
they have any more influence than Fulbright had really?
FAUBUS: Well, I’m sure that either one of them might have had more influence
with the delegation than Senator Fulbright. I don’t recall that we ever
consulted Senator McClellan on this particular matter, but he had been
very closely associated with the Kennedy family through his work on this Committee in
Washington where Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] had been Chief Counsel. I know
that when Senator McClellan’s son was killed in a plane accident in Arkansas that Bobby
Kennedy came with him to Arkansas to attend the funeral. We knew there was a close
relationship there. All this was very hectic. There was no time, we had no communications. It
was the biggest mass of confusion that I’ve ever seen, even worse than a campaign
headquarters. So just among ourselves in consultation we just decided Kennedy’s the man we
wanted to go for and we went.
HACKMAN: I was wondering, I think the Arkansas delegation was sitting close to
the Massachusetts delegation at that point, I wondered if any
friendships had developed during the convention.
FAUBUS: No, not particularly. We saw John McCormack [John William
McCormack]. I knew him pretty well. I’m not sure that he would have
known me at that time; he might have. I remember noticing
McCormack and one of the Kennedys—and I’ve forgotten now whether it was Bobby or the
president—in very close and animated conversation. We understood there was some
difficulty between McCormack and one of the Kennedys and Mr. Kennedy, whichever one it
was, stood quietly and spoke occasionally. But Mr. McCormack being for Mr. Kennedy for
the vice presidential
[-4-]
nomination. Now, this was just our haze understanding we knew nothing definite.
HACKMAN: As far as McCormack’s role, there’s always been some discussion
about the roll call when the Kennedy tide was on the way up and then
all of a sudden the Kefauver tide broke and turned in the opposite
direction; about the recognition of various states by Rayburn [Samuel Taliaferro Rayburn],
who was the chairman at that time. Do you recall anything at all about recognition of states
who were attempting to gain….
FAUBUS: No, I don’t, but it seems to me that the recognition of states happened
to be those that were more or less favorable to Kefauver. But we knew
nothing about whether this was deliberate or just by change in the
confusion. But I know that the California delegates, there must have been at least 2/3 of them
on their feet, were clamoring for recognition. They wanted to change their vote and go for
Kennedy before the end of the roll call. If California had ever gotten recognition, and had
changed its vote to Kennedy, it would have been a runaway. But James Roosevelt stopped
that. I was sitting just behind him to the right and was, in other words, a ringside spectator to
this interplay within the California delegation. When he stood and spoke, most of them
quieted and many sat down. There were a lot of labor people in the California delegation and
Roosevelt had a great deal of influence with them. He might have been the controlling factor
in the delegation, I don’t know, but he exercised some influence there that was quite decisive.
If he had been willing, and asked for recognitions, he might have gotten it, I don’t know. It is
my strong conviction that if California had gotten recognition they would have changed their
vote to Kennedy, and if they had polled the delegation they would have voted for Kennedy
unless Roosevelt had enough influence to stop them.
HACKMAN: Well, as far as the Arkansas delegation went, do you recall if its
reaction toward Kennedy was more a personality thing, in other words,
that he would run strong? Because I would think that he had been
identified as supporting Benson’s [Ezra Taft Benson] farm policies in some cases and also
the religious problem might have presented some problem for Arkansas people, or were these
issues really considered, do you recall?
FAUBUS: Well there was no time for calm deliberation at the moment. We
considered them; these things were in our minds, of course. Tom
Harper [Thomas Harper], who is now national committeeman from
Arkansas, was a member of the delegation, an
[-5-]
attorney from Forth Smith. I remember discussing this briefly with him. We didn’t think the
religious question would be any serious handicap as far as the vice presidency was
concerned. For the presidency it was a different thing, and we recognized that. We wanted
someone who had some appeal to the voters. Now, the Kennedys at that time were sort of
known to us as middle-of-the-road people, they were not extreme liberals, nor extreme
conservatives. Kefauver had quite a bit of disfavor in the state because he’s from the South
and many southerners felt that he had been too liberal on some of the issues which vitally
affected the region. So the delegation was not for Kefauver, We accepted him with good
grace once he was nominated, but we also felt he was a weak candidate. It turned out to be
the case Kefauver didn’t even carry his own state for the Democratic ticket whereas we
carried Arkansas for Stevenson and Kefauver, in spite of our feeling that they were two if the
weakest candidates that could be nominated so far as Arkansas was concerned. We felt that
Kennedy was the best candidate to get votes and that he was not an extremist.
HACKMAN: I see. Well, then moving on from the Convention, did you have any
other connection with Senator Kennedy or the people around him, let’s
say, from ’56 to ’59 or early ’60, before the campaign really got
going?
FAUBUS: Not that I recall.
HACKMAN: Do you recall if you followed his career at all closely and what your
attitude would have been in those periods?
FAUBUS: Well, I follow everyone’s career pretty closely in public life in
America, and we knew of the developments as they came about. And
when the ’60 convention came I was in the midst of a campaign and
didn’t attend. Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] from a neighboring state was a
candidate for the presidency. The Arkansas delegation went to the convention in California
officially uninstructed, but unofficially instructed by me, or asked by me, or requested by me,
to support Lyndon Johnson all the way, which they did. I was in the midst of a campaign and
what the Arkansas delegation did at the convention would have some effect on political
fortunes at home. Our primary was not over, and I was a candidate for renomination in the
primary. In ’56 the primaries were over and we could go to the convention and be more free
to decide on the candidates that we thought were the best candidates to win. In 1960 we had
to be mindful of the effect of the action of the Arkansas delegation on our own races here in
the state, mine and others.
[-6-]
HACKMAN: Well, in this period, let’s say, between ’56 and ’60, do you recall when
you attended the National Governors’ Conferences in those years, was
anybody particularly active at this level for Kennedy in relation to you,
do you remember?
FAUBUS: No, I don’t recall that they were, I saw Senator Kennedy only once, I
believe, during that period. The friendly relationship that developed
from the ’56 convention was carried over. Mr. Tom Harper and others
in the Arkansas Bar Association invited Senator Kennedy to speak to the Association annual
meeting at Hot Springs. At that time I was in St. Joseph’s Hospital in Hot Springs, which,
incidentally, was a Catholic facility, recovering from minor surgery. Senator Kennedy,
accompanied by Mr. Harper, came to my room to visit me after speaking at the Bar
Association meeting. This is the only time that I met him personally, that I recall, until after
he was nominated for president in 1960.
HACKMAN: What were your feelings toward Senator Johnson at that time, in ’60?
Was your, or was that support of the Arkansas delegations for him
strictly from the standpoint of the situation in the state? Or how serious
had his efforts been in the state, in contact with you?
FAUBUS: I had no more personal contact with President Johnson than I had with
Senator Kennedy at the time, very few personal contacts with either.
The support of Johnson in the convention of ’60, I’d say was based 75
to 90 percent on the political facts of life rather than any personal inclinations.
HACKMAN: Had any Kennedy people been working in the state before the
convention in ’60, or had they been in contact with you as far as trying
to get your support for him?
FAUBUS: They had been in contact with members of the delegations. I don’t
remember any contact with me. But, of course, there again, there
wasn’t much time. I was in the midst of a campaign for renomination
and any contacts I would have had with them would have been quietly through
intermediaries. There were none.
HACKMAN: Did you ever discuss the question of the nomination with McClellan,
Senators McClellan or Fulbright, or any of these people in the
delegation…
[-7-]
FAUBUS: I don’t recall that I did. I had discussed the presidential nomination for
1956 with both Senator Fulbright and Senator McClellan, each one
individually. But there was no discussion with either in 1960.
HACKMAN: I don’t know whether you’d want to talk about that. As far as not
going to the convention in ’60, was this completely dependent on your
involvement in the campaign in Arkansas? I know there were some
comments that the demonstrations of the Faubus for President group out at Los Angeles had
something to do with it.
FAUBUS: No, it really didn’t. I know there’s a lot of speculation on that, but I
think it’s safe to say that it did not. Sometimes maybe these things
influence you unconsciously to some degree, but I don’t recall that I
was conscious of any feeling about that particular matter. If I had been with the delegation it
would have assumed the same attitude which it did—to support Lyndon Johnson for the
presidency. The Faubus for President demonstration at the convention was as surprising to
me as to the others.
