View
244
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
1/19
Review: Following Scientists AroundAuthor(s): Steven ShapinReviewed work(s):
Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society by BrunoLatour
Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 533-550Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/285237
Accessed: 22/12/2009 10:56
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Ltd.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Studies of
Science.
http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/285237?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/285237?origin=JSTOR-pdf7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
2/19
ESSAY
REVIEW
Following
Scientists
Around
Steven
Shapin
Bruno
Latour,
Science
in Action: How to Follow
Scientists and
Engi-
neers
throughSociety
(Milton
Keynes,
Bucks.:
Open University
Press;
Cambridge,
MA:
Harvard
University
Press,
1987),
274
pp.,
?25,
?9.95
pbk.
ISBN 0-335-15357-7
(6-9
pbk).
Bruno Latour has
been
following
scientists
around for
years.
Now
he
wants us to follow him
following
them
around. He offers
studentsof
science
and
technology
a
detailed
map
that
will
allow
us to follow him
easily.
He
defines the
nature,
scope
and terms of
the
exercise;
he
even
inventsa name- 'technoscience' for its objectof study.Inunmistak-
ably
French fashion
he
gives
us
'rules of
method' and
'principles',
numberedand
ordered. No one
following
Latour
is meant to
get
lost
or
to
stray
off the
line of
march.
Stragglers
will
have no
excuses.
There
has
never been a
programme
or
research n
the social
studies of
science
that
has been
presented
in
such a
systematic
and
integratedway.
This
is
no
mere
supplement
o our
existing nterpretative
epertoires,
no
piece-
meal
compilation
of
case-studies. It is
not meant to
be
slotted into
the
relativist or the 'social constructivist'agendas,whose research,in any
case,
is said to
be
fundamentally
misconceived.
This is
offered
as a new
programme
or
empirical
and theoretical
work that
has
the
capacity
to
keep
us
occupied
nto the
foreseeable uture.
Latour'sbook
will
receive,
and
it
deserves to
receive,
the
closest and most
widespread
attention.
Indeed,
the
general
perspective
developed by
Latour
and his
colleagues
in
Paris is
already
being,
to
use Latour's
language,
'black-boxed'
into
a
matter-of-fact
resource for
research in
the social
studies
of
science.1
The
study
of
technoscience
under
Latour's
eadership
promises
to be
great
fun. He is
clearly
enjoying
himself
immensely.
He writes with
Social
Studies of
Science
(SAGE,
London,
Newbury
Park,
Beverly
Hills
and
New
Delhi),
Vol.
18
(1988),
533-50
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
3/19
Social Studies
of
Science
panache,
charm and infectious
wit.2 This
is
one
of
the funniest
books
in
a
discipline
which is well-endowed with
funny-men. (Much
of
the
book's residual
Franglais
has
got
to be
intentional )
The hilarious and
well-judged
caricatureof the
history
of
ideas tradition
(132-36)
alone
is
worth the
purchase
price.
If
many
of us
are
going
to be victims
of
the Latourian
war
against
existing
tendencies
in
the social studies
of
science,
we
may
as
well
die
laughing.
Ave
Bruno,
morituri
e salutant.
The
Technoscientific
War
The
military
(Machiavellian,
Hobbesian,
Nietzschean)
metaphor
s,
of
course,
Latour's trade
mark,
and it is
basic
to his
understanding
of
scientific
and
technological activity.3
Technoscience
is
war conducted
by
muchthe
same
means. Its
object
s domination nd ts methods nvolve
the mobilization
of
allies,
their
multiplication
and
their
drilling,
their
strategic
and forceful
juxtaposition
o the
enemy.
This
agonistic
model
has,
beyond
doubt,
picked
out and stressed features of
science
and
technology which other perspectives have missed or systematically
undervalued.
To those raised
on
the functionalist diom
which insisted
upon
the
harmonious
solidarity
of
the scientific
community,
Latour's
'red-in-tooth-and-claw'
ociology
will
come as
a
violent shock.
Indeed,
his
whole
enterprise
s
little more than the
systematic
working-through
of
the
military metaphor,
and,
ultimately,
its
designation
as a literal
depiction
of science and
technology.
The basic elements
of
Latour'saccount
may
be
reasonably
well
known
from his previouswritings.4Science andtechnologyare informedby a
Drang
an Macht.
Its actors
work out their
mpulses
o
grow,
to
transform
themselves
from 'micro-actors'
o 'macro-actors'.
This
they
do
vampire
fashion:
by subduing
thers,
by
insinuating
hemselves
nto others'
bodies
and
by
turning
hem
into
agents
of their
own volition. Successful
cientific
and
technological
enterprises
are
manifestations
of the
triumph
of
the
will.
The
laboratory
s not a
peaceful
retreat
rom
political
and economic
struggles
that
rage
outside.
It
is a
great
battlefield
upon
which
most
combatantsare
slaughtered
and
from
which
only
the
strong
walk
away.
Waris
usually
understoodas a meansto an end:in itself it yields nothing
but
corpses
and
heroes,
and it
has
rarely
been
justified
as
worthy
in its
own
right.
Science
and
technology,
however,
are
productive.
They
produce
facts and
machines,
and
these constitute
their
justifications.
What are
the means
of technoscientific
war and
how do
they produce
these
goods?
If
scientists
and
engineers
are
trying
to
impose
their
will
534
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
4/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists Around
upon
others,
let us
imagine
an actor
who
resists and
let us follow
him
as he
attempts
o maintain
his resistance.
If he resists
a
simple
scientific
assertion about a matter of
fact,
he can be shown a
textual
display
of
allies that vouch for the
claim,
and
that he will have
to
confront
should
he
not submit.
Initially,
we are still
in
a
paper
world
and the allies
take
the form of
cited authorities: 'if
you
don't believe
me,
take a look
at
all the other
scientists
who
support
me'.
Rhetoric,
then,
is the
general-
issue
weapon
of scientific
armies,
and Latour's
account is
founded
on
a
rhetorical
nalysis
of scientific
activity.
Scientific actsare
made
hrough
rhetorical
manoeuvring
with
grammatical
modalities':
positive
modalities
makingstatementshard,
negative
modalities
making
them soft. When
the statements
become hard
enough,
they may
be
inserted into
other
statements
without modificationor
justification:they
are
facts, and,
as
such,
they
can
be made
into
allies
for
further
claims to
facticity.
The
fate of a statement s not
determined
by
its
contentor its
structure,
nor
by
the
individual who first
made
it,
nor
by
the
context
in
which
it was
initially
made.
Fact-making
is a
collective
business
and it is
extended
in
time. Statements
can
only
become facts if
they
are
noticed
and used without modificationby others. Moreover, the status of any
statement
cannot be
guaranteed
against
the
fact-destroying
activity
of
others,
in
other
places,
at
other times.
'The
status of
a
statement
depends
on
later
statements'
(27).
