Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K. Vijh ED- Technical Engineers India Limited

Technical Session # 3ATopic : Process Safety Management in Design , Construction & Commissioning

Topic: Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning

By:Lalit K. VijhED- TechnicalEngineers India Limited


MAJOR HAZARDS IN OIL INDUSTRY


SAN JUANICO DISASTER PEMEX, MEXICO, 1984

BEFORE AFTER


SAN JUANICO DISASTER, PEMEX, MEXICO, 1984

8” Pipe rupture occurred near the sphere

The Control Room operator tried to identify the cause of pressure fall but without success.

The release of LPG occurred for more than 5-10 minute

The gas cloud grew to cover a large area and ignited from a ignition by ground flare.

The VCE severely damaged the tank farm and resulted in LPG leak from other damaged tanks

Just 4 minutes later first tank underwent BLEVE.

Over the next hour, 12 separate BLEVE explosions were recorded.

The two largest BLEVE’s(from 2400 m3 spherical tanks) registered 5.0 seismic reading on R.S

The explosions destroyed the local town of San Juan Ixhuatepec.

Approximately 500-600 people killed and 5000-7000 others suffering severe burns.


LESSONS LEARNED - SAN JUANICO DISASTER

Sitting of Major Hazard Installation

• The high death toll occurred because the housing was too near to the plant. At the time the plant was constructed the area was underdeveloped, but over the years the built-up area had gradually crept up to the site.

Layout and Protection of large LPG Storages

• The total destruction of the facility occurred because there was a failure of the overall system of protection, which includes layout, emergency isolation and water spray systems.

Gas Detection and Emergency Isolation

• One feature which might have averted the disaster is more effective gas detection and emergency isolation. The plant had no gas detector system and probably as a consequence, emergency isolation was too late.


LPG FIRE AT VALERO, MCKEE REFINERY, 2007


LPG FIRE AT VALERO, MCKEE REFINERY

The propane release was likely caused by the freeze-related failure of high-pressure piping at a control station that had not been in service for approximately 15 years.

The lack of remote isolation significantly increased the duration and size of the fire, resulting in extensive damage to the Propane Deasphalting Unit, the main pipe rack, and an adjacent process unit.

Flame impingement on a non-fireproofed structural support caused a pipe rack to collapse, significantly increasing the size and duration of the fire, and led to the evacuation and extended shutdown of the refinery.

The exposure of three one-ton chlorine containers to radiant heating from the fire led to the release of approximately 2.5 tons of highly toxic chlorine.

A butane storage sphere was exposed to radiant heating that blistered its paint. The manual firewater deluge valve for the butane sphere was located too close to the PDA unit and could not be opened during the fire.


JAIPUR FIRE ACCIDENT 2009

• 11 Dead• Loss of ~ Rs.280 Crores


EXPLOSION IN VENEZUELA'S LARGEST OIL REFINERY ON 25-08-2012

• 48 Dead (official figure)• Initial Report indicate poor

maintenance as chief cause


Source : Harry J. Toups LSU Department of Chemical Engineering ,SACHE 2003 Workshop

Mechanical

Operator Error

Unknown

Process Upsets

Natural Hazards

Design

Sabotage & Arson

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

44 %22 %

12 %

11 %

5 %

5 %

1 %

CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS IN OIL INDUSTRY


APPROACH FOR SAFETY IN PLANT DESIGN?

Eliminate or minimize hazards rather than control hazards

Don’t wait for a major accident to identify need to improve major hazard management.

Need to learn lessons from accidents but don’t rely on this approach

Manage risks via Foresight rather than Hindsight i.e. be proactive rather than reactive.

More a philosophy and way of thinking than a specific set of tools and methods applicable at all levels of design and operation from conceptual design to plant operations


INHERENT PASSIVE

ACTIVE PROCEDURAL

PROCESS SAFETY STRATEGIES


INHERENT• Eliminate or reduce the hazard by changing to a

process or materials which are non-hazardous or less hazardous

PASSIVE

• Minimize hazard using process or equipment design features which reduce frequency or consequence without the active functioning of any device



ACTIVE

• Controls, safety interlocks, automatic shut down systems

• Multiple active elements : Sensors, Logic device, Control element

PROCEDURAL• Standard operating procedures, safety rules,

emergency response procedures, training



HSE during Project Execution

• Environment Impact Assessment• Environmental Baseline Survey• Process Hazard Review• Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Project Conceptualization Stage

• P&ID Review For Operational Safety• HSE Plan & HSE Philosophy• HAZOP & SIL Studies• Fire, Explosion & Dispersion Analysis/ Consequence

Analysis• HSE Action Tracking Register & PHSER

Process Design Stage

• Plot Plan Review• Plot Plan Review Through Plot Plan Risk Review

Committee• Quantitative Risk Assessment• Detailed HAZOP & HAZOP Close Out Report• Fire & Gas Safety System Review• Cause & Effects/Safety Charts Review• Preparation of HSE Dossier & PHSER• Safety Manual & Operating Manual Preparation

