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Los estándares de cuidado en la negligencia
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The Standards of Care in Negligence Law
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UniversityPressScholarshipOnlineOxfordScholarshipOnline
ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen
Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001
TheStandardsofCareinNegligenceLawRICHARDW.WRIGHT
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0012
AbstractandKeywords
Thischapterchallengestheutilitariansclaimwithrespecttothestandardsofcareinnegligencelaw.Negligenceliabilityisthemostcommontypeoftortliabilityandisthoughttobethemostobviousexampleoftortlawsutilitarianfoundation.Iftheutilitarianefficiencytheorycannotexplainnegligenceliabilityitsprimedoctrinalexampleinitsfavoritefieldofcommon-lawliabilityitisinveryserioustrouble.Conversely,iftheequalfreedomtheorycanexplainandjustifynegligenceliability,itwillhaveclearedwhatmanyseeasthebiggesthurdleforanon-utilitariantheoryoftortliability.Negligenceisgenerallydescribedasbehaviourthatcreatesunreasonableforeseeablerisksofinjury.Almostalljuryinstructionsdonotprovideanytestordefinitionofwhatconstitutesunreasonablyriskybehavior,otherthananoftencircularreferencetotheordinarycarethatwouldbeexercisedbythereasonableorprudentpersoninthesameorsimilarcircumstances.
Keywords:utilitarian,standards,care,negligencelaw,liability,tortlaw,equalfreedom,riskybehavior,
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injury
I.MoralFoundationsInaprioressayinthiscollection,IarguedthattheKantian-Aristoteliantheoryoflegalresponsibility,basedonthefoundationalnormofequalindividualfreedom,isnormativelymuchmoreattractivethanitsmaincompetitor,theutilitarianefficiencytheory.Accordingtotheequalfreedomtheory,eachhumanbeinghasanabsolutemoralworthasafreeandequalmemberofthecommunity.Thus,thecommongoodtowhichlawandpoliticsshouldbedirectedisnotthemeaninglessmaximizationoftheaggre-gateutilityorwelfareofthesocietyasawhole,asassumedbytheutilitarianefficiencytheory,butratherthecreationofconditionsthatalloweachpersontorealizehisorherhumanityasaself-legislatingfreerationalbeing.1
Thelegaleconomistsgenerallydonotcontesttherelativenormativeunattractivenessoftheutilitarianefficiencytheory.Theyusuallyacknowledgethatutilitarianefficiencycanbeatbestasecondarygoalthatisconstrainedbydistinctmorallyjustifiablegoalsmoreparticularly,thepursuitofjustice.However,theyexplicitlyorimplicitlyassumethatthisconstraintisminimal.2Theyalsoarguethat,althoughtheutilitarianefficiencytheorymayappeartobenormativelyunattractive,itseemstobethemoraltheorythatactuallyunderliesourlawandpolitics,sinceitallegedlybest(orevensolely)explainsthecontentofourexistinglaws,particularlytortlaw.3
(p.250) Inmyprioressay,Ichallengedtheutilitariansdescriptiveclaimprimarilyonthegloballevel.IelaboratedtheKantianconceptofRightanditscorollaryAristotelianconceptsofdistributiveandcorrectivejusticeandarguedthattheseconceptsexplain,justify,andilluminatethegeneralstructureoftortlawanditstraditionalstatusasthepreferredliabilityregimeforinterpersonalinjury.Inthisessay,Ichallengetheutilitariansclaimwithrespecttothestandardsofcareinnegligencelaw.Negligenceliabilityisthemostcommontypeoftortliabilityandisthoughttobethemostobviousexampleoftortlawsutilitarianfoundation.Iftheutilitarianefficiencytheorycannotexplainnegligenceliabilityitsprimedoctrinalexampleinitsfavoritefieldofcommon-lawliabilityitisinveryserioustrouble.Conversely,iftheequalfreedomtheorycanexplainandjustifynegligenceliability,itwillhaveclearedwhatmanyseeasthebiggesthurdleforanonu-tilitariantheoryoftortliability.
II.TheUnworkabilityoftheUtilitarianHandFormulaNegligenceisgenerallydescribedasbehaviorthatcreatesunreasonableforeseeablerisksofinjury.Almostalljuryinstructions,thevastmajorityofjudicialopinions,andmanysecondarysourcesdonotprovideanytestordefinitionofwhatconstitutesunreasonablyriskybehavior,otherthananoftencircularreferencetotheordinarycarethatwouldbeexercisedbythereasonableorprudentpersoninthesameorsimilarcircumstances.4
Legalscholarsarelessreticent.Thereisanalmostuniversalassumptionamonglegalscholarsthatapersonsconductisdeemedunreasonable,andhencenegligent,ifandonlyiftheforeseeableriskscreatedbysuchconductexceeditsexpectedsocialutility.5Thisaggregaterisk-utilitytestofreasonablenesswasmostexplicitlyarticulatedinJudge
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LearnedHandsfamousformulainUnitedStatesv.CarrollTowingCo.:apersonsconductXisunreasonableonlyifPtimesLisgreaterthanB,wherePistheprobabilityofaninjuryoccurring,Listhemagnitudeoftheinjury,andBistheexpectedbenefitofengaginginconductXor,conversely,theexpectedburdenorcostthatwouldhavetobebornetoavoidengaginginconductX.6
TheassumedprevalenceofHandsrisk-utilityformulaastheoperativetestofreasonablenessinnegligenceisdeemedtobethestrongestevidence(p.251) oftheutilitarianefficiencyfoundationoftortlaw.Undertheutilitarianefficiencytheory,conductisefficient(hencereasonableandnotnegligent)ifitmaximizesthetotalsumofexpectedbenefitsminuscosts;itdoesnotmatterwhobearsthecostsandwhogainsthebenefits.TheHandformulaseemsperfectlytoreflectthisview.However,thereareinsurmountableproblemswiththeHandformulaevenundertheutilitarianefficiencytheory.
Theproblemsarebothdescriptiveandanalytic.Inordertoidentifytheefficientlevelsofprecaution,onemustfocusonmarginalincrementsincostsandbenefitsattributabletomarginalincrementsinprecaution,ratherthanthetotalcostsandbenefitsofsomeparticularsuggestedprecaution.7Yetitishighlydoubtfulthatcourtsengagein,orareevencapableofengagingin,suchmarginalanalysis.8
Moresignificantly,evenpropermarginalanalysiswillnotidentifytheefficientlevelsofprecautionwhentheHandformulaisappliedseparately(asitmustbe)totheconductofthedefendantandtheplaintiff.Forexample,assumethata$100losstotheplaintiffcouldhavebeenavoidedby(1)aunilateral$40precautionbythedefendant,(2)aunilateral$60precautionbytheplaintiff,or(3)abilateral$15precautionbythedefendantand$15precautionbytheplaintiff.Asisalmostalwaysthecaseinpractice,themostefficient(leasttotalcost)optionisthethird,whichrequiresbilateralprecautionbybothpartiesratherthanunilateralprecautionbyoneortheother.Yet,applyingtheHandformulaseparatelytoeachpartysconduct,thedefendantwouldbedeemednegligentifshedidnotadoptoption(1),sinceher$40precautionwouldhaveavoideda$100loss,andtheplaintiffwouldbedeemednegligentifhedidnotadoptoption(2),sincehis$60precautionwouldhaveavoideda$100loss.Underthetraditionalnegligenceliabilityrule,accordingtowhichtheplaintiffcannotrecoverifheiscon-tributorilynegligent,thedefendantwillnottakeanyprecaution,sincesheknowstheplaintiffeitherwilladoptoption(2),inwhichcasetherewillbenolossandhencenoliability,orwillnotadoptoption(2)andbebarredfromrecoveringanydamagesduetohiscontributorynegligence.Theplaintiff,knowingthatthedefendanthasno(economic)reasontotakeanyprecaution,willadoptoption(2)i.e.,spend$60toavoidthe$100loss.UsingtheHandformulatodeterminethenegligenceofthepartiesrespectiveconductthusleadstotheleastefficientoptionbeingchosen,ratherthanthemostefficientoption.
TheHandformulawillidentifytheefficientprecautionlevelforoneofthepartiesonlyifitisappliedusingtherisks,burdens,andbenefitsthat(p.252) wouldbeexpectediftheotherpartywereexercisinghisorherefficientlevelofprecautionasolutionblithelyassumedbythelegaleconomists.9However,thissolutionishopelesslycircular:
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identifyingthefirstpartysefficientprecautionlevelrequiresfirstknowingthesecondpartysefficientprecautionlevel,butthesecondpartysefficientprecautionlevelcanbeidentifiedonlyifthefirstpartysefficientprecautionlevelisknown,andsoonaroundthecircle.
Thus,fromthestandpointofutilitarianefficiency,theHandformulamustbeabandoned.NegligencemustbedefinednotasafailuretosatisfytheHandformula,butratherasafailuretoadopttheefficientlevelofprecaution.Asintheaboveexample,thisefficientlevelcanonlybeidentifiedbyconsideringalltheexpectedcostsandbenefitstothedefendantandtheplaintiff(andothers)ofallthepossiblecombinationsofprecautionbythedefendantandtheplaintiff(andothers)andthenchoosingtheleastcostoption.Yet,asHandhimselfnoted,inpracticeitwillbeimpossibletotakeintoaccountmorethanafewoptionsandtheirexpectedcostsandbenefits,andevenfortheseoptionstheexpectedcostsandbenefitsgenerallycannotbeestimated.10Attemptingtocalculateandenforceefficientprecautionlevelsbasedonsuchhighlyimperfectinformationmayverywellleadtogreaterinefficiencyratherthangreaterefficiency,evenassuming(contrarytotheusualsituation)thatsomedeterminateanswerissuggestedbytheavailable(imperfect)information.11
III.NonutilitarianAttemptstoJustifytheHandFormulaAlthoughthelegaleconomistsaggregaterisk-utilityinterpretationofnegligence,especiallyasembodiedintheHandformula,isunderminedbymajortheoreticalandpracticalproblems,almostalllegalscholars,includingthosecriticaloftheutilitarianefficiencytheory,assumeitisdescriptivelycorrect.Criticsofutilitarianefficiencygenerallyhaveattemptedtoconstructnon-utilitarianargumentstoexplainandjustifythesupposeduseoftheaggregaterisk-utilityformulainnegligenceandothertortcases.TheyrelyexplicitlyorimplicitlyonthefundamentalKantianmoraldutytorespecttheequalabsolutemoralworthofyourselfandothersasrational(human)beings.Thisdutyisassumedtorequirethatinallyouractionsyoumustweightheinterestsofothersequallywithyourown,whichleadsimmediatelyandinevitablytotheaggregaterisk-utilityconceptionofreasonablenessandnegligence.
