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7/24/2019 The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923
1/11
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The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923Author(s): Joseph C. GrewSource: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Feb. 15, 1954), pp. 1-
10Published by: American Philosophical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3143664Accessed: 03-07-2015 13:43 UTC
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THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE, 1922-1923
JOSEPH C. GREW
(Read November 2, 1953)
As
I wroteto Justice
Roberts ast spring, he
invitation o
address this
Society is one of the
highest onors
hathas ever
come to me.
The
purposeof the
Society o review
ignificant
developmentsn all the
fields f
knowledge ies in
withmy own
feeling hat the
accuraterecording
of
history s
one of the most
important f the
disciplines nd
thisfeeling as
led me duringmy
forty-odd ears
ofpublic service
o keepfullper-
sonalcontemporaryecords. These are comprised
in some 168
bound volumes,
which I have felt
might ome
day add color and
atmosphere o the
perhaps drier
official eports from
our officers
abroad.
They are
now
in
theHarvard
Library.
I
have
felt hat an
obligation estedon
us, while
in
the
arena, tomake our
individual
ontributions
towardpiecing
ut the moreformal
ecord.
This,
togetherwith the
Society's further b-
jective to
develop
a
humane
and philosophical
spirit
s
myexcuse,
if
excuse be
needed,
for
my
papertonight
n certain spects
of thefoundingf
the
presentTurkish
Republic
on
the
wreckage
f
the formerOttomanEmpire,for few events in
history ave surpassed
n drama the
enlightened
transition
n a
remarkably
hort
period
of
time
from
he
old
to the new
and the alteration f "The
Sick
Man of
Europe" to
a
progressive
modern
state onscious
like of ts
nternationalbligations
and of ts
opportunitieso take
ts properplace
in
the
family
f civilized
nations.
The
Lausanne Peace
Conference
f
1922-1923,
which
ed
to the consolidation
ftheTurkishRe-
public,was one of
the most
dramatic nternational
meetings hat have
ever attended.
How could
it be otherwisewhensuchwell-known igures s
Mussolini,
Lord Curzon,
Venizelos, Poincare,
General smet
Pasha,
later
smet
n6nil,
President
of the
Turkish
Republic,
and
other
outstanding
statesmen
participated After
sitting
for three
months
n
the autumn
of
1922 and
the winter f
1923
the
conference
iterally
lew up and
it
was
not until three months ater that
t
reassembled,
and
finally,
fter
nother
hree
months,
roduced
a
treaty
f
peace
between
Turkey
and
the
Allies
of
the
First
World.War.
We Americans, ince
we had nevergone to
war
with Turkey,were
presentonlyas so-called
ob-
servers, ur dutybeing
two-fold: irst, o
help n
everyproperway toward
he attainment fpeace
and, second,
to protect egitimate
American n-
terestsn the Near
East. Duringthe first
artof
the conference ur
representatives ere Richard
W. Child,
Ambassador to Italy; Admiral
Mark
Bristol,High Commissioner
o Turkey; and
the
present peaker,whowas thenMinister o Switz-
erland. In the second
phase of the conference
he alone represented
he United States.
The
origins
of the Lausanne Conference
were
historically
f marked nterest nd
significancen
the development
f
Turkey's
future
world
rela-
tions. The transition
rom he Ottoman
Empire
to the TurkishRepublic
was notan easy process.
I well rememberhose
earlyyears of the Republic
for
was
closelyassociatedwith
that processof
transition.
Those
were the
years
of
great
re-
formswhich profoundlyffected
Turkish
life-
the new law codes,
new emphasisupon
liberal
education, he emancipation fwomenand many
other
progressive
nd constructiveevelopments.
I remember he
days when
Angora
was little
more than an undeveloped
provincial own,ad-
joining
the ancient itadel,
lmost
bereft f trees
and with
a mosquito-infested
wamp
on
the
out-
skirts. Malaria was
rife. Washingtonwas
prob-
ably even
more
primitive
hen t was
first hosen
as
our
own nation's apital.
In
fact, hirty-three
yearswent by
before heforeign iplomats
ould
be
persuadedto
move there
fromPhiladelphia.
In
Angora
our
representatives
here
before
my
own arrival n 1927,Robert mbrie nd Howland
Shaw,
had
to live
in a
railway
car
on a
siding
becausemodern abitation as
unavailable
r
non-
existent. It
was not
uncommon
n those
days
to
see
a
half-dozen
r morebodies
hanging
rom
he
execution
ripods
n the
main
square
of the town.
AdmiralBristol,
ur
High
Commissioner,
ived
n
Constantinople,
ow
Istanbul. Politics seemed
fairly
imple
n
those
days, too,
for
only
one
po-
litical party existed,
and that was the Govern-
ment
party.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL.
98, NO. 1, FEBRUARY,
1954.
1
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2
JOSEPH C.
GREW
[PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.
My own recollections ake the form f a series
of cliches. Far back, in 1905, I attended, s a
visitor,
he Selamlik, nd saw the Sultan Abdul
Hamnid rive through he narrow treets f Con-
stantinople o attend he Friday rites. Pictures-
queness nd beautywere there n fullmeasure, he
fascination f the mosques and bazaars in
old
Stambul, he perennial oveliness f the Bosporus.
How keenly remember he five summers ater
spent on that neffably eautifulwaterway. But
in those days of the OttomanEmpire, t was not
the beauty f a free ociety. The Turkishpeople
were
still
n
shackles.
Thencame the First World War and eventually
the Lausanne Conference. After he Allies had
completed heir eace treaty, eneral smet Pasha
and
I
sat down at
a small
table and together
negotiated a treaty between Turkey and the
United States.
It was
a
good treaty, romboththe American
and
the Turkishpoints f view. Even
today,
hat
treaty,
lthough t
is
now as dead as a door-nail,
is commemoratedy a bronzeplaque in the Beau
Rivage Hotel at Ouchy, Lausanne. In some re-
spects,
ndeed, t was more favorable o American
interests ven than the treatynegotiated y the
Allies was to their interestsbecause I simply
outsat
General smet.
I
broughtt
home
o
Wash-
ington,well pleased and expecting he accolade
"WNell onethougoodandfaithfulervant." But,
alas, alas, domestic
politics
intervened.
There
were
still
n
our
country
lementswhichwere
dis-
satisfied hat had notbeen able to
pull
mpossible
rabbitsfrom mpossible
hats.
