Pf capital asbury automotive 092214 final

Strictly Confidential September 2014

Point Frederick CapitalPoint Frederick Capital

Point Frederick Capital

Management, LLC

Asbury Automotive: Car Dealers Are Now Where U.S.

Home Builders Were In Mid-2008 And Asbury May Be The

Most Cyclically Vulnerable In The Space

Chand Sooran & Anand Kalola


No representation is made that the Investment manager’s or the Fund’s investment process, investment strategies, goals or risk management techniques will or are likely to be achieved or be successful. See Important Information on Page 2.

Presentation for: Chand Sooran

Important Information

2

This material has been prepared by Point Frederick Capital Management, LLC (the “Investment Manager” or “Point Frederick”). The information in this material is for illustration and

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2



INVESTMENT THESIS AND CONCLUSION




4

Asbury Automotive Has Had A Terrific Run But Faces A

Number Of Cyclical Challenges And One Structural Risk

Recommendation: We contend that Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. is a compelling short investment

for its pronounced and industry-leading exposure to the peaking North American new and used car

cycles, and for its growing reliance on ancillary revenue, the most profitable of which is derived from

marketing financial transactions to its customers on behalf of third party lenders and insurers.

Industry Challenges Abound

• Autos have made full V-shaped recovery from the post-2008

trough, erasing any pent-up demand for cars

• US auto OEMs have pulled forward demand from subsequent

periods, as they seek to justify their expansion of manufacturing

capacity

• Credit became steadily easier with longer lease terms, higher

loan-to-value, inflated residual values, and a return to lending to

subprime borrowers, taking consumer auto finance to peak

levels

• Higher interest rates, reduced/toppy credit availability, and

persistent anemic economic growth weigh on future prospects

• Easy financing led to bigger car purchases ; tighter financing

suggests a move to less expensive auto purchases

• Used car prices have started falling with greater supply

coming off lease and may be the leading edge of broader price

declines

Company-Specific Issues

• ABG is exposed to the recent decline in luxury / full-size used

car pricing as 85% of the Company’s car sales are luxury / mid-

line imports

• 25% of ABG’s new financing arrangements are for subprime

customers, much higher than peer auto dealers , suggesting the

exhaustion of the buyer base in its geographies

• The Company obtains a large and growing part of its gross

margin from its financial services business, which may be

restricted by potential CFPB proposals to cap all markups in a

move to contain disparate impact

• Any downturn in unit volumes has pronounced pejorative

implications for its parts and service and financing gross profit

• Margins have been declining steadily in new and used car

sales

• Lack of new dealer acquisitions at an attractive cash flow

multiple may limit future growth




5

-

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

500.00

600.00

9/12/2008 9/12/2009 9/12/2010 9/12/2011 9/12/2012 9/12/2013 9/12/2014

Axis

Tit

le

Post-Lehman Share Price Performance: ABG vs. Index Of Auto Dealers

Auto Dealers

ABG

Reference: Bloomberg, Point Frederick Capital

Asbury Automotive Stock Has Markedly Outperformed Its

Peer Group In The Past Twelve Months



BUSINESS AND BUSINESS MODEL




7

Asbury Automotive Is One Of The Largest Auto Dealers In

The US, Concentrated Principally In The US Southeast & NJ

Company Description:

Asbury Automotive Group (“Asbury”, “ABG”, or the “Company”) is the 7th largest U.S.-based franchised automotive

retailer, operating 102 franchises with 81 dealership locations. Asbury sells and services 29 vehicle brands with

85% of new vehicle sales comprising luxury / mid-line imports. The Company has developed its dealership

portfolio via acquisition of large, locally-branded dealerships, primarily in the South and Southeastern U.S. During

fiscal year 2013, ABG sold over 150,000 retail vehicles and generated over $5.3 billion in sales. ABG has a market

capitalization of $2.0 billion as of 9/22/2014.

Reference: Company, Point Frederick Capital

Business Model:

Asbury has four business units: (i) sale of new cars; (ii) sale of used cars; (iii) finance and insurance; and (iv) parts

and service. To become an authorized dealer, Asbury obtains franchise agreements from OEMs or acquires

existing dealership franchises. The sale of new and used cars is typically a low margin business which allows the

Company to establish a relationship with the customer as well as get the chance to arrange financing. As part of

the finance and insurance unit and at the time of a sale of a vehicle, Asbury arranges financing and other prepaid

services/guarantees (for roughly ¾ of auto sales) in partnership with OEM and non-OEM lenders. Asbury typically

earns a marketing fee, net of a chargeback for contracts terminated or cancelled (usually within 90 days).

Chargebacks amount to anywhere between 9-14% of financing revenue. The marketing fee may include spread

income participation in excess returns on assets backing guarantees. The Company’s parts and service division

provides replacement parts, collision repair services, or vehicle maintenance for cars it has sold and for other cars

with whose owners they can establish relationships.




8

Reference: Company

The Business Model Is Co-Dependent: New/Used Vehicle

Sales Lead to Incremental, Higher Margin Parts & Service

and Finance & Insurance Revenue

New Vehicle Sales:

• 55% of total revenue and 21% of total gross profit

→ low margin business

Used Vehicle Sales:


→ low margin business

Parts and Service:


→ high margin business

Finance and Insurance:


→ high margin business




9

New Vehicle Sales Are A Gateway To More Lucrative

Ancillary Revenue

Acquire Dealership

Purchase of existing

dealership

Utilize Floor-Plan /

OEM-Provided

Financing

Purchase New Car

Inventory Sale to Customer

• New Vehicle Sales includes the arrangement of fixed-term leases

• Leases give ABG dealership first option to purchase vehicles upon lease expiration (to

build used car inventory)

