Mr Jaganath Sankaran - Evaluating the EPAA Missile Defense System: Does it Threaten Russian ICBMs?...

Evaluating the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

Missile Defense System:

Does EPAA Threaten Russian ICBMs?

What Measures Of Cooperation With Russia Are Viable?

RUSI Missile Defense Conference

Session II - March 18, 2014

Jaganath Sankaran

Post-Doctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Managing the Atom ProjectBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Harvard University

This research was performed as a Stanton Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow from August, 2012 to August, 2013 at the RAND Corporation. The views expressed are the author’s.

The Policy Problem – A Seeming

Disagreement over EPAA Capability

• The United States and NATO have endorsed EPAA for defense against Iranian ballistic missiles

• Russia has raised concerns about the effect of EPAA on its deterrent forcesEPAA on its deterrent forces

• Russia has pegged further nuclear arms reductions to a resolution of these concerns

Analysis of EPAA performance can inform discussions on these issues.

2

Architecture of the EPAA Missile

Defense System

Russian ICBM trajectories

Iranian missile trajectories

EPAA Sites

Estimating the Performance of EPAA without

the SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor

• EPAA Phase IV (SM-3 Block IIB with Vbo of 5.5 km/s) has been cancelled, leaving only slower interceptors in planned deployment– Does this change the perceived threat to Russian – Does this change the perceived threat to Russian ICBMs?

– Does it render all Russian concerns invalid; i.e. will this action make both Aegis-Ashore and ship-based Aegis ineffective against Russia?

– Is the system still capable of effectively defending against Iranian threats? (Not discussed here, but yes)

4

Bottom Line: Results From the

Analytic Evaluation of EPAA

• The currently planned interceptors do not allow EPAA to reach Russian ICBMs aiming for the U.S., even given optimistic assumptions for defensedefense

• Analytic result dependent only upon final velocity of interceptors, which is realtively easier for Russia to verify by monitoring EPAA inteceptor flight tests

Does EPAA as Currently Conceived

Threaten Russia? Threaten Russia?

6

Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack

(no time delay)

Vbo < 3.5 km/s

Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s

Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s

Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s

Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s

Vbo > 5.5 km/s

Offense: Russian ICBM

Missile Attack from

Vypolzovo, Russia to

Washington D.C.

Defense: From Aegis

Ashore SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5

km/s) located in

Redzikowo, Poland

7ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and

(3) No Countermeasures

Vypolzovo,

Russia

Washington D.C.,

U.S.A

Redzikowo,

Poland

Defense Against Russian ICBM

Attacks

– EPAA Phase II Aegis-Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania with SM3-IB with a Vbo of 3.5 km/s does not have a capacity to intercept this particular (or any other) Russian missile trajectory.

– Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in – Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland with SM3-IIA with a Vbo of 4.5 km/s.

– In fact, even the canceled SM3-IIB with a Vbo of 5.5 km/s has no capability against this particular Russian trajectory.

– What about other Russian launch locations? Are they vulnerable?

8

Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks on

U.S. East Coast– All Launch Locations

120 seconds is a very favorable estimate of the time needed by the Globus II radar in Norway

to start tracking Russian ICBMs. The real-world conditions will be more demanding.

Are there other deployments of EPAA (outside

current U.S. plans) that might intercept current U.S. plans) that might intercept

Russian ICBMs?

10

Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack

(no time delay)

Vbo < 3.5 km/s

Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s

Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s

Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s

Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s

Vbo > 5.5 km/sVypolzovo,

Russia

North Sea

11ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and

(3) No Countermeasures

Russia

Washington D.C.,

U.S.A

Offense: Russian ICBM Missile

Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to

Washington D.C.

Defense: From Ship-based SM-3

IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the

North Sea Area

Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack

(no time delay)

Vbo < 3.5 km/s

Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s

Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s

Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s

Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s

Vbo > 5.5 km/s

Bershet,

Russia

Barents Sea

12ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and

(3) No Countermeasures

San Francisco,

U.S.A

Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack

from Bershet, Russia to San Francisco

Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA

(Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the Barents

Sea Area

Joint (North and Barents Sea) Defense

Against Russian ICBM Attacks

Cancelation of SM3-IIB Should Resolve All

Plausible Russian Concerns

• The baseline EPAA deployment after the cancelation of the

SM3-IIB allows a strong analytic result:

– The baseline EPAA deployment can not kinematically reach Russian ICBMs, even with implausibly short time delays

• Realistic time delays eliminates the theoretical capability to

engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-

IIA in the North Sea and the Barents Sea

The cancelation of the SM3-IIB has in effect removed any

threat from EPAA to the Russian deterrent potential against

the United States.

14

What measures of cooperation

between NATO and Russia are between NATO and Russia are

viable?

Russian Position on Cooperation

• Medvedev: “We do not want next generations of politicians in 2019 or 2020 to take decisions which would open a new page in arms race. But such a threat exists and everyone in Russia and the U.S. should understand this.”

• Russia wants legally binding “military-technical” guaranteesguarantees– Certain changes to the algorithms of the missile defense

radars

– Refraining from bringing Aegis ships into areas that are in proximity to trajectories of Russian ICBMs

– Stationing Russian observers at U.S. and NATO missile defense installations

– Formulating a mechanism to monitor the implementation of these measures

U.S./NATO Position on Cooperation

• The U.S. Senate resolution supporting ratification of New START specifically states that it would not accept any limitations on missile defense

• U.S. will not accept limits on capabilities and numbers of missile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploymissile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploy

• Non-binding political agreement affirming U.S. missile defenses are not aimed at Russia

• Prominent scholarly suggestion rest on data sharing about interceptors. However, it is not clear what data can be provided that they are not capable of independently obtaining.

Possible Measures of Cooperation

• Cooperation might instead be achieved via a range of disparate interactions.

• Missile Defense isn’t always about Missile Defense– Not irreducible to technical arguments? Deployments close

to Russia’s border regions

– Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense – Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense plans? Reflection of broader U.S.-Russia relations?

• Dialogue on Threat Assessment (Iran, North Korea)

• Joint Data Exchange Center– Some form of monitoring U.S. missile defense operations

– Demonstrating limitations of current U.S. space-based and ground-based early warning/missile tracking systems

Thank you. Questions.

EPAA Defense Against Present

Iranian Threats

20

EPAA Would Reach Present Iranian Threats

Interceptor Interceptor

Location

Target

Missile

Targeted

Location

Distance to

targeted

location (km)

Intercept

Possible?

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Eastern

Mediterranean Sea

Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

Incirlik Air

Base, Turkey

964 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Eastern

Mediterranean Sea

Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

(depressed

trajectory)

Incirlik Air

Base, Turkey

964 YES

trajectory)

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

Incirlik Air

Base, Turkey

964 NO

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Eastern

Mediterranean Sea

Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

Izmir Air

Base, Turkey

1670 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

Izmir Air

Base, Turkey

1670 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian

Shahab-3/3A

(depressed

trajectory)

Izmir Air

Base, Turkey

1670 YES

EPAA Would Reach Future Iranian Threats

Interceptor Interceptor

Location

Target

Missile

Targeted

Location

Distance to

targeted

location (km)

Intercept

Possible?

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Camp Darby,

Italy

3064 YES

SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5

km/s)

Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Camp Darby,

Italy

3064 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Ramstein Air

Base,

3309 YES

km/s) Base,

Germany

SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5

km/s)

Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Ramstein Air

Base,

Germany

3309 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 NO

SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5

km/s)

Rezikowo, Poland Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 YES

SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5

km/s)

Western

Mediterranean Sea

Iranian Safir Rota, Spain 4529 YES