Theories of International Relations-Introduction

Keshab Giri, Master of Research in International Relations, The University of Essex, UK.

PhD Candidate, The University of Sydney, Australia

A Lecture for 1st Semester MIRD, TU, Nepal

Theories of International Relations:

An Introduction

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Outline for Today

Today’s Lecture: A Map for Study of IR

Grand Theory: Realism

Grand Theory: Liberalism

Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:

1. Theories of International Conflict

2. Theories of International Cooperation

What is International Relation?

Indo-Nepal Relations

Proxy War in Syria

Eurozone Crisis

United Nations

Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit

What are Theories of International Relations?

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What are Theories of International Relations?

Apart from those key events grabbing headlines in national/international media, there are so many other developments in international politics around the world, how do we understand and explain them?

Do We Know Them? Can We Explain Them? Why Do They occur? Do They Have Any Pattern?

We need Theories to simplify reality and draw a pattern of events to develop our understanding of real international phenomena. Realism, Liberalism, and other Alternative Theories of

IR come handy in explaining Events/Developments/Trends in International Relations.

Realism: Classical Realism Classical Realism: Human Nature: rational, objective, ego-

centric, and driven by self-interest and power. Primacy of interest over ideology.

Thomas Hobbs, 1651, ‘Leviathan’ 1. human beings are rational and smart, 2. resources are finite but desires are infinite, 3.‘war of all against all’, 4. government is delegated power and consent to pursue interest of their citizens- peace inside-war outside Niccolo Machiavelli, Thucidydes, E.H. Carr, Hans J.

Morgenthau, etc.

Realism: Offensive Realism John H. Mearsheimer (2001) ‘Tragedy of Great Power Politics’Core Assumptions: 1. There is no world government.2. Every state is capable of using military force against some other states.3. There is always the possibility that the a state is attacked by another.4. States want to preserve their territorial integrity and autonomy.5. States are rational actors.Predictions: 1.Regional Hegemony is the most secure situation 2.When two states are equally powerful, neither attacks.

Realism: ‘Security Dilemma’, ‘Existential Uncertainty’, and ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’

John Hertz, 1950, ‘Security Dilemma’ Mitzen, 2006, ‘Existential Uncertainty’ Booth and Wheeler, 2008, ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’

Missile Test by North Korea

Iranian Nuclear Program NATO Missile Shield Europe

Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism

Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism:1. States as the most important actors2. States are unitary, rational actors3. States operate under anarchy4. States care about their own survival

Prediction for Neo-Realism1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma)2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour

Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism Neo-Realism/Structural Realism: Systemic Level Analysis Anarchy in International System Kenneth N. Waltz: The founder of Neo-Realism/Structural

Realism, advocate of scientific approach in IR, ‘Man, State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis’, (1959), Three Images:

1. First Image: Classical Realism- human nature, 2. Second Image: Political structure in a state makes some state more war-prone. For example, dictatorship, capitalist countries are more war-prone. Why? 3. Third Image: Most important of all images. Anarchy!

Logical Inconsistency in Realism

Mearsheimer (2001): Being a preponderant power or hegemon is the most secure condition for a security of a state

Logical Inconsistency in Realism Waltz (1964): Bipolarity is the most stable system.

Liberalism Human Nature is Dynamic and it can be Progressive!

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Liberalism Comparisons: Classical Realism and Classical Liberalism

Classical Realism

1 States are the most important actors

2 States are unitary actors

3 States are rational actors

4 National security is the most important concern in IR

5 Human nature is bad

6 Laws / institutions won’t matter

Classical Liberalism

1 States are important actors but not only one actor

2 States are not unitary actors

3 States are not always rational actors

4 There are other important concerns in IR as well

5 Human nature is not necessarily bad

6 Laws / institutions play crucial role in fostering cooperation

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Recap Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism:1. States as the most important actors2. States are unitary, rational actors3. States operate under anarchy4. States care about their own survival

Prediction for Neo-Realism1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma)2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Key Assumptions of Neo-Liberalism?

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism? Same!1. States as the most important actors2. States are unitary, rational actors3. States operate under anarchy4. States cares about their own survival

Prediction for Neo-Liberalism?

