Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing 'Going Dark: Encryption ... · 7/8/2015  · Business. I...

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TestimonybyPeterSwireHuangProfessorofLawandEthics

SchellerCollegeofBusinessGeorgiaInstituteofTechnology

SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing“GoingDark:Encryption,Technology,andtheBalance

BetweenPublicSafetyandPrivacy”July8,2015

ChairmanGrassley,RankingMemberLeahy,andMembersoftheCommittee,thankyoufortheopportunitytotestifytodayon“GoingDark:Encryption,Technology,andtheBalanceBetweenPublicSafetyandPrivacy.”IamPeterSwire,theHuangProfessorofLawandEthicsattheGeorgiaTechSchellerCollegeofBusiness.Ihaveworkedonencryptionissuesasagovernmentofficialandscholarfortwodecades,includingrecentlyasamemberofPresidentObama’sReviewGrouponIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnology.Amoredetailedbiographyisattachedtotheendofthistestimony.

Mytestimonytodayisinthreeparts.First,theReviewGroupreportconcludedthatstrongcybersecurityandstrongencryptionshouldbevitalnationalpriorities.OurRecommendation29stated:

“Werecommendthat,regardingencryption,theUSGovernmentshould:(1)fullysupportandnotundermineeffortstocreateencryptionstandards;(2)notinanywaysubvert,undermine,weaken,ormakevulnerablegenerallyavailablecommercialsoftware;and(3)increasetheuseofencryptionandurgeUScompaniestodoso,inordertobetterprotectdataintransit,atrest,inthecloud,andinotherstorage.”

TheReviewGroupunanimouslyandclearlyrecommendedthattheU.S.Government vigorouslyencouragetheuseofstrongencryption.Withfullawarenessofthe“goingdark”concerns,wesharplycriticizedanyattempttointroducevulnerabilitiesintocommerciallyavailableproductsandservices,andfoundthateventemporaryvulnerabilitiesshouldbeauthorizedonlyafteradministration-widescrutiny.Basedonthetop-secretbriefingsandourexperience,wefoundthesepolicieswouldbestfightcyber-crime,improvecybersecurity,buildtrustintheglobalcommunicationsinfrastructure,andpromotenationalsecurity.

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Second,itismoreaccuratetosaythatweareina“GoldenAgeofSurveillance”thanforlawenforcementtoassertthatitis“GoingDark.”Inpreviouswritings,1 Ihaveagreedthatthereareindeedspecificwaysthatlawenforcementandnationalsecurityagencieslosespecificpreviouscapabilitiesduetochangingencryptiontechnology.Thesespecificlosses,however,aremorethanoffsetbymassivegains,including:(1)locationinformation;(2)informationaboutcontactsandconfederates;and(3)anarrayofnewdatabasesthatcreatedigitaldossiersaboutindividuals’lives.

Thetestimonyspecificallyshowstheenormousgainstolawenforcementresultingfromadoptioninthepasttwentyyearsofdigitalsmartphonesandtextmessaging,thetwoareasmosthighlightedbylawenforcementasexamplesof“goingdark.”Althoughrelativelyfewtextmessagesweresenttwentyyearsago,by2010thenumberexceeded6trilliontextsperyear. Forthepredominantshareofthosemessages,thecontentisavailablefromtheprovider.Evenforthesubsetwherethecontentisencrypted,lawenforcementcangainaccesstothemeta-data,linkingsuspectsandwitnessestotheirentiresocialgraphs.

Fortextmessages,itmightbetemptingtosaythatlawenforcementcouldcalltheglasshalf-empty(sometextsareencrypted)orhalf-full(sometextsareintheclear).Withoversixtrillionmessagesfillingthecup,though,ittakeschutzpahtosaytheglassisempty.Text messagesareaprimeexampleofagoldenageofsurveillance,andnotofgoingdark.

Third,government-mandatedvulnerabilitieswouldthreatensevereharmtocybersecurity,privacy,humanrights,and U.S.technologicalleadership,whilenotpreventingeffectiveencryptionbyadversaries.

Asoccurredinthe1990’s,adiversecoalitionofcybersecurityexperts,technologycompanies,privacyexperts,humanrightsactivists,andothershasexpressedvociferousandunitedoppositiontogovernment-mandatedencryptionvulnerabilities.2Mytestimonyhighlightssomeoftheseconcerns:

Technologycompanies,evenbeforeSnowden,hadmultiplereasonstodeploystrongencryptiontoenhancecybersecurityandcustomertrust.Theongoingdevelopmentofencryptionshouldthusnotbeseenprimarilyasashort-termresponsetoSnowden’srevelations.

Overwhelmingtechnicalproblemsandcostsresultfrommandatestocreatevulnerabilitiesinencryption.AnewreportissuedonJuly7isjustthemostrecent,credibleexplanationofthesetechnicalissues.

1 PeterSwire&KenesaAhmad,‘GoingDark’Versusa‘GoldenageforSurveillance’,CENTERFORDEMOCRACYANDTECHNOLOGY,Nov.28,2011(availableat https://cdt.org/blog/’going-dark’-versus-a-‘golden-age-for-surveillance’/).2 Foronecoalitionletter,seehttps://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3138--113/Encryption_Letter_to_Obama_final_051915.pdf.

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U.S.Governmentsupportforencryptionvulnerabilitiesincreasescybersecurityproblemsinthe“leasttrustedcountries”andglobally,andunderminesU.S.humanrightspolicies.TheUnitedStatesshouldbeastrongexampleforcybersecurityandhumanrights,ratherthananexcuseusedbyrepressiveregimestosurveilU.S.-basedbusinessesandindividualsandclampdownonpoliticaldissent.

Mandatedvulnerabilitiesarebadindustrialpolicy– theythreatenU.S.technologicalleadershipwithoutpreventingbadactorsfromusingstrongencryption.

Inconclusion,providingaccessexceptionsforU.S.lawenforcementandintelligenceagencieswillbeharmful,ratherthanhelpful,tonationalsecurity.Despiteconcernsof“goingdark,”thesteadyincreaseofelectroniccommunicationsworldwideprovidestheseagencieswithanever-growingamountofvaluabledataandmeta-datatouseinidentifyingandpursuingtargetsofinvestigations.TheinabilitytodirectlyaccessthecontentofasmallfractionofthesecommunicationsdoesnotwarrantthesubsequentdamagethatwouldresulttoprivacyandtoU.S.economic,diplomatic,andsecurityinterests.

I.ReviewGroup:StrongCybersecurityandStrongEncryptionareVitaltoNational Security

InAugust,2013PresidentObamanamedmeasoneoffivemembersoftheReviewGrouponIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnology,torecommendpoliciesinthewakeoftheSnowdenrevelations.Ourreportemphasizedinstrongtermstheneedfor strongcybersecurityandstrongencryption,withoutcreatingvulnerabilitiesforgovernmentaccess.3TheReviewGroupunanimouslyfoundtheseissuesessentialtoachievingnationalsecurityandothernationalgoalsinglobalizedinformationnetworks.

MultiplekindsofevidencesupportgivingcredencetotheReviewGrouprecommendations.ThePresident’stasking tothegroupmadenationalsecuritythefirstpriority,alongwithotherconsiderationssuchasrelationswithallies,economiceffects,privacyandcivilliberties,maintainingpublictrust,andaddressinginsiderthreats.Themake-upofthegroup,alongwithmyownrole,showedacommitmenttonationalsecurity,informedbyexpertiseinmeetingeachofthesegoals: RichardClarkehasservedascybersecuritycoordinatorandalsoanti-terroristcoordinatortoPresidentsofbothpoliticalparties;MichaelMorellhasthirtyyearsofexperienceintheintelligencecommunity,includingservingasactingDirectoroftheCIA;bothCassSunsteinandGeoffreyStoneareeminentlegalscholars,withparticular

3 “LibertyandSecurityinaChangingWorld:ReportandRecommendationsofthePresident’sReviewGrouponIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnology”(2013),https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.