Presumably,
though
without
explicit
acknowledgement,
Latour is
here
affiliating
himself
with
a version
of
philosophical
initism
familiar from
the
work of
Hesse
and
Barnes:
concept
application
s
open-ended
and
revisable;
nothing
in
the
nature
of
reality
and
nothing
about
past
usage
determines how
terms
are
employed.5
Statements
are
endemicallyvulnerable o users' decisions:
do
users
take
any
notice?
do
they
modify
the
statements?
reject
them?
incorporate
hem in
other
statements?
The
recalcitrant
eaderhas now
been shown
the
forces
arrayed
against
his
resistance,
and,
therefore,
the
price
to
be
paid
should he
continue
to
deny
the
truth of
what is
asserted. As he
persists
in
his
resistance,
the
debate
becomesat
once
more
'technical'
and
more
'social'.
It
becomes
technical
because
the
doubter has to
be shown
in
the
text
what
claims
(and
who)
he
must
also
doubt if
he
wants to
doubt
this
one.
It
becomes
more social because allies are
being
mobilized and enemies are
being
isolated. In
general,
the
technical
appearance
of
scientific
literature
consists,
Latour
says,
in
nothing
but
its
social
character,
its
display
of
phalanxes
of
armed
allies
making
t
pointless
to
resist. 'If
being
isolated,
besieged,
and left
without
allies
and
supporters
s not
a
social
act,
then
nothing
s. ...
This
literature
s so
hard o
read
and
analyse
not
because t
535
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
5/19
Social Studies
of
Science
escapes
from
all normal social
links,
but because
it
is more social
than
so-callednormalsocial ties' (62). Latour husmajesticallysweeps aside
one
of
the
major
obstacles
blocking
he
progress
of
the
sociologists'
army:
the dualistic
opposition
between what
is
'scientific'
or
'technical'
and
what is 'social'.
The scientific
literature
displays
the cost of
doubting,
but
doubt,
as
Latour
recognizes,
may
still be
persisted
with.
The
show
of the instru-
ments
of torture
may
not be
enough
for
the committed
heretic;
they may
have
to be
applied
o his
flesh. The doubter
may
resist
all mere rhetorical
tricks;
he
may
want
to follow the scientist into the actual
place
where
the work is done: the
laboratory.
He
may
want to see the
reality
that
is said to
'lie behind'
the text. What
he
sees there raises
the cost
of
resistance
still further.
If
you
don't
believe the
representations
roduced
by
your antagonist,
you
will
ultimately
have to learn
to make them
yourself.
More than
that,
you
will be
obliged
to build
your
own instru-
ments
and to
gather
them
into one
place.
You
will,
that
is
to
say,
have
to secure
the resources
to construct a
'counter-laboratory'.
At
each
stage
of
doubt,
the
cost
of resistance
s increased. It
becomes
botheconomicallyandmorallyharder o continuerefusingone's assent.
On the
one
hand,
you
will have
to build
your
own
laboratory
o
contest
the
claims;
on
the
other,
you
will
have
to
impugn
the
competence
or
good
faith
of those
you
choose
to disbelieve.
The
financial
cost
is
impossible
o
bear;
he
social cost
is
alienation.
Latour's
haggy-dog
tory
comes
to a
pragmatic
nd.
More,
and
more
powerful,
allies are
mobilized
and
juxtaposed
to
the
forces
of doubt.
In
principle,
doubt
may
be con-
tinued
indefinitely;
in
practice,
doubters
give up.
The
laboratory
acts
on resisters ike a Romanphalanxactedondisorganized arbarianabble:
The
layman
s awed
by
the
laboratory et-up,
and
rightly
so.
There
are not
many
places
under
he
sun
where
so
many
and such
hardresources
are
gathered
n so
great
numbers,
sedimented
in so
many layers,
capitalised
on such a
large
scale...
[C]onfronted
by
laboratories
we
are
simply
and
literally impressed.
We are left
without
power
. .to
dispute
the
spokesmen's
authority.
(93)
Disciplining
and
Persuading
The collective natureof
fact-making
and
machine-makingprecipitates
an
apparent
aradox.
You
want to
make
yourself
great,
to secure
author-
ship
for
your
own creation.
But
to do so
you
need
a
multitude
of
allies.
How
to enlist
their
assistance
and,
at the same
time,
to
ensure
hat
hey
do
not
modify
the
claim
or the
device
out
of all
recognition?
You
have
both
to
'enrol'
and
to 'control'.
One
way
to
enrol
others
is
straightforward:
536
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
6/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin: Following
Scientists
Around
you
can cater
for
potential
allies'
'explicit
interests'. You
shape
your
claim or your machineso that otherswill immediatelybelieve it or buy
it.
However,
if
you
do this
you
will
not
grow great
yourself;
your
authority
will
not be enhanced
or
even
recognized;
you
will
merely
help
others to
grow.
You can
always get
allies to march
n
the direction
they
already
want
to
go,
but that is
unlikely
to do
you
much
good.
So
what
you
must do
is
to translate their interests nto
your
preferred
course
of
action,
to
get
them 'to
follow
us rather hanthe other
way
around'
111).
There are
many
strategies
that
may
be used to
effect this translation.
You
can,
for
example,
tell
people
that their
goals
are unrealizable
as
presently
conceived,
that
they
can attain hem if
only they
make a short
detour from the
route
of
march
they
are
on
already.
Scientists who
tell
industry
and the
military
that
they
can
only
get
useful outcomes if
they
make a
detour into basic research are
trying
to
achieve this
type
of
translation.
Still,
there are limits to translations hat
depend
upon
others'
explicit
interests. Better to outflank the
explicit purposes
of
potential
allies. You can
give people's objectives
different
interpretations
han
is
customary; you
can invent new
objectives
and
try
to sell them to
a
group;you can try to create a new groupwith characteristicsyou have
custom-tailored;
you
can tell a
group
that the detour
you
propose
isn't
very
long,
all
the time
keeping
them
moving
in
your
preferred
direction.
Best of
all
you
can make
yourself
indispensable
o
allies.
Indeed,
this
is
a
description
f
the state
of
affairs hatexists when
you
have
succeeded.
You
no
longer
have to
sell
your product,
because
your
goods
have
become
simply necessary
for an
array
of
allies to
achieve their
purposes.
Your
product
s then a
black-box. The
thermometer
s,
for
example,
used
by
laymenand scientistsfor a wide rangeof purposes;no one has to display
and
justify
the
physical
principles
underlying
ts use
in
order to
get
on
with the
job
of
taking
a
reading;
such
readings
must
be taken in
order
for
any
numberof
other
tasks to be
realized;
and
any
attempt
o
dispute
the
legitimacy
of
thermometricmeasures of
physical
reality
will
be
strenuously
opposed
by
almost
all the
world.