• Provides incremental parts & service and finance & insurance revenue

• Customers who lease historically return to dealerships more often than purchasers of

new vehicles

Start-Up via New

Franchise

Agreement

Incremental Parts

& Service

Revenue

Arrangement of

Finance &

Insurance

Reference: Company




10

Used Vehicle Sales Are Another Gateway To More Lucrative

Ancillary Revenue

Build Used Car

Inventory

Purchase Trade-Ins,

Off-lease Vehicles or

At Auctions

Utilize Floor-Plan

Financing

Inventory

Management Sale to Customer

• Used vehicle inventory is typically sold as wholesale via auction if a vehicle is not sold at retail

within 60 days

Incremental Parts

& Service

Revenue

Arrangement of

Finance &

Insurance

Reference: Company




11

Parts And Service Is The Highest Gross Margin Segment

And Caters To A Potentially Broader Population Of Drivers

Car Owner In Need

of Repair /

Maintenance

ABG Provides

Maintenance,

Collision Repair, or

Replacement Part

Bill to Customer

or OEM

Billed to OEM if

Car is Under

Warranty

Customer Pays

Cash If Not

Covered by

Warranty

• 59% of divisional gross profit is customer pay

• The customer does not need to be a pre-existing customer acquired through a car sale

Reference: Company




12

Finance And Insurance Is A Pure Margin Business Segment

Sale of New / Used

Vehicles

ABG Arranges

Financing and Other

Prepaid Services /

Guarantees

ABG Earns

Marketing Fee,

Including Spread

Income

Participation

Service Contracts

May Lead to Parts

& Service Work

Financing

Provided by OEM

Financing

Provided by

Third-Party

Lender

• Approximately 25% of financing arrangements are for subprime customers

Reference: Company




13

Reference: Asbury Automotive Shareholder Presentation 04/16/14

Asbury Is Primarily A Southern Auto Dealer, Centered On

Florida And Georgia




14

Reference: Asbury Automotive Shareholder Presentation 04/16/14

The Company Has A Mix Of Domestic And Foreign Brands

Offering Luxury And Mid-Level Cars




15

Reference: Asbury Automotive Investor Presentation 06/03/14-06/04/14

The Company Opened Its First “Q Auto”, A Standalone

Dealer Focused Exclusively On Used Cars

There are 40 million used cars sold annually in the US.




16


Auto Sales Margins Are Much Lower Than The Lucrative

Parts and Services and Financing and Insurance Lines




17

The Bulk Of The Parts And Service Gross Profit Comes From

Commoditized Routine Maintenance Activities





18


In Addition To Revenues From Arranging Financing, ABG

Earns Revenue By Selling Other Services And Guarantees

Other products include extended service contracts, guaranteed asset protection, prepaid maintenance,

and credit life and disability coverage.




19


Asbury Owns Roughly 60% Of Its Facilities And Looks To

Increase That Ratio To 75% In The Current Environment




20


The Dealer Market Is Fragmented And Asbury Plans To Grow

By Acquisition, Adding $500m Of Revenue From 2014-2017

The Company argues it has the systems to deal with complexity independent dealers do not have.




21


The Asbury Board Recently Approved An Increase In The

Buyback Program To $100m From $30m



INDUSTRY OVERVIEW

The auto industry has fully recovered from the devastating trough conditions in the aftermath of the

financial crisis. Numerous secular changes in the factors that drive auto demand suggests trend demand

should be lower than the previous peak. These include weak scrappage, lower driver growth, and fewer

miles driven. The combination of a large number of cars coming off-lease, increasing North American

manufacturing capacity, and a weaker Japanese Yen only exacerbate this problem. Subprime lending

has recovered to prior peak levels; it is becoming more and more difficult to find the incremental buyer.

These factors translate to potentially significantly lower volumes and prices in the auto dealer industry.




23

Reference: Morgan Stanley, “Auto Credit,” 8/21/14

Supportive Credit Conditions Since 2009 Have Pulled

Forward Demand Through Low Monthly Payment Math




24

Reference: Morgan Stanley, "Cutting U.S. Autos to Cautious," 09/08/14

Generous Loans Via Higher Loan-to-Value Balances….




25

…Longer Loan Terms…





26

…And Increased Subprime Lending…

Roughly 25% of Asbury’s new financing arrangements are for subprime customers. This compares to

16% for CarMax and 12% for Lithia in their most recent quarters.





27

Reference: Manheim Used Car Report - Annual 2013

…Have Returned Auto Credit Issuance Close to Prior

Peaks…




28

...Driving A Full V-Shaped Auto Recovery

Autos recovered earlier than expected but may also peak earlier than expected





29


Consumer Debt Remains At Low Levels




30


Credit Default Rates Remain At Low Levels




31


While At Low Levels, Repossessions Are Expected To Rise




32


Gasoline Prices Remain In Check




33

Reference: Equifax, "Not Yesterday's Subprime Auto Loan," Economic Trends Commentary 08/26/14

Auto Originations Remain At High Levels With Subprime

Taking a Larger Portion of New Loans




34


Within New Subprime Loans, Credit Quality Is Holding Up




35


Subprime Auto Loan Write-Offs Remain Low




36


Low Subprime Write-Offs Will Lead to More Aggressive

Lending




37

Easy Credit And Inflated Residual Values Lower Monthly

Affordability, Sending TTM SAAR Values To Prior Peaks





38

Reference: Credit Suisse, "Sentiment on Auto Stocks Appears Cautious," 09/12/14

North American OEMs Are Running At Close To Maximum

Capacity…




39

…But That Is Not Stopping Them From Adding Even More

Manufacturing Capacity





40


New Vehicle Sales Have Recovered Much Faster Than New

Home Sales, On A Relative Basis




41


Pent Up Demand Has Led Both New and Used Vehicle Sales

Higher Since 2009




42


Used Vehicle Sales Have Benefited Both Franchised and

Independent Dealers




43


Used Vehicle Sales As A Percent of Total Vehicles in

Operation Continues to Fall




44

Reference: National Auto Dealers' Association - Used Car Guide - September 2014.