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expertise,respectively,incost/benefitpolicyanalysis4 andhowtotradeoffsecurityandcivillibertiesintimesofcrisis.5

TheReviewGroup,inadditiontotheexpertiseofthemembers,receiveddetailed briefingsonencryption,cybersecurity,andrelatedtopicsatthemosthighlyclassifiedlevels.WemetpersonallywithtopofficialsinmeetingsattheNSA,CIA,FBI,andelsewhere.WereceivedparticularlydetailedbriefingsonnationalcapabilitiesinencryptionanddecryptionduetotheNSA’sleadingroleonencryptionissuesandalsoitsInformationAssuranceDirectorate’sleadingroleincybersecuritydefense.6

ClearevidenceestablishespositiverecognitionoftheReviewGroup’sreportandrecommendations.Alongwithwidespreadcoverageinthepress,thePrincetonUniversityPressre-issuedtheReportinapaperbackedition– thefirsttimeafederalreporthasreceivedsuchtreatmentsincethe9/11CommissionReport.PresidentObamaandhisadministrationhaveadoptednumerousofour46recommendations;wehavebeentoldthattheadministrationhasadoptedatleast70%oftherecommendationsinletterorinspirit.Inaddition,CongresshasfoundtheReporthelpful.EachofthemajorprovisionsoftheUSAFREEDOMActisconsistentwithoneormoreoftheReviewGroup’srecommendations.7

Basedonthetop-secretbriefingsandtheknowledgeofthemembers,theReviewGroupunequivocallyrecommendedthefollowing:strongencryption,withoutbackdoors,isessentialtocybersecurity,nationalsecurity,andthepreventionofcyber-crime. TheReviewGroupwasawareoflawenforcementandintelligenceagencyconcernsabout“goingdark.”Wesimplyfoundnobasisforweakeningcybersecurityduetothegoingdarkarguments.

Ourdiscussionhighlightedthecentralroleofeffectiveencryptionforourglobalcommunications infrastructure generally,andspecificallytoaddressthe“massiveincreaseincyber-crime”:

“EncryptionisanessentialbasisfortrustontheInternet;withoutsuchtrust,valuablecommunicationswouldnotbepossible. Forthe

4 CassSunstein,alongwithhis numerouspublications,servedasAdministratorforfiveyearsfortheOfficeofInformationandRegulatoryAffairsoftheU.S.OfficeofManagementandBudget,whichoverseescost/benefitanalysesoffederalregulations.http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10871/Sunstein.5 GeoffreyR.Stone,PerilousTimes:FreeSpeechinWartimefromTheSeditionActof1798toTheWaronTerrorism (2004),TopSecret:WhenOurGovernmentKeepsUsintheDark (2007),WarandLiberty:AnAmericanDilemma (2007).6 Seehttps://www.nsa.gov/ia forinformationontheIAD’sroleandactivities.7 PeterSwire,TheUSAFREEDOMAct,thePresident’sReviewGroupandtheBiggestIntelligenceReformin40Years,IAPP PRIVACYPERSPECTIVES,Jun.8,2015(availableathttps://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-usa-freedom-act-the-presidents-review-group-and-the-biggest-intelligence-reform-in-40-years).

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entiresystemtowork,encryptionsoftwareitselfmustbetrustworthy. Usersofencryptionmustbeconfident,andjustifiablyconfident,thatonlythosepeopletheydesignatecandecrypttheirdata.

“Theuseofreliableencryptionsoftwaretosafeguarddataiscriticaltomanysectorsandorganizations,includingfinancialservices,medicineandhealthcare,researchand development,andothercriticalinfrastructuresintheUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld. Encryptionallowsusersofinformationtechnologysystemstotrustthattheirdata,includingtheirfinancialtransactions,willnotbealteredorstolen. Encryption-relatedsoftware,includingpervasiveexamplessuchasSecureSocketsLayer(SSL)andPublicKeyInfrastructure(PKI),isessentialtoonlinecommerceanduserauthentication. Itispartoftheunderpinningofcurrentcommunicationsnetworks.Indeed, inlightofthemassiveincreaseincyber-crimeandintellectualpropertythefton-line,theuseofencryptionshouldbegreatlyexpandedtoprotectnotonlydataintransit,butalsodataatrestonnetworks,instorage,andinthecloud.”

Basedonthisanalysisoftheproblem,werecommendedvigorousU.S.governmentsupportforeffectiveencryption,includingabanonsubvertingthesecurityofgenerallyavailablecommercialproductsandservices:

“Recommendation29:Werecommendthat,regardingencryption,theUSGovernmentshould:(1)fullysupportandnotundermineeffortstocreateencryptionstandards;(2)notinanywaysubvert,undermine,weaken,ormakevulnerablegenerallyavailablecommercialsoftware;and(3)increasetheuseofencryptionandurgeUScompaniestodoso,inordertobetterprotectdataintransit,atrest,inthecloud,andinotherstorage.”

Ourconcernwithcyber-crimeandcybersecurityextendedtoourdiscussionofcyber-vulnerabilities,including“ZeroDay”attacks,definedasattackswheredevelopershavehadzerodaystoaddressthevulnerability.ReviewGroupRecommendation30emphasizedthatvulnerabilitiesshouldbe“quicklyblocked,sothattheunderlyingvulnerabilities arepatchedonUSGovernmentorothernetworks.” TheReviewGrouprecommendedthat,“whenanurgentandsignificantnationalsecuritypolicycanbeaddressed”byleavingavulnerabilityunpatched,anagencyoftheUSGovernmentmaybeauthorizedtousethevulnerability“temporarily,”insteadof“immediatelyfixingtheunderlyingvulnerability.”Allowingthevulnerabilitytoremainunpatchedshouldbesubjectto“asenior-level,interagencyapprovalprocess,”chairedbytheNationalSecurityCouncil.Toensurethatmultipleperspectivesareincludedbeforeallowingsuchvulnerabilities,we

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wrotethattheprocessshouldinvolve“allofficesanddepartmentswithrelevantconcerns,generallyincludingtheNationalEconomicCouncil,State,Commerce,Energy,andHomelandSecurity.”

InconclusionontheReviewGroup,weunanimouslyandclearlyrecommendedthattheU.S.Governmentvigorouslyencouragetheuseofstrongencryption.Withfullawarenessofthe“goingdark”concerns,wesharplycriticizedanyattempttointroducevulnerabilitiesintocommerciallyavailableproductsandservices,andfoundthateventemporaryvulnerabilitiesshouldbeauthorizedonlyafteradministration-widescrutiny.Basedonthetop-secretbriefingsandourexperience,wefoundthesepolicieswouldbestfightcyber-crime,improvecybersecurity,buildtrustintheglobalcommunicationsinfrastructure,andpromotenationalsecurity.

II.GoingDarkvs.a GoldenAgeofSurveillance

In2011,Ico-authoredanarticlethathasbeenwidelycitedintheencryptiondebates:“GoingDarkvs.aGoldenAgeforSurveillance.”8 WedidnotagreethattheFBIandotheragenciesare“goingdark.”Weacknowledgedthat,“duetochangingtechnology,thereareindeedspecificwaysthatlawenforcementandnationalsecurityagencieslosespecificpreviouscapabilities.”Wecontinued: “Thesespecificlosses,however,aremorethanoffsetbymassivegains.Publicdebatesshouldrecognizethatwearetrulyinagoldenageofsurveillance.Byunderstandingthat,wecanrejectcallsforbad encryptionpolicy.”Thefouryearssincewritingthatarticle,includingmyexperienceintheReviewGroup,havereinforcedmyconfidenceintheseconclusions.The“goingdark”claimisfundamentallyincorrect;instead,governmentagenciesareoperating ina“goldenageofsurveillance.”

Inthispartofthetestimony,Icriticallyexaminelawenforcementstatementsabouthowcommonthe“goingdark”problemis.Ithenexplainthebasisforconcludingthatweareinsteadina“goldenageofsurveillance,”andapplytheanalysistoencryptedtextmessagingandencryptedsmartphones.