HACKMAN: Had other people in the South approached you to go to the convention
and sort of lead the South as an area at the convention in relation to the
platform and the candidate?
FAUBUS: Yes, I was approached a number of times, but any time it was
mentioned to me I told them that I had a race of my own and that I
would have to give my undivided attention to that and so, invariably, it
was pursued no farther. So, there was no lengthy discussion of the matter.
HACKMAN: What about the National State’s Rights party that nominated you for
the presidency at that point. What was your opinion of this group? And
what, if any, contacts if you have with them?
FAUBUS: I don’t recall that I ever met any of those people except one lady from
Arkansas who attended the convention. I disavowed the nomination as
soon as the work reached me. And the fact of the matter is, which
would come later on in
[-8-]
this, I talked to Bobby Kennedy personally about the situation in Florida where my name had
been placed on the ballot by petition. This was after I had already been nominated for
governor in Arkansas, which was tantamount in reelection. I told Bobby I would leave my
name on the ballot in Florida or take it off, whichever he said. I said, “You make the decision
and tell me what you want me to do.” He called back later and said maybe it would be better
for them if I took my name off the ballot in Florida. President Kennedy later told me in a
joking way that they were afraid that I would carry the state, but I think he was only
flattering me.
HACKMAN: Getting back to the convention when you were talking about Bobby
Kennedy, I had heard somewhere that at one point he had told the
Arkansas delegation, or virtually told them to stick with Johnson, in a
way saying that they didn’t really want the Arkansas vote. Do you think that was ever the
case?
FAUBUS: If so, I never did know of it.
HACKMAN: I know, I think…
FAUBUS: They contacted the delegation in California in an attitude of wanting
their support. But they were told by the leaders of the delegation,
which I believe, Tom Harper was chairman of the delegation, that their
decision had already been made and there just wasn’t anything they could do about it. They
had to stick with Johnson and they were going to stick with him all the way, which they did.
HACKMAN: And I know at one point, I think, maybe in a slip up Senator Kennedy
had said, well, he didn’t think he needed the South to win the
nomination and to carry the country. I think it sort of angered some of
the people at that point.
FAUBUS: Well, most people are a little sensitive about their influence or whether
they’re wanted or needed.
HACKMAN: After the convention then, as far as the presidential campaign, you
came out, I believe, in September, and said that you would support the
Democratic ticket. Do you recall how that decision came about, was
this basically dependent on the primaries being over, or…
FAUBUS: The primaries were over. I was the nominee of the
[-9-]
Party and had been the nominee of the party in the past, both here in
this county [Madison] and on the state level. So I announced that I
would support the Democratic ticket.
HACKMAN: Did the Kennedy people ever approach you in this period and discuss
what administration policies would possibly be if they were elected in
an effort to get your support during the campaign? Or were you ever
approached at all by them?
FAUBUS: Not personally. I was in close touch with their people in Arkansas. In
fact, they sent a man to Arkansas who stayed in the Democratic
headquarters in Little Rock all the time. I don’t recall his name. The
man who is now a federal judge, Judge Pat Mehaffy, was our main contact with the Kennedy
people. He made trips to Washington, to the headquarters to Arkansas contacted him.
Mehaffy kept me fully informed.
HACKMAN: Was there every any effort to set up a Kennedy organization outside
the regular Democratic organization in the state, or did they try to
work completely through…
FAUBUS: They worked through the Democratic organization. So far as I recall
there was no effort to set up anything outside of the Democratic
organization.
HACKMAN: Johnson, at that time the vice presidential nominee, called at one time,
I think, a unity conference to get people in the South together at
Nashville after the convention. Did you attend that, do you recall?
FAUBUS: No. I don’t recall if we had a representative, we might have, but I
don’t recall. We felt that the best way for us was to go ahead and do
what we could for the Democratic ticket in Arkansas, without being
aligned with groups which were constructed to be by some as trying to organize certain
groups in the South regardless of the feelings of other and people generally.
HACKMAN: Did the Kennedy people ever make any effort to organize the Negro
vote in Arkansas outside the Democratic organization, do you recall, to
work with any of the Negro leaders?
FAUBUS: Yes, they did, but not outside the Democratic organization. It was
using someone who was in our Democratic staff.
[-10-]
HACKMAN: Some of the Negro people who supported you, then they would
work…
FAUBUS: Yes, and many of the white leaders, political leaders, also.
HACKMAN: Do you have any recollection of Kennedy’s trip to Texarkana in
September of 1960? Can you remember discussing that?
FAUBUS: Yes, I went down and joined them. We met them at the airport. We
had a parade through the city. The district fair at Texarkana was under
way at the time and there was a tremendous crowd of people in the
city, one of the largest I’ve ever seen there. The streets were full. I remember there were
hundreds and hundreds of young people. They had come to the fair and not so much to the
political rally. But here was a national figure and they were all interested in seeing him and
he got a very fine reception. I appeared with him on the platform along with Senator
Fulbright, Senator McClellan, I believe, and some of the political leaders from Texas.
HACKMAN: I know usually when he came in to speak in the state he would always
identify more closely, it seemed, with the congressional delegation
than he would with you. Did you ever discuss that with him or…
FAUBUS: No. No. I never discussed that matter with him. But this is only
natural. A president is going to have to work with the congressional
delegation and they knew that I wasn’t doing anything to hurt them.
They knew also that the whole state Democratic organization, which was my organization,
no question about that, was working with them. So there was really no need for them to use
persuasion with me. Sometimes the influence of a political leader is greatly overestimated. I
think this is especially true in Arkansas. The people have never very much been told by any
political leader for whom to vote in a presidential race, or any other. I discussed this at some
length with Bobby Kennedy, when he was invited, with my knowledge and consent, to come
to Osceola.
HACKMAN: When was this?
FAUBUS: This was later in the campaign, after Senator Kennedy, the presidential
nominee, had appeared at Texarkana. I went to Osceola and appeared
on the platform with Bobby Kennedy and the political leaders of that
area. With my
[-11-]
knowledge the situation was discussed, and Bobby was told that if he stayed away from
certain subjects and stressed others, that would help a great deal. Following this advice, his
speech was built mainly around the work of the committees which were investigating the
corruption in government and the racketeers. He stressed those matters, which had
considerable favor in this state.
However, they didn’t carry that county, Mississippi County. It voted Republican in
that election in the race for president. I had always been strong in Mississippi County; I’d
carried it overwhelmingly. In this instance, the political strength of one man could not be
transferred to another. This has always been peculiarly true in Arkansas. There have never
been slates in this state. Our candidates, as governors, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
attorney general, etc., each runs independently. Whereas, in Louisiana you have the Morrison
[James H. Morrison] slate, the Long [Russell B. Long] slate, McKeithen [John J. McKeithen]
slate, whoever the political leaders are. But in this state each person always runs
independently because our races have been in the primaries, as they have been in Louisiana,
or course, also.
I explained this to Bobby Kennedy, but he said to me, he didn’t infer it, he said it
directly, “Well, we know that whatever is done in the state, however it goes, is up to you.” I
replied, “I would certainly, in all sincerity and honestly, like to disabuse you of that idea. I’m
for you. I’ve endorsed you publicly. I appeared with the presidential nominee at Texarkana.
I’ve come up here to appear with you, in an area where the Kennedys are not popular. So I’m
doing all that I can, but don’t be under the misapprehension that I can carry the state for you
or take it away from you.” He didn’t seem to believe me.
