Actas literales de los debatesDoslovný záznam ze zasedání

Fuldstændigt forhandlingsreferatAusführlicher Sitzungsberichte

Istungi stenogrammΠλήρη Πρακτικά των συζητήσεων

Verbatim report of proceedingsCompte rendu in extenso des débats

Resoconto integrale delle discussioniDebašu stenogramma

Posėdžio stenogramaAz ülések szó szerinti jegyzőkönyveRapporti VerbatimVolledig verslag van de vergaderingenPełne sprawozdanie z obradRelato integral dos debatesDoslovný zápis z rokovaniaDobesedni zapisi razpravSanatarkat istuntoselostuksetFullständigt förhandlingsreferat

Edición provisional - Prozatímní vydání - Foreløbig udgave - Vorläufige Ausgabe - Esialgne versioon - Προσωρινή έκδοση - Provisional edition - Edition provisoire - Edizione provvisoria - Pagaidu versija - Negalutinė redakcija - Ideiglenes kiadás - Edizzjoni proviżorja Voorlopige uitgave - Wydanie tymczasowe - Edição provisória - Predbežné vydanie - Začasna verzija - Väliaikainen versio - Preliminär utgåva

2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 9

MARTES - ÚTERÝ - TIRSDAG - DIENSTAG - TEISIPÄEV - ΤΡΙΤΗ - TUESDAY - MARDI MARTEDI’ - OTRDIENA ANTRADIENIS - KEDD - TLIETA - DINSDAG - WTOREK TERÇA-FEIRA - UTOROK - TOREK - TIISTAI - TISDAG

ÍNDICE

16. 11. 2004................................................................. 91 - Apertura de la sesión .............................................. 92 - Aprobación del Acta de la sesión anterior: Véase el

Acta ....................................................................... 93 - Presentación de documentos: Véase el Acta ............ 94 - Transferencias de créditos: Véase el Acta................ 95 - Debates sobre casos de violaciones de los derechos

humanos, de la democracia y del Estado de Derecho(anuncio de las propuestas de resoluciónpresentadas): véase el Acta ..................................... 9

6 - Demanda de amparo de la inmunidad parlamentaria:Véase acta.............................................................. 9

7 - Venta de armas....................................................... 98 - Misión ALTHEA en Bosnia y Herzegovina .......... 209 - Comunidad turcochipriota..................................... 2710 - Cambios climáticos............................................. 3711 - Envases y residuos de envases............................. 4212 - Situación en Cuba............................................... 4813 - Orden del día de la próxima sesión: véase el Acta 5714 - Cierre de la sesión .............................................. 57

OBSAH

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Zahájení zasedání ................................................... 92 - Schválení zápisu z předchozího zasedání: viz zápis . 93 - Předloení dokumentů: viz zápis............................. 94 - Převody prostředků: viz zápis ................................. 95 - Rozpravy o případech poruování lidských práv,

demokracie a právního státu (oznámení předloenýchnávrhů usnesení): viz zápis ..................................... 9

6 - ádost o ochranu parlamentní imunity: viz zápis ..... 97 - Obchod se zbraněmi ............................................... 98 - Mise ALTHEA v Bosně a Hercegovině................. 209 - Turecká komunita na Kypru.................................. 2710 - Klimatické změny............................................... 3711 - Obaly a obalové odpady...................................... 4212 - Situace na Kubě.................................................. 4813 - Pořad jednání přítího zasedání: viz zápis............ 5714 - Konec zasedání................................................... 57

INDHOLD

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Åbning af mødet..................................................... 92 - Godkendelse af protokollen fra det foregående møde:

se protokollen ........................................................ 93 - Modtagne dokumenter: se protokollen .................... 94 - Bevillingsoverførsler: se protokollen ...................... 95 - Debat om tilfælde af krænkelse af

menneskerettighederne, demokratiet ogretsstatsprincippet (meddelelse om indgivnebeslutningsforslag): se protokollen ......................... 9

6 - Anmodning om beskyttelse af parlamentariskimmunitet: se protokollen....................................... 9

7 - Våbenhandel .......................................................... 98 - Althea-missionen i Bosnien-Hercegovina ............. 209 - Det tyrkisk-cypriotiske samfund ........................... 2710 - Klimaændringer ................................................. 3711 - Emballage og emballageaffald ............................ 4212 - Situationen i Cuba .............................................. 4813 - Dagsorden for næste møde: se protokollen .......... 5714 - Hævelse af mødet ............................................... 57

INHALT

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Eröffnung der Sitzung ............................................ 92 - Genehmigung des Protokolls der vorangegangenen

Sitzung: siehe Protokoll.......................................... 93 - Vorlage von Dokumenten: siehe Protokoll .............. 94 - Mittelübertragungen: siehe Protokoll ...................... 95 - Debatten über Fälle von Verletzungen der

Menschenrechte, der Demokratie und derRechtsstaatlichkeit (Bekanntgabe der eingereichtenEntschließungsanträge): siehe Protokoll.................. 9

6 - Antrag auf Verteidigung der parlamentarischenImmunität: siehe Protokoll ..................................... 9

7 - Waffenausfuhren.................................................... 98 - Althea-Mission in Bosnien und Herzegowina........ 209 - Türkische Gemeinschaft Zyperns.......................... 2710 - Klimawandel...................................................... 3711 - Verpackungen und Verpackungsabfälle .............. 4212 - Lage in Kuba...................................................... 4813 - Tagesordnung der nächsten Sitzung: siehe Protokoll

............................................................................ 5714 - Schluss der Sitzung ............................................ 57

4 16-11-2004

SISUKORD

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Istungi algus ........................................................... 92 - Eelmise istungi protokolli kinnitamine: vt protokoll 93 - Saadud dokumendid: vt protokoll............................ 94 - Assigneeringute ümberpaigutamine: vt protokoll..... 95 - Inimõiguste, demokraatia ja õigusriigi põhimõtete

rikkumise juhtumite arutamine (esitatud resolutsiooniettepanekute tutvustamine): vt protokoll ................. 9

6 - Parlamentaarse immuniteedi kaitsmise taotlus: vtprotokoll ................................................................ 9

7 - Relvamüük............................................................. 98 - ALTHEA missioon Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinas........ 209 - Küprose türgi kogukond ....................................... 2710 - Kliimamuutused ................................................. 3711 - Pakendid ja pakendijäätmed................................ 4212 - Olukord Kuubas ................................................. 4813 - Järgmise istungi päevakord: vt protokolli ............ 5714 - Istungi lõpp ........................................................ 57

ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Έναρξη της συνεδρίασης ........................................ 92 - Έγκριση των συνοπτικών πρακτικών τηςπροηγούµενης συνεδρίασης: βλ. ΣυνοπτικάΠρακτικά ............................................................... 9

3 - Κατάθεση εγγράφων: βλ. Συνοπτικά Πρακτικά ....... 94 - Μεταφορές πιστώσεων: βλ. Συνοπτικά Πρακτικά.... 95 - Συζήτηση για περιπτώσεις παραβίασης τωνανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτων, της δηµοκρατίας και τουκράτους δικαίου (ανακοίνωση των προτάσεωνψηφίσµατος που έχουν κατατεθεί): βλ. ΣυνοπτικάΠρακτικά ............................................................... 9

6 - Αίτηση υπεράσπισης βουλευτικής ασυλίας: βλέπεΣυνοπτικά Πρακτικά .............................................. 9

7 - Πωλήσεις όπλων .................................................... 98 - Αποστολή ALTHEA στη Βοσνία-Ερζεγοβίνη ....... 209 - Τουρκοκυπριακή κοινότητα.................................. 2710 - Κλιµατικές αλλαγές ............................................ 3711 - Συσκευασίες και απορρίµµατα συσκευασίας ....... 4212 - Κατάσταση στην Κούβα ..................................... 4813 - Ηµερήσια διάταξη της επόµενης συνεδρίασης: βλ.Συνοπτικά Πρακτικά ............................................ 57

14 - Λήξη της συνεδρίασης ........................................ 57

CONTENTS

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Opening of the sitting ............................................. 92 - Approval of Minutes of previous sitting: see Minutes

.............................................................................. 93 - Beschlüsse betreffend bestimmte Dokumente: siehe

Protokoll................................................................ 94 - Transfers of appropriations: see Minutes................. 95 - Debates on cases of breaches of human rights,

democracy and the rule of law (announcement ofmotions for resolutions tabled): see Minutes ........... 9

6 - Request for the defence of parliamentary immunity:see Minutes............................................................ 9

7 - Arms sales ............................................................. 98 - ALTHEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina ...... 209 - Turkish Cypriot community.................................. 2710 - Climate change................................................... 3711 - Packaging and packaging waste .......................... 4212 - Situation in Cuba................................................ 4813 - Agenda for next sitting: see Minutes ................... 5714 - Closure of sitting................................................ 57

SOMMAIRE

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Ouverture de la séance............................................ 92 - Approbation du procès-verbal de la séance

précédente: voir procès-verbal................................ 93 - Dépôt de documents: voir procès-verbal ................. 94 - Virements de crédits: voir procès-verbal ................. 95 - Débats sur des cas de violation des droits de

l'Homme, de la démocratie et de l'Etat de droit(annonce des propositions de résolution déposées):voir procès-verbal .................................................. 9

6 - Demande de défense d'immunité parlementaire: voirprocès-verbal ......................................................... 9

7 - Vente d'armes......................................................... 98 - Mission ALTHEA en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine ....... 209 - Communauté chypriote turque.............................. 2710 - Changements climatiques ................................... 3711 - Emballages et déchets d'emballages .................... 4212 - Situation à Cuba ................................................. 4813 - Ordre du jour de la prochaine séance: voir procès-

verbal .................................................................. 5714 - Levée de la séance.............................................. 57

16-11-2004 5

INDICE

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Apertura della seduta .............................................. 92 - Approvazione del processo verbale della seduta

precedente: vedasi processo verbale........................ 93 - Presentazione di documenti: vedasi processo verbale

.............................................................................. 94 - Storno di stanziamenti: vedasi processo verbale ...... 95 - Discussioni su casi di violazione dei diritti umani,

della democrazia e dello Stato di diritto(comunicazione delle proposte di risoluzionepresentate): vedasi processo verbale........................ 9

6 - Richiesta di difesa di immunità parlamentare: vedasiprocesso verbale..................................................... 9

7 - Vendita di armi....................................................... 98 - Missione ALTHEA in Bosnia-Erzegovina............. 209 - Comunità turco-cipriota ........................................ 2710 - Cambiamento climatico ...................................... 3711 - Imballaggi e i rifiuti di imballaggio ..................... 4212 - Situazione a Cuba ............................................... 4813 - Ordine del giorno della prossima seduta: vedasi

processo verbale................................................... 5714 - Chiusura della seduta .......................................... 57

SATURS

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Sēdes atklāana....................................................... 92 - Iepriekējās sēdes protokola apstiprināana: sk.

protokolu ............................................................... 93 - Dokumentu iesniegana: sk. protokolu .................... 94 - Apropriāciju pārvietojumi: sk. protokolu................. 95 - Adjournment of the session: see Minutes................. 96 - Pieprasījums aizstāvēt deputāta neaizskaramību: sk.

protokolu ............................................................... 97 - Ieroču pārdoana .................................................... 98 - Operācija "Althea" Bosnijā un Hercegovinā .......... 209 - Kipras turku kopiena ............................................ 2710 - Klimata izmaiņas................................................ 3711 - Iepakojums un izlietotais iepakojums .................. 4212 - Situācija Kubā .................................................... 4813 - Nākamās sēdes darba kārtība: sk. protokolu......... 5714 - Sēdes slēgana.................................................... 57

TURINYS

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Plenarinio posėdio atidarymas............................... 92 - Ankstesnio posėdio protokolo patvirtinimas: r.

protokolą ............................................................... 93 - Dokumentų pateikimas: r. protokolą...................... 94 - Asignavimų perkėlimas: r. protokolą ..................... 95 - Diskusijos dėl mogaus teisių, demokratijos ir

teisinės valstybės paeidimo atvejų (paskelbiamipateikti pasiūlymai dėl rezoliucijų): r. protokolą.... 9

6 - Praymas ginti parlamento nario imunitetą: r.protokolą ............................................................... 9

7 - Prekyba ginklais..................................................... 98 - ALTHEA misija Bosnijoje ir Hercogovinoje......... 209 - Kipro turkų bendruonemė..................................... 2710 - Klimato pokyčiai ................................................ 3711 - Pakuotės ir pakuočių atliekos.............................. 4212 - Padėtis Kuboje ................................................... 4813 - Kito posėdio darbotvarkė: r. protokolą ............. 5714 - Posėdio pabaiga................................................ 57

TARTALOM

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Az ülés megnyitása ................................................ 92 - Az előző ülés jegyzőkönyvének elfogadása: lásd a

jegyzőkönyvet........................................................ 93 - Dokumentumok benyújtása: lásd a jegyzőkönyvet... 94 - Előirányzatok átcsoportosítása: lásd a jegyzőkönyvet

.............................................................................. 95 - Viták az emberi jogok, a demokrácia és a

jogállamiság megsértését érintő ügyekről (benyújtottállásfoglalási indítványok bejelentése): lásd ajegyzőkönyvet........................................................ 9

6 - A parlamenti mentelmi jog érvényesítésére irányulókérelem: lásd a jegyzőkönyvet................................ 9

7 - Fegyvereladás ........................................................ 98 - A bosznia-hercegovinai ALTHEA misszió............ 209 - Ciprusi török közösség ......................................... 2710 - Klimatikus változások ........................................ 3711 - Csomagolás és csomagolási hulladék .................. 4212 - Kubai helyzet ..................................................... 4813 - A következő ülés napirendje: lásd a jegyzőkönyvet

............................................................................ 5714 - Az ülés berekesztése........................................... 57

6 16-11-2004

WERREJ

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Ftuħ tas-seduta ....................................................... 92 - Approvazzjoni tal-Minuti tas-seduta ta' qabel: ara l-

Minuti.................................................................... 93 - Dokumenti mressqa: ara l-minuti ............................ 94 - Trasferiment ta' approprjazzjonijiet: ara l-Minuti..... 95 - Dibattiti dwar każijiet ta' vjolazzjoni tad-drittijiet tal-

bniedem, tad-demokrazija u l-istat tad-dritt (tħabbirta' mozzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjonijiet imressqa): ara l-minuti .................................................................... 9

6 - Talba għall-ħarsien ta' l-immunità parlamentari: ara l-Minuti.................................................................... 9

7 - Bejgħ ta' armi ......................................................... 98 - Missjoni ALTHEA fil-Bożnija Ħerżegovina ......... 209 - Komunità Ċiprijotta-Torka ................................... 2710 - Bdil fil-klima...................................................... 3711 - Ippakkjar u skart mill-ippakkjar .......................... 4212 - Sitwazzjoni f'Kuba.............................................. 4813 - Aġenda tas-seduta li jmiss: ara l-Minuti .............. 5714 - Għeluq tas-seduta ............................................... 57

INHOUD

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Opening van de vergadering ................................... 92 - Goedkeuring van de notulen van de vorige

vergadering: zie notulen ......................................... 93 - Ingekomen stukken: zie notulen .............................. 94 - Kredietoverschrijvingen: zie notulen ....................... 95 - Debatten over gevallen van schending van de

mensenrechten, de democratie en de rechtsstaat(bekendmaking van ingediende ontwerpresoluties):zie notulen ............................................................. 9

6 - Verzoek om verdediging van de immuniteit: zienotulen................................................................... 9

7 - Wapenverkoop ....................................................... 98 - Missie ALTHEA in Bosnië-Herzegovina .............. 209 - Turks-Cypriotische gemeenschap.......................... 2710 - Klimaatverandering ............................................ 3711 - Verpakking en verpakkingsafval ......................... 4212 - Situatie op Cuba ................................................. 4813 - Agenda van de volgende vergadering: zie notulen5714 - Sluiting van de vergadering................................. 57

SPIS TREŚCI

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Otwarcie posiedzenia ............................................. 92 - Zatwierdzenie protokołu poprzedniego posiedzenia:

patrz: protokół........................................................ 93 - Składanie dokumentów: patrz: protokół .................. 94 - Przesunięcie środków: patrz: protokół..................... 95 - Debaty na temat przypadków łamania praw

człowieka, demokracji i państwa prawa (ogłoszeniezłożonych projektów rezolucji): patrz protokół ....... 9

6 - Wniosek o skorzystanie z immunitetuparlamentarnego: patrz: protokół ............................ 9

7 - Sprzedaż broni ....................................................... 98 - Misja ALTHEA w Bośni i Hercegowinie.............. 209 - Turecka wspólnota cypryjska................................ 2710 - Zmiany klimatyczne ........................................... 3711 - Opakowania i odpady opakowaniowe ................. 4212 - Sytuacja na Kubie............................................... 4813 - Porządek dzienny następnego posiedzenia: patrz:

protokół ............................................................... 5714 - Zamknięcie posiedzenia...................................... 57

INDICE

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Abertura da sessão.................................................. 92 - Aprovação da acta da sessão anterior: ver acta ........ 93 - Entrega de documentos: ver acta............................. 94 - Transferências de dotações: ver acta ....................... 95 - Debates sobre casos de violação dos direitos

humanos, da democracia e do Estado de direito(comunicação das propostas de resoluçãoapresentadas): ver acta ........................................... 9

6 - Pedido de defesa da imunidade parlamentar: ver acta.............................................................................. 9

7 - Venda de armas...................................................... 98 - Missão ALTHEA na Bósnia-Herzegovina............. 209 - Comunidade cipriota turca.................................... 2710 - Alterações climáticas.......................................... 3711 - Embalagens e resíduos de embalagens ................ 4212 - Situação em Cuba............................................... 4813 - Ordem do dia da próxima sessão: ver acta........... 5714 - Encerramento da sessão...................................... 57

16-11-2004 7

OBSAH

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Otvorenie rokovania ............................................... 92 - Schválenie zápisnice z predchádzajúceho rokovania:

pozri zápisnicu ....................................................... 93 - Predloené dokumenty: pozri zápisnicu................... 94 - Prevod finančných prostriedkov: pozri zápisnicu..... 95 - Rozprava o prípadoch poruenia ľudských práv,

demokracie a princípov právneho tátu (oznámenie opodaných návrhoch uznesenia): pozri zápisnicu ...... 9

6 - iadosť o ochranu poslaneckej imunity: pozrizápisnicu................................................................ 9

7 - Obchod so zbraňami ............................................... 98 - Misia ALTHEA v Bosne a Hercegovine................ 209 - Komunita cyperských Turkov ............................... 2710 - Zmeny klímy ...................................................... 3711 - Obaly a odpady z obalov..................................... 4212 - Situácia na Kube................................................. 4813 - Program rokovania na nasledujúci deň: pozri

zápisnicu.............................................................. 5714 - Skončenie rokovania........................................... 57