I
was
openly
ac-
ctused
n
the
lUnited
tates
Senate
of having
sold
nmy-ation'sbirthrightor imess
f
pottage.
The
Americans of Armenianorigin in the
United
States wanted
to obtain
ll
of
Armenia s
a sort
of
independent
atherland. The
debate
in
the
Senate
was close
but
my reaty
was
finally
efeated
bv
six
votes.
Then,
a few
years
ater,
was sent
as
the
first
American Ambassador
to
the
new
TurkishRepublic onegotiate newtreaty.
Ah,
but
times
had
changed
hen.
By
thattime
the
Turks
were
ridinghigh. My
new
treaty
was
duly negotiated
n
Angora.
By
that
time
the
Armenians
n
our
country
had shot their
bolt,
and,
while
this
second
treaty
was not
one-half s
favorable
o
American nterests
s the first
ne,
it I)assed
the
Senate
viva
voce
without
ven a tal-
lied
vote.
Such
are
politics
But
I was satisfied.
The relations
between
Turkey
and the
United
States were
thenon
a firm
reatv
oundation
nd
the
ground
was laid for future
healthy
develop-
ment.
To
go back
to the
origins
f the
Lausanne
Con-
ference,
here
occurred,
uring
he war, the
Brit-
ish invasion
fGallipoli.
If
my
history
s correct,
theBritishCommanding eneral, fterhis troops
had swarmed
shoreon
the beaches, llowed
them
sometwenty-four
ours
to
washtheir
lothes
nd
rest,
before
proceeding
o the attack.
At
that
critical
moment,
he story
has it,
and
I believe
he
storv
s accurate,
he
Turkish
ine across
the
Gal-
lipoli
peninsula
had in
its center
dangerous
un-
filled ap
through
which
ny nvading
rmy
ould
have
poured.
This
situation
was reported
o
the
German
General,
Liman
von
Sanders,
in
com-
mand of
the defense
of Constantinople,
out
his
orders
ppearto
have
been
delayed.
And then
t
was thata comparativelyoungTurkishColonel
on his
own
nitiative
imself
ave
theorder
to
fill
the
gap
and
moved
his regiment
ntothe
unfilled
area
to complete
he Turkish
line.
WNhenhe
Allies
arrived
he
nextday,
t
was too
late.
The
gal)
had
been
filled.
Those twenty-four
ours
of
rest and
clothes-washing
ad been
fatal
to
the
attack.
Perhaps
need
hardly
ay
that
thename
oftheTurkish
Colonel
who
had taken
he
respon-
sibility
nd
given
thecommand
o
fill
he
line
of
defense
was Mustapha
Kemal,
later
President
Kemal
Atatuirk,
he
George
Washington
of
the
TurkishRepublic.
I
will
not take
up
your
time
by
a detailed
c-
count
of
the
developments
f the
next
four
years.
Suffice
t
to
say
that
n
the
Armistice
f
Mudros
in
1918,
after
Turkev
had
capitulated,
nd
in
the
grimPeace
Treaty
fSevres
n 1920.Turkey,
with
two
governments
unctioning,
ne in
Constanti-
nople
and
the
other
n
Angora,
was reduced o
a
helpless
fraction
f its
former elf.
The
Allies,
being
busy
with
other hings,
hen
pparently
or-
got
all about Turkey
nd overlooked
he fact
hat
the Sultan
had
refused
o
ratify he Treaty
of
Se'vres
and that
the
nationalists
had
simiply
re-
1)tldiated
t. Thus Turkey and the Allies were
still at
war.
In
the
meantime,
the
Greeks,
incited
largely
by
Lloyd
George,
had
in
1919
invaded
Anatolia
and
destroyed
Smyrna.
But
the Turks,
magnificent
fighters
hat
they
were,
led
by
Mustapha
Kemal
and
General
Ismet Pasha,
drove
the Greeks
from
Asia
Minor
in
September,
1922,
and
the
Armistice
of Mudanva
was
signed
on October
11,
1922.
by
which
Turkey
retained
all of
Anatolia
and
Eastern
Thrace.
It
was
in
that
situation
ain(l
atmosphere
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VOL. 98 NO. 1, 1954] THE PEACE
CONFERENCE
AT LAUSANNE
3
that the Lausanne Conferencewas called
in the
autumn f 1922. By thenthe Turks
were fullof
confidence,s theyhad good reason to
be. Some
of the Allies failed
to recognize he great change
thathad come bout
n Turkey ince he Armistice
of Mudros and the Treaty of Sevres. They
pounded the conferenceable and demanded
one
concession after
another. General Ismet Pasha
sat quietly nd simply aid "no" to almost
every-
thing. He was in the driver's eat and
knew it.
The Allies had no stomach o fight o soon
again.
Today
a
strong
urkey tands ut
as a
force
or
stabilityn the Eastern
Mediterraneanrea. This
is a Turkey determinedo maintain ts
national
integrity,ut mindful f its responsibilities
o co-
operatewithotherfreedom-loving
ations o cre-
ate the kind of
world
n
which
t can survive
s
a free nation and proceed with its national
development.
The announcement
n 1945 byPresident
n6nii
that new
political
partiesto supersede
the
single
Government artywould be permitted
n
Turkey
was a
tangible ndication
f the
consolidation f
the
Republic.
In
recent
years,
the
multi-party
system as come to
be recognized
s
a permanent
feature
f
Turkish
political ife. While
united n
foreign olicy,
he various parties
re
expressing
themselvesopenly
in the Grand
National
As-
sembly,
n
the press
and
in
publicmeetings,
n the
differences hich separatethemin internal f-
fairs. They,
as well as the Turkishpeople,
have
been gaining
valuable experience n
democratic
processes, earning
he necessity f getting long
with each
other,
even
though holdingopposing
views,
n such a
way
as
to
promote
ather han
endanger he
national
security.
The
world will
watch
with great nterest
urther vidence
of the
maturity f the Turkishpeople.
THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE
At theverybeginning nterest,
f course,
cen-
teredon Mussolini, he
new
hero,
untried
nd un-
known. He himself vidently ad a view to the
dramatic nd was anxious to
impress
hepeople
at
home
with his
independence mong foreign
statesmen.
Instead of coming straight
to
Lausanne,
he
stopped
at
Territet
and
made
Poincare
and Lord
Curzofi
ome to see
him
there.
In
the course
of the
evening
he
agreed
to meet
them n
Lord
Curzon's
room
t Lausanne the
next
morning unctually
t ten o'clock. At 10:20,
after
Poincare
and
Curzon
had fumed
p
and down the
room
waiting orhim, hey
ent secretary
o see
what
was the
matter.
