012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)

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HAMILTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC 1109 Alfred Street Cincinnati, Ohio Plaintiff vs. Denise V. Newsome Post Office Box 14731 Cincinnati, Ohio 45250 Defendant

: : : : : : : : : : :

CASE NO.: 09CV01690 DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TOCOMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRYAND DETAINER; NOTIFICATIONACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM;COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FORJURY TRIAL1

COMES NOW Defendant, named as Denise V. Newsome (“Defendant”) and presents

this, her Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer; Notification Accompanying

Counter-Claim; Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial in the above referenced matter. In

support thereof, Defendant states:

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO

COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

1. Defendant denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant has no knowledge of Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC (“Stor-All” or “Plaintiff”), being the owner (not “owner and landlord” of the “premises located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio 45214.” This appears to be a factual assertion and/or allegation by Stor-All and a discoverable issue; however, Stor-All has presented no evidence to support its ownership of said premises. In its craftiness in the use of the pen, Stor-All is attempting to mislead this Court and the Defendant by intentionally and purposefully omitting the fact that it is not Defendant’s landlord. Furthermore, Stor-All has failed to present any factual documentation/evidence (i.e. Rental Agreement) to support its assertion that Defendant is a tenant of it. There is no contract, lease and/or rental agreement between Stor-All and

1 Boldface, Italics and Underline added for emphasis. Legal Resource materials utilized: American

Jurisprudence Pleading and Practice Forms, Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, West’s Ohio Digest, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, etc.)

EXHIBIT 104

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Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

2. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, this again appears to be a factual assertion accusing Defendant of being “in default of her rental agreement for failure to pay rent.” However, Stor-All has failed to produce the rental agreement it relies upon because no such rental agreement exist between Stor-All and the Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

3. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant is in receipt of a “NOTICE TO LEAVE THE PREMISES” mailed to her on or about January 9, 2009 and not January 9, 2008. In said document Stor-All identifies itself as “Landlord: Stor-All Alfred, LLC. . .;” however, has failed to produce any factual documentation to assert such a claim. Stor-All has failed as alleged “Landlord” to provide any evidence to sustain a Landlord and Tenant relationship because no such relationship exist between Stor-All and the Defendant; moreover, no such document to sustain such an allegation. Stor-All was not authorized by Ohio statutes/laws to execute and/or serve such a notice identifying itself as Defendant’s landlord. Such action by Stor-All may be implied as being done with deceit and fraudulent intent. Furthermore, said action of Stor-All in the service of such notice, is an abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

4. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Stor-All has presented no factual documentation to support a contract between it and Defendant. In Paragraphs 2 and 4, Stor-All alleges Defendant has been in default “From and after, April 1, 2008;” then, asserts in Paragraph 4, “Defendant has, since Janury 19, 2009, unlawfully and forcibly detained from the Plaintiff possession of the above-described premises;” however, presents no factual documentation to support such allegations. Defendant on July 27, 2007, entered into a Rental Agreement with Crown Storage-Camp Washington for the storage unit located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214; therefore, Defendant is in legal possession of storage “Unit 173.” See EXHIBIT “1” – Rental Agreement attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Said Agreement being provided to the Defendant by Stor-All upon request. There is no contractual and/or rental agreement between Stor-All and Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Defendant incorporates herein by reference her answers set forth in Paragraphs 1 through

4 above as if fully restated and/or set forth herein. Defendant further states in response:

5. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant denies that she “is indebted to

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Plaintiff for rent and late fees in the amount of $552.39.” Moreover, while Stor-All makes such allegation and/or assertion, it has presented no evidence to sustain the debt it alleges it is entitled to. Stor-All alleges Defendant owes the debt; however, has failed; (a) to prove that there is such a debt – has provided no documentation to sustain such a claim and/or that Plaintiff had agreed to such or obtained any such services warranting such charges, (b) how it arrived at said debt; and (c) its entitlement to said debt. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

6. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph following Paragraph 5 which begins, “WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands restitution and recovery of said Premises” in Stor-All’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, it is important for this Court to know that Stor-All and/or others have unlawfully and illegally seized the Premises it seeks this Court’s intervention on. Executing and enforcing its own self-made forcible entry and detainer action over the Defendant’s objections. Moreover, as a matter of law, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. are not entitled to the relief sought in said Paragraph. Therefore, this Court is to deny the relief Stor-All is seeking. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

7. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph that is blocked bearing a title, “NOTICE UNDER THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT.” Without waiving said denial, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. are not entitled to the debt they allege is owed by the Defendant. Moreover, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. is attempting to unlawfully and illegally collect a debt to which it knows is fraudulent and/or false. Stor-All is liable and subject to the injury/harm rendered and/or sustained by the Defendant for any bad faith actions – as its Complaintfor Forcible Entry and Detainer filed in this lawsuit – to collect a debt to which it has full knowledge it is not entitled to. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE PURPOSES OF AVOIDING VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE LITIGATION, NEEDLESSLY

INCREASING THE COST OF LITIGATION, ETC.: Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, is hereby

NOTIFIED that should it elect to answer the Counter-Claim, that its responsive pleading shall

comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 82 and/or the applicable laws governing

said matters and those responses to Defendant’s Counter-Claim:

2 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Rule 8 General Rules of

Pleadings – Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d.

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1. State in short and plain terms Stor-All’s defenses to each claim asserted

and shall admit or deny averments upon which it relies; 2. If Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the truth of an averment, it shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. However, said denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied;

3. If Stor-All intend in good faith to deny only a part or qualification of an

averment, then it shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder; and

4. Be subject to the provisions of Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.

Stor-All’s (which includes, its attorneys, representatives, agents, etc.) “failure to comply with Rule 11 is subject to possible disciplinary action.” Stor-All’s signing of pleading constitutes a certificate of the following:

a. That the attorney (or party) has conducted a

reasonable inquiry;

b. That he or she is satisfied that the paper is well grounded in fact;

c. That the pleading has a basis in existing law or that the attorney (or party) has a good faith argument to amend or reverse existing law;

d. That the pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or needless increase of his opponent’s costs of litigation.

. . . If the pleading or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, appropriate sanctions shall be imposed by the court on motion or on its own initiative. Sanctions may include an order to pay the other party the amount of reasonable expenses caused by the violation, including reasonable attorney fees.3

Stor-All is hereby further NOTIFIED that:

5. It is to familiarize and/or acquaint itself with the Rules governing responsive pleadings. Answers such as “failure to state a claim,” “lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” provided for purposes of misrepresentation,

3 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure

7.530 Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers.

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delay of proceedings, obstruction of justice, etc. will be subject to the provisions of Rule 11.4

6. If Stor-All’s answer is not sufficiently definite in nature to give reasonable notice of the allegations in the Counter-Claim sought to be placed in issue, the Defendant’s, Denise Newsome’s (“Defendant”), averments may be treated as admitted (i.e. a corporate defendant’s denial of “each and every allegation” did not give “plain notice.”).5

7. A denial of knowledge or information requires that Stor-All not only lack

first-hand knowledge of the necessary facts involved, but also that Stor-All lack information upon which it reasonably could form a personal belief concerning the truth of the Defendant’s allegations.6

8. Normally, Stor-All may not assert lack of knowledge or information if the

necessary facts or data involved are within Stor-All’s knowledge or easily brought within its knowledge – (i.e. An answer denying information as to the truth or falsity of a matter necessarily within the knowledge of the party’s managing officers is a sham, and will be treated as an admission of allegation of the Counter-Claim.7)

9. An averment, that Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient

to form a belief as to matters that are of common knowledge or of with it can inform itself with the slightest effort, will be treated as patently falseand the effect and purpose will be taken as such to merely delay justice.8

10. If Stor-All’s Answer to the Counter-Claim is not incompliance with the

rules and/or laws governing responsive pleadings and/or said matters, the applicable Motion to Strike the Answer will be filed and request for the proper relief (i.e. sanctions against Stor-All and/or its attorney [if applicable]) will be sought.

4 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure

7.100 Pleadings Allowed through 7.262 Effect of Failure to Deny. 5 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller Federal

Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1261. 6 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller Federal

Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262. 7 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller Federal

Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262 and also Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 1964)..

8 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: See Reed v. Turner, 2 F.R.D. 12; and Squire v. Levan, 32 F.Supp. 437.

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in good

faith and has been drafted to save time and costs and/or expenses. Defendant can only hope that

Stor-All will allow wisdom to prevail.

Stor-All is also NOTIFIED that unless it serves and file a written response to the

Counter-Claim within the specified time allowed, the Defendant will seek judgment of and

against it by default for the relief demanded in the Counter-Claim.

DEFENDANT’S COUNTER-CLAIM and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW Defendant, Denise V. Newsome – a/k/a Denise Newsome (“Defendant”)

having answered and providing defense to Plaintiff’s, Stor-All Alfred, LLC’s (“Stor-All” or

“Plaintiff”), Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer, and without waiving said defenses

thereof, files this her Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial.

Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to

Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as if set forth in full herein and reiterates her non-

waiver of the denials therein stated.

Statement of Facts:

1. On or about July 27, 2007, Defendant entered into a Rental Agreement with Crown Storage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”). See EXHIBIT “1” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

2. Crown Storage at all times mentioned was the owner and/or landlord

according to the Rental Agreement (Lease No. 2543) entered into with the Defendant. 3. On July 27, 2007, Defendant was lawfully possessed of a certain storage

Unit Numbered 173 located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, Hamilton County, Ohio and lawfully possessed and owned the personal property placed in and/or contained therein.

4. Defendant rented the storage unit from Crown Storage for $29.82 per

month and the rental contract was in full force and in effect at all times mentioned.

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5. Nothing in the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant

states how such matters involving the property being sold during the Defendant’s tenancy should be handled. Defendant did not agree to be bound by any terms and conditions of said Rental Agreement upon Crown Storage through a sale of its property to another.

6. Under the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant no

problem arose regarding unpaid rent. Defendant made payments in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement entered into with Crown Storage.

7. Defendant has duly performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required to be performed by her under the Rental Agreement entered into with Crown Storage under its terms and conditions, except for those acts which have been prevented, delayed or excused by acts or omissions of Stor-All and Crown Storage.

8. For approximately eight (8) months under the Rental Agreement between

Crown Storage and Defendant, Crown Storage had no problems in obtaining rent payment from Defendant.

9. In April 2008, Stor-All unlawfully entered and seized the storage unit and

property of the Defendant. Said acts are in violation of within meaning of RC § 5321.04 of the Landlord and Tenant Act.

10. Problems arose with the Defendant’s rental of her storage unit after Stor-All’s assertion of entitlement of Defendant’s rent and unlawful seizure of her property and denial of access to said unit and property.

11. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s constructive eviction of Defendant from the premises, Defendant suffers from mental anguish and pain, all to Defendants general damage to be determined by a jury.