VSEBINA

16. 11. 2004...................................................................1 - Otvoritev seje ......................................................... 92 - Sprejetje zapisnika predhodne seje: gl. zapisnik ...... 93 - Predloitev dokumentov: gl. zapisnik...................... 94 - Prerazporeditev sredstev: gl. zapisnik...................... 95 - Razprave o primerih kritev človekovih pravic,

demokracije in načela pravne drave (razglasitevvloenih predlogov): gl. zapisnik ............................ 9

6 - Zahteva za začito poslanske imunitete: gl. zapisnik 97 - Prodaja oroja ........................................................ 98 - Misija ALTHEA v Bosni in Hercegovini .............. 209 - Turka ciprska skupnost........................................ 2710 - Podnebne spremembe ......................................... 3711 - Embalaa in odpadna embalaa........................... 4212 - Razmere na Kubi ................................................ 4813 - Dnevni red naslednje seje: gl. zapisnik ................ 5714 - Zaključek seje..................................................... 57

SISÄLTÖ

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Istunnon avaaminen................................................ 92 - Edellisen istunnon pöytäkirjan hyväksyminen: ks.

pöytäkirja .............................................................. 93 - Vastaanotetut asiakirjat: ks. pöytäkirja .................... 94 - Määrärahojen siirrot: ks. pöytäkirja......................... 95 - Keskustelu ihmisoikeuksien sekä demokratian ja

oikeusvaltion periaatteiden loukkauksia koskevistatapauksista (käsiteltäväksi jätetytpäätöslauselmaesitykset): ks. pöytäkirja.................. 9

6 - Pyyntö parlamentaarisen koskemattomuudenpuolustamiseksi: ks. pöytäkirja............................... 9

7 - Aseiden myynti ...................................................... 98 - Althea-operaatio Bosnia ja Hertsegovinassa.......... 209 - Kyproksen turkkilainen yhteisö............................. 2710 - Ilmastonmuutokset ............................................. 3711 - Pakkaukset ja pakkausjätteet............................... 4212 - Kuuban tilanne................................................... 4813 - Seuraavan istunnon esityslista: ks. pöytäkirja ...... 5714 - Istunnon päättäminen.......................................... 57

INNEHÅLL

16. 11. 2004 ..................................................................1 - Öppnande av sammanträdet.................................... 92 - Justering av protokollet från föregående

sammanträde: se protokollet ................................... 93 - Inkomna dokument: se protokollet .......................... 94 - Anslagsöverföringar: se protokollet ........................ 95 - Debatter om fall av kränkningar av de mänskliga

rättigheterna samt av demokratiska och rättsstatligaprinciper (tillkännagivande av framlagdaresolutionsförslag): se protokollet........................... 9

6 - Begäran om fastställelse av parlamentariskimmunitet: se protokollet........................................ 9

7 - Vapenhandel .......................................................... 98 - Operation Althea i Bosnien och Hercegovina........ 209 - Den turkcypriotiska befolkningsgruppen............... 2710 - Klimatförändringar............................................. 3711 - Förpackningar och förpackningsavfall ................ 4212 - Situationen i Kuba.............................................. 4813 - Föredragningslista för nästa sammanträde: se

protokollet ........................................................... 5714 - Avslutande av sammanträdet .............................. 57

8 16-11-2004

2-001

16. 11. 2004

_______

2-002

PRÉSIDENCE DE M. MOSCOVICIVice-président

2-003

1 - Ouverture de la séance

2-004

(La séance est ouverte à 15h05)

2-005

2 - Approbation du procès-verbal de la séanceprécédente: voir procès-verbal

2-006

3 - Dépôt de documents: voir procès-verbal

2-007

4 - Virements de crédits: voir procès-verbal

2-008

5 - Débats sur des cas de violation des droits del'Homme, de la démocratie et de l'Etat de droit

(annonce des propositions de résolution déposées):voir procès-verbal

2-009

6 - Demande de défense d'immunité parlementaire:voir procès-verbal

2-010

7 - Vente d'armes

2-011

Le Président. L'ordre du jour appelle, en discussioncommune, la déclaration du Conseil concernant la levéede l'embargo sur la vente d'armes à la Chine et le rapportde M. Romeva i Rueda sur le cinquième rapport annueldu Conseil établi en application du point 8 du dispositifdu Code de conduite de l'Union européenne en matièred'exportation d'armements.

Je donne tout de suite la parole à M. Nicolaï, au nom duConseil.

2-012

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, it is a privilege to behere today to discuss with you an issue to which thisParliament and the Dutch presidency attach greatimportance: arms export policy and the European UnionCode of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin withsome comments on the report on the Council's FifthAnnual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Pleaseallow me to start with some general remarks about theCode of Conduct.

The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it hasbecome one of the more successful instruments of ourcommon foreign and security policy. Arms export policy

has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It wasconsidered to be an essential element of undiminishednational sovereignty in which interference by otherswas, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasinginter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation inthe European Union.

That is impressive progress, and the success of the Codeof Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in itby third countries. I am not only talking about countriesaspiring to become Member States of the EuropeanUnion, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a usefultool that can help them establish an efficient andresponsible export control policy.

The Dutch presidency attaches great importance tofurther harmonisation of the European arms exportpolicy and to making that policy even more transparent.One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusionof the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hopeto be able to finalise this review before the end of theyear. I stress that I use the words 'first review' onpurpose. It is important that we see the Code as a livingdocument which should regularly be held up to the light,and take into consideration internal and externaldevelopments and views. Hence I am sure that this willnot be the last review of the Code.

In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutchpresidency has also stressed the importance of increaseddialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 Septemberthe Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with theDutch chairman of the COARM working group on theEU Code of Conduct and the current review. Thecommittee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda,participated in a conference on the review of the Codeon 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited MrRomeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with theCOARM working group on 3 December to discussParliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited MrRomeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which thepresidency is organising, together with the CzechGovernment, in Prague, to inform the candidatecountries and Norway on the implementation of theCode. We think it is important that the parliamentaryrole in European arms export policy is highlighted inthat regard.

At this point I would like to make some more specificremarks on the draft report and on the motion for aresolution. The European Parliament report refers to theCouncil's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened,most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct.Some of the points addressed in the report are beingdiscussed in the framework of this review. In this respectI should mention the following points.

10 16-11-2004

The European Parliament report welcomes the commonposition on arms brokering. In the present review thereis already consensus to extend the application of theCode to brokering activities. The same is true forlicensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities willbecome subject to the criteria and practices set out in theCode of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also beapplicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers oftechnology.

Outside the context of the review of the Code ofConduct, we have made progress in areas such asoutreach. I have already mentioned the seminar inPrague in December. In September, Member Statesagreed on a more coherent approach concerningoutreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a databaseon the outreach activities of the individual MemberStates so as to achieve better coordination.

Progress has also been made in the further developmentof the denial notification and consultation system oneof the core elements of the Code. Consultations ondenials are now taking place in such a way that allMember States are informed about the consultation.Only the final decision of a Member State as to whetheror not it will undercut the denial is not automaticallyshared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronicdatabase is being developed by the Council Secretariat,which will contain the denials notified by MemberStates, as well as information on the consultations theyhave undertaken. This database will contribute greatly tothe efficiency of bilateral consultations and thetransparency of their outcomes.

Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code.Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report formaking the Code legally binding. You may be awarethat there is no consensus on this issue in the Council:about half of the Member States are in favour of makingthe Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it.However, there is something more important than thequestion of whether the Code is politically or legallybinding. That is the actual content of the Code and theway it is implemented, because changing the status initself would probably have little or no effect on the armsexport policy of individual Member States.

The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance ofincreased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleasedthat the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be moretransparent than previous ones. We hope that furthersteps can be taken, probably as soon as next year.

The transparency of the national reports is also ofimportance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI,recently organised a meeting with Member States onhow to improve national reporting. I am sure thatsubsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative.

The resolution also advocates a monitoring system tocontrol end-use. This is an area where more work couldbe done. A recent US Government study shows that, in

the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorisedexports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not endin the hands of the indicated end-user. We have nofigures for the EU, but there is no reason to think theywould be dramatically different. We will therefore, as afirst step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controlswhere we will be briefed by the US authorities on theirexperiences with post-shipment control programmes.

This brings me to probably the most politically sensitiveissue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis Chinaattracts the special attention of this Parliament and ofmany national parliaments. I take note of the appeal inthe resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue ofthe future of the arms embargo is still under discussionin the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss thisissue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutchpresidency is well aware of the various concernsexpressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also byimportant partners like the US and Japan.

One such concern is the human rights situation in China.The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rightsissues with China, and monitors carefully thedevelopments on the ground. All these concerns aretaken into account in the discussion.

We are also discussing measures supplementary to theCode of Conduct that should prevent an increase in theflow of arms and military technology from Europe toChina should the embargo be lifted. The aim of thesemeasures is to increase transparency and intensifyconsultation among Member States. It is not yet clearwhen this discussion will be concluded.

In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to seethat the European Parliament pays so much attention tothe important issue of arms export policy. As I saidearlier, increased dialogue on this issue between theCouncil and Parliament is one of the objectives of ourpresidency. Progress has been made or is under way onmany of the points mentioned in the report and theresolution.

There are areas where further progress is possible. Thetransparency of the national reports is one;harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria isanother. However, we can say that the glass is alreadymore than half full. Please be assured that theNetherlands will do its utmost in the remaining sixweeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller.

2-013

Patten, Commission. First of all, I apologise forappearing in front of the House for yet another farewellappearance. I am starting to know what Frank Sinatramust have felt like, as he staggered on making farewellappearances until he was into his seventies. I hope thisreally is the last afternoon that the House will have toendure me, but that is in Parliament's hands.

As Members know, given the way in which the commonforeign and security policy operates, this is not an issue

16-11-2004 11

on which the Commission takes a lead. Nevertheless, wehave an obvious interest in the overall development ofour relations with China, which by and large areexcellent, and the arms embargo naturally operates inthat context. As Parliament knows, the embargo wasimposed by the European Council in 1989, following theevents in Tiananmen Square, the early stages of which Iwas able to witness at first hand as the then vice-chairman of the Asia Development Bank.

This year, China has intensified its campaign to have theban lifted. That campaign continues in the run-up to thesummit between the European Union and China nextmonth. The Chinese authorities consider the embargo tobe evidence of discrimination against them; they arguethat the ban is obsolete. They claim that it severelyhinders the further development of bilateral relations.

Whilst we have acknowledged that positive change hasoccurred and that the political situation in China hasmoved on since Tiananmen, China's observance of somebasic human rights, notably in the area of political andcivil rights, continues to fall well short of internationalnorms. Without making any direct link we have,therefore, consistently told the Chinese authorities at thehighest level that the lifting of the embargo would begreatly assisted if they could take the sort of concretesteps in the field of human rights that would convincethe European public that that was an appropriate courseof action.

I know that a number of Member States are favourablydisposed towards lifting the embargo and have made thatview public. Others believe that it is premature, citingconcerns about human rights. Human rights were anissue that figured prominently in the resolution passedby this House last year against lifting the ban.

Those Member States arguing for lifting the ban use therationale that the controls introduced in the 1998 EUCode of Conduct on arms sales render it nugatory. Iacknowledge that this argument is not withoutsubstance.

I am very keen to move forward with our importantstrategic partnership with China, a country that is rapidlyemerging as a global player across the board, and isnow, amongst other things, our second largest tradingpartner. That is one of our top foreign policy goals in theyears to come.

That said, given the underlying logic of the embargo andthe significant political and symbolic issues involved forboth sides, it is understandable that some Member Statesargue that the lifting of the ban should take place againsta background of positive and tangible steps by China toimprove its human rights situation.

I should also like to say a few words on the EuropeanParliaments report on the operation of the EUs Code ofConduct on arms exports. The strength of the Code ofConduct is closely related to the China embargo debate,since it will guide Member States' export practice if the

ban is lifted. Responsibility for the arms trade currentlyrests with Member States, but the Commission is fullyassociated with its consideration under the commonforeign and security policy.

I commend the rapporteur for putting together asubstantial document which merits very carefulattention. It challenges Member States to attain morestringent standards on the control of arms exports.Amongst other things, it asks for more transparency, notsomething that is normally immediately associated withthe arms trade. It also seeks further controls andlimitations on such trade, inherently difficult areas forthose Member States with significant arms industries.

Whilst the report focuses primarily on improvement inEuropean practice, its scope is global. Recognising theEuropean Unions potential to promote best practicearound the world, it advocates, among other things, aninternational arms trade treaty.

We should not forget - and I am sure Parliament has not- the sobering fact that around half a million people dieeach year as a result of violence linked to small arms andlight weapons. As you are well aware, the Commissionis regularly involved, with other internationalorganisations and NGOs, in dealing with theconsequences of inappropriate or illegal arms sales. Weare also implementing some specific projects to reducedestabilising accumulations of weapons around theworld. A pilot project initiated by the EuropeanParliament is under way to see what else can be done.More certainly needs to be done. I particularly supportthe idea of an international agreement to strengthen thecontrol of conventional arms sales. That is why theCommission has, as part of wider EU efforts, stronglysupported the adoption of an international Code ofConduct on arms exports based on the European Unionsinitiative.

Member States are currently considering how to improvethe Code of Conduct and we are encouraging theseefforts to strengthen EU controls on conventional armssales. The success of this endeavour will be a factor inthe ongoing China arms embargo debate.

We all know the importance of China as an economicpartner and a political player in the world in the comingdecades. China is, to a considerable extent, regaining theposition that it had in the world until the middle of the19th century, when it was still responsible for probably30% of global GDP. The historic recovery we arewitnessing is, on the whole, extraordinarily beneficial tothe rest of the world. China's integration as an openeconomy into the world economy is good for all of us.

It is not in any way demeaning to us or the Chinese if weregularly make it clear that there are other issues thatconcern us, such as issues of human rights. I am sure weshall in due course see an improvement as the politicalsituation in China matches the economic one. It isimpossible these days for any country to remaincompletely self-contained. It is impossible for a country

12 16-11-2004

to open up its economy whilst keeping politics underabsolutely rigid control.

I look forward to a more intimate relationship withChina in the years ahead. I hope China will continue toplay a positive role in the international community. Ilook forward to a serious dialogue with China abouthuman rights, leading to improvements of which I amsure Mr Sun Yat-Sen would have approved.

2-014

Le Président. Merci Monsieur le Commissaire, lesujet est important et il faut passer à la discussion, maisje ne puis m'empêcher de dire que vous êtes un peucomme Franck Sinatra: on ne se lasse pas de vos adieux.

2-015

Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Ponente. SeñorPresidente, agradezco de nuevo, tanto al señor Nicolaïcomo al señor Patten, no solamente su presencia aquísino también la claridad y la franqueza con la que hanhablado, y con las que espero podamos también entablarel diálogo posteriormente.

En efecto, en este Parlamento son frecuentes lasdenuncias que hacemos sobre las violaciones de losderechos humanos en distintas partes del mundo asícomo lo son, también, las resoluciones que adoptamoscon relación a la condena de estos hechos. Hemoscondenado asesinatos, torturas, malos tratos y guerras, ycondenamos permanentemente la extrema pobreza quehay en el mundo y que sufren miles de pueblos ymillones de personas. Y, mientras tanto, nuestrosGobiernos siguen autorizando exportaciones de armas,lo que no sólo sirve para empeorar todavía más lascondiciones de estas personas sino que, además,conlleva que los compradores dediquen sumas ingentesde dinero a fines militares, cuando las prioridadessociales y de desarrollo de sus países exigen priorizarprecisamente otros fines.

En el año 2000, 189 países firmaron en Nueva York laDeclaración del Milenio comprometiéndose, entre 2015y 2050, a acabar con la pobreza, garantizar el accesouniversal a los medicamentos esenciales y la igualdad deoportunidades entre hombres y mujeres, así como uni-versalizar la alfabetización y escolarización primarias,entre otras muchas cuestiones. Para conseguir estosfines, es necesario que los Gobiernos destinen, al menos,60 000 millones de dólares anuales a la aplicación dedicha Agenda del Milenio. No obstante, a pesar de quees extremadamente difícil encontrar dinero para estosfines, el gasto militar mundial entre 2002 y 2003 crecióen 64 000 millones de dólares, y entre 2003 y 2004 huboque añadir todavía 50 000 millones de dólares.

Los países de la Unión Europea, como responsables dela tercera parte de las exportaciones mundiales de armasconvencionales, tenemos en este sentido una importanteresponsabilidad. En el año 2002, al que, en definitiva,hace referencia el informe que ahora estamos discu-tiendo, la Unión Europea vendió armas y equipamientomilitar por valor de 21 000 millones de euros a paísescomo Arabia Saudita, Marruecos, India, Pakistán,

Angola, Turquía, Irán, Argelia, Colombia, Israel o,incluso, Iraq, entre otros muchos destinos que, haciendouna estricta lectura del Código de conducta de la UniónEuropea, no deberían encontrarse entre los compradoresde armas europeas. ¿Dónde está el problema? Ya se hamencionado; el problema reside, por un lado, en quedicho código sigue siendo demasiado vago y, por otro,en que no es todavía un instrumento jurídicamentevinculante, por lo que su vulneración no conllevaresponsabilidades penales.

El Parlamento Europeo ha sido siempre la institucióneuropea más vanguardista a la hora de exigir que lasexportaciones de armas europeas se rijan por un estrictocódigo de conducta y, a la vez, que estas exportacionessean coherentes con los constantes mensajes que desdela Unión Europea hacemos en favor de la prevención delos conflictos armados y de la promoción de la paz y eldesarrollo. Por eso, después de diez años de dedicarmeprofesionalmente a este tema, tengo que felicitar particu-larmente a la Presidencia holandesa, por los esfuerzosque está haciendo, no solamente de cara a la revisión delCódigo de conducta, sino también para conseguir queéste sea un texto mucho más valiente, coherente y, endefinitiva, eficaz. Pero no es suficiente todavía y, poreso, hay que recordar -lo hacemos en el informe- que espreciso reiterar la necesidad de revisar el texto delCódigo, para hacerlo más estricto, exigir que éste seconvierta en un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante-aunque todavía no tengamos el consenso, hay quetrabajar para conseguirlo-, exigir a los Gobiernos queincrementen la transparencia y mejoren la informaciónque proporcionan sobre las autorizaciones y denega-ciones de permisos, reclamar que el Código se apliquetambién a la exportación de material que puede serutilizado para torturar o para aplicar la pena de muerte,exigir a la Unión Europea que se dote de instrumentosque permitan mejorar los registros de los intermediariosde armas, bien trabajen éstos desde la Unión Europea,bien estén registrados estrictamente en ella, que searmonicen al alza las legislaciones de control de expor-taciones. Finalmente, entre otras muchas cosas, elinforme reclama que la Unión Europea colidere a escalainternacional la adopción de un tratado internacional dearmas.