Vehicle Forecasts Remain Bullish, As Light Vehicle Sales are

Assumed to Decrease Only Slightly




45

However, Weak Scrappage, Driver Growth, and Miles Driven

Suggest Trend Light Vehicle Demand Actually May Fall

Weak light vehicle demand drivers suggest longer-term trend may be mid-15m or less

Reference: Credit Suisse, "Sentiment on Auto Stocks Appears Cautious," 09/12/14; Morgan Stanley, "Cutting U.S. Autos to Cautious," 09/08/14




46


Miles Driven Have Steadily Contracted




47


Scrappage Remains Relatively Low




48


Demand May Fall As The Incremental Light Vehicle Buyer Is

Getting Harder to Find




49

The Manheim Used Vehicle Price Index Has Topped Out And

Started to Fall – A Leading Indicator?

The combination of rising used car supply from maturing post-crisis leases, aggressive new car

incentives, and a potential crackdown on subprime lending may put pressure on used car pricing





50

Used Vehicle Prices Have Fallen for Four Consecutive

Months

Reference: Morgan Stanley, "Used Prices Drop Four Months Straight," 09/09/14




51

Importantly For Asbury, Used Luxury and Full-Size Cars

Have Been Hit Disproportionately…





52

…While Used Truck Pricing Has Held Up





53

Since The Crisis, Strapped Consumers Have Been More

Likely To Lease Than To Buy, A Secular Change





54


High Leasing Activity Will Flood Used Car Market Upon

Lease Expirations, Pressuring Prices




55

A Higher USD/JPY Will Enable

Japanese OEMS To Be Aggressive On New Car Pricing





56

Reference: National Auto Dealers' Association - Used Car Guide - September 2014

New Car Incentives Remain High and Continue to Grow at a

Rapid Rate




57

Post-Crisis, Used Car and New Car Inflation Have Tracked

One Another

Reference: Morgan Stanley "Used Prices Drop Four Months Straight" 09/09/14




58


Used Vehicle Retail Gross Margins Have Been Steadily

Declining



RISKS




60

ABG Is Exposed To Both Industry and Company-Specific

Risks

Go-forward auto sales

fall more than expected

due to demand

exhaustion

Geographic

concentration in

Florida, Georgia, and

Texas

Used car prices start to

fall at a rapid rate due

to oversupply, leading

to gross margin

compression

Aggressive new car

incentives further

pressure used car

pricing

Lack of new dealer

acquisitions at an

attractive cash flow

multiple may limit

future growth

Reduced credit

availability and higher

interest rates weigh on

new car demand

Large exposure to

luxury / mid-line

imports, categories that

have seen recent

pricing pressures




61

The CFPB Seeks To Contain The “Disparate Impact” Of

Mark-Ups On Minorities And May Forbid All Mark-Ups

“To prevent discrimination from recurring at these

lenders, the CFPB has identified at least three

possible ways institutions can limit their fair

lending risk:

• Conduct internal monitoring for

discrimination…;

• Limit discretionary markups…;

• Eliminate dealer discretion for markups …”

[Emphasis added]

Implication: As finance and

insurance represents 24% of total

gross profit, a significant portion

of Asbury’s high margin business

could be in jeopardy.

Reference: “CFPB Proposes New Financial Oversight Of Nonbank Auto Finance Companies,” 9/17/14

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-proposes-new-federal-oversight-of-nonbank-auto-finance-companies/



VALUATION AND REWARD/RISK ANALYSIS




63

Our Analysis Implies A Reward/Risk Ratio of 2.6x With A

Downside Per Share Price Of $32

($ in M, except for per share data)

Base Upside Downside

Lease-Adjusted EV $2,790 $3,192 $1,738

Less: 2015E Lease Expense @ 7x (210) (210) (210)

Enterprise Value $2,580 $2,982 $1,528

Less: Net Debt (542) (542) (542)

Less: Preferred SH - - -

Less: Noncontrolling Interest - - -

Equity Value $2,039 $2,440 $986

Per SH $66.84 $80.00 $32.34

2015E EBITDAR $331 $353 $306

2015E EBITDA $301 $323 $276

2015E EPS $4.54 $5.00 $4.04

Adj EV/2015E EBITDAR 8.4x 9.0x 5.7x

EV/2015E EBITDA 8.6x 9.2x 5.5x

P/2015E EPS 14.7x 16.0x 8.0x

Consensus 2015E EBITDA $323

Consensus 2015E EPS $4.74

Reward/Risk 2.6x

Target % Return -51.6%



FINANCIALS – BASE CASE




65

Base Case New Vehicle Economics

NEW VEHICLES

New Vehicle - Units 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 18,663 14,248 16,371 16,712 19,429 21,994 23,330 24,377 25,245

Mid-line Import 48,435 38,766 42,431 40,560 48,136 51,632 52,354 53,506 55,173

Mid-line Domestic 9,277 7,234 8,181 9,353 10,147 11,082 11,141 11,237 11,237

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 76,375 60,248 66,983 66,625 77,712 84,708 86,825 89,121 91,656

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions 3,086 1,785 2,451 2,679 2,365 1,258 2,831 1,573 1,573

Total New Vehicle Units 79,461 62,033 69,434 69,304 80,077 85,966 90,173 91,893 94,428

New Vehicle - Units - Mix % 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 23.5% 23.0% 23.6% 24.1% 24.3% 25.6% 25.9% 26.5% 26.7%