I understand in some of the states in the Northeast a political leader has such strength
that he can take a state one way or the other, depending upon his choice. But that wasn’t true
in Arkansas at that time, and it isn’t true now. I think that my endorsement of the Democratic
ticket and my open support, without being too active, was as much as I could do. It would
have been dangerous for me to be too active. I wouldn’t have gotten any more votes for the
presidential nominee than were gotten anyhow and I would have jeopardized my own
fortunes severely. I was as much help to them as I could have been, because the people who
were my leaders, like Ben Butler [Benjamin F. Butler] and Ohlendorf [Harold F. Ohlendorf]
in eastern Arkansas, other political leaders, because I endorsed Kennedy and went along,
they also went. But this still doesn’t have a great deal of effect on the rank and file. That’s
the reason Bobby Kennedy was carefully instructed to avoid certain
[-12-]
subjects as much as possible and stress others that had favor in the state. I don’t know how
much effect Bobby’s appearance had in Arkansas but we did invite him to come; we were
courteous and helpful as we could be during his visit. From Osceola Bobby flew to Chicago
with Senator McClellan. At that time Senator McClellan had never endorsed the Kennedy
candidacy. The fact of the matter is we had some difficulty in getting Senator McClellan to
be at Osceola to introduce Bobby Kennedy. But after he had agreed to introduce Bobby and
appeared with us, and then had flown with Bobby from there to Chicago, this more or less,
well, had a tendency to cement relations with the Kennedys. Up to that time I was the leading
political figure in Arkansas who had endorsed the Democratic ticket. My endorsement was
not so much a personal thing or an espousal of the Kennedy philosophy of government, but
as the Democratic nominee for governor of the state, I announced I would support all of the
Democratic nominees, which included the candidates for president and vice president.
HACKMAN: What effect did the Johnson nominee as vice president have in
Arkansas? Did this help measurably?
FAUBUS: Not very much. The election was so close in Arkansas in that
particular race that any one of a number of things may have made the
difference. I don’t think there’s any question without my endorsement
at that time Kennedy would have lost the state. I think my endorsement,—this sounds self-
serving, but I’m trying to evaluate objectively and as honestly as I can,—perhaps had the
biggest influence on the way the state went. But still, that might not have been enough, it was
so close. The endorsement of Senator McClellan, or having Johnson on the ticket as vice
president, could have made the difference. Perhaps Bobby’s appearance at Osceola could
have made the difference stressing the subjects which he did, in his speech. Because of the
closeness of the election in Arkansas, Johnson as a running mate may have been decisive, but
that circumstance had minimal influence on the state as a whole.
HACKMAN: Was civil rights the overriding issue of importance in Arkansas in that
election? Or how much influence did other things, religion and
agriculture, maybe other things have?
FAUBUS: Religion had an appreciable effect. But not nearly as much as the civil
rights issue. Without the civil rights issue Kennedy would have swept
the state over-
[-13-]
whelmingly, in spite of, or regardless of, the religious angle. But all of this made a
difference. Yes, he lost many votes in some church groups, many of which carried on an
organized effort in opposition to his candidacy. Some people who had been life long
Democrats voted Republican in that particular race. The civil rights issue was the overriding
question.
HACKMAN: Were any of these religious groups in contact with you in an effort to
prevent you from endorsing the ticket at all?
FAUBUS: Yes, yes, some of them were quite unhappy with me. There was no
open organized effort directed towards me, but I was contacted by
leaders in various sections.
HACKMAN: In the campaign, in September, I believe, there was a Southern
Governors’ Conference here at Hot Springs that year. Price Daniel
[Marion Price Daniel] who was Governor of Texas was elected the
chairman, and some people interpreted that as an attempt to get the ticket behind Johnson and
Kennedy. Do you recall your role in this or if this was the purpose here?
FAUBUS: No, I’ve forgotten that the conference was in Arkansas that year, but I
guess that’s right. Price Daniel, who was the governor of Texas and
known—or thought—to be very close to the vice presidential nominee,
was nominated and elected as chairman. I had nothing whatsoever to do with it. I didn’t play
any role. Usually politicking for the chairmanship is held to a minimum in the southern
conference. Something was made of the fact that I was the senior governor at the time and
was passed over. However, I was elected vice chairman at the time. I never actively sought a
position of this kind, and it’s only seldom that anyone does in the conference. I think
Daniel’s election was overly emphasized as having a significance that wasn’t there. It had
some significance, perhaps, for the national publicity. I had no objection because I thought a
lot of Price Daniel. I think he’s one of the finest and one of the most able politicians and
public figures that I have known in the nation. The fact of the matter is we could have carried
the state for Daniel much easier than for the senator from Texas.
HACKMAN: Was this feeling demonstrated on the part of other governors from the
South, do you think, this feeling that Johnson was not helping the
ticket that much, or do you recall any expressions of that attitude?
FAUBUS: Well, many of the governors were talking about it as were many other
southerners.
[-14-]
HACKMAN: You mean, about why he got on the ticket in the first place?
FAUBUS: No. As to how much he was helping. I think, looking back, that
Kennedy’s selection of Johnson, perhaps, resulted in his election
where he would have lost. Because he had a difficult time in carrying
Texas, as you know, which is a big state, as well as some of the others. I think there would
have been a consensus among the governors that the nomination of Johnson certainly helped
in the South, but that it was not nearly as much help, that it had not nearly as much weight as
was given it in the national press and among national political figures.
HACKMAN: Do you recall, Ross Barnett [Ross R. Barnett] of Mississippi at that
time was making some effort to use unpledged electors in some of the
southern states. Do you recall him making any effort at the governors’
conference in relation to that? Or anything…
FAUBUS: No, for the most part these things were left out of the conference. This
has been especially true in the southern conference. We’ve regarded
the conference as working sessions, or where we could have some
fellowship and get acquainted, which was quite a pleasure to the political figures, their
families and members of their delegations. We felt the work that was done, which was
beneficial to all of us, was more important than the political angles. The states of the South
are quite independent. Arkansas is not going any certain way because Louisiana does, or
Mississippi, or Alabama, or Florida, and neither is any other state going to do this. Each is a
sort of political entity of its own, depending upon the regional tides, and local issues within
the state, as well as the personalities and influences of the political leaders.
If you will recall, unpledged electors were on the ballot in Arkansas. Those of us who
supported Kennedy figures that this was a help. Those who supported Nixon [Richard M.
Nixon], especially some of the religious groups, made a terrific effort. They started telephone
campaigns, urging, “Don’t vote for these unpledged electors. This is going to cause us to lose
the state to Kennedy and Johnson.” Very likely, if the unpledged electors hadn’t been on the
ballot, Nixon might have carried the state. He would have had a better opportunity because
he could have pulled a few more of what we call bandwagon votes. Nearly all those who
voted for the unpledged electors, preferred Nixon over Kennedy.
[-15-]
HACKMAN: At the time of the governors’ conference there was a telegram sent and
signed by ten of the southern governors, including yourself, I believe,
in support of the Kennedy ticket. Do you recall how this developed? I
think everybody, other than Ross Barnett, was a party to it.
FAUBUS: I think perhaps this originated with the governor of Texas [Marion
Price Daniel].
HACKMAN: I had heard or read that it might have had something to do with the
debate that was being held at that time. The people were influenced by
Kennedy’s debate against Nixon. Did that have any influence at all?
FAUBUS: It might have had some. I don’t recall trying to evaluate the matter. It
had no particular influence with me. I signed the telegram more or less
for the same reason that I had endorsed Kennedy to begin with.
HACKMAN: What areas of the state did Kennedy have the most trouble in, do you
recall, what were the reasons?
FAUBUS: The eastern part of the state, and some of the counties in the southern
section. There’s always some difficulty up here [northwest section]. I
think I lost two counties in the general election by my endorsement of
Kennedy, Washington and Benton Counties, two large counties here. But this area, in the
northwest corner, constitutes the major Republican strength in the state and has for years. I
lost some counties in this particular section, I feel sure, because of my endorsement of the
Democratic ticket. So his difficulty in this region was no more than any other Democratic
candidate. Well, I’d say it was a little more than other Democratic nominees has because this
constituted a basic Republican strength, coupled with the dissatisfaction with the issues
prevalent at the time. The religious issue had considerable bearing in northwest Arkansas.
HACKMAN: All right, moving on from the election then, did you have any meetings
with Kennedy or his people between the time of the election and the
inauguration as to possibly what policies would be in regard to
Arkansas, or any other thing?
FAUBUS: No. I never had a personal conference with President Kennedy after he
was elected.
[-16-]
HACKMAN: What did you anticipate as far as what the accents of the Kennedy
administration would be, do you recall having any preconceptions
about what they might do?