12. Stor-All’s constructive eviction of Defendant from the premises and the unlawful/illegal seizure of her storage unit and property were retaliatory, oppressive and malicious within the meaning of RC §5321.03, in that it has subjected the Defendant to cruel and unjust hardship, harassment, threats, etc. in willful and conscious disregard of Defendant’s rights, entitling Defendant to an award of punitive damages within meaning of RC §521.12.

13. As a further proximate result of Stor-All’s conduct as alleged in its Complaint and in this Counter-Complaint, Defendant will incur moving expenses and additional increase in storage cost in an amount to be determined.

14. Defendant made it verbally known and in writing she was not interested

with leasing with Stor-All. Neither was she interested in entering a Rental Agreement with Stor-All. As evidenced in the file of Stor-All regarding the Defendant, the “STOR-

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ALL LEASE AGREEMENT” to date remains unexecuted. See EXHIBIT “2” attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

15. In or about April 2008, Stor-All claimed that Defendant went into default.

When Defendant submitted payment for her storage unit, it was rejected by Stor-All. Payment was submitted under the terms and agreement of the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and the Defendant. Defendant advised of her objections. When Defendant advised wanting to retrieve her property, Stor-All denied her request and demanded that she pay monies for rent and late fees and lien charges applied.

16. In or about April 2008, Stor-All forcibly seized the Defendant’s storage

unit. Defendant did not authorize and/or agree to such forcible seizure. 17. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),

etc. unlawfully invaded the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize and/or agree to such invasion.

18. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),

etc. forcibly seized the Defendant’s storage unit and prevented, interfered, refused and denied Defendant access to her storage unit unless she gave it money.

19. Since April 2008, Defendant’s right to her storage unit was striped away

from her without legal and/or statutory authority by Stor-All. Defendant has not been to her storage unit for approximately ten (10) months because of the unlawful/illegal actions of Stor-All.

20. On December 9, 2008, Stor-All’s representative, Lori Whiteside (“Whiteside”), contacted Defendant at her place of employment by use of Defendant’s employer’s fax machine at (513) 852-6087. See EXHIBIT “3” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

21. On December 9, 2008, Whiteside contacted Defendant at her place of employment via facsimile at (513) 852-6087. Whiteside doing so without the authorization of the Defendant to correspond with her through her employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087. Whiteside using said method of correspondence to place the Defendant’s employer and Defendant’s co-workers on notice as to the personal and private affairs of the Defendant. Whiteside knew and/or should have known that sending correspondence to Defendant’s employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087 would have been received by Defendant’s employer and or Defendant’s co-workers. The action of Whiteside was done with forethought and premeditation. The action of Whiteside was willful, malicious and wanton and was done with reckless regard to the rights and privacy of the Defendant.

22. On December 9, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside of her objections in sending her correspondence to her employer at the fax number (513) 852-6087. Whiteside was provided with a fax number by the Defendant had she wanted to use this

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form of motion for communication; however, Whiteside with her own motives ignored the information provided by the Defendant and sent fax to the Defendant at a number not authorized by her. Through Defendant’s correspondence to Whiteside, she placed Whiteside of her knowledge that sending of fax to employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087 was ill motivated. Whiteside was advised of the emotional, mental anguish, etc. harm/injury sustained by Defendant. See EXHIBIT “4” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

23. On December 19, 2008, Whiteside advised the Defendant that Stor-All’s file in the matter regarding her was being submitted to Stor-All’s attorney, Dave Meranus in Cincinnati, Ohio. Whiteside withholding the name of the law firm in which Meranus was employed. Whiteside withholding name of law firm that Meranus was employed at because of knowledge and/or may have been made aware that Defendant was working with an attorney, Thomas J. Breed, who was formerly employed with Stor-All’s counsel’s law firm prior to coming to Defendant’s employer, Wood & Lamping LLP. See EXHIBIT “5” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein.

24. Information as to the attorney(s) Defendant assisted could be heard when calling and listening to her voicemail message at her place of employment, Wood & Lamping LLP. Said information (i.e. name of law firm, attorneys she provided assistance to) was in Defendant’s voicemail.

25. Whiteside was able to obtain the information regarding the Defendant’s place of employment and the attorney(s) to which she assisted. Whiteside having called the Defendant at her place of employment and in failing to reach her, proceeded to call Defendant at home.

26. Whiteside advised Defendant she has a background in the legal field.

27. In the December 19, 2008 facsimile to Defendant, Whiteside also advised of Stor-All’s plans scheduling an “amnesty weekend for January 9, 10, and 11, 2009.” Said weekend would entail, “at which time we are going to have a moving truck and driver available for any of the tenants that wish to vacate the premises at absolutely no cost to the tenant.” See Exhibit “5.”

28. The amnesty weekend by Stor-All was done with willful and malicious intent to deprive the Defendant of any damages to which she may be entitled. The amnesty weekend by Stor-All was to release other tenants from such similar criminal and civil wrongs they had subjected the Defendant to. Stor-All’s amnesty weekend was for the benefit of masking/ shielding its liability for the illegal/unlawful acts rendered the Defendant and perhaps others.

29. Stor-All having knowledge that it was in violation of the statutes/laws; however, failed to notify its tenants who elected to participate in the amnesty weekend

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scam, that they were waiving any right to seek damages of and against Stor-All if they elected to take Stor-All up on its frivolous and ill-motive good will offer.

30. On December 19, 2008, Defendant provided Whiteside with Ohio statutes/laws to advise her of the violations of Stor-All. To no avail. See EXHIBIT “6” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

31. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside of concerns that the amnesty weekend appeared to be “only in the interest of Stor-All alone.” Defendant also advising knowledge that Stor-All was considering bringing a Forcible Entry and Detainer action. Stor-All only deciding to bring such an action upon being advised by Defendant that their threats (which lasted for several months) of Liens and her property being sold/auctioned were prohibited by the statutes/laws of Ohio. Whiteside having already confirmed that Defendant was right that they were not entitled to the “LIEN-actions” they repeatedly harassed her with. In Defendant’s December 23, 2008, correspondence, Defendant provided Whiteside with a draft of a Complaint she is considering filing. See EXHIBIT “7” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

32. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside, “you are not a lawyer; the courts are here to interpret and enforce the laws. I am certain that the reason why Stor-All has not received rent is not due to any breach on my part. So let Stor-All move forward with their lawsuit and I will counter in that it is clear where the laws lie. The offer made was only what was in Stor-All’s best interest, so let the Court(s) decide if it had a legal right to withhold my rent and continue to threaten me with liens – when I proved case law to support it was not entitle to such. The delay was not due to my part and neither was nonpayment for any contribution on my part, but all attributed to the direct acts of Stor-All and its insistence on imposing liens on me in which it was not entitled and neither was there a lease between me and Stor-all.” See Exhibit “7” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

33. On January 9, 2009, Stor-All mailed Defendant “NOTICE TO LEAVE

THE PREMISES” by January 19, 2009. Stor-All did not fax and mail said notice. It provided notice to the Defendant via regular mail and certified mail. Defendant was at her place of employment all day. Apparently Stor-All having knowledge as to Defendant’s employer’s intent to terminate her employment. A causal link/connection established. Whiteside taking a far departure from the method of communication she had been using prior to January 9, 2009. Moreover, since introducing herself to Defendant.

34. On January 9, 2009, Defendant was terminated from her place of employment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Being advised that her termination was due to her position being eliminated. Said termination was without just cause.

35. Defendant’s termination was done with willful and malicious intent to aid Stor-All. Moreover, to aid Stor-All in obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant. By succeeding in getting the Defendant terminated, this eliminated the potential conflict

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of interest that may arise had Defendant still been employed with Wood & Lamping and working with Thomas J. Breed when Stor-All’s counsel filed its Complaint in this action.

36. Defendant’s termination was done to cause her financial ruin and devastation. Stor-All thinking that with said ruin and devastation, the Defendant would be forced to waive important rights secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and other statutes/laws governing said matters. Stor-All believing that if the Defendant is terminated that she would be forced to succumb to its attempts of extorting monies from her. Nevertheless, with all its hard work – failing on December 9, 2008, to obtain Defendant’s termination – Stor-All was ruthless, unrelenting and determined to see that Defendant was terminated from employment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Said acts by Stor-All was done for ill gain.

37. What Stor-All did not know which proved to be very beneficial to the

Defendant:

(a) That prior to December 2008 and in December 2008, Defendant had notified her employer of a medical procedure.

(b) That in December 2008, when Defendant again notified her employer of the need for medical procedure, from the time of notification Defendant was covered and/or protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

(c) That on January 8, 2009, Defendant provided her written request form to begin this process. That said leave was approved by her attorneys, which included Thomas J. Breed’s approval.

(d) That the very NEXT day (January 9, 2009) in retaliation and in efforts of aiding Stor-All, Wood & Lamping LLP terminated Defendant’s employment with no just cause and in violation of the FMLA; moreover, in efforts of assisting Stor-All in the criminal and civil wrongs undertaken against the Defendant.

(e) That in an effort to cover up their unlawful/illegal acts, Wood & Lamping had a representative remove Defendant’s Employee Handbook from her desk. The taking of the Employee Handbook was done with malicious intent to cover-up and/or mask/shield an illegal animus. With laughter, that was not the Defendant’s only copy. Defendant retaining a copy of her Employee Handbook at her residence as well.

(f) That during Defendant’s employment with Wood & Lamping, she assisted an attorney by the name of Julie R. Pugh, who specialized in employment law. That Pugh and another attorney, Heather Walsh, conducted an Employment Seminar in which the Defendant attended. At said Seminar attendees were provided with a Notebook containing Wood & Lamping LLP’s Employer’s Guide. With laughter of which Defendant also received and retained. A

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Notebook and the Employer’s Guide available to the public. A Guide clearly addressing violations of Wood & Lamping under the FMLA.

(g) While Defendant knew that her termination was unlawful, the icing on the cake came upon receipt of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer; wherein said document not only provided the name of counsel, David Meranus, but that Stor-All had engaged the services of Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin, LPA – former law firm of Thomas J. Breed. Breed being the attorney Defendant assigned to assist at Wood & Lamping LLP. A causal link established between Defendant’s wrongful discharge and Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal acts against her. Moreover, an established relationship and/or shared interest between Stor-All, their counsel – his law firm, and Wood & Lamping.

(h) Defendant is thankful, thankful, thankful, for the additional information obtained and/or received in that it has opened the door for many, many, many. . . opportunities for justice and the recovery of damages.