A.Challengesfacinglawenforcementaccess.FBIDirectorComey’sarticlethisweekinLawFarehighlightslawenforcementconcernsabout“goingdark.”Notably,DirectorComeysaysthat“ourconversationsandour‘papersandeffects’willbelockedinsuchawaythatpermitsaccessonlybyparticipantstoaconversationortheownerofthedeviceholdingthedata.”9AlthoughIagreethattherearecertainsubsetsofcommunicationsthatmaynotbereachablewithacourtorder,DirectorComey’sstatementissoover-broadthatpolicymakersshouldbe

8 PeterSwire&KenesaAhmad,‘GoingDark’Versusa‘GoldenageforSurveillance’,CENTERFORDEMOCRACYANDTECHNOLOGY,Nov.28,2011(availableat https://cdt.org/blog/’going-dark’-versus-a-‘golden-age-for-surveillance’/).9 JamesComey,“Encryption,PublicSafety,and“GoingDark,”July6,2015,http://www.lawfareblog.com/encryption-public-safety-and-going-dark.

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extremelycautiousaboutdrawingpolicyconclusionsfromtheassertion.Notably,DirectorComey’sstatementessentiallyignoresthepervasivefactofcloudbackupofcontent,andalsogreatlyover-statestheextenttowhichemailsorotherrelevantcontentisorwillbe“dark”tolawenforcement.

Beforelookingatthefactualdetails,Ipausetoemphasizemysupportforhighlyeffectivelawenforcementandintelligenceactivitiestopromotepublicsafetyandnationalsecurity.Mypreviousgovernmentworkandotherexperiencehavegivenmeconsiderablesympathy and, Ibelieve, insightaboutthechallengesfacinglawenforcementandintelligenceagencies.DuringmytimeontheReviewGroup,forinstance,oneofmysonswasservingasplatoonleaderforamotorizedinfantryunitinKandahar.IcanassureyouthatIwantedoursignalsintelligencetobeabsolutelyoutstandingtopreventanIEDorotherremote-controlthreatfromharminghispatrol.In2000,thePresident’sChiefofStaffentrustedmetoserveasChairofaWhiteHouseWorkingGrouponhowtoupdatewiretaplawsfortheInternet.Thatprocessincludedallofthemajorlawenforcementandintelligenceagencies,andresultedina clearedadministrationbill,acceptedbythoseagencies,thatwaslaterintroducedintheSenatebySenatorLeahy.Alongwiththeseyearsofexperienceworkingonlawenforcementissues,InotethatasalawstudentIworkedfortheManhattanDistrictAttorney’soffice,representedtodaybyitsleader,Mr.Vance.Doingapoliceride-alongforanightinHarlemisoneofmanyexperiencesthathasgivenmeavividappreciationforhowourpoliceofficersputthemselvesinharm’swayastheyfacecriminalsandotherthreatstoourpublicsafety.

Ihavewrittenpreviouslyaboutthecentralimportanceofcloudback-upandotherstoredrecordsasafeatureoflawenforcementaccesstocommunications.10Therearenumerousreasonswhycontentonamodernsmartphoneorcomputerisverytypicallystoredonthecloud,includingtheneedforback-upandtheabilityforindividualsorenterprisestoaccessimportantinformationfromdifferentdevices.Inaddition,thestandardoperationofahugeportionofappsonasmartphoneincludes automaticreportingofinformationtotheappdeveloperorothers.Forinformationscoredinsuchcloudsettings,standardfunctionalitybythecloudprovidermeansforaverywiderangeofapplicationsthatinformationisviewablebythecloudproviderandnotencryptedforaccessonlybytheuser.

Despiteconcernsfromlawenforcementaboutend-to-endencryption(wherecontentcanbeviewedonlybythesenderandrecipient), myview isthatthegovernmentinthevastmajorityofcaseshasretainedandwillretainaccesstoplaintextofthecontent.Forcorporateaccounts,thegovernmentcanreadilysubmitacourtordertothecorporateITdepartment,whichwillthenturnoverthecontentonpainofcontemptofcourt.Forindividualemail accounts,thegovernmentremainsinasimilarlystrongposition.Theportionofindividualswhouse whoend-to-endencryptionremains vanishinglysmall.Allofthelargestemailproviders

10 “FromReal-TimeInterceptstoStoredRecords:WhyEncryptionDrivestheGovernmenttoSeekAccesstotheCloud,”InternationalDataPrivacyLaw(2012),doi:10.1093/idpl/ips025.

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todayretaintheabilitytoaccesstheplaintextofemailswhenservedacourtorder.Individualswhousesmallerproviderscanchooseend-to-endencryption(wherethecontentsareavailableonlytothesenderandrecipient),butfewdosoduetothehighriskofproblems– userswholosetheirkeysloseaccesstoalloftheiremails.Howmanyofuswouldmanageaccesstoourbankaccountsorotherimportantaccountswithoutthepossibilityofassistanceifweforgetthepassword?Theriskoflosingallaccesstoone’scommunicationsisanenormousbarriertoadoption. Thatisthesinglebiggestreasoninmyviewthat Icontinuetodoubtthatwewillseewidespreadadoptionofend-to-endencryption.

Inshort,lawenforcementmayfacesmallsubsetsofcircumstancesthatmatchDirectorComey’sstatedconcern:lockeddevicesorend-to-endencryption(“accessonlybytheparticipantstoaconversation”).Atafactuallevel,however,weshouldremainhighlyalerttoover-broadassertionsaboutthepervasivenessofsuch“goingdark.”

B.Greaterrecentgainsforlawfulaccess.

Thediscussionherehighlightsthreeareaswherelawenforcementhasfargreatercapabilitiesthaneverbefore: (1)locationinformation;(2)informationaboutcontactsandconfederates;and(3)anarrayofnewdatabasesthatcreate“digitaldossiers”aboutindividuals’lives. ThisinformationaboutanyindividualsuspectismadeevenmoreusefulbecauseofthewaythatBigDataanddataminingcanhelpidentifysuspects.

1.Locationinformation.Knowingthelocationovertimeofasuspectorwitnessisanenormousboontolawenforcement.Forthefirsttimeinhumanhistory,weliveinanagewheremostpeoplecarrya trackingdevice,themobilephone. Locationinformationcomesstandardwithawirelessnetwork– thephonecompanyneedstoknowwhereyourphoneistosendyouthecall. Aspecificcellhandlesthecall,sothenetworkknowswhatcellyouarein. Locationinformationistremendouslyusefulforlawenforcementandnationalsecurityagencies. Itcanputasuspectatthesceneofacrime,orestablishanalibi. Itcanactasa“bug”withouttheneedfortheagencytoplaceabugonthesuspect’spersonorproperty.

Evenforthefewwhodon’tcarryaphone,locationisgettingfarmoredifficulttohide.Videosurveillancecamerasexistinstores,gasstations,andaproliferatingvarietyofotherplaces.Ourcars’locationsaretrackedbyEZPass,parkinggarages,andmanymore.Goingforward,astheInternetofThingsmultipliesthesensorsindailylife,wewillseeanexponentialincreaseinthedensityofrecordsaboutourindividuallocation.Whenitcomestolocation,themapsareincreasingly litupforlawenforcement,andemphaticallynotdark.

2.Meta-datarevealsconfederatesandco-conspirators.ThedebatessinceSnowdenhavesensitizedusalltothepowerandimportanceofmeta-data.Congress,intheUSA-FREEDOMAct,recentlysetimportantnewlimitson

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governmentbulkcollectionofmeta-data,preciselyoutofrecognition ofhowmuchmeta-data reveals.

Theexplosiveincreaseinmeta-dataprovidesunprecedentedinformationtolawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesaboutasuspectorwitness’confederatesandco-conspirators. Formanyinvestigations,whoiscalledisatleastasimportantaswhatissaidinthecall. Theinvestigatorgetsleadsonwhomelsetoinvestigateandcanfollowthoseleadstothecontact’scontacts,andsoon. NothingintheUSA-FREEDOMActlimitedtheongoingexpansionofmeta-dataheldbytheprivatesector.

Theimportanceofconfederateshasbecomefamousinsocialnetworking.Theterm“socialgraph”wascoinedinconnectionwithsocialnetworkstodescribethephenomenonof“theglobalmappingofeverybodyandhowthey'rerelated.”11

Forinvestigatoryagencies,mappingeverybodyandhowtheyarerelatedisextremelyuseful.