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism? Same!1. States as the most important actors2. States are unitary, rational actors3. States operate under anarchy4. States cares about their own survival

Prediction for Neo-Liberalism? 1. Cooperation is possible 2. States can pursue mutual gains under some conditions

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

‘Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and Robert Axelord, 1980, ‘Effective Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma’

1. ‘Single-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is inadequate to explain interactions among states 2. Simulated Repeated Computer Game Experiment with ‘experts’ in Game Theory 3. Evolutionary Game Theory: Pragmatically Optimistic, being nice, and forgiving strategy reaps more benefits

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Robert O. Keohane,1984, ‘After Hegemony: Cooperation and

Discord in World Political Economy‘ 1. Inspired by ‘Evolutionary Theory of Cooperation’ and ‘Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ by Axelord. 2. Conditions for States to Cooperate: a. States should expect that they will engage in same issue for long time with other states/ Long Shadow of Future b. States should be able to monitor other state’s behaviour/ Monitoring c. State should be willing and able to punish those who renege/ Ease of Punishment. 3. International Institutions/Regimes enable those condition to hold

Alternative Theories of International Relations

Beyond ‘Isms’: Theory of International Conflicts- 1. Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War), 2. Alliance and War, 3. Diversionary Theory of War. 4. Democratic Peace Theory Theory of International Cooperation- 1. Hegemonic Stability Theory 2. Rational Design Project 3. Regime Type and Cooperation

Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War)

War is mutually corrosive and costly. Why states pursue war instead of non-violent bargaining process?

James D. Fearon (1995) offers three rationalist explanation of war:

1. Issue Indivisibility: If issue of contention is not dividable, states may not reach agreement and thus might result in war. 2. Information Problem: private information, incentive to misrepresent the Information, and uncertainty about action and outcome. -Risky Return Trade-Off, costly signal, 3. Commitment Problem: Shifting balance of power (Preventive War), First strike advantage (Pre-emptive War), Bargain over object that provides power.

Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War)

Robert Powell (1999): War is more likely when there is disparity between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’.

1. Greater difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’: war more likely 1. Lesser difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’: war less likely Very different from Realists’ explanation of war: such as

‘preponderance of power’ school and ‘balance of power’ school.

Alliance and War An alliance is a formal agreement among independent states

to cooperate militarily in the event of military conflict. Obligations in Alliance: Defence, Offence, Consultation, and

Neutrality. Those are conditional on: adversary, location, and issue. The utility of Alliance: 1. alliances must influence members’ war intervention decisions 2. members’ war intervention decisions must influence outside states Leeds (2003) and Johnson & Leeds (2011) find that

Alliances with defence obligations seem to deter international conflict.

Alliance and War

Diversionary Theory of War

Rejects Unitary Actor Assumption of Realism. Recall one of the key assumptions of Realism: States are unitary actors with coherent preferences.

Importance of Domestic Politics in formulating Foreign Policy of the state.

Main Assumptions: 1. Leaders want to remain in power. 2. Public prefer a ‘capable’ leader in power. 3. Incompetent leaders pretend to be competent leaders. Prediction: 1. A leader has incentive to divert attention away from bad policy outcomes by pursuing aggressive foreign policy which can lead to war.

Diversionary Theory of War

Morgan and Bickers (1992) analysing US politics, find that the probability of US presidential use of force increases as partisan support decreases.

A Leader will lose support if he is directly or mainly responsible for failures at domestic front

Johnson and Barnes (2011) looking at economic situation of 155 countries from 1950 to 1998, find that economic problems only increase conflict when the economy is closed, why?

When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as responsible for the economy.

Diversionary Theory of War

When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as responsible for the economy and therefore has less diversionary

incentives.

Democratic Peace It is not a ‘Causal Theory’ per se. It’s just an empirical observation. Tons of research on the relationship between regime type and war.

Considered one of the strongest relationship in international conflict research.

Source: COW data 1816-2008 on inter-state wars. Perspectives: 1. Culture and Norm: Peaceful conflict resolution 2. Institutional Constraints: Leaders are constrained, people can punish them easily 3. Information: Transparent, credible threats.

