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This slide is: Unclassified 1
Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures
Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference of the Mine Warfare Association
11 May 2011
This brief is Unclassified Mr. Marvin Heinze
NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense
Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare CommandA Warfare Center of Excellence
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Our Discussion Today
• Mission / Requirements• Capability / Capacity • Exercises • Preparation• Related efforts
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Mine Warfare in the United States…It happens…
• Lake Ponchartrain, 2004– Floating IED discovered ivo visiting
dignitary
• Sacramento River, 1980– “Patriotic Scuba diver’ closes the
shipping channel
• Chesapeake Bay, June 1942– U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines– 3 ships sunk – 2 ships damaged
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MHD MCM Policy / Mission
• DoD is the lead MOTR agency for mine countermeasures in the Maritime Domain (NSPD41/MOTR)
• Navy has DoD maritime mine countermeasure capability, implying– MCMRON and MCM forces will be
needed to counter mine and UWIED threats
– No civil authority MCM capability
• Specific domestic MCM Mission not defined – Interagency equities and priorities
– CONPLANs have general mission
• DHS will plan for the prevention and detection of sea mining…(MOTR)
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VCOM NMAWC+
MIW Battle Staff
USN MIW Operational Framework
SMCM Class Advocate
SMCM Class Advocate
COMTHIRDFLTCOMTHIRDFLT
COMCMRON SEVENCOMCMRON SEVENCOMCMRON FIVECOMCMRON FIVE
COMSECONDFLTCOMSECONDFLT
COM NMAWC
VCOM NMAWC
USW COE (ASW + MIW)
COM NMAWC
VCOM NMAWC
USW COE (ASW + MIW)
COMSEVENTHFLTCOMSEVENTHFLT
COMFIFTHFLTCOMFIFTHFLT
CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx
COMCMRON TWOCOMCMRON TWO
COMSIXTHFLTCOMSIXTHFLT
CTF xxCTF xxCTF xxCTF xx
COMFOURTHFLTCOMFOURTHFLT
Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and training
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MHD/S MCM Response Capability
SMCM• Ships in San Diego
• Long response times
• Limited capability
•Confined water
AMCM• MH-53E in NORVA
• Limited capability
•Confined water
• Deployable
UMCM• UUVs, Divers, MMS
• EOD PLT, MMS PLT
•Neutralization
• UUV PLT
• Rapidly deployed
• Confined water Capable
Command and Control• MIWC in San Diego
• MCM CDR in San Diego
• Rapidly deployable
--
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Follow on
• Leadership– NMAWC VCOM and staff
• Aircraft– 4 - 6 MH 53E
– Various MCM equip
• Ships– 2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM
• Marine Mammals– MK 7/8 MMS
– 6+ dolphins
Today’s MHD/S MCM Response Capacity
Initial
• Leadership– MIWC LNOs
– COMCMRON staff
• UUVs– 2 X UUV PLT
• Mk 18 UUVs
• Divers– 2 X EOD MCM PLT
– 1 X VSW Dive PLT
7
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Experimentation / Exercises in MHD/S MCM
2008-2009• 4 events in 2 years
– Change detection– Experimentation
• Low Frequency Broad Band
• Synthetic Aperture Sonar
• High clutter limits current mine hunting effectiveness• Improving change detection techniques and procedures
– Use of data fusion center
• Advanced new sonar technologies– LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines – Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target discrimination
• MHD MCM CDR training
2010• Bay Shield 10
– MCM CDR Training (MHS)• Frontier Sentinel 10
– MCM CDR Training (MHD)– Experimentation
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Exercise Bay Shield 10 Quick Look
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV
MCM planning and execution using Port Folder and “change detect” tactics
Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission
Conduct MCM Ops within a multi-agency Unified Command structure
Goods USCG/USN interaction and
integration MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement
with the COTP/UCP
Valuable CONUS MCMC training for MCMRON 2/ DIV 31
Preparations for Frontier Sentinel
Others
Large number of contacts overwhelm mine hunting capacity
Incident Command System proficiency needed
Limited UCP secure comms
Areas of MCM ops
2 Mines Found
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Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview25 May – 11 Jun 2010
PURPOSE
Bilateral homeland defense/ security exercise to conduct information / intelligence sharing, conduct mine
countermeasures operations, conduct sea trial experimentation, conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and response to
synchronize the operational planning process.
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Frontier Sentinel 10 Participants
US Navy: COMSECONDFLT NMAWC COMCMRON TWO ONRHM14 DET NOMWCEODMU ONE & SIX
US Coast Guard: SECTOR Hampton RoadsDOG (MSRT, MSST)
Canadian Navy: JTF Atlantic2 x MCDVFleet Diving Unit
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission
Train MCMRON TWO
Conduct Sea Trial Experiments
Improve confined waterways TTP
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Trident Fury 2011Esquimalt, Canada
Participating Forces
Overview
-What: TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise involving US and Canadian Forces.
- Where: Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt Approaches and Constance Banks
- When: 02-13 May 2011
Objectives
- Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations
- Conduct integrated MCM operations
- Exercise interagency interoperability
- Improve confined waters MCM tactics
- Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC
- Assess MCM capability and capacity
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Baseline Survey Port Folders
Change Detection Results
Homeland Defense Port Surveys and MIW Port Folders
Bottom SedimentsBottom Roughness
Doctrinal BottomClutter Density
Baseline imagery New imagery
Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted
• Quick response guide for MCMC
• Port folders cover 17 DoD ports– all complete as of Dec 2010– bi annual updates started
• Posted on Enterprise Knowledge Management (eKM)
• Port Folders accelerate port opening
• Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification
• Change detection results:– Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects
– Reduces clearance time by ~30%
• Port Folders accelerate port opening
• Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification
• Change detection results:– Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects
– Reduces clearance time by ~30%
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Related MHD MCM efforts
• Naval Postgraduate School– 2008 -“A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in US Ports”
• Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee – 2009 -“MIEDs in Ports and Harbors” study
• Center for Naval Analysis– 2008 -“Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and Security”– 2011 - “Mine Clearance in support of Homeland Security”
• NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division– 2011 – “Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study”
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MHD MCM way ahead
• Better define specific requirements– Defense– Whole of government
• Improve confined waters equipment– Neutralization UUV– One pass Detect to Engage– Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission package
• Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining– Better threat awareness– Effective surveillance– Cooperative efforts with port entities
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Questions?
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USS SAMUEL B ROBERTSSADAF 02- Moored Contact USS TRIPOLI
LUGM I- Moored Contact
USS PRINCETONMANTA- Bottom Influence
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$10,000 $100 Million
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$1,000 $57 Million
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$1,000 $10 Million
Mine Warfare Direct Costs
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Mine Warfare Indirect Costs
• Economic/Political Effects– 90%+ US trade transits US ports– Significant cost
• Global Commerce Effects– ~33% World trade transits US ports– Significant effect on trade
• Power projection– 90% of military sustainment by sea– Significant effect on defense
operations
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