Atsomelevel,allofusrealizetherapidincreaseinthedensityofourcommunicationsinrecentyears.ThePewFoundation,forinstance,reportsthat8%ofInternetuserswereonsocialmediain2005,comparedwith61%in2010and74%in2014.12 Withwirelessphonesandunlimitedcallingplans,thevolumeofourphonecallshasskyrocketed,documentingindetailwhomwespeakwith. VoiPcallsthroughservicessuchasSkypeandFacetimesimilarlydocumenttheto/frominformation. E-mailshavebecomeapervasivefeatureoflifeformanypeople;theemergenceofglobalwebmailproviders,andnationwideservice ofprocessprovidedintheUSAPATRIOTAct, gives agenciestheconvenienceofservingmanylawfulrequeststoasmallnumberofproviders. Techniquesformaskingmeta-dataenormouslylagbehindcurrentencryptiontechniquesforcontent.

Ourwireline,wireless,andVoiP calls,alongwithtextsandsocialnetworkingrecordsaretreasuretrovesofinformationforinvestigatoryagencies. Inthebygoneeraofface-to-facecommunications,notracewasusuallyleftregardingwhomasuspecthadtalkedwith. Today,bycontrast,anindividualwouldneedtoabstainfrommanyeverydayactivities,overaperiodofyears, topreventthegovernmentfromobtaininginformationabouthisorhercontacts. Theidentityofthosecontactshelpsleadinvestigatorstoadditionaltargetsofinterest,therebypaintingabroaderandmoreprecisepictureofpotentialcriminalornationalsecurityactivity.

3.DigitaldossiersandBigData.Informationaboutlocationandaperson’sconfederates,inturn,aresimplyexamplesofthelargertrendtowardsdetailedpersonalrecords.PrivacyscholarsandregulatorssuchastheFederalTradeCommissionhavedocumentedthemulti-dimensionalexpansionofpersonal

11 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/21/tech/main6418458.shtml.12 http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/social-media/social-media-use-all-users/

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informationinthehandsofdatabrokers,13 banks,hospitals,onlineadvertisers,governmentagencies,andotherrecordholders.14 Thenewera of“BigData”includesadvancedanalyticsthataretominethedatainthesenumerousdatabases.Althoughafewpeopleattempttolive“offthegrid,”thisisnotafeasibleoptionforthevastmajorityofcitizensindevelopedcountries. Onceanindividualisidentifiedasatarget,thegovernment – vialawfulprocess – canaccessinformationspecifictothatindividualinunprecedenteddetail.

C.GoingDarkvs.GoldenAgefortextmessages.Twoareasofconcernthatlaw enforcementhashighlightedhave beenthepossibilityofend-to-endencryptionfortextmessagesandnewpoliciesformobiledevicesthatensurethereisno“masterkey”toallowlawenforcementaccesstothedevice.Forbothoftheseexamples,thelawenforcementclaimsto“goingdark” turnout,uponinspection,tovalidatetheviewthatweareinagoldenageofsurveillance.

Fortextmessages,lawenforcementhasexpressedconcernsthatsomesoftware,suchasiMessageandWhatsApp, providesend-to-endencryptionofthecontent.Theideaof“goingdark”isthatlawenforcementhaslostsomething– theyusedtobeabletoseesomething,andnowitisdark.Butthatisnotwhathashappened.Notsolongago,therewerenotextmessages– inalmostallinstances,dailycommunicationsnevercreatedarecordofcontent,becausewespoketosomeoneinourpresence,orcalledsomeoneonanon-wiretappedphone.

Amuchmoreaccuratecomparisonwithpastpracticeisthatlawenforcementhasgainedaninestimableboon– therecordedmeta-dataoftextmessages. ThehistoryofSMS(shortmessageservice)illustratesthepoint.Accordingtoonesource,thenumberofSMSsentbyatypicalcellphoneuserin1995was.4permonth,risingto35peruserpermonthby2000.By2010,whenper-textchargesfortextmessagingwere becomingobsolete,anestimated6.1trillion SMStextmessagesweresent,inadditiontotheenormousquantityoftextmessagessentthroughFacebookMessenger,WhatsApp,andotherdatatextservices.15

Fortextmessaging,therefore,lawenforcementhasexperiencedthenewbrightness ofliterallytrillionsoftextmessagesperyear.Forthepredominantshareofthosemessages,thecontentisavailablefromtheprovider.Evenforthesubsetwherethecontentisencrypted,lawenforcementcangainaccesstothemeta-data,linkingsuspectsandwitnessestotheirentiresocialgraphs.

13 FED. TRADECOMM’N, DATABROKERSA CALLFORTRANSPARENCYANDACCOUNTABILITY (2014)(availableathttps://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf).14 DanielJ.Solove,DigitalDossiersandtheDissipationofFourthAmendment Privacy,75S. CAL. L. REV.1083(2002)(availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313301).15 Thestatisticsherearetakenfromhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_Message_Service;ITU,THEWORLDIN2010 ICT FACTSANDFIGURES (2010)(availableat http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/material/FactsFigures2010.pdf).

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Fortextmessages,itmightbetemptingtosaythatonecancalltheglasshalf-emptyorhalf-fullforlawenforcement.Withoversixtrillionmessagesfillingthecup,though,ittakeschutzpahtosaytheglassisempty.Textmessagesareaprimeexampleofagoldenageofsurveillance,andnotofgoingdark.

D.GoingDarkvs.GoldenAgefordeviceencryption.Historicalperspectivesimilarlyhelpsusunderstandgoingdarkvs.agoldenageofsurveillanceforsmartphones.Twodecadesago,atypicalarrestrarelyresultedinpoliceaccesstoacellphone– mobilephoneswerefairlyrare.Adecadeago,atypicalarrestmightturnupaflipphone,withsmallamountsofmeta-dataaboutwhohadsentandreceivedrecentcalls.Today,manyuserscarrysmart-phoneswithgigabytesofdata,analmostunimaginablecornucopiaofinvestigativedetailintexts,emails,photos,andotherapps.Itisessentiallyimpossibletodescribethishistoricaltrajectoryasthepolice“goingdark.”Before,theyhadlittleornothing.Today,theyoftenhaveacornucopia.

Thelawenforcementresponseisbasicallythattheydon’talwaysgetthecornucopia,orsometimestheyonlygetmostofthecornucopia.Let’sbeginwiththebasics,whetherlawenforcementgetsanyaccesstowhatisinthedevice.First,manyuserstodaydon’tevenputapasscodeontheirphone– anyonewhopicksitupcanaccesstheinformation.Second,ifasuspectdoesuseapasscode,manyusershavenoencryptionofdataonthephoneortherearetechnicalwaystoevadetheencryptionimplementation.Third,especiallyinourworldwhereconfederatesandco-conspiratorsaresoeasytoidentify,theprosecutorsonlyhavetograntimmunitytooneco-conspiratorinordertogainentryintothecontentsharedwiththeothersuspects.Fourth,thecourtshaveyettoresolvehow theFifthAmendmentprivilegeagainstself-incriminationappliestoopeninganencryptedsmartphone,especiallyina“goingdark”scenario;thecourtsmaydecidethatthegovernmentcanjailsuspectsforcontemptiftheyrefusetoopenthephone.Biometricidentification,whichisincreasinglyusedforsmartphones,maybeespeciallyavailabletolawenforcementwithouttriggeringtheprivilege.ThesefourreasonsmayhelpexplainwhyithasbeensodifficultfortheFBIandotherlawenforcementofficialstoprovideexamplesofwhereencryptionhasfrustratedaninvestigation,andthemostrecentstatisticsactuallyshowadeclineinwiretapsencounteringencryptionin2014comparedto2013,hardlyevidenceof“goingdark.”16

Evenwherelawenforcementdoesnotgainaccesstothedevice(thecornucopia),lawenforcement canoftengetmostoralloftherelevantdata(mostofthecornucopia).Ihavealreadydiscussedmuchofthedatathatremainsavailableto

16 Accordingtothefederal2014WiretapReport:“Thenumberofstatewiretapsinwhichencryptionwasencountereddecreasedfrom41in2013to22in2014.Intwoofthesewiretaps,officialswereunabletodeciphertheplaintextofthemessages.Threefederalwiretapswerereportedasbeingencryptedin2014,ofwhichtwocouldnotbedecrypted.Encryptionwasalsoreportedforfivefederalwiretapsthatwereconductedduringpreviousyears,butreportedtotheAOforthefirsttimein2014.Officialswereabletodeciphertheplaintextofthecommunicationsinfourofthefiveintercepts.”http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2014

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lawenforcementwithoutrecoursetothedeviceitself– locationofthephone;plaintextofemails;meta-dataandoftenplaintextfortextmessages;andsocialnetworkingdatashowingconfederates. Inaddition,asdiscussedabove,cloudstorageoftenexistsfornumerousotherdata-sets,suchascloudstorageofphotosandvideos,locationonappssuchasWazeandUber,bankingandotherfinancialappsshowingpurchases,andsoon. Indeedtheincreasingnormisfull-devicebackupstothecloud.Evenforaninaccessibledevice,therefore,thefullcontentmaybeavailablefromanaccessiblecloudprovider.