Mid-line Import 61.0% 62.5% 61.1% 58.5% 60.1% 60.1% 58.1% 58.2% 58.4%

Mid-line Domestic 11.7% 11.7% 11.8% 13.5% 12.7% 12.9% 12.4% 12.2% 11.9%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 96.1% 97.1% 96.5% 96.1% 97.0% 98.5% 96.3% 97.0% 97.1%

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions 3.9% 2.9% 3.5% 3.9% 3.0% 1.5% 3.1% 1.7% 1.7%

Total New Vehicle Units 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

New Vehicle - Units - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury -23.7% 14.9% 2.1% 16.3% 13.2% 10.8% 3.6%

Mid-line Import -20.0% 9.5% -4.4% 18.7% 7.3% 3.6% 3.1%

Mid-line Domestic -22.0% 13.1% 14.3% 8.5% 9.2% 1.4% 0.0%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -21.1% 11.2% -0.5% 16.6% 9.0% 5.2% 2.8%

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions -42.2% 37.3% 9.3% -11.7% -46.8% 25.0% 0.0%

Total New Vehicle Units -21.9% 11.9% -0.2% 15.5% 7.4% 6.9% 2.8%




66


New Vehicle - Revenue per Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 46,938$ 46,722$ 48,665$ 49,569$ 49,596$ 49,891$ 53,292$ 50,330$ 49,352$

Mid-line Import 24,747$ 24,408$ 25,140$ 26,159$ 26,392$ 26,805$ 27,068$ 26,400$ 25,608$

Mid-line Domestic 32,036$ 34,241$ 37,673$ 37,507$ 36,888$ 36,735$ 38,549$ 39,059$ 39,059$

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 31,055$ 30,866$ 32,420$ 33,624$ 33,564$ 34,098$ 35,379$ 34,542$ 33,797$

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ -$

Total New Vehicle Units 29,849$ 29,978$ 31,391$ 32,324$ 32,572$ 34,341$ 36,081$ 33,946$ 32,805$

New Vehicle - Units - Revenue per Unit - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury -0.5% 4.2% 1.9% 0.1% 0.6% 0.9% -1.9%

Mid-line Import -1.4% 3.0% 4.1% 0.9% 1.6% -1.5% -3.0%

Mid-line Domestic 6.9% 10.0% -0.4% -1.7% -0.4% 6.3% 0.0%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -0.6% 5.0% 3.7% -0.2% 1.6% 1.3% -2.2%

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Total New Vehicle Units 0.4% 4.7% 3.0% 0.8% 5.4% -1.2% -3.4%

NEW VEHICLES

New Vehicle - Gross Profit - $ per Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 3,461$ 3,530$ 3,763$ 3,812$ 3,778$ 3,615$ 3,897$ 3,647$ 3,455$

Mid-line Import 1,652$ 1,656$ 1,402$ 1,585$ 1,411$ 1,381$ 1,425$ 1,443$ 1,408$





New Vehicle - Gross Profit - $ per Unit - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 2.0% 6.6% 1.3% -0.9% -4.3% 0.9% -5.3%

Mid-line Import 0.3% -15.3% 13.1% -11.0% -2.1% 4.5% -2.4%

Mid-line Domestic 7.2% 17.4% -6.3% -2.8% -3.7% 0.2% -6.2%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 1.1% -1.8% 6.5% -6.0% -2.3% 3.5% -4.2%

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions

Total New Vehicle Units 2.1% -2.2% 5.9% -5.1% 1.4% 0.7% -5.2%




67


New Vehicle - Gross Profit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 65 50 62 64 73 80 86 89 87

Mid-line Import 80 64 60 64 68 71 74 77 78

Mid-line Domestic 20 17 22 24 25 27 27 27 25

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 165 131 143 152 167 177 187 193 190

Plus: New Vehicle Units - Acquisitions - - 0 - - 4 6 2 -

Total New Vehicle Units 165 131 144 152 167 181 193 195 190

New Vehicle - Gross Profit - Margin % 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Luxury 7.4% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 7.2% 7.8% 7.2% 7.0%

Mid-line Import 6.7% 6.8% 5.6% 6.1% 5.3% 5.2% 5.3% 5.5% 5.5%








68

Base Case Used Vehicle Economics

USED VEHICLES

Used Vehicles Retail - Units 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 44,241 39,373 46,329 54,009 57,434 67,768 69,859 70,702 70,702

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions - - 144 - - 1,686 2,892 1,206 -

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 44,241 39,373 46,473 54,009 57,434 69,454 72,751 71,908 70,702

Used Vehicles Retail - Units - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS -11.0% 17.7% 16.6% 6.3% 18.0% 4.3% 0.0%

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units -11.0% 18.0% 16.2% 6.3% 20.9% 3.5% -1.7%

Used Vehicles Retail - Revenue per Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 17,843$ 18,251$ 18,930$ 18,923$ 19,187$ 19,778$ 20,790$ 19,824$ 18,833$

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ 20,522$ 33,689$ 18,408$ -$

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 17,843$ 18,251$ 18,936$ 18,923$ 19,187$ 19,796$ 21,103$ 19,800$ 18,833$

Used Vehicles Retail - Revenue per Unit - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 2.3% 3.7% 0.0% 1.4% 3.1% 0.2% -5.0%

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 2.3% 3.8% -0.1% 1.4% 3.2% 0.0% -4.9%

Used Vehicles Retail - Revenue 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 719 877 1,022 1,102 1,340 1,409 1,402 1,332

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions - 3 - - 35 57 22 -

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 719 880 1,022 1,102 1,375 1,466 1,424 1,332

Used Vehicles Retail - Revenue - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS -9.0% 22.0% 16.5% 7.8% 21.6% 4.6% -5.0%






