Rwc

October 2011Too big to fail? Inside the battle to save the income investor

Introduction to RWC Partners Equity Income & Value Funds

2

• Nick Purves, Ian Lance and John Teahan launched in October 2010

• Current AUM for the team is approximately £1bn

• 2 Fund offerings

• RWC Enhanced Income – 7% yield UK Equity Income fund with call writing overlay

• RWC Income Opportunities – UK centric equity income fund with added flexibility

Issues in the UK Equity Income Sector

This creates a number of problems for investors

• Size reduces investable universe

• Yield restriction forces exposure to big dividend payers and creates commonality between the funds. These stocks are not always going to be under valued

• This can lead to large position sizes in the big dividend payers which increases stock specific risk e.g. BP

• Size also tends to lead to over diversification (80-100 stocks)

RWC Income funds specifically designed to mitigate these problems

• Funds sizes will always reflect a prudent approach to capacity and risk management – i.e. they won’t grow too big

• Overseas flexibility and covered calls allow income targets to be reached without taking additional risk

• We have a flat holding structure of 3-4% position sizes – investment views not the index define position sizing

• We have a focused fund of 25 stocks

• These funds should absolutely be considered along side traditional UK equity income funds

Key Features of the Equity Income Sector

• Large sector (£54bn) dominated by small number of large funds

• Over half of the sectors assets are managed by four firms

• FTSE is a restrictive Index

• Three sectors represent 50%

• Seven stocks paying out over 50% of income available

• IMA Sector limitations

• 80% in UK equities and

• Yield 110% of FTSE All Share Index

3

4

Why Now is the Right Time to Consider this Approach

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UK Base Rate US Fed Funds Rate

Monetary Policy Designed to Boost Asset Prices..

• Interest rates have been below average for the past decade and are now at emergency levels

• At some point, they are likely to normalise

• Cash is not attractive but low rates have driven up nearly all other asset classes

“Easier financial conditions will promote economic growth. For example, lower mortgage rates will make housing more affordable and allow more homeowners to refinance. Lower corporate bond rates will encourage investment. And higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending”

Ben Bernanke, 4th Nov 2010

5Source: Bloomberg

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1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

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e-E

arni

ngs

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io (

CA

PE

)

Year

1901 1966

2000

Price-Earnings Ratio

1981

1921

1929

21

Equities at High Valuation

6Source: Robert Shiller, 2011

Historically adjusted price to earnings ratio of S&P 500 index

Current Valuation implies Below Average Future Returns

7Source: Robert Shiller, Morgan Stanley

10-year annualised total returns by starting G&D PE

10-155-10 20-25 25-3015-20

Bonds Yields are at 220 Year Lows!

8

• Owning bonds now only makes sense if you believe in deflation

• Examples of prolonged deflation are rare (US 1930’s, Japan 1990’s) especially after the ending of the gold

standard

• Of 24 largest economies, only Switzerland has averaged inflation below 3% since 1900

• Much more typical pattern is banking crisis default inflation (12 since 1977)

9

Are Bonds Less Risky or Just Less Volatile than Equities?

Source: Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2011

Standard Deviation of Returns1900 – 2010

UK US

Equities 20.0% 20.3%

Bonds 13.7% 10.2%

• Bonds are less ‘volatile’ than equities but produce lower returns in the long run

• But ‘risk’ is a function of starting valuation

• A combination of low starting yield and rising inflation is disastrous for bonds (but good for governments to inflate away their debt)

• A buyer of UK bonds in 1946 lost 73% of value in real terms by 1974 and did not break even until 1993

• Is post WW2 Government induced financial repression repeating itself today?

End of the Debt Super Cycle?