If
you
achieve this
kind
of
success,
you
(your
statement,
apparatus,
place
of
work)
will
have
become an
'obligatory
point
of
passage'
(120-21,
132, 141,
150-51,
156,
162).6
Having
enrolled
your
allies,
you
must now make surethat
they
keep
in
line,
particularly
hat
they
don't transform
your
creation so
that it
is
no
longer
recognizable
s
yours.
The
thing
must
spread,
but it
must
spread
as
'the
same'
thing
that
you
produced
at
the
start of
the
process.
You
control
your
enrolled
allies
and make
them
predictable
by
building up
a
network
of
elements
around
he
thing
in
question, linking
'the fate
of
537
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
7/19
Social
Studies
of
Science
the
claim with so
many
assembled elements
that
it
resists all
trials
to
break it
apart' (122). Here, too, matters become highly 'technical'.
Pasteur nterestedfarmers
n
his anthrax
vaccine,
but
he was in
danger
of
losing
their
interest
f he
could
not
get
the
bacilli
to
behave
themselves
properly.
He
had
to
make
the
behaviour
f boththe bacilli
andthe
farmers
predictable.
This
involved 'technicalities'
ike
finding
precisely
the
right
temperature
t
which to culturethe
germs
so that the
farmers
could and
would
use the vaccine
reliably.
You
must,
in
Latour's
usage,
construct
a
'machine'
in which
the
assembledelements are tied to one anotherand
act
as
a whole.
'When such cohesion
is obtained
we at last have a black
box'
(131).
Once
you
have done
that,
no one can
tamper
with
any
one
component
without
eroding
the
functioning
of
the entire machine.
'Dis-
sent has been
made unthinkable'
(133).
The
strength
of
the
Roman
phalanx
did
not
arisefromthe numbers
t contained
butfrom ts
disciplined
coordination.
Actor-Networks
Latour's 'networks'
are
heterogeneous
n their
composition.
They
con-
tain entities
we
are accustomed
to
call
'things'
as well
as
those
we
are used
to
designate
as
'people'.
Anything
can
be an
'actant'
or
an
'actor'
in technoscientific
networks.Latour's
erosionof the
conventional
boundaries
eparating
politics
from science
is
predicated
upon
the
insis-
tence that
objects
and
non-human ntities
as well
as
people
are
political
beings.
Things
belong
to
the
study
of
political
order as
much
as
human
agents. Thus, Pasteur's network
contained
both
bacilli and
farmers;
George
Eastman's
ncluded
photographic
mulsion
and an
invented
group
of
camera
users;
Robert
Boyle's
tied
together
an
air-pump,
n
operational
vacuum,
moderate
Anglican
clerics
and
political
theorists.
The
ingenuity
of the
scientist
or
engineer
-
that
which defines
his
identity
-
is
his
ability
'to include
n
the
same
repertoire
of
ploys
human
and
non-human
resources'
125).
Latour
egards
t as a
great
mistake
o decide
n
advance
what
alliances
are
composed
of:
whether
their
elements
are human
or
non-human,
whether
they
are
subjective
or
objective.
We have
only
to
ask whether an associationis strongeror weakerthan another.Tech-
nology
and science are
the activities
that
build
strong
alliances
out
of
heterogeneous
components.
They
are,
Latour
says,
'so
muchthe
same
phenomenon
that
I was
right
to use
the same
term
black-box...to
designate
their
outcome'
(131).
This,
then,
is the definition
of
'techno-
science',
the
thing
Latour's
enterprise
aims
to
understand.
538
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
8/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists
Around
An
importantconsequence
flows from this for our
perception
of
the
boundaries between 'science' and 'society', and for our view of the
proper
scope
of
'sociology'.
Because the networks
which confront
us
are
composed
of both human and non-human
elements,
we never
see
'science'
and
'society' separately,
only
stronger
and weaker
associations.
'Scientific' work
is also 'social'
work, or,
as
it
might
be
put,
solutions
to the
problem
of
knowledge
are solutions o the
problem
of social
order.
'Society'
is
constructedand stabilized at the same time that 'facts'
and
'machines'
are
constructed.
From
this observation Latour draws
both
optimistic
and
pessimistic
conclusions for the
scope
of
sociological
accounting
in the
study
of technoscience. On the one
hand,
sociology
can
go
anywhere:
there is
nothing
in
science
and
technology,
however
technical and
esoteric,
which is
beyond
the
sociologist's proper
ambit.
On
the
other,
the resources
the
sociologist
can use to
say
intelligible
things
about
science and
technology
are
drastically
curtailed.
Because
the order of
society
is the outcome of
settled
controversies,
Latour
will
not allow us to
invoke
'society'
(or
'social
factors')
'to
explain
how and
why
a
controversy
has been settled'
(144).
Since 'actornetworks' areheterogeneous,they mayextendanywhere
in
nature or in
society. They
may
reach from
the virus
to
Versailles;
indeed,
the
virologist
must
enlist allies
in
the
corridors
of
power
in
order
to do his
work
and
to
createhis
objects.
Latour
tudieswhat s
customarily
called the
'professionalization'
of
science
in
terms of
the enrolmentof
allies in
society
and the translation f
their
nterests.The
professionaliza-
tion of
science
is to be
understood
as the
constitutionof the
laboratory
as an
'obligatorypoint
of
passage'.
Thus,
Latourfollows
the work
that
precipitates herecognizedboundariesdividing 'science' from 'society'
and
'politics',
while
denying
those boundaries
any analytic
legitimacy.
He
gives
a new
twist to our
understanding
of
'science
policy'
and
of
the
basis of
the
'purity'
of
'pure
science'.
Laboratory
work
becomes
more
and more
'technical'
just
in
order to
enrol
and
discipline
allies,
including politicians
and
industrialists. Its
apparent
ndependence
s,
consequently,
precisely
the
resultof
the
political
work
done
in
enrolling
these
allies.
'Those
who are
really
doing
science are
not
all
at the
bench;
on
the
contrary,
there are
people
at the
bench
because
many
more are
doing
the science elsewhere'
(162).
So much for the
boundary
between
the
'internal'
and
the
'external'.
Latour
is
one of
the
very
few
students of
modern
science and
tech-
nology
who
recognizes
the
fundamental
mportance
of
the
links which
bind
these
activities to
the
military.
This
is not
because he
adopts
any
readily
discernible
anti-militaristic
tance
(Latour's
position appears
o
539
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
9/19
Social Studies
of
Science
be
somewhere between even-handedand above it
all),
but
because
he
wants to
follow
technoscientificactor-networkswherever
they go.
The
military
s
a natural
ally
for
scientists
wanting
o recruitand controlallies
simply
because the
military
has abundant
experience
in
'enrolling,
disciplining, drilling
and
keeping
in line'. If
you
can
sell to
the
military,
you
can
buy
into their networks.More
fundamentally,
echnoscienceand
the
military
have the same
problem:
that
of
winning.