38. On January 17, 2009, Defendant advised Stor-All of its receipt of its

Notice of Eviction. Defendant advising that any such action by Stor-All would be met with a Counter-Claim. In said correspondence, Defendant extended a good faith offer of $5,500. Said offer was declined by Stor-All as evidenced in the filing of their Complaint. In said correspondence, Defendant advised, “I believe a wise man would tell you that $5,500 is a reasonable and/or good faith offer – considering the additional damages and costs I may be entitled to should a lawsuit be have to be filed by me and/or on my behalf (attorney fees, compensatory damages, etc.).” Nevertheless, Stor-All refused said offer. Taking the path of a fool. Stor-All refusing said offer in that it was aware of its unlawful/illegal acts.

39. On or about January 20, 2009, Stor-All brought a Forcible Entry and

Detainer action against the Defendant. 40. For the Defendant, it was a good thing Stor-All refused her January 17,

2009 offer. The doors have been swung open for exceedingly higher damages well above that which Defendant was not aware was entitled to at the time of her January 17, 2009 offer. Yes, it was a good thing and very beneficial to the Defendant when Stor-All declined her offer. Especially, upon learning of what was taking place behind the scene and Stor-All appears to have been in the driver seat of such wrongs being committed against Defendant.

41. Stor-All had actual knowledge that Defendant owed it no rent and that it

had unlawfully and illegally seized the Defendant’s unit and property without legal authority and/or statute.

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42. Stor-All’s filing of its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint was not only to collect a frivolous debt that it knew it was not entitled to from the Defendant, but to use such Complaint for “abuse of process” purposes to unlawfully and illegally extort monies from the Defendant to which it is not entitled.

43. Stor-All by filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint against

Defendant, intended to deceive and commit fraudulent acts upon this Court in an effort to get this Court to engage in the furtherance of the criminal activities they have subjected the Defendant to.

44. None of the Defendant’s property has been recovered and she has been

denied access to the storage unit and retrieval of her property unless she pays monies Stor-All, its agents and/or representatives are attempting to extort from her.

45. Defendant has repeatedly in good faith provided Stor-All with dates that

she would like to obtain her property; however, said requests were denied unless Defendant agreed to pay the outrageous fee and/or charges imposed by Stor-All.

46. Not only has Stor-All stooped to such criminal acts in its extortion

scheme; but in its demands to the Defendant, request that Defendant pay it the monies without any consequences and/or liability to Stor-All. Stor-All refusing to own up to its liability in this matter.

47. During the time and place referred to above, Stor-All unlawfully and

wrongfully seized the Defendant’s storage unit and denied her access and retrieval of her property which may be in value of $8,000.00, and refused to allow her to retrieve her property unless she paid the outrageous fees (late and lien) that it illegally and unlawfully attached.

48. During the period of the unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unit

and property, Stor-All subjected the Defendant to repeated threats of placing a lien on her property and repeatedly serving her with documents entitled, “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.” See EXHIBIT “8” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

49. Upon receipt of Stor-All’s “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN

ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.,” Defendant responded in a timely manner as to her objections. Defendant being entitled to rights guaranteed/secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, Ohio Landlord & Tenant Act, and any/all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters.

50. In early and/or mid 2008, Stor-All was timely, properly and adequately

placed on notice as to the statutes/laws it was in violation of in the handling of Defendant’s storage unit and property. To no avail. Stor-All made a willful, conscious and knowing decision to continue to conduct business in such an illegal/unlawful manner.

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51. Stor-All elected to unlawfully seize and take the Defendant’s storage unit

and property hostage. Stor-All making it clear Defendant would not be receiving her property unless she paid the monies it demanded from her.

52. While Defendant repeatedly requested and demanded that Stor-All provide

her with legal conclusions to support its actions, to date, as with Stor-All’s Complaint filed in this action, it has not been able to provide the Defendant with the information requested. Nevertheless, as with Stor-All’s Complaint, it continues to demand monies from the Defendant to which it is not entitled. Stor-All being requested as early as May 13, 2008 to provide said information. See EXHIBIT “9” – electronic copy9 attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

53. Defendant acted in good faith, and, before the institution of the proceeding

of Stor-All’s Complaint, Defendant stated all facts and circumstances connected with this matter to support her defense in this lawsuit. Stor-All was provided with facts, evidence and/or statutes/laws governing said matters which supported Defendant’s defense to the monies it was asserting was owed it. Moreover, with case laws/statutes supporting a defense to the relief she sought. A jury trial on this matter will sustain that there is sufficient information in the possession of Stor-All to support the filing of its Complaint against Defendant is an abuse of process, is not sound in law and filed in furtherance of the criminal and civil wrongs already rendered against Defendant.

54. Defendant, as lessee in the Rental Agreement entered into between Crown

Storage and her, entered into said Agreement of the storage unit in good faith. Upon the execution of said Agreement, Defendant entered into possession of the premises under the terms of the Agreement and pursuant to the Agreement, remained in good standing as a tenant of said premises at all times until Stor-All took over and began claiming right and/or entitlement to Defendant’s rent and the outrageous fees and liens charges leveled against her. Moreover, Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal denying Defendant access and depriving her of her property in storage unit.

55. During the period when Defendant was entitled to the peaceable

possession of the premises as a tenant under the Lease entered between she and Crown Storage, Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seized the Defendant’s property and denied her access and/or retrieval of said property unless she paid the monies it attempted to extort from her. Stor-All doing so intending to injure Defendant in her good name and reputation, and in order to cause the Defendant great loss and damages, falsely, willfully, maliciously and without probable cause whatever, unlawfully took possession of Defendant’s storage unit and property over the Defendant’s objections, and caused the lock Defendant placed on her storage unit to secure her property to be removed and may have replaced it with a lock of its own to deprive the Defendant access to the demised premises and her property.

9 Defendant reserving the right to supplement this Exhibit upon retrieving executed copy if requested.

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56. Stor-All knew that Defendant had no binding Rental Agreement with it; moreover, that Defendant’s Rental Agreement was with Crown Storage. However, through its unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unit and property, it attempted to unlawfully/illegally extort monies from the Defendant in exchange for her receipt of her property. Stor-All’s sole purpose for filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer action is in furtherance of its unlawful and illegal practices of said extortion practices; moreover, to deprive Defendant access to her storage unit and her property. Thus, the filing of Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint is an abuse of process in that its lawsuit is being used for a purpose other than that for which it was lawfully intended to be used for.

57. Stor-All devised an elaborate scam to unlawfully/illegally obtain the

property of persons renting space at the 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214. Said scam involving the taking of person’s property through a lawful process; however, through illegal means (i.e. by way of extorting money, etc. from persons through fear of losing their property). Stor-All using such methods for financial gain from the monies earned at auctioning off property. For instance, Defendant believes that an auction would have yielded Stor-All a profit – her rent being approximately $29.82 and had Stor-All sold it at auction, stood to earn a great deal more (perhaps hundreds and/or thousand of dollars more).

58. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful and illegal seizure

and taking of Defendant’s storage unit and its removal of Defendant’s lock and may have replaced it with one of its own, Defendant was deprived of her rights as a tenant and of her personal property contained on the premises under the Rental Agreement between she and Crown Storage.

59. To date, Defendant has not recovered her property and is not certain if her

property is still there in that she has been denied access to it for almost a year. An inability to recover because Stor-All has repeatedly attempted to extort monies from the Defendant in exchange and/or has attempted to get the Defendant to waive rights secured to her under the statutes/laws which would entitle her to relief for such unlawful/illegal practices.

60. Stor-All’s acts were willful, malicious and wanton in hopes that Defendant

would weary and eventually abandon her property. To Stor-All’s disappointment, Defendant is literate, college educated and capable of researching the laws.

61. The record in Stor-All’s possession will support the good faith efforts by

the Defendant to support her response and the efforts made to resolve this matter and retrieve her property. However, Stor-All refused all such good faith efforts by Defendant in that it refused to accept its liability from the illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered the Defendant.

62. There is no Landlord and Tenant relationship between Stor-All and

Defendant. Stor-All just asserted such title of Landlord over the Defendant’s objections.

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Moreover, with knowledge that Defendant did not wish to enter into a Rental Agreement with it. Action by Stor-All was for purpose of abuse of process.

63. Stor-All since asserting such relationship (Landlord and Tenant), has

retaliated and deprived the Defendant of quiet enjoyment of premises as a direct result of Defendant’s refusal to enter a Rental Agreement and to deprive her of property.

64. Stor-All’s actions were intentional. Stor-All’s conduct and behavior being

done to deprive the Defendant beneficial enjoyment of premises and the retrieval of her property in that Defendant does not wish to enter a Rental Agreement with Stor-All.

65. Stor-All has intentionally filed its Forcible Entry and Detainer action

knowing it is not entitled to the relief it seeks. Stor-All using a lawful purpose with unlawful/illegal intent; moreover, for abuse of process.

66. Since Stor-All’s filing of its Complaint, Plaintiff was able to obtain the

additional information and ill motive of Stor-All and its unrelenting efforts to destroy her life.

67. Defendant has given Stor-All reasonable time to return her property and in

good faith has attempted to reach a financial settlement to compensate her for the injury/harm sustained. To no avail. Stor-All merely wants the Defendant to let it go without consequences for the criminal and/or illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered her.

68. Defendant believe that prior to bringing this counter-claim, she has in

good faith attempted to mitigate damages; however, Stor-All again, simply wanted Defendant to agree to monies to which it was not entitled and/or leave without holding it accountable for the damages (injury/harm) Defendant sustained as a direct and proximate result of its unlawful/illegal actions.

COUNT ONE ABUSE OF PROCESS

(OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC, ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.)

Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 68 of her Counter-Claim and

Paragraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as

if set forth herein with said protection as that argued therein.

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Defendant seeks relief as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s abuse of process in

the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. In support thereof, Defendant

alleges:

69. Stor-All in the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer has

filed said action for purposes of abuse of process. Stor-All’s bringing of its forcible entry and detainer action in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of such proceedings with ill and/or ulterior motives – i.e. to obtain an undue advantage over the Defendant, obtain storage unit and monies from the Defendant to which it was not entitled, subject the Defendant to injury/harm, etc.. Neither was Stor-All entitled, as a matter of law to bring said forcible entry and detainer action against the Defendant.