69

Base Case Used Vehicle Economics

Used Vehicles Retail -Gross Profit per Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 2,029$ 2,001$ 1,881$ 1,819$ 1,769$ 1,818$ 1,717$ 1,536$

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions -$ -$ -$ -$ 1,305$ 2,254$ 1,327$ -$

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 2,029$ 2,003$ 1,881$ 1,819$ 1,758$ 1,829$ 1,710$ 1,536$

Used Vehicles Retail - Gross Profit per Unit - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 0.1% -1.4% -6.0% -3.3% -2.8% -3.0% -10.5%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 0.1% -1.3% -6.1% -3.3% -3.4% -2.7% -10.2%

Used Vehicles Retail - Gross Profit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 90 80 93 102 105 120 123 121 109

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions - - 0 - - 2 4 2 -

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 90 80 93 102 105 122 127 123 109

Used Vehicles Retail - Gross Profit - Margin % 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 11.4% 11.1% 10.6% 9.9% 9.5% 8.9% 9.2% 8.7% 8.2%

Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 11.0% 7.2% 0.0%

Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 11.4% 11.1% 10.6% 9.9% 9.5% 8.9% 9.2% 8.6% 8.2%

Used Vehicles Retail - Gross Profit - Growth % yoy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015







70

Base Case Financials

FINANCIAL RESULTS

Financial Results 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LTM 2014 2015

Total Revenue 4,093 3,406 3,936 4,141 4,642 5,335 5,623 5,617 5,562

Growth % yoy -16.8% 15.6% 5.2% 12.1% 14.9% 5.3% -1.0%

EBITDA 150 123 153 155 211 250 278 296 301

Margin % 3.7% 3.6% 3.9% 3.7% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.3% 5.4%

Growth % yoy -18.0% 23.9% 1.2% 36.2% 18.8% 18.1% 1.6%

EBIT 129 101 132 132 188 226 252 270 275

Margin % 3.2% 3.0% 3.3% 3.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.8% 4.9%

Growth % yoy -21.7% 30.2% 0.4% 42.3% 20.1% 19.5% 1.7%

NOPAT 240 65 88 83 118 142 158 168 172

Margin % 5.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1%

Growth % yoy -72.8% 35.6% -6.3% 42.9% 19.6% 18.3% 2.6%

PF Net Income 198 31 55 48 86 108 124 135 139

Margin % 4.8% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.5%

Growth % yoy -84.5% 79.7% -12.0% 76.9% 26.1% 25.0% 3.0%

PF FD EPS 6.24$ 0.93$ 1.65$ 1.48$ 2.72$ 3.47$ 4.08$ 4.41$ 4.54$

Growth % yoy -85.1% 77.6% -10.1% 83.0% 27.7% 27.2% 3.0%

Cash Flow from Operations 529 111 10 (181) (21) 51 107 204 198

Margin % 12.9% 3.3% 0.3% -4.4% -0.4% 1.0% 1.9% 3.6% 3.6%

Growth % yoy -79.0% -91.1% -1930.3% -88.6% -344.9% 90.9% -2.8%

CapEx 69 8 30 22 56 50 65 46 30

Margin % 1.7% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.5%

Growth % yoy -88.0% 262.7% -26.9% 156.4% -11.5% -7.2% -35.2%




71

Base Case Financials


Levered Free Cash Flow 460 103 (20) (204) (78) (1) 40 157 168

Margin % 11.2% 3.0% -0.5% -4.9% -1.7% 0.0% 0.7% 2.8% 3.0%

Growth % yoy -77.7% -119.7% 907.9% -61.7% -99.4% -31459.8%

Total Debt 600 538 544 459 466 554 549 549 549

Less: Liquid Assets (92) (85) (21) (11) (6) (5) (7) (112) (272)

Net Debt 508 453 523 447 460 549 542 436 277

Total Debt/EBITDA 4.0x 4.4x 3.6x 3.0x 2.2x 2.2x 2.2x 1.9x 1.8x

Net Debt/EBITDA 3.4x 3.7x 3.4x 2.9x 2.2x 2.2x 2.2x 1.5x 0.9x

Total EBITDA/Interest Expense 2.2x 2.2x 2.9x 2.8x 4.0x 4.6x 5.2x 5.7x 5.7x

ROE % 0.0% 12.56% 19.16% 14.82% 21.25% 21.99% 25.38% 22.63% 18.89%

RNOA % 0.0% 9.37% 10.93% 10.71% 13.73% 13.63% 15.16% 15.65% 16.64%



COMPARABLE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL

TRADING RANGES




73

ABG Trades In-Line With Auto Dealer Comparables On A

FWD P/E and EV/EBITDA Basis

SUMMARY AUTO DEALER COMPARABLES

($ in M) LTM

Market Cap.

Enterprise

Value(1) Revenue EBITDA FCF Yield % EBITDA % P / 2014E

EV / 2014E

Revenue

EV / 2014E

EBITDA 2014 PEG

Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. $2,039 $2,580 $5,404 $267 1.9% 4.9% 15.5x 0.4x 8.5x 94.2%

Lithia Motors Inc. $2,097 $2,340 $4,237 $235 (2.8%) 5.5% 15.9x 0.5x 8.6x 62.9%

CarMax Inc. $11,954 $11,758 $13,013 $973 (8.9%) 7.5% 21.9x 0.9x 11.7x 159.7%

Penske Automotive Group, Inc. $3,867 $4,912 $15,768 $543 1.5% 3.4% 13.1x 0.3x 8.5x 93.0%