• For thirty years, consumers, corporates and governments lived beyond their means – the debt supercycle

• This had profound implications for all asset prices (equity, bonds, houses etc)

• The next decade is likely to be a period of deleveraging

• This will likely mean lower growth, higher unemployment and greater volatility

• In an environment of deleveraging and low growth, compounding income could once again be a superior strategy

10

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Households Corporates Financials GSEs Government

US Total Debt as % of GDP

Source:, Federal Resrve 2010

11

The Importance of Dividends

Source: GMO, August 2010, RWC Estimates

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

1871 - 2009 1982 - 2000 2000 - 2009 2011 - 2020 Estimate

The Importance of Dividends (S&P 500)

Dividend Yield Change in Real Dividends Change in Valuation

Valuation Matters: Quality is important but not at any price

12Source: Empirical Research Partners1 Large cap stocks.2 Std. Error of Net Operating Earnings Growth over five years3 Large cap stocks (ex financials & utilities) annualised rates of return 1965 – August 2010

FactorReturn Spread

Best & Worst Quintile

Price-to-Book Value 4.2%

Net Debt-to-Capital 1.3%

ROIC 0.4%

Earnings Stability2 0.0%

Annualised Nominal Monthly Returns3

Quality factorQuintile

1 – 4 AverageWorst Quintile Difference

ROIC 15.2% 8.2% 7.0%

Net Debt-to-Capital 14.6% 11.3% 3.3%

Earnings Stability2 15.1% 9.6% 5.5%

Relative Returns1 for the One Year Holding Periods 1955 – May 2010

Quality factors within cheapest Price-to-Book Quintile

Valuation still matters

Buying ‘good’ companies that are fully priced does not add value

• Within the subset of cheap companies, differentiating by quality improves returns

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011

13Source: Nomura Strategy research, Worldscope, FTSE , ExShare

Large Cap High Quality Equities is One of the Few Areas to Become Cheaper

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Price to Book of European high ROE/ high FCF ROE stocks Price to Book of US high ROE/ high FCF ROE stocks

Why?

• De rating from over valuation in 2000

• Baby boomers retiring and selling equities

• Assets shift from equities to private equity, alternatives, EMD and High Yield, commodities

• Within equities, shift to small cap and emerging markets

Johnson and Johnson

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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

EPS DPS Price Price/Earnings

• Since 2000, Earnings per share +186%, Dividends per share +211%, Share price +13%

• Price/earnings ratio at lowest level for 20 years

Source: Bloomberg, company report and accounts

Opportunity in Lowly Valued, High Quality, Income Paying Equities

15Source: Bloomberg, Consensus Estimates, August 2011. 10 year corporate bond yields where available.

CompanyFree Cash Flow Yield

Dividend YieldPotential Dividend Growth

Corporate Bond Yield

AstraZeneca 13% 5.3% 8% 2.8%

GlaxoSmithKline 11% 5.0% 6% 3.5%

Vodafone 10% 6.0% 4% 4.1%

RSA Insurance 13% 8.0% 5% N/A

Legal and General 11% 4.7% 6% N/A

Next 11% 3.8% 7% 5.3%

Deutsche Telekom 15% 7.2% 8% 4.5%

K.P.N. 15% 8.5% 7% 4.4%

Merck 10% 4.2% 6% 3.7%

Pfizer 10% 3.8% 6% 3.8%

Microsoft 11% 2.4% 9% 3.5%

Johnson and Johnson 8% 3.4% 5% 3.5%

10 Year Gilt 2.3%

US 10 Year Treasury 1.8%

+=

Bond Equity Conundrum

• In corporate debt, yield increases as credit quality reduces

• In equities, highest quality companies currently have highest dividend yield

Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg

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AAA AA A BBB BB B NR

Dividend Yield 10yr Bond Yield

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Industry volumes BAT volume Sales Operating prof its EPS Dividend Share price

Annualis

ed

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wth

Decliningindustry

Market sharegrowth

Price/miximprovements

Marginimprovement

Share count reduction

Increasedpayout ratio

Valuation re-rating

17Source: RWC Partners, 2010, company report and accounts

Growth Rates for BAT 2001 to 2010

Cash Generation (not Sales Growth) Drives Value Creation

1% p.a. volume growth

17% p.a. increase in share price

• Strong cash generation, good use of cash and low starting valuation lead to attractive total returns for shareholders