The
Secretary,
who told
me the story, aid he found Mussolini
quietly
reading n his room nd, whenhe told himthat
he
was twentyminutes ate for his appointmentnd
that the two other
statesmenwere waitingfor
him,Mussolini aid: "Oh they're here, re
they?
Very well, I'll come." On anotheroccasion,he
sent representativeo Lord Curzon to announce
thathe woulddine withhim hat vening.
Curzon
sentback wordthathe would be veryglad to
have
Mussolinidine withhim at 8 :30. The messenger
remarked hat he was
sorry hat he had instruc-
tions
to say that
Mussoliniwould dine withLord
Curzon at
7:30.
Curzon threwup his arms
in
despair nd agreedto split he differencend
call
it 8 :00. But quite apartfrom hese ittle y-plays,
I was deeply mpressed y Mussolini's quiet re-
served orce nd the
greatpower fhis personality.
A story s told thatwhen Claire Sheridan, he
authoress nd sculptress,urnedup at Lausanne,
Mussolini okingly nvited er to come to see
him
in Rome and that he promptlyccepted he
sug-
gestion, raveled y
the same
train
nd took rooms
in the hotelwherehe was staying. Mussolini
till
regarded he matter s a joke until he day
after
their arrival several
men appeared at his room
withmanypails
of
plaster, oards,nails,etc.,
nd
whenhe
asked what
n thunder heywere for,
he
was
informed hatMrs.
Sheridan
was about
to
make a bust of him. Mussolini forcibly
ut the
men to flight nd is said to have writtenMrs.
Sheridan letter n
whichhe refused
ositively
o
be sculped adding that busts were made
only of
dead
men
and that
he himselfwas still
very
much
alive.
There
was
the late
Mr.
Stamboliski,
he
Prime
Minister f Bulgaria,hairy, normous,
with
fierce
upturnedmoustaches, ooking
far more like
a
brigand
han a statesman, itting tolidly
t the
conferenceablewith
his
secretary,
lle
Stancioff,
of the
Bulgarian
diplomatic ervice, ust
behind
him nterpretingis
words nd, imagine, lso
his
thoughts,
ecause for
halfdozen words
from
er
chiefMiss Stancioff ouldtalkperfect renchor
perfect nglish
for ten
or fifteen
minutes.
She
was
witty
nd had
many assages
of
armswith he
other
delegates.
One
day,
when
pleading
for
Bulgaria's outlet o
the
sea,
she said to Venizelos
"How can
you,
with
your
hundreds
of
harbors,
object
to the
egitimate
esires
of
poor
little
Bul-
garia,
which
has but threemiserable
orts
on the
Black
Sea?" Venizelos,
as
quick
as
a
flash,
e-
plied
"God
put
Greece in the middle of the
sea;
it
is
notmy
fault
"
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4
JOSEPH C.
GREW
[PROC.
AMER.
PHIL. SOC.
There was Marquis Garroni,
the first talian
delegate, ged,
genial, oothing s a lullaby
t the
conference
able,but withnever a word
that was
original r
constructive.He simply agged
long.
There was
Barrere,
heold-school rench
diplo-
mat,whohad been Ambassador o Italyfor ome
twenty-five
ears. It is said that in
his youth
he was a rabid
communistnd that
when he pre-
sented his letters f credence
o King Humbert,
the atter sked himhow t was that uch
a change
had taken
place in his political deals.
Barrere
replied:
"Sire, a man who is not radical
in his
youthhas no heart,but
a man who is not con-
servativen his age has
no head."
There was Tchitcherine,
he Russian delegate,
who
talked
in
a high,squeaky voice
which re-
minded
me of
nothing
o much as a slate pencil.
During the conference was invited y my Nor-
wegiancolleague o meet
himat dinner, n an
en-
tirely nofficial ay, as
he had particularlysked
to meet heAmerican epresentative.
My inclina-
tion
t firstwas to
refuse, ut
my
colleaguesurged
me to accept
on
the ground
hat omething seful
might e
learned. And
so
I went.
There were
five of us
at table,the three Scandinavian
MNin-
isters, chitcherine,
nd myself. We sat there or
fourhours and the
talk was
intenselynteresting.
We discussed
ascism
t length
nd Tchitcherine's
summing p of Mussoliniwas "He
has a passion,
not a program." Once,
in
speaking
of
the
con-
ference,
e turned
o
me
and said: "Every
rebuke
Lord Curzon addresses
to me across the confer-
ence table strengthens
e
just
so
much
with
the
Soviet Government
nd
strengthens
he Soviet
Governmentroportionately."
n
reply
o
my
n-
quiry
as to whether
developments
were
taking
place in Russia tending
owards
more
moderate
and
less radical
regime,
e said:
"Yes,
but
don't
tell he
people
o.
The
people
mustnot
be
allowed
to
suspect
what
s
going
on
in this
direction.
If
they
were
openly
ware of
t,
further
evelopments
would
become
mpossible."
But the outstanding ersonalities f the first
phase
of
the
conference
ere,
n
myopinion,
ord
Curzon,
Venizelos,Montagna,
he second Italian
delegate,
nd Ismet
Pasha. Curzon
mpressed
me
greatly.
He was
said to be
pompous, onceited,
and
a martinet
o
his
subordinates,
ho still
refer
to the old
college egend
that
"George
Nathaniel
Curzon
is a
very superior
person."
But in
his
personal
relations
t the
conference e
saw
noth-
ing
whatever
f this
kind. He
was
always genial,
always courteous,
always entertaining.
Never
have
I
enjoyed
nything
morethan
the small
din-
ners
of
three
or four
which
he appeared
to
love,
and
where
he
would
sit
hour
after
hour
telling
stories,
necdotes,
xperiences,
n
a
delightful
ein.
But
at the
conference
able
his
attitude
nd
tac-
ticswere, nmyopinion,ll-judged ndproductive
of ittle
uccess.
He habitually
reated smet
ike
an
office
oy,
browbeat
im,
nd coveredhim
with
ridicule.
Ismet
bitterly
esented
his,
and it
did
notmake
for
spirit
f
conciliation
n the
part
of
theTurks.
At
thevery
beginning
ord
Curzon
adopted
team-roller
ethods
nd
refused
o
allow
the
Turks
to
have
any say
in
theorganization
f
the
conference.