Por último, puesto que este debate tiene lugar en unmomento en que algunos Gobiernos europeos se estánplanteando la necesidad de levantar el embargo de armassobre China, es pertinente aprovechar esta oportunidadpara, una vez más, reiterar la inconveniencia de levantardicho embargo. Las razones para ello son, por lo menos,tres: la situación claramente insatisfactoria de losderechos humanos en dicho país, denunciada muchasveces por varias ONG; el hecho de que, siendo China elprincipal importador de armas convencionales delmundo, ampliar todavía más el mercado militarciertamente conllevará una aceleración de la carreraarmamentista en la región y, por último, los numerososriesgos de que se produzca un agravamiento de ciertosconflictos no resueltos tales como los que enfrentan aChina con Taiwán o la situación de presión -aún sinaclarar- sobre el Tíbet.

16-11-2004 13

Por todo ello, apelo al Consejo a que no solamenteescuche, sino que tome en consideración y respete laspropuestas y recomendaciones hechas por esta Asam-blea, con el objetivo de eliminar de una vez la flagrantecontradicción que supone lamentar, por un lado, lapobreza, las guerras y las vulneraciones de derechoshumanos en el mundo, mientras que, por otro,contribuimos a alimentar el fuego de múltiplesviolencias con nuestras armas y nuestros silencios,incomprensibles para millones de víctimas.

(Aplausos)

2-016

Henin (GUE/NGL), rapporteur pour avis de lacommission du commerce international. Monsieur lePrésident, chers collègues, armer ou développer, voilàbien toute la question. On estime, en effet, que plus de20 % de la dette des pays en développement est due auximportations d'armes. Dans ces pays, les dépensesmilitaires dépassent souvent, de loin, le budget de lasanté ou celui de l'éducation. Parfois même, ellesdépassent les deux réunis. Il devient donc vital pour ledéveloppement durable de ces pays de limiter demanière très importante les flux d'importations d'armes.On ne peut vivre longtemps dans un monde où900 milliards de dollars sont dépensés pour le militairealors que seulement 325 milliards de dollars sont utiliséspour des subsides agricoles et que seulement60 milliards de dollars sont consacrés à l'aide audéveloppement.

Ainsi, pour ne prendre qu'un seul exemple, en Afriquesubsaharienne, entre 1995 et 2001, les dépensesmilitaires ont augmenté de 47 % et l'espérance de vie areculé de quatre ans. Certes, il existe depuis 1998 unCode de conduite de l'Union européenne en matièred'exportation d'armements. Certes, les pays de l'Unioneuropéenne ont fait des progrès. Toutefois, urgence il y aà aller plus loin, d'autant que d'autres puissances, commeles États-Unis, la Russie ou la Chine, n'ont pas cetteretenue. Je pense que les mesures préconisées par lacommission du commerce international du Parlement,même si elles sont en dessous des aspirations de certainsd'entre nous, le permettent. Elles doivent être adoptéescar elles nous font entrer dans une autre logique. Jeciterai en particulier l'harmonisation complète de lapolitique d'exportation des armements des Étatsmembres à moyen terme, la diversification et laréorientation de la production des entreprisesd'armements vers d'autres produits pour éviter desdrames sociaux et des pertes de compétences, la créationd'une agence européenne pour le contrôle desexportations d'armements et, surtout, la création d'unetaxe sur les exportations d'armes au profit des victimesdes conflits et de la lutte contre la pauvreté.

C'est pourquoi, si l'Union adoptait ces propositions et lestraduisait en mesures juridiques précises, ceciconstituerait déjà un progrès appréciable et celapermettrait de lancer une dynamique pour faire pressionsur des pays commes les États-Unis, la Chine, l'Ukraine,la Russie, Israël.

Si tout cela pouvait se conjuguer, pour être plus efficaceencore, à des mesures visant au contrôle de l'origine descapitaux dans les paradis fiscaux établis sur le territoirede l'Union, alors nous aurions fait un pas pour lasauvegarde de l'humanité.

Qu'il me soit permis, en guise de conclusion, de citerAlbert Einstein: "Soit l'humanité détruira les armements,soit les armements détruiront l'humanité".

2-017

von Wogau (PPE-DE), im Namen der Fraktion. HerrPräsident! Verehrte Kollegen! Auch ich möchte meinerFreude darüber Ausdruck verleihen, dass wir nochimmer Gelegenheit haben, Herrn Patten hier im Plenumzu sehen. Auch mir geht es so wie ihm, wie bei FrankSinatra: Ich höre seine Stimme immer wieder, und auchbei Herrn Patten ist das Gleiche der Fall.

Nun zu den Waffenexporten. Ich glaube, dass manwirklich mit Fug und Recht sagen kann, dass derVerhaltenskodex in Bezug auf Waffenexportewesentliche Fortschritte gebracht hat. Allerdings mussman auch sagen, dass diese Fortschritte noch nichtausreichen. Wir begrüßen sehr, dass die Ratspräsi-dentschaft über einige Klarstellungen in diesem Kodexverhandelt, und ich hoffe, dass sie dabei zu einem gutenErgebnis kommen wird. Ich halte es auch für sehrwichtig, dass nicht nur der Verkauf, sondern auch dieVermittlung des Verkaufs diesen Regeln unterstellt wird.

Das eigentliche Problem bei den Waffenexporten istaber nicht die gesetzliche Grundlage sondern bestehtdarin, dass diese gesetzlichen Grundlagen in denverschiedenen Ländern der Europäischen Unionunterschiedlich angewendet werden. Auf dieses Problemmüssen wir unsere Anstrengungen konzentrieren einmal dadurch, dass der Kodex für gesetzlich verbind-lich erklärt wird. Wenn dies auf Gemeinschaftsebenenicht möglich ist, ja, dann hindert nichts dieMitgliedsländer daran, das zu tun, wie es einige ja auchbereits getan haben. Auf diesem Wege müssen wirweitergehen, denn unser Ziel muss sein, dass wir auf dereinen Seite die innergemeinschaftliche Verbringung vonRüstungsgütern nicht mehr als Exporte behandeln. Dasist aber nur dann möglich, wenn wir in allen Ländern derEuropäischen Gemeinschaft in dieser Beziehung strikteund in gleicher Weise angewendete Regeln haben.

Und nun zur Frage des Embargos gegen China. MeineFraktion ist der Auffassung, dass wir diese strategischePartnerschaft mit China suchen müssen und dass sie derWeg der Zukunft ist. Wir wissen aber, dass es nocheinige Probleme gibt, wie den Umgang mit denMenschenrechten, Probleme in Bezug auf Taiwan undauf Tibet, und deswegen ist meine Fraktion derAuffassung, dass die Voraussetzungen noch nichtgegeben sind, dieses Embargo gegen China aufzuheben.

2-018

Gomes (PSE), em nome do grupo Senhor Presidente,eu junto as minhas palavras de agradecimento àPresidência e, em particular, ao Sr. Patten. Temos muita

14 16-11-2004

pena porque a União Europeia ainda precisava do seu"way".

Se a proliferação de armamentos nucleares faz imaginarcenários apocalípticos, a inflamação de conflitos pelocomércio de armas convencionais coloca-nos peranteprejuízos incalculáveis a nível do desenvolvimento demuitos povos, além da morte e da violação dos direitoshumanos de milhões de civis por todo o mundo.Segundo a doutrina de segurança estratégica aprovadapela União Europeia, as instabilidades regionais, osEstados falhados, a criminalidade organizada e o terro-rismo internacional constituem as principais ameaças aque temos de fazer face. Todas elas ameaças que asexportações de armas sem controlo para destinatáriosexteriores à União Europeia podem fomentar.

Nos últimos anos tem-se assistido a um esforço dosEstados-Membros da União Europeia para aperfeiçoar ocontrolo das exportações de armas convencionais comorigem ou trânsito no espaço europeu. Mas muito háainda a fazer!

Nós, socialistas, defendemos que é urgente tornarobrigatório o código de conduta da exportação de armas,bem como adoptar legislação nacional e europeia paraaumentar a transparência da actividade de intermediaçãode armas. Há que alargar o âmbito de proibição daexportação de certos instrumentos, como os utilizadospara a tortura ou as minas antipessoais. Há que controlar,de forma mais apertada, a venda de armamentos paragovernos ou grupos em zonas de conflito, tendo emconta as informações recolhidas pelos mecanismos decontrolo criados pelo Conselho de Segurança das NaçõesUnidas para a aplicação de embargos de armas. Osgovernos da União Europeia têm, aqui, a indeclinávelresponsabilidade de avançar com normas de direitointerno para assegurar a punição exemplar das empresase indivíduos que violem embargos de armas decretadospela União Europeia ou pelo Conselho de Segurança dasNações Unidas.

Nós, socialistas, apoiamos medidas que possam mitigaros efeitos do comércio de armas, como a criação doimposto para assistência a vítimas de conflitos armadose ao combate à pobreza, conforme foi recentementeproposto na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas emcurso.

A União Europeia pode e deve ir mais longe. Compassos como os que foram identificados nesta resolução- que nós votaremos a favor - e alargando a aplicaçãovinculativa do código de conduta, não apenas aosparceiros da Europa alargada, mas também aos novosvizinhos, para que haja um mercado comum europeu dearmamentos em que a recém criada Agência Europeia deArmamentos tenha um papel no controlo e na regulação.

Nós, socialistas, apresentamos especificamente emendassobre esta proposta de resolução instando o Conselho eos Estados-Membros a manter o embargo de armas àRepública Popular da China e a assegurar umaabordagem coerente sobre os embargos de armas em

geral. O embargo foi imposto na sequência do massacrede Tianamen e foi mantido, desde então, face aos gravesproblemas de direitos humanos que persistem na China,apesar da abertura ao exterior e do extraordináriocrescimento económico.

Em 2003, o Parlamento Europeu pronunciou-se atravésde uma resolução específica sobre esta matéria erecomendou a manutenção do embargo. Os relatórios doParlamento Europeu, tal como os de várias ONG dedireitos humanos, assinalam, ano após ano, grandepreocupação com a violação grave dos direitos humanosna China e no Tibete. Uma revelação sobre a adequaçãodo embargo de armas como instrumento para pressionaruma mudança significativa não pode conduzir aolevantamento do embargo de armas, pelo menosenquanto não haja um código de conduta vinculativosobre a exportação de armas e de instrumentos suscep-tíveis de serem utilizados em repressão interna e tortura.É preciso assegurar a coerência de todo o regime nestamatéria e a recente decisão relativamente à Líbia delevantamento do embargo de armas a este país éincoerente e expõe a União Europeia a acusações de"double standards".

2-019

Van Hecke (ALDE), namens de fractie. Voorzitter,collega's, het verslag Romeva is een bijzonderevenwichtig verslag. Het bevat heel wat interessanteaanbevelingen ter verbetering van de gedragscodebetreffende wapenuitvoer, waarmee de Raad deze keerhopelijk wel rekening zal houden. Dan pas kan de codeeen efficiënt en performant controle-instrument worden,wettelijk bindend, met sancties op de niet-naleving. Ikzou concreet willen ingaan op paragraaf twintig van hetverslag, waarin wordt gepleit voor de handhaving vanhet EU-embargo tegen China. Dit embargo nu opheffenzou een bijzonder slecht signaal zijn. Het zou eenschoolvoorbeeld zijn, denk ik, van hypocrisie enselectiviteit als het gaat om het verdedigen enwereldwijd beschermen van de mensenrechten. Dewaarden en de normen die de Unie hoog in het vaandelvoert, zouden dan eens te meer moeten wijken voor grofmercantilisme. Het vooruitzicht op vette orders voorDuitse onderzeeërs en Franse vliegtuigen lijkt voorsommigen voldoende om het wapenembargo tegenChina onderuit te halen. De Unie zou zo verworden toteen sjacheraar die zijn principes verkwanselt voor eenhandvol zilverlingen en dat onder Nederlandsvoorzitterschap, dat kan toch niet, mijnheer Nicolaï.

Europa kan trouwens onmogelijk wapens leveren aaneen land dat militair geweld wil gebruiken om zijnterritoriale eenheid te verzekeren. Nu al heerstvoortdurende militaire dreiging in de straten vanTaiwan, waar meer dan vijfhonderd raketten staanopgesteld. Het is dan ook een vals excuus dat degedragscode betreffende wapenuitvoer strenge beper-kingen zou opleggen. Het gevaar dat China wapensdoorvoert naar derdewereldlanden blijft latent aanwezig.Hoe dan ook, de opheffing van het wapenembargo tegenChina kan voor onze fractie hic et nunc geen optie zijn.

2-020

16-11-2004 15

Flautre (Verts/ALE), au nom du groupe. Je mefélicite, quant à moi, de ce que j'entends dans la bouchede mes collègues et je vois que ce Parlement faitdécidément preuve de beaucoup de sagesse.

Je voudrais faire remarquer à M. von Wogau, dont je mefélicite de la position sur la levée de l'embargo ou lavolonté de ne pas le lever, que, dans le même temps, lecaractère contraignant du code ne peut pas être laisséaux mains des États membres. On voit bien aujourd'huile peu de scrupules que certains chefs d'État ont à l'égardde la Chine. N'a-t-on pas entendu M. Chirac déclarer quel'embargo était d'un autre temps? Moi, dans cesconditions, j'invite ces chefs d'État qui, décidément, ontles yeux très ouverts sur l'immense marché quereprésente la Chine, à aller regarder de plus près ce quise passe dans les stades, ce qui se passe dans les camionsIveco, ce qui se passe dans un certain nombre de lieuxd'exécution sommaire.

Je crois que la Chine est aujourd'hui le champion dumonde de la violation des droits de l'homme et, en toutcas, le champion du monde des peines capitales, qui sontexécutées à tout va, dans des conditions extrajudiciairesabsolument insupportables, et je me demande si laviolation du code, que représenterait bien évidemment comme tout le monde l'a dit la levée de l'embargo surles armes imposé à la Chine, ne devrait pas aussi êtrecondamnée quand elle est verbale, exprimée par uncertain nombre de chefs d'État. Je me félicite que leConseil veuille réformer ce code de conduite et je l'incitepar ailleurs à déployer beaucoup d'énergie pourempêcher de telles déclarations qui, décidément, mettentà mal la crédibilité de politiques très nombreuses quel'Union européenne mène dans le domaine du respectdes droits de l'homme.

2-021

Agnoletto (GUE/NGL), a nome del gruppo. - SignorPresidente, onorevoli colleghi, si profila il rischio chequesto dibattito diventi una scadenza annuale, dove cidiciamo più o meno tutti d'accordo, ma poi resta solouna lista di buone intenzioni e di esortazioni allaCommissione e al Consiglio.

Per evitare ciò è assolutamente necessario che il codicediventi uno strumento di condotta giuridicamentevincolante, e che siano individuate precise sanzionicontro le aziende che non lo rispettano con sedenell'Unione europea. È altresì necessario che l'Unione siimpegni per chiedere ad altri paesi, quali Stati Uniti,Russia e Cina, l'adesione al codice di condotta - anche inconsiderazione del fatto che oltre il 50% dellaproduzione di armi nel mondo avviene nei Paesi membridel Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU.

Mentre noi parliamo, il mio paese, cioè l'Italia, haaumentato da un anno all'altro del 25% l'esportazione diarmi, e prevede per il futuro un aumento del 40%. Tra imaggiori beneficiari della vendita di armi da partedell'Italia, vi è l'Arabia Saudita, che non è certo unesempio di paese rispettoso dei diritti.

Credo che dobbiamo assolutamente mantenere l'embar-go nella vendita delle armi alla Cina, e inoltre che ladifesa dei diritti umani debba precedere assolutamentegli interessi economici del profitto.

Un'ultima osservazione: le spese militari nell'ultimoanno nel mondo sono pari a 900 miliardi di dollari, diquesti, 700 miliardi solo nei paesi civili del primomondo. Non è questa la civiltà che noi vogliamo!

2-022

Pęk (IND/DEM), w imieniu grupy politycznej. PaniePrzewodniczący, Panie i Panowie, to ważna debata. WUnii Europejskiej szczególnie ważne są debaty owartościach, ale gdy mówimy w tym przypadku owartościach, to ja pragnę przypomnieć kilka przypad-ków. Swego czasu Polska, która znajdowała się wtrudnej sytuacji, została nakłoniona przez jedno znajważniejszych państw świata, by nie przekazywaćbroni do jednego z państw Azji południowo-wschodniej.Uczyniła to z ogromną stratą dla swojego potencjaługospodarczego. Tamto państwo niezwłocznie wypełniłolukę i otrzymało wymierne wartości.

Chcę w tym miejscu powiedzieć wyraźnie, że jeżelikodeks ma mieć sens, bo jest to rozwiązanie zaistepotrzebne i sensowne, to musi on obowiązywaćformalnie w całej Unii Europejskiej i musi zostaćpodpisana światowa umowa, którą akceptowałybyjeszcze przynajmniej Stany Zjednoczone i Rosja. Jeżelisię okaże, że my będziemy wychodzić przed szereg i wimię tak zwanych wartości, w których brylujemy,zubożymy swoje społeczeństwa i swoje gospodarki, a wto miejsce wejdą inni, zwiększając przewagę nadnaszymi gospodarkami i możliwościami wpływu nasytuację na świecie, to tak naprawdę zmniejszymy swojemożliwości na poprawę egzekwowania praw człowiekaw świecie. Jestem za zawieszeniem sankcji wobec Chin,bowiem jest to działanie nieskuteczne, które zmniejszamożliwości rozwoju gospodarczego Unii Europejskiej.

2-023

Czarnecki, Ryszard (NI). Panie Przewodniczący,chciałem powiedzieć do Pana z rozpędu Panie Ministrze,ale Panie Przewodniczący Parlamentu, Panie i Panowie,gdy pół miliona ludzi rocznie umiera z powoduprzemocy związanej z bronią lekką, zarówno wkonfliktach zbrojnych jak i w wyniku przestępstw,Parlament Europejski musi reagować i ta debata jestczęścią tej reakcji.

Unia Europejska eksportuje śmierć, choć trzebaprzyznać, że eksportuje głównie poza Europę, ponieważw ostatnich pięciu latach aż 80% eksportu broni z UniiEuropejskiej zostało skierowane właśnie poza Europę.Nie ulegajmy jednak iluzji pacyfistów, którzy chcielibyzlikwidować wojny i broń, to jest nierealne, alekontrolować produkcję i sprzedaż broni w Unii można itrzeba. Wymagać tego także trzeba bardzo mocno odprzyszłych członków Unii. Komisja Spraw Zagranicz-nych naszego Parlamentu przyjęła poprawki zapro-ponowane przeze mnie w tym duchu, chodzi oczywiścieo Rumunię i Bułgarię, ale także o Chorwację i Turcję.

16 16-11-2004

Jako Polak zwracam uwagę Państwa na inicjatywę rządumojego kraju, który wraz z rządem Szwecji zainicjowałjuż pięć nieformalnych spotkań COARM, czyli grupyroboczej ds. eksportu broni konwencjonalnej międzypaństwami starej i nowej Unii. Chcę też gorąco poprzećpunkt 28 projektu rezolucji mówiący o zakazie eksportuprzyrządów służących do torturowania i wykonywaniakary śmierci. Jednocześnie nie jestem przekonany co dorealizmu propozycji zawartej w punkcie 40 mówiącym ospecjalnym podatku od handlu bronią. Sądzę, że kolejnypodatek nie będzie służył pokojowi w Europie i naświecie, chociaż może uspokoić sumienia biurokratów.