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 66 – Distinctions: While the gist of the action for malicious prosecution is that the prosecution has been carried on maliciously and without probable cause, the essence of the action for abuse of process is the use of process in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding, with an ulterior motive. 45 Ohio Jur.3d § 215 – Distinguished from malicious prosecution: Under Ohio law, the tort of abuse of process differs from the tort of malicious criminal prosecution in that the gist of the tort of abuse of process is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish; the purpose for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only thing of importance. (Bickley v. FMC Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp.2d 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

70. To support the prima facie requirement for abuse of process Defendant

must show: (a) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (b) the proceeding was perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (c) direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process. Therefore, in support of said allegation that Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is an abuse of process, Defendant states:

(a) The filing of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer initiated a legal proceeding in proper form and, through said acts, with its assertion for probable cause; (b) the filing of

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Stor-All’s Complaint has perverted these proceeding and the judicial process for purposes of attempting to accomplish an ulterior purpose – such as (i) extorting monies from the Defendant, (ii) cover-up/shield the unlawful/illegal eviction it initiated about April 2008, (iii) obstruct the administration of justice, deprive Defendant equal protection of the laws and due process of laws, (iv) financially devastating the Defendant for purposes of obtaining an undue advantage over her – Stor-All working on and/or seeing that Defendant was terminated from her place of employment in hopes that it would destitute the Defendant and force her to waive protected rights secured/guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, U.S. Constitution, Landlord and Tenant Act, and other applicable statutes/laws governing said matters; and (c) as a direct a direct and proximate result of the unlawful/illegal as well as criminal and civil wrongs Stor-All leveled against the Defendant, she has sustained direct damage from the wrongful use of process – i.e. Stor-All’s filing of Complaint was in furtherance of their criminal and civil wrongs already initiated against the Defendant. Stor All having already taken the laws into its hands and evicting the Defendant without legal authority and/or court order. Stor-All’s filing of Complaint was merely a continuance of it pattern-of-practice in abuse of process and when it failed up under its repeated “Notice of Intent to Enforce Lien. . . ,” it sought ways and means to see that Defendant was terminated from her place of employment until it accomplished such efforts on January 9, 2009, then it moved forward on January 20, 2009, and in continuance with abuse of process, filed its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer.

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 214 – Generally; Nature and elements

of cause of action: Under Ohio law, the elements of a claim of abuse of process are that (1) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process (Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 2005 FED App. 0273P (6th Cir. 2005); Bickley v. FMC Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Greenwood v. Delphi Automotive Systems, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 1047 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d, 103 Fed. Appx. 609 (6th Cir. 2004))…

71. In determining what relief, if any, the Defendant is entitled to for the Stor-

All’s abuse of process, the Court may: (a) consider loss of earnings, (b) physical

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suffering, (c) mental suffering, (d) embarrassment, (e) humiliation, (f) loss of property or freedom, etc..

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 218 – Damages: A prevailing plaintiff in an action for abuse of process is entitled to recover the amount of money which will reasonably compensate him for the actual damages he has sustained as a proximate result of the abuse of process in determining compensatory damages, the court may consider the plaintiff’s loss of earnings, medical and other expenses, physical suffering, mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of personal property or freedom. The plaintiff may recover only those damages which naturally resulted from defendant’s acts, and the court cannot consider remote, indefinite or speculative injuries or damages. Actual malice is necessary for a recovery of punitive damages in an abuse of process case. Where defendant’s abuse of the legal process involved a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of the plaintiff, as where the defendant was aware that his acts had a great probability of causing substantial harm to the plaintiff, an award of punitive damages is appropriate. (Donohoe v. Burd, 722 F.Supp. 1507 (S.D. Ohio 1989), judgment aff’d, 923 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1991).

72. Stor-All having knowledge of the injury that would be rendered and/or

had been rendered Defendant, resorted to a commonly used practice used by it in depriving citizens, such as Defendant, of equal protection of the laws and due process of laws, in unlawfully/illegally seizing Defendants storage unit without legal authority.

73. The legal process for obtaining premises through a forcible entry and

detainer action was abused by Stor-All. Stor-All evaded process and unlawfully evicted the Defendant and seized her property without just cause and without legal authority.

74. The perverted use by Stor-All of the legal process was done to deprive

Defendant rights secured and/or guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, U.S. Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and any/all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters.

75. Stor-All committed an illegal and wrongful act in commencing an eviction

of the Defendant by seizing her storage unit and taking her property without legal justification and/or probable cause.

76. Stor-All resorted to abuse of process to coerce and obtain collateral

advantage to force the Defendant to surrender her storage unit and/or abandon said storage unit, by abusing process, taking the laws into its own hands, unlawfully seizing

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Defendants storage unit and taking her property for the means of extorting monies from her.

77. Acting with express authorization by Stor-All, its employees, agents

and/or representatives willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and illegally entered the Defendant’s storage unit in order to evict her without legal process and/or statutory right.

78. Access to the Defendant’s storage unit was obtained by force without legal

process and/or statutory right. 79. The malicious and wrongful acts of Stor-All caused Defendant damages,

inconvenience and discomfort, mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, distress, loss of employment and more to Plaintiff’s loss and damage in the sum to be determined.

80. Under Ohio law, the laws are clear on how matters involving rental of

commercial property is to be handled. 81. Stor-All placed the cart-before-the-horse when it took the laws into its

own hands and unlawfully/illegally evicted the Defendant from her storage unit. Now in a desperate effort to cover up such unlawful/illegal and criminal acts, it filed its January 20, 2009 Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer failing to advise the Court of the legal wrongs that it had rendered the Defendant. If Stor-All believed that it had a right to the Defendant’s storage unit (when it did not), it should have brought a forcible entry and detainer action BEFORE the unlawful/illegal eviction it performed under its self-imposed laws.

82. Defendant was never indebted to Stor-All and neither has Stor-All

presented any evidence to sustain such claim to monies alleged to be owed. 83. Stor-All’s failure to comply with statutes/laws governing said matter

subjected the Defendant to an illegal/unlawful eviction and the seizure of her property. 84. At any given time prior to Stor-All’s filing of the instant lawsuit, it could

have settled this matter; however, elected to move forward with ill motive. 85. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All maliciously sued out and caused Summons

in Action in Forcible Entry, Detainer, and Money to be issued against Defendant, falsely and maliciously in connection to its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer in the Hamilton County Municipal Court – Hamilton County, Ohio alleging failure to pay rent.

86. Stor-All had actual knowledge that the Defendant owed it no monies

alleged prior to bringing this instant lawsuit. Nevertheless, is abusing the judicial process for ill motive.

87. None of Defendant’s property that was unlawfully/illegal seized by Stor-

All has been returned to the Defendant.

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88. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted malicious and wrongfully

and with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant. 89. Stor-All’s filing of this instant lawsuit and seeking out the Summons to be

issued in this matter and causing said Summons to be executed, was willful, malicious and wanton.

90. Stor-All through its representative(s) contacted Defendant’s employer via

facsimile and/or other means known to it regarding dispute between it and Defendant. Stor-All doing so with ill intent/motive.

91. By filing this instant lawsuit and due to acts prior to filing by Stor-All,

Defendant has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses. Said expenses and services which is expected to exceed $15,000. Moreover, Defendant may be required to retain an attorney in the representation of this matter.

92. Ohio Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and other statutes/laws

governing such matters are clear that Stor-All’s handling of Defendant has created an infringement upon her protected rights.

93. A reasonable mind may conclude that there were other means available to

Stor-All prior to its unlawful/illegal eviction of Defendant from her storage unit and the seizure of her property. If Stor-All believed that it had a legal right (although it did not) to bring a forcible entry and detainer, it should have brought such action when at the time it claims rent was not paid – in April 2008 or shortly thereafter. Instead it elected to unlawful/illegally forcibly enter and seize the Defendant’s storage unit and property rather than use the legal process to resolve this matter. A reasonable mind may conclude that the unlawful/illegal method used by Stor-All in the taking of the Defendant’s storage unit and property is one commonly used by it to deprive citizens, such as Defendant, of protected rights.

94. The abuse of process by Stor-All was done with malice, forethought,

harassment, retaliation, and improper motive to all this Court to grant punitive damages. 95. Stor-All with knowledge of the way its employees, agents and

representatives were conducting business on its behalf, did nothing to deter, prevent and/or correct such legal wrongs rendered the Defendant. Instead, Stor-All made a willful and conscious decision to unlawfully/illegally evict the Defendant and seize her storage unit and property.

96. As a direct and proximate result Stor-All’s acts, Defendant was injured,

deprived entitlement to storage unit and property, deprived rights secured under the Ohio Constitution, U.S. Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and any/all applicable laws governing said matters.

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97. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted maliciously and wrongfully and with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant requests exemplary damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages against Stor-All in the sum to be determined by a jury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC for:

98. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $250,000.

99. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined. 100. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

$225,000. 101. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

$225,000. 102. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

$750,000. 103. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,

Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices.

104. Reasonable fees and/or attorney fees. 105. Costs of suit; and 106. Such other further relief as the Court deem just and proper.

COUNT TWO WRONGFUL EVICTION





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Defendant brings this Counter-Claim for the wrongful eviction action of Stor-All. In

Stor-All’s filing of Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer it has asserted itself as a Landlord

and, thus, has voluntarily surrendered itself to be liable to the damages and relief Defendant

seeks through her Counter-Claim. Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is done

for purposes of wrongful eviction action. Even if Stor-All would now want to abandon its

“Landlord” title to avoid liability, such acts would also fail in that such relinquishing of title

would then allow the Defendant to bring an action against it for “malicious prosecution.”

Therefore, Defendant alleges:

107. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All filed Complaint for Forcible Entry and

Detainer against the Defendant. 108. There is no Rental Agreement between Stor-All and the Defendant. An

unexecuted Stor-All Lease Agreement between Stor-All and Defendant supports said averment. Therefore, under Ohio law, Stor-All has no right to entry and/or the relief sought in their Forcible Entry and Detainer action.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 73 – Generally:

The estate of a landlord during the existence of an outstanding leasehold is a mere reversion, though, in the case of a tenancy under a lease, the lessor has an ever-present interest – a constant right to participate in the benefits of possession. However, in the absence of an agreement or statute to the contrary, the landlord has no right of entry during the lease term.

109. As a matter of Ohio law, Defendant was wrongfully evicted about April 2008, or shortly thereafter, in that Stor-All: (a) subjected her to disturbance in the use of her storage unit; (b) deprived Defendant of the enjoyment of her storage unit apparently as a third party either acting under its own authority or that of Crown Storage-Camp Washington, Defendant’s landlord and/or in which a Rental Agreement was entered; (c) denied the Defendant access unless she paid the charges/fees alleged; (d) had the Defendant’s lock removed from the storage unit in taking possession of it.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 161 – Generally: The term “eviction” is one with peculiar reference to a tenant, being the disturbance of his possession, or his expulsion,depriving him of the enjoyment of the premises demised, or any

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portion of them by the landlord, the act of third persons actingunder the authority of the landlord, or by act of someone having a paramount title.

110. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought against the Defendant although it is fully aware that it has already made an unlawful entry in an unreasonable manner of Defendant’s storage unit. Moreover, Stor-All has repeatedly served the Defendant with “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC § 5322.01 ET.SEQ.” with knowledge and/or should have known that such action was not permissible under the laws of the State of Ohio. Stor-All placing the cart-before-the-horse and being unsuccessful in such threats has now brought its Forcible Entry and Detainer action in furtherance of such threats, harassment and other unlawful/illegal means of which Defendant has had to endure in Stor-All’s efforts of obtaining her property. Therefore, this action is necessary to obtain injunctive relief as well as additional relief to which the laws of the state of Ohio entitle the Defendant to.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 130 – Wrongful entry or wrongful refusal of access under 1974 Landlord and Tenant Act: If a landlord under a rental agreement enters upon the demised premises in violation of the statutory provision governing the right of entry (R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), makes lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful, which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting from the entry or demands, obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney fees, or terminate the rental agreement. (R.C. 5321.04(B). As to award of attorney’s fees under R.C. ch. 5321 and/or § 135).

