Overview of BC-Hydro/BCIT Smart Power Microgrid · BC-Hydro/BCIT Microgrid Deliverables –Unique...

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Overview of BC-Hydro/BCIT Smart Power Microgrid

June 2013, Toronto, Ontario

Hassan Farhangi, PhD, PEng, SM-IEEE

Director, Smart Grid Research British Columbia Institute of Technology, Vancouver, Canada

Background

Problems facing the Power Industry:

1. Rising cost of energy

2. Aging infrastructure

3. Mass Electrification

4. Climate Change

Solutions pursued by Utility companies: 1. Optimize use of expensive assets 2. Manage end-user demand 3. Facilitate Co-Generation 4. Use renewable sources of energy

These require modernization of the electricity grid through strategic gradual implantation of fully validated solutions into the critical infrastructure.

BC-Hydro/BCIT Microgrid Deliverables

– Unique platform to offer Smart Grid training for students, faculty and industry professionals

– Help the institute reduce and/or optimize its carbon footprint and energy costs of the campus

– Help utilities validate new technologies and solutions in a near-real environment

– Mitigate critical infrastructure risks, security, reliability and vulnerability

– Create a ‘sandbox’ where new technologies and solutions can be developed, tested and qualified

BC-Hydro/BCIT’s Smart Microgrid

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Canada’s first campus based Smart Microgrid at BCIT’s Burnaby Campus

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BC-Hydro/BCIT RD&D Objectives • Development of a Smart Microgrid to enable:

Provisioning Methods for Smart Termination Points (Meters, Data Aggregators, Appliances, Sensors, Controls, etc)

Integration Solutions for Alternative Sources of Energy (Co-Generation thru Wind, Solar, Thermal, Storage, etc)

Innovative Network Architecture and Topology for Smart Grid

• Operational Analysis and Infrastructure Security: Resilience, Reliability, Security and Scalability Data Collection, Command & Control algorithms Vulnerability Analysis and Threat Mitigation Strategies

• Development of Interface Protocols & Models to ensure: Interface with Utility Back-office tools (Billing, Load Management, Service

Provisioning, Asset Management, Outage Restoration, etc) Seamless end-to-end deployment, operation & maintenance Easy & Intuitive human interface for operators & customers

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Microgrid Implementation Phases

Phase 1: Construction of Smart Microgrid (2008-2010)

• Completion of Smart Metering on designated loads

• Development of Load Control Devices for Afresh/Dorms

• Integration of Comm Network (Zigbee, WiMax and Fiber backhaul)

• Integration of Co-Gen, Solar Modules and Wind Turbine

• Completion of protection/islanding of BCIT Campus

• Retrofitting and Integration of AFRESH with Microgrid

• Dev of BCIT EMS system (target 10% annual saving)

Phase 2: Smart Grid Research and Development (2010-2015)

• Research thru NSERC Strategic Network (UoNB, McGill, UoT, UoWO, UoA, UBC, SFU, UVIC and BCIT)

Phase 3: Smart Microgrid Commercialization (2015-2017)

• Setup of Industry Canada’s NCE (Network of Centers of Excellence) in pan-Canadian Smart Grid technology

BC-Hydro/BCIT Microgrid Topology

PV Modules (Canopies)

300 KW

Wind Turbine 2X5 KW

BUS

BUS

Campus Wide Communication Network (Wi-Max, Zigbee, ISM RF, PLC, Fiber)

EV Charging Stations

Industrial Loads

Classrooms & Offices

Residences

Dis

trib

uti

on

Net

wo

rk

CO-Gen

Plants

Command &

Control

Communication

Network

Campus

Loads Li-Ion Storage

550 KWh

Thermal Turbine 250KW

BUS

BUS

Microgrid Control Center

BUS

Substation Automation & Critical Infrastructure

Security Lab

Distributed Energy

Management

BUS

BUS

BC Hydro/BCIT’s Microgrid SLD

Thermal Co-Gen

• Fed by Nebraska Boiler

• New advanced multi-fuel boiler in Building SE8

• Combined Heat and Power (CHP)

• Planned Flywheel (25 KW)

• Installed Li-Ion Storage pack (25 KW)

• Rated at ~ 250 kW

Thermal Co-Gen

Thermal Co-Gen

PV Co-Gen

Wind Co-Gen

Net-zero Nanogrid

Smart Home Nanogrid SLD

Nanogrid Communication Network

Smart Appliances

Load Control Thru Scheduling

Smart Microgrid Control Center

Critical Infrastructure Security Lab

Substation Automation

Existing BCIT Substation E Retrofits for IEC-61850

Smart Metering technologies

• Smart Meters are installed in various buildings and on some target loads to be monitored