FAUBUS: Many of the people in the state felt that with the Kennedy
background—his father was a free enterprise businessman and a
member of the Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] administration—he
would not be an extremist on any issue. He was highly regarded as an individual. Many
people admired his intelligence, and his ability to handle situations. Here and there someone
would express some concern at his youthfulness and inexperience, but this, in my judgment,
was only minor. I did confer with him on two or three occasions by telephone. And he told
me that he would consult with me on appointments from Arkansas. So when he decided to
name Brooks Hays [Lawrence Brooks Hays] to—what was the first position he named him
to?—was it a presidential advisor?
HACKMAN: That was the second, first he was over—let’s see, he’d been over with
TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority], or REA [Rural Electrification
Administration], one of the two, TVA, I think. And let’s see the…
FAUBUS: Anyhow, while he was in Florida, he called me and I very honestly
told him my opinion. I said, “Now, I’m a great believer in a man
having his own people and if this is the man you want it’s all right
with me. I’ll tell you quite frankly it won’t help you the least bit here. The people to whom
Hays appeals, you already have. So you won’t gain any votes whatsoever, except maybe one
here and there because of the state pride. What you need to do is branch out and pull in some
people who have influence with other groups. Certainly, you’ll have influence with other
groups. Certainly, you’ll have to name some people from these groups that are already for
you…”
HACKMAN: I’m going to reserve this thing so we can get …
[BEGIN SIDE II OF TAPE I]
FAUBUS: I told him I had no objection, Brooks Hays was a fine man and I hoped
would do him a good job, but that it wouldn’t help him.
Now a difficulty developed. I was informed by the Kennedy Administration that this
arrangement would be kept behind the scenes.
[-17-]
Then it leaked out and was in the press that Hays had been cleared with me, and that I
approved of the selection. Then in self-protection and in self-defense I had to issue a
statement in which I told the truth; that the president had called me; that I had told him that I
was a great believer in an official having his own people whoever he wanted in his
administration; that I had no objection to Mr. Hays’ appointment, but that it wouldn’t help
him the least bit in Arkansas; that Brooks Hays was known as a man of vacillation; that he
bent like a reed in the wind with every breeze that blew; and that it [the appointment] wasn’t
going to help the president any. Well, naturally, they didn’t consult with me anymore. But,
someone didn’t keep the faith on the national level by leaking the matter to the press, and
putting me on the spot. I had not asked to be consulted in the first place. I was glad to be
consulted if I could be of help, and told the president I appreciated it, and that I would give
him the benefit of any information I had and my completely truthful evaluation and
viewpoint on such matters for whatever benefit they would be to him.
HACKMAN: Were there ever any other later appointments that you objected to or
tried to make a recommendation on?
FAUBUS: No, he made some appointments later, which I highly approved, such
as Pat Mehaffy for federal judge, and I had no objection to the people
he named as attorneys for the Justice Department in the state. I believe
there are two, one in the eastern and one in the western district. Some people were named in
the national administration, who were good friends of mine and friendly to me, but they were
in minor positions.
HACKMAN: Had you felt, let’s say, at the beginning of the administration that a
great deal of change in the desegregation of schools and public
accommodations, et cetera, would be pushed in the Kennedy
administration? Or did you feel it was inevitable?
FAUBUS: We didn’t know. As I said before, there was a feeling among the
people in the state,—and the feeling of the people was more important
so far as Kennedy’s fortunes
[-18-]
were concerned, rather than mine as an individual or political leader, because I’ve already
stated, influence or strength is not transferred from one man to another in Arkansas, except to
the bare minimum. But there was a feeling among the people in the state that he wouldn’t be
an extremist and many people were very deeply disappointed when he went as strong as he
did on the civil rights thing.
HACKMAN: When something like this would take place in the state, for instance, a
push to desegregate a school by the Justice Department, for instance,
would you be consulted on this, or would they try to go directly to the
community first in a persuasive effort or how was this usually handled?
FAUBUS: I wasn’t consulted. It appeared that they worked mostly with the
people on the local level, and this, of course, had a tendency to keep
down any unified opposition to what they were trying to do. I think
they worked with a pretty well unified plan, but in a manner, also, to keep the opposition
from being equally unified.
HACKMAN: Did you ever take any specific problems to the White House level, any
of these actions that you objected to? Maybe not directly to the
president, but to anyone else there, do you recall? Or to Bobby
Kennedy?
FAUBUS: No, I don’t recall that I did.
HACKMAN: What about other Kennedy domestic programs in relation to the state,
do you recall what your opinion of them was? For instance, the Area
Redevelopment Administration, I think, made their first grant to some
community up in…
FAUBUS: Very good. I approved as an individual and as a political leader, and
the people in the state approved generally, of many of the programs,
such as the Area Redevelopment Administration, the Upstream
Watershed Control Program, the conservation program, generally, the building of the dams
on the Arkansas, the White and other rivers. The president had good support from the state in
all these programs and the relationship between my administration and the federal agencies
involved was very pleasant, very cordial. There was much cooperation which was very
beneficial to the state, and we think, oft times beneficial politically to the national
administration.
HACKMAN: There was never any problem then with civil rights problems being
held against the state as far as federal grants of any kind whatever?
[-19-]
FAUBUS: Apparently not. Not to my knowledge. Besides our help and support
was essential to the success of the other worthwhile programs. I told
the people of the state many times, many who disagreed with me and
some who agreed with me, even some who were my friends who didn’t like some things that
were happening, that I didn’t think we should be so inept or so stupid as to stop all progress
in every field simply because we didn’t agree with some of the things the national
administration was doing. This was my attitude all the time. There were many good programs
beneficial to the people. This made for wonderful cooperation between the state and almost
all the federal agencies of government in these particular areas.
HACKMAN: How effective did you feel the Arkansas congressional delegation was
in this period in relation to the state problems? Any problems in the
relationship there?
FAUBUS: On these same problems there was almost complete harmony between
the state administration, which was me and the people who worked
with me, the congressional delegation, and the federal agencies. There
was never any cross-purpose there. I never was at odds with any
member of the congressional delegation. In other words, a member of the congressional
delegation wasn’t wanting one thing, and me wanting another. This never did occur. There
was almost complete harmony there and unity in that respect. This, of course, made it easier
for the national administration.
HACKMAN: In relation to the governors’ conferences again, could you recall a little
bit how the feeling toward the Kennedy administration developed as it
was revealed through the attitude of some of these other southern
governors at the conferences of ’61, ’62, and ’63?
FAUBUS: No, some opposition developed to the national administration. It was
not possible for many of the southern governors to agree publicly with
the Kennedy administration on some issues. At the same time, I found
that cooperation with the national administration in other fields was very similar to that in my
state. Not as good, perhaps, as it was in Arkansas, because it couldn’t have been better. I
doubt if it was as good in some other states. I did observe among the southern governors,
most of whom could not succeed themselves, a tendency occasionally to join up and do some
leg work for somebody in the national administration in the hopes of benefitting by it. This
wasn’t pleasing to some other governors in the conference.
HACKMAN: Do you recall any of the specifics of that?
[-20-]
FAUBUS: I don’t know if this was true or not, but it was aired around one of the
conferences. Perhaps the next year after the meeting at Hot Springs,
that the Kennedy people had called and requested that I not be elected
chairman of the southern conference, that they must have someone else. I never did learn if
this was true but I suspect it was. I would resent this, not because I wanted to be chairman,
but because this was outside their field. I do know there were certain people in the
conference who would carry out such a request in order to incur favor. In other words, some
politicians would yield, the word “sell out” is too strong perhaps, to blandishment and to
certain things, not because they were in the public interest or in accord with prevailing
sentiment, but in an effort to ingratiate or endear themselves to the powers that be for
personal benefit. Governor Hodges [Luther B. Hodges] was one of those. I think, perhaps, he
had less respect among the southern governors than any one in the region because he had a
tendency to do these things. In other words, he sometimes became an errand boy for the
federal powers of the national administration while still publicly espousing certain issues
contrary to the administration.
HACKMAN: Hodges had been governor up—what, to ’60, and then went to the
Commerce Department. Would this have been in the Kennedy period?
FAUBUS: I believe it was.
