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Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Reform. 11 th Annual Firearms Import/Export Conference August 1, 2012. Mr. Gordon Yim Senior Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Analyst Office of International Cooperation/International Plans and Transactions - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Reform
Mr. Gordon Yim
Senior Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Analyst
Office of International Cooperation/International Plans and Transactions
OUSD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)/IC/IPT
11th Annual Firearms Import/Export Conference
August 1, 2012
1
Agenda
• Problem Overview• Export Control Reform• Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure
(TS&FD) Reform • Defense Exportability Features Initiative• Questions
2
The Problem
• What are our strategic objectives wrt to the partner?
• What are the partner’s capability requirements?
• What capabilities does the partner want?
• How urgent is the need?
• Is there a higher-priority need for these capabilities?
• What is the partner’s capacity to absorb and effectively employ the capabilities in question?
• What strategic benefits does the U.S. gain by providing the requested / required capabilities?
• How sensitive is the technology in question?
• What is the partner’s ability to capitalize on the technology in question?
• What is the partner’s capability and will to protect sensitive U.S. technology?
• What are the risks to the U.S. or its allies/partners if the technology / system is compromised?
• How serious are these risks?
• Can these risks be mitigated satisfactorily?
3
Provide required capabilities
quickly to allies and partners
Protect the “crown jewels” of U.S. Defense
technology
How can the USG/DOD best balance these two demands?
What is DOD’s
“decision trade
space”?
???
TS&FD versus Export Approval
USGTS&FD
Approval
USGTS&FD
Approval
USGExport
Approval
USGExport
ApprovalService, OSD
and USG TS&FD boards meet to
determine if release is “the right thing to
do”
Compliance with the AECA and
ITAR – either via an approved
Export License or ITAR
Exemption
4
Preparing for exportability early
in acquisition process – Defense
Exportability Features (DEF)
Reducing Congressional
notification process timeline
Defense Cooperation and
Exports
Protecting “crown jewels” and
fostering economic/national security interests
What Can DoD Influence?
5
Enhancing DoD’s ability to provide urgently-needed capabilities to
partners and allies
Ensuring efforts are aligned with general U.S. foreign policy goals –
e.g., QME, MTCR
Security Cooperation
Reform
Enhancing DoD TSFD decision processes to
provide timeliness, quality and
synchronization of release reviews
Acquisition Initiatives
Export Control Reform
Tech Security & Foreign
Disclosure
DoS-proposed Congressional
Notification process
Foreign Policy/Pol-Mil
Considerations
DoD
Interagency
Export Control Reform-- Basic Principles --
• Basic Principles– Protect the “Crown Jewels” of U.S. Technology
Ensure protection of assets that gives our warfighters a critical edge– Expedite Technology Sharing and Cooperation with Allies and Partners
Build Partnership Capacity Secure ties with Allies and partners; increase cooperation and collaboration
– Enhance and improve enforcement, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities Deny exports to countries and entities of concern
• Basic Elements– Single Control List– Single Export Control Licensing Agency – Single IT System to process all licenses – Single Export Enforcement Coordination Agenc
6
International Programs Overview
- Foreign Military
Sales (e.g. F-18)
- Cooperative Memorandum
of Understanding (e.g. JSF)
- Direct Commercial
Sales(e.g. C-17)
Technology Security&
Foreign Disclosure
Export Control
StateNo
Yes
DoD-Led(State & Intel Community
Participation)
State – Munitions (Commerce – Dual Use)
International TransactionMechanisms
Technology Security &Foreign Disclosure
(TS&FD)
Export Control
Congressional Oversight
StateSFRCHFAC
DoDSASC HASC
7
TSFD Status Quo – Multiple Entry/Exit – Multiple ‘Pipes’ –
Gov’tIndustry
• FMS• Direct Comm’l
Sale• Cooperative
MOUs• Other
No Integrated OSD Appeal
Process
~150 -200 High Level Decisions (HLDs) & Top Level Decisions (TLDs)/yr
~500 SpecializedRoutine Decisions (SRDs)/ yr
Interagency process
NDPLO/CLOATCOMSECSAPDSCMTCRNVD/INSIntelDL/WFPNT/GPSGEOINTEW
AT&L Primary
AT&L Process
SAPCO Specialized
AT&L + Policy Specialized
USD(I) Specialized
NII Specialized
NII Specialized
NSA & NII Primary
NGA Specialized
Policy Specialized
Policy Primary
None No single process
DTSA Specialized
DecisionDecision
DecisionDecision
DecisionDecision
DecisionDecision
Decision
OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TSFD’
Routine TSFD Decisionsbased on delegated authority
ATTR SSG (Arms Transfer & Technology ReleaseSenior Steering Group)
MILDEPs
Other DoD
Components
PROBLEM #4Too many decision documents
PROBLEM #3 – Too much autonomy w/out synchronization & timelines
PROBLEM #5 No top level DoD closure process
PROBLEM #2Too many entry points/no triage
PROBLEM #1Reactiveapproach
~ 150-200 HLDs/yr
~ 85K RDs /yr
~ 85,000 Routine Decisions (RDs)/ yr
NSA and NGA based on specialized
authorities
~ 500 SRDs/yr
8
TS&FD Reform Background
• DSD established Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Review Group (TS&FD RG) in July 2010 based on an Export Control reform report recommendation
• DSD approved ‘Phase I’ TS&FD RG Findings & Recommendations on Dec 20, 2010 with key follow-up actions: Establish TS&FD Office (TSFDO) (Feb 14, 2011)
Conduct Phase II TS&FD processing ‘trade space’ analysis and report