Engineering Stage

• Safety Guidelines to Contractors• Safety Monitoring through Dedicated Safety Engineers• Safety Meetings• Safety Performance Evaluation

Construction Stage

• Punch List Preparation• Startup Formats• Pre Startup Safety Audit

Commissioning Stage


CONCEPTUAL DESIGN (Coarse HAZOP, What-if, Ranking)

SITE SELECTION (Rapid Risk Analysis, Environmental Impact Assessment)

PROCESS DESIGN (HAZOP, Safety Review, SIL)

ENGINEERING (Qualitative Risk Analysis, Plot Plan Review)

START-UP (Safety Audit, Emergency Plan)

RISK CONTROL DURING PROJECT STAGES


SAFETY AT PLANNING STAGE

Prevention of accidents should be the goal

Design options (use of chemicals, technology etc)

Layout review (various locations and configurations)

Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Environment Impact Assessment

Environmental Baseline Survey


HSE DURING ENGINEERING


SAFETY AT DESIGN STAGE

Adequate Design suitable for operations:• COMAH (Control of Major Accidental Hazard), OHRA (Occupational Health Risk Assessment), EIA (Environment Impact Assessment)

• HSECES (HSE Critical Equipment System), SCE/PS (Safety Critical Elements / Performance Standards)

• Fire Safety Assessment and Dispersion Analysis, QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment)• Noise Study, EERA (Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis), Waste Management PlanHAZID (Hazard Identification)

HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)

HSEIA (Health Safety Environment Impact Assessment)

SIL (Safety Integrity Level)

ALARP Study (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

Active and Passive Fire Protection System


TYPICAL PROCESS SAFETY CODES & STANDARDS USED IN DESIGN

Some of the standards widely used by designers and operating companies are:

• American Petroleum Institute (API)• American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)• Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) / Local Standards• British Standard Institution (BSI)• International Standard Organization (ISO)• Static & Mobile Pressure Vessel (SMPV) Rules• Petroleum Rules• IBR regulation

Process Design and Hydrocarbon Services are complying to various OISD Standards

• OISD-STD-106 (Pressure Relief & Disposal System)• OISD-STD-108 (Recommended Practices on Oil Storage and Handling)• OISD-STD-116/117 (for Fire Protection)• OISD-STD-118 (Layouts for Oil and Gas Installations)• OISD-STD-144 (LPG Installations)• OISD-STD-150 (for LPG Mounded Storage Facility)• OISD-STD-152 (Safety instrumentation for process system in HC industry)• OISD-STD-163 (Process Control Room Safety)• OISD-STD-164 (Fire Proofing in Oil & Gas Industry)• OISD-STD-194 (Standard for Storage And Handling of LNG)• OISD-STD-197 (Guidelines for EIA)


PROCESS DESIGN PHILOSOPHY

Selection of proper Material of Construction (MOC)

Selection of proper piping class, rating.

Selection of proper design conditions (Pressure, Temperature)

Selection of hold up volume

Conformity to various codes/ standards

Adherence to good design practice

Feed Back from previous jobs, Client, Engineering, Commissioning.


PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY - LOPA

PROCESS

MITIGATION SYSTEM

OFFSITEEMERGENCY RESPONSE

ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PREVENTION SYSTEM

CONTROL & MONITORING


PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

Pressure Venting provisions shall be in accordance with API RP 520 (Part 1 &2), API RP 521 Standards

Flare system is provided to safely dispose of the materials released from PSV in case of any malfunction of system

• Controlling case for refinery or petrochemical complexes are usually cooling water or power failure. Whenever there is one cooling water system, cooling water failure loads for various units are added to calculate total flare load of the complex.

• For a large complex with very high flare load for cooling water failure case, complex may be segregated in to two or more cooling water systems and then flare load of one (controlling ) cooling water system may be considered for further design

• Temperature profile of flare header (ISBL & OSBL) is essential in having optimum provision of expansion loops in flare headers


PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY : LAYOUT

Key considerations/ safety features for layout

• Separation of hazardous areas from non-hazardous areas• Safe separation distances• Adequate escape routes, safe access for operation and maintenance of equipment• Main ignition sources should be grouped and located upstream prevailing wind.• Emergency response teams to have clear access to all fire fighting equipment.• Cable trays, pipe racks and escape routes shall be positioned such that risk of damage by pool fire

or explosions is minimized.• Optimize availability of emergency services and main safety equipment under all foreseeable

events.


Process Safety PhilosophyHazardous Area Classification

• The hazardous area classification shall be performed in accordance with IP Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15.

• Based on the above code various areas shall be classified into zones and Electrical appliances shall be selected suitably.