One
decision
after
nother
was
adopted
over
Ismet's
protests
nd,
when
at
the
next
meeting
smet
was
faced
with
a "fait
ac-
compli"
and
ventured
o protest,
Lord
C(urzon
simply emarkedhat bjectionswerenowtoo ate
and
went
on to
the
business
of
the
conference.
Whenever
smet mentioned
urkey's
national
s-
pirations
or
her desire
for
independence
nd
sovereignty,
urzon
always
waxedfacetious.
He
once
said
"Ismet,
you
remind
me of
nothing
o
muchas
a
music
box,for
you
play
the
same
old
tune
overand
over
and
over
again-sovereignty,
sovereignty,
overeignty."
On
another
occasion
he said
"Ismet,
you
have
a perfect
mania
for
be-
lieving
we
are
depriving
ou
of
your ndependence
and you
have thought
bout
it
so
much
thatyou
reallybelieve
t is
true.
You
remind
me
of
King
William
who
used
to tellhis friends hathe had
led the
charge
of the
guards
at
Waterloo
and
he
told
it
so
often hat
he finally
ame
to believe
t
himself,
lthough,
s is well
known,
he was
fully
one
hundred
miles
away
when
the
battle
took
place."
Curzon
was
equally
facetious
with
the
Russians,
nd
once,
when
Tchitcherineuggested
that
the
discussions
regarding
he
Straits
were
making
no
progress
nd
that he
best
thing
o
do
was
to
get
down
to
work
and draft
a treaty,
Curzon
mmediately
eplied
MIonsieur
chitcher-
ine,
that
s
a most
excellent uggestion.
If
you
willshutyourselfp in a room ll aloneand draft
us
a
treaty,
can
assure
you
that
we shall
give
it
most
careful onsideration,
nd
I have no doubt
that
t
will
prove
o
be a document
f
most
unusual
interest."
But apart
from
his sarcasm
and
irony
with
the
Turks
and
the
Russians,
Curzon
was
an
admirable
Chairman.
It
was a
delight
to listen
to
his clear,
incisive
remarks,
his beautifully
chosen
words and phrases,
and
his well-rounded
sen-
tences.
At
the conference
able
he
was
never
for
a moment
t
a
loss.
Once,
when
asking
that
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VOL. 98,
NO. 1, 1954] THE PEACE CONFERENCE
AT LAUSANNE
5
Turkey
deed
to
England
the
ground
where
the
Britishdead lay
buried t Gallipoli,
nd Ismet re-
marked
that therewas
no precedentfor
such
action
n
history, urzon
mmediatelyeplied
hat
the BritishGovernment
ad deeded
to France in
perpetuityhehouse andgroundwhere heGreat
Napoleon
died on the
Island of St. Helena
and
that he
Frenchflag erpetually lew rom he
staff
ofthebuilding.
As to Venizelos,he was
the fire-brandhrough-
out
and, althoughoften
llogicaland frequently
inaccurate n his
argumentsnd remarks,
very-
one
paid
attention
hen he spoke. He would
be-
gin gently
nd in a soft
ngratiating oice,
but
littleby little
would work himself
nto a fury,
bellow t the topof his
lungs andwildlywave
his
arms
in
the air, which,
s I was seated next
to
him, was not always conducive to my personal
comfort. On
one occasion during
one of these
transports
f
fury
he Chairman aid
"I
beg
ofyou
Mr.
Venizelos to be tranquil."
Whereup
Mr.
Venizelos beat
the tablewith
his
fists
n
redoubled
violence nd
shouted t thetop of
his lungs
I
am
tranquil,
am tranquil."
Riza Nour Bey,
the
Turk,
then turned
he solo into a
duet and pro-
ceeded to shout at Venizelos
across the
table.
Montagna,
the Chairman,pounded
on the
table
withboth
fists
rying
o restore rder,butfinding
it impossible
he declaredthe
meeting djourned.
This howeverhad no effectn Venizeloswhohad
worked
himself
nto a
frenzy.
Indeed his
pas-
sionateduels across the
tablewith
Riza Nour
Bey
were the
delight
f
the conference.
One
day
a dramatic
ncident
was
provoked
when
Tchitcherine
aid
he
hoped
Rumania would be
careful
nd not
allow herself
o
get
into the
posi-
tion
of
Greece
which
had suffered o
severely
t
the
hands
of
the
Turks.
Venizelos
immediately
challenged
im
aying
hat
t was not
customary
t
such nternational
onferenceso
make
cryptic
e-
marksof this
nature and
that
he demanded an
explanation.
Tchitcherine
huffled
is
papers,
consulted isexperts nd made a ratheramereply
that
he
was
referring
nly
n
general
erms o the
internationalituation,
t
which
Venizelosshrug-
ged
his shoulders
nd said thathe would
not
press
the
point
as
he
did
not wish to
delay
the
pro-
cedure.
Whether
we
sympathized
r
not,
we
all
listenedwhen Venizelos
spoke. He was a man
who
would
command ttention
n any situation
and his
free,
elf-confident,lear
deliverywas a
blessed relief fter
he halting ndistinct
peeches
of
some of the
otherdelegates.
I
mentioned
Signor
Montagna, the second
Italian delegate, s one of the outstanding igures
ofthe conference
ecause he understood he men-
tality f the Turk and
the propermethod f deal-
ing withhim better han ny otherdelegate; and,
not onlydid he bring he workof his sub-commit-
tees to
a
satisfactoryonclusionwhile other om-
mitteeswerestill
deep
in
acrid debate,but at the
criticalmoments f the
conferencet was always
he who, n a quiet and
unobtrusivemanner,man-
aged
to
smoothmatters ver
by his sensible nd
conciliatoryactics.
At
the end of the conference,
after
Montagna had,
in
my opinion contributed
more than any otherdelegate toward reaching
final greement, ld Marquis Garroni nsisted n
coming p
from
Rome to sign for taly,although
he was the onlyone of
the original irst elegates
to do this. And thusMontagnawas deprived f
the
prestige,
f t
could
be
regarded s such,which
he had earned by indefatigablework. In the
darkest
hours
of the
conference
Montagna was
always optimistic,
nd
I
am
convinced hat on
morethanone occasionhe
personally revented
rupture.