Sonic Automotive Inc. $1,274 $2,069 $8,763 $300 0.5% 3.4% 12.5x 0.2x 7.1x 96.5%

AutoNation Inc. $6,113 $7,927 $17,238 $845 3.0% 4.9% 15.0x 0.4x 9.0x 94.2%

MEDIAN (excl. ABG) $3,867 $4,912 $13,013 $543 0.5% 4.9% 15.0x 0.4x 8.6x 94.2%

2014E Growth 2015E Growth

Rev EBITDA Rev EBITDA

Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. 13.8% 24.3% 6.2% 6.4%

Lithia Motors Inc. 33.2% 29.0% 44.9% 32.1%

CarMax Inc. 10.9% 7.1% 12.0% 11.1%

Penske Automotive Group, Inc. 18.7% 15.0% 6.8% 9.5%

Sonic Automotive Inc. 8.4% (2.7%) 4.3% 12.2%

AutoNation Inc. 12.4% 6.6% 5.6% 8.5%

MEDIAN (excl. ABG) 12.4% 7.1% 6.8% 11.1%

(1) Excludes floor plan financing.




74

On A FWD P/E Basis, ABG Is Currently Trading Toward The

High End Of Its Historically Range Of 7x – 16x



DEBT MATURITY SCHEDULE




76

The Company Has Pushed Out Its Debt Maturity Schedule




DOWNSIDE FINANCIALS




78

Downside Case New Vehicle Economics

NEW VEHICLES


Luxury 18,663 14,248 16,371 16,712 19,429 21,994 23,330 24,076 23,626

Mid-line Import 48,435 38,766 42,431 40,560 48,136 51,632 52,354 52,998 52,401






Luxury 23.5% 23.0% 23.6% 24.1% 24.3% 25.6% 25.9% 26.5% 26.3%

Mid-line Import 61.0% 62.5% 61.1% 58.5% 60.1% 60.1% 58.1% 58.2% 58.4%






Luxury -23.7% 14.9% 2.1% 16.3% 13.2% 9.5% -1.9%

Mid-line Import -20.0% 9.5% -4.4% 18.7% 7.3% 2.6% -1.1%

Mid-line Domestic -22.0% 13.1% 14.3% 8.5% 9.2% 0.5% -1.6%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -21.1% 11.2% -0.5% 16.6% 9.0% 4.1% -1.4%


Total New Vehicle Units -21.9% 11.9% -0.2% 15.5% 7.4% 5.8% -1.3%




79



Luxury 46,938$ 46,722$ 48,665$ 49,569$ 49,596$ 49,891$ 53,292$ 50,006$ 49,067$

Mid-line Import 24,747$ 24,408$ 25,140$ 26,159$ 26,392$ 26,805$ 27,068$ 26,595$ 26,101$






Luxury -0.5% 4.2% 1.9% 0.1% 0.6% 0.2% -1.9%

Mid-line Import -1.4% 3.0% 4.1% 0.9% 1.6% -0.8% -1.9%


Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -0.6% 5.0% 3.7% -0.2% 1.6% 1.1% -1.7%


Total New Vehicle Units 0.4% 4.7% 3.0% 0.8% 5.4% -1.4% -3.1%

NEW VEHICLES


Luxury 3,461$ 3,530$ 3,763$ 3,812$ 3,778$ 3,615$ 3,897$ 3,584$ 3,309$

Mid-line Import 1,652$ 1,656$ 1,402$ 1,585$ 1,411$ 1,381$ 1,425$ 1,415$ 1,305$






Luxury 2.0% 6.6% 1.3% -0.9% -4.3% -0.8% -7.7%

Mid-line Import 0.3% -15.3% 13.1% -11.0% -2.1% 2.5% -7.8%

Mid-line Domestic 7.2% 17.4% -6.3% -2.8% -3.7% -0.4% -6.2%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 1.1% -1.8% 6.5% -6.0% -2.3% 1.7% -7.7%


Total New Vehicle Units 2.1% -2.2% 5.9% -5.1% 1.4% -1.0% -8.7%




80



Luxury 65 50 62 64 73 80 86 86 78

Mid-line Import 80 64 60 64 68 71 74 75 68






Luxury 7.4% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 7.2% 7.8% 7.2% 6.7%

Mid-line Import 6.7% 6.8% 5.6% 6.1% 5.3% 5.2% 5.3% 5.3% 5.0%








81

Downside Case Used Vehicle Economics

USED VEHICLES











Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ 20,522$ 33,689$ 18,408$



Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 2.3% 3.7% 0.0% 1.4% 3.1% 0.9% -2.0%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 2.3% 3.8% -0.1% 1.4% 3.2% 0.7% -1.9%












82

Downside Case Used Vehicle Economics






Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 0.1% -1.4% -6.0% -3.3% -2.8% -5.5% -12.3%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 0.1% -1.3% -6.1% -3.3% -3.4% -5.2% -12.0%










Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS -10.9% 16.0% 9.6% 2.9% 14.7% -2.2% -12.3%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units -10.9% 16.5% 9.1% 2.9% 16.8% -2.6% -13.5%




83

Downside Case Financials

FINANCIAL RESULTS


Total Revenue 4,093 3,406 3,936 4,141 4,642 5,335 5,623 5,559 5,382

Growth % yoy -16.8% 15.6% 5.2% 12.1% 14.9% 4.2% -3.2%

EBITDA 150 123 153 155 211 250 278 288 276

Margin % 3.7% 3.6% 3.9% 3.7% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.2% 5.1%

Growth % yoy -18.0% 23.9% 1.2% 36.2% 18.8% 15.2% -4.3%

EBIT 129 101 132 132 188 226 252 263 250

Margin % 3.2% 3.0% 3.3% 3.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.7% 4.7%