2-024

Gawronski (PPE-DE). Signor presidente, può essereanche vero che l'embargo alla Cina sembraanacronistico, soprattutto dopo l´abolizione nei confrontidella Libia, che non è certo un modello di rispetto per idiritti dell'uomo. È anche comprensibile che la Cina,Stato sovrano, cerchi di rafforzare la sua difesa persalvaguardare la sua sicurezza e integrità territoriale.

È anche vero che qualche piccolo progresso è stato fattoper migliorare il rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo, che laCina rimane protagonista nella lotta contro il terrorismoed esercita utili pressioni sulla Corea del Nord, perchéponga fine allo sviluppo delle armi nucleari. Tuttavia, èvero anche che Pechino cerca di sfruttare le divergenzeche ci sono sull'argomento fra noi e gli Stati Uniti. Mimeraviglio che nessuno in questa sede abbia sottolineatotale aspetto: i rapporti transatlantici, che per noi devonorimanere di primaria importanza, saranno influenzatidall'atteggiamento più o meno comune che adotteremonei confronti della crescente potenza cinese.

Bisogna anche tenere conto dell'equilibrio strategico,anche se precario, attualmente in atto nello stretto diTaiwan. Taiwan, che è un modello di democrazia da cuila Cina è ancora lontanissima. Allora se per ragioni diRealpolitik, per ragioni economiche e politiche, più chedi rispetto della democrazia, vogliamo abolire l'embargo,lo potremmo fare solo impegnando la Repubblicapopolare cinese a chiari e continui progressi nel rispettodei diritti dell'uomo, come del resto ha detto oggi ilrappresentante della Commissione. Cercando almeno didiscutere, non voglio dire di concordare, la nostraposizione con quella degli Stati Uniti e di quei paesieuropei attualmente contrari a togliere l'embargo.Ritengo essenziale avere un atteggiamento il piùpossibile comune e il più possibile concordato in questamateria.

2-025

Van Den Berg (PSE). Voorzitter, wapenleverantiesvan EU-lidstaten aan derde landen dienen aan eengemeenschappelijk en helder, bindend en toetsbaar kaderte voldoen. Dat is natuurlijk een voorwaarde als we toteen echt verantwoord Europees beleid willen komen.Het is gewoon jammer dat een aantal van de landen, deheer Nicolaï zei het ook al, nog steeds een dergelijkbindend kader dwarsboomt. Drie belangrijketoetsingscriteria zijn het klassieke mensenrechtenbeleiden natuurlijk de praktijk die daar in een land uitvoortvloeit, de regionale spanningen in een bepaald

gebied en ook de relatie tussen wat een land uitgeeft aanarmoedebestrijding enerzijds, en de omvang van hetbudget voor defensie anderzijds. Als je kijkt naar hetverzoek van China en nu ook van een aantal landenbinnen Europa om dat wapenembargo op te heffen, danmoet je dat eigenlijk tegen die criteria afwegen. Demensenrechtensituatie is een blijvend en terecht punt vanzorg in de EU. Enerzijds worden door China essentiëleverdragen onderschreven, anderzijds is er de praktijk diedaarvan afwijkt. De behandeling van dissidenten, vanetnische en religieuze minderheden en de grootschaligetoepassing van de doodstraf zijn gewoonweg zeerzorgwekkend. Ook de zware beperking op de vrijheidvan meningsuiting en op arbeidsrechten zoals vak-bondsrecht en stakingsrecht blijft een groot punt vanzorg.

Het andere punt, de regionale ontwikkeling, is ookevident. Die spanningen zijn aanwezig op geopolitiekvlak.

Tot slot, het economisch punt. China is natuurlijk eensamenleving met enorme veranderingen, met eenenorme economische dynamiek die ook wordtgekenmerkt door keihard kapitalisme dat gigantisch vanaard is, en door een grote economische groei. Er zijnevenwel ook grote verliezers. De ongelijkheid bestaaterin dat zo'n 200 miljoen mensen in dit landwerkzoekend zijn, onder de armoedegrens leven, metalle sociale onrust vandien. In die situatie dienteconomische verandering gepaard te gaan met grondigepolitieke hervorming en sociale democratie. Ik steun danook van harte de lijn die mijn fractie van het Parlementsteeds heeft gevolgd, namelijk dat het wapenembargo nuniet mag worden opgeheven. Ik benadruk tegelijkertijddat dialoog met China, een gigantische speler op zoweleconomisch als politiek vlak, noodzakelijk is. Wij alsEuropa moeten proberen het democratiseringsproces tebevorderen en hulp te bieden bij het oplossen van socialeproblemen. Wij moeten China helpen de rol vanwereldspeler effectief en fair te vervullen, dat is in hetbelang van de internationale rechtsorde.

2-026

Malmström (ALDE). Herr rådsordförande!Kommissionär Patten! Alltid trevligt att se er igen.Vapenembargot mot Kina var EU:s respons påhändelserna på Tienanmen Square i juni 1989. Det varvårt sätt att visa vår avsky mot det som hände tusentals,fredliga, demonstrerande studenter. Sedan dess harvärlden förändrats. Kina har förändrats, men interegimen. Kina är världens största diktatur. Hundra-tusentals oliktänkande förtrycks, sitter fängslade iarbetsläger, landet är världsledande när det gälleravrättningar, de mänskliga rättigheterna kränks dagligen,yttrandefriheten är kraftigt inskränkt och all oppositionär i princip förbjuden.

Regimen tycks således inte förändras och nu diskuterarvi om vi ska lyfta embargot, trots att inga förändringarhar skett. Vad sänder det för signaler till omvärlden ochtill Kina? Kina ger bra handelsmöjligheter och vi skahandla med Kina, men vi får inte glömma vem vi har att

16-11-2004 17

göra med. Vi kan inte svika alla de tusentals,hundratusentals, demokratiaktivister, politiska fångar, deungdomar som i hemlighet surfar på internet för att fåreda på vad som verkligen händer. Alla dessa hoppas påEuropa. Ska vi då svika dem genom att sälja vapen tillden regim som förtrycker dem? Ska vi ha europeiskamissiler och ubåtar riktade mot den demokratiskarepubliken i Taiwan?

Nej, vi måste vara konsekventa. Det är vår trovärdighetsom står på spel och den är viktigare än franskaMirageplan, svenska JAS Gripen eller tyska ubåtar. Denliberala demokratiska gruppen räknar med att ni herrrådsordförande står upp för de mänskliga rättigheternaoch behåller embargot och skickar med det budskapettill rådet.

2-027

Staes (Verts/ALE). Voorzitter, collega's, ik wil hiervandaag nog eens benadrukken dat, zoals voorzitterNicolaï terecht zei, de gedragscode een heel belangrijkinstrument is. Maar collega's, laat ons realistisch zijn. Dedagelijkse praktijk, ook in mijn eigen land, toont wel aandat er nog vele achterpoortjes zijn, dat er onduidelijkedefinities bestaan, dat weigeringen soms wordengenegeerd en dat handelsbelangen al te vaak primerenop de naleving van mensenrechten. En dat zorgt vooronnoemelijk veel ellende. Dat zorgt voor onnoemelijkveel gekwetsten, onnoemelijk veel doden. Daarom dus,collega's, de terechte eis van ons Parlement tot eenstriktere formulering. Daarom de terechte eis tot hetwettelijk bindend maken van deze code. Daarom ook denoodzaak van meer controle, onder meer op heteindgebruik.

Daarom is het ook terecht dat het embargo tegen Chinagehandhaafd blijft. In die zin verleen ik mijn volle steunaan landen zoals Nederland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk,Ierland, de Scandinavische landen, Polen en Tsjechië,die in de Raad blijven zeggen dat zij dit embargo willenhandhaven.

Meneer Nicolaï, hou vol, hef het embargo niet op, nietop de EU-top met China op 8 december en ook niettijdens de Europese Raad op 17 december aanstaande. Uheeft onze volledige steun.

2-028

Claeys (NI). Voorzitter, in feite is het hemeltergend dathet opheffen van het wapenembargo tegen China zelfsmaar in overweging wordt genomen. Dat wapenembargois geen anachronisme, zoals daarjuist door een sprekerwerd gesteld. Het aanhouden van het embargo is eerst envooral een kwestie van mensenrechten. Het is niet omdatChina door zijn demografische omvang een buiten-gewoon interessant economisch potentieel biedt, dat wedaarom onze principes van mensenrechten plotsoverboord moeten gooien.

Indien een land als Frankrijk zijn zin krijgt en hetembargo tegen China wordt opgeheven, dan verliest deEuropese Unie al haar geloofwaardigheid. Het is nietalleen een kwestie van mensenrechten, het is ook het feitdat China een rechtstreekse bedreiging vormt voor een

democratisch land als Taiwan. Er zijn meer dan 600raketten gericht op Taiwan en het is een schande datzelfs maar wordt overwogen ook nog eens nieuwewapens te leveren aan een land dat een dergelijkebedreiging vormt voor een democratisch land.

2-029

Jarzembowski (PPE-DE). Sehr geehrter HerrPräsident, sehr geehrter Herr Ratsvertreter, sehr geehrterHerr Kommissar Patten! Der Ratsvertreter hat sehr offendargelegt, dass es im Rat Streitigkeiten zwischen zweiGruppen gibt. Aber ich finde, was uns wichtig seinmüsste, ist, das grundsätzliche Verhältnis zu China aufdem Gipfel richtig zu besprechen. Und darauf, müsstedie Präsidentschaft versuchen, sich wenigstens zueinigen und zu sagen: Jawohl, wir erkennen an, dass esin den letzten Jahren Verbesserungen bei derAnwendung der Menschenrechte in der VolksrepublikChina gegeben hat, aber sie reichen eben bei weitemnicht aus. Wenn man sieht, wie die Glaubensfreiheit, wiedie Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit und wiedie Pressefreiheit in der Volksrepublik China immernoch massiv unterdrückt werden, reicht es eben nichtaus, mit wirtschaftlichen Interessen darüberhinwegzuwischen.

Insofern mein Appell an den Rat, hier eine klare Linie zuziehen: Ja, wir erkennen an, dass es Verbesserungengegeben hat, aber sie sind völlig unzureichend. Chinamuss vorangehen unter der neuen Führung. Ich schließemich meinen Vorrednern an: Man kann nicht dasWaffenembargo aufheben, solange noch prominenteRegierungsvertreter in Peking mit Waffengewalt gegenTaiwan drohen, wie es gestern der Fall war. Es ist nichtakzeptabel, dass über die Meeresenge von Taiwanhinweg mit Waffengewalt Politik gemacht wird.

Chris Patten hat uns immer den richtigen Weg gewiesen.Wir haben immer gesagt, wir fordern den politischenDialog zwischen der Volksrepublik China und Taiwan -einen politischen Dialog, den beide Seiten beginnenmüssen. Ich hoffe, dass die politische Führung in Chinatatsächlich den ersten Ansatz wählt, nämlich wieder überdie Assoziation zu gehen und den Dialog aufzunehmen.Es wäre ein völlig falsches Zeichen, in einer Situation, inder die Volksrepublik China gerade Taiwan mitWaffengewalt droht, das Waffenembargo aufzuheben.Ein völlig falsches Zeichen - ich denke, wir sind uns daalle einig, und der Rat sollte auf dem Gipfel auchentsprechende klare Worte sagen.

2-030

De Rossa (PSE). Mr President, I would like first of allto welcome the progress made with regard to the Codeof Conduct on Arms Exports, but it is still a sad fact that500 000 people die each year as a result of the use ofsmall arms and light weapons. These are, in my view,the real weapons of mass destruction in the world today.

It is extraordinary that while we know that 20% of theweapons that the United States sells fall into the wronghands, we have no statistics whatsoever on the quantityof arms exports from the European Union that fall intothe wrong hands. We have no idea of the extent to which

18 16-11-2004

we are responsible for the 500 000 deaths resulting fromthe use, and indeed misuse, of small arms exports.

On the question of China, it is neither wise nor indeedfeasible to believe that we can ignore or isolate China.Nevertheless, it is important that we maintain pressureon the Chinese Government to improve the political andhuman rights situation in China. It is therefore necessaryto maintain the embargo and indeed to tie it in withmaking our own Code of Conduct on Arms Exportslegally binding.

2-031

Coveney (PPE-DE). Mr President, I am anxious tocontribute to this debate to emphasise two main points.First of all, there is nothing wrong with legitimate armstrade and legitimate EU arms exports consistent with aworking code of conduct.

Secondly and more importantly, effective control ofarms exports is an essential part of a coherent policy thatmeets EU objectives on peace, respect for human rightsand democracy. As many speakers have said,conventional arms kill more that half a million people ayear, that is one person every minute. There are 639million small arms in circulation in the world producedby over one thousand companies in a least 98 countries.It is essential therefore that the EU have a strict armscode policy that equates with EU values if we are tooffer global leadership on this issue.

The EU must also continue to promote an internationalcode of conduct. The export of small arms in particularto third countries which do not uphold values ofdemocracy and human rights creates greater instability,not just in the regions to which the arms are exported,but for the world as a whole.

It is a fact that uncontrolled arms exports undermineglobal security. The voluntary code of conduct in theEuropean Union has had some success; we need to buildon that success. Continuing the Code of Conduct onArms Exports on a voluntary basis in the future does notgo far enough. I support the recommendation that thevoluntary code becomes a legally binding one. Thiswould be a bold step but one that can allow theEuropean Union to increase its control, in a morerealistic way, over the export of arms from EuropeanUnion countries.

I would like to comment on the recommendations in thereport that a tax be imposed on arms exports. It is myview that if the industry in Europe abides by a bindingcode of conduct and the only arms being traded arelegitimate and consistent with that code, it is theninappropriate to burden the industry with an extra tax.

With regard to the lifting of the embargo on arms inChina, I support the rapporteur's view that the banshould remain in place. While I welcome and supportthe dialogue and the development of a positiverelationship between the European Union and China,

removal of the arms embargo in the immediate term isstill premature.

2-032

Aloyzas Sakalas (PSE). - Gerbiamas Pirmininke, anorėčiau atkreipti Jūsų dėmesį į Tarybos siūlymąnutraukti ginklų embargą Kinijai. Noriu kiekvienopaklausti, ar kuri nors usienio valstybė grasino Kinijai?Jei taip, tai kuri? Jei ne, tai kam reikalingi modernūsginklai valstybei, kuri garsėja mogaus teisiųnepaisymu, vienpartine diktatūra ir įstatymų virenybėsnebuvimu? Nuo kada Europos Sąjunga nusprendiaginkluoti komunistines diktatūras? Mes matėme, kaipKinijos Liaudies Respublika grasino ir tebegrasinakarine invazija tokiai demokratinei valstybei, kokia yraTaivanis.Jei mes nenorime sukurti papildomo įtampos idiniotame regione, tai turime pritarti AFET rengiamamdokumentui, rekomenduojančiam nepanaikinti ginklųembargo Kinijos Liaudies Respublikai. Kitaip galimasusilaukti dar vieno konflikto, į kurį, matyt, reaguotumekokia nors nauja rezoliucija. Bet tai nebūtų jokio efekto.Kalbant apie kodeksą, reikia pasakyti, kad jis turėtų būtitiktai teisikai įpareigojantis. Kitaip tai bus tik tučiaspopierių rinkinys.

2-033

Van Orden (PPE-DE). Mr President, BritishConservatives believe that the Code of Conduct on ArmsExports has worked well as a politically bindinginstrument since it came into being in 1998, but there isscope for some improvement and refinement.

However, we are opposed to the Code becoming legallybinding. We sense that there are often fine politicaldecisions to be made and that these are best taken bypolitically accountable ministers rather than by judges.Some of the information on which decisions are based ishighly sensitive and confidential and should remainwithin the domain of government. We certainly wouldnot wish to see the European Court of Justice involvedin this area. In any case, a legally binding ban wouldmerely present another opportunity for certain states toexercise their hypocrisy, as we have seen, for example,with the efforts by some to evade the European Union'stargeted sanctions against regimes in Zimbabwe andBurma or, indeed, the efforts by certain states tocircumvent UN sanctions against the regime of SaddamHussein in Iraq.

If we look at the Romeva i Rueda report, some of itsprovisions would simply be counterproductive ifadopted. For example, it calls for the publication ofinformation on the number of licences refused, statingthe reasons for refusal. The published details on licenceapplications that have been denied would giveunscrupulous arms manufacturers and dealersknowledge about which goods are wanted by whom -effectively a rogue traders' customer list.

We already have adequate laws in the United Kingdom,but want to encourage other states to meet our own highstandards. You can be sure that any new EU law wouldbe gold-plated and rigorously enforced in Britain but

16-11-2004 19

ignored in other countries. We spend a lot of timepolicing ourselves in Europe, but the main problems arecountries which are not bound by any scruples orinternational rules.

2-034

Howitt (PSE). Mr President, every year arms killhundreds of thousands of people and causeimmeasurable human suffering. Not only are unlawfulkillings in wartime on the increase, but equipment isbeing misused by soldiers, paramilitaries and police tokill, wound and commit terrible atrocities againstcivilians in peacetime as well.

On current trends, by 2020 the number of deaths andinjuries from war and violence will overtake the numberof deaths caused by diseases such as malaria andmeasles. Although the EU Code of Conduct waswelcome as a first step, export controls across the EUstill have many weaknesses and loopholes and we needthe political will to implement the changes required toadd to and tighten up the Code criteria, to regulatelicensed production overseas, to apply the Code toweapons components, to strengthen arms embargoes andto ensure that all EU Member States publish annualreports on arms exports, which Austria, Greece andLuxembourg have failed to do. Otherwise the rules willcontinue to be bypassed.

For example, the helicopters used against civilians andinsurgents by the security forces in Nepal contain EUcomponents. German Deutsche AG diesel enginesbypass EU embargoes by going to China and to Burmaand the production of military small arms has beenshifted to Malaysia, a country that has aggressive exportplans for these arms and would not be subject to the EUCode.

As already indicated in operative provision 11, thisshould not stop at Europe. The British Conservativeshypocritically preach that others should do what theyclaim is done in Britain. I am proud of what Britain hasdone, but I want to see an international arms trade treaty.They will not support that in this resolution.

Finally, I should like to endorse the view expressed inthis debate that there are many hurdles to be overcomebefore the embargo against China can be lifted. First, itis crucial that any decision to lift the embargo should notadversely affect stability across the Taiwan Straits.Second, we need to understand fully the impact on theflow of arms if the embargo is lifted. Third, we shouldexpress our continuing concerns about China's humanrights record and any decision must be subject to itsprogress in meeting human rights standards.