The
similarity
between 'the
proof
race and
the armsrace'
is,
in
the
end,
not a
metaphor.
They
are,
for
Latour,
the
same sort
of
activity:
'technoscience is
part
of a
war
machine and should
be
studied as
such'
(172).
The remainderof Latour'sbook uses actor-network
heory
to recon-
ceptualize
a series of
problems
usually
assigned
o the
domains
of macro-
sociology, anthropology
nd
longue
duree
historiography.
For
example,
he dissolves
the
categories
'belief and
'knowledge',
'rationality'
and
'irrationality',
nto the
geometry
and
dynamics
of
intersections
between
different
actor-networks.
The
'GreatDivide' between
rational
and irra-
tional
cannot
refer
to what
is believed and
how
inferences
are
made,
since the
accusations
can
always,
as
a matter of
principle,
be
turned
around 188-95). Instead, hedesignationsproperlyreferto appearances
generated
as
the
result of
certain
kinds
of
contact
between
members
of
different
networks.
The Great Divide
is
a
summary
of how matters
outside
scientific
networks
appear
when looked at
from within.
In
turn,
it
is a
function
of
the
transits
raced
by
technoscientific
ravellers
rossing
a series
of
other cultures
with the intention
of
coming
back and
telling
stories.
The
cultures
thus
transitted
by
'these
peculiar
travellers
sent
away
in
order
to
come
back
are
going
to
appear
by comparison
"local",
"closed", "stable", "culturallydetermined"' 211).
We
get
the
impres-
sion that
rules
of
logic
have
been
broken,
but we are
only seeing
the
result
of certain
kinds
of
dynamic
interaction
between networks
of
different
'scale'.
From
what
sources
do such differences
in
scale arise?
In what
do the
differences
between
great
and
small,
strong
and
weak,
consist?
Latour
deals
with
these
questions
through
a
study
of
imperialism.
He wants
to
identify
the
bases
of domination
which
imperialism
shares
with
techno-
science.
Ultimately,
the
power
to
dominate
consists
in the differential
possession
of
knowledge.7
One
group
can get the edge on another f it
can
more
effectively
gather
and
distribute
elevant
knowledge.
The
sailor
who is
seeing
a
dangerous
eef
for the
second
ime
is
more
knowledgeable
than
one
who
is
seeing
it
for the
first
time.
Forewarned
s
forearmed.
How
is
it
possible
for those
who
have
not
yet physically
gone
out
to
the reef
to have
seen
it
already?
How
can
you
act
at
a
distance?
The
540
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
10/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists Around
answer is
straightforward:
ou
bring
the reef home
and show
it
about.
Of
course,
there
are certainpracticalproblemsassociatedwithshipping
distant
objects
like reefs back
home,
so what
you
do
is to
manipulate
the scale of the
thing
in
question
so that it is more
easily portable
and
so
that he
largest
number
of
people
at home can havethe same
experience
of it. In
Latour's
erminology,
you
achieve
this
by
creating
scaled-down
'immutable
mobiles',
entities hatretain heir
shape
while
beingmultiplied
indefinitely
nd
combined
n
an indefinitenumberof
ways:
charts, ables,
maps,
logs, plans,
lists.
Latour nds wherehe
begins:
n
a
paper
world. The basis of
domination
is the accumulation n certain 'centres of calculation'of mountainsof
inscribed
paper.
This
paper
world is
what allows its
manipulators
o
dominatethe
real
world. The
objects
of
technoscience,
no
matter
what
their
size,
'all end
up
at such a scale that a few
men
or
women
can
dominate hem
by
sight;
at one
point
or
another,
they
all take
the
shape
of
a flat surfaceof
paper
..;
they
all
help
to reversethe balanceof
forces
between
those who master
and those who
are
mastered';
'it
is
simply
a
question
of
scale'
(255, 227).
Technoscience s
truly
a
paper
war.
Paper
is at once the battlefieldand the ultimateweapon.
Interesting
Sociology
C'est la
guerre,
mais
est-ce
que
c
'est
magnifique
There is so
much here
that is
instantly
appealing:
the
account of
enrolment
processes,
the
'energy-cost'
theory
of
scientific
assent,
the
study
of
institutionalization
in
terms of
obligatorypoints
of
passage and funnelledinterests, and,
not
least,
the
parallels
Latour
points
out
between the
objects
of
science
and the
objects
of
technology.
Picking
elements out of
Latour's book
and
intercalating
hem into
existing
traditions
in
the
social
studies
of
science
could
keep
us
gainfully
occupied
for
years.
This is
what
may
ultimately
happen
to
Latour's
work,
but
this is
clearly
not
what Latour
wants o
happen.
He wants o
enrol
us and
keep
us in
line;
he
doesn't
want
us
to
modify
the
elements
out of
all
recognition,
and he
doesn't
want
us to
enrol
him.
It
is
only
right,
therefore,
to
assess
the
schema as a
whole, and as Latourhas
proffered
it to us. Whatare the
goals
of the
social
studies of
science as
Latour
conceives
them? How
do these
relate
to
our
existing goals?
What
resources is
he
offering
us that
can
help
us
achieve
our
goals?
It is
possible
that
some
readers of
a
nervous
disposition
may
feel
uneasy
about
Latour's
dare-devil
theorizing, squeamish
about
his
book's
541
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
11/19
Social
Studies
of
Science
over-weening
ambition
and
the
cosmic
scope
of
his schemata.This would
be
wrong:
we
need
many
more workers
in
our field who
cast their nets
as
widely
as
Latour;
we
need to
go
back to
the
goals
of the
1930s
when
workers like
Zilsel,
Borkenau,
Grossmann,
Fleck,
Bernal,
Hessen,
Mannheim,
and
Sorokin
all
sought
o
say things
about
science and
society
that nterested
people
outwith
he
narrow
confines
of
an academic
discip-
line.
No,
Latour's readers
would
be
better advised to
worry
about
his
modesty,
reticence
and
self-denial,
all
the more so since
the ambition
is
apparent
while the restraint s not.
What,
according
to
Latour,
will
we be
doing
if
we elect to follow him? His
answers
may
strike some
workers in the field as
disappointing.
All these resources have been
mobilized and
arrayed
or the
sake
of
a
'tiny
breathing pace'
for 'those
who want to
study
independently
he
extensions
of
all these networks'
(257).8
This
is
not the
Ring of
the
Niebelungen
after
all;
it is
just
a
shaggy-dog
story
of
epic
proportions.
Latour reckons that we need a
respite
from
causal
explanations
of
science and
technology.
It makes no difference whether the causal
items
are,
as
it
is
usually put, 'cognitive',
'natural'or 'social':
all
such
explanatory nterprisesarefundamentallymisconceived. Yet it is never
made
clear what sort
of
enterprise
we are
being
invited
to
put
in
the
place
of
explanation.