As for smet Pasha,
my opinion f
him
under-
went several changes
during
the
course of the
conference,
ut
my
final
udgment
s
that,
while
lacking any
of the
adaptability
r
finesse f
his
opponents,
e
played
a
straight
nd honest
game
throughout.He was often ccused ofgivinghis
word and then
withdrawing t,
but it must be
rememberedhat
he was
continuallyubject
to
in-
structions
rom
Angora,
which
have
every
rea-
son
to
believe
were
frequently
ore
ntransigeant
thanhe
himselfwishedto
be, and,
at least in our
own
negotiations,when,
from time to
time,
he
tentatively ccepted
a certain formula or
pro-
visionforour
treaty
nd
laterwithdrew is
agree-
ment,
e
always
made
t clear
n
advance hat
hese
provisional greements
were
subject
to instruc-
tions
fromhome.
In the course of our
negotia-
tions,
when
we
were
debating
ome
complicated
point,he wouldfrequentlyay to me "Mr. Grew,
you
are
a
diplomat
while
I am
nothing
but
a
soldier
and
I am
not versed
in the finesse of
diplomacy";
to which
I
always replied "Every
day
of
my twenty ears'
experience
n
diplomacy
has
shown
me the
advantage
of
expressing
ne's
mind
openly, andidly,
nd
honestly,
nd
you
will
never find
any
other kind of
diplomacy
n
my
part."
After
ll,
in
Ismet's
position,
t
was
the
bluff
ualities
of the soldier and not
the
subtlety
of the
old-school
diplomat
which he
needed
and
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7/11
6
JOSEPH
C.
GREW
[PROC.
AMER.
PHIL. SOC.
whichhe
exercisedthroughout.
He was
in
a
besieged
tronghold
nd
all he
had to do was
to
hold
out against
all assaults
and he did
it with
conspicuous
success.
In actual
debate
he was
hopelessly
utclassed,
partly
through
he
handi-
cap of hisdeafness,whichnecessitatedveryword
thatwas
said at the
conference
eingwritten
own
for
him by the
secretary
t his
side,and,
also,
I
believe,
because
he was neither
uick-witted
or
keenof comprehension;
or
did he
appear to
have
a thorough rasp
of the details
of the
subjects
under
debate,
nd many
time
t the
conference
table he
missed n admirable
pportunity
o score
offLord
Curzon
and others
when
beingattacked
and browbeaten.
I remember
nce
when
Lord
Curzon
was attacking
smet's objection
to the
continuance
f
the
foreign tationnaire
hips
in
Constantinoplen the groundthat theywere a
relic
of the capitulations,
ord Curzon
said
"But
our only
reason
forkeepingthe
stationnaires
s
for hepurpose
of
obtaining
ransportation
o and
fro
like cabs
or taxi
automobiles."
What a
hit
Ismet would
have made
if
he had replied
Then,
Lord
Curzon,
assume
that
you will
have
no ob-
jectionto
our maintaining
Turkish
stationnaire
in London,which
s
also
a port
nd where
trans-
portation
s
equally
as
necessary
s
in Constanti-
nople."
The
element
of
intrigue
and
international
rivalrywhichwenton at Lausanne,of which
had
occasion
to observe
many
instances
nd
il-
lustrations,
pened
my
eyes to
the sorry
tate
of
old worlddiplomacy
nd caused
me to realize
that
even
theplots
of
E.
Phillips
Oppenheim
re not
all of them
o far-fetched. uring
the course
of
the first hase
of
the conference
room
of one
of
our secretaries
was
entered,
his locked
trunk
broken pen
and
an
envelope
bearing
he title
nd
seals
of
the
Department
f State
was
stolen
and
never found.
Fortunately,
t contained
nothing
more comprehensive
hanthe aissers-passers
and
personal
accounts
of the
secretary
n
question.
But,from hatmoment, e arranged o have one
of our
staff
n
the
Chancery
ay
and
night,
with-
out exception.
But
I must
not
dally
with these
various
side-
lights
nd
must ell
you
something
f
the
working
of the
conference.
On
January
hirty-first
ord
Curzon
decided
that drastic
measures
must be
taken
to conclude
negotiations
nd
he not only
presented
he Turks
with complete
raft reaty
based
in
part
on
theagreements
lready
reached,
but
containing
many
otherprovisions
which
had
not been
fully
discussed,
nd he also
drew
uip
timetable
mapping ut each
day's procedure
nd
ending
withhis
definite etermination
o
leave
Lausanne
on February
second,
which
was later
extendedto
February
fourth.
To make
a long
story hort, can perhapsnot do better hanread
to you the
entries
n my diary for that ast
day
of the
first
hase
of the
conference.
Sunday,
February4,
1923.
A fateful
day.
None of
us had any
idea what
it
would bring
forth.
We simplyknew
that the
Allied
draft
reatywas
to be on the
conference
able at
4 P.M.
for the Turks
to sign
or leave,
and that
Curzon had
sworn
to depart
t 9 P.M. whatever
he
result.
Duca,
the Rumanian
Minister
for Foreign
Affairs,
aid to
Mrs. Grew just
before unch,
n
a particularly
hoice
metaphor:
"The
abscess is
going to
break todaybut
we don't know whetherthe resultwill be good or
bad."
At
1
30 while
we were
all at lunch
the first
m-
portant
development
ccurred.
I
saw Arlotta,
the
Italian
secretary,
hurryinto the
dining
room and
hand
a
document
o Garroni
who
immediately
rose
and left the room.
It proved
to be
a
draft treaty
drawx~n
p by
the Turkish
delegation
and
handed to
the
Allies
in
reply
to their
draft,
containing
only
those
clauses
which had been
discussed
and
agreed
to by both
sides
in
committee
nd omitting
ll
others.
Ismet accompanied
t
by a
note in which
he said that
he
felt
the clauses
already
agreed
to constituted
sufficientasis forpeace, and thatother ubjects still
under
controversy
ould be
settled
ater. It
was a
clever
move.
The delegates
of the
Inviting
Powers
immediately
went
into conference
n Lord Curzon's
room.
At
3 :30 they
ummoned
smet
who
came
down
from
his
hotel with a
large group
of his experts.
At 7
Bentinck,
the
British
secretary,
called
me on
the
telephone
and
said
that
the Turks wvere
probably
going
to sign
in
a few
moments
nd
suggested
that
I
get
our
delegates
together
to
be
ready
to
go
to
Lord Curzon's
room to witness
the
ceremony.
I
collected
Ambassador
Child
and
Admiral Bristol
and
we
went into the
hall
at the
foot
of
the
staircase
in
theold partof thehotel eadingfromCurzon's floor.
