Application Whitelisting - Complementing Threat centric with Trust centric security

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Presented by Osama Salah

Application WhitelistingComplimenting Threat Centric with Trust Centric

Security

Application Whitelisting

Is Applicationon whitelist?

Is Applicationon Blacklist?

Deny! Don’t Run!

Run it!

Don’t Run!

Allow! Run it!

Yes

No

Yes

No

ThreatCentric

TrustCentric

Else

Else

Default Allow

Default Deny

Blacklist Fail

Decision Rationale Objective Q1. What do we

know more about, the bad or the good?

Q2. Is it easy to mange?

Malware Prevent malware from executing.

The Good White ListBut we do Black List

No (White List)Yes (Black List)

Access Control

Allow access to employees only.

The Good White List Yes

No-Fly List Prevent known bad people from getting on planes.

The Bad Black List Yes

What is the Problem?

…in the context of this presentation.

Exponential Malware Growth

Source: AV-TEST, www.av-test.org

How are we typically trying to solve the

problem?

Traditional Malware Prevention Stack

Dat

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ente

r Fire

wal

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End

poin

t Pro

tect

ion

Hos

t FW

Ant

iviru

s

HIP

S

Ant

i AP

T

Fire

wal

l

Web

Filt

erA

ntiv

irus

IPS

Fire

wal

l

Web

Filt

erA

ntiv

irus

IPS

Antivirus Effectiveness

“When none of the antivirus scanners detected a malware sample on the first day, it took an average of two days for at least one antivirus scanner to detect it”

“Over the course of 365 days, no single antivirus scanner had a perfect day - a day in which it caught every new malware sample”

“After a year, there are samples that 10% of the scanners still do not detect”

Source: lastline.com, Antivirus Isn’t Dead, It Just Can’t Keep Up

“On Day 0, only 51% of antivirus scanners detected new malware samples”

“After two weeks, there was a notable bump in detection rates (up to 61%), indicating a common lag time for antivirus vendors”

How do we get infected today?

• Watering Hole Attacks

• Zero-Day Vulnerabilities http://where ever target typically hangs out

• Google says the best phishing scams have 45% success rate (2014).

• FireEye on Spear Phishing: 70% open rate, 50% of those click on links. (2012)

APT Protection

Turing Test in Reverse: New Sandbox-Evasion techniques Seek Human Interaction (fireeye.com, June 2014)

“Cybersecurity is a constant arms race. Simulating mouse movement and clicks is not enough to fool the most advanced sandbox-evading malware. Now malware authors are incorporating real-world behaviors into their evasion strategies.”

“Simulating these behaviors—the way actual people scroll documents, click the mouse button, and move the cursor— is a huge challenge for cybersecurity. Anticipating future evasion techniques might be even tougher. Expect malware authors to employ more novel techniques that look for that human touch.”

Microsoft phishing emails target corporate users, deliver malware that evades sandboxes (scmagazine.com 02.2015)

Quarian Targeted-Attack Malware Evades Sandbox Detection (blogs.mcafee.com 09.2014)

One additional prediction: To date, cybercriminals have mainly focused on escaping application sandboxes. However, increasingly popular standalone sandbox systems offered by security software vendors pose a new hurdle for cyberthieves. In response, cybercriminals have begun to explore ways for their malware to escape from those sandbox systems. Today a significant number of malware families identify and evade sandbox-based detection. (McAfee Labs Threat Report Nov. 2014)

Malware Authors Using New Techniques to Evade Automated Threat Analysis Systems (symantec.com 10.2012)

An Independent test of APT attack detection appliances(MRG Effitas and CrySyS Lab, Nov. 2014)

What are others saying?

Secure Standard Config

Application Whitelisting

Patch Applications

Patch Operating System

Minimize user with Admin priv.

Application Sec. Patching

“..prevents 85% of targeted cyber intrusions..”

“…are the most effective means yet found to stop the wave of targeted intrusions that are doing the greatest damage to many organizations.”

Software Whitelisting

System Sec. Patching

No Admin Priv. Browsing/Emailing

Source: Gartner Hype Cycle for Infrastructure Protection, 2014

What is probably the most successful App Whitelisting Implementation?