(p.253) Forexample,RonaldDworkin,whilenotexplicitlyinvokingKants(oranyother)moraltheory,attemptstoexplaintheassumeduseoftheaggregaterisk-utilityformulainnegligenceandprivatenuisancecasesbyarguingthatinsuchcasestherearecompetingclaimsofabstractright(alsomoreaccuratelydescribedasmereinterests)whichmustberesolvedbyusingthebasicprincipleofequalconcernandrespecttocompromisethecompetingclaimssoastomaximizethecollectiveutilityoftheparties.12Similarly,ErnestWeinrib,explicitlyrelyingonKantianmoraltheory,assumesthatthecategoricalimperative,whichrequiresonetoactinaccordwithamaximthatonewouldadoptasanequalmemberofthekingdomofends,forbidsanyself-preferenceinconceptionoraction.Heargued,untilrecently,thatthisallegedrequirementofcompleteimpartialityofinterestmandatesanobjectivecomparisonofinterestsconceptionofreasonablenessforbothdefendantsandplaintiffs.13CharlesFriedalsopurportstofindinKantianmoralityarequirementofcompleteimpartiality,whichheatonetimeusednotonlytojustifythe
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aggregaterisk-utilityconceptionofnegligencebutalsotoconstructasocialriskpoolfromwhichpersonssupposedlycandraw,withincertainunclearlimits,toexposeotherstominorormajorrisk.14
Thesearguments,althoughmeanttobenon-utilitarian,arebaseddirectlyontheutilitarianconceptionofequality,accordingtowhichtreatingpeopleasequalssimplymeanscountingeachpersonsinterestsequallywhilemaximizingthetotalsatisfactionofinterests.ThisconceptionofequalityisdirectlyopposedtotheKantianconceptionofequalindividualfreedom,accordingtowhicheachindividualmustalwaysbetreatedasanendinhimselfratherthansolelyasameanstothesatisfactionoftheinterestsofothers.KantsdoctrineofRightmandatesproperrespectfortheequalabsolutemoralworthofothersbyrequiringaslegalaswellasethicaldutiesthatresourcesbedistributedtopromoteeachpersonsequal(p.254) positivefreedom(distributivejustice)andthatconductwhichmightaffectanotherpersonsexistingstockofresourcesbeconsistentwiththatothersequalnegativefreedom(correctivejustice).Kantsdoctrineofvirtuerequiresasasolelyethicaldutyproperconcernfortheequalabsolutemoralworthofothersaswellasyourselfbymakingtheirhappinessoneofyourownends.Itdoesnot,however,requirethatyouweighothersinter-estsequallywithyourownineverythingyoudo.Sucharequirementwouldcompletelyundermineindividualautonomyandfreedom,15
Althoughheisanon-utilitarianmoraltheorist,GeorgeFletcherusuallyequatesreasonablenessintortlawwithutilitarianefficiency.Inanearlyarticle,hearguedthatnegligenceandtortiousconductingeneralshouldbeunderstoodintermsofanon-utilitarianparadigmofnon-reciprocalrisk-creationandlackofexcuse,asanallegedimplementationoftherighttoequalsecuritythatisembodiedincorrectivejustice,ratherthanintermsoftheutilitarianefficiencyparadigmofreasonableness.16Now,however,Fletcheracceptstheutilitarianefficiencyinterpretationofnegligence.Heclaimsthatacollaborativeprincipleunderliesthelawofnegligence:Byenteringintocertainspheresofrisk-taking,plaintiffanddefendantbothcomeunderdutiestoactwithaviewtothe[aggregate]costsandbenefitsoftheiractions.Theybecomeaunit,actingunderanimplicitobligationtooptimizethe[aggregate]consequencesoftheiractionsandhaveashareddutytofindtheoptimallevelofharmfulactivities.17
EthicofcarefeministssuchasLeslieBendertravelthesamepathasDworkin,Weinrib,Fried,andFletcher,althoughtheyseemunawareofthedestinationtowardwhichtheyaretravelingandmightbeshockedtolearnoftheirtravelingcompanions.Benderequatesthereasonablenessstandardinnegligenceand,moregenerally,theliberalconceptsofreason,autonomy,rights,equality,fairness,andjusticewithamasculineethicofantisocial,self-interested,wealth-based,dehumanizingutilitariancalculation.Sheseekstoreplacethereasonablenessstandardanditsmasculineethicwithafeminineethicofcareandconcernfortheneedsandwelfareofothers,accordingtowhichapersonincasesofbothmisfeasance(puttingothersatrisk)andnonfeasance(failuretoprotectothersfromrisksyoudidnotcreate)shouldbeheldtoalegalstandardofconsciouscareandconcernofaresponsibleneighbororsocialacquaintanceforanother
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underthesameorsimilarcircumstances.18
(p.255) BendersfeminineethicofcaremightwellbelesscaringthanthecompleteimpartialityrequirementespousedbyDworkin,Weinrib,Fried,Fletcher,andthe(mostlymale)utilitarianefficiencytheorists,accordingtowhichothersinterestsandwelfaremustalwaysbetreatedasbeingequallyasimportantasyourown.Recognizingthatweallcaredifferentlyforfamilyandfriendsthanwedoforstrangersandthatwecouldnotpossiblyhavetheenergytocareabouteverypersonaswedoourchildrenorlovers,Benderprescribesvaryinglevelsofrequiredcaredependingontheclosenessoftherelationship.19Yet,givenherrejectionofthemasculinenotionsofautonomyandself-interestandheremphasisonthefeminineethicofcareandconcernfortheneedsandwelfareofallothers,itisnotatallclearhowshecouldjustifysuchpreferredtreatmentforonesfamilyorfriends(oroneself).Conversely,assumingavariablestandardbasedonclosenessofrelationship,sheseemsunabletojustifyherproposedrequirementthattheconcernappropriateforneighborsandacquaintancesmustalsobeaffordedtostrangers.
Theproposeddisplacementofthemasculineethicofreason,autonomy,rights,equality,fairness,andjusticebyafeminineethicofcareandconcernforotherswouldseemtobe,asfeministssuchasCatharineMacKinnonandMargaretRadinhaveargued,atrapforwomenespeciallysince,beingafeminineratherthanamasculineethic,itapparentlywouldonlyapplytowomen.20Inarecentarticle,Benderseemstoacknowledgethisproblem.Shenowstatesthatreasonhasitsplaceintortlaw,butthatreasonisaricheranddeeperconceptthantortlawhashistoricallyacknowledged,andsheurgestheusefulnessofthereason/careparadigminsuggestingreconceptualizationsthatmakelawmorereflectiveofhumanexperienceandmoreresponsivetoconcernsofjustice.21
IV.TheEqualFreedomStandardsofCareIfBenderwerefurthertoinvestigateKantian-Aristotelianmoralandlegaltheory,shewouldfindapowerfulelaborationofthemoralandlegalobligationstorespectandcareforthehumanityinothersaswellasoneselfthatshehopestocaptureinherreason/careparadigm.Theseobligationsinclude(althoughtheyareoftenoverlooked)thelegallyenforceabledutiesofdistributivejusticeandthepurelyethicaldutiesofbeneficenceaswellasthelegallyenforceabledutiesofcorrectivejustice.
(p.256) Tortlawfallswithinthedomainofcorrectivejustice,althoughdistributivejusticeconsiderationsareinterwovenincertaintortdoctrines.Correctivejustice,aimsatsecuringeachindividualspersonandexistingstockofresourcesagainstconductbyothersthatwouldbeinconsistentwiththeequalnegativefreedomofall.Onesnegativefreedomthefreedomfromunjustifiedinterferencewithonesuseofonesexistingresourcestopursueonesprojectsorlifeplanwillbecompletelyunderminedifonemustalwaysweightheinterestsofallothersequallywithonesownwhendecidinghowtodeployonesexistingresources,asrequiredbytheutilitarianefficiencytheory,theprincipleofequalconcernandrespectasinterpretedbyDworkinandothers,and
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Bendersfeministethicofcare.Underthesetheories,nooneistreatedasadistinctpersonwithonesownlifetolead.Rathereachpersonismerelyafungibleaddendinthecalculationofsomemysticalaggregatesocialwelfare.Foranyparticularactivity,itdoesnotmatterwhoisbeingputatrisk,bywhom,orforwhosebenefit;allthatmattersisthemaximizationofaggregatesocialwelfare.Thisisthemorallyunattractivemessageandeffectoftheutilitariansconceptionofreasonableness.
UndertheKantian-Aristoteliantheory,whichisbasedonthefoundationalnormofequalindividualfreedomratherthanthemaximizationofaggregatesocialwelfare,therespectiveweightstobegiventoanactorsinterestsandtheinterestsofotherswhomightbeaffectedbythatactionwillvaryconsiderablydependingon(amongotherfactors)whoisbeingputatrisk,bywhom,andforwhosebenefit.Forexample,giventheKantianrequirementoftreatingothersasendsratherthanmerelyasmeans,itisimpermissibletousesomeoneasameremeanstoyourendsbyexposinghim(orhisresources)tosignificantforeseeableunacceptedrisks,regardlessofhowgreatlythebenefittoyoumightoutweightherisktohim.Conversely,sacrificingyourinterestsforthebenefitofsomeoneelseisregardedasmorallymeritorious,althoughnotlegallyrequired,eveniftherisktoyougreatlyoutweighstheexpectedbenefittotheotherperson,aslongasyourexposingyourselftotheriskdoesnotconstituteafailuretoproperlyrespectyourownhumanity.
Itistheequalfreedomconceptionofreasonableness,ratherthantheutilitarianefficiencyconception,thatisreflectedinactualtort-lawdoctrinesanddecisions.Undertheutilitarian-efficiencytheory,itisasinefficienttobeabovetheoptimallevelofcareastobebelowit:eitherformofdivergencethereforeshouldbeconsiderednegligent.However,consistentwiththeequalfreedomtheory,defendantsandplaintiffsareonlydeemednegligentforbeingbelowtherequiredlevelofcare,notforbeingaboveit.Onlywhenoneisbelowtherequiredlevelofcareisthereanimpermissibleinterferencewiththerightsofothers(defendantsprimarynegligence)orafailureproperlytorespectonesownhumanity(plaintiffscontributorynegligence).
(p.257) Moreover,althoughtheutilitarianefficiencytheorywouldapplythesameaggregaterisk-utilitystandardofcaretoplaintiffsanddefendantsinallsituations,takingintoaccountallrisksandbenefitstoeveryone,actualtortlawconsistentwiththeequalfreedomtheoryappliesquitedifferentstandardsofcareindifferentsituations.Thisisevidentforallthreeaspectsofthestandardsofcare:theriskstakenintoaccount,theperspectivesapplied,andthesubstantivecriteriaofreasonableness.
