Point of Sale Threat Actor Attribution Through POS Honeypots · PDF filePoint of Sale Threat...

PointofSaleThreatActorAttributionThroughPOSHoneypots

KyleWilhoit

Sr.ThreatResearcher

TrendMicro

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• Spokeatmanyconferencesworldwide,includingBlackhat• Specialize inthreat intelligence,offensivesecurity,andICS• Master’s inComputerScience• Bachelor’s inComputerScience

@lowcalspam

#whoami

Objective…WHOISBEHINDPOS SYSTEMATTACKS

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Merchant. Goods and services provider that accepts credit card

payments

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Acquiring Bank: Bank that processes and settles a merchant’s

credit card transactions with an issuer

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Issuing Bank: Bank or financial institution that issues credit cards to

consumers

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Payment Services Provider: Third-party service provider that handles payment transactions between merchant’s bank and

acquirers bank

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“Regular”MerchantTransactions

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LargeMerchantTransactions

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WhyAttackPOSSystems?•Oldoperatingsystems

•Multiplecomponents(Network,bot,killswitch)

•Multipleexfil methodssupported

•Generallyunpatched

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POSRAMScraping- CreditCardData

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POSRAMScraping- QuickOverview

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POSRAMScrapingMalware- AFamilyAffair

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POSHoneypotsforIntel

•Totrackactormovement,honeypotwascreated

•Fakecreditcardinformationwasused

•Fakenames/personas

•Fakecompanies

•“Embedded”documents

•ActingasaMerchant

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POSHoneypotsforIntel

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Hardware/Software

•RadiantPOS1220C–MicrosoftEmbeddedXP–MicrosoftEmbeddedPOSReady7–WindowsEmbeddedCompact2013–AlohaPOS

•Additionalvirtualizedenvironments

•Fakecreditcardgenerator

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LegalDisclaimer!

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FakeCompany

•MLOTCoffeeCompany

•Createdwebsitetoenticeattackers–PrimarilyforusewhenfacingPOSsystemonInternet

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Architecture

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HoneypotConsiderations

•Username:Password–Aloha:Password

•Keptdefaultinstall–DefaultVNCcredentials–UnencryptedVNCconnection–Etc.

•CustomizedtocomefromMLOTCoffeeCompany

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FakeCreditCardGenerator•Pythonscripttogeneratefakecreditnumbersanddumpintomemory,generatingfaketransactions

•Multipleoutputmethodstotargetmanyfamilies– Luhn algorithm–Track1/Track2dumps–Creditcardnumbersbetween13and19digits– Trackdelimiter(^)

•RandomlygeneratedtotrackonUG

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ThreeExecutionLocations

•ExecutemalwaredirectlyonPOSsystem

•Executemalwaredirectlyonbatchprocessor

•HungoffInternetandwait

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ExecutiononPoS System

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AnyBites?

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5103997799204658|0519|0175|CharlesBlue|Cupertino|5953CountessDr|95129|CA|US

5529876429582855|0919|058|BarbaraWafer|CollegePark|2087FlaniganOaksDrive|20741|MD|US

5111387990819704|0521|585|LauraDGriffin |Waco |3160HillHaven Drive |76706|TX|US

5446387373227851|0321|244|JamesEvans|LosAngeles|2564KerryWay|90017|CA|US

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PossibleScenariosRegardingSeller

•MayberunningPOSmalwareandsellingharvestednumbers

•Maybepurchasingfullz frommalwareadministrator/author

•Maybetradingforfullz frommalwareadministrator/author

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ExecutiononBatchProcessorSystem

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BatchProcessorConfiguration

•Merchantsstoreanentireday’sauthorizedsalesinabatch.Attheendoftheday,theysendthebatchviaPSPstoacquirersinordertoreceivepayment.

•CanbedoneremotelyorlocallyonPOSsystem

•Forcaseofexercise,usedadifferentPOSsystem–Portugueselanguagesetting

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PossibleScenariosRegardingSeller

•MalwareAuthor/Sellerarelikelynotthesame–MalwareappearstiedtoFighterPOS– Sellerappearstobeunrelated,otherthanBrazilianconnetion

•Couldbeworkingtogether?

•CouldhavetradedcreditcardnumbersonUG

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HangingOfftheInternet

•Unfortunately,therewasn’tmuchdirectlyrelatedtoPOSexploitation–ThreeloginswithdefaultAlohausername/password

•NoPoS specificmalwareutilized

•Appearstobemostlyskids

•Restofthedatawasallgarbageautomatedscans

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SoWhoCares?

•Mostcriminalsdon’tpre-testbeforesale

•TheymayormaynotbedirectlyresponsibleforthesaleandPOSmalware

•CorrelationbetweenPOSactorsandthesaleofCCnumbers

•Gather“intel”aboutactors/authors

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Fin.KYLEWILHOIT@GMAIL.COM

@LOWCALSPAM

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