2-035

Nicolaï, Council. I would like to thank all theMembers of Parliament for their remarks on this veryimportant matter. Let me start with the sensitive issue ofChina.

Strong opinions have been expressed about human rightsand other concerns, such as regional conflicts. It was

stressed that the Council should not lift the armsembargo on China, with almost all the Members ofParliament present expressing the same sentiments. MrVan Hecke mentioned the Dutch position. However,everyone knows that I am here not as a representative ofthe Dutch Government, but of the Council presidency.Nevertheless, the Dutch Government is facing a verycritical Dutch Parliament, which is almost unanimouslyof the same opinion as this Parliament. That is also thecase in other countries. I listened very closely to yourremarks and share many of your concerns on this matter.These are currently also being voiced in the Council, andI must make it clear that even if this embargo is lifted, arestrictive EU export policy will be applied. It isimportant to be aware of that.

With regard to the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,many Members of Parliament mentioned the issue of theCode's status and stressed the importance of it beinglegally binding. Mr Van Orden, on the other hand,mentioned the issue of judicial consequences and thepossible increase of the role of judges, which is alsounder discussion in the Council. I understand thearguments but you must be aware that positions aredivided in the Council. The content of the Code and howwe implement it is of greater importance than its status,which would probably have no effect on the arms exportpolicy of the individual Member States.

I agree with Mr Czarnecki, who stressed the importanceof aspiring Member States applying the Code ofConduct. That is one of the reasons that the presidencyorganised a seminar to help these countries in thatrespect.

Mr Agnoletto stressed the importance of urging othercountries - the Russian Federation and the US - to applythis Code. We are in regular contact with thesecountries, aiming to maximise cooperation in this field,thus making export policy more efficient.

Mr von Wogau raised the issue of differences in theinterpretation of the criteria, which is indeed animportant point. I agree and have already told Parliamentthat harmonisation of the application of the criteria is animportant objective.

In another question, Mr Henin asked about post-shipment controls. As I stated in my initial remarks,post-shipment controls are essential to ensuring thatarms go where they are meant to go and do not fall intothe wrong hands. Unlike the US, the EU Member Statesdo not apply such controls, at least not on a regular andsystematic basis.

This issue has been identified as a priority in the SixthEU Arms Export report. As a first step Member Stateswill in the near future organise a meeting with USexperts in order to be briefed on the US programme. Onthe basis of this briefing, Member States will have todecide how best to move forward this important issueboth nationally and jointly.

20 16-11-2004

There were also questions from Mr Romeva i Rueda andMrs Gomes about the trade regulation on tortureequipment. This draft regulation is at present beingdiscussed in Council.

Mrs Gomes also asked about taxation of the arms trade.We are aware of the various suggestions made in thatregard, including those by Member States of theEuropean Union. However no concrete detailedproposals are currently being discussed within theEuropean Union.

I would like to conclude by commenting on what MrRomeva i Rueda said in his introduction. On the onehand he paid compliments to the presidency for thereview of the Code of Conduct, but on the other hand hesaid it was not enough. In a way I agree that we shouldgo further, and that this should not be the final step. It isindeed a first review and we should continue our efforts.I very much appreciate Parliament's strong commitmentto this issue and the active role that Parliament hasplayed.

(Applause)

2-036

Le Président. Le débat est clos.

Le vote aura lieu demain, à 12 h 30.

DÉCLARATION ÉCRITE (ARTICLE 142)

2-037

Pomés Ruiz (PPE-DE), por escrito. Debemosdefender los valores de la libertad y la democracia con ellegítimo uso de la palabra y la responsable aprobaciónde normas legales.

El gran mercado que aporta la República Popular Chinano debe hacernos olvidar que su régimen político siguesiendo heredero de un sistema de valores marcadamentecomunista y muy alejado de los estándares aceptables.

Taiwán sigue siendo un pueblo que sufre la opresiónpolítica y el aislamiento económico que impone laRepública Popular China, que recientemente ha vuelto autilizar la amenaza de la lucha armada contra Taiwán.

No se dan las condiciones para un levantamiento delembargo del comercio de armas. Si con esta situaciónapenas se consigue limitar la carrera armamentista de laRepública Popular China ¡que sería con el levantamientodel embargo!

Además, sería considerado como una aprobación delactual estatus de confrontación, en vez de insistir en elnecesario diálogo político de la República Popular conTaiwán. Provoquemos la acción política y no la armada.

2-038

8 - Mission ALTHEA en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine

2-039

Le Président. L'ordre du jour appelle à présent lesdéclarations du Conseil et de la Commission sur lamission ALTHEA en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine.

Je donne à nouveau la parole au président en exercice duConseil, M. Nicolaï.

2-040

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, the European Securityand Defence Policy is on the brink of a historic step. TheEU's first military crisis management operation,Operation ALTHEA, will start on 2 December. In thedevelopment of the ESDP, we have made great progressfrom concepts and capabilities to concrete actions. Likethe first EU police mission, the first military operationwill take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The preparations for the deployment of OperationALTHEA after SFOR leaves Bosnia and Herzegovinaare well advanced. An operational concept has beenapproved, force generation has taken place, and 11 thirdcountries have been invited to contribute to theoperation. A committee of contributors has had its firstmeeting and the operations plan has been approved bythe Council.

Operation ALTHEA will be an EU-led operation, withthe use of NATO assets and capabilities. Therefore, theDeputy SACEUR was appointed operation commanderin early July. The operation's HQ has been established inMons. In early October the force headquarters inSarajevo reached initial operational capability with aview to reaching full operational capability by earlyDecember, when authority is transferred from SFOR.

People might consider the transfer of the operation fromSFOR to the EU a big and risky step. They might havedoubts about the capabilities of the EU mission.However they are wrong, if only because 80% of theSFOR forces have transferred to ALTHEA, while thedeparting 20%, which are US forces, will be replaced byadditional European forces. All the EU Member Statescurrently contributing to SFOR will continue theircontributions in ALTHEA. However, ALTHEA is notjust an EU operation. Third countries like Morocco,Bulgaria, Romania, Norway and Turkey will participateas well. I am very pleased about their participation,because it shows that it is not just the EU that caresabout Bosnia and Herzegovina. As members of thecommittee of contributors, these countries will have thesame rights and obligations as the EU Member Statestaking part in the operation in terms of its day-to-daymanagement.

No effort has been spared in ensuring a smoothtransition from NATO to the EU and that includes thedelineation of tasks between ALTHEA and theremaining NATO headquarters in Sarajevo,arrangements on the availability and use of reserveforces and on the sharing of intelligence. The EURFORcommanding officer and the commander of theremaining NATO headquarters will be based at the samecamp, ensuring operational coordination.

16-11-2004 21

NATO itself also remains present in Bosnia andHerzegovina. We therefore have a NATO strategicreserve for support in emergencies. This can be used forboth NATO and Operation ALTHEA. This is a goodexample of the pragmatic and efficient use of limitedresources. It also emphasises the good cooperationbetween the EU and NATO. With the transition fromNATO to the EU, the last phase of military presence willstart. The accent will no longer be on the prevention ofinter-ethnic fighting but on assisting civil and militaryreforms. After that, a military presence can bewithdrawn.

With ALTHEA, we are contributing to the security andstability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is importantto the reforms in that country. At the same time,operation ALTHEA is dare I say the final element ina comprehensive European Union policy towards Bosniaand Herzegovina. It is also part of our broader strategyfor the Balkans. The combined activities in the political,economic development and security fields mutuallyreinforce each other. The situation in the country has adirect impact on the region and on the EU. We thereforehave a clear interest in its stability and prosperousdevelopment. EU involvement is not only in its interestsbut also in our own and, given our comprehensive andcoherent approach, it is only logical that the EU hastaken over the NATO operation.

The ultimate objective is to put Bosnia on track towardsthe EU and this will be achieved through the strengthand stabilisation association process. The EU militarymission, together with other EU activities such as theEU police mission, the EU monitoring mission and theCARDS development programme, will complement thatprocess

A comprehensive approach reflects our belief that thefuture of Bosnia lies firmly in Europe. It exemplifies ourlong-term commitment. It is now up to the Bosnianpeople to make the vision come true. They willeventually have to decide whether to join the Europeanpolitical and economic union. Such a choice requiresfundamental reforms of state, economic and judicialstructures. Equally, they will have to confirm thedecision to join the European community of values.Such a decision requires an environment of tolerance,dialogue, respect for religious freedoms and a toughstance in words and deeds against the impunity of warcriminals.

The right political will and popular support by theBosnians, combined with our comprehensive role, couldand should lead Bosnia away from conflict into a stableand peaceful future, a future in which our specialrepresentative Lord Ashdown will play an ever moreimportant role.

Let me conclude by saying that Bosnia and Herzegovinais on the right track. Stability and security are increasingand, with its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures,the country is moving more and more from the area ofDayton to the area of Brussels.

However, much remains to be done, because we are stillconcerned about the lack of cooperation with ICTY,particularly in the case of the Republika Srpska. ICTYcooperation is an important criterion for closer relationswith the EU and NATO. Here Bosnia and Herzegovinawill have to deliver. I hope the reforms of the defenceand police apparatus, one of the key tasks of ALTHEA,will also bear fruit in that field. In that way operationALTHEA will bring even more benefit to the people ofBosnia and Herzegovina in their quest for a durable andjust peace.

2-041

PRZEWODNICZY: ONYSZKIEWICZWiceprzewodniczący

2-042

Patten, Commission. I am extremely glad to have thisopportunity to say a few words about Bosnia andHerzegovina, just two weeks before the handover toEUFOR on 2 December. The launching of the ALTHEAmission is an important event: important because it willbe the first significant military operation undertakenunder the European Security and Defence Policy. Thetransfer from NATO has required long and detaileddiscussions because it was crucial to get things rightfrom the very start. My colleagues Mr Solana and Mr deHoop Scheffer deserve a great deal of credit for securinga successful outcome.

I know some will be concerned that a brand new militarymission in Bosnia sends a signal that the countrycontinues to suffer from significant instability. Thatwould, in my judgement, be an entirely wrongconclusion to draw. Last Spring the North AtlanticCouncil Ministerial Meeting noted an 'improved securityenvironment in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. As a resultthey decided to reduce the number of troops committedto SFOR from 12 000 to 7 000. I have been visitingBosnia for several years and I can personally attest to thetransformation which has come over the country duringthat period.

It would be the height of folly to take for granted theundoubted improvements which have occurred. All thatis happening is that Europe is taking on more directresponsibility for its own continent not before time,some might say. However, there will be a review of theoperation every six months. This will take account of itsduration, as well as its size and configuration. There isno question of keeping troops in Bosnia unnecessarily;as soon as conditions permit, the number of troops canbe reduced and eventually the mission will come to anend.

It is important at this time to recognise that BosniasEuropean future will assume growing importance as themilitary presence continues to reduce in size. Bosnia,like all the countries of the Western Balkans, has a clearEuropean perspective as a potential candidate country.Last November the Commission published a feasibilitystudy setting out 16 points on which the country neededto make significant progress before a recommendationcould be made to the European Council to start

22 16-11-2004

negotiations on a stabilisation and association agree-ment. Although there has been progress since then, I amdisappointed to end my mandate as Commissionerwithout being able to give Bosnia the green light. I verymuch hope that my successor, Commissioner Rehn, willbe able to do so early in his new mandate. Once he didso, the Council would have to accept his assessment anda negotiating mandate would then have to be agreed.Only then could negotiations start. There is no reasonwhy they could not do so some time during 2005. IfBosnia is to make progress on this timescale, a numberof things are required.

First, the authorities have to make further progress onthe legislation associated with the 16 points. Much hasbeen done here, but there are continuing blockages inareas like VAT and public broadcasting.

Second, Bosnia has to recognise that passing laws haslittle utility if they are not implemented properly. Thereis still a great deal of work to be done here.

Third, the Commission indicated in the feasibility studythat it would expect proper cooperation with the HighRepresentative in his reform agenda, as provided for inthe Dayton Paris Peace Accords. One crucial area here isthe question of police reform. I very much hope that, bythe end of the year, Mr Wilfried Martens will be able toreport agreement on the way forward.

Finally, there is the question of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. BosniaHerzegovina is a member of the United Nations and asignatory to Dayton. As I have made clear on a numberof occasions, there can be no dilution of the absoluterequirement for full cooperation with the Tribunal. Thisis fundamental to Bosnias prospects for furthermovement through the stabilisation and associationprocess. It is a crucial test of Bosnias commitment to itsinternational obligations and to the rule of law. It is alsoa fundamental part of the process of allowing the victimsof the atrocities to let go of the past. Allowing thoseaccused of terrible human rights abuses to remain freemakes it impossible for the communities to be properlyreconciled. Next week the Chief Prosecutor, Mrs Carladel Ponte, will be reporting to the United NationsSecurity Council on the cooperation of the countries ofthe Western Balkans with the Tribunal. Up until now,she has been quite clear that Republika Srpska has notbeen cooperating at all. It is indeed a disgraceful matterthat not one indictee has been transferred by theRepublika Srpska to The Hague, although there arereports today that some war crime suspects have beenarrested by Republika Srpska for trial locally. This iswelcome news, but Republika Srpska will be judged bythe international community on its cooperation with theTribunal on cases which fall under its jurisdiction. It ison that issue that Mrs del Ponte will be reporting to theSecurity Council. I have no reason to expect that herreport will be positive on Republika Srpska. If that isindeed the case, Lord Ashdown will have to consider hisresponse. Certainly, it is intolerable that the prospectsfor the whole country to make progress towards joining

the European Union and NATO are being compromisedin this way. I urge the political leadership of RepublikaSrpska to take action now to fulfil their obligations. Ifthey do not, they will be responsible for anyconsequences which flow from their failure.

Honourable Members, the people of Bosnia Herzegovinasuffered the most from the Balkan wars in the 1990s.Now they have emerged from that terrible period andhave a clear chance of creating a real country with agenuine prospect of joining our European family. As Ileave the Commission, I wish them every success and Ilook forward to hearing of their progress in the monthsto come.

(Applause)

2-043

von Wogau (PPE-DE), im Namen der Fraktion. HerrPräsident, verehrte Kollegen! Die Übertragung derVerantwortung für die Sicherheit von Bosnien undHerzegowina von der NATO auf die Europäische Unionist ein sehr wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zu einereuropäischen Verteidigungsidentität. Nach denOperationen in Mazedonien und im Kongo ist dies nundie dritte Operation dieser Art und auch die größte. Essind immerhin 7.000 Männer und Frauen in dieserOperation involviert, das heißt, sie ist wesentlich größerals das, was wir in der Vergangenheit gekannt haben.

Was ist nun unsere Aufgabe als EuropäischesParlament? Es ist die demokratische Kontrolle, obwohlich im jetzigen Stadium der Entwicklung eher von einerparlamentarischen Begleitung sprechen würde; wirhaben aber bestimmte Fragen zu stellen: Stimmt dieFührungsstruktur und ist sie leistungsfähig? Wird sieauch unter Krisensituationen standhalten? Wie steht esmit der Ausrüstung und der Bewaffnung der Soldaten,die dorthin geschickt werden? Sind sie miteinanderkompatibel, entsprechen sie den Anforderungen?

Es wird auch sehr wichtig, zu sehen, wie dieZusammenarbeit mit der NATO nach den Berlin-plus-Verhandlungen und - eine Spezialität der EuropäischenUnion und ihrer Sicherheitsstrategie - wie vor allemauch die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem zivilen unddem militärischen Part dieser Krisenbewälti-gungsoperation funktionieren wird.

Für uns ist auch ganz besonders die Frage derFinanzierung dieser Operation wichtig. Wir habenimmer wieder die Sorge, dass hier mehr und mehrSchattenhaushalte entstehen, die weder von den 25nationalen Parlamenten noch vom EuropäischenParlament kontrolliert werden können. Deswegen stellenwir auch in der Entschließung, die wir verabschiedenwerden, die Forderung, dass die Ausgaben, die hieranfallen - soweit das nach der Verfassungsentwicklungderzeit möglich ist - vom europäischen Haushaltübernommen werden.

2-044

Wiersma (PSE), namens de fractie. Voorzitter, ik wilgraag van de gelegenheid gebruik maken om

16-11-2004 23

commissaris Patten, die hier eigenlijk in extra speeltijdnog aanwezig is, te complimenteren voor de rol die hijde afgelopen jaren heeft gespeeld in de Balkan en metname in het voormalig Joegoslavië. Ondanks zijnsomberheid over het stabilisatie- en associatieakkoordmet Bosnië en Herzegovina, denk ik dat het op zich tochpositief is dat de Europese Unie na al die jaren deambitie heeft verwezenlijkt om een grote operatie, endan nog wel in het voormalig Joegoslavië, op te zetten.Na de Dayton-akkoorden van 1995 was het de NAVOdie de verantwoordelijkheid nam voor destabilisatiemacht in Bosnië en Herzegovina. Nu hetgemeenschappelijk veiligheids- en defensiebeleid van deEuropese Unie vorm krijgt, is het een logische stap datde Europese Unie zelf de verantwoordelijkheid neemtvoor de stabiliteit in het hart van haar eigen continent.Het is dan ook een goede stap dat de Europese Unie einddit jaar de stabilisatiemacht van de NAVO in Bosnië enHerzegovina aflost. ALTHEA is een belangrijke test vande defensieambities van de Europese Unie. De operatieis met aanvankelijk zevenduizend militairen aanzienlijkgroter dan eerdere operaties van de Europese Unie zoalsConcordia in Macedonië en Artemis in Congo.Operationeel gezien bouwt de missie voort op SFOR.ALTHEA heeft hetzelfde robuuste mandaat waarmeeook in onze ogen de veiligheid van onze militairen zogoed mogelijk wordt gewaarborgd. Er kan gebruikworden gemaakt van de ervaring die de NAVO inBosnië en Herzegovina heeft opgedaan, maar depolitieke verantwoordelijkheid komt bij de EuropeseUnie te liggen, zodat de Europese Unie kan tonen dat zeeen gezamenlijke externe rol op grotere schaal danvoorheen kan spelen.

Mijn ervaring is dat men in Bosnië over het algemeenpositief staat tegenover deze missie. Iedereen die iktijdens een recent bezoek aan Bosnië en Herzegovinasprak, verwelkomt de grotere betrokkenheid van deEuropese Unie. Tegelijk is er nog sprake vanspanningen, er is al naar verwezen, tussen deverschillende delen waaruit het land bestaat. Terwijl deBosnisch-Kroatische federatie duidelijk toenaderingzoekt tot Europa op weg naar EU-lidmaatschap, bestaater in de Republika Srpska nog altijd weigerachtigheidals het gaat om samenwerking met het tribunaal in DenHaag. De operatie moet ertoe bijdragen dat de situatie inBosnië en Herzegovina verder wordt gestabiliseerd.ALTHEA moet zo goed mogelijk bijdragen tot deopbouw van de staat Bosnië-Herzegovina, de rechtsstaat,de politie en het leger en stabiele democratischestructuren, zodat het land zich in de Europese structurenkan integreren. Uiteindelijk, en dat moet naar mijnmening de ambitie van de Europese Unie zijn, moet ditland als geheel, de staat Bosnië-Herzegovina, op eigenbenen kunnen staan.