The Emergency Shutdown system

• The Emergency Shutdown system shall be designed to fail-safe so that, in the event of loss of any of the controls to the system, the shutdown valves shall fail closed and the blowdown valves fail open.

• The Emergency Shutdown system shall be reviewed in accordance with IEC 61508.

PRPROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY


Redundancy

Voting systems

Philosophy of alarms and trips

Emergency depressurization

Emergency shut down (ESD)

Safety valve

HIPPS – High Integrity Pressure Protection System

PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY - Instrumentation


FIRE CONTROL AND MITIGATION– F&G Detection System

The fire and gas (F&G) detection system is to provide an early warning to personnel of the existence of a potentially dangerous situation and to enable automatic initiation of remedial actions

• The required functions/actions on fire and/or gas detection shall be developed during detail design phase.

• The Fire and Gas Detection systems shall be designed and installed in accordance with NFPA and OISD Standards.

• Detector locations shall be determined by means of case by case examination of the facilities layout and may be placed either peripherally around the facilities, at suitable intervals or placed to cover areas with a leak potential, or both.

F&G Field Devices

• Gas detectors – H2, HC, H2S, Cl• Fire detectors –Flame, Heat, Smoke


Active Fire Protection : A “dormant” system that needs to be activated in order to perform its function.

• The main objective of active fire protection is to: • Provide cooling (Deluge System, Sprinkling System)• Control the fire (ie., prevent it from spreading)• Extinguishment of the fire incident (Fire Extinguishers, Foam System)

Passive Fire Protection : A system that performs its function without relying on the requirement of activation

• Fire Proofing/ Passive fire protection is a barrier or safeguard which provides protection against the heat from a fire without additional intervention i.e. it performs its function without relying on activation.

FIRE CONTROL AND MITIGATION – ACTIVE AND PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION


HSE DURING CONSTRUCTION


SAFETY AT CONSTRUCTION STAGE

Setting of Project specific HSE objective and targets

Implementation of Project specific HSE Plan

Preparation and Implementation of ERP

Project HSE Review (PHSER for Construction)

Dedicated Warehouse /Procedures for storage of Materials and Hazardous substances

HSE Training, Inspection & audit

HIRA & Legal register and ensuring its compliance

Pre- Deployment Inspection and Certification for Mobilization of suitable and safe equipment


Tools for Monitoring/Implementation of HSE at Sites

• HSE Specification

• HSE Plan

• HSE Procedures

• HSE Induction

• Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis (HIRA)/

Job Safety Analysis (JSA)

• Tool Box Talks

• Mock Drills (Fire, Electrocution , Fall from

height )

• HSE Inspection/ Walk-through

• HSE Meetings

• Road Safety & Movement of vehicles

• Fitness certificates for all Lifting tools &

Tackles, Cranes

• HSE Permits Viz. Scaffolds, Confined space,

Height work, Excavation

• HSE Awareness/ Motivational Programs

• HSE Reporting including LTIFR, FAR

• Reporting of Near Miss Accidents & Corrective

Actions

• Accident Investigations & Recommendations

• Analysis of Leading &Trailing Indicators


• Legal compliance• HSE Management System & Competence • HSE Performance

Pre qualification &Selection

• General Terms & Condition• Code of Conduct

Contractor Preparation

• HSE Plan & Organization• Competence of Personnel• Signing of code of conduct

Contract Award

• Kick of Meeting• Medical Check up

Pre commencement & Mobilization

• HSE Training as per approved HSE Training MatrixContractors Orientation &

Training

• Periodic evaluation• HSE Review meeting

Managing the Contractors

• HSE Performance RecordsPost Contract Evaluation

CONTRACTOR’s SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESS


HSE DURING COMMISSIONING


SAFETY AT PRECOMMISSIONING & COMMISSIONING AND HANDOVER

SIMOPS - Simultaneous Operation study for Planning and coordination

Multilayer Safety checks to meet Aggressive Schedule

Multi disciplinary trained manpower

Manuals, SOP & Checklists

Authorization & documentation for Changes, Bypass etc

Pre Start up Safety Review

HSE Action Tracking Register/ Formal HSE Close out Report

Project HSE Review (PHSER for Pre- Commissioning)

Lesson Learnt


SUMMARY

Safety in design is of paramount importance for process safety management

Goal should be to prevent rather than control & mitigate hazards

Select inherently safe processes and Incorporate adequate active & passive safety features in design minimizing dependence on human intervention

Select Process specifications/ design conditions, Materials to reflect normal as well as start up/ transient conditions

Ensure strict adherence to safety & design standard & codes during design/engineering/construction & commissioning

Carryout Safety Studies like RRA/ QRA, HAZID, HAZOP, SIL etc to ensure adequate safety features including control & mitigation are built in design & to finalize location/ layout of facilities


THANK YOU

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Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K. Vijh ED- Technical Engineers India Limited