E.SummaryonGoingDarkvs.GoldenAge.Tosummarize,lawenforcementdoesconfrontimportantchallengesasencryptionandothereffectivecybersecuritymechanismsbecomemorepervasive.Therewillbeparticularinstanceswherealawfulcourtorderwillnotgeneratethefulltextofacommunication.Nonetheless,numerousothertechnicaltrendsaremovingsharplyinthedirectionofunprecedentedlawenforcementaccess.Iftheagencieshadthechoicebetween1990-eracapabilitiesorcapabilitiestoday,theywouldchoosethecapabilitiestoday.

III.Government-MandatedVulnerabilitiesWouldThreatenU.S.TechnologicalLeadership,WhileNotPreventingEffectiveEncryptionbyAdversaries

Whilenationalsecurityinterestsare,justifiably,thefocusofthecurrentdiscussionaroundencryption,anymandatedvulnerabilitieswouldhavefarreachingeffectsinothersectorsofU.S.interestaswell.Thefirst“CryptoWars”inthe1990’sareillustrativeofthefutilityofthisapproach:attemptstocontroltheexportofencryptionnegativelyimpactedU.S.businessinterestswhileotherplayersenteredtoprovidetheirownencryptionsolutions.AnymandatedweakeningofU.S.encryptiontodaywouldcreatesimilarissues,asconsumers bothathomeandabroaddemandstrong,independentencryptionforavarietyofreasons.HamstringingU.S.companiesfrombeingabletomeetthisdemandwillonlybenefitforeigncompetitorswhoseektofillthevoidwhilegivingpoliticalcoverforthosecountrieswhowilldemandsimilaraccessinordertofurtherthesuppressionoftargetedspeechandoppression.

A. Technologycompanies,evenbeforeSnowden,hadmultiplereasonstousestrongencryptiontoenhancecybersecurityandcustomertrust.

AlthoughencryptionissueshavebecomethesubjectofgreaterpublicdebatesincethebeginningoftheSnowdenrevelations,therehasbeenanongoingtrendtodeployeffectiveencryptionforconsumerandbusinessapplications.ThecentralimportanceofencryptiontocybersecuritywasamajorthemeintheReviewGroupreport,asdiscussedabove.Strongencryptionisessentiallythebroadest-spectrumantibioticagainstcyber-infections.Inoureraofpervasivecyber-attacks,encryptioniscrucialtopreventingidentitytheft,reducingtheharmfuleffectsofdatabreaches,andprovidingmyriadotherprotectionsagainstattacks.

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Thenecessaryandpervasivespreadofencryptionwasthetopicofmy2012articlewhyencryptiondrivesthegovernmenttoseekaccesstothecloud,citedabove.Thatarticlegavea2012listofexamplesofwidespreadencryption:

“CorporateandgovernmentusershavewidelyadoptedVirtualPrivateNetworks(VPNs)forremoteusers.VPNsarestronglyencrypted,thusprotectingtheorganization’semailsandothercommunications.

Electroniccommerce,includingcreditcardnumbers,isoverwhelminglyconductedtodayusingSSL(SecureSocketsLayer).

FacebooknowsupportsSSL.IfitenablesSSLbydefault [whichistruein2015],thenitssocialnetworkingcommunicationswouldnotbereadableattheISPlevel.

ResearchinMotion’sBlackberryproductsusestrongencryption,andRIMitselfdoesnothavethekeysforcorporationswhomanagekeysthemselves.

Majorweblockerservices,suchasDropbox,useSSLbydefault. Skype,theleadingVoIPprovider,encryptsend-to-end.Manyinternational

callsaremadeusingSkype.VoIPenablesvoicecommunicationstobeencryptedatscale.

ManyInternetgamesandotherservicesuseencryption,often withaccompanyingvoiceandchatchannels.”17

Thistrendhascontinuedsince2012,includingforthedeviceencryptionofsmartphonesthattheFBIhas criticized.18 Althoughitmightseemthatthewidespreaduseofencryptionisareasontomandatevulnerabilitiesinsoftwaretoenablelawenforcementaccess,myviewisdifferent.Thegrowingandpervasiveuseofencryptionisrecognition ofitscentralitytodefendingagainstcyber-attacks–theongoingdebatesaboutcybersecuritylegislationinCongressshowaconsensusthatcustomersneedthis protection,andcompaniesneedtosupplyit.Inaddition,CALEAII-stylemandatesrunupagainstthepervasiveuseofencryption.Such

17 “FromReal-TimeInterceptstoStoredRecords:WhyEncryptionDrivestheGovernmenttoSeekAccesstotheCloud,”InternationalDataPrivacyLaw(2012),doi:10.1093/idpl/ips025.18 JoeMiller,GoogleandAppletointroducedefaultencryption,BBC NEWS,Sep.19,2104(availableathttp://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29276955),KlintFinley,EncryptedWebTrafficMoreThanDoublesAfterNSARevelations,WIRED,May16,2014(availableathttp://www.wired.com/2014/05/sandvine-report/),PeterEckersley,Launchingin2015:ACertificateAuthoritytoEncrypttheEntireWeb,EFF,Nov.18,2014(availableathttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/certificate-authority-encrypt-entire-web),JamesVincent,MicrosoftwillencryptBingsearchtrafficbydefault,THEVERGE,Jun16,2015(availableathttps://www.theverge.com/2015/6/16/8788373/encrypted-search-microsoft-bing),KateVinton,WikipediaIsNowUsingHTTPSByDefaultToPreventSnoopingandCensorship,FORBES,Jun.12,2015(availableat http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/06/12/wikipedia-is-now-using-https-by-default-to-prevent-snooping-and-censorship/),AlexHern,FacebookintroducesPGPencryptionforsensitiveemails,THEGUARDIAN,Jun.1,2015(availableathttp://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/01/facebook-introduces-pgp-encryption-for-sensitive-emails),MicahLee,MicrosoftGivesDetailsAboutItsControversialDiskEncryption,TheIntercept,Jun.4,2015(availableat https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/04/microsoft-disk-encryption/).

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mandateswouldbearegulatorynightmare,affectingsomanyapplicationsandimplementationsastobeunmanageableandenormouslycostly.

B.Overwhelmingtechnicalproblemsandcostsresultfrommandatestocreatevulnerabilitiesinencryption.

ThetechnologicalhopesoflawenforcementwereexpressedinHousetestimonythisAprilbyAmyHess,ExecutiveAssistantDirectoroftheScienceandTechnologyBranchoftheFBI.Shesaid:

“Tobeclear,weintheFBIsupportandencouragetheuseofsecurenetworksandsophisticatedencryptiontopreventcyberthreatstoourcriticalnationalinfrastructure,ourintellectualproperty,andourdata. Wehavebeenonthefrontlinesofthefightagainstcybercrimeandeconomicespionageandwerecognizethatabsolutesecuritydoesnotexistineitherthephysicalordigitalworld. Anylawfulinterceptoraccesssolutionshouldnotlowertheoverallsecurity.” (emphasissupplied)19

Theheartoftheproblemisthis: theReviewGroupandthevastmajorityoftechnicalexpertsdonotthinktheFBI’shopesarepossibletoachieve,forthesortsofaccesssuggestedinCALEAIIproposals.Eveniftheyassistlawenforcementinsomerespects, theproposedlawfulinterceptandaccesssolutionsloweroverallsecurity.