Er is op dit moment geen eindpunt van de EU-missievoorzien, maar het kan niet de bedoeling zijn dat eenmilitaire macht zonder meer aanwezig blijft tot hetmoment dat Bosnië klaar is om toe te treden tot deEuropese Unie. Daarvoor bestaat vooralsnog geenrealistisch tijdpad, maar toetreding tot de EU is om hetzo te zeggen een civiele en geen militaire operatie.

Alleen een functionerende staat die de eigen veiligheidkan garanderen, kan ook op een geloofwaardige manierlidmaatschap van de Europese Unie aanvragen.

Normalisering is dus het doel, en het is dan ooknoodzakelijk dat de Europese Raad, die tot deze missieheeft besloten, ook zo snel mogelijk een soort exit-strategie ontwikkelt die misschien kan samenhangen methet stabilisatie- en associatieproces. Een dergelijke exit-strategie zal de EU ook noodzaken haar betrokkenheidbij de ontwikkelingen in Bosnië-Herzegovina verder teintensiveren. Alleen als naar vertrek wordt toegewerkt,kan ALTHEA substantieel bijdragen tot het uiteindelijkedoel, namelijk de sub-stabilisatie in de Europeseintegratie van Bosnië en Herzegovina.

2-045

Jäätteenmäki (ALDE), ryhmän puolesta. Arvoisapuhemies, hyvät kollegat, Bosnia ja Hertsegovinanturvallisuustilanne on parantunut, mutta maa on siltiepävakaa, ja kansainvälinen läsnäolo on tarpeen. Tulevaoperaatio edistää Bosnia ja Hertsegovinan lähentymistäEU:hun ja vahvistaa unionin roolia koko Länsi-Balkanilla. Käsiteltävänä oleva esitys on hyvä, ja jäsenWiersma on tehnyt loistavaa työtä. Altheanvarjoesittelijänä tein huomioita pohjaesitykseen ja oleniloinen, että ne otettiin huomioon esitystä laadittaessa.

On tärkeää, että Bosnia ja Hertsegovinassa toimitaanjärjestäytynyttä rikollisuutta ja naiskauppaa vastaan.Haluan korostaa, että paikallisia poliisijoukkoja koot-taessa on huomioitava etnisten ryhmien entistätasapuolisempi edustus. Tämä lisää alueen kaikkienryhmien luottamusta ja sitoutumista järjestyksenylläpitoon.

Vapaana olevat sotarikolliset on saatava kiinni. Daytoninsopimus on pantava täytäntöön. On kyseuskottavuudesta. Tämä on Nato-esikunnan tehtävä.Kyseessä on ensimmäinen merkittävä EU:n johtamasotilaallinen operaatio. Meidän on tarkkailtavaoperaation sujumista erittäin tiiviisti. On tärkeäähuolehtia sen operatiivisesta puolesta ja työnjaonselkeydestä.

EU:n on varmistettava, että Althea-joukot kunnioittavatkaikilta osin ihmisoikeuksia. EU on sitoutunutkunnioittamaan ihmisoikeuksia, ja sen tulee näkyäAlthean kaikessa toiminnassa, oli sitten kyse vangittujentai pidätettyjen kohtelusta tai mistä tahansa toiminnasta.Parlamentin valtuuskunta tutustuu Althean toimintaanensi vuonna ja sille tulee kaikkien muiden tehtävienohella varata myös mahdollisuus ihmisoikeuksienkunnioittamisen arvioimiseen.

2-046

Beer (Verts/ALE), im Namen der Fraktion. HerrPräsident! Für meine Fraktion möchte ich in denVordergrund stellen, dass wir uns zum großen Glück alleeinig sind, wie wichtig es für die Europäische Union,aber auch für Bosnien ist, dass wir dieses Mandatübernehmen. Wenn es stimmt, dass es wirklich derSchlussstein ist, wie Sie, Herr Nicolaï, angedeutet haben,würde ich mir wünschen, dass wir einen weiteren

24 16-11-2004

politischen Fortschritt erreichen, nämlich dass wir diebosnische Regierung ausdrücklich auffordern, uns mitdieser Mission einzuladen.

Wir haben rechtlich jede Grundlage, die Grundlagen vonSFOR, also seitens der Militärintervention, die esgeschafft hat, nach zehn Jahren jetzt diesen Fortschrittder Stabilisierung zu ermöglichen. Aber sollten wir nichtdanach streben, das Gleiche zu erreichen wie inMakedonien, dass die Regierung uns bittet, dort in demÜbergangsfenster präsent zu sein, wenn wir schon davonreden, dass wir die Zukunftsperspektive Bosniens inEuropa sehen? Ich glaube, dass das ein Erfolg wäre.Warum sollten wir nicht auch mit Bosnien undHerzegowina ein sogenanntes SOFA, also ein status offorces agreement abschließen, wie wir es auch mitanderen Staaten, die uns um Hilfe gebeten haben, getanhaben?

Zweitens: Wir brauchen diese regelmäßige Berichterstat-tung, und ich hoffe, wir werden dies morgen auchfestlegen. Das Parlament ist engagiert, weil wir alle seitJahren engagiert sind. Wir reden nicht nur über eineMilitärintervention. Im nächsten Jahr jährt sich zumzehnten Mal der Angriff auf Srebenica, und es jährt sichDayton, und ich glaube, wir haben eine Verpflichtung,dies hier klar zu sagen. Herr Patten, ich hoffe, dass wirIhrem Anliegen folgen und uns intensiv um die ZukunftBosniens kümmern.

2-047

Belder (IND/DEM), namens de fractie. Voorzitter, inhet licht van de hedendaagse geschiedenis kun jemoeilijk beweren dat Europese bemoeienis met dewestelijke Balkan een doorslaand succes was. Om derusteloze Balkan, naar de sprekende titel van de Duitsepublicatie, te stabiliseren, was assistentie van over deAtlantische oceaan noodzakelijk. Per slot van rekeninghebben we niet voor niets de NAVO. Juist die blijvendebetrokkenheid van de NAVO, ook bij de Europesemissie ALTHEA in Bosnië-Herzegovina, stelt mij nogenigszins gerust. In feite is deze hele, zogenaamdeEuropese, operatie namelijk ingebed in transatlantischesamenwerking op basis van de 'Berlijn Plus-regeling'tussen de Europese Unie en de NAVO. Deze conclusie,mijnheer de Voorzitter, trek ik uit de brief van hetNederlandse voorzitterschap aan het NederlandsParlement van 9 november. Mijnheer de Voorzitter, demissie ALTHEA noopt al bij al tot Europesebescheidenheid. Wat meer is, naar mijn overtuiging zetook zij weer een groot vraagteken achter het nut en denoodzaak van een Europees veiligheids- en defensie-beleid. Die machtsaspiratie kan alleen maar leiden totverzwakking of zelfs uitholling van de NAVO en danzijn wij allemaal in Europa - naar een Nederlandsgezegde, mijnheer Nicolaï - ver van huis.

2-048

Poli Bortone (UEN), a nome del gruppo. SignorPresidente, onorevoli colleghi, nel ringraziare il collegaWiersma per la completezza e la qualità della suarelazione, voglio sottolineare a nome del gruppo UENl'importanza che questa missione militare di pace

dell'Unione europea riveste nella delicatissima area dellaBosnia Erzegovina.

Si tratta della prima volta per l'Unione,.al di là del fattosimbolico che permetterà ai 7000 militari già operativisotto l'egida della NATO di fregiarsi ora del simbolo adodici stelle sulle maniche della loro divisa, la missionevuol comunque significare più Europa, quindi unamaggiore visibilità dell'Unione nei Balcani.

Se negli anni novanta, quando sono scoppiati l'uno dopol'altro i sanguinosi conflitti etnici nella regione, ci sidomandava dove fosse l'Europa e se c'è stata unadolorosa assenza da parte nostra, oggi siamo testimoni diuna presenza e di una attenzione adeguata alle circostan-ze da parte delle nostre istituzioni.

I 7000 militari arriveranno in Bosnia forti, prima ancorache delle armi, soprattutto delle loro competenze, dellaloro umanità, della loro disponibilità verso lepopolazioni locali. Queste ultime sono consapevoli dellanecessità di una presenza militare sul territorio, in questadelicata fase di stabilizzazione del paese, e sono quindipronte ad accoglierli con grande favore. Questi militarinon arrivano soli in un territorio sconosciuto. Con loro,in Bosnia, ci sono le Istituzioni, la Commissione, l'Altorappresentante dell'Unione - che da due anni e mezzolavora come vero governatore illuminato in Bosnia, neltentativo non facile di assicurare la costruzione di unoStato di diritto in un quadro rinnovato di pacificaconvivenza fra le tre maggiori etnie del paese.

C'è infine questo Parlamento, che con la sua delegazioneguidata dall'infaticabile presidente Pack, segue da vicinogli avvenimenti in Bosnia, come dimostra fra le altrecose la recente visita effettuata in questo paese. Talevisita è servita per ribadire ai membri del Parlamentodella Bosnia Erzegovina princìpi e percorsi diavvicinamento all'Unione europea. Oggi nell'otticadell'accordo di associazione e di stabilizzazione e undomani, non ancora prevedibile nel tempo, in prospettivadella futura adesione .

Tutto questo, comunque, non deve illudere. Passiimportanti sono stati compiuti in Bosnia sulla via dellastabilizzazione. Il desiderio di normalizzazione èpalpabile in molte zone del paese e la voglia didimenticare il passato e pensare al futuro appartiene atutti i suoi abitanti. Dei sedici punti previsti nello studiodi fattibilità, molti sono stati già tradotti in norma.

È giusto ed è confortante notarlo, ma resta ancora moltoda fare. La missione militare di pace dal 2 dicembresotto l'egida dell'Unione è lì per questo.

2-049

Stenzel (PPE-DE). Herr Präsident, HerrRatspräsident, Herr Kommissar! Auch ich darf mich beidieser Gelegenheit von Ihnen verabschieden und michfür Ihre Zusammenarbeit in all den Jahren herzlichbedanken. Sie haben sich ja besonders dem Westbalkangewidmet, und ich hätte mir gewünscht, dass wir hierkeine militärische Sicherungsaktion der EU mehr zu

16-11-2004 25

installieren brauchen, zehn Jahre nach denBalkankriegen. Es ist aber - wie der Hohe Vertreter fürdie Außenpolitik vor Jahren einmal gesagt hat - eineFront, mit der wir uns noch länger befassen müssen, undsie liegt vor unserer Haustür in Europa. Sie liegt unsnäher als andere Krisengebiete, seien sie im Kongo,seien sie im Sudan oder seien sie an der Elfenbeinküste,so bedauerlich dies alles ist und auch uns in dieVerantwortung nimmt.

Aber ALTHEA ist eben mehr, sie ist ein Testfall für diesichtbare Rolle der EU in Bosnien und Herzegowina, diehier erstmals von der NATO Aufgaben übernimmt. DieMission ist Teil eines koordinierten und kohärentenZugangs, der auch den Stabilisierungs- undAssoziationsprozess umfasst, wobei ich mir wünsche,dass auch dieser größere Fortschritte macht, denn dassnoch 16 Punkte offen sind, ist für uns besorgniserregend.

Bosnien und Herzegowina bedarf der europäischenPerspektive, und ALTHEA soll diese Perspektive mitsichern. Wesentlich ist aber eine klare Befehlsstruktur,die Doppelgleisigkeiten zwischen NATO und ALTHEAvermeidet und die Befehlsstruktur so klar wie möglichmacht. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen ALTHEA undNATO wird hier also ebenfalls einem Test unterzogen.Bedauerlich ist, dass die budgetäre Absicherungaußerhalb des normalen EU-Budgets stattfindet unddaher das Europäische Parlament nicht so eingeschaltetist, wie es sein sollte. In diesem Sinne begrüße ich denBericht und kann im Namen der EVP-ED-Fraktionunsere Zustimmung zusichern.

2-050

Ludford (ALDE). Mr President, I welcome the switchto an EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.I also applaud the fact that Lord Ashdown will promoteoverall EU political coordination there and, specifically,will give the EU force political advice.

NATO's SFOR was criticised by Amnesty Internationalfor human rights violations. Lord Ashdown will have animportant role in ensuring that the ALTHEA EUFORmission does not practice arbitrary arrests or ill-treatment of detainees. I would urge that the Bosnia andHerzegovina Human Rights Ombudsman be givenjurisdiction over their activities. I also hope that the EUtakeover of military responsibility will lead to anenergetic effort to find war criminals and deliver them toThe Hague.

Finally, I want an assurance of zero tolerance towardssexual abuse, exploitation and use of prostitutes who arevictims of trafficking.

It is at last time to say goodbye to Commissioner Patten,but I look forward to working with him in the quest for a'yes' vote on the Constitution in Britain.

2-051

Kallenbach (Verts/ALE). Herr Präsident! HerrKommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Es tut gut,sich immer wieder zu erinnern, um einer besserenZukunft willen. Es ist noch nicht solange her, dass

mitten in Europa auf dem westlichen BalkanVertreibung, Mord und ethnische Säuberungen dieSchlagzeilen füllten. Die EU aber war wie gelähmt undkonnte keine wirklich wirksamen Schritte zurVerhinderung durchsetzen. Es ist gut, wenn auchschmerzhaft, sich an Srebenica, an Mostar oder an BanjaLuka zu erinnern und sich bewusst zu werden, dass diebisherige militärische Präsenz unter Führung der NATOzwar eine gewisse, aber dennoch fragile Stabilität inBosnien und Herzegowina erzielt hat.

Es ist gut, dass die EU mit der ersten größerengemeinsamen Militärmission mit erweitertem Auftragviel mehr Verantwortung in diesem Teil Europasübernimmt, mit dem Ziel, langfristig für ein stabiles,friedliches, multiethnisches, und regional wie interna-tional kooperierendes Bosnien und Herzegowina zusorgen. Es wird ein weiterer Prüfstein für Europa sein,auch für die im nächsten Jahr sehr wahrscheinlichanstehenden Entscheidungen in diesem Gebiet, auch imKosovo.

Ich möchte aber auch an uns appellieren, eine derartigeUnterstützung, auch für eine wirtschaftlicheEntwicklung, für Kostengeld, bitte auch bei derFinanzperspektive zu berücksichtigen.

2-052

Pack (PPE-DE). Herr Präsident! Liebe Kolleginnenund Kollegen! Nur wenige Bemerkungen zum Kern derSache. Erstens: Als Vorsitzende der Delegation für dieBeziehungen zu Albanien, Bosnien und Herzegowinasowie Serbien und Montenegro (einschließlich Kosovo)freue ich mich, dass das große finanzielle und zivileEngagement der EU unter Leitung von Herrn Patten nundurch die immer noch notwendige Militärmission, jetztin europäischer Hand, flankiert wird.

Zweitens: Dieser Wechsel von SFOR zu EUFOR wirdauch in Bosnien und Herzegowina begrüßt. Es macht jaeinmal mehr deutlich, wie eng das Schicksal vonBosnien und Herzegowina mit dem unsrigen verknüpftist. Das Gelingen unserer politischen, wirtschaftlichenund militärischen Mission ist der Lackmustest für unsereAußen- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Drittens: Die Aufgaben der EUFOR sollten klarbeschrieben werden. Sie sollte sich nicht unnötig in dieinnerstaatliche Strafverfolgung von Einzelpersoneneinmischen. Polizei und Justiz im Lande haben sowohlfür die Verfolgung als auch für die Inhaftierungnormaler Krimineller inzwischen die Kapazitätenentwickelt. Auch die Festnahme von Kriegsverbrechernwie im Fall von Mladic und Karadzic sollte Sache desverbleibenden NATO-Kontingents, und vor allem dereinheimischen Serben in der Republika Srpska sein.Beide haben dies bisher nicht mit sichtbaremEnthusiasmus betrieben, die Republika Srpska hat essogar hintertrieben. Die EUFOR aber sollte andereAufgaben haben.

Viertens: Wie wird sich die Zusammenarbeit zwischender Polizeimission und EUFOR gestalten?

26 16-11-2004

Fünftens eine Frage, die mich bereits in den letztenJahren umgetrieben hat: Sind die Soldaten der EUFORauf die Probleme des Frauenhandels und dererzwungenen Prostitution hinwiesen worden? Gibt eseinen ethischen Kontext? Und wer wird Verstöße dannwo und wann ahnden? Bosnien und Herzegowina istnicht nur ein Durchgangsland, es ist auch einNehmerland, und das nicht zuletzt durch dieinternationale Anwesenheit.

Und sechstens: Der Name EUFOR ist der richtige.Warum also ALTHEA? Eine mythologische Frauenfigurumgeben von Blut, von Rache, von Revanche, dieschließlich selbst im Selbstmord endet. Was hat sichderjenige, der diesen Namen erfunden hat, dabeigedacht? Etwas Fingerspitzengefühl hätte man dabeihaben müssen. In einer Gegend, wo wir selbst gegenRache, gegen die Revanche arbeiten, hätte man etwasanderes erwarten dürfen. Und noch etwas: EUFOR istder Name, unter dem die Mission heute schon aufgroßen Postern in Sarajevo willkommen geheißen wird.Lassen wir es dabei, motten wir ALTHEA da ein, wo siehingehört!

2-053

ZA PŘEDSEDNICTVÍ: PAN OUZKÝMístopředseda

2-054

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, I thank Members fortheir remarks. As they were remarks rather thanquestions, I think I can be brief.

Most of the Members who spoke agreed on the fact thatthe step we want to take in Bosnia and Herzegovina is animportant step for the security and defence policy of theEuropean Union. We also agree on the fact that it isimportant for them and also for the European Unionbecause of the European perspective on Bosnia andHerzegovina. Mr von Wogau, Mr Wiersma and otherswere very clear on that.

There were questions, especially from Mr von Wogau,about the command structure. I shall explain. We havethe Deputy SACEUR as commander of operations. He issupported by an EU operation which has its headquarterslocated within those of NATO in Mons, as I mentionedbefore. Under the Deputy SACEUR we have an EUcommand element in Naples where the regional NATOheadquarters is located. This is in charge of the regionalBalkans operation.

The field commander falls directly under this commandelement and hence there is a very thorough militarystructure. As with all European Union operations, thePolitical and Security Committee has political controland provides strategic direction. As regards armaments,as I said before it is the same people with the sameequipment.

I agree with Mrs Poli Bortone and others that progresshas been made but a lot remains to be done. In additionto the ICTY cooperation I have already mentioned andthe internal reforms, I hope indeed Bosnia and

Herzegovina will also become more active in regionalcooperation.

Croatia has made considerable progress and could be anexample in a number of fields except perhaps withregard to ICTY, as we will hear from the ChiefProsecutor, Carla Del Ponte, on 23 November.