111. Defendant has been subjected to acts of actual eviction by Stor-All in that

she has been excluded from her storage unit and Stor-All has repeatedly denied her access unless she paid monies it was attempting to extort from her. Defendant has also been subjected to acts of constructive eviction by Stor-All in that: (a) it has repeatedly interfered and/or obstructed Defendant’s access to her storage unit, removed the Defendant’s lock she had on her storage unit and may have replaced it with one of their own, (b) it has substantially deprived the Defendant of the beneficial use of her storage unit and the Defendant has not returned; and (c) the Defendant has involuntarily relinquished possession of her storage unit – i.e. Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seizing storage unit and taking it as its own, (d) Stor-All’s acts were meritless, done in malice and bad faith; moreover, so severe that it not only interfered with Defendant’s peaceful enjoyment of the storage unit, but went as far as bringing such unlawful/illegal practices to the Defendant’s place of employment which resulted in the Defendant being terminated.

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65 Ohio Jur.3d § 162 – Elements and requisites; actual or constructive eviction: An eviction, in the strict sense of the term, is to enter upon lands and expel the tenant (Forbus v. Collier, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 331, 2 W.L.B. 122, 1877 WL 7471 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1877). However, the result is also an eviction if the tenant loses the enjoyment of any part of the leased premises by some act of the landlord, of a permanent character, done with the intention of depriving him or her of the enjoyment (Id.) An eviction may be actual or constructive (McAlpine v. Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120, 1860 WL 31 (1860); Wetzel V. Richcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N.E. 1004 (1895)). Actual eviction involves expulsion or exclusion from the demised premises (Liberal Sav. & Loan Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489, 19 Ohio Op. 170, 30 N.E.2d 1012 (1940); Foote Theatre, Inc. v. Dixie Roller Rink, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d 456, 471 N.E. 2d 866 (3d Dist. Hardin County 1984)). In order to establish constructive eviction, there must be proof of active interference by the landlord or someone authorized by the landlord which compelled the tenant to leave (Eckhart v. Robert E. Lee Motel, 2 Ohio App. 3d 80, 440 N.E.2d 824 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1981)). Constructive eviction occurs when the landlord has substantially deprived the tenant of beneficial use of the premises, and the tenant vacates (Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F. Supp.2d 1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000). So long as the tenant remains in possession, he or she cannot maintain that there has been a constructive eviction. Thus, for constructive eviction to occur when there is merely interference with the tenant’s possession and enjoyment, the tenant must relinquish possession of premises (Doll v. Rapp, 74 Ohio Misc.2d 140, 660 N.E.2d 542 (Mun. Ct. 1995)). . . . Constructive eviction also occurs when the landlord’s actions are meritless, done in malice or bad faith, and so severe as to interfere with the tenant’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises. (Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F.Supp.2d 1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000)). Thus, a constructive eviction has also been defined as a failure or interference on the part of the landlord with the intended enjoyment of the leased premises, which is of a substantial nature, and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises. (Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 13 Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165 N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. Ross County 1959)).

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 173 – Pleading and proof; Trial:� Illustration: A charge to the jury that a

constructive eviction is such a failure or interference on the part of the landlord with the intended enjoyment of the leased premises as

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to be of a substantial nature, and so injurious to the tenant as to deprive him or her of the beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises, is a clear and concise definition of a constructive eviction, and in the absence of a request for a more complete definition, is sufficient. (Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 13 Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165 N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. Ross County 1959)). In an action for damages for breach of covenants in a lease, a defense that the lessor’s agent evicted the lessee raises an issue of fact as the agency, which must be passed on by a jury unless a jury is waived (Shepfer v. Hannenkrat, 48 Ohio App. 35, 1 Ohio Op. 19, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 192 N.E. 274 (5th Dist. Tuscarawas County 1933)).

112. On January 9, 2009, and on the same date that Defendant was terminated

from her place of employment, Stor-All served her with “NOTICE TO LEAVE THE PREMISES” asserting that the Defendant rented from it. Requesting the Defendant to leave the premises with knowledge it has not allowed her on the premises and/or entry into her storage unit since about April 2008. Had Defendant complied with said notice and vacated, she would have lost her rights to bring this Counter-Claim, in that her vacating would have been taken as voluntary. At the time of Stor-All’s filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as well as its claim to ownership of the property, the Defendant was rightfully in possession of her storage unit and entitled to remain. In the interest of justice and in compliance with Ohio law, Defendant: (a) should await legal proceedings threatened against her – in which she has; and (b) rather than comply with Stor-All’s notice to leave the premises (which it has denied her access for almost a year), bring an action such as her Counter-Claim for alleged damages that perhaps never would have resulted. In fact, Stor-All was so determined to ruin the Defendant; it went as far as engaging and/or providing information for review by her former employer for purposes of obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant in the handling of this matter. A causal link between Stor-All’s acts and Defendant’s wrongful termination is established.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 164 – Notice to vacate; bringing possessory action: A notice by the landlord that the tenancy is being terminated, combined with a demand by him or her for possession of the premises, and voluntary compliance therewith by the tenant without protest, is not an eviction for which damages may be recovered. (Greenberg v. Murphy, 16 Ohio C.D. 359, 1904 WL 1147 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1904)). [Practice Guide: If the tenant is rightfully in possession and entitled to remain, the tenant should await legal proceedings that are threatened, and make defense thereto, rather than comply with the demand, and then bring an

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action for alleged damages that perhaps never would have resulted. (Greenberg)] Where a tenant, upon request or notice to vacate, voluntarily abandons the premises without protest, no action for damages against the landlord, based on fraud or misrepresentations as to the reasons for such request can be maintained under rights recognized by the common law, or any statute of Ohio. (Ferguson v. Buddenberg, 87 Ohio App. 326, 42 Ohio Op. 488, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 473, 94 N.E.2d 568 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1950)).

113. Stor-All through the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and

Detainer is attempting force the Defendant to give up her storage unit. The actions of Stor-All are in violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and statutory provisions governing rights given to the Defendant under the Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s actions, Defendant has sustained damages and/or injury/harm to which she is entitled to compensatory damages to the extent that she is being forced to leave as well as having to pay more for a comparable space elsewhere.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 131 – Generally; liquated damages: General contract principles govern damages recoverable in an action for the breach of a lease, including claims for breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of a warranty of habitability, and breach of a landlord’s statutory duties. (Allen v. Lee, 43 Ohio App. 3d 31, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1987)). A party injured by a breach of a contract is entitled to his or her expectation interest, which is the injured party’s interest in having the benefit of the bargain by being put in as good a position as that party would have been in had the contract been performed. (Ohio Jur. 3d, Damages § 18; see F. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 90, 351 N.E.2d 121 (1976)) [Observation: Under Ohio law, any ambiguities in commercial lease language setting forth damages recoverable upon default must be strictly construed against drafter of lease10 (NewMarket Acquisitions, Ltd. v. Powerhouse Gym, 212 F.Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).] As to the damages recoverable for a breach by the lessor, the general rule is that a lessee who is forced by the lessor’s breach to give up the lease incurs compensable damages to the extent that

10 § 89 Construction Against Party Preparing Lease: The general rule that ambiguities in a written

instrument must be construed against the person who prepared it (Bevy’s Dry Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, Inc. v. Streble, 2 Ohio St.2d 250, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 507, 208 N.E.2d 528 (1965); Crickets of Ohio, Inc. v. Hines Invests, L.L.C., 2006-Ohio-2901, 2006 WL 1575212 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Fairfield County 2006); Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 486, 277 N.E.2d 584 (Mun. Ct. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 1972 WL 20379)(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1972)) and favorably to the person who had no voice in the selection of the language (Madden v. American News Co., 11 Ohio Misc. 119, 40 Ohio Op.2d 355, 229 N.E.2d 119 (C.P. 1967)) applies to the interpretation of the leases.

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the lessee has to pay more for comparable space over the term of the original lease, plus any special damages (Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 97, 98. As to measure of damages for breach of covenant of title of quiet enjoyment, see § 184).

114. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought for

purposes of extorting monies from the Defendant and to have her unlawfully/illegally evicted.

115. Stor-All having no authority under Ohio statutes/laws to bring this action

against the Defendant. 116. Prior to Stor-All’s filing of Forcible Entry and Detainer action, it knew

and/or should have known that it was not entitled to bring this lawsuit against the Defendant.

117. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s acts, the Defendant has

sustained damages and/or injury/harm to which she seeks relief thereof through the filing of this instant Counter-Claim. Said relief as allowed under Ohio law:

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 174 – Measure and elements of damages: In many jurisdictions, the view is taken that in a tort action for wrongful eviction by a landlord or by persons for whose act the landlord is responsible, the tenant may recover as general damages the actual or rental value of the unexpired lease term less the rent reserved (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 668). There is authority in Ohio supporting this view (Grunau v. Faflik, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 142, 77 N.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1947)(damage for eviction by or under authority of landlord is reasonable value of leasehold) and also the view that a lessor is liable to the lessee (or a sublessor is liable to the sublessor) for all damages sustained by reason of a wrongful eviction for which he or she is responsible. (Hoffstetter v. Harris, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 579, 1921 WL 1344 (C.P. 1921)). In actions based on the wrongful eviction of a tenant, damages for special losses, such as . . . expenses in defending an ejectment action, have been recovered. . . .exemplary damages are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable (Ohio Jur.3d, Damages § 128). . . . [Illustration: A landlord’s constructive eviction of the tenants. . . in changing the locks of the tenants’ door one day after posting a three-day eviction notice . . .entitled the tenants to punitive damages (Proctor v. Frame, 90 Ohio Mis. 2d 11, 695 N.E.2d 357 (Mun. Ct. 1998)).

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A tenant who is constructively evicted . . . is entitled, as far as it is possible to do so, to a monetary award in order to be placed in the position that the tenant would have been in had constructive eviction not occurred, keeping in mind the purpose for which the premises were leased. Thus, where there is a constructive eviction of the tenant, the tenant may be awarded judgment on the landlord’s counterclaims which are based on unpaid rent for the balance of the lease agreement (Weingarden v. Eagle Ridge Condominiums, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 7, 653 N.E.2d 759 (Mun. Ct. 1995)).