Repeatedblue-ribbonpanelsoftechnicalexpertshavecometothesameconclusion.Inthe1990’s,RepresentativeBobGoodlattesummedupthelessonsthatCongresswaslearning:

“Strongencryptionpreventscrime. Justasdead-boltlocksandalarmsystemshelppeopleprotecttheirhomesagainstintruders,therebyassistinglawenforcementinpreventingcrime,strongencryptionallowspeopletoprotecttheirdigitalcommunicationsandcomputersystemsagainstcriminalhackersandcomputerthieves. Theblue-ribbonNationalResearchCouncilsaiditbest,concludingthatstrongencryptionsupportsbothlawenforcementeffortsandournationalsecurity,whileprotectingtheproprietaryinformationofU.S.businesses.”20

19 AmyHess,StatementBeforetheHouseOversightandGovernmentReformCommittee,SubcommitteeonInformationTechnology,Apr.29,2015(availableathttps://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/encryption-and-cyber-security-for-mobile-electronic-communication-devices).20 BobGoodlatte,“Let'sOpenUpEncryption,”TheWashingtonPost,June12,1997,availableathttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/encryption/stories/ocr061297.htm(emphasisadded),citingKennethW.DamandHerbertS.Lin,Editors,CommitteetoStudyNationalCryptographyPolicy,NationalResearchCouncil,“Cryptography'sRoleinSecuringtheInformation

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Aninfluentialgroupofencryptionexpertsissueda1997reporton“TheRisksofKeyRecovery,KeyEscrow,andTrustedThird-PartyEncryption.”21Amongthekeyfindingsofthistechnicalgroup:“Thedeploymentofkey-recovery-basedencryptioninfrastructurestomeetstatedspecificationswillresultinsubstantialsacrificesinsecurityandgreatlyincreasedcoststo endusers.”Thereportmadenumerous,tellingcriticismsofkeyrecoveryapproaches.Frommyparticipationinthepolicydebatesoftheera,therewasnoeffectivetechnicalresponsebysupportersofgovernmentkeyrecoveryapproaches.

InMay,2013,justpriortothefirstSnowdenrevelations,theCenterforDemocracyandTechnologygatheredadifferentgroupoftechnicalexpertstowrite“CALEAII:RisksofWiretapModificationstoEndpoints.”22Theconclusionsabouttheharmsofmandatedvulnerabilitieswereclear:

“TheU.S.governmentisproposingtoexpandwiretapdesignlawsbroadlytoInternetservices,includingvoiceoverInternetprotocol(VoIP)servicesandotherpeer- to-peertoolsthatallowcommunicationsinreal-timedirectlybetweenindividuals. Thisreportexplainshowmandatingwiretapcapabilitiesinendpointsposesserioussecurityrisks. Requiringsoftwarevendorstobuildinterceptfunctionalityintotheirproductsisunwiseandwillbeineffective,withtheresultbeingserious consequencesfortheeconomicwell-beingandnationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates.”

AnimpressivenewtechnicalstudybyagroupofexpertswasreleasedonJuly7,justbeforethishearing,entitled“KeysUnderDoormats:MandatingInsecuritybyRequiringGovernmentAccesstoAllDataandCommunications.”23Itstates:

“Wehavefoundthatthedamagethatcouldbecausedbylawenforcementexceptionalrequirementswouldbeevengreatertodaythanitwouldhavebeentwentyyearsago. Inthewakeof thegrowingeconomicandsocialcostofthefundamentalinsecurityoftoday’sInternetenvironment,anyproposalsthatalterthesecuritydynamicsonlineshouldbeapproachedwithcaution. ExceptionalaccesswouldforceInternetsystemdeveloperstoreverse“forwardsecrecy”design

Society,”NationalAcademiesPress(1996),availableathttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/5131/cryptographys-role-in-securing-the-information-society.21 HalAbelson,RossN.Anderson,StevenMichaelBellovin,JoshBenaloh,MattBlaze,WhitfieldDiffie,JohnGilmore,PeterG.Neumann,RonaldL.Rivest,JeffreyI.Schiller,andothers.https://www.schneier.com/paper-key-escrow.html.22 https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf.23 “KeysUnderDoormats:Mandatinginsecuritybyrequiringgovernmentaccesstoalldataandcommunication.” Abelson,Harold;Anderson,Ross;Bellovin,StevenM.;Benaloh,Josh;Blaze,Matt;Diffie,Whitfield;Gilmore,John;Green,Matthew;Neumann,PeterG.;Landau,Susan;Rivest,RonaldL.;Schiller,JeffreyI.;Schneier,Bruce;Specter,Michael;Weitzner,DanielJ.

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practicesthatseektominimizetheimpactonuserprivacywhensystemsarebreached. Thecomplexityoftoday’sInternetenvironment,withmillionsofappsandglobally-connectedservices,meansthatnewlawenforcementrequirementsarelikelytointroduceunanticipated,hardtodetectsecurityflaws.”

Thenewstudyhighlightsthreegeneralproblems.First,providingmandatedaccess“wouldforceaU-turn fromthebestpracticesnowbeingdeployedtomaketheInternetmoresecure.”Forinstance,bestpracticesnowincorporate“forwardsecrecy,”where“decryptionkeysaredeletedimmediatelyafteruse,sothatstealingtheencryptionkeyusedbyacommunicationsserverwouldnotcompromiseearlierorlatercommunications.”Iflawenforcementrequireskeyretention,thenthatdirectlyunderminestheprotectionagainstlaterattacks.

Second,buildinginexceptionalaccesswouldsubstantiallyincreasesystemcomplexity:

“Securityresearchersinsideandoutsidegovernmentagreethatcomplexityistheenemyofsecurity— everynewfeaturecaninteractwithotherstocreatevulnerabilities. Toachievewidespreadexceptionalaccess,newtechnologyfeatureswouldhavetobedeployedandtestedwithliterallyhundredsofthousandsofdevelopersallaroundtheworld. ThisisafarmorecomplexenvironmentthantheelectronicsurveillancenowdeployedintelecommunicationsandInternetaccessservices…Featurestopermitlaw-enforcementexceptionalaccessacrossawiderangeofInternetandmobilecomputingapplicationscouldbeparticularlyproblematicbecausetheirtypicalusewouldbesurreptitious—makingsecuritytestingdifficultandlesseffective.”

Third,exceptionalaccesswouldcreateconcentratedtargetsforbadactorstotarget:

“Securitycredentialsthatunlockthedatawouldhavetoberetainedbytheplatformprovider,lawenforcementagencies,orsomeothertrustedthirdparty. Iflawenforcement’skeyshaveguaranteedaccesstoeverything,anattackerwhogainedaccess tothesekeyswouldenjoythesameprivilege. Moreover,lawenforcement’sstatedneedforrapidaccesstodatawouldmakeitimpracticaltostorekeysofflineorsplitkeysamongmultiplekeyholders,assecurityengineerswouldnormallydowithextremely high-valuecredentials. RecentattacksontheUnitedStatesGovernmentOfficeofPersonnelManagementshowhowmuchharmcanarisewhenmanyorganizationsrelyonasingleinstitutionthatitselfhassecurityvulnerabilities. InthecaseofOPM,numerousfederalagencieslostsensitivedatabecauseOPMhadinsecureinfrastructure. Ifserviceprovidersimplementexceptional

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accessrequirementsincorrectly,thesecurityofalloftheiruserswillbeatrisk.”

Atapracticallevel,therearethousandsofpolicedepartmentsspreadacrosstheUnitedStates.Providingonlineaccesstothesepolicedepartments,whilehavingiron-cladassurancesthatnohackerscangetin,ignoresthelessonsoftherecentOPMbreachandthenumerousotherdatabreachesinthepublicandprivatesectors.