I end with a short but important remark. On behalf of thepresidency I would very much like to thankCommissioner Patten for the important role he played inthe Balkans. As he said, we are all looking forward tothe new Commission and the new Commissioner, onwhich this Parliament will decide on Thursday.Nevertheless we will miss Commissioner Patten.

(Applause)

2-055

Pack (PPE-DE). Herr Ratspräsident! Ich habe zweiFragen gestellt, ich habe nicht nur geredet. Ich habe Siegefragt, in welcher Art und Weise die Soldaten aufdieses schwierige Amt vorbereitet wurden, in Bezuggerade auf das Thema Frauenhandel und erzwungeneProstitution. Ich habe Sie gefragt, wie und wo sieverurteilt oder zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden wennes dazu kommt , und ich habe Sie zweitens gefragt, obSie daran denken, dieses schreckliche Wort ALTHEAaus dem Verkehr zu ziehen, weil es dort unten fürSchwierigkeiten sorgt. Es waren zwei wichtige Fragen,und ich hätte gerne eine Antwort.

2-056

Nicolaï, Council. I cannot add very much. I tried toexplain in relation to the first question and also to Mrvon Wogau's question. With regard to the secondquestion, it is a tradition that we choose Greek, Romanor Latin figures as names for operations and activities. Isuppose that it was chosen for this reason.

2-057

Ludford (ALDE). Mr President, like Mrs Pack Iasked some specific questions. One of these was similarto hers and concerned assurances as to the non-use ofprostitutes who are the victims of trafficking. This is nota trivial point, it is really important.

Secondly, I asked whether the Bosnia and HerzegovinaHuman Rights Ombudsman would have jurisdictionover EUFOR activities with a view to avoiding the kindof criticisms levelled at SFOR regarding arbitrary arrestsand the ill treatment of detainees. These were veryspecific questions and I would be very grateful for ananswer from the presidency.

2-058

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, unfortunately I cannotbe precise enough to answer the second question.

As to the first question, I fully agree with the importanceof the remark and the issue itself.

2-059

President. Rozprava je ukončena návrhem usnesení,které předloil Výbor pro zahraniční věci.

16-11-2004 27

Hlasování se bude konat ve středu v 12:30.

2-060

9 - Turecká komunita na Kypru

2-061

Předseda. Dalím bodem je společná rozprava o:

- Zpráva: Anders Samuelsen (A6-0031/2004) - Evropskáagentura pro obnovuo návrhu nařízení Rady, kterým se mění nařízení Rady(ES) č. 2667/2000 o Evropské agentuře pro obnovu

a

- Zpráva: Mechtild Rothe (A6-0032/2004) - Nástroj profinanční podporu (Kypr)Návrh nařízení Rady, kterým se zřizuje nástroj profinanční podporu na posílení hospodářského rozvojeturecké komunity na Kypru

2-062

∆ηµητρακόπουλος (PPE-DE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε,συγγνώµη που διακόπτω πριν αρχίσουµε τη συζήτησηγια τη σηµαντική έκθεση της κ. Rothe, αλλά επειδή ηπαρέµβασή µου είναι σχετική, ζητώ το λόγο τώρα.

Έχω κάποιες πληροφορίες, και σας παρακαλώ παράπολύ να το ελέγξετε, ότι η υπηρεσία της Ολοµέλειας µετον τίτλο Tabling Οffice παρουσιάζει ή πρόκειται ναπαρουσιάσει για ψήφιση µία αυθαίρετη διάταξη τωντροπολογιών στην έκθεση της κ. Rothe. Όταν το πληρο-φορήθηκα, φώναξα και µπορεί, επειδή εδώ έχουν και οιτοίχοι αυτιά, να το έχει µάθει ήδη η υπηρεσία και ναέχει κάνει τη δέουσα αλλαγή. Εάν δεν την έχει κάνει,τονίζω εάν δεν έχει κάνει την αλλαγή, σας παρακαλώπάρα πολύ, να ειδοποιήσετε τον αναπληρωτή ΓενικόΓραµµατέα, τον κ. Rømer, ότι πρέπει να κάνει τηναλλαγή και να του υπενθυµίσετε, ότι όταν στοπροηγούµενο Προεδρείο ψηφίσαµε τη δηµιουργία τουTabling Οffice είχαµε κάνει σαφές ότι το Tabling Οfficeδεν έχει καµία πολιτική δικαιοδοσία. ∆ιότι εάν δείτε τηδιάταξη των τροπολογιών που έχω εδώ, είµαι βέβαιοςότι στην παρουσίασή της εκ µέρους του Tabling Οfficeυποκρύπτεται πολιτική σκοπιµότητα, την οποίαν καικαταγγέλλω. Και, τελειώνοντας, τονίζω ότι εάν δεν έχεικάνει ήδη την αλλαγή και εάν δεν πρόκειται να τηνκάνει, το ζήτηµα του Tabling Οffice θα οδηγηθεί εκµέρους µου, στη ∆ιάσκεψη των Προέδρων τωνπολιτικών οµάδων.

2-063

President. Thank you for your motion. I promise youwe will check it.

2-064

Μάτσης (PPE-DE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, πάνω στο θέµατης βοήθειας προς την Τουρκοκυπριακή κοινότητα, ηοποία ταλαιπωρείται αρκετό καιρό και θέλουµε τοζήτηµα να λήξει οµαλά χωρίς άλλα προβλήµατα.

Έχω να παρατηρήσω, κύριε Πρόεδρε, ότι η ΕπιτροπήΠροϋπολογισµών του Κοινοβουλίου έχει αποφασίσει -πολύ ορθά- ότι τα χρήµατα θα δοθούν προς την Τουρκο-κυπριακή κοινότητα από τη θέση 3, δηλαδή από τη θέση

βοήθειας προς τα κράτη µέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.Τώρα πληροφορούµαι ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή έχειπροβεί σε εισήγηση να δοθούν τα χρήµατα αυτά από τηθέση 7, δηλαδή από τη θέση που αφορά τηνπροενταξιακή επιχορήγηση...

(Ο Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον οµιλητή)

2-065

President. I am sorry, but that is not a point of order.

2-066

Patten, Commission. Mr President, I will seek in thecourse of my remarks to answer very robustly on theCommission's behalf the point made by the honourableMember, and to make it clear why it views heading 7 asthe correct one for this assistance. If the honourableMember can wait for a moment and listen to what I haveto say, it may help inform him on any subsequent pointsof order he wishes to raise.

I would like to cover both the question of the extensionof the European Agency for Reconstruction's mandateuntil the end of 2006 and the question of theCommission's proposals for helping Northern Cyprus.There is a connection between the two and I will makethat clear in my remarks.

I wish to start by paying tribute to the Agency and toRichard Zink for the splendid work done since 2000 tohelp Serbia-Montenegro, including Kosovo and theFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Agencywas set up to deliver aid fast and effectively tocommunities which were in urgent need of it. That isexactly what it has done. The independent externalevaluation of the Reconstruction Agency has concludedthat the Agency has done an excellent job in fulfilling itsoriginal mandate. If the House remembers, it was aCommission Task Force for Kosovo, established justafter the end of the conflict in July 1999, that laid thebasis for the establishment of the Agency in February2000. Since then its key positions have been held bydetached Commission officials with long experience inmanaging our assistance. The Agency's record ofsuccess is the basis for the Commission's proposal tomaintain it in its present format until the end of 2006,when the current assistance programme for the WesternBalkans - the CARDS programme - also expires.

On the strength of this positive evaluation, theCommission has not proposed any other substantivechange to the Agency regulation as it stands. We have,however, given a great deal of attention to theamendments tabled by the Committee on ForeignAffairs, and in particular to the suggestion to submit aCommission report on the future of the Agency by June2005.

I am sure the House will appreciate that the importantdebate on the new Community financial perspective for2007-2013 will have an impact on how to deliverassistance to the Western Balkans. We therefore feel itrealistic to set the end of 2005 rather than the middle of2005 as a deadline. Also, as the committee has

28 16-11-2004

requested, and in order not to leave any doubt about thefuture of the Agency, we will ensure that any proposal toextend the Agency beyond 2006 should be made by theCommission by 31 March 2006 at the latest.

For formal reasons, we have not deemed it appropriateto accept as a legal requirement an obligation to reporton the division of tasks between our delegations and theoperational centres of the European Agency forReconstruction. The existence in the same country ofboth the Agency and the delegations calls for closecooperation on the ground to ensure that our assistanceeffort is not dissipated in any way. We have made greatefforts to ensure that any difficulties are addressed bymaking the necessary changes to administrativeprocedures. However, we will continue to be available todiscuss with the Committee on Foreign Affairs anyconcrete issues that it thinks could hamper the Agency'swork.

I would like to underline once again the very importantjob which the Agency has done. When I became aCommissioner in the autumn of 1999, there wasconsiderable concern as to whether we would be able todeliver assistance sufficiently rapidly in the WesternBalkans. The Agency did the job extremely well and Iwant to pay tribute again to all those who have beenresponsible for that.

In order not to jeopardise the effective performance andoperations of the Agency in the Western Balkans, wehave also found it sensible to go ahead with the originalproposal to extend the time limit of the Agency'smandate and not to await the final outcome of theCouncil's discussions on the assistance package for theNorthern Cyprus community and the extension of thegeographical scope of the Agency.

Since the current mandate of the Agency expires at theend of next month, the positive opinion of Parliamenttoday is essential so as not to interrupt our assistance tothe Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and toSerbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo.

Let me now turn to the Commission's proposals forassisting Northern Cyprus, in the course of which I shalltry to answer the point of order the honourable Memberraised earlier. As the House is aware, the Council invitedthe Commission, after the failure of the referendum onthe reunification of Cyprus in April 2004 - and I wouldlike to wholly associate myself with everything that mycolleague, Commissioner Verheugen, said about that - tobring forward comprehensive proposals to put an end tothe isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. On 7July, the Commission duly adopted a comprehensivepackage of trade and aid measures, as requested by theCouncil. Although today we are only discussing theRothe report on the financial instrument, I would like tostress again the political importance of the package,which aims at facilitating the reunification of Cyprus bymeans of financial assistance and trade underpreferential conditions.

The proposal for a Council regulation establishing alegal instrument for encouraging the economicdevelopment of the Turkish Cypriot community createsa specific financial instrument for an amount of EUR259 million, to be implemented from 2004 to 2009.

At this point I will explain to the honourable Memberwhy it is we have argued that heading 7 is the correctheading for this assistance. The financial instrumentaims to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus byencouraging economic development, with particularemphasis on the economic integration of the islandthrough approximation and alignment with the acquis,mainly through TAIEX, and by improving contactsbetween the two communities and with the EuropeanUnion. Most of the activities will therefore be similar tothe pre-accession activities financed under heading 7,which appears to us to be the most suitable financialperspective heading for this particular assistance.

Priority will be given to investments in the field ofinfrastructure, transport - including links between thetwo communities - and environment projects such aswaste disposal, sewerage and improvement of the watersupply, water quality and the distribution system. Ruraldevelopment, as well as measures concerning small andmedium enterprises, will be another priority. Otherobjectives are social policy, labour market policies,vocational training and treatment of illegal immigrantworkers, as well as reconciliation, confidence-buildingmeasures and bicommunal projects.

As regards implementation of the funds, differentoptions have been carefully examined by theCommission. We finally propose that the Commissionbe enabled to entrust the European Agency forReconstruction with the implementation of largeinfrastructure projects under this regulation, andamendment of the Agency Statute to this effect isconsidered in the Samuelsen report which we are alsodiscussing here.

The Agency option is clearly the most suitable asregards economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It wouldallow the Commission to rapidly deliver assistance tothe Turkish Cypriot community after the regulation isadopted.

The Commission welcomes Parliament's support for thefinancial instrument as expressed in the Rothe report onthe proposal. Concerning the proposed amendments, Ithink the House is aware that these have already beendiscussed in depth in the Committee on Foreign Affairsand the Committee on Budgets. The Commission isgrateful for the proposals made by those committees andwe can support the substance of the majority of them.

I would, however, also like to take this opportunity tounderline that in our judgement it is regrettable that theCouncil has not yet been able to agree, after nearly fourmonths of discussion, on the text of the financialinstrument. Implementation of the assistance could startimmediately after the adoption of the regulation and the

16-11-2004 29

Commission has already taken the necessary preparatorysteps.

As for the solution to the Cyprus problem, the conditionsstill do not exist for a new international initiative. In myview the Annan Plan remains the only realistic basis fora comprehensive settlement. Concerning its possible rolein any new process aimed at a settlement, the Commis-sion remains ready to support efforts towards a settle-ment that would permit a reunified Cyprus to be fullyintegrated into the European Union.

2-067

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, at its meeting inLuxembourg on 26 April 2004, the General Affairs andExternal Relations Council underlined its determinationto put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriotcommunity and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprusby encouraging the economic development of theTurkish Cypriot community. To that end, the Councilinvited the Commission to bring forward comprehensiveproposals, with particular emphasis on the economicintegration of the islands and to improve the contactbetween the two communities and the European Union.

The Council also recommended releasing the EUR 259million already earmarked for the northern part ofCyprus in the event of a settlement. In that light, as theCommissioner has just said, with a view to the economicintegration of the island and improved contact betweenthe communities, in July 2004 the Commissionsubmitted a draft regulation establishing a financialinstrument in which the opinion of the EuropeanParliament is requested. It also submitted a draftregulation on direct trade between the northern part ofCyprus and the rest of the EU.

In line with the mandate given by the Council on 26April, the Dutch presidency committed itself to puttingthe proposals forward and made considerable efforts tothat end. Both proposals were carefully considered in thePermanent Representatives Committee. Difficulties wereencountered and concerns were expressed during thatdiscussion on certain issues such as property andsovereign rights.

Progress was made after intense discussion, especiallyon the draft regulation establishing a financialinstrument. The remaining point is the definition of therole of the European Agency for Reconstruction, anddiscussions are also continuing on the direct traderegulation. There are still substantial problems with thisdraft regulation and the Council and the Commission areworking very hard to resolve the issue. The Dutchpresidency is considering discussing this at the nextGeneral Affairs and External Relations Council. I wouldlike to say that we are grateful for the constructive workundertaken by the parliamentary committees involved.

The aim of the Dutch presidency is to provide real andeffective economic opportunities for the Turkish Cypriotcommunity, by promoting trade with the EU whilstrespecting fully the sovereign rights of the Republic of

Cyprus. We trust that this will ultimately benefit thepeople of Cyprus throughout the island.

2-068

Samuelsen (ALDE), rapporteur. Mr President, theprocess by which we have come to the point ofprolonging the European Agency for Reconstruction'smandate does not merit high marks for artisticperformance. The Commission's request for aprolongation itself came at a very late stage. Memberswill recall that Parliament in its previous resolution onthe European Agency for Reconstruction had asked theCommission to present its evaluation report on the statusof the Agency by June 2003 at the latest, in order toallow the EP to hold a debate on the future of theAgency and its adequacy in managing EU externalassistance in some Stability Pact and stabilisation andassociation countries. The Commission did not followParliament's recommendation and only presented itsreport during this year's electoral period.

Further delays arose as a result of the change in theregulation with regard to the Agency's geographical areaof responsibility, the intention of which was to bringassistance for the promotion of the economicdevelopment of the Turkish Cypriot community withinthe remit of the Agency. My committee rightly took thedecision to postpone adoption of this report and the oneregarding assistance to the northern part of Cyprus untilit received the relevant documentation.

However, these shortcomings should not cloud the factthat an impressive job has been done on the ground bythe Agency's staff. I have always been in favour ofextending their mandate. They are doing a good job andneed to know that they can sign contracts for buildingsand pay salaries for next year. My concerns weredirected at the lack of clarity and coordination in thedivision of tasks between the European Agency forReconstruction's offices and the Commission'sdeconcentrated delegations, a matter which I haveaddressed in my report.

The progress made in developing an effectivedecentralised system for contracts and financialmanagement systems for EU assistance as foreseen inthe CARDS multiannual programme for 2005-06 for theFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia needs to beexamined further.

I would be happy to incorporate a proposal fusing theideas of two fellow Members by asking the Commissionto submit by June 2005 a report on the future of theAgency after 31 December 2006. This should ensure thata prospective extension is not addressed with the samehaste as in the past.

I agree that the remit of the European Agency forReconstruction should be extended to cover the imple-mentation of financial assistance for the northern part ofCyprus. I would propose that we adopt the relevant partof the Commission's text, in agreement with the

30 16-11-2004

rapporteur on the proposed instruments, to ensureconsistency between the two reports. I hope that allMembers will join me in supporting the extension of theEuropean Agency for Reconstruction's mandate for theterm proposed.

I should like to inform Parliament that I have asked forthe oral question and debates on the future of theWestern Balkans, originally planned to coincide with thevote on the European Agency for Reconstruction'sreport, to be postponed until the December part-session.It would be more useful to debate the future of theregion when the new Commission is in place, as we hadoriginally envisaged would be the case at this juncture.A debate in December would also save this importantdebate from drowning under speculation over the newteam of Commissioners.

2-069

Rothe (PSE), Berichterstatterin. Herr Präsident, liebeKolleginnen und Kollegen, Herr Kommissar! Ich werdemich überwiegend über den Vorschlag für eineVerordnung des Rates zur Schaffung eines finanziellenStützungsinstruments zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichenEntwicklung der türkisch-zypriotischen Volksgemein-schaft äußern. Als Berichterstatterin begrüße ich diesenVorschlag sehr.

Mit den vorgesehenen 259 Millionen Euro soll biseinschließlich 2006 die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung dertürkisch-zypriotischen Volksgemeinschaft unterstütztwerden. Ursprünglich sollte die Summe erst nachAnnahme des Annan-Plans freigegeben werden, um dengroßen wirtschaftlichen Abstand der türkisch-zypriotischen Volksgemeinschaft zu verringern. Nach-dem der Annan-Plan nun im Februar von der großenMehrheit der türkischen Zyprioten angenommen wurde,aber am Nein der griechischen Zyprioten scheiterte, hatder Rat empfohlen, dieses finanzielle Stützungsinstru-ment auch ohne eine Einigung auf Zypern in Kraft zusetzen.

Für den Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten kannich als Berichterstatterin sagen, dass wir diesesVorhaben einmütig unterstützen. Ich darf mich an dieserStelle auch wirklich für eine sehr gute Zusammenarbeitim Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheitenbedanken. Die in dieser Verordnung vorgeseheneGemeinschaftsbeihilfe kann und soll einen Beitrag dazuleisten, dass eine zunehmende Annäherung an dengemeinschaftlichen Besitzstand erfolgt, um dieÜbernahme vorzubereiten. Eine Übernahme, die dann,nach einer Lösung auf Zypern, notwendig ist. Diesesfinanzielle Unterstützungsinstrument soll nicht zuletzteine solche Lösung fördern. Die rund 260 MillionenEuro - das unterstützen wir sehr - sollen in Umwelt-,Verkehrs-, Telekommunikations-, Wasser- und/oderEnergieprojekte fließen, in Umstrukturierungsmaß-nahmen etwa im ländlichen Raum, in Maßnahmen, diebesonders kleinen und mittelständischen Betriebenzugute kommen, sowie in bi-kommunale Projekte, durchdie Vertrauensarbeit zwischen den Volksgruppengeleistet wird. Natürlich können und sollten auch

Maßnahmen in Famagusta vorgesehen werden, um dieWiederbewohnbarkeit zu ermöglichen. Sie wissen, dasses dort entsprechende Initiativen gibt.