The
hall
was packed
with members
of
(lelegations
and
newspaper
correspondents
waiting
for
the
final
denouement.
The air was
full
of
electricity;hardly
anyonetalked;
we
simply
istened and
waited.
The
hall
upstairs
was
littered
with
the
packed
trunks
of
the
British
delegation;
n fact
when
smet
was
calling
on
Curzon yesterday.
he
British
made a
point
of
bustling
about
and
removing
various
trunks under
Ismet's
nose so that
he
could
not
fail
to
be
impressed
with he
definite
lans
for
departure.
Thus we
waited,
expecting
ny
moment o be
summoned
o watch
the
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8/11
VOL. 98, NO. 1,
1954]
THE PEACE CONFERENCE
AT LAUSANNE
7
signing
of
the
treaty.
Suddenly, at
8 o'clock, the
sound
of a door
opening above;
everyonegot
up and
moved toward
the staircase.
In
a moment smet
ap-
peared,
descending
he stairs followed
by his
delega-
tion;
he took off
his
bowler hat,
bowed right
nd
left
to the crowdin the hall, smilingbroadly nd leftthe
hotel.
Certainly shall
never forget
hat scene.
The
Conference
was broken;
there would be
no
signing.
AfterBentinck's
message n
hourbefore
we had hardly
doubted
that a settlement
would
be made.
Child,
Bristol
and I almost
immediately
went
to Lord
Curzon's
room.
Everyone
had left. In
a moment
Curzon appeared;
he burst into the
room like
an
angry bull, glared
at us and began
to pace up
and
down waving
his fist n the
air.
He was perspiring
and looked all
in. He
shouted,
"We
have been sit-
ting
here
for
four
mortal
hours and
Ismet has
re-
plied to
everything
we have said
by the
same old
banalities-independence
and
sovereignty.
We have
all done our best. Even Bompard (the Frenchdele-
gate)
beat his fist
on
the
table and told
Ismet
that
he was simply
tirringup
war. Bompard
made
the
strongest peech
I ever heard
him make." We
asked
Curzon
what
Ismet had broken
on.
Curzon
said
it
was the judicial
clauses.
(This
was only partially
correct
as
it
was
the economic
clauses
too.)
He
said that
at the
last moment
smet
had withdrawn o
another
room with
his
experts
and
that they
had
fullyexpected
him
to
come
back
and
sign.
Instead
he returned,
efused
o
sign,
bowed
and left he
room.
It was
all
over.
Curzon
was
in
a fearful tate.
We
asked
him if we
could
do
any good
by
seeing Ismet,
for as impartial bservers t was withinour province
while safe-guarding
American
interests o contribute
in
every proper
way
to the cause
of
peace.
He said
that
Bompard
and
Montagna
had
gone up
to
see
him
but
that t could
do no
good.
We
said
we
would
try
and
again
asked
him
if the
judicial
clauses
were the
real
stumbling
lock.
He answered
n
the
affirmative.
Child,
Bristol
and I
then
hurried downstairs.
I
had the
Hudson at the
door
in
a
minute
nd
we drove
quickly
o the Palace
Hotel.
Bompard
and
Montagna
were
with Ismet
but
we
were shown
into Hussein's
room. The
concierge
told us that
Lord Curzon's
train,
he Orient
Express,
was an hour ate
and
would
not leave before
ten o'clock.
This
proved to
be
wrong. Curzonhimselfhad had the train held back
for half
an hour
in
order
to hear
the
result
of
Bompard's
and
Montagna's
talk
with
Ismet,
but as
soon
as
they
eported
o
results
he
trainwas released
and actually
eft
t
9:25
or
thereabouts.
A
moment
after
we were seated
Ismet came in,
Bompard
and Montagna having
just
left. We
were
with
him
approximately
n hour.
We went over
mlch ground
with
regard
to
the udicial
clauses,
but
Ismet told
us at
once
that
the
economic
clauses
were
no less
the
cause
of
the
break
as
they
would
place
Turkey
in "financial
and industrial
slavery." We
asked him
if he would make
further oncessions
on
the
judicial clauses
provided
we
should
obtain
con-
cessions from he Allies in
other
respects.
He
asked
what we
suggested. We
said that firstof all
the
foreign
udicial
advisers
should
be
admittednot
only
to the courts of Constantinople nd Smyrna but to
those
of
Samsun and
Adana as well. The
argument
continued or
bout
half nd
hour; Ismet
kept
rubbing
his
forehead s if
almost
dazed. He
said
in
Turkish
"My
heart is
squeezing
me."
Finally he got
up and
went nto the
adjoining room,
tayed there for
three
minutes,
hen
returned. It
was evident
that he had
gone
to consult his
experts,
but he
continued
the
discussion
without a sign
that
he
had seen
them.
Then quite
suddenly
he said,
"All
right, will
con-
cede."
We said
"Samsun and
Adana?"
He
replied,
'No,
only
Samsun." We
said:
"That
is
not
enough
to
justify
our
retaining Lord
Curzon."
Another
twentyminutesof
discussion.
Again
Ismet left the
roomi-for we werepushing himhard-returned and
seated himself
gain.
He looked
awfully
ired. Then
after
a decent
nterval,
o as not to
give us
the
im-
pression
that he had
talked
with his
experts,he
said:
'All
right,
will give you
both Samsun
and
Adana,
but
you
must
give
me
your
word
of
honor
that
you
will
not
reveal
these
concessions
to
the Allies
before
you have
secured theirs."
We
agreed,
arose, shook
hands
and said
we
hoped and
believed
thatthis
would
be a fair
basis for
renewed
negotiations
nd
hurried
to
the
station
n
the car.
We were
elated for
these
concessions that
we had
obtained
were
by
no
means
unimportant,
smet
having
obstinately tood
out on
them withthe Allies. We felt sure at thatmoment
that Curzon
would remain.
At the
station
saw
Bompard
getting ntohis car
and wondered
why
he
was
leaving just
as
Curzon
was
about
to start.
Other
people
appeared to be
en-
tering
their cars also
and
I
saw
some
of
the Italians
coming
out
of
the station. I
went
up
to
McClure
who
was near
our
car as we
got
out
and
asked him
how
soon
Lord
Curzon's train was
starting.
"He's
just gone," he
said;
"The train has
just pulled
out.
They've
all
gone-the whole
delegation." And
that's
that.
It
is
idle to
speculate upon
whether
the Con-
ference of Lausanne could have been saved by our
arriving
five
minutes
earlier
at the
station.