Presumably,
it is
some version
of
verstehende
or hermeneutic
sociology, though
one feels entitled
to a much
more
systematic
confrontation
with this issue
than Latour
actually
provides.
Instead,
a
matter of such fundamental
mportance
s
largely
dealt
with
by
putting
n
place
a
practical anguage
which
eschews
the
word
'why'
in favour of
the word 'how'.
We 'follow' scientists
around;
we 'enter'
their
laboratories;
we 'watch' them
at
work;
we 'understand'
he nature
of science and
technology.
But we don't
'explain'
why they
make the
choices
they
do,
why
the controversies
we observe come
to
be closed
and
why
they
are settled
as
they
are.9
Such
explanation,
t is
suggested,
s
misguided
on two
grounds.
Latour
first
observes that
the closure
of controversies
generates
new controver-
sies.
'We could review
all the
opinions
offered
to
explain
why
an
open
controversy
closes,
but
we
will
always
stumble
on
a
new
controversy
dealing
with
how and
why
it closed.
We
will have to
learn
to live with
two contradictory oices talkingatonce...'(13). It is hard o understand
how Latour
makes
the move
from
the
undeniable
observation
hat there
are different
members'
accounts
of
controversy
losure
to the
conclusion
that
the
analyst
cannot
or must
not
explain
such
closure.
(Gilbert
and
Mulkay
do
indeed
make this
move,
but Latour
has
not
noticeably
allied
himself
with their
programme
of 'discourse
analysis'.)10
542
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
12/19
Essay Review:
Shapin: Following
Scientists
Around
More
fundamentally,
Latour
argues
that
we cannot
explain why
controversies
close because
the
alleged
cause
is not independentof the
effect
to
be
explained.
We cannot
give
a realist
explanation
because
the
'settlement
of a
controversy
s the cause
of Nature's
representation';
nd
we
are barred from
sociological
explanations
because the
closure of
a
controversy
s
also 'the cause of
Society's
stability'
(258).
Explanation
of
science and
technology
n termsof 'social
factors',
andthe
programme
dedicated o
showing
the 'social construction
f science
and
technology',
are
banned because
they
are
said
to
rest
upon
an
illegitimate
dualism
between science
and
society.
Analysts
who use
groups
endowedwith interests n
order
o
explain
how an
idea
spreads,
a
theory
is
accepted,
or a
machine
rejected,
are
not
aware
[sic]
that the
very
groups,
the
very
interests that
they
use as causes in
their
explanations
are the
consequence
of an
artificial
xtraction nd
purification
f
a
handfulof links from
these
ideas,
theories
or
machines.
(141)
This
is a
serious
charge,
even
putting
to
one side
the
unfortunate
diagnosis
of
other
analysts'
tates
of
'awareness'. t is
the
basis
of
Latour's
attack
upon
'relativists'
and
'social
constructivists'and
the
warrant or
the
heroic
self-denial he
imposes upon
his
own
accounts.
Are
Latour's
criticisms
well-aimed and
well-informed?Has he
adequately
character-
ized
the nature
and
statusof
the
sociological
explanations
he
criticizes?12
If
he has
not,
has he
imposed
unnecessary
onstraints
pon
his own
work?
Interests
and
other 'social
factors',
Latour
says,
cannot be
used as
causal
items
because
they
are the
consequences
of
negotiation
and the
effects of
the
settlementof
disputes.
He
uses his
accountof
the
transla-
tion
of
interests
through
talk
and
negotiation
as
proof
of
this.
Latour
is hereevidentlyequating nterestswithaccounts of interests:as verbal
manoeuvring
proceeds
and
produces
its
effects on
interest-talk,so,
it
is
assumed,
interests
hemselves are
transformed.
They
are
thus too
soft
to
act as
causal or
explanatory
resources.
But,
as
interest-theorists
ike
Barnes
have
repeatedly
explained,
their
'work
refers
to
interests,
not
to
agents'
accounts of
interests,
and the
two
cannot
be
assumed to
be
the
same,
any
more
than
cream-cakes
and
accounts of
cream-cakescan
be
assumed
to
be
the
same.
With
cream-cakes
there is
a
chance
of
satisfying hunger
-
with accounts of cream-cakesthere is not'.13
Interests,
Goals
and
Skills
'Interests'
properly
point
to
the
fundamentally
oal-oriented
and
instru-
mental
characterof
scientific
work,
and to
the
contingencies
by
which
543
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
13/19
Social
Studies
of
Science
particulargoals
are constituted.
If
Latour is to show the illicitness
of
interest-explanations,e shouldsystematically idhis work of theorizing
about he
goal-directedness
f
technoscience.
In
practice
he
does
no such
thing.
This book
is
firmly,
and
potentially
fruitfully,
rooted
in a view
of technoscientific
work as
goal-directed,
as,
indeed,
was his earlier
Laboratory Life.
It
is, however,
remarkable that Latour is
now
so
reluctant o
acknowledge
this
orientation,
and even
implicitly
to
deny
it. In
Chapter
of
the
present
book the items that
ndicate
he
instrumental
character
f
scientists'
and
technologists'
work
are
referred
o as
'goals'.
Curiously, nothing
s said about what
'goals'
are,
for Latour ntroduces
theterm as a
way
of
defining
and
showing
the
dependence
of 'interests'.
He notes the
etymological
derivation
of
'interests'
from 'inter-esse'
(that
is,
'what
ie[s]
in
betweenactorsand their
goals'),
and thus
distinguishes
between interests
(which
he
treats
as
negotiated hrough
alk)
and
goals
(which
are
generally,
if
not
invariably,
spoken
of
as
given)
(108-10).14
Latour
has,
to
all
appearances,
banned nterests
by treating
hem
as the
same
as
interest-accounts,
hile
re-introducing
he instrumental
haracter
of technoscientific
work
by
the
back
door,
in the form
of
'goals'.
Latour hereforestill maintainsa fundamentally, f implicitly, instru-
mentalistorientation.
This is
not
to be criticized.
It is the
major
resource
thatallows
him to make
sense
of scientists'and
engineers'
behaviour,and,
for want
of
a more
politic
word,
to
'explain'
what informstheir
trainsof
discursive
and
manipulative
work.
They
are
maximizing
animals.
In
Laboratory
Life,
Latour
and
Woolgar
asked
'WhatMotivatesScientists?'.
They
happily
and
systematically
answered
the
question
by
invoking
the
notion hat
scientists,
as
they
followed
their
career
rajectories,
acquired
a
range
of 'investments'
whose
value
hey
tried o
protect
and
enhance.
These
investments
ncluded
ommitments
o the
credibility
f
past
achievements,
socially
acquired
expertise,
and
familiarity
with
traditions
of instrumen-
tation.
Such
investments
were
invoked
as
explanatory
responses
to
questions
ike 'What
drives scientists
o... write
papers,
construct
bjects,
and
occupy
different
positions?
What makes
a
scientist...
choose
this
or
that
method,
this
or
that
data...