HACKMAN: He wouldn’t have been governor in that period would he? It was in an
earlier period. It would have been Terry Stanford [James Terry
Sanford] of North Carolina, after he came in. Hodges served about
seven years,
Including part of the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration, and was
followed by Sanford for four years. I was thinking in ’60, or rather ’61, as soon as the
administration started he became secretary of commerce.
FAUBUS: Yes, this could have been at the conference preceding the one at Hot
Springs, but I was under the impression it was the one that followed. I
guess it was the one preceding.
HACKMAN: Or, maybe, it was at Hot Springs. Could that have been possible?
FAUBUS: No, this was at a conference at another place.
HACKMAN: Okay. In a couple of those conferences proposals were made to
censure the administration in a resolution on
[-21-]
their civil rights bill, and specifically, I think it was the time of the March on Washington in
’63. Do you recall what your role was in relation to that?
FAUBUS: I tried to keep the resolutions from being presented. In other words,
my attitude was, let’s not bring up these controversial things in the
conference, because we won’t accomplish anything. A resolution, or
an expressed viewpoint, would have little weight, if any whatsoever, and it’d just cause
disruption in the conference and difficulty for all of us. I felt we should keep those things out
and confine ourselves to the work of the conference that would benefit us individually and as
a region. This was my attitude always and I never did bring up anything in the conferences of
this nature.
HACKMAN: Do you recall who else was acting with you as a moderating influence
on this issue?
FAUBUS: Well, usually the governor of Texas, and I served with three. Usually
the governor of Louisianan, and I served with four of those; and oft
times the governors of border states like Maryland, Kentucky, West
Virginia. Some of the governors, say of a state like West Virginia, could have a very liberal
attitude. They could bring up issues and take stands which were helpful to them politically.
To take the same stand would be most harmful politically to me, or a governor in another
state. Likewise, someone in Mississippi or Alabama could bring up an issue which would be
beneficial for me to support, but with which the governor of West Virginia couldn’t agree.
Because of the divergencies in the region, geographic, political and otherwise, there were
many issues that had a tendency to divide. I tried always to keep such issues from coming
before the meetings in the southern and the national conference. I could see no good reason
to bring up a matter that would be embarrassing to the national administration or to a chief
executive in any region. Almost single handedly I prevented issues of this nature being
brought up in the southern conference in Greenbriar, West Virginia, when Wallace [George
C. Wallace] and Barnett were governors. I was chairman at the time.
HACKMAN: Do you recall any dealings with Vice President Johnson in this period
on civil rights? He headed that equal employment opportunity thing
[President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity] for the
president. They tried to come into local areas in some instances and give these plans for
progress.
FAUBUS: No. They usually left me alone in these matters. They
[-22-]
knew I wouldn’t attempt to cause them any difficulty and neither was I
in a position to give them any help. So if they left me out of these
matters it was better for me and them also. I think this was generally known or understood
and that’s, perhaps, the main reason that I was seldom bothered about these matters.
HACKMAN: Same question I had in relation to 1960, how seriously did you
consider running for Senate in ’62?
FAUBUS: Scarcely at all.
HACKMAN: This was the year you had said you weren’t going to run for the
governor and then came out again later. Do you recall what this was all
about and what your reasons were at that time?
FAUBUS: Well, I’d talked to many people across the state who would say,
“When you don’t run, I’m going to run.” Well, Alford [Thomas Dale
Alford] had been elected to Congress, defeating Brooks Hays with the
write-in campaign. Some of the Hays people always blame me for it, but I wasn’t to blame.
Hays was the one that cost himself the election. He was nominated at the same time I was in
the same primary, which showed that I didn’t bother his race because my strength was still
very great at the time.
It had always been my attitude and the general attitude of the people in the state that
they appreciate you pleading for their support and advocating your own candidacy, but they
don’t appreciate your trying to tell them how to vote in any other race. This is a very strong
tradition that’s grown up in the state and has prevailed for a long time. After the primaries
were over, Brooks Hays’ son [Marion Steele Hays], began taking a very active part in an
attempt to promote some of the civil rights programs. Then Brooks, feeling that he was pretty
strong, came back and made some very unwise statements in some public speeches in the
state. I saw this was getting him into difficulty. One of his strong friends and supporters was
a man by the name of Forrest Rozzell, who for many years has been the executive secretary
of the Arkansas Education Association. One day Mr. Rozzell called me. He said, “I’ve got a
group that would like to confer with you. We’ll come to your office but we’d like to wait
until you get through with all your work so we can talk for awhile without being interrupted.”
I replied, “Well, it might be better if I got away from here when I have finished my work. I’ll
just come by our office.” The AEA office is only a stone’s throw from the Capitol building.
So I went by, and the group happened to be only
[-23-]
Rozzell and Brooks Hays. Since I’d already been nominated, they attempted to prevail upon
me to come out and take the role of leadership in promoting some of the civil rights
programs, principally in the field of school integration. They cited what Brooks had been
doing. I waited until they go through with their pitch, if you want to call it that, and I said,
“Now, gentlemen, I respect each of you. I respect your views and I respect your right to do
what you choose to do. But I’m not fixing to attempt anything like you urge because all I
would do would be to cut my own throat.” I continued, “Brooks, you’re getting into serious
trouble, and you’re doing it yourself. I haven’t said a word to anyone, privately or otherwise,
that would reflect in any manner on you, or any of our friends.” And I told Rozzell, “You’re
going to be in difficulty also.” Then Brooks began to say, “Oh, I know my people. You know
I’ve been here visiting.” And I said, “Now Brooks, I know who you’ve been visiting with,
you’re visiting with only one group.” It happened that I visit with them too. “I’m not in as
high standing with that group as you are, but I do have friends in the group. I’m also visiting
and associating with people in other groups, and I know what I’m talking about. You’re
getting in serious trouble. You’d better attend to your congressional duties and let the federal
agencies that have outlined these programs bear the burden of promoting them. After all, they
weren’t our programs on the state level.” But I didn’t seem to prevail on them too strongly
for Brooks continued his speaking.
Sure enough, this tide began to rise, a tide of disfavor with Hays which he, himself,
with his son, had created. I hadn’t uttered a single public statement and hadn’t said a word to
anyone in private against Hays. All at once, Alford was running. Yes, Alford came to see me,
came to see me three times, and I discouraged him. I told him all the difficulties of a
campaign without his name on the ballot: getting the people to write-in his name, getting
known to the public in only eight days; all the Democratic nominees would feel an obligation
to vote against him because they were nominees and Brooks was a nominee; no organization;
the election officials chosen by the Democratic organization and the Republican
organization. I told him it was virtually impossible to win a race under those circumstances,
He came back a second time and I went over the same things. Then, at the last minute, he
came the third time to the mansion in the early morning to talk to me. I reiterated the same
things and added, “Now, Dale, I’m not going to tell you to get into this race. You’ve got all
the difficulties in the world. I’ll tell you only one thing. In my judgment, you’d have a bare
chance of winning. I can tell the sentiment. So you’re taking a long, long chance, and you’ve
got
[-24-]
to make that decision yourself. I wouldn’t encourage you the least bit to run.” I left him and
went to the office and went to work. About noon the news came on the radio that he had
announced and that was the first I knew of it. Now, a lot of people thought I put him in the
race, but I didn’t. Here again it is shown that if you contrary too much the tides of public
sentiment, you’ll be cut down and no organization, and no political leader can save you.
Rozzell almost got thrown out of his position in the AEA. In fact, if his organization could
have voted then on the election of board members, they would have voted him out. Having
enough board members committed to him at that time, with their replacements selected, one
by one, later on, he had a chance to mend his fences and retain his position. Brooks,
unfortunately, didn’t have that opportunity and lost his seat in Congress.
After Dale Alford won, many of Hays’ friends blamed me for the outcome, and
regardless of what the facts were, many other people accepted the premise that I was
responsible for Alford being in the Congress. We were then identified in the public mind as
political allies.
That is the background which leads to my answer to your question—why did I change
my mind and see the governor’s office again in 1962 after saying I would not. First, I didn’t
have any great desire to go to Washington. I could have run for Fulbright’s seat in the
Senate—the polls showed I could have won—or for Jim Trimble’s [James W. Trimble] seat
in the House. Instead, I decided to retire, temporarily at least, from active campaigning. So
many people had said they would run for governor when I quit that I felt sure there would be
one or more candidates my friends could support.