• Technologies chosen based on challenging environments (e.g. PLC in Welding shop, etc)

• Different MDMS need to be integrated under utility EMS

• Issues were discovered (e.g. reliability of technologies)

Communication System Topology

Hybrid Communication System

Distribution Substations WAN

Frequency & Network Planning

Network Status as of October 2010

Asset Management

EMS Residence Portal

• Designed to increase awareness of electrical consumption

• Targets to reduce consumption by modifying consumer behavior

• Portal design was based on Social science research

• Consumers sensitive to how they’re doing versus their neighbours

• Focus on empowering consumers to make the right energy choices

EMS Residence Portal

Demand Response

Load Control Thru Scheduling

• User Specified Scheduling

• Targets baseboard heaters, hot water tanks, lighting, etc.

• EMS directly communicates with load control boxes

DR Competition Results

• Held over two weeks in Jan 2010 between BCIT’s dorms (identical buildings, all electric powered, flat rental rates)

• Objectives: Use DR technology to reduce consumption without introducing inconveniences for inhabitants

• 21% overall reduction in consumption

• Over 30% reduction in winning house

• GREAT response from students!

– Level of interest very high (community info sessions)

– Pro-active (and sometimes disallowed) measures

– Motivated by competition between different houses

Impact of DR Field Tests on Student Residence Demand Curve

Mitigation of EV Charging Impact on utility’s typical distribution feeders

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

BC-Hydro/BCIT Energy OASIS

Critical Infrastructure Security Lab • Network Performance Testing (jaalaM

AppareNet)

• Encryption Software Protection Testing (BSB Utilities and Whitenoise Labs)

• Network Security Study (Syncrude)

• SCADA Protocol Vulnerability Analysis (US National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre)

• SCADA/PCN Firewall Best Practices (NISCC)

• PLC Attack Testing (BP)

• Modbus/TCP blackPeer testing (DoD TSWG’s Infrastructure Protection Program)

Critical Infrastructure Security Lab

• Oil Sands Control Systems Security (Suncor)

• Honeywell C300 Controller Device Vulnerabilities (Honeywell)

• Seminar on Cyber Security Needs for Critical Infrastructure in the Energy Industry (Industry Canada)

• ExxonMobil Site Security Assessment (Idaho National Labs) • DNP3 Vulnerability Analysis & Testing (Cisco) • ASI Fellowships & IEEE Awards for security testing • Two spin-off companies (Byres Security and Wurldtech)

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Vulnerabilities

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Physical layer: Wireless/RF

Protocols: IEC 61850 , ANSI C12.22

Unauthenticated access

Eavesdropping

Playback

Spoofing

Intrusion detection

Malformed packets

Denial of Service

Insecure Primary Interfaces * *Ref: AMI Attack Methodology, Carpenter, Goodspeed, Singletary, Skoudis, Wright – Jan 2009

SG System Level Vulnerabilities

• Hackers potentially tampering with pricing signals, causing rapid demand changes , causing feeder failures or generation system imbalance

• Intruders changing Substation assets parameters (VVO, CB, VR, etc) causing substation shutdown and domino failures

• Control Centre HMI – often Windows or Linux machines with inherent security vulnerabilities

• LTE – are all-IP, so can be hacked, spoofed, infected with viruses, prone to DoS attacks

• WiMAX – jamming, interference, rogue base stations, protocol fuzzing, spoofed management frames

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Vulnerabilities identification and mitigation strategies

• Identify Potential IEC 61850 and ANSI C12.22 Vulnerabilities to mitigate

• Acquire, Configure, and Commission IEC 61850 and ANSI C12.22 Devices

• Configure Test Gear to Exploit Vulnerabilities (e.g. malformed packets, DoS, eavesdropping, prevention of playback, spoofing, intrusion detection)

• Ensure mitigation strategies such as IEC 62351-6 address above, without violating critical GOOSE timing constraints

• Analyze & Document Vulnerability Tests and Mitigation Results

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Questions?

Dr. Hassan Farhangi, PhD, PEng, SM-IEEE

Director, GAIT, BCIT Technology Centre

BCIT CARI Bldg Wing B, 4355 Mathissi Place

Vancouver, BC, V5G 4S8, CANADA.

Tel: +1-604-456-8074

e-mail: Hassan_Farhangi@bcit.ca

http://www.bcit.ca/microgrid/

http://www.smart-microgrid.ca/

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