Letmeaddmypersonalobservationsonthesestudiesaboutthetechnicalobstaclestosafekeyrecoverybylawenforcement.Ihaveengagedwithawiderangeoftechnicalencryptionexpertsfortwodecades,bothinsideandoutsideofgovernment,oftenastheonlypersonwithlegaltrainingataconference.IhaveanappointmentintheCollegeofComputingatGeorgiaTech,andteachcybersecuritythere,withamajorityoftheclassingraduatestudiesininformationsecurity.Basedonthisengagementwithtechnicalexperts,theysaythesamethingsinprivateasarewrittenintheblue-ribbonreports.Thepassionthatthemosteminenttechnicalexpertsshowhereisduetotheirconvictionbasedonhard-foughtexperience,andnotasalobbyingploy.

Quitesimply,thetechnicalexpertsItrustbelievethattheFBIisaskingfortheimpossible.CALEAII-styleproposalshurtsecurity.

C.U.S.Governmentsupportforencryptionvulnerabilitiesincreasescybersecurityproblemsinthe“leasttrustedcountries”andglobally,andunderminesU.S.humanrightspolicies.

U.S.Governmentsupportforencryptionvulnerabilitiesnotonlyencounterstheseveretechnicalcybersecurityproblemsjustdiscussed,butalsoincreasesthelikelihoodofcybersecuritythreatsoriginatingfromothercountries.U.S.governmentsupportforsuchvulnerabilitiesharmsbothcybersecurityandhumanrights.

In2012Iwastheleadauthorofa65-pagelawreviewarticleon“EncryptionandGlobalization,”acomprehensiveexaminationofglobaleffectsofnationalencryptionpolicies.24Whatwecalledthe“leasttrustedcountry”problemiscriticaltounderstandingcybersecurityandencryptioninourglobalizedsetting.Ifonecountrysetslimitsonencryption,thencross-bordercommunicationsthatcomplywiththatcountry’slawswillhavethat vulnerability.Ifonepartytoacommunication usescompromisedencryptionasrequiredinthatcountry,thenthosegloballywhocommunicatewiththatcountrywillhavetheircommunicationscompromisedaswell.

Keyescrowprovidesavividexampleoftheleasttrustedcountry problem.

24 PeterSwire&KenesaAhmad,“EncryptionandGlobalization,”13Colum.Sci.&Tech.L.Rev. 416(2012).

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Considerwhatevercountryintheworldyoutrusttheleast.ForIndia,thatcouldbePakistan,forTaiwanitcouldbeChina,forIsraelitcouldbeIran. (IprefernottopickonesuchcountryfortheUnitedStates.)Howsecurewouldanyofthesecountriesbeiftheirleasttrustedcountryhadkeyescrowfortheircommunications?Wewrote: “Ultimately,lawsthatlimiteffectiveencryptioncreatesecurityholes.Communicationsthatoriginate,end,travelthrough,orcomplywiththepoliciesofthosenationsaresystematicallyweakened—they areassecureastheywouldbeinthehandsofourleasttrustedcountry,whatevercountrythatmaybe…Thinkaboutimportantcommunicationsinthehandsofthecountryyoutrustleastintheworld. ThatistheInternetthatwouldresultfromlimitsonstrongencryption.”

Inthisglobalized setting,theUnitedStateshasacrucialleadershiproletoplayconcerningpossiblecompromisesinglobalcommunicationssecurity.IsawthispersonallywhenImetinIndiawithseniorofficialsin2011,whenIndia wasconsideringasweepingkeyescrowproposal.Inthesediscussions,weexplainedthehistoryofthecryptowarsinthe1990’s,andgavethetechnicalandpoliticalreasonswhytheU.S.governmenthadcorrectlydecidedtoabandonakeyescrowapproach.Afterthesediscussions,andthosewithotherAmericanandglobalexperts,theIndiangovernmentsubstantiallycutbackitslegalproposal,andalsohashadfarlessthanfullimplementationoftheresidualprovisions.Inshort,theAmericanexamplewasusefulinreducingthebadeffectsonglobalsecurity,notablyincludingforU.S.individualsandcompaniescommunicatingabroad.IfAmericanpolicybecomestomandateencryptionvulnerabilities,eitherinlawandpractice,thenourmoralandpolicyauthoritytoargueforstrongcybersecurityiseroded.

Thehumanrightsimplicationsofmandatingvulnerabilitiesarealsosubstantialandimportant.TheReviewGroupReportdiscussedtheimportanceoftheU.S.InternetFreedomagenda,tobolsterprotectionsforjournalist,religiousminorities,andpolitical dissentersaroundtheworld,especiallyinrepressiveregimes.InFebruary,theU.S.governmentwroteadetailedstatementabouttheimportanceofencryptiontoglobalfreeexpressionandhumanrightstoDavidKaye,SpecialRapporteuronthePromotionof theRighttoFreedomofOpinionandExpressionfortheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights.Keystatementsincluded:

“AsPresidentObamarecentlymadeclear,theUnitedStatesfirmlysupportsthedevelopmentofrobustadoptionofstrongencryption,whichisakeytooltosecurecommerceandtrade,safeguardprivateinformation,promotefreedomsofexpressionandassociation,andstrengthencybersecurity.Encryption,aswellastoolsthatassistwithanonymity,areespeciallyimportantinsensitivecontextswhereattributioncouldhavenegativepolitical,socialorpersonalconsequencesorwhentheprivacyinterestsintheinformationarestrong….Consistentwiththislegalframework,asamatterofpolicy,theUnitedStateshaslongsupportedthedevelopmentanduseof

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strongencryptionandanonymity-enablingtoolsonline.”25

Theimportanceoftheseanonymity-enablingtoolshasbeenunderscoredbyfinancialsupport,especiallyfromtheU.S.StateDepartment,fordevelopmentofsoftwareandplatformstoenablehumanrightsactivistsandothersabroadtocommunicateeffectivelynotwithstandinglocalpoliticalregimes’effortstounderminesuchcommunications. TheU.S.governmentsupportforitsInternetFreedomagendaisbroadlyconsistentwiththeJune17,2015JointCivilSocietyStatementby25leadingnon-governmentorganizationsentitled“PromoteStrongEncryptionandAnonymity intheDigitalAge.”26

Inconclusiononthe“leasttrustedcountry”discussion,itisabundantlyclearinourglobalizedworldthatdecisionsaboutU.S.lawenforcementaccesstocommunicationshaveimportanteffectsonhowothercountriesdecidetorespondtosimilarissuesintheirowncountries.TheInformationTechnologyIndustryCouncilandSoftware&Information IndustryAssociationmadethispointinarecentletter:“Inadditiontothesesecurityandtrustconcerns,theU.S.policypositiononencryptionwillsendasignaltotherestoftheworld.ShouldtheU.S.governmentrequirecompaniestoweakenencryptiontechnology,suchrequirementswilllegitimizesimilareffortsbyforeigngovernments.Thiswouldthreatentheglobalmarketplaceaswellasdepriveindividualsofcertainliberties.“27 TheUnitedStatesshouldbeastrongexampleforcybersecurityand humanrights,ratherthananexcuseusedbyrepressiveregimestosurveil U.S.-basedbusinessesandindividualsandclampdownonpoliticaldissent.

D.Mandatedvulnerabilitiesarebadindustrialpolicy– theythreatenU.S.technologicalleadershipwithoutpreventingbadactorsfromusingstrongencryption.

Inextturntowhymandatedvulnerabilitiesarebadasamatterofeconomicandindustrialpolicy.SuchvulnerabilitiesthreatenU.S.technologicalleadershipbecausetheyprovideareadyexcuseforforeigngovernmentsandpurchaserstoeschewAmericanproductsandservices.Aswelearnedfromthecryptobattlesofthe1990’s,theyalsoarefutile– theyencouragenon-U.S.supplierstogainthetechnicaledgeinsupplyingeffectiveencryption.

InApril,2015Housetestimony,KevinBankstonoftheNewAmericaFoundationsummarizedkeyeconomicarguments:

“Americantechnologycompanies,whichcurrentlydominatetheglobalmarket,havealreadybeenwrestlingwith diminishedconsumertrustinthewakeofrevelationsaboutthescopeofthe

25http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/States/USA.pdf26 https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/17/promote-strong-encryption-and-anonymity-digital-age-027 http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/58fbf8de-cd86-47a0-a114-43a55776d2e6.pdf.