Fighting States Frequency PercentAutocracy vs Autocracy 55 57.89 %

Democracy vs Autocracy 39 41.05 %Democracy vs

Democracy1 1.05 %

Total 95 100 %

Democratic Peace

Example: Maoz & Russett (1993) who compare norm-based theory with institutional constraints theory.

Maoz & Russett (1993) find that levels of democracy in a dyad are negatively related to the likelihood that the dyad experiences war, militarised dispute (i.e., crisis bargaining), and dispute escalation, controlling for potentially confounding factors.

There are other prominent studies as well pertaining to Democratic Peace:

- Audience Costs (Information Perspective) (Fearon, 1994) - Informational Perspective and Institutional Perspective Schultz (1999)

Theory of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory

Two Problems in International Cooperation: 1. Distribution Problem (Neo-Realists: Waltz 1979 & Mearsheimer 2001) 2. Enforcement Problem (Neo-Liberalist: Keohane 1984) What is the prescription of Hegemonic Stability Theory to

overcome those problems? 1. Hegemon provides ‘Public Good’ resolving Distribution Problems 2. Using its preponderance, it can solve Enforcement Problems

Theory of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory

Kindleberger (1978) claims that presence of Britain as hegemon in 1920s stabilised world economy but decline of Britain in 1930s and reluctance of US to act as hegemon contributed towards instability.

Keohane (1984), among others, criticise HST saying that the presence of a hegemon is neither necessary nor sufficient.

Regime Type and International Cooperation

This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and Neo-Liberalists, what is it?

Regime Type and International Cooperation

This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and Neo-Liberalists, what is it?

States are unitary actors. It doesn’t matter what type of regime states have and their domestic politics.

Regime Type and International Cooperation

How does domestic politics might influence international cooperation?

Two-Level Game and Distributional Problem, Putnam (1988) 1. Level-I: International Negotiation, Level-II: Domestic Ratification 2. Win-Sets: Larger the Win-Sets in Level-I, easier to reach agreement; Larger Win-Sets in Level-II, easier to ratify them. Two-Level Game and Enforcement Problem, Leeds (1999) and

Leeds, et al, (2009) 1. Pairs of Democracies and pairs of Autocracies are more likely to cooperate than mixed Pairs 2. Regime change can change policy but leadership change does not necessarily change policy and thus doesn’t always affect international cooperation

Rational Design Project

International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity, who claim this?

Rational Design Project

International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity, who claim

this? Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, such as Keohane (1984) But Neo-Liberals Institutionalists do not come clear on design

of the International Institutions/Regimes.

Rational Design Project

Different Institutions matter differently: Different institutional design features address different problems of cooperation.

Read Mitchell (1994), Koremenos et al. (2001), Rosendorff & Milner (2001), Mitchell & Keilbach (2001), Abbott & Snidal (1998), etc.

Steps of international cooperation: 1 Need of cooperation (e.g., public goods provision) 2 Form a cooperative agreement with other states 3 Design institutions to cope with the problem of enforcement 4 When member states comply with the agreement, they achieve cooperation

Recap What is a theory of International Relations?

Realism: Classical, Offensive, Neo-Realism/Structural Realism

Liberalism: Classical, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:

1. Theories of International Conflict: Bargaining Theory of War

(Rationalist Explanation of War), Alliance and War, Diversionary

Theory of War, Democratic Peace

Recap Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:

1. Theories of International Cooperation: Hegemonic

Stability Theory,

Regime Type, Rational Design Project.

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Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain the Following Events?

Indo-Nepal Relations

Proxy War in Syria

Eurozone Crisis

United Nations

Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit

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Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain the Following Events?

Realism (Classical)

Realism (Structural)

Rational Design Project

Liberalism (Neoliberalism)

Realism (Offensive)Realism/ Institutional Design

Any Questions?

Please introduce yourself before presenting your question.

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Thank You HAPPY NEW YEAR 2073: May this year spark in you intellectual inquisitiveness and philosophical wisdom.

Thank you for being patient!