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David SIMPLOT-RYL RFID tags and communicating sensors Security@INRIA 13 décembre 2005 RFID Tags and Communicating Sensors: Overview of Security Aspects David SIMPLOT-RYL IRCICA/LIFL, Université de Lille 1 CNRS UMR 8022, INRIA Futurs, France http://www.lifl.fr/~simplot [email protected]

RFID, sensors, and security

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David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

RFID Tags and Communicating Sensors: Overview of Security Aspects

David SIMPLOT-RYL

IRCICA/LIFL, Université de Lille 1CNRS UMR 8022, INRIA Futurs, France

http://www.lifl.fr/~simplot [email protected]

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Outline

Introduction

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

RFID Tags

Smart labelsRadio Frequency Identification Tag

By opposition to bar code which use optical principles

A strongly limited component:500 times smaller than a classical microprocessor

Chip with a size of some mm²RFID Tag

Intel Pentium 4

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Principle

Typically, RFID Tags are passive components: they have no battery!Tag are powered by electromagnetic field generated by reader

Communication from reader device to vicinity tags: amplitude shift keying (ASK)Communication from tags to reader device: impedance shift keying (ISK)

courtesy Intersoft

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

EAS Application

Electronic Article SurveillanceOnce powered, the tag emitsThe reader listen channel and activate alarm as early as transmission is detectedDuring checkout, the tag is burned out

Problem: power and hear the tag whatever the tag orientation

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Current smart labels

RFID Tag can memorize information

Up to 256 bytes for present generationsRewritable (flash memory)Or not (write once)Can be protected by password

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Substitute of bar code

Low-cost bar codeless than one cents (€)

High cost for interrogator device

Static information Limited information

~ ten digits (decimal)NB. Systemd that extend bar code capabilities exist (code-barre 2D, etc…)

High-cost tagsTen cents (€)

Lost cost for interrogator device

Dynamic information Significant information

capabilityKilobit order ~ several digit hundreds

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Substitute of bar code (2)

Provided information concerns a collection of objects and requires centralized system

Security relies on centralized system

Unidirectional optical communication

Direct line of sightHandlingSensitive to dust…

Information relative to the object

Can be completed by centralized system

Security at tag levelFight against falsification

RF communicationNo Line of Sight

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Substitute of bar code (3)

Item by item scanning Scanning of set of items

Batch identificationNo handling

Fast identification More than 200 tags per

second

courtesy to Mike Marsh

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Batch identification protocols

Protocol which aims to collect without error all ID or data of tags while minimizing identification time

Collision management (simultaneous transmissions)Avoid tag missing/lostMaximize identification speed

It is MAC layer(medium access)

AlohaCSMA/CD, FDMA, CDMAtoo complex…

Dedicated protocolsSuperTag (Aloha)TIRIS de Texas Instrument (tree based algorithm)I•Code de Phillips (idem)STAC de TagSys/LIFL (adaptive round)

Centralized configurationIntelligence in interrogator device ⇒ simple and low-cost tags

Champ électromagnétique du lecteur

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Applications

Batch identification

Marathon Automatic clocking in

Automatic luggage sorting

Automatic inventory50 items in less than one second

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Networking the physical world

RF Tag

Networked Tag Readers

SavantControlSystem

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

More POPS, smaller POPS…

100µm

Courtesy, Alien Technology

* POPS = Portable Objects Proved to be Safe(e.g. smartcards, RFID, sensors, smastdust…)

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

The MIT Auto-ID Center Vision of “the internet of things” Co

urte

sy, A

uto-

ID C

ente

r

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Auto-ID Center classification

Class V tags Readers. Can power other Class I, II and III tags;

Communicate with Classes IV and V.