Why aren’t more enterprises implementing Whitelisting?• Maturity and Culture

– Change Control, Admin Control on Workstations– Software Asset Management discipline– Balancing between security and operations– Complaints Management

• It’s not easy• Perception that its is not flexible• Perception: Performance overhead, another agent on endpoints,

doesn’t play nice with AV• Decision maker not impacted (Externality)• Bad Marketing

It’s a Question of Trust…• Trust the Solution

– Vulnerabilities or Evasion possible– Risk Reduction not elimination– Augmenting other controls not replacing

• Trust the Implementer– Skills, capabilities, references

• Trust the Administrator– Control through process and audits

Possible Enforcement Policies:• Low: Allowed to run, monitor only • Medium: Prompt Users, allow to run locally• High: Block untrusted• Run policies in monitoring mode (what if?)• On Existing or new files• Combine with Local or Global Approvals• Combine with Reputation/Trust Level

It’s not all Black and White

Lessons Learnt: Application Trust Policy OptionsTo put it in context, below some figures of our particular deployment

1.8 Million Unique FilesCollected over a period of approx. 6 months

1800 End Users 1300 Workstations 220 Servers

Trusted Publishers

48%Signed Files

Non-SignedFiles

52%

~ 1.8 Million Files~ 8300 Publishers

Trusted Publishers

“…the Darkhotel attackers are using a variety of digital certificates to sign their malware. Attackers often employ stolen certificates in this way, but the Darkhotel group seems to have taken a different tack, duplicating legitimate certificates that have weak keys.”

Certificate Authority Hacks

Stolen Certificates Code Signing System Hack

DigiNotar Files Bankruptcy in Wake of Devastating Hack (09.2011)

Independent Iranian Hacker Claims Responsibility for Comodo Hack (03.2011)

VeriSign Hit by Hackers in 2010 (02.2012)

Hackers Breached Adobe Server in Order to Sign Their Malware (09.2012)Bit9 Hackerd into, the Criminals Seize Code-signing

Certificate (02.2013)

Sony attackers also stole certificates to sign malware (02.2013)

Zeus malware found with valid digital signature (04.2014)

Certificates RevocationHP accidentally signed malware, will revoke certificate (10.2014)

Microsoft Revokes Certificates Used by Flame Malware (06.2012)

Adobe to revoke code signing certificate (09.2012)

Weak Certificate Hack

Trusted PublishersSome Issues• Publisher dropping non-signed files.• Publisher replacing previously signed files with non-signed files.

Application Whitelisting Features• Typically you can put trusted publishers manually on a whitelist or

automate it by using reputational approval of the publisher.• You also ban publishers.• Publisher Check on new file detection• Periodic Certificate re-check• Exclude Weak Certificates

Trusted Directories• Files located in a specific directory and executed

from it are allowed to deploy.• Can be used to further lockdown updater policies by

limiting where the files need to be coming from like: C:\WSUS\WsusContent\

• Easy option if you can control what goes into the Trusted Directory

• Don’t use with removable drives

Trusted User or Group• Selected users can be granted permissions to

deploy software.• Can be granted in urgent/exceptional cases.

Trusted Software Delivery System• Software Distribution Systems like Microsoft SCCM, PDQ

Deploy…• Software that updates itself like Adobe Reader, Chrome, AV

software etc.• Patch Management Solutions (WSUS, …)• Solutions come with a list of preconfigured Updaters• Add updater rules manually, basically by selecting the

process that will do the updating.

Threat Levels

• Clean• Potential Risk• Malicious• Unknown

Clean26%

Unknown74%

Trust Levels

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

1400000

File Type Distribution (1.8M files)

76%

8%

7%

4%

5%

exe

msi

jar

dll

vb,regmui,syscom,bat

Implementation Considerations• Application whitelisting is augmenting existing

controls, it is not replacing them.• Determine Scope of Deployment

– Workstations, Laptops, Servers..

• Determine the stakeholders and understand how they will be impacted. Engage them early.– End Users, Client Support, Systems Eng., Developers, Anyone

who currently has admin rights…

• Strategy: Stop the bleeding, cleanup later

Implementation Considerations• Develop Application Whitelisting Policy & Procedure (align with

software asset management lifecycle)– Obtaining, testing, approving, deploying, maintaining

• Why and how are new applications entering the company?• New Deployments, Trial Software, Updates, Patching, Web

Download, Email, USB…• What is the approval process? How can you automate it?• Be ready to respond quickly (emergency), especially early on in

the project.

Benefits Summary• Reduce number of malware incidents• Zero-Day Protection• Improve security of end-of-life or hard to patch endpoints• Detect insider threats or bad behavior• Improved forensic capabilities (Data, Drift Reports, Snapshots)• Better Change management will require better planning and can

lead to less downtime• Permit usage of USB devices (if the risk is introducing malware not

data leakage)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

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