Many of these people did not run, and it appeared almost certain that either Dale
Alford or Sid McMath would wind up as the Democratic nominee. Alford, although widely
regarded as a political ally, broke faith, and, without determining my intentions, announced
as a candidate for governor. I learned later that he was encouraged and, to a great extent,
financed by the forces of Congressman Wilbur Mills [Wilbur D. Mills] and Senator
Fulbright, to keep him out of either of their races. That made him unacceptable to my friends.
McMath had opposed me for so long that most of my friends could in no way support him.
Under the circumstances as described, I decided to run again, entered the race and won. I lost
some support because some of my supporters had gotten obligated to other candidates when I
announced I would not run. I still had enough support to win over five opponents without a
runoff.
[-25-]
HACKMAN: How did this—the attitude in Arkansas toward the Kennedy
administration on civil rights develop on through then? It became more
serious a problem, I take it, even in ’62, right as some people were on
you even because you weren’t seen as strong enough on the issues.
FAUBUS: Yes. It grew more difficult. I was being attacked and criticized by
extremists on both side of the so-called civil rights issue. There’s a
question, which now, of course, will never be answered, as to whether
or not President Kenney could have carried the state for reelection. The people of the state
admired him in many ways; I admired him in many ways. He was a very able man, there’s
not a question about it. Still, he was the victim, much as was I and other political figures
across the South and across the nation, of the tides of an issue that might have cost him the
state if he had been permitted to seek reelection.
Things can change rapidly in politics. A serious international crisis can come up, such
as the Cuban situation. The people of Arkansas and the people of the South were, without
question, stronger for Kennedy on this issue than the rest of the nation. There is no doubt
about that. Just as right now, the South is stronger for President Johnson on international
relations and the Viet Nam situation that is the rest of the nation. So it’s a question of which
issue is uppermost in the minds of the people at the time of an election, which sometimes
determines the survival or the defeat of a political figure.
HACKMAN: What do you recall about Senator Kennedy’s visits into the state
during the period. I think he was in Fort Smith in ’61, October of ’61,
and then he came again down to the dedication of Greer’s Ferry Dam.
FAUBUS: Very pleasant. I met him at Fort Smith, appeared with him on the
program at the airport, Then he flew from there on to—what, Big
Sandy?—Well, anyhow, this place in Oklahoma, where Senator Kerr
[Robert S. Kerr] had invited him to dedicate a highway and some other project. He had a
great deal of favor at Fort Smith. The people there, from the little people up to the big
business people, were very interested in the continuation of Fort Chaffee. In his remarks at
the airport, Kennedy pledged unequivocally, without any reservations, that the camp would
remain active. This, of course, created strong favor for him in that region. Some of the civil
rights issues were not as important in that particular region as was the continued operation of
Fort Chaffee. The problem of civil rights was more serious in other sections of the state.
[-26-]
There was some question raised about my reluctance to meet President Kennedy at Fort
Smith. I’ve always felt that you just don’t run out to meet a political figure of this kind
without some indication that your presence is at least acceptable or tolerable, if not desired.
My attitude of opposition to the pushing of some of the civil rights programs was well
known. President Kennedy’s were well known. I simply hadn’t said anything. I hadn’t said
whether I was going to Fort Smith or whether I wasn’t. I was just keeping quiet. Because I
kept quiet I got some very strong criticism in the press in Little Rock. If they could find
where they could hurt me by using something, even a manufactured issue, a synthetic one,
shy, they would do it. So they began to make something out of this. But just as soon as I
received the word from the Kennedy organization that I would be welcome there, I issued a
statement saying I would go to Fort Smith to welcome the president. He was coming to our
state, and regardless of any disagreements we might have on issues, he was the president of
these United States. I was the governor of the state, and the president was entitled to this
courtesy. So I was there to meet him. Our relationships, as they always were when I met him
personally, were very pleasant indeed. In fact, I don’t think I’ve ever met but one man that I
would describe as more gracious than President Kennedy, and that was Harry Truman [Harry
S. Truman]. Harry Truman, without doubt, is the most gracious man that anyone ever met.
Our visit there was brief. His remarks were brief as well as the entire program from the
platform. Then he flew on to Oklahoma. Some of the press said something about my not
going on to the meeting, but it wouldn’t have been proper for me to horn in on the meeting
without some indication from Senator Kerr, or someone that they would, at least, be glad to
have me. And no indication was ever given. I was not invited. So naturally, I didn’t go on. I
might have declined if I had been asked because of business in the state. I don’t know what
the situation was at the time, how pressing the business matters were. President Kennedy and
his party spend the night with Senator Kerr at his ranch home after the dedication in
Oklahoma.
HACKMAN: What about the…. Go ahead.
FAUBUS: Well, that’s about all about the visit to Fort Smith.
HACKMAN: What about the one then at Greer’s Ferry? I know some people were
upset about the crowd or something, the critics were upset about the
speech you gave there. Do you recall that?
[-27-]
FAUBUS: Yes. Sometime before the Greer’s Ferry dedication. I joined the
congressional delegation in Washington. All of us went together to the
White House to extend an invitation to the president to come to
Greer’s Ferry and dedicate the dam and lake. The invitation was given without reservation. I
don’t mind telling you that some of the congressmen were afraid to go and extend the
invitation unless I went along. Tides were rather uncertain at the time in the state. So without
hesitation, I said, “Sure, I’ll be glad to extend an invitation. We’ve got a fine facility, built by
the federal government. This administration is largely the author of the project and
responsible for its construction. It has come to fruition, and certainly he should have an
opportunity to come and dedicate it if he wishes. I’ll be glad to go with the delegation.”
So all of us went together to the White House to extend the invitation. When the time
was set, we began to make arrangements. And I say this, without any disrespect to the
congressional delegation, when I was governor, my organization did practically 100 percent
of the work. We made all the arrangements with the local people. We cooperated with all the
federal agencies. The secret service people came to us when the affair was over and said they
had had the finest cooperation and it was the best arranged affair in which they had ever
participated. They said this without reservation and so far as I know, the personnel of all the
federal agencies felt the same. They came to my office, to my aides in the National Guard
and state police and said the same thing with apparently great sincerity. So we did make good
arrangements. The affair was very fine.
President Kennedy, as always, was very gracious. Previous to Kennedy’s arrival in
Little Rock, a greeting committee had been set up. We observed that about 80 percent of the
committee members had not supported President Kennedy. They were people who would
horn in on the glory, you know, without ever having done anything to earn it. So I called
Tom Harper and also talked to Bill Smith [William J. Smith] and Pat Mehaffy. Bill Smith
and Pat Mehaffy were perhaps closer to the Kennedy administration than any other
individuals in the state. Together we arranged to invite an additional group of people to meet
the president out at the airport [Strategic Air Command Air Force Base, Little Rock]. A
special place was reserved for them out there. We invited some of my worst enemies, but
they were good friends and supporters of the president. They were entitled to have an
opportunity to meet him, and him to meet them. Among these people were Heiskell [John N.
Heiskell] of the [Little Rock Arkansas] Gazette and Patterson [Hugh B. Patterson, Jr.] of the
Gazette, who wouldn’t give me credit for anything good. But we thought we owed this to the
president.
[-28-]
Now myself and two or three of my personal associates made these arrangements for the
benefit of these people who were his supporters who had been left off of the original
committee. On the official committee, a check revealed that 80 percent of them were people
who had voted against the president and would vote against him next time But Hugh
Patterson, Mr. Heiskell, the labor leaders and co-op leaders we invited there had supported
the president, were still supporting him and would have supported him the next time. We felt
they were entitled to a chance to meet the president and him to meet them. This was
something that happened, or was done aside from the official program, at my instigation, and
with help. Bill Smith first made the suggestion. Military ceremonies for the president were
held at the air base. I flew with him in his helicopter along with Congressman Mills and
others, I don’t remember, Senator McClellan, I believe, Senator Fulbright, from the air base
to Greer’s Ferry. Then I was permitted to ride with him in the car, I don’t recall who else,
from where the helicopter landed to the ceremony and then from the ceremony back to the
helicopter. Then we traveled by helicopter back to Little Rock to the Arkansas livestock
show grounds where, again at my instigation and with the help of his supporters,
arrangements had been made for the president to speak to the crowds at the livestock show.