Class IV tags: Active tags with

broad-band peer-to-peer communication

Class III tags:semi-passive RFID tags

Class II tags: passive tags with additional

functionality

Class 0/Class I:read-only passive tags

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Sensor applications

Military applications:(4C’s) Command, control, communications, computingIntelligence, surveillance, reconnaissanceTargeting systems

Health careMonitor patientsAssist disabled patients

Commercial applicationsManaging inventoryMonitoring product quality

Misc.Monitoring disaster areas Home security

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Sensor Nets for Search and Rescue

Inactive Sensor

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Sensor Nets for Search and Rescue

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Sensor Nets for Search and Rescue

Active Sensor

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Privacy risks

Privacy Risks for Consumers and EnterprisesPrivacy advocates decry the risks of RFID: silent physical tracking of consumers and inventorying of their possessions. For businesses too, RFID introduces new privacy and security risks -- and a whole new dimension to corporate espionage. See CNIL recommendations

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

500 Eurosin wallet

Serial numbers:597387,389473

Wigmodel #4456

(cheap polyester)

30 items of lingerie

The Times(paid with Amex card 345882299)

Pack of cigarettes(fourth pack this week)

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Privacy risks

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Privacy risks

There are well-known techniques to deal with this issue…My GSM could be identified by any fake BTS

What is the difference with RFID ?

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Medium is different

“Tree-walking” protocol for identifying RFID tags

000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111

00 01 10 11

0 1

?

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Low cost RFID tags

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Low cost?

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Trade-off security vs cost

Cost ~ number of transistorsSecurity level ~ effort the pirate has to produce

NB. High similarity between RFID evolution and smartcard history

Security level

Cos

t

Research efforts

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Tag privacy approaches

DesactivationReactivation problem

Public-key based protocolHeavyweight

User interventionNot user friendly :-)

Blocker tagInterference when identification is needed

Silent tree-walkingJust kidding

One-time identifiersPseudonym tags

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Tag Authentication

Threats:Cloning and forgery

Approaches:Track and trace Anticipate movements, detect and report frauds Effort on network infrastructure

Challenge-response Heavyweight Tamper resistance is required

Static authentication Cloning is not addressed

Idem with public-key Heavyweight

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Security on network infrastructure

Threats:Disclosure of information about tagsModificationTraffic analysis, etc.

Challenges:Tag databases potentially need to be available to many parties Suppliers, retailers, consumers, auditors, …

Information about a given tag may be managed in many places, and/or may change hands over timeReader security

Classical challenges in software infrastructure (middleware)!The challenge is the size of the database

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Localization and positioningExample of DV-hop triangulation:

Base station (position known)Sensors

Security problems in sensor networks (1)

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Positioning

Room = 10m x 10m

PrecisionHop = ± 43 cm

ν = ± 35 cm

RSS = ± 18 cm

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Coverage and exposure problemsCoverage problem Quality of service (surveillance) that can be provided by a particular

sensor network Activity scheduling (nodes can sleep while preserving surveillance

surveillance)Exposure problem A measure of how well an object, moving on an arbitrary path, can

be observed by the sensor network over a period of time

Security problems in sensor networks (2)

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Security problems in sensor networks (3)

Dissemination and data gathering

Flooding is used to build gathering treesBuilding suitable gathering trees is an open questionFlooding is a beaconless protocol but energy consumingData fusion is possible along transmission

bottleneck

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Security problems in sensor networks (4)

The problem is to detect and isolate misbehavior nodes

Some techniques:Group key managementReputation mechanismVirtual currency to enhance cooperation

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

Conclusion

We can learn a lot from smartcard historyShortcuts are preferred to replay :-)

Privacy/AuthenticationChallenges are in cost/security tradeoffNew authentication protocols?

Middleware issuesGo beyond of simple “re-painting”Performance issues are the important problem

Sensor networksGroup key managementSimilarities with security in ad hoc network (of course)

Operating SystemMobile code (not for now)

David SIMPLOT-RYLRFID tags and communicating sensors

Security@INRIA13 décembre 2005

RFID Tags and Communicating Sensors: Overview of Security Aspects

David SIMPLOT-RYL

IRCICA/LIFL, Université de Lille 1CNRS UMR 8022, INRIA Futurs, France

http://www.lifl.fr/~simplot [email protected]