A.RisksTakenintoAccountDifferentrisksaretakenintoaccountinanalyzingtheallegednegligenceofdefendantsandplaintiffs.Theanalysisofadefendantsallegednegligencefocusesontheforeseeableriskstootherscreatedbythedefendantsconduct,ratherthantheriskstoeveryoneincludingherself,whiletheanalysisofaplaintiffsallegednegligencefocusesontheforeseeableriskstotheplaintiffhimselfcreatedbyhisconduct,ratherthantheriskstoothersaswellashimself.22Thisdifferentialtreatmentisinexplicableundertheutilitarian
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efficiencytheory,whichviewsdefendantsandplaintiffsasmorallyandeconomicallyindistinguishablecausesoftheeffectsoftheirinteractingactivitiesandseekstoconstructliabilityrulesthatwillmaximizetheaggregatenetbenefitsofsuchinteractions,takingintoaccountallexpectedcostsandbenefitstoeveryone.23Incontrast,theequalfreedomtheoryeasilyexplainsandjustifiesthedifferentriskstakenintoaccount.AsamatterofRightorjustice,thedefendantisliableforaninteractionalinjuryifandonlyifherconductforeseeablyaffectedthepersonorpropertyofanotherinamannerthatwasinconsistentwithhisRighttoequalnegativefreedom,thusgeneratingacorrectivejusticeobligationofrectification.24Intheanalysisoftheplaintiffscontributorynegligence,aquitedifferentissuearises:whetherthedefendantsprimafaciecorrectivejusticeobligationtotheplaintiffshouldbebarredorreducedbecause,inthelightoftheforeseeableriskstohimself,theplaintifffailedtoactwithproperrespectforhisownhumanityandthusalsobearsmoralresponsibilityforhisinjury.25
B.PerspectiveApplied(ObjectiveorSubjective)Similarly,differentperspectivesareappliedinanalyzingtheallegednegligenceofdefendantsandplaintiffs.Whenassessingadefendantsallegednegligence,anobjectiveperspectivegenerallyisapplied:thedefendantisrequiredtotakeatleastasmuchcareaswouldbetakenbythe(ideal)(p.258) prudentpersonwithordinaryphysicalandmentalabilities.Thestandardisnotloweredtoconformwiththedefendantsparticularphysicalandmental(dis)abilities.Althoughadefendantwithanobviousphysicalincapacityisnotrequiredtodowhatsheisincapableofdoing,sheisrequiredtotakewhateveradditionalprecautionsarenecessarytoreducetheforeseeableriskstootherstotheobjectivelyspecifiedacceptablelevel.Ontheotherhand,althoughitoftenisnotexplicitlymentionedbythecourts,itisgenerallyrecognizedbycourtsandcommentatorsthatamoresubjectiveperspectiveisappliedwhenassessingaplaintiffsallegedcontributorynegligence.26
Undertheutilitarianefficiencytheory,asubjectiveperspectiveideallyshouldbeappliedtobothdefendantsandplaintiffs.Itwouldbeinefficienttorequirealldefendantsorplaintiffstoattainthesamelevelofriskreductiondespitewidelyvaryingphysical,mental,technical,andeconomiccapacitiestoachievesuchriskreduction.Instead,eachdefendantorplaintiffshouldberequiredtoinvestincareonlytothepointwherethemarginalcostofsuchcaredoesnotexceedthemarginalbenefitsinreducedrisk.Duetodifferingcapacitiesandthuscostsofcare,thispointwillvaryforeachindividual.Itisonlytheveryhighadministrativecostsofattemptingtoapplythesubjectiveperspectivethatrequireadoptioninmostinstancesoftheobjectiveperspective,whichisassumed(butnotshown)tobeasecond-bestefficientsolutionforbothdefendantsandplaintiffs.Thus,whenpersonal(in)capacitiesareeasilyascertainable,theyshouldbetakenintoaccountforbothdefendantsandplaintiffs.27
UnderKantsmoraltheory,asubjectiveperspectivewouldberequiredifthequestionwerethemoralblameworthinessormeritofthedefendantsorplaintiffsconduct.But,whenevaluatingthedefendantsconductinatort(ratherthanacriminal)action,thatisnottherelevantquestion(unlesspunitivedamagesareatissue).Instead,therelevant
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questionisthedefendantsmoralresponsibilityforhavingadverselyaffectedsomeoneelsespersonorproperty.Assuch,thequestionisoneofobjectiveRightratherthansubjectivevirtue.Theexternalexerciseoffreedomdependsonsufficientsecurityagainstinterferencesbyotherswithonespersonandproperty.Regardlessofmeasurementproblems,usingasubjectiveperspectivetodeterminethenegligenceofdefendantswouldmakesuchsecurityimpossible,sincetheriskstowhichonecouldpermissiblybeexposedbyothers(p.259) woulddependonthesubjectivecapacitiesoftheparticularotherswithwhomonehappens(oftenunpredictably)tointeract.Tohavesufficientlysecureexpectations,onesrightsinonespersonandpropertymustbedefinedbyanobjectivelevelofpermissibleriskexposurebyotherswhich,underthemoralcategoricalimperativeanditscorollary(thesupremeprincipleofRight),mustbeequallyapplicabletoallandobjectivelyenforced.Thus,anobjectivestandardoflegalfault(moralresponsibility),ratherthanasubjectivestandardofmoralfault(blame),isrequiredwhenconsideringlegalresponsibilityfortheadverseeffectsofadefendantsconductonthepersonorpropertyofothers.28
Whenthecontributorynegligenceofaplaintiffisatissue,thequestioniswhethertheplaintiffsrecoveryfromadefendantwhoinfringedhisrightsbynegligentlyinjuringhimshouldbebarredorreducedbecauseoftheplaintiffscontributiontohisowninjury.Sinceweareconcernedwithaninjurytotheplaintiffhimself,ratherthananinjurytothepersonorpropertyofothers,noissueofRightimmediatelyarises.Insteadtheissueiswhethertheplaintiff,byexposinghimselftotheparticularrisk,failedtoproperlyrespecthisownhumanityandthusshareswiththedefendantmoralresponsibilityforhisinjury.Whenassessingtheplaintiffsmoralresponsibilityforhisowninjury,thereasonjustgivenfordepartingfromthesubjectiveperspectiveofmoralfaultorvirtueandinsteadapplyingtheobjectiveperspectiveoflegalfaultorRighttothedefendantsconductdoesnotdirectlyapplytotheplaintiffsconduct.Rather,theissueofRightarisesindirectlyandappliesinamuchmorelimitedmanner.Properregardfortheequalfreedomofthedefendantsuggeststhattheplaintiffsconductbedeemednegligentandaffecthisrightofrecovery,evenifitwassubjectivelyreasonableinthelightofhisphysicalandmentalcapacitiesandbeliefs,ifitwasunforeseeablyidiosyncratici.e.,ifitfelloutsidethe(broad)rangeofforeseeablebehaviorforthegreatmassofpersonsinsimilarsituations.Thus,theplaintiffsconductshouldbejudgedbyalimitedsemi-subjectiveperspectiveratherthanafullysubjectiveperspective.29
(p.260) C.TheSubstantiveCriteriaofReasonablenessFinally,differentcriteriaofreasonablenessareusedinevaluatingtheallegednegligenceofdefendantsandplaintiffsindifferentcontexts.Contrarytowhatiscommonlyassumed,thecourtsrarelyusetheaggregaterisk-utilityformulaoranyotheruniformdefinitionofreasonableness.Rather,differentfactorsaretakenintoaccountanddifferentweightsaregiventothosefactorsdependingonanumberofconsiderationsthatarehighlyrelevantundertheequal-freedomtheorybutirrelevantundertheutilitarianefficiencytheory.
Inanarticlepublishedin1915thatisoftencitedaspresagingJudgeHandsformula,HenryTerrynotedfivefactorsthatmayberelevant,including[1]theprobabilityand[2]
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themagnitudeofanyinjurythatmightresultfromtheconductatissueand,insomecases,atleast,[3]theprobabilityand[4]themagnitudeofthebenefitexpectedtobeattainedbysuchconductdiscountedby[5]theprobabilitythatthebenefitwouldbeattainedintheabsenceofsuchconduct.30In1927,WarrenSeaveywarnedagainstassum[ing]thatwecanrelyuponanyformulainregardto"balancinginterests"tosolvenegligencecases,andhestatedthattheutilityofthedefendantsconductusuallyisnotconsideredorisweightedverylowwhenthedefendantforherownbenefitputsanotherspropertyorespeciallypersonatrisk,orintentionallyinterfereswiththepersonorpropertyofanother.31JudgeLearnedHandhimself,theauthoroftherisk-utilityformula,notedthattheformulasfactors
arepracticallynotsusceptibleofanyquantitativeestimate,andthesecondtwo[LandB]aregenerallynotso,eventheoretically.Forthisreasonasolutionalwaysinvolvessomepreference,orchoicebetweenincommensurables,anditisconsignedtoajurybecausetheirdecisionisthoughtmostlikelytoaccordwithcommonlyacceptedstandards,realorfancied.32
Similarly,afterelaboratingtheusualacademicaggregaterisk-utilityinterpretationofreasonableness,JohnFlemingwarns:
Butnegligencecannotbereducedtoapurelyeconomicequation.[I]ngeneral,judicialopinionsdonotmakemuchofthecostfactor[ofeliminatingtherisk],andforgoodreasons.Foronething,ourlegaltraditionintortshasstrongrootsinanindividualisticmoralitywithitsfocusprimarilyoninterpersonalequityratherthanbroadersocialpolicy,[T]hecalculusofnegligenceincludessomeimportantnon-economicvalues,likehealthandlife,freedomandprivacy,whichdefycomparison(p.261) withcompetingeconomicvalues.Negligenceisnotjustamatterofcalculatingthepointatwhichthecostofinjurytovictims(thatisthedamagespayable)exceedsthatofprovidingsafetyprecautions.Thereasonablemanisbynomeansacaricaturecoldblooded,calculatingEconomicMan.33
Verylittlescholarlyattentionhasbeenpaidtothecriteriaofreasonablenessthatareactuallyappliedindifferentsituations.Intheremainderofthisessay,Iattempttobegintofillthisgap.Thedifferentsituationswillbedistinguishedprimarilybywhoputwhomatriskforwhosebenefitandbywhetherthepersonputatriskconsentedtosuchriskexposure.Morespecifically,Iexaminethestandardsofcareinthefollowing(non-exhaustive)contexts:(1)defendantstreatingothersasmeans,(2)defendantsengagedinsociallyessentialactivities,(3)defendantoccupierson-premisesrisks,(4)defendantsactivitiesinvolvingparticipatoryplaintiffs,(5)paternalisticdefendants,(6)plaintiffsself-interestedconduct,(7)plaintiffsself-sacrificingconduct,and(8)defendantsfailuretoaidorrescue.