Otherwise he would have appeared only before the crowd at Heber Springs, site of Greer’s
Ferry Dam, and would not have seen the additional thousand.
I presented him to the audience at Little Rock. It was my privilege and honor to
introduce him, but here again, some of my critics at the Gazette inferred, or stated, that I
could have said more. By introducing him as great American, I went a little farther than
protocol permits or advises, that you simply say, “Ladies and Gentlemen, the president of the
United States.” But I added some remarks to the effect that,—“It was a great honor and
privilege for us to have him in the state. It was gracious of him to come and to be with us,
and it was my privilege to present a great American, the president of the United States, the
Honorable John F. Kennedy.”
HACKMAN: The Gazette never got to that.
FAUBUS: Oh, they jumped on me for not saying more, yet, I had taken liberties
already to say that much. So you see, with these people, I could do no
right, no matter how I handled it. Yet, I was the one who arranged for
them to see him.
HACKMAN: You wanted to have them in there.
[-29-]
FAUBUS: I would have appreciated it if I had been in the president’s
circumstance, the same arrangement, because these people were very
strong supporters of his.
HACKAMAN: That’s about all the specific questions I have, unless you have some
conclusions you want to draw either on the Kennedy administration or
on the development of federal-state relationships in that period, maybe
some mistakes that the Kennedys made in regard to Arkansas and the South.
FAUBUS: Well, the relationships with the Kennedy administration on all levels,
the relationship was excellent, except for this controversial area of
civil rights. We believed in and supported practically all of his
domestic programs. We believe we made them work better in Arkansas than nearly any other
state. The administration costs were less, benefits were greater and this created favor for him.
This was especially true with the REA co-ops—of which there are eighteen in the state and,
perhaps, the single most influential political group in the state—the Farmers Union,
organized Labor and the Negro groups. Working with the national administration we made
these programs work for the benefit of these people, which helped the president to hold them
and to build favor with them. We even made many of these programs work well enough that
the disfavor was lessened with the chamber of commerce group and others, other groups that
don’t usually grow enthusiastic about these programs.
The president was very gracious to me at Heber Springs. In my remarks, I openly
criticized the civil rights promotion or pushing by his administration and others. But my
impression of John F. Kennedy was that he was a good politician; that he could understand
the issues which enabled a man to survive in one area which would be the political death of
him in another; he was gracious and understanding enough to work with another political
figure, or a man of his own party, or an ally, such as I had been, or an opponent to some of
his policies as I had become, and permit him enough flexibility to survive because there
wasn’t any possibility of electing and outright Kennedy man in Arkansas at that time. The
best the Kennedy administration could hope for was someone like me who would give his
administration 100 percent cooperation in all areas where it was possible. This is my personal
impression of President Kennedy as a public figure and as a politician.
HACKMAN: Let me ask you something. How did the relationship with the federal
government under President Kennedy differ from that that had existed
under President Eisenhower?
[-30-]
FAUBUS: The biggest difference was an improvement, because in the matter of
patronage there was no conflict—Kennedy appointed Democrats.
Kennedy gave greater support to some of the domestic programs, such
as the big dams, conservation, etc., which Eisenhower was not as friendly to the co-ops
[REA], who have been my political allies, as was President Kennedy. There would have been
no electric service in my original farm home had it not been provided by the Rural Electric
Administration. I strongly supported this program always. Eisenhower was not as mindful of
the problems of the poor as was Kennedy’s administration. How mindful he was personally, I
do not know, and had not the opportunity to learn. But there was an improvement in the
Kennedy administration in the field of cooperation, even though cooperation was good with
most agencies of President Eisenhower’s administration. In fact, we gave President
Eisenhower better cooperation than did some of the Republican governors on many of the
programs.
HACKMAN: Do you have anything at all you’d want to add about the Little Rock
situation while we’re recording this at all? I don’t have any specific
questions, I just thought maybe you’d want to put something on it for
people who are reading this thing in the future would be interested in.
FAUBUS: Well, I think there was considerable misunderstanding. There was
great distortion, and sometimes outright falsification, deliberately
promoted by certain segments of the press. I’m not sure about
President Kennedy, but I don’t think Bobby Kennedy understood enough about the
difficulties. I recall when he came to Little Rock with Senator McClellan when the senator
returned to attend the funeral of his son who has been killed in a plane accident that he
expressed an attitude of questioning about me.2 “Senator McClellan, how do you get along
with this fellow?” and so on. Yet, in many respects, I was more liberal than Senator
McClellan. So it showed that he didn’t understand the situation, he didn’t have a personal
knowledge of the local or state situation. One fallacy has been effectively laid to rest by
subsequent events since ’57. There was a great effort on the part of the press, the Arkansas
Gazette, aided by Time, Life; McGill [Ralph E. McGill], people of this bent, to create the
impression that the problem would not have existed had it not been for me,
[-31-]
that I personally created the situation in an effort to benefit from it politically. Subsequent
events have now shown that there is a problem, regardless of whether it had been me or
anyone else. The problem was there and is still with us. Regardless of whether Kennedy was
president or someone else, the problem was still there. That has been shown by the
difficulties in Watts, Cicero, Rochester, New York, Baltimore, Cambridge, Jacksonville;
well, all across the nation. Now, looking back, the situation was handled better in Little
Rock, whether as the result of my efforts or just plain luck, anyone’s entitled to his
viewpoint. But we had not a single death to this day in Arkansas attributed to a radical
incident, yet there have been any number of deaths in any number of states attributed to these
incidents. No stores were looted, we had no lying down in the streets, blocking traffic, or in
businesses. No windows have been broken. No businesses looted, not a single death. So
whether by luck or by design, or a combination of both, the situation was handled better in
Arkansas than it was anywhere else. And since subsequent events have proven that I didn’t
create the problem, that it is there regardless of who’s on the scene, I think it’s made me look
great deal better than I looked at the time.
HACKMAN: Anything else at all that you want to put on?
FAUBUS: There was a great deal more high regard for President Kennedy than
for his brother Bobby. One of the things that hurt him the worst in
Arkansas was when he made Bobby attorney general. I was not
2 This was after I had visited the senator in his hotel room to pay my respects, express my sympathy and offer
any assistance that I could give.
opposed to it at the time. I said it’s all right when I talked to Senator McClellan about it. He
asked me what I thought about it. I said, “Well, I think it’s all right, Senator. A man ought to
be able to trust his own brother, and certainly, you’ve got to have someone you can trust in
positions of responsibility.” But Bobby went too far. I know he’s an able man, but people got
the impression, that perhaps his ability was falsely portrayed, just as people had a false
impression of me in many respects. He was a bit imperious, bordering on arrogance in his
attitude in dealing with some of the problems. This hurt President Kennedy in Arkansas more
than any other one single thing. But, who know. Perhaps out of all the interviews you’ll get
across the nation, a central theme, or a consensus can be reached about what the situation was
generally and what the pertinent facts were in the whole situation. No one can know all the
facts from one particular spot, such as that which I occupied, or anyone else in any other
particular spot in the nation.
HACKMAN: Thank you very much.
[END OF INTERVIEW]
[-32-]
Addenda
BOB KENNEDY
At the time Robert Kennedy [Bob Kennedy] spoke at Osceola in behalf of his brother’s
candidacy for the presidency, there was another occurrence worthy of mention.
In the introduction of those on the platform, the applause for me was heavy, in fact
much stronger than for any other.
Kennedy was presented last as the main speaker. Those of us on the platform stood
and applauded in tribute to him. He stood, looked calmly out over the audience (the applause
for him was not as strong as it had been for me), then turned and looked directly at me. I
leaned toward him, across other, and took his outstretched hand in a handshake. The applause
came again, stronger. Then he turned back to the audience and began to speak as we on the
platform were seated. (The audience was standing in an open area in front and to the sides of
the platform).
The handshake was a gesture of alliance with me for the benefit of the audience.