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NationalSecurityAgency’sprograms,alossoftrustalreadypredictedtocostoureconomybillionsofdollars.AnynewrequirementthatthosecompaniesguaranteethattheU.S.governmenthavethetechnicalcapabilitytodecrypttheirusers’datawouldgiveforeignusers— includingmajorinstitutionalclientssuchasforeigncorporationsandgovernmentsthatespeciallyrelyonthesecurityofthoseproductsandservices—evenmoreincentivetoavoidAmericanproductsandturntoforeigncompetitors. ItwouldalsolikelydiminishtrustinthesecurityofdigitaltechnologyandtheInternetoverall,whichwouldslowfuturegrowthoftheInternetandInternet-enabledcommerceandthreatentheprimaryeconomicengineofthe21stcentury.Toputitbluntly,foreigncustomerswillnotwanttobuyoruseonlineservices,hardwareproducts,softwareproductsoranyotherinformationsystemsthathavebeenexplicitlydesignedtofacilitatebackdooraccessfortheFBIortheNSA.”28

Theexperiencefromthe1990’sshowsthatforeignsuppliersareeagertostepintogapsleftbyU.S.restrictionsonencryption.Undertheexportcontrolregimetheninexistence,itwasillegaltoexportstrongencryptionfromtheU.S.Otherencryptionsuppliers,suchasfromRussiaandIsrael,becamesignificantplayerspreciselybecauseU.S.-basedcompaniescouldnotsupplyeffectivesoftwareencryptionfromtheU.S.Inmyexperience,thefutilityoftheencryptionlimitswasanespeciallypersuasiveargumenttomembersofCongress– whyshouldwesupportanapproachthatunderminedtheU.S.techsectorandalsodidn’tstopthespreadofstrongencryption?Arelatedphenomenon,lesswellknown,wastheconcernwithinthePentagonabouttherisingcompetitionfromnon-U.S.technologycompanies.FortheDepartmentofDefense,limitsonU.S.encryptiondevelopmentmeantthatitfacedtheriskofrelyingonsecond-rateencryptionforitsownsystems,whileothercountriescouldbedevelopingstate-of-the-artencryptionthatwouldbenefitothermilitariesbutnottheUnitedStates.

MandatedvulnerabilitieswithintheUnitedStates,toassistlawenforcement,thusrepeatthe1990’ssyndromeofharmtoU.S.industry aswellasfutility.Muchofthegrowthinencryption-relatedsoftwareandproductscouldcomefromnon-U.S.companiesthatservetheglobalmarketforsecurecommunicationsandstorage.Othergrowthwouldcomefromthealready-flourishingfreeandopen sourcesector.AsBankstonwrote:

“AgovernmentmandateprohibitingU.S.companiesfromofferingproductsorserviceswithunbreakableencryptionisoflittleusewhenforeigncompaniescanandwilloffermoresecureproductsandservices,andwhenanindependentcoderanywhereontheplanethastheresourcestocreateanddistributefreetoolsforencryptingyour

28 http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/4-29-2015-IT-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-Encryption-Bankston.pdf.

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communicationsorthedatastoredonyourmobiledevices. AsformerHomelandSecuritySecretaryMichaelChertoffrecentlyputit,‘[T]hatgenieisnotgoingbackinthebottle.’”29

StanfordcybersecurityresearchJonathanMayersumsupthefutilityoftechnologycontrolsjustifiedby“goingdark”concerns:

“Cryptographicbackdoorsare,however,notasolution.Beyondthemyriadotherobjections,theyposetoomuchofacost-benefitasymmetry.Inordertomakesecureappsjust slightlymoredifficultforcriminalstoobtain,andjust slightly lessworthwhilefordevelopers,thegovernmentwouldhavetogotoextraordinarylengths.Inanarmsrace betweencryptographicbackdoorsandsecureapps,theUnitedStateswouldinevitablylose.”30

Conclusion

Muchmorecouldbeaddedaboutwhysuchadiversecoalitionofcybersecurityexperts,technologycompanies,privacyexperts,humanrightsactivists,andothersaresopassionatelyconcernedaboutthe“goingdark”argumentsmadebylawenforcementagencies.31Wecanrespecttheheartfeltconcernsoflawenforcementofficialsfacingnewchallengeswhilerespectfullydisagreeingwithproposedpolicies.Thepolicydebatesinthe1990sendedinaclearverdict,acceptedbyCongressandtheadministration-- effectiveencryptionisessentialtoourmoderncommunicationsinfrastructure,andmandatedweaknessesinencryptionarebothfutileandultimatelycounter-productive.

Biography ofPeterSwire

PeterSwireistheHuangProfessorofLawandEthicsattheGeorgiaTechSchellerCollegeofBusiness.HehasappointmentsbycourtesywiththeCollegeofComputingandSchoolofPublicPolicy.Hiscoursesinclude“InformationSecurityStrategiesandPolicy”and“Privacy,Technology,Policy,andLaw.”

In2015,theInternationalAssociationofPrivacyProfessionals,amongitsover20,000members,awardedhimitsPrivacyLeadershipAward.In2013,heservedasoneoffivemembersofPresidentObama’sReviewGrouponIntelligenceandCommunicationsTechnology.Priortothat,hewasco-chairoftheglobalDoNot

29 Bankston,athttp://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/4-29-2015-IT-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-Encryption-Bankston.pdf,quotingJasonKoebler,“TheManWhoCraftedthePatriotActNowSupportsYourRighttoEncryptData,”Motherboard,February27,2015,availableathttp://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-man-who-crafted-the-patriot-act-now- supports-your-right-to-encrypt-data.30 JonathanMayer,“YouCan’tBackdooraPlatform,”Apr.28,2015,http://webpolicy.org/2015/04/28/you-cant-backdoor-a-platform.31 Foronecoalitionletter,seehttps://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3138--113/Encryption_Letter_to_Obama_final_051915.pdf.

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TrackprocessfortheWorldWideWebConsortium.

SwireisSeniorCounselwithAlston&Bird,LLP.HeisSeniorFellowwiththeFutureofPrivacyForum,aPolicyFellowwiththeCenterforDemocracyandTechnology,andaCybersecurityFellowwiththeNewAmericaFoundation.

UnderPresidentClinton,SwirewastheChiefCounselorforPrivacy,intheU.S.OfficeofManagementandBudget,thefirstpersontohaveU.S.government-wideresponsibilityforprivacypolicy.Inthatrole,hechairedtheWhiteHouseWorkingGrouponEncryption,andparticipatedinthe1999WhiteHouseannouncementenablingexportofstrongencryption.AsChiefCounselor,hisactivitiesincludedbeingWhiteHousecoordinatorfortheHIPAAmedicalprivacyrule,chairingaWhiteHousetaskforceonhowtoupdatewiretaplawsfortheInternetage,andhelpingnegotiatetheU.S.-E.U.SafeHarboragreementfortrans-borderdataflows. UnderPresidentObama,heservedasSpecialAssistanttothePresidentforEconomicPolicy.

Swire’swritingsonencryptioninclude:(1)“TheUsesandLimitsofFinancialCryptography:ALawProfessor'sPerspective,”chapterintheproceedingsofFinancialCryptography '97(Springer-Verlag,1997);(2)“‘GoingDark’vs. ‘AGoldenAgeforSurveillance,’”CenterforDemocracyandTechnology,Nov.28,2011(withKenesaAhmad);(3)“EncryptionandGlobalization,”13Colum.Sci.&Tech.L.Rev.416 (2012)(withKenesaAhmad);(4)“FromReal-TimeInterceptstoStoredRecords:WhyEncryptionDrivestheGovernmenttoSeekAccesstotheCloud,”InternationalDataPrivacyLaw(2012),doi:10.1093/idpl/ips025;(5)“GoingDarkvs.GoingSecure– NewCDTExpertsReportonCALEAII,”IAPPPrivacyPerspectives,May16,2013;(6)“TheFBIDoesn’tNeedMoreAccess:We’reAlreadyintheGoldenAgeofSurveillance,”JustSecurity,Nov.17,2014.

SwiregraduatedfromPrincetonUniversity,summacumlaude,andtheYaleLawSchool,wherehewasaneditoroftheYaleLawJournal.