?'15In other
words,
'investments'
were
offered
as
explanations
of
scientists'
decisions
and
judgements
in
relation
to the
possibilities
presented
to them.
It is a pity that this explicit line was apparentlyabandoned without
significant
comment)
by
its authors.
Even
though
it
seems
to be
ruled
out
by
Latour's
(and
Woolgar's)
present
programmatic
tatements,
his
approach
has
enormous
potential.
It
may,
indeed,
be
the
most
profitable
way
forward
for
sociological
explanations
of
scientific
action
and
of the
closure
of scientific
controversies.
Consider
Latour's
present
account
544
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
14/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists
Around
of
technoscientific
controversy
and
its
settlement.At each
stage
of
the
disbeliever's trajectory,the energy cost of his resistanceis raised. In
Latour's
story
it
simply
becomes
harderand harder
or
resistanceto
be
offered. The
resources hat
are
arrayed
against
he dissenterare
various:
they
include
rhetoric,
more
rhetoric,
new
objects,
bigger
laboratories
and more
expensive
nstruments,
more
allies,
more
powerful
allies,
more
disciplined
allies,
morecohesive networks
of
allies,
the rhetoric
of
trans-
lation,
and,
finally,
the
combination
of
these
in
'the
long heterogeneous
list
of
resourcesand allies that scientists
[gather]
o
make dissent
impos-
sible'
(103).
While it becomes
more
costly
and awkward o
resist,
Latour
is at
pains
to assureus thathe has not offered
anything
ike a
principled
explanation
of
why
controversies
close. How can
he,
since,
in
his
opinion,
all
potential
explanatory
resources are too
soft to do the
job?
Interests
can be talked
away;
reality
and
society
are
themselves mere
precipitates
of
technoscientific
controversy,
the
results of
further alk.
The
in-principle
problem
of
what settles
controversy
is
simply put
to
one side
in
favourof a
list of the
elements which
figure
in
its
resolution.
On the one
side we have
all the resources
arrayed
o
makethe dissenter
submit or to enlist his disciplinedparticipation;on the other we have
Latour's
undamental
scription
o the
technoscientific
ctorof maximiz-
ing
behaviour
and the
ability
to
calculate
likely
consequences
of his
behaviour.
What
informs his
decision to
resist or
submit,
to
join
this
or
that
network? f
we
are to
give
an
explanatory
esponse
o
this
question
we
need
something
which
is not
simply
the
result of a
controversy
being
settled,
something
which is not
simply
to
be talked
away
or
around.The
laboratory
ethnographer
hould not
have far to look
for
something
of
thatsort. When
he enters
he
laboratory
what
else
shouldhe
see but
scien-
tists at work?
They
are,
as Latour
nsists,
producing
'traces',
but
they
produce
them
through
routines
of
work.
Work is
of
many
kinds:
it
may
be
discursive
(rhetorical,
representational)
nd it
may
be
manipulative.
The
ability
o
accomplish
work of
certain
kinds
s
acquired
hrough
rains
of
socialization,
and,
once
acquired,
constitutes
a
major
'investment'
to
be
protected
and
maximized.
An
attack
upon
the
validity
of
a
work-product
a
scientific
fact or
theory,
a line of
enquiry,
a
research
programme)
s
importantly
n
attack
upon the legitimacy and value of the work-abilities that make it. The
scientist
whose
skills
are of no
value is
literally
unemployed,
and
he will
fight
to
defend
the
value of
his
skills
as
fiercely
as
any
miner,
compositor
or
machinist
fighting
the
'rationalizations'
of
Thatcherism.
Moreover,
skills,
competences
and
routines
which
entrain
work-abilities,
are not
vulnerable
o
'work-talk'
or
'skill-talk'.
Given a
community
f
competent
545
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
15/19
Social
Studies
of
Science
users,
there
is no
way
to talk
your way
into
possession
of the
relevant
skill. You either
have the
ability
to
speakFrench or you don't; to ride
a
bicycle;
to build a
working
TEA-laser;
to
make
a
souffle;
to
culture
Drosophila
cells;
to
perform
Monte
Carlo
computer
imulations;
o write
a
scientific
paper
in
the form
acceptable
to
Nature.'6
There is
a
peculiar
ophthalmological
onditionthat
appears
preferen-
tially
to
afflict
the
intellectualclasses.
They
can
see the
product
of
work,
but
the work itself
seems
to be
invisible. This condition
takes its
toll
even when the work concerned s
intellectualwork
and
the
products
are
ideas. The effect
of
this
optical
distortion an
be a
contrastbetween
paper-
workand
proper-work,
anassimilationof talk to
thought,
andanundue
prominence given
to
that
which
is,
or
can
be,
verbalized. Of
course,
discursive
competences
are skills
as
much as
manipulative ompetences,
and
iterary
kills are as
much
nvolvedas
manipulative
kills in the labour
processes
which
makescientific
goods.
But,
for all Latour's
mphasisupon
'following'
scientists nto
their
places
of
work,
his book contains
remark-
ably
little
on the work world
of
technoscience.
Compared,
or
example,
to
Michael
Lynch's
recent
accountof scientific
'shop
work',
Latour's
book
gives the impression that scientists' day-to-daywork consists almost
entirely
of
rhetorical,
representational
nd
literary
practices.'7
doubt
if
the
word 'skill'
ever
appears
n this
book, and,
even
if I
noddedand
missed
one
or
more
usages,
there
is
certainlynothing
here that ndicates
serious
interest
in
the
extended
and
energy-consuming
processes
of
training
by
which
scientists
acquire
heir nstrumentalnd
otherskills. Yet
the
'inscrip-
tions' and 'traces'
hat
constitute cientific
goods
are
undeniably
roduced
by
routines
of
manipulative
ndother
workthat
represent,
s it
were,
scien-
tists'
capital.
Calculative
echnoscientific
actors,
such
as
those
who
figure
in Latour's
account,
are
therefore
quite
able
to
weigh
in the balance
the
courses
of
action
offered
o them
and
he
investments
hey
have
acquired
n
their
skills and
competences.
One
should
say
that
hey
have an
'interest'
n
those
skills and
work-routines,
an
'interest'
n
encouraging
or
enlisting
n
courses
of
action
which
promise
to
give
scope
and
value to their
skills
and
routines.
Given a
basically
calculative
model
of
the
actor
(which,
indeed,
Latour
hares
withthe
sociologists
he
criticizes),
interests'
eem
quite
hard
and
durable
enough
to
figure
in
a
job
of
explanatory
work.18
Dualism
and
Discourse
The
constraints
which Latour
places
on
himself and
his
programme
rise
from the same
source
as
his valuable
contributions
o the
discipline.