He was saying to the people there and across the state, “I am friendly to Faubus so
you can safely vote for my brother,” and perhaps to me, “I have accepted you publicly now
deliver the state for candidacy.”
If a photograph of the occurrence has been caught, and the picture run statewide, it
would no doubt have benefited somewhat Senator John Kennedy’s candidacy at the time in
Arkansas. So far as I know, no photograph was made at the time, or at least one was never
published to my knowledge.
However, once the election was over, there was little evidence of acceptance by the
Kennedys of me or my administration.
[-33-]
AN OCCURANCE FOLLOWING JOHN F. KENNEDY’S
CAMPAIN APPERANCE AT TEXARKANA
I traveled from Little Rock to Texarkana to meet and appear with John F. Kennedy in
his campaign appearance speech there. Accompanying me were Pat Mehaffy, the behind-the-
scenes manager for Kennedy in Arkansas, and Attorney William J. Smith [Bill Smith], both
of Little Rock.
We met Kennedy’s plane at the Texarkana airport, greeted him, and all joined in the
parade from there to the speaking site in the heart of the city. Other Arkansas political figures
in the parade were Arkansas’s two U.S. senators, William Fulbright and John L. McClellan.
Also, Congressman Oren Harris, who was already there because that was a part of his
congressional districts.
After the political rally ended, each figure or group made its individual way back to
the airport. My group—myself, Smith and Mehaffy—arrived ahead of the Kennedy party. I
was ready to take off for the return to Little Rock. We were standing near the Kennedy plane
and Bill Smith said, “Let’s wait and say good-bye to the next president.”
Mehaffy concurred with Smith’s suggestion. Since our presence was known and
observed by many members of the press corps, who were likewise gathering, and since it
might be construed as a discourtesy to Kennedy if I left without waiting the brief period
required, I acquiesced in the suggestion.
Very shortly, candidate Kennedy appeared and shook hands with a number of people
a short distance away. He then accosted Congressman Harris. For a few moments they were
engaged in a close conversation, seemingly private and confidential, with Kennedy doing
most of the talking with Harris listening soberly and intently.
Then the two of them turned and walked toward the plane ignoring others nearby who were
interested in greeting the candidate. No one approached them for they were still seemingly
engrossed in a close confidential conversation as they strode along. They reached the tail of
the plane and then walked alongside the considerable distance to the entrance, climbed the
steps together and disappeared inside. I recall Kennedy’s long strides with the shorter Harris
beside him. As I recall Kennedy’s arm was, at least part of the time, around his companion’s
shoulders. I distinctly recall that the action seemed awkward for both. They passed very near
my group
[-34-]
and still nearer a number of other people, but distinctly refrained from glancing to either side
during the walk. I recall having the impression that they were going inside for some purpose,
perhaps connected with the subject matter of their close conversation, and that they would
shortly reappear, as we knew Congressman Harris was not going away on the plane. (The
next stop for the Kennedy entourage was somewhere in the Midwest, perhaps St. Louis or
Chicago as I recall.)
Very shortly, Harris left the plane alone, looking somewhat nonplused, and
approached my group. He said that Kennedy would not reappear, whereupon my group—
Smith, Mehaffy and myself—started for our car and Harris accompanied us.
When we were in private in the automobile, Harris explained the situation. I must say I never
saw anyone more embarrassed or ill at ease with his task. The color came and went in his
face, from white to red with mixtures of purple. We listened quietly.
Kennedy told him, he explained, that a reporter—I’ve forgotten the name—in the traveling
press group was seeking to get a picture of him—Kennedy—shaking hands with me, which
was to be run in a New York periodical to hurt Kennedy’s candidacy with some radical group
there. To prevent the possibility of the use of such a photograph, Kennedy, had engaged the
service of Congressman Harris to assist him in avoiding my group while boarding his plane. I
never inquired of Harris whether Kennedy had explained the reason to him before or after
boarding.
My group received the explanation quietly without comment. Congressman Harris,
after completing his embarrassing task, said goodbye, and Smith, Mehaffy and myself began
our return journey to Little Rock as Kennedy’s plane roared into the sky on its journey
northward.
Smith, no doubt, felt badly about his strong suggestion to wait to “say goodbye to the
next president” in view of what by many would be considered an insulting snub to the
governor of the state and his companions. It was apparent from Harris’ extreme discomfort
that he did not relish the occurrence or his, perhaps, unwilling role in it. Mehaffy, the strong
leader and organizer for Kennedy in the state, must have been concerned with the effect of
the incident on my attitude and activity in the campaign.
The incident didn’t bother me that much. My conscience was clear. I had not,
wittingly or unwittingly, been guilty of any act of discourtesy to my party’s candidate for
presidency,
[-35-]
nor had I been remiss in my duties as governor toward a visiting dignitary. I had displayed
the courage to meet, greet and appear with a political figure, who, up to that time, was the
most unpopular Democratic presidential nominee ever to appear in Arkansas.
I could understand the action, for I have seen much of this seeming lack of moral and
political courage on the part of many public figures. I had difficulty in understanding the
reasons or the judgment which prompted the action. After all, I had met Kennedy at the
airport and personally greeted him, joined in the parade and had been seated on the platform
during the entire rally including the candidate’s speech and appeal for votes. What difference
could one more personal contact have made after all that?
To me, and I’m sure to a varying degree on my companions, the incident had one
decided effect. In my mind it took Kennedy out of the ranks of the greatly courageous, and
placed him in the broad ranks of the less courageous and less admired political figures who
often purposely avoid a common courtesy to a fellow American or a fellow human being for
fear of losing a vote.
To me the Kennedy action that day was distinctly at variance with the theme of the
book Profiles of Courage, which was authored in his name.
As to the four Arkansas participants in the incident that day, Harris, Smith, Mehaffy
and myself, we kept the matter a closely guarded secret. In view of the closeness of the
election results in the state as revealed in the voting later on, if the incident had become
known the resulting publicity could well have cost Kennedy the electoral votes of Arkansas.
To this day in March 1976, perhaps less than a dozen people know of the incident.
[-36-]
Orval E. Faubus Oral History Transcript
Name List
A
Alford, Thomas Dale, 23, 24, 25
B
Barnett, Ross R., 15, 16, 22
Benson, Ezra Taft, 5
Butler, Benjamin F., 3
C
Carter, Arthur, 3
D
Daniel, Marion Price, 14, 16
Dunlap, J.E. Jr., 3
E
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 21, 30, 31
F
Farley, James A., 2
Faubus, Orval E., 1, 8, 33
Fulbright, James W., 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 25, 29, 34
G
Gary, Raymond Dancel, 2
Gore, Albert Arnold, Sr., 3
H
Harper, Thomas, 5, 7, 9, 28
Harriman, William Averell, 2, 3, 4
Harris, Oren, 4, 34, 35, 36
Hays, Lawrence Brooks, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25
Hays, Marion Steele, 23
Heiskell, John N., 28, 29
Hodges, Luther B., 21
Humphrey, Hubert H., 1, 2, 3
J
Johnson, Lyndon B., 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26
K
Kefauver, Carey Estes, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6
Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36
Kennedy, Robert F., 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 31, 32, 33
Kerr, Robert S., 26, 27
L
Long, Russell B., 12
M
McClellan, John L., 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 29, 31, 32, 34
McCormack, John William, 4, 5
McGill, Ralph E., 31
McKeithen, John J., 12
McMath, Sidney Sanders, 3, 25
Mehaffy, Pat, 10, 18, 28, 34, 35, 36
Mills, Wilbur D., 25, 29
Morrison, James H., 12
N
Nixon, Richard M., 15, 16
O
Ohlendorf, Harold F., 3, 12
P
Patterson, Hugh B. Jr., 28, 29
R
Rayburn, Samuel Taliaferro, 5
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 17
Roosevelt, James, 2, 5
Rozzell, Forrest, 23, 24, 25
S Smith, Odell, 3
Smith, William J., 28, 29, 34, 35, 36
Stanford, James Terry, 21
Stevenson, Adlai E., 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
Symington, W. Stuart, 4
T
Trimble, James W., 25
Truman, Harry S., 27
W
Wallace, George C., 22
Woods, Henry, 3
Y
Young, Robert A. III, 3
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