1.DefendantsTreatingOthersasMeansThefirstcategory,theinvoluntaryDPDcategory,encompassessituationsinwhichthedefendant(D)puttheplaintiff(P)atrisktobenefitthedefendant(D)orsomethirdparty,andtheplaintiffdidnotseektobenefitdirectlyfromthedefendantsrisk-creatingactivity.
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Recently,afewscholarshavenotedthattheactualtestofnegligenceinsuchcasesisnottheutilitariansaggregaterisk-utilitytestbutrather(consistentwiththeequalfreedomtheory)thedefendantscreationofasignificant,foreseeable,andunacceptedrisktothepersonorpropertyofothers.34Ariskissignificant,andhenceunreasonableunlessacceptedbytheplaintiff,ifitisalevelofrisktowhichanordinarypersonwouldbeunwillingtobeexposedwithouthisconsent.
ThebestknowncaseofthistypeistheBritishHouseofLordsdecisioninBoltonv.Stone,inwhichtheplaintiff,whilestandingintheroadinfrontofherhouse,wasseriouslyinjuredwhenshewasstruckbyaballthathadbeenpropelledbyanexceptionalhitoutofthenearbycricketgroundsoveraninterveninghouseandintothestreet.35EachoftheLawLordsassumedthatthedefendantcricketclubwouldbeliableinnegligenceiftheriskwereforeseeableandofasufficientlyhighlevel,regardlessoftheutilityofthedefendantsconductortheburdenofavoidingcreatingtherisk.Eachlordconcludedthattherisk,althoughforeseeable,wasnotofasufficientlyhighleveltobedeemedunreasonableasamatteroflaw,giventheverylowprobabilitiesofaballsbeinghitintotheroadandalso(p.262) hittingsomeoneonthelittle-usedresidentialsidestreet.LordReidwasthemostexplicit.Hestatedthatinordertobenegligent,ariskmustnotonlybeforeseeablebutalsobeonethatareasonableperson,consideringthematterfromthepointofviewofsafety,wouldconsidermaterialorsub-stantial:
InconsideringthatmatterIthinkthatitwouldberighttotakeintoaccountnotonlyhowremoteisthechancethatapersonmightbestruckbutalsohowserioustheconsequencesarelikelytobeifapersonisstruck;butIdonotthinkthatitwouldberighttotakeintoaccountthedifficultyofremedialmeasures.Ifcricketcannotbeplayedonagroundwithoutcreatingasubstantialrisk,thenitshouldnotbeplayedthereatall.Idonotthinkthatareasonablemanconsideringthematterfromthepointofviewofsafetywouldorshoulddisregardanyriskunlessitisextremelysmall.36
Inasubsequentcase,theLawLordssittingasthePrivyCouncilinaCommonwealthcaseonappealfromAustralia,TheWagonMound(No.2),heldthat,evenwhentheforeseeableriskisinsubstantial(small),thedefendantwillstillbeheldnegligentif,butonlyif,theriskwasrealratherthanfar-fetchedorfantasticandthedefendanthadnovalidreasonforfailingtotakestepstoeliminateit.Avalidreasoncouldbethatitwouldinvolveconsiderableexpensetoeliminatetherisk.[Thedefendant]wouldweightheriskagainstthedifficultyofeliminatingit.Boltonv.Stone,thecourtsaid,hadinvolvedsucharealbutinsubstantialrisk.But,thecourtreiterated,iftheriskwererealandsubstantial,itwouldbeunreasonablenottotakestepstoeliminateit,regardlessoftheutilityoftheriskortheburdenofeliminatingit.37
TheWagonMound(No,2)issometimesmisreadasabandoningBoltonv.Stonessubstantialriskcriterionandreplacingitwiththerisk-utilityformula.ButthePrivyCouncilclearlystatesthattherisk-utilityformula,ratherthanbeingtheuniversaltestofdefendantsnegligence,isapplicableonlyinthosesituationsinwhichtheriskordinarilywouldbeconsideredinsubstantial.Iftheriskissubstantial,theutilityofthedefendants
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conductisirrelevant.Therisk-utilityformulaisusedtoexpandthedefendantsliability,toencompasssituationsinwhichtheriskordinarilywouldbedeemedinsubstantialbutisneverthelessdeemedunacceptablebecauseitisreal,ratherthanfantastic,andthecostofeliminatingitwouldbesimilarly(p.263) small(noprecisequantitativebalancingofriskandutilityseemstobefeasible,impliedorjustifiedeveninthesesituations).38
AlthoughnotusuallyemployinglanguageasexplicitasLordReidsinBolton,anddespitesometimesemployingbalancinglanguage,courtsintheUnitedStatesandelsewheregenerallyalsofindadefendantnegligentifshecreatedaforeseeablesignificantunacceptedriskofinjurytothepersonorpropertyofothers.39Aswepreviouslynoted,juryinstructionsonadefendantsnegligencerarely,ifever,refertotheaggregaterisk-utilityformula,focusinginsteadonthecareexpectedofthereasonableordinaryorprudentpersonwhoactswithproperconcernfortheeffectsofheractivityonthepersonsandpropertyofothers.Courtshaveupheldjuryfindingsofnegligenceeventhoughthejuryhasspecificallyfoundthatthebenefitsasawholeofthedefendantsconductoutweighedtherisks.40Inacareful,documentedstudyofallnineteenthcenturyCaliforniaandNewHampshireappellatecourtdecisionsontortliability,GarySchwartzreports:
Thefactorofprivateprofitwasseenasareasonforbeingskeptical,ratherthanappreciative,oftheproprietyofriskyactivityengagedinbyenterprise.Ingeneral,theNewHampshireandCaliforniaCourtswerereluctanttofindthateconomicfactorsjustifiedadefendantsrisktaking.NeitherCourtevenonceheldmeremonetarycostsrenderednonnegligentadefendantsfailuretoadoptaparticularsafetyprecaution.41
Defenselawyerscarefullyavoidmakingargumentstojudgesorjurorsthatseektojustifyrisksimposedontheplaintiffbyallegedlyoffsettingenhancementsofthedefendantsutility.Defendantsthatarethoughttohavedeliberatelymadesuchrisk-utilitydecisionsareoftendeemedbyjuriesandjudgesnotonlytohavebeennegligent,butalsotohavebehavedsoegre-giouslyastojustifyaheftyawardofpunitivedamages,asoccurredintheFordPintoandasbestoscases.42
(p.264) 2.DefendantsEngagedinSociallyEssentialActivitiesWhilethepurelyprivateutilitytothedefendantofhisconductisrarelytakenintoaccount,thesocialutilityofthedefendantsconductistakenintoaccountinsomesituations,althoughnotthroughautilitarianbalancing.AcoupleofthesesituationsarethesubjectoftheWisconsinSupremeCourtsillustrationsofappropriatebalancingofthesocialinterestsinnegligencecasesunderanordinarycarejuryinstruction:
Onedrivingacarinathicklypopulateddistrict,onarainyday,slowlyandinthemostcarefulmanner,maydoinjurytothepersonofanotherbythrowingmuddyorinfectedwateruponthatperson.Societydoesnotholdtheactorresponsiblebecausethebenefitofallowingpeopletotravelundersuchcircumstancessofaroutweighstheprobableinjurytobystandersthatsuchconductisnotdisapproved.Circumstancesmayrequirethedriverofafiretrucktotakehistruckthrougha
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thicklypopulateddistrictatahighrateofspeed,butifheexercisesthatdegreeofcarewhichsuchdriversordinarilyexerciseunderthesameorsimilarcircumstances,societyweighingthebenefitsagainsttheprobabilitiesofdamage,inspiteofthefactthatasareasonablyprudentandintelligentmanheshouldforeseethatharmmayresult,justifiestheriskandholdshimnotliable.43
Thecourtsfirstillustrationreflectsthefactthatinanysocietycertainriskssuchasthoseposedbyproperlyconstructed,maintained,andoperatedelectricalgenerationandtransmissionfacilities,dams,trains,automobiles,andplaneswillbeunavoidableaspectsofactivitiesessentialorimportanttoallpersonsinthesociety.UnderthesupremeprincipleofRight(universalizableequalfreedom),allmembersofsocietywillbedeemedtohaveacceptedsuchactivitiesandtheirunavoidablerisksasbeingreasonable(butnotnecessarilyasbeingimmunefromstrictliabilityfordamagescausedtothosenotseekingtodirectlybenefitfromaparticularriskyactivity).Yet,astheWisconsincourtnotes,thesociallyimportantactivitymustbeoperatedinthemostcarefulmannertominimizetheriskstoothers,andtheactivitywillbedeemedreasonableonlyiftheriskstoothersarenottooserious(intheillustrationtheyaredeminimis)andaregreatly(notmerelymarginally)outweighedbytheactivityssocialutility.
TheWisconsincourtssecondillustrationinvolvestheoperationofpublicemergencyvehiclesbydefendantsseekingtoalleviateseriousthreatstopeopleslivesorproperty.Insuchemergencysituations,thedefendantis(p.265) heldtobejustifiedinengaginginpractices(e.g.,drivingathighspeeds,onthewrongsideoftheroad,andthroughtrafficsignals)thatordinarilywouldbedeemednegligent,butonlyifsheundertakesadditionalprecautionsorwarnings(suchasslowingdownatintersections,soundingsirens,andflashinglights)sothatthosetherebyputatriskcan,withoutsignificantinterferencewiththeirlegitimateactivities,avoidbeingexposedtoasubstantialorsignificantrisk.44Defendantsinemergencysituationsarethustreatedsimilarlytodefendantswithphysicalincapacities,whoaswehavenotedarenotrequiredtodowhattheyareincapableofdoingbutarerequiredtotakeotherstepstoavoidexceedingtheobjectivelyacceptablelevelofrisk.45
3.DefendantOccupiersOn-PremisesRisksInafewsituations,wherethedefendantsownrightsaredirectlyimplicated,thedefendantsprivateutilityistakenintoaccountandasemi-subjectiveperspectiveissometimesapplied.Oneofthesesituationsinvolvesrisks,topersonswhocomeonthedefendantsproperty,thatresultfromactivitiesorconditionsontheproperty.Whetherformulatedasdistinctdutiesorasasingleall-encompassingdutyofreasonablecare,thestandardofcarevariesaccordingtowhethertheplaintiffwasabusinessinvitee,asocialguest,alicensee,achildtrespasser,oranadulttrespasser.46Thehighest,objectivestandardofcareisrequiredforbusinessinvitees,whilethelowest,semi-subjectivestandardofcareisrequiredforadulttrespassers.Ofthevariouscategoriesofon-premisesplaintiffs,onlybusinessinviteesareaffordedapproximatelythesameprotectionasoff-premisesplaintiffs.47
Thesedistinctionsarefairlyeasilyexplainedandjustifiedundertheequalfreedom
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theory,whichwouldnotrequirethedefendanttosignificantlysacrificeherownintereststoprotectfromon-premisesrisksthose(especiallyadults)whohavewrongfullytrespassedonherproperty,ortogobeyondprovidingwarningsandmoderatesafeguardstomakethepremisessaferforlicenseesorsocialgueststhansheiswillingandabletomakeitforherself.Thisequal-freedomreasoningappearsofteninthecases.For(p.266) example,intheHouseofLordsdecisioninBritishRailwaysBoardv.Herrington,LordReidstated:
Normallythecommonlawappliesanobjectivetest[todefendants].Ifapersonchoosestoassumearelationshipwithmembersofthepublic,saybysettingouttodriveacarortoerectabuildingfrontingahighway,thelawrequireshimtoconducthimselfasareasonablemanwithadequateskill,knowledgeandresourceswoulddo.Hewillnotbeheardtosaythatinfacthecouldnotattainthatstandard.Ifhecannotattainthatstandardheoughtnottoassumetheresponsibilitywhichthatrelationshipinvolves.Butanoccupierdoesnotvoluntarilyassumearelationshipwithtrespassers.Bytrespassingtheyforceaneighbourrelationshiponhim.WhentheydosohemustactinahumanemannerthatisnotaskingtoomuchofhimbutIdonotseewhyheshouldberequiredtodomore.