Both
546
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
16/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists
Around
stem
from his
opposition
to
conventionally given
dualisms that
have
bedevilledthe social studiesof science and allied enterprises.His book
is
structured
around a
systematic
assault
on the
legitimacy
of a
range
of
dualisms,
including
those that
uxtapose
the social
and the
scientific,
the
subjective
and the
objective,
the
outside
and the
inside
of
science,
the irrationaland
the
rational,
belief and
knowledge,
the social and the
natural ciences.
In all cases
we are instructed
not
to
assume
the
validity
of
the dualist divides
and not
to
use
their
components
as
interpretative
resources.
Instead,
we are
to
seek
an
understanding
of the
processes
through
which the
analytically
nvalid
dualismsare
constituted.Our
data,
Latour
says,
shouldnotbe
composed
of discreteentities calledhumans,
non-humans,
machines,
facts,
science
and
society.
It should be made
up
of
stronger
and weaker
heterogeneous
associations
(127, 240).
This
is
a world
in
which
anything
and
anybody
can be an actantor an
actor,
where we
may
elliptically
speak
of texts but
not
people
as
having
inde-
pendent
interests,
where all differences
are differences
of
scale.
It is the world of the seamless
web,
a world
in which
everything
is
connected to
everything
else,
in
which even
the discrete existence
of
things and the categorizationof processes cannot be used to interpret
or
to
explain
the
actions
of those who are said to
produce
them.
There
is muchto
be said
in
favour
of
monistic
mpulses
and the close
inspection
of
seams,
but
there
is little
to
be
said from within a seamless web.
Ultimately,
those that
truly
inhabit the seamless web can
say
nothing
intelligible
about ts
nature,
even,
if
they
are
consistent,
hat t
is
seamless
and that it
is a web.
And,
after
all,
natural cientists do not inhabitsuch
a
world.
They
happily
alk about
causes
and
effects,
they
seek
to
explain
how
and
why
one
thing brought
about another
thing, they distinguish
between
human
beings
and rocks.
If
we
want
to
understand he nature
of
technoscience,
and
if we
follow scientists aroundto
do
so,
we will
notice with
what
facility
hey engage,
for
example,
n
causal
explanations.
Why
shouldwe
who seek to
understand
what
scientists
do
deny
ourselves
the same
discursive
practices hey
use? We
may
well
wish
to be
'indepen-
dent'
of
scientists,
but
why
should we
impose
constraints
on
ourselves
that
scientistsdo not
observe?In another
context Bruno
Latourhas
said,
'No
amount
of
method can
make
one
text less
of a
fiction
than another
one. In consequence, we are perfectly free to use any style, any data,
any
effect,
any
composition
that
we
(the
authors
of
a written
ext)
deem
adapted
to
the audience.'19
Quite
right.
Latour'swork
gives
students f
science and
technologymajor
resources
to
extend
their
interpretative
rojects.
We
should
be
enormously
grateful
for
these
resources and we
should
put
them to
work
as soon as
possible.
547
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
17/19
548
Social
Studies
of
Science
At the same time he has
told us that we must
use these
resourcesin the
service
of
a
scholarly enterprise
which
seems
radicallyrestricted
com-
pared
to
many
of
those with which
we are
familiar. Latourhas not
yet
given
us
a
convincing argument
hat this new
enterprise
s
an
advance
rather
than
a retreat.
*
NOTES
1. For
example,
John Law
(ed.),
Power,
Action and
Belief:
A New
Sociology
of
Knowledge
?,
Sociological
Review
Monograph,
No. 32
(London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1986),
esp.
1-19, 196-280;
Michel
Gallon,
Law
andArie
Rip
(eds),
Mapping
he
Dynamics
of
Science and
Technology:
Sociology
of
Science in the Real World
London:
Macmillan,
1986).
This
latter
ext is a collection of
essays inspiredby
Latour's
work. The
Glossary
of
Latourian
erminology
xvi-xvii)
should
be
consulted
by
readers
of Science n
Action,
which
would
havebenefited
rom
suchan
aid. In a
personal
ommunication
ritten fter
his Review
was
edited,
Bruno Latour
has told me
that
the
term 'technoscience'
s not
his invention.
It
derives,
instead,
from
the
work of
Heidegger.
2.
Unfortunately,
he
proof-reading
and the
editing
do
a
disservice
to
the
quality
of
the
writing.
The book is marred
by
hundreds f errors
great
and
small,
fromnumerous
pelling
mistakes
to
major
typesetting
and
editing
blunders
that make
it difficult
to recover the
sense
of
diagrams
(193-94)
and entire
pages
of text
(15-16).
3.
See,
especially,
172-73
of
this book
and
Latour,
Les
microbes:
guerre etpaix,
suivi
de irreductions
(Paris:
A.
M.
M6tailie,
1984).
4.
Apart
romthe well-known
LaboratoryLife:
TheSocial Construction
f
Scientific
Facts
(Beverly
Hills,
CA:
Sage,
1979) [with
Steve
Woolgar],
Latour's
writings
of
special
relevance
in this
connection nclude:
'Give
Me
a
Laboratory
nd
I
Will
Raise
the
World',
in KarinD.
Knorr-Cetina
nd
Michael
Mulkay
eds),
ScienceObserved:
Perspectives
n the
Social
Study
of
Science
(London:
Sage,
1983),
141-70;
'Unscrewing
the
Big
Leviathan,
or
How Actors
Macrostructure
eality
andHow
SociologistsHelp
ThemDo
So',
inKnorr-CetinandAaron
Cicourel
eds),
Advances
n
Social
Theory
nd
Methodology:
Toward
n
Integration
f
Micro
and
Macro
Sociologies
(London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1981),
227-303
[with
Michel
Callon];
'Visualization
and
Cognition:
Thinking
with
Eyes
and
Hands',
Knowledge
and
Society:
Studies
n the
Sociology of
Culture
Past and
Present,
Vol.
6
(1986),
1-40;
and
Les
microbes,
op.
cit.
note 3.
5.
Mary
B.
Hesse,
TheStructure
of
Scientific
Inference
(London:
Macmillan,
1974);
Barry
Barnes,
T. S.
Kuhn and Social Science
(London:
Macmillan,
1982),
Chapter
2.
6.
This
important
otion
possibly
derives
most
directly
rom
Bourdieu;
ee,
for
example,
his
interpretation
f
the
symbolic
meaning
of the domestic
threshold:
P.
Bourdieu,
'The
BerberHouse', in MaryDouglas(ed.), RulesandMeanings:TheAnthropologyf Everyday
Knowledge
(Harmondsworth,
Middx:
Penguin,
1973),
98-110,
on 109.
7.
Latour
actually
wants
o
'get
rid of all
categories
ike
those
of
power
[and]
knowledge'.
It is unclear
what
new
terminology
he
prefers,
though
one
can
speculate
hathe
is
gesturing
towards Foucauldian
notions
such as
the
'power-knowledge'
uncture:
Michel
Foucault,
ed. Colin
Gordon,
Power-Knowledge:
elected
Interviews
and
Other
Writings,
1972-1977
(Brighton,
Sussex:
Harvester
Press, 1980).