• This is now understood by investors and fully reflected in the share price

Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Cash from operations 3246 3265 3225 3989 4203 4761

Capital expenditure -3007 -3714 -3991 -4427 -4641 -5047

Free cash flow 239 -449 -766 -438 -438 -286

Dividend paid -688 -1229 -1378 -1455 -1537 -1623

Change in net debt -449 -1678 -2144 -1893 -1975 -1909

Net debt (cash) 22139 23817 25961 27854 29829 31738

Source: Morgan Stanley estimates at February 2011

Utility Companies Fail to Meet Our Criteria

• Regulated to only make returns in line with cost of capital

• Poor cash generation

• Highly levered balance sheet

• Dividends not covered by free cash flow

Example: National Grid

18

But what’s the catalyst?

19

Company(Market Cap)

Previous Capital Returns Recent Asset Disposal Future Capital Return

Deutsche Telekom(€48bn)

Attempted sale of T Mobile USA to AT&T for $39bn

$15bn debt reduction €5bn share re-purchase. Expected €3.7bn dividend and €400m share re-purchase on ongoing basis

KPN

(€16bn)

In last 7 years, have paid €6.8bn in dividends and retired €9bn of equity i.e. nearly 100% of market cap

Total share holder return to be €2.2bn p.a. (€1.2 dividend, €1bn share re-purchase) or 14% of market cap

Vodafone

(£86bn)

Re-purchased £20bn of equity and paid out £20bn in dividends in last six years

Sale of 44% stake in SFR to Vivendi for £6.8bn

£4bn of SFR proceeds used for share re-purchase. Dividend of £4.8bn likely to rise to £7.6bn when Verizon Wireless starts paying a dividend

Pfizer

($165bn)

Sale of Capsugel to KKR for $2.4bn

In excess of $5bn share re-purchase during 2011. Exploring sales of non-core businesses with revenues of $10bn

AstraZeneca

($73bn)

Have re-purchased $14bn of equity and paid $17bn in dividends in last 7 years

Will return 50% of post-tax, pre R&D cash (approx $6bn p.a) in dividends and share re-purchases

Next

(£4bn)

Has bought back £2.3bn of shares and paid £1.1bn dividends since 2000

In the next 5 years, Next are forecast to pay £800m in dividends and retire £1.2bn in equity (50% of market cap)

21%1%

16%

7%

26% 4%

15%

1%

9%

20

Cash

TelecomsDeutsche Telecom 4%KPN 4%Swisscom 3%Vodafone 5%

Consumer ServicesNext 4%Wal-Mart 2%

PharmaceuticalsAstra Zeneca 5%Eli Lilly 4%GlaxoSmithKline 5%Johnson and Johnson 3%Merck & Co 4%Pfizer 5%

EnergyBP 4%

InsuranceLegal and General 4%Old Mutual 3%RSA Insurance 4%Standard Life 4%

Other Financials

TechnologyHewlett-Packard 3%Logica 3%Microsoft 4%

Source: RWC, September,2011. Positions less than 2% excluded

Current Portfolio Breakdown – RWC Income Opportunities Fund

Swaptions

RWC Equity Income and Value - summary

• Issues with UK Equity Income sector

• Large sector dominated by small number of firms

• UK index now highly concentrated

• IMA sector limitations

• RWC funds offer long term benefits of income investing but without the constraints

• Monetary policy led to high valuations

• Bond yields offer no protection from higher inflation

• Significant opportunities for good absolute returns now exist in large cap, high quality equities

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Appendix

22

Investment Process: businesses with a historically attractive ROE

• For high return businesses intrinsic value grows over time; low return businesses see intrinsic value decline

• Returns tend to mean revert – but around different levels

• We look for companies where profits mean revert to a high level but where this is not factored into share prices

Source: CSFB Holt / BloombergCFROI – Cash Flow Return on Investment

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1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