Soitappearstomethatanoccupiersdutytotrespassersmustvaryaccordingtohisknowledge,ability,andresources.Ithasoftenbeensaidthattrespassersmusttakethelandastheyfindit.Iwouldrathersaythattheymusttaketheoccupierastheyfindhim.
[Theoccupier]mightoftenreasonablythink,weighingtheseriousnessofthedangerandthedegreeoflikelihoodoftrespasserscomingagainsttheburdenhewouldhavetoincurinpreventingtheirentryormakinghispremisessafe,orcurtailinghisownactivitiesonhisland,thathecouldnotfairlybeexpectedtodoanything.Butifhecouldatsmalltroubleandexpensetakesomeeffectiveaction,Ithinkmostpeoplewouldthinkitinhumaneandculpablenottodothat.
Itwouldfollowthatanimpecuniousoccupierwithlittleassistanceathandwouldoftenbeexcusedfromdoingsomethingwhichalargeorganisationwithamplestaffwouldbeexpectedtodo.48
Moresuccinctly,LordPearsonstated:Thereisalsoamoralaspect.[T]respassingisaformofmisbehaviour,showinglackofconsiderationfortherightsofothers.Itwouldbeunfairiftrespasserscouldbytheirmisbehaviourimposeonerousobligationsonothers.49
Undertheutilitarianefficiencytheory,itwouldseemthat(contrarytothecases)defendantlandownersshouldbeatleastasconcernedabouton-premisesrisksasoff-premisesrisks,regardlessofthestatusoftheplaintiff,andindeedarguablyshouldbesubjecttogreater(strictorabsolute)liabilityforon-premisesrisksastheusualcheapestcostavoider.Thelegaleconomistsattemptstoexplainthedefendantlandownersgreatlyrelaxeddutyofcaretotrespassersasplaintiffsand,conversely,therelatedstrict(sometimespunitive)liabilityoftrespassersasdefendants,relyonaconvolutedandad
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hocencouragingmarkettransactionsrationalethatisriddledwithexceptionsforallegedinfeasiblebargainingsituations.50
(p.267) 4.DefendantsActivitiesInvolvingParticipatoryPlaintiffsAnothermajorcategoryofnegligencecases,theVoluntaryDPPcategory,encompassessituationsinwhichthedefendant(D)puttheplaintiff(P)atriskatleastpartiallytobenefittheplaintiff(P),andtheplaintiffsoughttobenefitdirectlyfromthedefendantsriskyactivity.Thiscategoryincludessituationsinwhichtheplaintiffswerecustomersof,participantsin,orwillingspectatorsofthedefendantsriskyactivity.Inthesesituations,theriskwillbedeemedreasonableevenifitwassubstantialifitwasonethattheplaintiffimplicitlyacceptedasbeingworthwhilegiventhebenefitsheexpectedtoobtainfromtheriskyactivity(includingthebenefitofnothavingtopayanyincreasedprecautioncoststhatwouldlikelybepassedontohim).Hence,inthiscontextatypeofrisk-utilitytestisproperundertheequal-freedomtheory.Butthebenefitstakenintoaccountarelimitedtothoseexpectedbythetypicalplaintiff,ratherthanalsoincluding(astheutilitarianefficiencytheorywouldmandate)anyindependentutilitytothedefendantoraggregatesocialutility.Moreover,thecomparisonofriskandutilityisnotasimplequantitativecomparisonofnon-weightedfactors,asisassumedbytheutilitarianefficiencytheory.Dependingonthevaluesinvolved,thecomparisonmaybequalitativeratherthanquantitative,ormayinvolveweightedorlexicallyorderedfactors,orboth.Forexample,rarely,ifever,wouldseriousriskstolifeorhealthbedeemedoutweighedbymereeconomicbenefits.
Therearemanyexamplesofcasesinthiscategory.Amongthemostcommonnowadaysaresuitsbyaproductpurchaseroruserallegingdefectivedesignbytheproductsmanufacturer.Acommon(butnotexclusive)testofdefectorreasonablenessinsuchcasesisanexplicitrisk-utilitytest,whichinallbutahandfulofcasesfocusessolelyontherisksandbenefitstothetypicalconsumer,ratherthanonanyindependentutilitytothedefendantoraggregatesocialutility.51Inatypicalnon-productliabilitycase,theplaintiff,apassengeronthedefendantstrain,apparentlyfaintedinawashroomandreceivedsevereburnsonherfacewhenitcameintocontactwithanexposedheatingpipeunderawatercooler,whichpipecouldonlybereachedbypersonskneelingorlyingdownonthefloor.Assumingthatfailingtoguardagainstsuchanoccurrencewouldbeunreasonableifitwerereasonablyforeseeable,thecourtheldthatitwasnot.52Theriskconced-edlywasforeseeableandperhapscouldhavebeendeemedsignificant(reasonablyforeseeable).Yet,giventheverysmallrisk,itisunlikelythatthe(p.268) typicalpassengerwouldhavebeenwillingtopay,throughincreasedticketprices,thedistributedcostsofeliminatingtheriskbyshieldingthepipesineverywashroomoneverytrain.
5.PaternalisticDefendantsAdistinctandinfrequentlyencounteredcategory,theinvoluntaryDPPcategory,encompassessituationsinwhichthedefendant(D)puttheplaintiff(P)atriskforwhatthedefendantconsideredtobetheplaintiffs(Ps)bestinterest,buttheplaintiffdidnotconsenttoorseektobenefitfromthecreationoftherisk.Consistentwiththeequal-
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freedomtheorybutcontrarytotheutilitarian-efficiencytheory,defendantsgenerallyarenotallowedtodothiswithouttheplaintiffsconsent,eveniftheexpectedbenefitsallegedlygreatlyoutweightherisks,unlesstheplaintiffisincapableofgivingconsentandthereisauthorizedsubstitutedconsent.
Themostcommoncasesinvolvemedicaltreatment.Althoughsomejurisdictionsleavetothemedicalprofessionthejudgementofwhatrisksshouldbedisclosedtothepatient,manyUnitedStatesjurisdictionstodayfollowthepatient-centeredstandard,accordingtowhichthephysicianhasthedutytodiscloserisksthatwouldbedeemedmaterialbythetypicalpatient,orwhichthephysicianotherwiseknowsorhasreasontoknowarematerialtotheparticularpatient.53Thepatient-centeredstandardhasalsobeenapprovedbytheHighCourtofAustraliaandtheSupremeCourtofCanada,54andwasfavoredbyLordsScarmanandTemplemanintheBritishHouseofLordsdecisioninSidawayv.BethlemRoyalHospital,55
However,abaremajorityoftheLawLordsinSidawayaffirmedtheCourtofAppealsadoptionofthephysician-centeredmedical-practicestandard,basedonEnglandsmorepaternalisticapproachtodoctor-patientrelationsandaconcernthatthetransatlanticapproachwasbothimpracticalandwoulddonothingforpatientsormedicine,althoughitmightdoagreatdealfprlawyersandlitigation.56Nevertheless,themajorityintheHouseofLordsagreedwiththeminoritythatthedoctorsjudgementonproperriskdisclosurewouldhavetogivewaywhen(p.269) necessarytorespondfullytoapatientsqueryabouttherisksinvolved.57Moreover,LordBridge,joinedbyLordKeith,statedthat,whiletheissueofproperriskdisclosureistobedecidedprimarilyonthebasisofexpertmedicalevidence,exceptionalcasesmightarise:
[T]hejudgemightincertaincircumstancescometotheconclusionthatdisclosureofaparticularriskwassoobviouslynecessarytoaninformedchoiceonthepartofthepatientthatnoreasonablyprudentmedicalmanwouldfailtomakeit.ThekindofcaseIhaveinmindwouldbeanoperationinvolvingasubstantialriskofgraveadverseconsequences.Insuchacase,intheabsenceofsomecogentclinicalreasonwhythepatientshouldnotbeinformed,adoctor,recognisingandrespectinghispatientsrightofdecision,couldhardlyfailtoappreciatethenecessityforanappropriatewarning.58
Despitethedisagreementsonthedoctor-centeredversuspatient-centeredstandardfordeterminingwhichrisksarematerialtothepatient,itisuniversallyrecognizedthatthepatienthastheright,regardlessofthedoctorsopinion,todecidewhetherornottoundergosomemedicaltreatmentandthatthedoctorhasacorrelativedutytodisclosematerialriskstothepatient.Thisrightanddutyseemobviousundertheequalfreedomtheory,buttheyaredifficulttoexplainundertheutilitarianefficiencytheory.
Thelegaleconomistmightarguethatthemedicaltreatmentcasesarelowtransaction-costsituationsinwhichthedoctorshouldbeprecludedfrombypassing(fullyinformed)marketbargainingbyfailingtodiscloseriskinformationthatisknowablyorforeseeablymaterialtothepatient.59Butapatientsrefusaltoundergosometreatmente.g.,a
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refusaltoacceptbloodtransfusionsbecauseofreligiousbeliefsorotherreasonsmaygreatlyendangerhishealthandlife,therebycreatingsubstantialexpecteddisutilitynotonlytohimselfbutalsotootherseconomicallyoremotionallydependentonhim.Thetransactioncostsofnegotiatingwithsuchaffectedthirdpartieswillgenerallybeveryhigh,yetthecompetentpatientsrighttorefusetreatmentremainsclear,eventhoughundertheutilitariansimpartialcalculustheaggregatebenefitstothepatientandothersofgoingaheadwiththetreatmentmightbethoughttogreatlyoutweighthepsychicand/orreligiouscoststothepatient.