It
is
not
impossible;
in
fact
I
hardly see how
Curzon
would have
dared to leave
after
what we had
to
tell
him,
for
it
showed
that
the
Turks
had
not
got
to the
end
of
their
rope
in
the matter of
conces-
sions
and
that with a
sufficient
mount
of
patience
still
other
concessions
might
be
gained.
Patience
was
the
necessary
element
which
Curzon lacked
and now I know
that
without
that
quality
it
is
use-
less
to
try
to
deal with the
Turk.
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9/11
8
JOSEPH
C. GREW [PROC. AMER.
PHIL.
SOC.
The second
phase
of the Conference,
hich
be-
gan on
April 23
and ended
on July24, was
in
many
respects ar
more nteresting
hanthe
first
phase,
but I do not
wishto
wearyyou
withtoo
long an account
and
shall therefore
imit
myself
tospeaking f only woorthree f theoutstanding
features.
The first
difficult roblemwe
had
on
our hands
was,
strange s
it mayseem,
theneces-
sity of
establishing
riendly
elations
with
our
British olleagues.
Apparently
ord Curzon
had
gained
the impression,
uring
the
firstphase
of
the Conference,
hat our
delegation
ad been
dis-
tinctly ro-Turk
nd
had aided
and abetted
the
Turkish
delegation
n their
Machiavellian
man-
oeuvres. It
is true
that one
or two members
f
our delegation,
who had
lived long
in Constanti-
nople,
were somewhat
pro-Turkish
n their
at-
titude nd wereperhaps een too frequentlyn the
company f
members
f the
Turkishdelegation,
whichmay
have given
rise to
theseunwarranted
suspicions.
But the
charge hat
our delegation
t-
self was pro-Turk,
r took
any step,
or said
any
word contrary
o the interests
f
the Western
Powers was
wholly
without oundation.
Through-
out
the entireConference
e lived
up to the
pur-
pose
of
our
mission,
which
was
(1)
to
safeguard
American
nterestsnd
(2) to
contribute
n every
proper
way
towards
he conclusion
f peace.
Be that as
it
may,
we
learned
through
arious
channelsthat the British Governmentwas not
anxious
that
we
should
be
present
t the
second
phase
of the
Conference.
The
French
nd Italian
Governments,
owever,
ook
a differentiew
of
the
matter
nd,
whenthe notices
forthe
second
meeting
were
sent
out
by
the
SecretariatGeneral,
we
dulv
received
ur notice
with he
rest,
nd,
to
my
considerable pprehension,
was
appointed
o
represent
he
United
States
alone. At
the
very
beginning
made
a
point
of
seeing
each of
my
Allied
colleagues
and
telling
hem
exactly
where
we
stood
and
whatwe
proposed
o do at the
Con-
ference,
nd
that
I shouldtake
no
step
without
giving hemfull nformation.Thereafter, hen-
ever
saw Ismet,
which
was,
of
course,
promptly
known
o
all,
I
took
mmediateccasion
to see
my
Allied
colleagues
and tell
them
exactly
what
we
talked
about. To make
a
long story
hort,
his
policy
had its
desired
ffect,
ecause,
fter
having
strenuously
pposed
our
request
o
be
admitted
o
the deliberations
f
the
various
sub-committees
and
groups
of
experts,
ir
Horace
Rumbold,
he
British representative,
inally
withdrew
his ob-
jection
ometime
fter
he Conference ad started.
Instead,however, f coming o me and tellingme
frankly f his change
of attitude, s I should cer-
tainlyhave done in a
similar ase, he had to save
his face t all costs nd
merely enthis egal expert
to break the news to
me. About the same time
he calleduponme withgreat ceremony nd, tak-
ing a document ut of his pocket,he said that he
had been instructed y
his Government o read
to me the followingmessage:
His Majesty'sGovernmentalues the friendship
and cooperationf theAmerican elegation n(1will
be glad
o earn
tsviews
ndto nformt ofourviews
during hecourse f theConference.
This was the only all thatRumboldmade upon
me during he entire hree
months hat we were
colleagues at Lausanne,
although we had been
young secretaries ogethern Cairo some twenty
years
ago
and were
again colleagues
in
Berlin
before he war when we together ealed up the
archives f
the
British
mbassy. The
French nd
Italian
delegates,
n thecontrary, ame to see
me
as often s I went to see them, nd we were
in
the habitof
dropping
n on each other t any time
of
day or night o compare
notes and discuss
de-
velopments.
In
spite of the message
from the
British
Government,
ir Horace Rumbold
never
once
during
he Conference
onsulted
me or
gave
me his own opinion
or informationn his own
initiativewhile we were
in Lausanne. .\s a
re-
sult he miissedmuch hatmight ave beenofvalue
to
him,while
the nformation
e could
have given
me
I
was
able to obtain equally
well
from
ther
sources.
These
things
ount
n
the
ong
run.
It
makes one
inclined o
agree
with a
remarkmade
to
me one
day
by
one
of
my
other
colleagues
at
Lausanne
that
"the
French are
clever
in little
things
but
stupid
n
great
ones,
while the
British
are clever
n
great
ones
and
immensely tupid
n
the smallthings."
The
miost erious
development
n
the
second
phase
of
the
Conference
f Lausanne
was
unques-
tionablyheTurco-Greek ispute verreparations.
There
is
no
doubt
whatever
hat at
one moment
the
Conference
ung
on the brink f
rupture
nd
Europe
on the
brink f
war,
for f the Greek
rmy
had invaded
Eastern Thrace,
as
it
was
certainly
on
the
point
of
doing,
herewould
without
ues-
tion have
been a
general
conflagration
n
the
Balkans,
nd
there
s
no telling
how far
thatcon-
flagrationmight
have extended.
The
danger
be-
came
evident
about
Mav
10 on which date
I
learned hat
he
GreekGovernment as
consider-
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10/11
VOL. 98, NO. 1, 19541
THE PEACE
CONFERENCE AT
LAUSANNE
9
ing an ultimatum o Turkey on the
following
grounds: (1) Maltreatment f Greekprisoners;
(2) theopening y theTurks of safedeposit aults
in the Greek banks in Constantinople,nd
(3)
the alleged expulsion f GreeksfromAsia
Minor.