%

British Airways - Historic and Predicted CFROI

CFROI Discount rate Average

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-5

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%

Next PLC - Historic and Predicted CFROI

CFROI % Discount rate Average

0

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1000

1500

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2500

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Next PLC

Last Price

0100200300400500600700800

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

British Airways

Last Price

24

Investment Process: stocks with low valuations based on sustainable cash flows

MicrosoftAstraZeneca

Source: CSFB Holt, September 2011

• Healthcare businesses historically make mid-teens real cash

returns

• Investors worried about patent challenges and US healthcare

reform are pricing for mid single digit returns

• One of the strongest technology franchises in the world with

amongst the highest returns in the sector

• Now priced to make a return below cost of capital

AstraZeneca – good business where market is sceptical about sustainability of returns

Microsoft – share price assumes returns fade to below below cost of capital

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35

1991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021

CFROI % Future CFROI implied by current share price Average CFROI %

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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

CFROI % Future CFRIO implied by current share price Average CFROI %

25

Rio TintoBritish American Tobacco

Source: CSFB Holt, November 2010

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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

CFROI % Average CFROI % Future CFROI implied by current share price

• Tobacco returns have risen significantly in the last decade…

• But are now priced to remain at the all time high level for 10 years

• Commodity businesses such as mining typically make returns

below cost of capital

• Recent benefit from price rise of metals is being extrapolated into

the future

Investment Process: both price and quality matter

BAT – a good business where future high profitability is reflected in the share price hence we have no exposure to the tobacco sector

RIO – historically a poor business where the market is now willing to believe the future will be different from the past. We have no exposure to the mining sector

-60%

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11

SJP Equity Income Performance (Net) FTSE All-Share

Source: RWC Partners / Bloomberg. Data is shown for the period 29/12/2000 to 31/08/2011 net of fees. Equity index used is FTSE All share (TR).

Note that Nick Purves has been responsible for the SJP Equity Income Fund since 29/12/2000 during that time he has been employed by both Schroders and RWC Partners

Past performance is not a guide to the future. The price of investments and the income from them may fall as well as rise and investors may not get back the full amount invested2626

SJP Equity Income vs FTSE Allshare

Data to end August 2011 6 months % 12 months % 3 years % 10 years %

SJP Equity Income Fund % -11.95 -2.32 11.37 74.66

FTSE All Share Index % -9.14 7.16 7.52 49.59

Investment Performance (net of fees)

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10

SJP Equity Income vs FTSE Allshare

SJP Equity Income Performance (Net) FTSE All-Share

1 year %

3 years%

5 years%

Schroder Income Fund +62.4 +10.4 +51.7

FTSE All Share +52.3 -0.7 +41.3

Sector average +45.9 -10.7 +24.5

Rank 7/83 1/73 1/63

Quartile 1 1 1

Investment Performance

Source: Lipper Hindsight, bid to bid, net income reinvested, as at 31/03/2010* November 2005

1 year %

3 years%

Since Launch*%

Schroder Income Maximiser Fund +54.3 +9.2 +32.1

FTSE All Share +52.3 -0.7 +25.3

Sector Average +45.9 -10.7 +14.5

Rank 14/83 3/73 6/63

Quartile 1 1 1

27

Equity Income and Value: portfolio management team

Nick Purves – portfolio manager

• Joined RWC Partners in August 2010 to launch specialist value and income franchise

• 16 years at Schroders – senior portfolio manager

• Manager of Schroder Income Fund since 2003 and Schroder Income Maximiser Fund since launch in 2005

• Schroder Income Fund ranked 1st (out of 57) in its sector during period under management

• Schroder Income Fund: Morningstar five star rated, OBSR AA rated, Winner of Moneywise fund awards 2009 UK Equity Income and Equity Income and Growth

• Schroder Income Maximiser: Morningstar five star rated, OBSR A rated, Winner of Lipper Fund Awards 2010 UK Equity Income, Winner of Trustnet 2009 UK Equity Income

• Manager of St James’s Place Equity Income Fund since 2001

• UK Institutional Specialist Value Fund Manager

• Total of £5bn under management

• Qualified as Chartered Accountant in 1993 with KPMG

• Graduated from Bristol University in 1989

28


Ian Lance – portfolio manager

• Joined RWC Partners in August 2010 to launch specialist value and income franchise