6.PlaintiffsSelf-interestedConductWeturnnowtotheplaintiffscontributorynegligence.Theprincipalcategory,thePPPcategory,encompassessituationssuchasCarrollTowinginwhichtheplaintiff(P)puthimself(P)atriskforhisown(Ps)benefit.60Sinceweareonlyconcernedwiththerisktheplaintiffimposedonhimself,(p.270) noissueofRightisdirectlyinvolved,butratheronlywhethertheplaintifffailedproperlytorespecthisownhumanityandthusalsoismorallyresponsibleforhisinjury.Whenengagedinsuchpurelyself-interestedbehavior,itwouldbeirrationalforapersontoexposehimselftoriskswhichsubjectivelyexceedtheexpectedbenefits.
AsintheVoluntaryDPPdefendantcategory,thisrisk-utilitytestreflectstheequal-freedomapproachratherthantheutilitarianefficiencyapproach.Onlyrisksandbenefitstotheplaintiffaretakenintoaccount,ratherthan(asrequiredbytheutilitarianefficiencytheory)allrisksandbenefitstoanyonewhomightbeaffectedbytheplaintiffsconduct.Therisksandbenefitsareevaluatedfromthesubjectiveperspectiveoftheplaintiff(aslongasthatperspectiveisnottooidiosyncratic),ratherthantheobjectiveperspectiveoftheidealprudentperson.Andthecomparisonofrisksandbenefitsisnotaquantitativemeasurementandbalancingofmarginalrisksandexpectedutilities,butratheracommon-senseassessmentoftherelevantrisksandutilities,whichmaybeandoftenareassessedqualitativelyorlexicallyratherthanquantitatively.61
7.PlaintiffsSelf-SacrificingConductThispenultimatecategory,thePPXcategory,encompassessituationsinwhichtheplaintiff(P)puthimself(P)atriskforsomethirdpartys(Xs)benefit.Undertheutilitarian-efficiencytheory,theplaintiffshouldbedeemedcontributorilynegligentiftheriskstotheplaintiff(andothers),objectivelyconsidered,outweightheexpectedbenefittothethirdparty(andothers).Undertheequalfreedomtheory,however,theplaintiffswillingnesstosacrificehisownintereststobenefitsomeoneelseisconsiderednotonlyreasonable,butalsomorallypraiseworthy,evenif(undertheutilitariancalculus)theriskstotheplaintiffseemmuchgreaterthantheexpectedbenefittothethirdparty,aslongastheplaintiffsconductdoesnotconstitutelackofrespectforhisownhumanity.
Theequal-freedomtheoryisconsistentwiththecases,whiletheutilitarian-efficiencytheoryisnot.Probablythemostcommonsituationiswhentheplaintiffputshimselfatrisktorescuesomehelplesspersonwhohasbeenputinseriousdangerbythedefendantsnegligence.Intheserescuesituations,courtsholdthat,nomatterhowmuchtheriskto
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theplaintiffmayseemtoexceedtheexpectedbenefittothepotentialrescuee,theplaintiffsconductismorallymeritoriousratherthanmorallyblameworthyorunreasonableunlessitwasfoolhardy,wanton,rash,orreckless.62(p.271) Whenthelifeofthepotentialrescueeisatissue,therisktotheplaintiffisconsideredfoolhardyorrashonlyiftherewasnorealchanceofsavingthepotentialrescuee.
OneofthebestknowncasesisEckertv.LongIslandRailroad63whichwas(mis)usedbyTerrytoillustratetheutilitarianbalancingofthefivefactorsthatheidentifiedasbeingrelevanttoadeterminationofadefendantsorplaintiffsnegligence.64TherescuerinEckertjumpedinfrontofthedefendantsnegligentlydriventraintosaveachildonthetracks,pushingthechildoffthetracksjustbarelyintimebutbeinghitandkilledhimself.Ifweplausiblyassumethatthelives(L)oftherescuerandthechildwereequallyvaluable(althougheconomistsmightconsidertheremaininglifeofthepresumablyproductiveadulttobemorevaluablethanthatoftheasyetunproductivechild),theprobabilityoftherescuersbeingkilledwasatleast75percent,theprobabilityoftherescuersrescuingthechildwasatbest25percent,andtheprobabilityofthechildremainingonthetrackswithoutanyrescueattemptwasaround90percent,thentherisktotherescuer(0.750L)greatlyexceededtheexpectedbenefittothechild(0.25x0.9L=0.225L).Thecourtneverthelessheldthattherescuersconduct,ratherthanbeingcontributorilynegligent,wasmorallymeritorious,andthatitwouldbecontributorilynegligentonlyifitwasrashorreckless.65TheutilitarianefficiencytheoristsignoretheEckertcourtsrashorrecklesslanguageandimplausiblyassumethattherisktotherescuerwaslessthantheexpectedbenefittotherescuee.66
8.DefendantsFailuretoAidorRescueThelastcategory,thenonfeasanceDPDcategory,isthereverseofthePPXcategorythatwehavejustdiscussed.Itencompassessituationsinwhichthedefendantfailedtoaidapersonwhoneededherhelp,butthedefendantsfailuretoaidwasnonfeasanceratherthanmisfeasancesincethedefendantdidnotcreateorworsentheplaintiffsneedycondition.Thedefendant(D)didnotputtheplaintiffatriskforthedefendantsbenefit,butratherlettheplaintiff(P)remainatriskinordertoavoidaburdentoorlossofbenefitbythedefendant(D).Insuchsituations,thegeneralcommonlawruleisthatthedefendanthasnolegaldutytoaidtheplaintiff.Incivil-lawjurisdictionsandafewcommon-lawjurisdictions,thereisalimitedlegal(criminallawandsometimesalsotortlaw)dutyofeasyrescuei.e.,adutytorenderaidinemergencysituationstoapersonwhoselifeorhealthisseriouslythreatened,iftherescuercandosowithoutexposingherselftosignificantrisksorburdens.Thegeneralno-dutyruleincommonlawjurisdictionsisriddledbyanexpandinglistofcategoriesofpersonsheld(p.272)subjecttoadutyofeasyrescue,usuallybutnotalwaysbasedonsomespecialrelationshipwiththeplaintiffortheplaintiffsassailant.67
Althoughitmightseemefficienttoimposeadutytoaidwhenevertheexpectedbenefitstotheplaintiffoutweightheriskorburdentothedefendant,ifappliedgenerallythisdutycouldpromoteinefficientgenerallaziness(theeconomistsmoralhazardproblem).Thus,utilitarianefficiencytheoryprobablywouldrejectageneralmoralorlegalobligation
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ofbeneficenceorcharity,andlimitthedefendantsdutytoemergencysituationsinvolvingsignificantriskstotheplaintiffslifeorhealth.Ithasbeensuggestedthatutilitariansmightalsoexcludeaspracticallyunenforceable(andhenceeconomicallywasteful)anyrequirementthatthedefendantimposeonherselfasignificantrisktoherownlifeorhealth.68However,thisexclusionwouldconcedethelackofacceptanceoftheutilitarianmoraltheory,sinceunderthattheoryadefendantshouldwillinglyincursuchariskifitwereoutweighedbytheexpectedbenefittotheplaintiff.Inanyevent,utilitarianefficiencytheorywouldrequireadefendanttoimposesignificantnon-healththreateningburdensonherselfinemergencysituationsinvolvingsignificantriskstotheplaintiffslifeorhealthiftheexpectedbenefitstotheplaintiffexceededtheburdensonher.69Yetnojurisdictionimposessuchadutyofnon-easyrescue.
LandesandPosnerputforthvariousefficiencyargumentstotrytoexplainthelackofageneraldutytoattemptrescue.Oneargumentisthatacausation(misfeasance)requirement,althoughusuallyirrelevanttoefficiencydeterminations,isneeded(forunexplainedreasons)inthisonecontexttoavoidexcessiveadministrativecostsinidentifyingwhowouldhavebeenefficientorcheapest-costrescuers.Anotherimplausibleargumentisthatadutytorescuewouldinefficientlyreducethenumberofpotentialrescuersbecausepeoplewouldavoidactivitieswhichmightgiverisetoadutytorescue.Yetanyactivitymightgiverisetoadutytorescue;tocompletelyavoidsuchadutyonewouldhavetoceasetoexist.Conversely,giventherareoccurrenceofemergency-rescuesituations,evenadutyofnon-easyrescueshouldhavelittleimpactonpeopleschoiceofactivities.Athirdimplausibleargumentisthatadutytorescuewouldcreateamoralhazardproblem:that,relyingonthedutytorescue,peoplewouldtakeinsufficientprecautionsfortheirownsafetyorevenplacethemselvesinexigentcircumstancesinordertobeabletosuefornon-rescue.70
Thelackofalegaldutyofnon-easyrescueiseasilyexplainedandjustifiedunderKantianmoraltheory.Nopersoncanbeusedsolelyasameansforthebenefitofothers,whichmeansthatnoonecanbelegally(p.273) requiredtogobeyondtherequirementsofRight(correctivejusticeanddistributivejustice)ifsuchanobligationwouldrequireasignificantsacrificeofonesautonomyorfreedomfortheallegedgreatergoodofothers.Correctivejusticedefinesthescopeofonesequalnegativefreedomnottohaveonespersonorexistingstockofresourcesadverselyaffectedbyothers.Itisthuslimitedtosituationsinvolvingmisfeasance,inwhichthedefendantsconducthasputthepersonorpropertyoftheplaintiffinaworsepositionthanifthedefendanthadnotbeenpresent.Althoughdistributivejusticeobligatespersonswithmorethantheirjustshareofsocietysresourcestoredistributethatexcesstothosewhohavelessthantheirjustshare,thesedistributivejusticedutiesgenerallyaremultilateralratherthanbilateralandthusarenecessarilyorbestimplementedthroughlegislativeandadministrative(re)distributionschemes.71InadditiontotheserequirementsofRight,Kantspecifiesadutyofbeneficenceasoneoftheprincipaldutiesofvirtue,butheinsiststhatthisissolelyanethicaldutybecauseitisonlyspecifiableasanindeterminatebroadduty,whichvariesdependingoneachwould-bebenefactorsownresourcesandneeds,ratherthanasadeterminate(andhencelegallyenforceable)Strictduty.72
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ThusKantianmoralphilosophy,whilerecognizingalegaldutyofdistributivejusticeandapurelyethicaldutyofbeneficence,rejectsagenerallegaldutyofnon-easyrescueorbeneficence.Itisoftenthoughttogofurtherandtosupporttheno-dutyrule,rejectingevenadutyofeasyrescue.73Yetthisisfarfromclear.Kanthimselfneveraddressedtheissueofalimitedlegaldutyofeasyrescue.AlthoughKantsometimessaidthattheissueofneedisirrelevanttoRight(legalobligation),hesaidthisinthecontextofdistinguishingthesolelyethicaldutyofbeneficence.74GivenKantsfundamentalfocusonequalindividualfreedom,bothnegativeandpositive,itwouldseemthatKantsmoralphilosophywouldsupport(indeedrequire)alegaldutyofeasyrescue,whichbydefinitionwouldnotentailanysignificantburdenonthedefendantssubstantivefreedomandyetwouldbeessentialtotheplaintiffscontinuedfreedom,ifsuchadutycouldbedeterminatelyspecifiedandpracticablyenforced.Thislegaldutycouldbebased,giventheexigentcircumstances,eitherondistributivejusticessecuringof(p.274) equalpositivefreedomordirectlyontheunderlyingfoundationalnormofequalindividualfreedom.