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
18/19
Essay
Review:
Shapin:
Following
Scientists
Around
8. The thrustof the crucial
word
'independently'
s not
explained
here
nor in a similar
usage
earlier
(17).
Presumably,
this refers
to
Latour's well-known
advocacy
of
the
'outsider's'
perspective,
hough
his
reading
s
apparently
t odds with his
repeated
nsistence
that we 'follow'
scientists
as 'the
best
of
all
guides'
(21).
An outsider
may
indeed
be
'independent',
but he will find himself unable
to 'follow' scientists
very
far.
Moreover,
Latour
vigorously argues
the
apparently
elativistcase that
udgements
of
the
validity
and
efficacy
of
claims
can
never be
'independent'
of
particular
networks
(247-50).
9. For
elegant arguments
n favour of
explanatory
ocial science and its
compatibility
with
verstehen,
see John
Law
and Peter
Lodge,
Science
for
Social
Scientists
(London:
Macmillan,
1984),
Chapter
22. For Law's current
position
see,
for
example,
Law,
'Power/Knowledge
and
the Dissolution
of the
Sociology
of
Knowledge',
in Law
(ed.),
op.
cit. note
1, 1-19;
Michel
Callon,
John
Law and Arie
Rip,
'How to
Study
the Force
of
Science',
in
Callon,
Law and
Rip
(eds),
op.
cit.
note
1,
3-15.
10. See
G.
Nigel
Gilbertand Michael
Mulkay, Opening
Pandora's Box: A
Sociological
Analysis of
Scientists'Discourse
(Cambridge:Cambridge
University
Press,
1984).
There
is no
reference to Gilbert and
Mulkay's
work
in
Latour's book.
11. It
is
unlikely
thatrelativists
n
the social studies
of
science
will
recognize
themselves
from Latour's
caricature
(195-97).
In
his account relativists seek
only
to establish the
rational
equivalence
of
alternative
views;
they
should be
left to
'their
professional
duties
as
defence
lawyers'.
In
fact,
a number
of
relativistshave
sought
to
explain
why
in
specific
settings
certainmoves
are
not
counted
rational,
egitimate
or
permissible.
See,
for
example,
H.
M.
Collins,
'An
Empirical
Relativist
Programme
n
the
Sociology
of Scientific Know-
ledge',
in
Knorr-Cetina&
Mulkay
(eds),
op.
cit. note
4,
85-113. It is one
of
the
major
ironies
of
contemporary cholarship
hatso
manypeople
have taken o
saying
that
relativism
and social
constructivismare 'fashionable'at
just
the
point
when
all but
a
few
relativists
have
jumped ship.
12.
One
must,
for
all
that,
welcome
any
pressure
that
urges analysts
further o
refine,
define,
justify
and
reflect
upon
their
explanatory
resources.
If
there is
misunderstanding,
by
no
meansall the blameneed
be laid at Latour'sdoor.
'Interest-explanation',
or
example,
does
indeed merit further
ustification,
and,
for
that
reason,
one wishes that Latourhad
made
the bases of his
criticisms more
explicit.
13.
Barry
Barnes,
'On the
"Hows" and
"Whys"
of Cultural
Change',
Social
Studies
of
Science,
Vol.
11
(1981),
481-98,
on
492;
see also
Barnes,
Scientific
Knowledge
and
Sociological
Theory
(London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1974),
Chapter
4.
14.
There s
the further
ategory
which Latourcalls
'explicit
interests'and
which
seems
to
describe
actors' state of
knowledge
of
their
(so-to-speak)
real interests
(108,
113-14).
But
Latour's
discussionof
goals
and
interests
s
ambiguoushroughout.
or
example,
having
described
the
flexibility
of interests
with
respect
to
interpretative
alk,
he then
says
that
while
interests
'are
elastic',
'there is a
point
where
they
break
or
spring
back'
(112-13).
And
even
his
'goals',
which he
usually
invokes
as the
inelastic
purposes
of
actors,
are,
elsewhere,
said to be
liable to
displacement
by
others'
interpretative
work or invented
for
actors
by
others
(e.g.,
108, 114-15).
15. Latour&
Woolgar, op.
cit. note 4,
Chapter
5,
esp.
189-91.
16.
See,
for
example,
H.
M.
Collins,
Changing
Order:
Replication
and Induction n
Scientific
Practice
(London:
Sage,
1985),
Chapter
3.
17.
Michael
Lynch,
Art and
Artifact
n
Laboratory
Science:
A
Studyof Shop
Work nd
Shop
Talk n a
Research
Laboratory London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1985);
and see
Latour's
critical
review: 'Will
the Last
Person o Leave
the
Social
Studies
of
Science Please
Turn
on
the
Tape-Recorder?',
Social Studies of
Science,
Vol.
16
(1986),
541-48.
549
7/23/2019 Shapin Latour
19/19
Social Studies
of
Science
18. For research
pointing
to
the
explanatory
work to be done
by
the
categories
of
skill
and
competence,
see,
for
example,
Peter
Galison,
'Bubble-Chambersnd
the
Experimental
Workplace,'
in
Peter Achinstein
and
Owen
Hannaway
(eds),
Observation,
Experiment,
and
Hypothesis
n Modem
Physical
Science
(Cambridge,
MA: MIT
Press,
1985),
309-73;
Galison,
How
Experiments
End
(Chicago,
IL: The
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1987);
Andrew
Pickering,
Constructing
Quarks:
A
Sociological History
of
Particle
Physics
(Edinburgh:
University
of
EdinburghPress/Chicago,
L: The
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1984);
Pickering,
'The Role of Interests in
High-Energy Physics:
The
Choice
between
Charm and
Colour',
in
Karin D. Knorr et al.
(eds),
The
Social Process
of Scientific
Investigation.
Sociology of
the
Sciences,
Volume
IV,
1980
(Dordrecht:
Reidel,
1981),
107-38;
Pickering,
'Forms of Life:
Science,
Contingency
and
Harry
Collins',
British
Journalfor
the
Historyof
Science,
Vol. 20
(1987),
213-21,
on 220-21. I have
discussed
empirical
tudies
of
'professional
ested interests'
n
'History
of Scienceand Its
Sociological
Reconstructions',
History of
Science,
Vol. 20
(1982),
157-211,
esp.
164-69.
19.
Latour,
op.
cit.
note
17,
548.
Steven
Shapin
has been
a lecturer
in
the
Science Studies
Unit since 1972.
He has
published
extensively
in the
history
and
sociology
of
science,
and
is
currently
working
on a
book
assessing
the bases of
credibility
in
seventeenth-century
science.
Author's
address:
Science Studies
Unit,
University
of
Edinburgh,
34
Buccleuch
Place,
Edinburgh
EH8
9JT,
Scotland,
UK.
550
Recommended