Growth % yoy -21.7% 30.2% 0.4% 42.3% 20.1% 16.3% -4.8%

NOPAT 240 65 88 83 118 142 158 163 157

Margin % 5.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9% 2.9%

Growth % yoy -72.8% 35.6% -6.3% 42.9% 19.6% 15.0% -4.0%

PF Net Income 198 31 55 48 86 108 124 130 124

Margin % 4.8% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.3%

Growth % yoy -84.5% 79.7% -12.0% 76.9% 26.1% 20.7% -5.2%

PF FD EPS 6.24$ 0.93$ 1.65$ 1.48$ 2.72$ 3.47$ 4.08$ 4.26$ 4.04$

Growth % yoy -85.1% 77.6% -10.1% 83.0% 27.7% 22.9% -5.2%


Margin % 12.9% 3.3% 0.3% -4.4% -0.4% 1.0% 1.9% 3.7% 3.7%

Growth % yoy -79.0% -91.1% -1930.3% -88.6% -344.9% 94.3% -3.7%

CapEx 69 8 30 22 56 50 65 46 30

Margin % 1.7% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6%

Growth % yoy -88.0% 262.7% -26.9% 156.4% -11.5% -7.2% -35.2%




84

Downside Case Financials



Margin % 11.2% 3.0% -0.5% -4.9% -1.7% 0.0% 0.7% 2.9% 3.2%

Growth % yoy -77.7% -119.7% 5.8%

Total Debt 600 538 544 459 466 554 549 549 549


Net Debt 508 453 523 447 460 549 542 437 285




ROE % 0.0% 12.56% 19.16% 14.82% 21.25% 21.99% 25.38% 22.03% 17.28%

RNOA % 0.0% 9.37% 10.93% 10.71% 13.73% 13.63% 15.16% 15.22% 15.21%



UPSIDE FINANCIALS




86

Upside Case New Vehicle Economics

NEW VEHICLES


Luxury 18,663 14,248 16,371 16,712 19,429 21,994 23,330 24,696 27,533

Mid-line Import 48,435 38,766 42,431 40,560 48,136 51,632 52,354 53,896 56,808






Luxury 23.5% 23.0% 23.6% 24.1% 24.3% 25.6% 25.9% 26.7% 28.0%

Mid-line Import 61.0% 62.5% 61.1% 58.5% 60.1% 60.1% 58.1% 58.2% 57.8%






Luxury -23.7% 14.9% 2.1% 16.3% 13.2% 12.3% 11.5%

Mid-line Import -20.0% 9.5% -4.4% 18.7% 7.3% 4.4% 5.4%

Mid-line Domestic -22.0% 13.1% 14.3% 8.5% 9.2% 1.4% 0.0%

Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -21.1% 11.2% -0.5% 16.6% 9.0% 6.0% 6.4%


Total New Vehicle Units -21.9% 11.9% -0.2% 15.5% 7.4% 7.7% 6.2%




87



Luxury 46,938$ 46,722$ 48,665$ 49,569$ 49,596$ 49,891$ 53,292$ 50,601$ 51,363$

Mid-line Import 24,747$ 24,408$ 25,140$ 26,159$ 26,392$ 26,805$ 27,068$ 26,595$ 26,108$






Luxury -0.5% 4.2% 1.9% 0.1% 0.6% 1.4% 1.5%

Mid-line Import -1.4% 3.0% 4.1% 0.9% 1.6% -0.8% -1.8%


Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS -0.6% 5.0% 3.7% -0.2% 1.6% 2.0% 1.1%


Total New Vehicle Units 0.4% 4.7% 3.0% 0.8% 5.4% -0.5% 0.0%

NEW VEHICLES


Luxury 3,461$ 3,530$ 3,763$ 3,812$ 3,778$ 3,615$ 3,897$ 3,695$ 3,728$

Mid-line Import 1,652$ 1,656$ 1,402$ 1,585$ 1,411$ 1,381$ 1,425$ 1,454$ 1,430$






Luxury 2.0% 6.6% 1.3% -0.9% -4.3% 2.2% 0.9%

Mid-line Import 0.3% -15.3% 13.1% -11.0% -2.1% 5.3% -1.6%


Total New Vehicle Retail Units - SS 1.1% -1.8% 6.5% -6.0% -2.3% 5.2% 1.5%


Total New Vehicle Units 2.1% -2.2% 5.9% -5.1% 1.4% 2.3% 0.6%




88



Luxury 65 50 62 64 73 80 86 91 103

Mid-line Import 80 64 60 64 68 71 74 78 81






Luxury 7.4% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 7.2% 7.8% 7.3% 7.3%

Mid-line Import 6.7% 6.8% 5.6% 6.1% 5.3% 5.2% 5.3% 5.5% 5.5%








89

Upside Case Used Vehicle Economics

USED VEHICLES








Total Used Vehicle Retail Units -11.0% 18.0% 16.2% 6.3% 20.9% 3.5% 0.8%



Used Vehicle Retail Units - Acquisitions -$ -$ -$ -$ -$ 20,522$ 33,689$ 18,408$



Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 2.3% 3.7% 0.0% 1.4% 3.1% 3.9% 2.5%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 2.3% 3.8% -0.1% 1.4% 3.2% 3.7% 2.7%












90

Upside Case Used Vehicle Economics






Used Vehicle Retail Units - SS 0.1% -1.4% -6.0% -3.3% -2.8% 0.8% 0.4%


Total Used Vehicle Retail Units 0.1% -1.3% -6.1% -3.3% -3.4% 1.0% 0.9%
















91

Upside Case Financials

FINANCIAL RESULTS


Total Revenue 4,093 3,406 3,936 4,141 4,642 5,335 5,623 5,719 6,043

Growth % yoy -16.8% 15.6% 5.2% 12.1% 14.9% 7.2% 5.7%

EBITDA 150 123 153 155 211 250 278 300 323

Margin % 3.7% 3.6% 3.9% 3.7% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.2% 5.3%