Theprimaryobjectiontoadutyofeasyrescue,evenbyardentlibertarianssuchasRichardEpstein,hasbeenthesupposedindeterminatenessandimpracticalityofimplementingsuchaduty.Epsteinsuggeststheintractabledifficultyofdecidingwhoshouldbeheldliablewhenmanypeoplewerepresentwhoeasilycouldhaveaidedtheplaintiff.75Yetdoctrinessuchasjointandseveralliabilitycanbeusedhereasinothermultipledefendantsituations.Epsteinalsosuggeststhatitisdifficultifnotimpossibletodistinguisheasy-rescuesituationsfromnon-easy-rescuesituations.Forexample,hearguesthatadutyofeasyrescuewouldrequiremostpersonstorespondaffirmativelytoacharitableappealfor$10tosavethelifeofsomestarvingchildinacountryravagedbywar.76Butthisisnottrue:ifonehadsuchaduty,onewouldbeforcedtorespondtorepeatedindistinguishableclaimsthatwouldquicklyadduptoasignificantburden.Thefeasibilityofimplementingalegaldutyofeasyrescueseemstobedemonstratedbyitsactualimplementationincivil-lawjurisdictions.
Nevertheless,thereisalegitimateconcernthatnolegaldutytorescueshouldbeimposedinnonfeasancesituationsthatwouldsignificantlyinterferewiththedefendantsRightofequalfreedom.Ibelievethisconcernjustifiesapplyingasubjectiveperspectiveandraisingtheburdenofprooffromapreponderanceoftheevidencetoclearandconvincingevidencewhendeterminingwhethertherescueattemptactuallywouldhavebeeneasy(i.e.,wouldnothavebeenasignificantintrusiononthedefendantsautonomy).Inaddition,Iacknowledgesomedoubtsaboutthejusticeofimposingextensivetortdamageswhichmightbankruptthedefendantwhenthedefendantisbeingchargedmerelywithnonfeasance(failuretobenefitsomeoneelse)ratherthanmisfeasance(affirmativelyputtingsomeoneelseatrisk).Suchdoubtsmightsuggestthatonlyminorcriminalpenaltiesorsignificantlyrestrictedtortdamagesbemadeavailableforbreachofthedutyofeasyrescue.
V.ConclusionTheKantian-Aristoteliantheoryoflegalresponsibility,whichisbasedonthenormatively
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attractivepremiseofequalindividualfreedom,explains,justifies,andilluminatesthevariousaspectsofthemultiplestandardsofcareinnegligencelaw.Ontheotherhand,theutilitarian-efficiencytheory,whichtreatsplaintiffsanddefendantsasindistinguishableandfungible(p.275) addendsinthemaximizationofaggregatesocialwelfare,isacompletefailure.Itnotonlyisnormativelyunattractive,assometimesisconceded,butalso,contrarytowhatisgenerallyassumed,failstoexplainorjustifyanyofthevariousaspectsofthestandardsofcareinnegligencelaw.Thisfailureisacriticalonefortheutilitarian-efficiencytheoryoflaw,whichgenerallyhasofferedtortlaw,andmoreparticularlynegligencelaw,astheprimeillustrationofthetheorysownutility.(p.276)
Notes:(1)See,RichardW.Wright,Right,JusticeandTortLaw,thisvolume.
(2)See,e.g.,GUIDOCALABRESI,THECOSTSOFACCIDENTS:ALEGALANDECONOMICANALYSIS(1970),2433,291308;WILLIAMM.LANDES&RICHARDA.POSNER,THEECONOMICSTRUCTUREOFTORTLAW(1987),1,89,14,1823,3123;RICHARDA.POSNER,ECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW(3dedn.,1986),113,216.
(3)See,e.g.,LANDES&POSNER,supra,note2;A.MITCHELLPOLINSKY,ANINTRODUCTIONTOLAWANDECONOMICS(1983);STEVENSHAVELL,ECONOMICANALYSISOFACCIDENTLAW(1987);GuidoCalabresi,ConcerningCauseandtheLawofTorts:AnEssayforHarryKalven,Jr.,43U.CHI.L.REV.69(1975);RonaldH.Coase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3J.L.&ECON.1(1960).ButseeCALABRESI,supra,note2,at23987(criticizingtortlawasinefficient).
(4)Themajorexceptionistheconsumer-orientedrisk-utilitytestfordefectiveproductdesigns.Seeinfra,textatnote51.
(5)SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS(1963),2913(butseeinfra,note43);JOHNG.FLEMING,THELAWOFTORTS(7thedn.,1987),1028(butseeinfra,textatnote33);3FOWLERV.HARPER,FLEMINGJAMES,JR.&OSCARS.GRAY,THELAWOFTORTS(2dedn.,1986),46782;W.PAGEKBETON,DANB.DOBBS,ROBERTE.KEETON&DAVIDG.OWEN,PROSSERANDKEETONONTHELAWOFTORTS(5thedn.,1984),1713[hereinafterPROSSER&KEETON].
(6)159F.2d169,173(2dCir.1947).
(7)SeeJohnPratherBrown,TowardAnEconomicTheoryofLiability,2J.LEGALSTUD.323,3324(1973).
(8)SeeMarkF.Grady,ANewPositiveEconomicTheoryofNegligence,92YALEL.J.799,8069,8219(1983).
(9)SeeLANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at8791.
(10)SeeMoisanv.Loftus,178F.2d148,149(2dCir.1949);infra,textatnote32.
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(11)SeeLANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at201,24;Brown,supra,note7,at3334,3401,3434.
(12)SeeRONALDDWORKIN,TAKINORIGHTSSERIOUSLY(rev.edn.,1978),934,98100,3068.Dworkinnownotesthatadutyalwaystoweighothersinterestsequallywithyourownwouldcompletelyunderminepersonalautonomyandisnotanacceptedpartofordinarymorality.Yethecontinuestoassertthatsuchadutyexistsinnegligenceandnuisancecases,whichallegedlyinvolveconflictsinindividualsabstractlegalrightsthatmustberesolvedbyapplyingthepreferredconceptionofequalityofconcerntodefineindividualsconcreterightsinparticularinteractions:seeRONALDDWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE(1986),291312.
(13)SeeErnestJ.Weinrib,TowardAMoralTheoryofNegligenceLaw,2LAW&PHIL.37,40,4955¬e27(1983).WeinribrecentlyhasbeenpersuadedthatEnglishandCommonwealthcourtsusuallyignoretheutilitysideoftherisk-utilityformulaandfocusonthecreationofsignificantforeseeableunacceptedriskstoothers:seeErnestJ.Weinrib,UnderstandingToriLaw,23VAL.U.L.REV.485,51819¬e61(1989),citingStephenR.Perry,TheImpossibilityofGeneralStrictLiability,1CAN.J.L.&JUR.147,16970(1988);seealsoRichardW.Wright,AllocatingLiabilityAmongMultipleResponsibleCauses,21U.C.DAVISL.REV.1141,117981(1988).
(14)SeeCHARLESFRIED,ANANATOMYOFVALUES:PROBLEMSOFPERSONALANDSOCIALCHOICE(1970),414,18391,196200.
(15)SeeWright,supra,note1;infra,note72andaccompanyingtext.
(16)SeeGeorgeP.Fletcher,FairnessandUtilityinTortTheory,85HARV.L.REV.537,53743,550,5567,560,56971(1972).
(17)SeeGeorgeP.Fletcher,CorrectiveJusticeforModerns,106HARV.L.REV.1658,1677,1678(1993).
(18)LeslieBender,ALawyersPrimeronFeministTheoryandTort,38J.LEGALEDUC.3,31(1988);seeidat25,28,3036&n.113.
(19)Seeid.at32.
(20)SeeFeministDiscourse,MoralValuesandtheLawAConversation,34BUFF.L.REV.11,208,734(1985)(remarksofCatharineMacKinnon);MargaretJ.Radin,ThePragmatistandtheFeminist,63S.CAL.L.REV.1699,1699701,171219(1990).
(21)SeeLeslieBender,AnOverviewofFeministTortsScholarship,78CORNELLL.REV.575,580(1993).
(22)SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS(1963),283cmt.f,463&cmt.b,464cmt.f;FLEMING,supra,note5,at96,242.
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(23)SeeCoase,supra,note3.
(24)SeeWright,supra,note1.
(25)Seeinfra,textatnotes289.
(26)See,e.g.,Sniderv.Callahan,250F.Supp.1022,1023(W.D.Mo.1966);GUIDOCALABRESI,IDEALS,BELIEFS,ATTITUDES,ANDTHELAW(1985),247,323,4654,147note131;FLEMING,supra,note5,at1024,25860;3HARPER,JAMES&GRAY,supra,note5,at38793,42166;4id.at33442;GaryT.Schwartz,TortLawandtheEconomyinNineteenth-CenturyAmerica:AReinterpretation,90YALEL.J.1717,17437,17502,17613¬e333(1981).Amoresubjectiveperspectiveisappliedtodefendantsinsituationsinwhichthedefendantsownrightsaredirectlyatissue.Seeinfra,textatnotes469andfollowingnote70.
(27)SeeLANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at1236.
