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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA Safety Culture
Continuous Improvement Process
(SCCIP)
Making safety culture tangible
IAEA
IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement
Process (SCCIP)
2
The IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process
provides comprehensive support to Member States
including
• Training to perform safety culture self- assessments
• Support in developing an effective and sustainable
safety culture improvement programme
IAEA
The overall goal with SCCIP is to support the receiving organization in its
capacity building of practical, systematic and systemic safety culture continuous
improvement.
The safety culture self-assessment training should be seen as an investment,
not a cost as it provides:
• A team of internal safety culture experts;
• A team of “change agents” and;
• High quality safety culture assessment results.
3 19 June 2013
SCCIP – Takes time and commitment
The experience of implementing SCCIP it that most of the trained personnel have a
technical educational background, but after the first assessment the team develops
sustainable knowledge of why people and organizations behave the way they do. In
short they have tapped into the behavioural and social sciences and gained
knowledge which is needed to proactively be equipped to catch declines and
improve in safety culture.
IAEA
Basis for SCCIP in the IAEA Safety Standards
GSR Part 1: National policy and strategy
• Requirement 1: National policy and strategy for safety • 2.3 (g): “The promotion of leadership and management for safety, including safety
culture.”
• Requirement 19: The management system of the
regulatory body • 4.15. The management system of the regulatory body has three purposes: … (3) The
third purpose is to foster and support a safety culture in the regulatory body
through the development and reinforcement of leadership, as well as good attitudes
and behaviour in relation to safety on the part of individuals and teams
• Requirement 29: Graded approach to inspections of
facilities and activities • 4.53. In conducting inspections, the regulatory body shall consider a number of
aspects, including:
• —Management systems
• —Safety culture
IAEA
Basis for SCCIP in the IAEA Safety Standards
– DS 456 (Draft GSR Part 2)
Requirement 13: Continuous improvement of safety culture
“All individuals in the organization, from senior management down, shall
demonstrate leadership by promoting safety. A normative framework
based on international best practices shall be described in the
management system to promote and support a strong safety culture”.
Requirement 14: Assessment of leadership and safety culture.
“Senior management shall regularly commission independent
assessments and provide for self-assessments of safety culture and
leadership”.
IAEA
• Culture is seen as something we can influence, rather than
something we can control
• Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization –
not only as a top-down process
• To effectively assess safety culture, multiple methods must
be used (interview, survey, focus group, observations,
document review) – a survey is not enough
• Edgar Schein’s well established iceberg metaphor helps to
understand and how to continuously improve safety culture
• observe visible aspects (artefacts and behaviour,
“above surface”) and;
• interpret this information to reveal the cultural reasons
behind (found in attitudes, values and basic
assumptions, “below surface”)
• For safety culture improvement, the IAEA emphasises
human interactions (shared space) including trust, mindful
communication, learning attitude, inquiring attitude, self-
accountability, diversity, self-reflection etc.
IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Continuous
Improvement – the Foundations
Artefacts,
Behaviour
Values
Attitudes
Basic
Assumptions
IAEA
Organizational capacity building through enhancement of the
understanding of:
• Safety culture and the value of safety culture assessments;
• How improvement in safety culture can enhance safety
performance thorough several positive synergies; and
• Everyone’s roles and responsibilities in cultural work.
To provide knowledge and practical
skills in SCSA methods, based on
current international research and
practices in the nuclear community.
7 INLEP Module 1 19 June 2013
Objectives of training within SCCIP
IAEA
IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement
Process – Senior management workshop
Senior Management Safety Culture Workshop – 3 DAYS
• Relationship between safety culture and enhanced safety performance
• Role of safety culture assessments for improving safety culture
• Roles and responsibilities of senior management in cultural improvement work
• Competencies and skills needed in team to be trained to perform safety
culture self-assessment (“Safety Culture Ambassadors”, STEP 2) –
supporting senior management in selecting an effective team
8
IAEA
Safety Culture Self Assessment Training – 2 WEEKS (separate) • Train a cross-functional, cross-hierarchical team (“Safety Culture Ambassadors”) to
• Perform high quality safety culture self-assessment applying the established IAEA Safety culture assessment methodology
• Develop and implement effective safety culture improvement activities • Training weeks separated – enhances learning output and allows for course reading in between • Bridging session in the end to ensure alignment between team and senior management • OUTCOMES: Team of Safety Culture Ambassadors who are equipped with practical tools and
knowledge to perform safety culture assessments
IAEA Safety Culture Continuous
Improvement Process – SCSA Training
9
IAEA
SCSA performed by safety culture ambassador team
• Tailored IAEA support missions to support organization in doing safety
culture self-assessment depending on need of individual organization
• OUTCOMES: Final self-assessment report and Safety Culture Improvement
Program
IAEA Safety Culture Continuous
Improvement Process – Performing SCSA
10
IAEA
Safety Culture Continuous Improvement
• Creation/amendment of safety culture continuous improvement programme
• Implementation of improvement activities
• Periodic safety culture assessments performed by Safety Culture Ambassadors
IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Continuous
Improvement – Never ending journey
11
IAEA
• IAEA Safety Standards and IAEA Safety Culture publications
• Social, Organizational and Behavioural sciences
• Past experiences- IAEA and external Safety Culture expert
knowledge and experience of Safety Culture Self Assessment
training approaches and materials
Course material is based on
IAEA
Methodology for Training – Learning-by-doing
• Core set of lectures based on the IAEA safety standards and science;
• Further illustration by specific examples through Application set
presentations;
• Interactive exercises on how to apply the four of the five data gathering
methods e.g. observations, interviews, questionnaire and focus groups;
• Performance of a “mini-self-assessment” based on a case study.