Venizelos,however, onsidered hese pointsweak
and recommendedo his Governmenthat he ulti-
matum,f ssued, should be based on the
Turkish
claimsforreparations romGreece. Shortly
fter-
wards Venizeloscalled on Ismet and talked o him
in a most hreateningnd bellicosemanner. Ismet
said,
"Do
you
mean
you are threatening e with
war?" Venizelos calmeddown somewhat nd
of-
fered o agree to the principle f paying repara-
tions, but with the understanding hat no
cash
should be paid,
as
Greece was incapableof doing
it. Ismet proposedeither rbitration r the pay-
mentof a lump sum, both of which suggestions
Venizelosrefused.At
this
tage smetwas
visibly
anxious and asked permission f theAllies to send
Turkish
troops
nto
Eastern Thrace to meet the
threat
of
war,
which
was,
of
course,
refused.
About this time Alexandris, he Greek Minister
of
Foreign Affairs, rrived
n
Lausanne and took
an
even more bellicose attitudethan Venizelos
had done. He said that Greece was absolutely
determined
o
go to
war
rather
han
pay, and
he
remarked
o
Montagna hat,
s
the
Allies
had sup-
ported he
Greek offensive
efore, hey ould not
now deserther. Montagna orrected imbysay-
ing "certainAllies" and added that "victory
was
often
more costly
han defeat." Alexandris said
that
the
Greek
army
was the
stronghold
f the
Allied position
at
the conference nd was now
at
the
zenith f ts
efficiency,
ut
that
f
timewent
by
without ts
attacking
his
efficiency
ould de-
crease.
Montagna indignantly
efuted he
sug-
gestion
hat the Greek
army
had
anything
what-
ever to
do
with
supporting
he
Allied
position.
Alexandris
then went so far as to
say
thatthe
Greek
rmy
had
been
deprived
f
victory
nd that
its
officers
ow
demanded atisfaction
yinvading
Eastern Thrace. There is no doubt that this
whole
question
was one of nternalGreek
politics.
The
military arty
was
literally hamping
t the
bit
while
Venizelos'
party
lso
needed
some con-
crete sset to retain
power
and
they
were
clearly
pushing
him
towardwar.
During hesedays
the
Allies
had continualmeet-
ings to determine hatshouldbe done. I called
on Rumbold t this time to ascertain
his
opinion,
and
he
said
he considered he situation
angerous
but
not
necessarily
ritical.
With the
French nd
Italian delegates worked n constant
oopera-
tion.
Pelle,
the French
representative,bout this ime
proposed o smet
hat heTurks should ccept he
town
of
Karagach
from he Greeks n lieu of re-
parations.
On May 25
1
called on each of
the Allies and
said I could not ee war ntervene
ithout xerting
theimpartialnfluence f the United
States as a
totallydisinterested ower, and that
I proposed
on
my
own
initiative o extendmyunofficialood
offices or mediation.
Each of theAllies agreed
heartily o thisproposal.
In spite of continual nsistence
n the part of
Venizelos and Alexandris that
a final meeting
should be held, and, in spite of repeated hreats
on
their part to
leave Lausanne and to invade
Eastern Thrace unless satisfaction ere immedi-
atelygiven,
very ffort as made to postpone he
meeting ntil smet should have
had time to re-
ceive n answerfromAngoraregarding
aragach.
On
the
twenty-fifth
f
May
it
was
evident
hat he
meeting ould
be no longer ostponed.
I
spent he
greaterpart of
the nightbefore hemeetingwith
Venizelos
and Ismet
separately, sing everypos-
sible
argument
to induce
a
peaceful solution.
Venizelos
told
me that
he would
accept
the
Karagach proposal nd
I
so
informedsmet.
The
meeting
was held at five o'clock on the
following aywith nedelegate rom achcountry
present.
It took
place
in a small
room at the
Chateau
and
was
intensely
ramatic.
We
all
sat
close
together
t a small
table;
Pelle,
the
Presi-
dent,
and Ismet
sitting opposite
one another.
Diamandy placed
himself between Ismet and
Venizelos
with
a view to
separating
he
princi-
ples
in
the controversy.
The
meeting egan
with
the
utmost
olemnity.
Each
delegate
n
turnmade
a
speechemphasizing
heseriousness
f the situa-
tion nd
calling
or onciliationnd moderation
n
both
sides.
Rumbold used
calm
logic, Montagna
made
an
impassioned lea,
while
Pelle
summed
p
the ituationna masterfulddressfollowed ythe
Japanese,
he
Serbian,
he
Rumanian,
nd
myself.
Ismet then
began
to
talk
and
it was evident t
once that
he
was
trying
o
dodge
the ssue.
Dia-
mandy slipped
a note across the table
to
Pelle
begging
him
to
pin
Ismet
down
to
facts.
Pelle
then
sked
Ismet
whether
e had
telegraphed
he
Karagach proposal
to
Angora.
Ismet
replied
n
the affirmative. elle
said,
"Have
you
received
reply
"
Ismet
answered,
Yes." "Do
you
ac-
cept
" Ismet
again
tried to
ramble off
on
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11/11
10
JOSEPH C.
GREW
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
tangents,
but
Pelle persisted
and
finally, fter
every effort o avoid the issue,
he gave a weary
assent.
All this had lasted two hoursduringwhichwe
were
all
under
the greatestpossible
strain and
when it finally ppeared thata solutionwas in
sight,the psychology f human nature took its
naturalcourse and the air of solemnity
hanged
immediatelynto one borderingn actual hilarity.
Diamandy, the Rumanian, got up and insisted
upon
Venizelos
moving
next
to
Ismet.
The
de-
tails
of
the
settlement
ere
then discussed
n
the
mostamicableway; Venizelos and
Ismet
calling
each other
"mon
cher
ami"
had
their hands on
each other's rms, aughed
ike school
boys,
and
appeared
to
be
on
the
point
of
actually mbracing.
The Serbian
danced about the room recording is
protest gainst the cession of Karagach, but as-
suring the meeting hat he would not think of
letting his stand n the way of peace and thathe
merelywished to go on
record,
Rumbold,
the
Englishman, howed his wild enthusiasmby a
contraction
f the facial
muscleswhich mounted
almost
o
a smile
nd the Jap beamedbenevolently
through
his
glasses
as
thoughhe had just eaten
a
most
excellent inner
nd
felt t
peace withthe
world.
Just
before
he
end
of the
meetingVeni-
zelos,
on
behalf f
Ismet
and himself,
hanked ll
those
who
had
helped
n
reaching
his
happy
olu-
tion, ncluding
he American Observer" and we
all
got up
and
shook
hands
all
round.
CAnd hat's
about the
whole
story.
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