118. Defendant seeks any and all relief afforded to her under the laws of the

State of Ohio and/or applicable statutes/laws governing such matters relating to the wrongful eviction she sustained. While Stor-All brought Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer on January 20, 2009, it had already taken the laws into its own hands by unlawfully/illegally evicting the Defendant under its own self-made laws. Since April 2008 to present, the Defendant has not been allowed to return to her storage unit. Moreover, in order to retrieve her property she was required to pay the monies Stor-All was attempting to extort from her. The acts of Stor-All were retaliatory, fraudulent, oppressive, willful, malicious and wanton entitling the Defendant to punitive damages. Moreover, the extremes of such acts are evidenced in Stor-All’s obsessive acts in destroying the Defendant’s life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The evidence supports that aggravation and outrage, spite and malice, fraudulent and evil intent, as well as a conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests and rights of the Defendant.

49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 538 – Generally, Measure of damages: Where a tenant is wrongfully evicted by the landlord or by persons for whose acts the landlord is responsible, the tenant may maintain an action in tort against the landlord and may recover as general damage the actual or rental value of the unexpired term less the rent reserved. In addition, the tenant may recover all losses actually sustained, or which the tenant will necessarily sustain, under the circumstances, as a result of the unlawful eviction. Such losses may include the cost of moving, actual expenses, reasonably incurred, and lost profits. 49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 544 – Punitive damage: The damages recoverable for wrongful eviction, actual or constructive, may include punitive damages. The mere commission of the tort of wrongful eviction, however, is insufficient. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the landlord’s conduct may be call willful or wanton.

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A commercial landlord acted with malice toward a tenant, and thus an award of punitive damages was warranted on unlawful eviction and conversion claims, where the landlord suddenly locked the tenant out of the rented premises, wrongfully retained the tenant’s business equipment, . . . and expressed personal animosity toward the tenant. . . It has also been stated that punitive damages may be awarded to tenants when a landlord’s conduct is morally culpable or actuated by evil and reprehensible motives (Maula v. Milford Management Corp., 559 F.Supp. 1000 (1983)), or is malicious and wanton (Stewart v. Johnson, 209 W. Va. 476, 549 S.E.2d 670 (2001)). In addition, a lessee who does not move, and is not evicted, because of a lessor’s retaliatory act may nevertheless recover a statutory punitive damages award of the lessor’s retaliatory act of fraud, oppression, or malice.


119. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

$75,000. 120. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined. 121. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

$20,000. 122. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $50,000. 123. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of




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COUNT THREE

LOSS OF ENJOYMENT/DISTURBANCE (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC,

ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.)




Defendant seeks relief for the loss of enjoyment and disturbance to as a direct and

proximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal actions. In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

128. Stor-All had no right to enter remove the lock Defendant had placed on

her storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said removal. Stor-All had no right to enter the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said entry. Even if Defendant’s tenancy was at will (when it was not), Stor-All had no legal and/or statutory authority to enter the Defendant’s storage unit; moreover, seize said unit and deny her access to it. Neither did Stor-All have a judgment from a court authorizing its actions taken against the Defendant. Stor-All bypassed the laws and took matters into it own hands and evicted the Defendant about April 2008.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 137 – Landlord’s right of entry: In light of the fact that the interest that a lessor normally retains in the leased premises is merely that of a reversion, a lessor generally has no right to enter the demised premises during the term of the lease (State of Cincinnati Tin & Japan Co., 66 Ohio St. 182, 64 N.E. 68 (1902); Nigh v. Keifer, 3 Ohio C.D. 1, 1890 WL 343 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1890); Kilfoyl v. Hull, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 552, 2 Cleve. Law Rep. 369, 1879 WL 6355 (Ohio C.P. 1879)). Even under a tenancy at will, the landlord has no right to enter without the tenant’s permission; he or she must resort to a legal remedy to enforce a right to possession. (Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App. 485, 46 Ohio Op. 289, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1951)). Notwithstanding the general rule that a lessor has no right to enter the demised premises during the term of the lease, a lessor may enter the premises without incurring liability as a trespasser where:. . .� there has been a breach of condition, � the entry is limited to common areas, � the lessor is acting under an express right of entry provided for in the lease (Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., 96 Ohio App. 367, 54 Ohio Op. 365, 114 N.E.2d

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514 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1953)), � the lessor is acting under a right of entry provided by statute.

129. The July 27, 2007, Rental Agreement was entered into between Crown Storage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”) and Defendant. Stor-All claims it is now owner of the property at which Defendant has a storage unit. Even if said property was sold and Stor-All purchased it, said purchase did not pass possession and control under the Rental Agreement to it. Accordingly, Stor-All by having no right to enter the leased premises has no power to authorize someone else to enter on its behalf. While Stor-All claims ownership of said property, it provided no evidence to support such claim.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 138 – Landlord’s right of entry – Entry of others on landlord’s behalf: In conjunction with the passing of possession and control of the premises under a lease agreement to the lessee, the lessor parts with the power and right to admit people to the premises or to exclude them. Accordingly, a landlord who has no right to enter the leased premises has no power to authorize someone else to enter on his or her behalf. (Richmond Glass and Aluminum Corp. v. Wynn, 1991 WL 172902 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Columbiana County 1991)).

130. In entering the Rental Agreement with Crown Storage, the “covenant of

quiet enjoyment” is implied and protected Defendant’s right to peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment of her storage unit. Under said covenant, Defendant was entitled to believe that Crown Storage would do no act (or allow anyone else – i.e. such as Stor-All) which interrupts the free and peaceable enjoyment of her storage unit and/or premises during the terms of said Agreement, and indemnified the Defendant from against such unlawful/illegal acts as committed against her by Stor-All.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 176 – Covenants respecting enjoyment of premises by lessee: A covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied into every lease contract for realty (Hamilton Brownfields Redevelopment, LLC v. Duro Tire & Wheel, 156 Ohio App.3d 525, 2004-Ohio-1365, 806 N.E.2d 1039 (12th Dist. Butler County 2004); Dworkin v. Paley, 93 Ohio App.3d 383, 638 N.E.2d 636 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994)) and protects the tenant’s right to peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment of the leasehold. (Dworkin). A covenant of quiet enjoyment, insofar as leases are concerned, has been defined as an undertaking on the part of the grantor to do no act which interrupts the free and peaceable enjoyment of the premises demised during the continuance of the term, and to indemnify the lessee against all acts committed by virtue of paramount title (Barker v. Blanchard, 5 Ohio N.P. 398, 7

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Ohio Dec. 537, 1898 WL 1464 (C.P. 1898)). Quiet enjoyment has also been defined to mean a right to enjoy unimpaired (so far as a landlord who is owner to the leased property can insure) the physical status of the property at the time of the execution of the lease, and for the duration of the lease. (Weiss-Pollak Co. v. Gibson Art Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 354, 1929 WL 2385 (C.P. 1929))

131. The covenant of quiet enjoyment afford to the Defendant under the Rental

Agreement with Crown Storage was interfered with when Stor-All took the laws into its own hands and obstructed and/or interfered with, as well as took away from the Defendant the entire access and use of her storage unit. Stor-All in committing such acts ousted and/or evicted the Defendant and has not allowed her to enter her storage unit unless she agreed to pay the monies they were attempting to extort from her and/or agreed to the unlawful/illegal terms presented by Stor-All to get her to waive her rights.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 178 – Acts of landlord: The covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when the landlord obstructs, interferes with, or takes away from the tenant a substantial degree of beneficial use of the leasehold. (Hamilton). Thus, the following acts may constitute a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment: interference by the landlord with the lessee’s possession by ousting the lessee from possession (Weiss-Pollak).

132. As a matter of law and in the interest of justice, Defendant is entitled to

compensatory damages, punitive damages and/or any and all applicable damages permissible by law.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 184 – Measure and elements of damages: In the case of a breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment by an eviction, the majority rule is that the measure of damages is the difference between the actual value of the unexpired term and the agreed rent, with actual value of the unexpired term and the agreed rent, with the actual value generally being measured by the rental value (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 621)(Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App.3d 14, 480 N.E.2d 99 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1984); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Russo, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 307, 1933 WL 2293 (Ct. App.2d Dist. Clark County 1933)). A tenant is entitled to damages for the period during which the landlord breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment (Hamilton). The evidence supported the award of punitive damages to the tenants. . . The landlord had resorted to self-help in resolving the lease dispute against the advice of counsel, for the malicious purpose of compelling the tenants to terminate the lease or to obtain a more favorable rental agreement. (Stern Enterprises v. Plaza Theaters I & II, Inc., 105 Ohio App. 3d 601, 664 N.E.2d 981

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(11th Dist. Portage County 1995). [� Practice Guide: The fact that the jury awarded 15 thousand dollars in compensatory damages to the wife but no compensatory damages to the husband on a claim against the landlord for breach of the covenant of quiet and peaceful enjoyment, even though the husband and wife were both parties to the lease, indicated that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on that claim (Hayes v. Heintz, 2002-Ohio-2608, 2002 WL 1041370 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2002)).

133. Defendant is has a right of action in tort against Stor-All for its wrongful

interference with Defendant’s use and access to her property and/or enjoyment of using her storage unit. Stor-All’s intrusion in Defendant’s storage unit without invitation from her constitutes trespassing in that Stor-All, as a matter of statute/law, had no legal authority to enter.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 154 – Generally; Right of tenant against landlord: The act of a landlord may constitute a wrong causing injury to the tenant for which injunctive relief may be sought or an actionof tort will lie. A tenant, therefore, has a right of action against the landlord to recover damages for a wrongful injury to the demised premises which affects his or her rights, and it has been held that a tenant has a right of action in tort against a landlord for a wrongful interference with his or her possession or enjoyment of the demised premises. (Am. Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 550). . . .a landlord’s attempted intrusion into a tenant’s apartment without invitation from the tenant constitutes a trespass in the absence of a showing that the landlord reserved a right of entry into the apartment. (McGuire v. Corn, 92 Ohio App. 445, 50 Ohio Op. 35, 110 N.E.2d 809 (6th Dist. Lucas County 1952)).

134. Defendant, as a matter of law, has a right to bring this Counter-Claim

against Stor-All. The only Rental Agreement that existed at the time of the incurrence of the allegations of Stor-All mentioned in its Complaint was that executed between Crown Storage and the Defendant. Stor-All is a third party who interfered with and caused a disturbance involving the Defendant’s storage unit. Stor-All as a third party interfered with Defendant’s use of her storage unit. Stor-All interfered with Defendant’s enjoyment of her storage unit. Stor-All’s interference decreases the value of the use during the period alleged in its Complaint. Stor-All’s interference has affected the Defendant’s interest therein.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 155 – Right of tenant against third persons: It is well-settled that a right of action accrues in favor of a tenant for any injury to the demised premises where the wrongful act of a third person interferes with or disturbs the tenant’s

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possession, use, or enjoyment of the premises, decreases the value of the use during the tenant’s term, or otherwise affects the tenant’s interest therein. (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 543)

135. Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in good faith to preserve the rights secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and any/all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters. Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been brought to recover damages of and against Stor-All for a nuisance – i.e. interference with the use or enjoyment of Defendant’s property, etc. – which infringed upon the rights of Defendant.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 157 – Acts constituting nuisance: A lessee may maintain an action to recover damages for a nuisance which is an infringement of his or her rights in the demised premises, such as a disturbance of the temporary possession as distinguished from the permanent possession. (Waugh v. Village of Marble Cliff, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 17, 26 Ohio Dec. 477, 1916 WL 967 (C.P. 1916)).