• 22 years experience

• Joined Schroders in 2007

• Manager of Schroder Income Fund and Schroder Income Maximiser Fund

• Schroder Income Fund ranked first in the sector during period managed

• Schroder Income Fund: Morningstar five star rated, OBSR AA rated, Winner of Moneywise fund awards 2009 UK Equity Income and Equity Income and Growth

• Schroder Income Maximiser: Morningstar five star rated, OBSR A rated, Winner of Lipper Fund Awards 2010 UK Equity Income, Winner of Trustnet 2009 UK Equity Income

• UK Institutional Specialist Value Fund Manager

• £5bn under management

• Previously Head of European Equities and Director of Research at Citigroup Asset Management and Head of Global Research at Gartmore

• Graduated from Loughborough University in 1988

29


John Teahan – portfolio manager

• Joined RWC Partners in September 2010

• Joined Schroders in 2003

• Employed as Fund Manager managing structured investment funds in the Multi Asset and Structured Investments department

• Specialized in trading and managing derivative securities for a range of structured funds

• Co-managed the Schroder Income Maximiser from launch in 2005 to May 2009

• Co-managed the Schroder European Dividend Maximiser and Schroder Global Dividend Maximiser funds

• Previously worked as a performance and risk analyst for Bank of Ireland Asset Management UK

• Investment career commenced in 2000

• Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Charterholder. Member of UK Society of Investment Professionals (UKSIP).

• Graduated from Trinity College Dublin with a BA (Hons.) Economics and Politics in 2000, attained MA from Trinity College in 2009

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Equity Income and Value Funds

RWC Income Opportunities RWC Enhanced Income

Launch date 30th September 2010 13th October 2010

Currency GBP GBP

Description A UK centric, diversified Equity Income portfolio A UK Equity Income portfolio with a covered call overlay aiming for a steady 7% p.a. yield

Objectives To maximise total return whilst providing an attractive absolute dividend yield. To reduce volatility through increased flexibility to invest outside UK equities

To provide a very attractive dividend yield and an element of capital appreciation over time

Reference Index FTSE Allshare FTSE Allshare

Target Yield At least 110% of the FTSE Allshare A stable 7% per annum

Style Intrinsic Value Intrinsic Value

Composition of Fund UK EquitiesCashOverseas equitiesOther (corporate bonds)

More than 50%0% - 15%20% - 45%0% - 10%

UK EquitiesCashOverseas equitiesOther (corporate bonds)

More than 80%0% - 15% 0% - 20%0% – 10%

Covered Call Writing Rarely but opportunistically Usually >90% of Equity portfolio

Distribution Frequency Quarterly Quarterly

Typical number of stocks 25-50 25-50

Sector Exposure Maximum 30%, no minimum Maximum 30%, no minimum

Stock Exposure Maximum 10% of fund in a single stock Maximum 10% of fund in a single stock

Currency Exposure Non-GBP investments typically hedged back to GBP Non-GBP investments not typically hedged back to GBP

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This document contains information relating to RWC Partners Limited and RWC Asset Management LLP (collectively, “RWC Partners”), each of which is authorised and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), and services provided by them and may also contain information relating to certain products managed or advised by RWC Partners (“RWC Funds”).

RWC Partners may act as investment manager or adviser, or otherwise provide services, to more than one product pursuing a similar investment strategy or focus to the product detailed in this document. RWC Partners seeks to minimise any conflicts of interest, and endeavours to act at all times in accordance with its legal and regulatory obligations as well as its own policies and codes of conduct.

The services provided by RWC Partners are available only for and this document is directed only at, persons that qualify as Professional Clients or Eligible Counterparties under rules of the FSA. It is not intended for distribution to and should not be relied on by any person who would qualify as a Retail Client.