(28)Kantsdoctrineofvirtue,whilespecifyingobjectivemoraldutiesbasedonthecategoricalimperative,assessesthemoralblameormeritofconductintermsofonessubjectivecapacityandeffortinattemptingtoascertainandsatisfythoseduties.KantsdoctrineofRight,ontheotherhand,directlyappliestheobjectiverequirementsofthecategoricalimperativeindeterminingonesmoralandlegalresponsibilityfortheadverseeffectsthatonecausestothepersonorpropertyofothers.Thus,asKantrepeatedlyemphasizes,anactionslegalityisjudgedbyitsexternalconformitywiththeobjectiverequirementsofRight,whileitsmoralityisjudgedbyonesinternalsubjectivecapacityandeffortstoconformonesconducttotheobjectiverequirementsofthecategoricalimperative,whichgroundsalldutiesofRightandvirtue:seeIMMANUELKANT,THEMETAPHYSICSOFMORALS(MaryOregortrans.,1991)(1797);*214,21832,312,382n.*,37980,3813&n.*,38994,401,4045,4467,463;Wright,supra,note1.
(29)Yettherangeofbehaviordeemedreasonableunderthemoresubjectiveperspectiveappliedtoplaintiffsissometimesverybroad,especiallyincasesinvolvingreligiousbelief:seeCALABRESI,supra,note26,at4654.
(30)SeeHenryT.Terry,Negligence,29HARV.L.REV.40,424(1915)(emphasisadded).
(31)SeeWarrenA.Seavey,NegligenceSubjectiveorObjective?,41HARV.L.REV.1,8note7(1927).
(32)Conwayv.OBrien,111F.2d611,612(2dCir.1940),revdonothergrounds,312U.S.492(1941).
(33)FLEMING,supra,note5,at1089(citationsomitted).
(34)Seesupra,note13.
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(35)[1951]A.C.850,8512.
(36)Id.at864,8678;seeid.at8589(LordPorter),8613(LordNormand),863(LordOaksey),868(LordRadcliffe).
(37)OverseasTankship(U.K.)Ltd.v.TheMillerS.S.Co.(WagonMound(No.2)),[1967]11A.C.617,633,6414(P.C.),perLordReid.LandesandPosnerignorethesestatementsinBoltonandTheWagonMound(No.2).SeeLANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at99.AlltheDPDcasestheydiscussasallegedillustrationsoftheHandformulaactuallyturnonthesignificanceoftheforeseeablerisk:seeid.at96100.
(38)Cf.LucyWebbHayesNatlTrainingSchoolforDeaconessesandMissionariesv.Perotti,419F.2d704,711(D.C.Cir.1969)(althoughriskofmentalpatientsjumpingthroughwindowinunsecuredareaofhospitalmayhavebeenverysmall,itremainedunreasonableandaproximatecauseofpatientsdeathiftherewasnogoodreasonforallowinghimtobethere).
(39)See,e.g.,Brownv.Kendall,60Mass.(6Cush.)292,296(1850):[O]rdinarycaremeansthatkindanddegreeofcare,whichprudentandcautiousmenwoulduse,suchasisrequiredbytheexigencyofthecase,andsuchasisnecessarytoguardagainstprobabledanger.Tomakeaninevitableaccident,itmustbesuchanaccidentasthedefendantcouldnothaveavoidedbytheuseofthekindanddegreeofcarenecessarytotheexigency.SeealsoDepuev.Flateau,111N.W.1,2(Minn.1907)(statingasimilarcomprehensiveprinciple);infra,textatnote52.
(40)See,e.g.,Curtisv.Stateexrel.DeptofTransp.,180Cal.Rptr.843,8536(Cal.Ct.App.1982).
(41)Schwartz,supra,note26,at1757(footnotesomitted);seealsoGaryT.Schwartz,TheCharacterofEarlyAmericanTortLaw,36UCLAL.REV.641,6413¬e8(1989).SchwartzsstudiesdemolishPosnersefficiencyinterpretationofnineteenthcenturytortlaw.
(42)SeeGrimshawv.FordMotorCo.,174Cal.Rptr.348(1981);Jacksonv.Johns-MansvilleSalesCorp.,781F.2d394,399409&n.12(5thCir.1986);GaryT.Schwartz,TheMythoftheFordPintoCase,43RUTGERSL.REV.1013,10358(1991).
(43)Osbornev.Montgomery,234N.W.372,376(Wis.1931).SeealsoRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS(1963),291,whichinterpretsreasonablenessintermsofarisk-utilitybalance,butemphasizesincommentdthatthelegalratherthanthepopularevaluationofthesocialvalueofthecompetinginterestsgovernsandincommentethat[t]helawattachesutilitytogeneraltypesorclassesofactsasappropriatetotheadvancementofcertain[public]interestsratherthantothe[private]purposeforwhichaparticularactisdone,exceptinthecaseinwhichthepurposeisofitselfofsuchpublicutilityastojustifyanotherwiseimpermissiblerisk.
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(44)Inmanyjurisdictions,evenoperatorsofemergencyvehiclesarenotallowedtodepartfromtheordinaryrulesoftheroadintheabsenceofexplicitstatutoryauthorization,andtheymuststrictlycomplywiththeadditionalprecautionsspecifiedinthestatuteasaminimumrequirementforavoidingbeingheldnegligent:seeJ.H.Cooper,Annotations,82A.L.R.2d312(1962)(firedepartmentvehicles),83A.L.R.2d383(1962)(policevehicles),84A.L.R.2d121(1962)(ambulances).
(45)Seesupra,textatnote26.
(46)Asmorethanonecourthasnoted,thevaryingstandardsofreasonablecarewithrespecttoon-premisesrisksdonot,asissometimesassumed,constitutedeparturesfromorlimitationsonthegeneraldutyofreasonablecare,butratherareelaborationsofthisgeneraldutyinthecontextofthedifferenttypesofsituationsthatmayarise:see,e.g.,Dillonv.TwinStateGas&Elec.Co.,163A.Ill,113(N.H.1932).
(47)SeeFLEMING,supra,note5,at41753;PROSSER&KEETON,supra,note5,at386434.
(48)[1972]A.C.877,8989;seeid.at9367(LordDiplock).
(49)Id.at925;seeid.at90910(LordMorris),916&91921(LordWilberforce),9247(LordPearson),9367&9413(LordDiplock).SeealsoSchwartz,supra,note26,at17667&nn.366&367(notingtheAmericancourtsattentiontosuchequalfreedomconcernsinnineteenth-andtwentieth-centuryon-premisesinjurycases).
(50)See,e.g.,POSNER,supra,note2,at467,1589,1701;cf.infra,textatnote59.
(51)SeeRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:PRODUCTSLIABILITY(TentativeDraftNo.2,1995),2cmt.eat24(listinganumberofconsumer-relatedrisksandbenefitsasrelevantfactors,andstatingitisnotafactorthattheimpositionofliabilitywouldhaveanegativeeffectoncorporateearnings,orwouldreduceemploymentinagivenindustry);id.at27.
(52)Hauserv.Chicago,R.I.&P.Ry.,219N.W.60,62(Iowa1928).
(53)See,e.g.,Canterburyv.Spence,464F.2d772(D.C.Cir.1972);Cobbsv.Grant,502P.2d1(Cal.1972);cf.Mohrv.Williams,104N.W.12(Minn.1905)(battery).Iftherewasnoconsentatalltothemedicaltreatmentoriftheconsentwasinvalid,abatteryactionisappropriate.However,iftheplaintiffwasawareofthenatureofthetreatmentandfreelyassentedtoit,butwasnotinformedofattendantmaterialrisks,anegligenceactionisappropriate:see,e.g.,Sidawayv.BoardofGovrsofBethlemRoyalHosp.&MaudsleyHosp.[1985]A.C.871,883,885,892,894;Reiblv.Hughes(1980)114D.L.R.3d1,1011(Can.);Minkv.UniversityofChicago,460F.Supp.713(N.D.111.1978).
(54)SeeRogersv.Whitaker,109A.L.R.625(Austl.1992);Reiblv.Hughes(1980)114D.L.R.3d1,1213(Can.).
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(55)[1985]A.C.871,882,88590,9035.
(56)Sidawayv.BethlemRoyalHosp.Govrs,[1984]1AllE.R.1018,1027(C.A.)(DonaldsonM.R.);seeid.at10301(DunnL.J.);affd.[1985]1A.C.at8905(LordDiplock),895901(LordsBridgeandKeith).
(57)See[1985]1A.C.at895(LordDiplock),8989(LordsBridgeandKeith).
(58)Id.at900;accord,Blyv.Rhoads,222S.E.2d783,787(Va.1976).
(59)Cf.supra,textatnote50.
(60)InCarrollTowing,theplaintiffsemployee,asaresultofhisabsenceforsomeunknownpurpose,puttheplaintiffsbargeatriskofbeingdamagedorsunkthroughnegligentmishandlingbyothers:seeUnitedStatesv.CarrollTowingCo.,159F.2d169,1734(2dCir.,1947).
(61)Seesupra,textatnotes229,32,512.
(62)See,e.g.,Bakerv.T.E.Hopkins&Son,Ltd.[1959]3AllE.R.225(C.A.)(wantonorfoolhardy);FLEMING,supra,note5,at1557(utterlyfoolhardy).
(63)43N.Y.502(1871).
(64)SeeTerry,supra,note30,at424;supra,textatnote30.
(65)43N.Y.at5056.
(66)SeeLANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at1001;Terry,supra,note30,at434.
(67)SeePROSSER&KEETON,supra,note5,at3737&nn.21&31.
(68)SeeErnestJ.Weinrib,TheCaseforaDutytoRescue,90YALEL.J.247,2806(1980).
(69)SeePOSNER,supra,note2,at174.
(70)Seeid.;LANDES&POSNER,supra,note2,at1436.
(71)SeeWright,supra,note1.
(72)Howfar[theduty]shouldextenddepends,inlargepart,onwhateachpersonstrueneedsareinviewofhissensibilities,anditmustbelefttoeachtodecidethisforhimself.Foramaximofpromotingothershappinessatthesacrificeofonesownhappiness,onestrueneeds,wouldconflictwithitselfifitweremadeauniversallaw.Hencethisdutyisonlyawideone;thedutyhasinitalatitudefordoingmoreorless,andnospecificlimitscanbeassignedtowhatshouldbedone.Thelawholdsonlyformaxims,notforspecificactions:KANT,supra,note28,at*393;seeid.at*390,4524.
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(73)SeeErnestJ.Weinrib,LawasaKantianIdeaofReason,87COLUM.L.REV.472,4889(1987).
(74)See,e.g.,KANT,supra,note28,at*230.
(75)SeeRichardA.Epstein,CausationandCorrectiveJustice:AReplytoTwoCritics,8J.LEGALSTUD.477,491(1979).
(76)SeeRichardA.Epstein,ATheoryofStrictLiability,2J.LEGAL.STUD.151,1989(1973).
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