Growth % yoy -18.0% 23.9% 1.2% 36.2% 18.8% 19.9% 7.5%

EBIT 129 101 132 132 188 226 252 275 297

Margin % 3.2% 3.0% 3.3% 3.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.8% 4.9%

Growth % yoy -21.7% 30.2% 0.4% 42.3% 20.1% 21.5% 8.2%

NOPAT 240 65 88 83 118 142 158 170 186

Margin % 5.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1%

Growth % yoy -72.8% 35.6% -6.3% 42.9% 19.6% 20.2% 9.0%

PF Net Income 198 31 55 48 86 108 124 138 153

Margin % 4.8% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.5%

Growth % yoy -84.5% 79.7% -12.0% 76.9% 26.1% 27.6% 10.9%

PF FD EPS 6.24$ 0.93$ 1.65$ 1.48$ 2.72$ 3.47$ 4.08$ 4.51$ 5.00$

Growth % yoy -85.1% 77.6% -10.1% 83.0% 27.7% 29.8% 10.9%


Margin % 12.9% 3.3% 0.3% -4.4% -0.4% 1.0% 1.9% 3.3% 2.4%

Growth % yoy -79.0% -91.1% -1930.3% -88.6% -344.9% 76.0% -23.7%




92

Upside Case Financials


CapEx 69 8 30 22 56 50 65 46 30

Margin % 1.7% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.5%

Growth % yoy -88.0% 262.7% -26.9% 156.4% -11.5% -7.2% -35.2%


Margin % 11.2% 3.0% -0.5% -4.9% -1.7% 0.0% 0.7% 2.5% 1.9%

Growth % yoy -77.7% -119.7% -19.5%

Total Debt 600 538 544 459 466 554 549 549 549


Net Debt 508 453 523 447 460 549 542 442 297




ROE % 0.0% 12.56% 19.16% 14.82% 21.25% 21.99% 25.38% 22.99% 20.32%

RNOA % 0.0% 9.37% 10.93% 10.71% 13.73% 13.63% 15.16% 15.91% 17.85%



Red Team Analysis




94

What Does The Red Team Analysis Suggest How This Could

Go Wrong?

ABG is sold to a strategic buyer as part of a larger

dealer roll-up strategy.

Continued, unprecedented demand for high quality

used vehicles results in the stabilization of used car

pricing.

ABG successfully completes a leveraged

recapitalization, using excess cash proceeds for

additional stock buybacks.

ABG is able to consistently locate and acquire mildly

underperforming independent dealerships at attractive

cash flow multiples, thereby adding value to the

enterprise.




95

What Is The Market Missing?

The price of used cars could come under severe

pressure, the result of four years of extremely strong

new car sales and leasing volumes as well as easy

credit conditions.

The market may be overestimating management’s

ability to build enterprise value through small tuck-in

acquisitions.

With newly added car manufacturing capacity and a

weak Japanese Yen, OEMs will maintain aggressive

new car incentives.

The market may be overlooking ABG’s exposure to

subprime customers. As 25% of new loan originations

are to subprime customers, ABG’s F&I and new/used

car business would be materially impacted if U.S.

regulators impose tighter lending standards as a

preemptive measure to stem excessive lending.




96

Fall in New Car

Demand

Used Car Over-

Supply

New Car Incentives

Stricter Financing

Negative Industry

Dynamics

Increased Rates

End of Easy Credit

Downside

ABG Tremendous Downside Despite Fantastic Recent

Performance



BIOS




98

Biographies

Chand Sooran, Chief Investment Officer

Chand has broad and deep experience investing across the capital structure. Most recently, he helped start up the

distressed value team at CQS as the #2 with positions across the capital structure, eventually running a parallel

long/short value equity book independently. His role as Portfolio Manager included membership in the HoldCo

creditors’ committee in the Six Flags Chapter 11 case and membership in the steering committee and the

creditors’ committee for Nell noteholders in the LyondellBasell Chapter 11 case. Prior to that, he worked as a

Senior Analyst at Columbus Hill Capital Management, a high profile value fund, covering Airlines, Telecoms, Media

and Technology in equities and in credit. Notably, he was a member of the ad hoc creditors’ committee in Delta

Airlines. Before joining Columbus Hill, Chand was a research analyst for five years in an internal multi-strategy

hedge fund at Lehman Brothers where he worked on a variety of strategies including distressed debt, deep value,

special situations, long/short equity and emerging markets. This included work as an unsecured creditor in the

UAL Chapter 11 case, special situations driven by litigation and other general value investing. Prior to going to

business school at MIT Sloan, he spent approximately six years trading foreign exchange, principally as a market

maker for foreign exchange options. In addition to being a graduate of MIT, Chand is a graduate of the University

of Toronto Schools, the Royal Military College of Canada and Queen’s University, as well as being a CFA

Charterholder and being certified as a Financial Risk Manager by the Global Association of Risk Professionals.

After graduating from RMC, Chand was a commissioned officer in the Royal Canadian Navy.




99

Biographies

Anand Kalola, Senior Analyst

Anand Kalola has over seven years of finance industry experience. Most recently, Anand was a Senior Associate

at Prospect Capital where he was responsible for originating, executing, and managing middle-market

investments. Prior to Prospect, he worked as a Senior Associate at Chanin Capital Partners/Duff & Phelps

Restructuring with a focus on executing financial restructurings. Anand began his career as a Financial Analyst

with the leveraged finance group at CIBC World Markets in Los Angeles. He holds a BS in Economics and a BA in

Biological Basis of Behavior from the University of Pennsylvania. He is also a CFA Charterholder.




Contact Information

100

Chand Sooran

Chief Investment Officer, Manager & Founding Member

[email protected]

646.380.6675

100