In addition, although certain sub-funds of RWC Funds SICAV are recognised schemes for the purposes of Section 264 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of the United Kingdom (“FSMA”), all other RWC Funds are unregulated collective investment schemes for the purposes the FSMA, the promotion of which either in or from the United Kingdom is restricted by law. Accordingly, this document is issued and approved by RWC Partners Limited for communication by RWC Partners only to, and is directed only at, persons reasonably believed by it to be of a kind to whom it may communicate financial promotions relating to unregulated collective investment schemes by virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) (Exemptions) Order 2001, as amended (the “Order”), or the Conduct of Business Rules of the FSA. Such persons include: (i) persons outside the United Kingdom; (ii) persons having professional experience of participating in unregulated collective investment schemes; and (iii) high net worth bodies corporate, partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts, etc. falling within Article 22 of the Order. Any unregulated collective investment schemes described herein are available only to such persons, and persons of any other description may not rely on the information in this document.

Where this document is received outside the United Kingdom, it is the responsibility of every person reading this document to satisfy himself as to the full observance of the laws of any relevant country, including obtaining any government or other consent which may be required or observing any other formality which needs to be observed in that country. Nothing in this document constitutes an offer or solicitation by anyone in any jurisdiction in which such an offer is not authorised or to any person to whom it is unlawful to make such an offer or solicitation. Interests in RWC Funds are available only in jurisdictions where their promotion and sale are permitted.

No person receiving this document may further distribute it, or copies of it, to any other person or publish any of its contents, in whole or in part, for any purpose.

This document is provided for informational purposes only. The information contained in it is subject to updating, completion, modification and amendment. RWC Partners does not accept any liability (whether direct or indirect) arising from the reliance on or other use of the information contained in it. The information set out in this document is to the reasonable belief of RWC Partners, reliable and accurate at the date hereof, but is subject to change without notice. In producing this document, RWC Partners may have relied on information obtained from third parties and no representation or guarantee is made hereby with respect to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Performance figures and data analysis within this document are shown and calculated net of fees and expenses and represent the reinvestment of dividends and income. Market index information shown within this document is included to show relative market performance for the periods indicated and not as standards of comparison. Such broadly based indices are unmanaged and differ in numerous respects from the portfolio composition of RWC Funds.

This document does not constitute offer or solicitation to anyone in any jurisdiction of or to acquire interests in any RWC Fund. Investment in any RWC Fund should be considered high risk. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results and may not be repeated. The value of investments in RWC Funds and the income from them may fall as well as rise and may be subject to sudden and substantial falls. Changes in rates of exchange may cause the value of such investments to fluctuate. An investor may not be able to get back the amount invested and the loss on realisation may be very high and could result in a substantial or complete loss of the investment. In addition, an investor who realises their investment in RWC Funds after a short period may not realise the amount originally invested as a result of charges made on the issue and/or redemption of such investment. The value of such interests for the purposes of purchases may differ from their value for the purpose of redemptions. No representations or warranties of any kind are intended or should be inferred with respect to the economic return from, or the tax consequences of, an investment in RWC Funds. Current tax levels and reliefs may change. Depending on individual circumstances, this may affect investment returns. There is no guarantee that the securities referred to in this document will be held by RWC Funds in the future. Nothing in this document constitutes advice on the merits of buying or selling a particular investment. This document does not constitute investment, legal or tax advice.

This document expresses no views as to the suitability or appropriateness of the RWC Funds or any other investments described herein to the individual circumstances of any recipient. Potential investors in the RWC Funds should refer to the latest relevant Full Prospectus, Simplified Prospectus and latest Annual and Interim Reports for more information.

A United Kingdom investor may not have the right (otherwise provided under the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance) to cancel any agreement constituted by acceptance by or on behalf of an RWC Fund of an application for interests in an RWC Fund. In addition, most if not all of the protections provided by the United Kingdom regulatory structure will not apply to investments in an RWC Fund. Shareholders in an RWC Fund will not receive compensation under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the United Kingdom in the event that the fund is unable or likely to be unable to satisfy claims against it.

This document is issued by RWC Partners Limited, a company registered in England and Wales (No. 03517613) with its registered address at 60 Petty France, London SW1H 9EU.

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