Implement TS&FD RG ‘Good Ideas’ on a rolling basis
• SecDef concurred with this approach on Jan 5, 2011 during Security Cooperative Reform (SCR) Task Force briefing
• TS&FD ‘Phase II’ Findings and Recommendations approved by DSD on Apr 15, 2011 – Implementation currently underway
9
10
ATTR SSG(Co-Chaired by USD(P) & USD(AT&L))
Appeal Process
• FMS• DCS • Cooperative MOUs
• Other
OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TS&FD’
Routine TS&FD Decisionsbased on delegated authority
ATTR SSG
DSD or SD
AppealDecision
AppealDecision
IF PROBLEM
Consolidated Decisions
IF PROBLEM
Guidance &Direction
DoDTS&FDOffice
DoDTS&FDOffice
MILDEPs
Other DoD
Gov’tIndustryCountry
HLDs
RDs
NSA ( for CNSS) & NGA (for RSCOM)
based on specialized authorities
SRDs
Policy (NDP)
AT&L TS&FD
CIO TS&FD
USD(I) TS&FD(RSCOM)
Guidance &Direction
CNSS – Committee on National Security SystemsDCS – Direct Commercial SaleFMS – Foreign Military SaleHLDs – High Level Decisions (OSD level)MILDEPs – Military DepartmentsMOU – Memorandum of UnderstandingNDP – National Disclosure PolicyRDs -- Routine Decisions (except for COMSEC and GEOINT)RSCOM – Remote Sensing CommitteeSRDs – Specialized Routine Decisions (on COMSEC and GEOINT)
New DoD TS&FD System -- Process Overview --
DTM-053: Attachment 4
10
TS&FD Process Transition Plan
• Authority: DTM 11-053 “Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) Processes”
• PURPOSE: Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the reform of TS&FD processes
to minimize process complexities, ensure timeliness and efficient processing of TS&FD release review requests; and implement holistic DoD-wide release review processes.
Provides additional guidance to the DEPSECDEF Memo “Comprehensive Review of DoD TS&FD Processes,” 22 Jul 10 and further delineates the roles and responsibilities of the ATTR SSG.
Establishes the TSFDO to serve as the central processing organization for ATTR SG review and adjudication of DoD high level decisions (HLDs) and specialized routine decisions (SRDs) that impact DoD aspects of TS&FD release requests in accordance with its missions and functions.
Initiates detailed planning for consolidation and subsequent implementation under the guidance of the ATTR SSG to DoD TS&FD authorities according to their respective member responsibilities.
11
DEF Background
Exportability design is rarely incorporated in AT&L programs …
Why? Because it isn’t considered or (if it is) it’s not funded
Why isn’t it considered?• Because we rarely accept the fact that systems will be exported in the future• Because we focus efforts on meeting defined U.S. warfighter JCIDS requirements rather than undefined Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) requirements
Why isn’t it funded? • Because (until FY11 & 12 NDAAs) we haven’t had clear authority to spend U.S. tax dollars “for foreign requirements”• Because we rarely have foreign funds available in early development
12
Defense Exportability Features SEC. 243 FY11 NDAA w/ FY12 NDAA (para (b)) Added
SEC. 243. PILOT PROGRAM TO INCLUDE TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION FEATURES DURING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS.
a) PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to develop and incorporate technology protection features in a designated system during the research and development phase of such system.
b) COST-SHARING.—Any contract for the design or development of a system resulting from activities specified under subsection (a) for the purpose of enhancing or enabling the exportability of the system either (1) for the development of program protection strategies for the system, or (2) for the design and incorporation of exportability features into the system shall include a cost-sharing provision that requires the contractor to bear at least one half of the cost of such activities.
c) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than December 31 of each year in which the Secretary carries out the pilot program established under this section, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the pilot program, including a list of each designated system included in the program.
d) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established under this section shall terminate on October 1, 2015.
e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term “designated system” means any system (including a major system, as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code) that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designates as being included in the pilot program established under this section.
(2) The term “technology protection features” means the technical modifications necessary to protect critical program information, including anti-tamper technologies and other systems engineering activities intended to prevent or delay exploitation of critical technologies in a designated system.
13
Defense Exportability Features (DEF)
• 7 programs (6 MDAPs and 1 non-MDAP) selected for DEF pilot program in FY11:
― 4 Program Offices in the process of soliciting/executing DEF feasibility studies with FY12 funding
― 3 programs reported to be unable to execute FY12 DEF study funding
• Study funding will total approximately $1.75M out of $1.89M appropriated, with matching funding from vendors in three programs
• AT&L/IC will work closely with the MILDEPs and contractors during study process and facilitate interaction with and feedback from Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure community.
• DEF feasibility studies will inform DEF implementation decisions for each program
Building “Exportability” into US Systems
14
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