136. As a matter of law, because there is no written or verbal agreement

between Stor-All and Defendant; however, there is a Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant, Stor-All may be considered a stranger and/or third party who interfered with Defendant’s enjoyment or possession of her storage unit; moreover in committing such wrongs against the Defendant, did so as a trespasser and not as Defendant’s landlord. Stor-All was aware that Defendant did not want to enter a rental agreement with it. Nevertheless, through the acts of Stor-All tried to force the Defendant into a rental agreement to which she strongly objected. While the actions of Crown Storage amounts to a breach of contract, Defendant is only required to defend this action brought against her by Stor-All and may bring future claims for damages of and against Stor-All as well as a “malicious prosecution” claim against Stor-All in its institution of the January 20, 2009 Complaint to which it knew and/or should have known it was not entitled to bring. From the unrelenting acts of Stor-All, Defendant has a right to bring this instant Counter-Claim and, through said counter-claim, seek injunctive relief.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 158 – Remedies: Interference by the landlord or a stranger with the lessees’s enjoyment or possession of the leased premises is a basis for the ordinary actions, such as an action of trespass. (Wilber v. Paine, 1 Ohio 251, 1824 WL 1 (1824)). Also, such interference may serve as the basis of an action for breach of lease (Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922)) or as an action for breach of covenant of title or quiet enjoyment (§§ 175 to 184). In proper cases, actions of forcible entry may be available, or injunctive relief may be obtained.

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137. Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in good faith in that she is entitled to injunctive relief of and against Stor-All who has brought the Complaint against her. Said injunction is permissible as a matter of law to correct and/or prevent the continued violations committed by Stor-All against the Defendant, in its wrongful entry and abuse of statutory right of entry from interfering with her right to peaceable enjoyment and possession of her storage unit. Stor-All alleges it is the owner of the property at which Defendant has a storage unit. Therefore, Defendant, as a matter of law, through this Counter-Claim, is entitled to a permanent injunction against Stor-All (who alleges to be the owner and/or purchaser of the property located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214) for its entry upon demised property of Defendant and making use of said property in a way that has deprived the Defendant of her rights under the tenancy.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 159 – Remedies – Injunctive relief: In certain instances, a tenant may be entitled to injunctive relief to prevent a landlord (Galati v. Sabbatino, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 523, 1924 WL 1974 (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1924); Robert Raitz & Co. v. Dow, 20 Ohio C.D. 284, 1907 WL 1140 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1907); Weiss-Pollak Co. v. Gibson Art Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 354, 1929 WL 2385 (C.P. 1929) – As to the right of a tenant, under the 1974 Landlord and Tenant Act (R.C. 5321.01 et. Seq.), to injunctive relief against a landlord’s wrongful entry or abuse of statutory right of entry, see § 130) or a third person (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Loomis Realty Co., 32 Ohio C.D. 493, 1912 WL 796 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1912), aff’d 88 Ohio St. 617, 106 N.E. 1066 (1913); Sedaris v. Riley, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 215, 1928 WL 2743 (C.P. 1928)) from interfering with his or her right to peaceable enjoyment and possession of the demised premises. (Newstedt v. Scarborough, 13 Ohio Dec. 327, 1902 WL 1023 (Super. Ct. 1902)). A person out of possession and claim a valid lease may obtain an order restraining another claimant who is in possession from occupying the premises, so as to avoid a multiplicity of actions for trespass. (Sedaris v. Riley, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 215, 1928 WL 2743 (C.P. 1928)). A tenant in possession is entitled to a permanent injunction against a purchaser of land who enters upon the demised premises and makes use of the premises in a way that deprives the tenant of his or her rights under the tenancy. (Kemp v. Feldman, 84 Ohio App. 154, 39 Ohio Op. 173, 81 N.E.2d 319 (2d Dist. Montgomery County 1948)).

138. As a matter of law, the Defendant has a right to bring this instant Counter-Claim for the injuries and/or harm sustained as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s legal wrongs – i.e. trespassing, nuisance, etc. – which has affected her use of the storage unit. About April 2008, Stor-All took the laws into its own hands and unlawfully evicted

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the Defendant and seized her property. Refusing to return said property to the Defendant unless she paid the monies it was demanding. The injuries sustained by the Defendant as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s actions, involved Defendant’s reputation, feelings, and/or loss of employment, etc. Defendant’s landlord, Crown Storage, did not encounter any problems with the Defendant in the payment of her rent. Defendant’s payments were in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and her. Defendant demands a jury trial in this action for the determination and measurement of damages she sustained.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 160– Measure and elements of damages: In the case of a temporary injury to a leasehold, such as a trespass or nuisance of a temporary character affecting the use and enjoyment of the premises, the diminution in the value of such use and enjoyment during the period of the tenancy up to the commencement of the action is the measure of the tenant’s damages for injury to the estate. Where there is some act of interference. . . by the landlord which does not amount to an eviction, the lessee is entitled to recover in damages such amount as will fully and adequately compensate him or her for the losses sustained. (Allen v. Lee, 43 Ohio App. 3rd 31, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1987); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Russo, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 307, 1933 WL 2293 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. Clark County 1933)).. . . In the case of a nuisance, where the injury complained of is to the person – that is, to the reputation, feelings, or health of the individual – it is unnecessary to prove damages in a monetary amount; it is sufficient to prove the facts causing the injury, inwhich case the jury will determine the measure of damages sustained. (Dieringer v. Wehrman, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 355, 12 W.L.B. 222, 1883 WL 5080 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1883)).






$650,000.

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144. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,



COUNT FOUR EXTORTION





Defendant seeks relief acts taken by Stor-All in its efforts of extorting monies from her.

In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

148. About early/mid 2008, Stor-All seized the Defendant’s storage unit and to date has refused to return it and her property unless she pays the monies it is attempting to extort from her. Defendant has repeatedly been subjected to threats of Stor-All’s intent to enforce lien on her property pursuant to RC §5322.01 et seq. A copy of such notices is attached hereto at Exhibit “8.” In furtherance of said criminal acts of extortion, Stor-All has now initiated a Complaint against the Defendant in efforts of extorting monies from her to which it is not entitled. Moreover, is attempting to get this Court to assist it in the committal of such criminal acts.

“Extortion” is the obtaining of property by the use of serious threats. U.S. v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990 (C.A. Ohio 1978)

149. The laws are clear that such criminal acts by Stor-All in its efforts of

extorting monies from the Defendant is prohibited by laws. Moreover, Stor-All’s unrelenting services of writings is evidenced in its “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET SEQ.” and now through its January 20, 2009 Complaint against the Defendant. Said writings of

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Stor-All contain willful and malicious threats of injury. Said writings of Stor-All involve the use of this instant lawsuit for purposes of this Court’s aiding in such criminal acts of extortion. Stor-All knew and/or should have known that its acts amounted to extortion. Moreover, Stor-All was timely, properly and adequately placed on notice by the Defendant that they were committing such criminal acts. As with Stor-All taking the laws into its own hands and depriving the Defendant of rights, it proceeded to attempt to extort monies from her.

Statute providing that no person shall knowingly send or deliver a writing for purpose of extorting money or other valuable thing or containing willful and malicious threats of injury or send or deliver in writing simulating legal process with intent to extort proscribed the sending or delivering of a writing with the purpose to extort, the sending or delivering of a writing containing willful and malicious threats of injury and sending or delivering a writing simulating legal process with intent to extort. R.C. § 2901.39 (State v. Kiser, 235 N.E.2d 126, 13 Ohio St.2d 126, 42 O.O.2d 337)

150. Rather than give in to the criminal acts of Stor-All and pay it the monies it

was attempting to extort from the Defendant, Defendant knew that Stor-All would eventually deliver itself to the Court willingly and such criminal activity would further be evidenced in the record. Over the Defendant’s protest and objections, Stor-All has now brought this instant lawsuit to extort monies from the Defendant it knew and/or should have known it was not entitled to.

A petition alleging that plaintiff in response to a warrant was informed by village mayor that plaintiff was guilty of selling intoxicating liquor and that plaintiff must either go to jail or pay $107.20 and that plaintiff paid said sum under protest stated cause of action on ground that plaintiff by reason of such threats and duress was deprived of due process and of the money paid to the mayor. St. Clair v. Teeples, 6 O.L.A. 174 (Ohio Appo. 1928)

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC

for:



$250,000.

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153. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $275,000.

154. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of

1,000,000. 155. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,



COUNT FIVE RETALIATION





Defendant seeks relief for Stor-All’s retaliation against her. In support thereof, Defendant

alleges:

159. Stor-All in Paragraph 1 of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer

asserts and/or alleges itself as “owner” and Defendant as “tenant” and in its January 9, 2009 “NOTICE TO LEAVE THE PREMISES” (attached as Exhibit A to its Complaint), as “Landlord.” Stor-All knowingly doing so because it did not think such slight and craftiness of the pen would be noticed. Stor-All with knowledge it had no claim to a relationship with the Defendant as “Landlord,” failed to produce the unexecuted Stor-All Lease Agreement it had.

160. Stor-All is aware that there is no written or oral rental agreement between

it and the Defendant to sustain such entitlement as landlord. Even if Stor-All was Defendant’s landlord (when it was not) then it would be subject to the statute/laws

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governing said relationships (Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and/or applicable statutes/laws).

161. Prior to Stor-All’s bringing of the instant lawsuit, it knew and or should

have known it was not entitled to do so and neither was it entitled to the relief sought therein.

162. Stor-All’s filing of this instant lawsuit is in retaliation of Defendant’s

advising it of violations – i.e. unlawful entry, depriving her of property, unlawful seizure, unlawful withholding of property, etc. -committed against her. Said retaliation is prohibited by law pursuant to RC § 5321.02.

163. Through this instant lawsuit, Defendant may use her Counter-Claim as a

defense to Stor-All’s Complaint to recover her storage unit that was unlawfully/illegally seized by Stor-All without probable cause and/or legal process. Defendant is entitled to recover damages for said seizure, deprivation of rights, interference, etc. pursuant to RC § 5321.02.

164. Stor-All’s filing this instant lawsuit does not prevent the Defendant from

recovering damages for any violations rendered against her. Stor-All knew and/or should have known that the filing of this lawsuit was an abuse of process. See RC § 5321.03.

165. Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal seizure of Defendant’s storage unit and

property deprived her rights secured under the statutes/laws of the state of Ohio. Moreover, governing Landlord and Tenant matters.

166. As a matter of statute/law, the Defendant is entitle to recover damages

from Stor-All for the bringing of this instant lawsuit.

5321.02 Retaliatory conduct of landlord prohibited. (A) Subject to section 5321.03 of the Revised Code, a landlord may not retaliate against a tenant by increasing the tenant's rent, decreasing services that are due to the tenant, or bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession of the tenant's premises because:. . .

(2) The tenant has complained to the landlord of any violation of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code;

(B) If a landlord acts in violation of division (A) of this section the tenant may:

(1) Use the retaliatory action of the landlord as a defense to an action by the landlord to recover possession of the premises;

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(2) Recover possession of the premises; or

(3) Terminate the rental agreement. In addition, the tenant may recover from the landlord any actual damages together with reasonable attorneys' fees.

5321.03 Actions by landlord authorized (B) The maintenance of an action by the landlord under this section does not prevent the tenant from recovering damages for any violation by the landlord of the rental agreement or of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code. 5321.04 Obligations of landlord. (A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall do all of the following: (7) Not abuse the right of access conferred by division (B) of section 5321.05 of the Revised Code; (8) Except in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, give the tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter and enter only at reasonable times. Twenty-four hours is presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (B) If the landlord makes an entry in violation of division (A)(8) of this section, makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful that have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting from the entry or demands, obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney's fees, or may terminate the rental agreement. 521.12 Recover damages. In any action under Chapter 5321. of the Revised Code, any party may recover damages for the breach of contract or the breach of any duty that is imposed by law.

167. Even if Stor-All would now want to abandon its claim to being “Landlord”

to avoid liability, such defense would also fail. Moreover, would only swing the door wide open and/or support any action Defendant may elect to bring for malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution in that Stor-All initiated the instant lawsuit with knowledge that it was not Defendant’s landlord; moreover, knew and/or should have known that it was not authorized to assert such claim and relief requested but nevertheless brought is lawsuit with malicious intent. Malicious prosecution in that Stor-All initiated this instant lawsuit for an improper purpose and without probable cause.

168. Stor-All’s instant lawsuit is vexatious.

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$1,500,000. 174. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,



COUNT SIX

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC,

ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.)




Defendant seeks relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Stor-All. In

support thereof, Defendant alleges:

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178. In mid 2008, Stor-All began serving the Defendant with “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC § 5322.01, ET SEQ.” Stor-All knew and/or should have known that it was not entitled to the relief sought through said notice. Defendant timely, properly and adequately repeatedly advised Stor-All that it was not entitled to said relief.

179. The acts of Stor-All described in this Counter-Claim in the filing of

Plaintiff’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer, were done willfully, maliciously, outrageously, deliberately, and purposely with the intention to inflict emotional distress upon the Defendant. Such acts were done in reckless disregard of the probability of causing the Defendant emotional distress. These acts did in fact result in severe and extreme emotional distress.

180. On December 9, 2008, Plaintiff’s representative, Lori Whiteside, sent a

facsimile transmission to the Defendant’s place of employment. Whiteside sending said facsimile to fax number (513) 852-6087. Defendant did not authorize Whiteside to send her faxes at (513) 852-6087; moreover, Defendant provided Whiteside with a fax number (513) 419-6453 to which she could submit fax prior to her December 9, 2008 fax. Whiteside may have obtained knowledge that Defendant was presently working with an attorney (Thomas J. Breed) who was a former employee of the law firm (Schwartz Manes & Ruby – a/k/a Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin, LPA) of their attorney, David Meranus. With said knowledge a reasonable mind may conclude that Whiteside set her sights to get the Defendant terminated from her place of employment in efforts of or unlawfully/illegally placing the Defendant in financial distress in hopes that it would force her to give in to Stor-All’s extortion demands. A reasonable mind may conclude that Whiteside’s acts were willful, malicious and wanton and done with intent to place Defendant’s employer on notice of the personal matters involving Plaintiff and the Defendant. Thus, establishing and evidencing a causal link.

181. Upon receipt of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer she

observed the law firm (Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin, LPA) under Stor-All’s counsel’s name. From observation, it alerted the Defendant to the fact that the attorney (Thomas J. Breed) she worked with at her former employer (Wood & Lamping) was employed with Schwartz Manes & Ruby prior to coming to Defendant’s former employer. To verify this, Defendant retrieved document from the internet (August 28, 1997 Letter to Ms. Bobbie Sterne from William B. Singer at: http://city-egov.cincinnati-oh.gov/Webtop/ws/council/public/child/Blob/12586.pdf;jsessionid=A31B4EA5C076983FC37980F6654496F9?rpp=-10&m=1&w=doc_no%3D'199701890'). See attached hereto at EXHIBIT “10” and incorporated herein by reference. Sure enough there is Thomas J. Breed (approximately fourth names down) on Schwartz Manes’ letterhead. Thus, establishing the ill motive for Stor-All’s acts and Defendant’s wrongful termination – conflict of interest. Stor-All stood to gain from the Defendant’s termination. Moreover, an undue advantage over her if it could financially devastate her. Thinking that because Defendant was terminated, she would not be able to defend a lawsuit brought against her. Stor-All realizing that Defendant had been terminated, in furtherance of its criminal and

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civil wrongs against her, initiated this lawsuit to extort the monies from her that she advised it was not entitled to.

182. Stor-All knew and/or should have known that its egregious acts

complained of in this Counter-Claim against the Defendant would cause her injury/harm. 183. The conduct of Stor-All was extreme and outrageous and beyond the

scope of conduct which would be tolerated by citizens in a democratic and civilized society. However, in order to deliberately injure Defendant, Stor-All committed the aforementioned extreme and outrageous acts with intent to inflict severe mental and emotional distress upon Defendant.

184. As a direct and proximate result of the Stor-All’s acts alleged above,

Defendant was caused to incur severe and grievous mental and emotional suffering, fright, anguish, shock, anxiety. Defendant continues to suffer same. For this harm Plaintiff requests compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by a jury.

185. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s willful, intentional and

malicious conduct, Defendant suffered severe and extreme mental and emotional distress. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an award of punitive damages as against Stor-All. Defendant has suffered damage as set forth in this Counter-Claim.

186. As a direct and proximate result of the Plaintiff’s acts alleged above, and

the willful, malicious and wanton acts in placing the Defendant’s employer on notice (through the transmittal of a facsimile on December 9, 2008) sent to the Defendant’s place of employment for her employer and its employees to view, Defendant was caused to incur severe and grievous mental and emotional suffering, fright, anguish, shock, anxiety, loss of employment approximately one month later (January 9, 2009). Defendant research revealed from information provided that Plaintiff knew and/or should have known that in the Defendant’s employment she worked with and or directly assisted an attorney (Thomas J. Breed) that was employed with the law firm (Schwartz, Manes & Ruby) of its counsel, David Meranus. The termination of Defendant’s employment coming on January 9, 2009 – the exact date of the beginning of Plaintiff’s Amnesty Weekend which included January 9, 10, and 11, 2009 (See Exhibit “19” ) For this harm Plaintiff requests punitive damages in an amount to be determined a jury. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC

for:



$300,000.

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190. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of





COUNT SEVEN ACTION FOR NEGLECT TO PREVENT





Defendant seeks relief against Stor-All for its failure to prevent the legal wrongs

complained of in this Counter-Claim. In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

196. Stor-All as early as April and/or May 2008 had knowledge of the wrong, illegal and unlawful acts complained of herein regarding its employees and/or representatives handling of matter regarding Defendant and the power to prevent or aid in preventing of said wrongs; however, did nothing to deter or prevent such actions. Even upon notification by the Defendant of such unlawful/illegal acts and/or injustices, Stor-All did nothing to correct the wrongs complained of; instead, made a conscious, willful and deliberate decision to continue to threaten the Defendant with lien actions.

197. As early as December 2008 (if not sooner – file submitted in December),

Stor-All’s attorney (an officer of the Court), David Meranus at the law firm of Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin LPA, had knowledge of the wrong, illegal and unlawful acts complained of herein and the power to prevent or aid in preventing said wrongs, did

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nothing to deter or prevent such actions, but encouraged it and/or participated in such legal wrongs. Then on January 20, 2009, Stor-All under the advisement of counsel authorized David Meranus to file the Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Defendant.

198. While Stor-All’s counsel, knew and/or should had known that its client

had no legal basis and/or statutory right to the lawsuit he filed, he went ahead and on behalf of his client, he did so anyhow. Said acts by counsel for Stor-All being willful, malicious and wanton; moreover, was done with knowledge that his actions and that of his client was an infringement on the Defendant’s rights.









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COUNT EIGHT NEGLIGENCE





Defendant seeks relief from acts taken by Stor-All as a direct and proximate result of its

negligence in this matter. In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

208. Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference herein Paragraphs 1 through 207 of this Counter-Claim, except for any and all allegations of intentional, malicious, extreme, outrageous, wanton and oppressive conduct by Stor-All and any and all allegations requesting punitive damages.

209. At all times mentioned herein, Stor-All was subject to a duty of care, to

avoid causing unnecessary harm and distress to citizens in the exercise of their duties. The conduct of Stor-All, as set forth herein, did not comply with the standard of care to be exercised by reasonable persons or private citizens, or officers of law, proximately causing Defendant to suffer damages as set forth in this Counter-Claim.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC

for:





$2,000,000.

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215. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices.


COUNT NINE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS





Defendant seeks relief from acts taken by Stor-All as a direct and proximate result of its

negligent infliction of emotional distress of her. In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

219. Defendant realleges and incorporates by reference herein Paragraphs 1 through 218 of this Complaint, except for any and all allegations of intentional, malicious, extreme, outrageous, wanton and oppressive conduct by Stor-All, and any and all allegations requesting punitive damages.

220. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were subject to a duty of care,

to avoid causing unnecessary harm and distress to citizens. The conduct of Stor-All, as set forth in this Counter-Claim, did not comply with the standard of care to be exercised by reasonable private citizens or officials of law, proximately causing Defendant to suffer damages as set forth in this Counter-Claim.




$350,000.

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222. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of





DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

228. Defendant hereby demands a jury trial in this action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:

229. General damages, if permissible, in an amount no less than $150,000.

230. Special damages, if permissible, in an amount no less than $550,000.

231. Compensatory damages, if permissible, in an amount no less than $1,000,000.

232. Punitive damages, if permissible, in an amount no less than $2,500,000.

233. Declare that the acts of Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, with regards to Defendant’s rights under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and other governing statutes/laws were in violation of Defendant’s Constitutional rights.

234. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices.

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