Fake data are provided to the trainers to extract cultural facts, perform
descriptive and normative analyses and communicate the results;
• Fostering of a good shared space and;
• In parallel a process of team-building is facilitated to assure effective
implementation and high quality assessment results.
IAEA
Implementation of SCCIP
• IAEA SCCIP support has been provided at
• Kozloduy NPP
• Belgoprocess NV
• Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)
• Laguna Verde NPP
• Senior management safety culture workshops have
been provided to a long list of organizations
IAEA
Feedback from participants…
"Safety Culture" was at the start a very abstract and rather new world for me. In a job where you think very rationally it is not common to think about behaviours and habits of people. You just go with the flow. By this course I've learned that by taking some distance and by being neutral you see things different.
Nancy Reusen, Supervisor Production Management, Belgoprocess
15
Before participating in this workshop, I was aware of the problem of a weak "Questioning Attitude" in TEPCO and wanted to find a solution to it. Through this workshop, (…) my outlook towards this problem broadened. My attention turned to the lower portion of the iceberg. The importance of conversation was one of the things I realized.
Shinichi Kawamura, General Manager of Nuclear Asset Management Dept., TEPCO
IAEA 16
Feedback from participants…
Before the start of the SCSA project in PNRA, I was just aware about the definition of safety culture which states that safety culture is the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in the organization… but I did not know about the actual meaning of this definition. However after passing through different steps of SCSA project like participation in workshop, collecting data by using five tools (interviews, focus groups, survey, observation, review of documents), participation of descriptive analysis of data by bubble diagram in connection with the underline assumptions (cultural aspects) with the help of the support mission, now I am confident and will be able to conclude some solid, valuable and understandable outcome for further improvement in the organization. Muhammad Sadiq, Directorate of Policies & Procedures, PNRA
IAEA
“[I]t has been a great opportunity to reflect about all the information we got, how to understand culture and go deeper to really understand how the organization is driven. I learned new techniques to do things differently, think outside the box and that I need to listen to my colleagues to have a shared understanding.”
Ariadna Bazan Limón, Independent Unit of Safety Engineering, Laguna Verde
17
Feedback from participants…
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Safety Culture
Assessment Methodology
IAEA
Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture
GS-G-3.5
Safety culture self-assessement should:
• Include the entire organization
• Several different self-assessment tools should be used (e.g. interviews,
focus groups, questionnaires, observations and document reviews)
• A designated team representing all organizational levels and functions at
the installation should carry out the self-assessment
• A specialist in safety culture should be included in the team
• The self-assessment team should receive training
• The self-assessment team should summarize the results and identify areas
for improvement and may suggest actions to be taken
• The results should be reported to the management at an appropriate level
• A follow-up assessment should be performed
The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach
IAEA
The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar
approach as self-assessment
• The independence and qualification of the members of the
assessment team should be considered crucial for the success of the
assessment
• The team should be staffed with sufficient diversity of experience and
should include specialists in behavioural science, with knowledge of
statistical methods of analysis
• The independent assessment team should aim at identifying
strengths and areas for improvement
Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture
GS-G-3.5
IAEA
Safety culture – multi-disciplinary expertise
• Anthropology
• Organizational theory
• Social Psychology
• Sociology
• Leadership and management theory
• Cognitive science
• Psychology
• Human Factor Engineering
• Resilience Engineering
• Organizational Factors
• ITO (interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organizations)
• Basic knowledge; Nuclear technology, nuclear organizations, regulatory
framework
Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture
GS-G-3.5
IAEA
• Using several assessment methods
The IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology
Interviews
IAEA
Concept of Culture and Safety Culture
• The concept of culture is descriptive
• The concept of safety culture is normative
IAEA
Descriptive/Normative
Descriptive
‘is’
Based on data and a theory
of culture
Normative
‘should’
Based on data, a theory
of culture and a norm
Descriptive must come before the Normative!
• It sets standards for behaviour and
values
• It is related to practices known to lead
to safety
• It focuses on certain limited aspects of
the organization
• Being evaluative in the descriptive stage
can lead to exclusions
• Being descriptive helps to pick up weak
signals
• Being descriptive means having a broad
agenda for dialogue
IAEA
Descriptive analysis: Images of culture
Descriptive analysis
IAEA
Normative analysis
Interview data
Cultural facts
Cultural themes
Survey data
Cultural facts
Cultural Themes
Focus group
data
Cultural facts
Cultural Themes
Document
data
Cultural facts
Cultural Themes
Observation
data
Cultural facts
Cultural Themes
Descriptive Analysis: Images of culture
Normative,
evaluative analysis
Safety culture is not a culture; it is a normative interpretation of a culture
IAEA
Summary
• The IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement
Process provides comprehensive support to
• perform safety culture self- assessments
• developing an effective and sustainable safety culture
improvement programme, incl.
• The IAEA safety culture assessment methodology
applies 5 data collection methods, and separates
the normative and descriptive analysis process
…Thank you for your attention
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