In meinem Bericht wird im Zusammenhang mit denvorzusehenden Maßnahmen darauf verwiesen, dass dasEigentumsrecht der Bürger der EU nicht verletzt werdendarf. Wir haben dies noch einmal betont, auch wenn wirwissen, dass es auch bisher selbstverständlich war,diesen Grundsatz bei der Durchführung europäischerProjekte zu beachten. Wir waren uns im Ausschuss einigdarin, dass die von der Kommission nachträglichvorgeschlagene Administration der Gesamtmaßnahmedurch die Agentur für Wiederaufbau unterstützt wird.Das auch an den Kollegen Samuelsen; da gibt es breiteUnterstützung, wir sind uns da völlig einig.

Die finanzielle Unterstützung ist ein Teil des Pakets, dasim Juli von der Kommission vorgeschlagen wurde; dieswurde bereits von Herrn Kommissar Patten und vom Ratgesagt. Bei dem ebenfalls vorgeschlagenen direktenHandel hat das Parlament kein offizielles Mitsprache-recht. Dennoch, denke ich, wird das Parlament morgendem Rat klar sagen, dass auch zum Handelsvorschlageine schnelle Beschlussfassung erwartet wird, wie wirauch eine schnelle Beschlussfassung über das finanzielleStützungselement erwarten.

Ich denke, es ist von erheblicher Bedeutung, dass dieUnion mit der Umsetzung dieses Verordnungsvorschlagsund des vorgeschlagenen direkten Handels ein klaresSignal an die türkisch-zypriotische Volksgemeinschaftgibt - insbesondere an die große Mehrheit, die sich fürden Annan-Plan und für ein Ja zur Europäischen Unionausgesprochen hat -, ein Signal, das klar macht: Wirwünschen eine baldige Lösung der Zypernfrage, aberwir nehmen die Belange der türkisch-zypriotischenZivilgesellschaft auch heute schon sehr ernst. Es ist imInteresse aller Zyprioten, es ist im Interesse einer gutenEntwicklung auf Zypern, dass die demokratischen, pro-europäischen Kräfte in der türkisch-zypriotischenVolksgemeinschaft gestärkt werden und keinesfallsresignieren.

Das Parlament wird mit diesem Bericht, so hoffe ich,einen Beitrag dazu leisten, und ich erwarte und hoffe,dass der Rat das auch sehr bald tun wird.

2-070

Silva Peneda (PPE-DE), relator de parecer daComissão dos Orçamentos. Senhor Presidente, a UniãoEuropeia sempre demonstrou ser a favor da adesão deChipre reunificado. No entanto, e apesar das diligênciasdiplomáticas, tal não foi possível, dado o resultadonegativo da consulta popular organizada em Abril de2004.

Para evitar uma situação de maior isolamento doterritório turco de Chipre e para fortalecer os contactosentre as duas comunidades, a Comissão Europeia apre-sentou uma proposta que visava o estabelecimento deum instrumento de desenvolvimento económico para

16-11-2004 31

esta comunidade de 259 milhões de euros para o períodode 2004-2006.

Por não ter sido alcançado o acordo político para aadesão de Chipre reunificado à União Europeia, essefinanciamento levantou uma série de dúvidas denatureza jurídica e também orçamental. Com efeito, nãoexiste qualquer rubrica que permita a atribuição directade verbas comunitárias em favor de um Estado-Membrocujo governo não exerça a sua autoridade de formaefectiva sobre parte do território. Recordo que aRepública do Chipre Norte não foi reconhecidainternacionalmente e não pode, por isso, ser consideradacomo Estado. Esta falta de fundamentação orçamentalimplica que este financiamento só pode ser lido emparalelo com o projecto de orçamento rectificativo n°10/2004.

Como relator de parecer para a Comissão dosOrçamentos, analisei a presente proposta da ComissãoEuropeia que sustenta, desta vez, que as verbaspretendem financiar actividades similares às actividadesde pré-adesão, o que se enquadra no âmbito da categoria7 do orçamento. Sem entrar na componente política dodebate, concordei, no entanto, com as implicaçõesfinanceiras desta proposta sobre as Perspectivas Finan-ceiras, apesar de ainda não ser de todo claro a querubrica irá ser afectado este apoio financeiro. Deixei, porisso, voluntariamente, em aberto, a escolha maisoportuna da fundamentação orçamental, tarefa quecaberá à Autoridade Orçamental analisar logo que oConselho de Ministros decida apresentar uma propostade texto.

Não podia concluir esta intervenção, Senhor Presidente,sem chamar a atenção desta Câmara para as dificuldadesque foi ter de opinar financeiramente sobre um textocuja parte mais importante ainda nem sequer foi alvo deum acordo pelo Conselho. Muito obrigado.

2-071

Stenzel (PPE-DE), im Namen der Fraktion. HerrPräsident! Die Europäische Agentur für Wiederaufbau sie sollte ja eigentlich auch "für Wiederaufbau undEntwicklung" heißen, aber sie trägt immer noch denNamen "für Wiederaufbau" , deren Schwerpunkt bisherdie Arbeit in Kosovo, Serbien und Montenegro war, hateine neue wichtige Funktion erhalten, sie soll nämlichdas Finanzierungsinstrument für Nordzypern verwalten.Es kann keine Zweifel geben, dass die Agentur diebisherigen Aufgaben in ihren alten Mandatsgebieteneffizient erfüllt hat, und ich bin überzeugt, sie wird dieseAufgabe auch für Nordzypern entsprechendwahrnehmen.

Wie in den vergangenen Fällen ist es allerdings auch fürNordzypern wichtig, dass die Kommission demEuropäischen Parlament und dem Rat bis Juni 2005einen Bericht über die Zukunft der Agentur nach dem31. Dezember 2006 vorlegt. Südosteuropa und auch diekommende Aufgabe sind für die EU zu wichtig, um dieZukunft der Europäischen Agentur für Wiederaufbau imUnklaren zu lassen. Auch muss das Verhältnis zwischen

der Agentur und den sogenannten dekonzentriertenKommissionsdelegationen geklärt sein, um Leerläufeoder Verdoppelungen zu vermeiden.

Der Bericht sollte natürlich auch die Umsetzung desmehrjährigen CARDS-Programms 2005-2006 für dieFührung der Republik Mazedonien beinhalten, was erbis jetzt nicht tut. Wir unterstützen daher den Vorschlagfür die Ergänzung der Verordnung des Rates über dieEuropäische Agentur für Wiederaufbau im Namen derEVP-ED-Fraktion.

(Beifall)

2-072

Μπεγλίτης (PSE), εξ ονόµατος της οµάδας. ΚύριεΠρόεδρε, πρώτα θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τους δύοεισηγητές, τον κ. Samuelsen και την κ. Rothe, για τηνπολύ υπεύθυνη δουλειά που έκαναν στις εκθέσεις τους.

Κατ' αρχάς για την ευρωπαϊκή υπηρεσία ανασυγκρό-τησης θα πρέπει να επισηµάνουµε ότι, µε έδρα τηΘεσσαλονίκη, έχει παίξει ένα καθοριστικό ρόλο στηνανασυγκρότηση της ευρύτερης περιοχής τωνΒαλκανίων, στη διαµόρφωση των αναγκαίων υποδοµών,στην οικοδόµηση των δηµοκρατικών θεσµών, στηνπροώθηση του κράτους δικαίου και στην υπεράσπισητων ανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτων στις χώρες τωνΒαλκανίων.

Αυτή η στρατηγική αποτελεί τη µόνη αξιόπιστηπρόταση για την ειρηνική ανασυγκρότηση τωνΒαλκανίων και την ενίσχυση της ευρωπαϊκής τουςπροοπτικής. Γι' αυτό το λόγο, κύριε Πρόεδρε, κρίνεταιπερισσότερο από αναγκαία η παράταση της λειτουργίαςτης υπηρεσίας µέχρι το τέλος του ∆εκεµβρίου 2006,καθώς και η πρόβλεψη της εξέτασης δυνατότηταςπαράτασης λειτουργίας και πέρα από αυτή τηνηµεροµηνία, αφού οι εξελίξεις στα Βαλκάνια θα είναισηµαντικές και το 2005 και την επόµενη περίοδο καιαπαιτούνται πολιτικές για την εµπέδωση της σταθε-ρότητας και της ασφάλειας στα Βαλκάνια.

Για το σκοπό αυτό, ζητώ από τον κ. Patten, να υποβάλειη Επιτροπή σχετική έκθεση προς το Συµβούλιο και τοΕυρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο.

Η αποτελεσµατική λειτουργία, η διαφάνεια, η βαθιάγνώση της διαδικασίας ανασυγκρότησης της ευρύτερηςπεριοχής από την υπηρεσία, αποτελούν την εγγύηση γιατην επέκταση της αρµοδιότητας και στην υλοποίηση τηςοικονοµικής βοήθειας προς την Τουρκοκυπριακήκοινότητα.

Ως προς το θέµα της έκθεσης για τη χρηµατοδοτικήενίσχυση της Τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας. Αυτά ταχρήµατα πρέπει να δοθούν στην Τουρκοκυπριακήκοινότητα, γιατί θα βοηθήσουν τους Τουρκοκύπριουςπολίτες και την Τουρκοκυπριακή κοινωνία, θα συµβά-λουν στην οικονοµική ανάπτυξη, στην ενσωµάτωση τουευρωπαϊκού κεκτηµένου, στη διαµόρφωση τωναναγκαίων υποδοµών και στη διαµόρφωση θέσεωνεργασίας. Θα συµβάλουν δηλαδή µε άλλα λόγια στη

32 16-11-2004

δηµιουργία των συνθηκών που θα επιτρέψουν τηνεπανένωση της Κύπρου µέσα από την ανάπτυξη τωνεπαφών, του διαλόγου και των ανταλλαγών µεταξύ τωνδύο κοινοτήτων.

Μέσα από τη χρηµατοδοτική βοήθεια θα πρέπει ναενισχύσουµε τις προοπτικές της λύσης και όχι τηνεµπέδωση της διαίρεσης. Γι' αυτό και τα µηνύµατά µαςπου στέλνουµε προς την Τουρκοκυπριακή κοινότηταπρέπει να είναι σαφή και καθαρά. ∆εν χρηµατοδοτούµετην αδιαλλαξία. Χρηµατοδοτούµε το διάλογο. Και εδώ,η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η υπηρεσία ανασυγκρό-τησης πρέπει να είναι ιδιαίτερα προσεκτικές κινούµενεςσε συνεργασία µε την Κυπριακή ∆ηµοκρατία και µεσεβασµό προς τις αρχές του ευρωπαϊκού δικαίου.

Τελειώνοντας, κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλω να ζητήσω από τηνΠροεδρία να τοποθετηθεί πάνω στο θέµα τηςκατηγορίας για τη χρηµατοδοτική ενίσχυση τηςΤουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας. Ο κ. Nικολάι θα πρέπεινα πάρει εκ µέρους της ολλανδικής Προεδρίας µια σαφήθέση, εάν η χρηµατοδοτική ενίσχυση θα ενταχθεί στηκατηγορία 7 ή στη κατηγορία 3.

2-073

Duff (ALDE), on behalf of the Group. Mr President,this is the first concrete expression of the EuropeanUnion's appreciation that the Turkish North Cypriotsvoted strongly for the Annan plan. It is the first, but it isbehind schedule and it is a small sum of money: far toosmall for the Commission's list of glamorous priorityprojects that Commissioner Patten, whom it is very niceto see still here, read out earlier.

As a result of a lack of generosity, the money will bespent in such a circumscribed fashion that it will onlyapply to 15% of the territory of North Cyprus, excludingmany villages that voted en bloc for the Annan plan. Iwould like to say that I deplore the sluggish progress onthis question in the Council. Worst of all, the financialregulation has been split from the trade regulation,which is by far the most important part of the package.Will the Minister commit the presidency to produce aresult on the trade question within three months?

2-074

Lagendijk (Verts/ALE), namens de fractie. Voorzitter, collega's, het kan niet vaak genoeg wordengezegd: het Europees Bureau voor wederopbouw heefthet imago van de Europese Unie op de Balkan inbelangrijke mate positief beïnvloed. Tot 2000 was deEuropese Unie toch vooral een bureaucratisch monsterdat allerlei beloftes niet of veel te laat waarmaakte. Na2000 was de Europese Unie, via het bureau, wel degelijkin staat om onder vaak moeilijke omstandigheden snelen efficiënt hulp te verlenen. Het is nog nooit eerdervertoond dat zo'n groot gedeelte van het geld dat voorhulpverlening was begroot, ook daadwerkelijk isuitgegeven. Nogmaals alle lof daarvoor.

Dat gezegd zijnde blijft toch de vraag, en we hebben hethierover als Parlement al vaker met de commissarisgehad, wat nu precies de achterliggende gedachte is bijde Commissie waarom een bepaalde taak door het

bureau wordt waargenomen of door de diverse kantorenvan het bureau of door de gedeconcentreerde delegaties,de ambassades van de Europese Unie. De Commissiezegt het misschien niet luidop, maar ze suggereert tochaf en toe dat het een beetje gezeur is van het Parlementdat we daarop steeds blijven aandringen. De redendaarvoor is dat we verdere onduidelijkheid willenvoorkomen. Ik zal u een voorbeeld geven. Er bestaat eengrote kans dat de Europese Unie in Kosovo meer takenzal krijgen in de loop van volgend jaar en van 2006:minder VN, minder UNMIC en meer Europese Unie.Betekent dit nu een grotere rol voor het bureau ofbetekent het dat er een opgetuigde, grotere delegatie eneen grotere ambassade komt? Het is belangrijk voor hetParlement dit te weten, omdat wij als Parlementmoeilijke en lastige politieke en financiële beslissingenmoeten nemen.

Voorzitter, ik zal niet verhullen dat mij ook een zekereweemoed bevangt. Dit debat is het laatste van de veledebatten die wij met de commissaris hebben gevoerd. Ikdenk dat een van de redenen van de populariteit van decommissaris in dit Parlement is dat hij de Balkan-politiek van de Europese Unie een gezicht, een stemheeft gegeven en dat op een voortreffelijke manier heeftgedaan. Ik wil hem daarvoor ook hier bedanken. Ik wensde Balkan een goede opvolger toe en ik wens decommissaris vooral veel plezier toe bij het bestuur vanOxford University en bij het schrijven van mooieboeken.

2-075

Αδάµου (GUE/NGL), εξ ονόµατος της οµάδας. ΚύριεΠρόεδρε, κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, το ΑΚΕΛ και ηΟµάδα της Ενωµένης Ευρωπαϊκής Αριστεράς ποτέ δενείχαν ως στόχο την οικονοµική αποµόνωση καιδυσπραγία των συµπατριωτών µας Τουρκοκυπρίων. Ταβαθύτερα αίτια αυτής της αποµόνωσης δεν είναι τοδήθεν εµπάργκο της ελληνοκυπριακής πλευράς, αλλά ητουρκική κατοχή, οι αποσχιστικές ενέργειες τουκατοχικού καθεστώτος, καθώς και η πλήρης διασύνδεσητης οικονοµίας των κατεχοµένων µε την τουρκικήοικονοµία περιλαµβανοµένης ακόµη και της εισαγωγήςτης τουρκικής λίρας ως νόµισµα στις κατεχόµενεςπεριοχές.

Μετά την τουρκική εισβολή και κατοχή του 1974, ηΚυπριακή ∆ηµοκρατία ανακήρυξε τα κατεχόµεναλιµάνια και αεροδρόµιά της ως κλειστά. Αφού δενµπορούσε να ασκήσει οποιοδήποτε έλεγχο σε αυτά.Αυτή ήταν και µία πράξη αυτοάµυνας, έτσι ώστε να µηνοδηγηθούµε σε αναγνώριση του ψευδοκράτους. Ταψηφίσµατα 541 και 550 του Συµβουλίου Ασφαλείαςκαθώς και µια σειρά από αποφάσεις του Ευρωπαϊκού∆ικαστηρίου Ανθρωπίνων ∆ικαιωµάτων επιβεβαίωσανπλήρως την ορθότητα της ανωτέρω απόφασης. Το ίδιοέγινε και στην πρόσφατη γνωµοδότηση της νοµικήςυπηρεσίας του Συµβουλίου, όπου αναγνωρίζεται ρητώςτο δικαίωµα της Κυπριακής ∆ηµοκρατίας να κρατείκλειστά τα εν λόγω λιµάνια και αεροδρόµια.

Η οµάδας µας υποστηρίζει το χρηµατοδοτικό κανονισµόγια τους Τουρκοκύπριους µε την προϋπόθεση βεβαίως

16-11-2004 33

ότι θα τύχει σεβασµού η Κυπριακή ∆ηµοκρατία και δενθα προσκοµίσει οποιαδήποτε οφέλη ή πολιτικής φύσης,πλεονεκτήµατα το κατοχικό µόρφωµα. Ελπίζουµε ότι σεαυτά τα ζητήµατα έχει επιτευχθεί κατανόηση και ευρείασυναίνεση.

Όσον αφορά το υπό συζήτηση κείµενο αναφορικά µε το"European Agency for a Construction" προκαλείεντύπωση στο ΑΚΕΛ το γεγονός ότι βρίσκεται σήµεραµπροστά µας προς ψήφιση, τη στιγµή που δεν υπάρχεισυµφωνία σε επίπεδο COREPER; Επιτροπής ή Συµβου-λίου. Υπενθυµίζω την άποψη της COREPER ότι τοζήτηµα θα συζητείτο επί εποµένης Προεδρίας, αυτήςτου Λουξεµβούργου.

Επειδή ακριβώς η Κυπριακή ∆ηµοκρατία δεν είναι τρίτηχώρα και τα κατεχόµενα δεν είναι ανεξάρτητα εδάφη,αλλά, όπως ρητώς προβλέπει στη ΣυνθήκηΠροσχώρησης, εδάφη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης σταοποία έχει ανασταλεί η εφαρµογή του κοινωνικούκεκτηµένου, το ΑΚΕΛ δεν µπορεί να υπερψηφίσει τονκανονισµό για το European Agency for a Construction.Εννοείται, ότι η εκ µέρους µας καταψήφιση τουκανονισµού καθόλου δεν σηµαίνει απόρριψη της βοή-θειας προς τις χώρες των Βαλκανίων.

Τέλος, ζητείται από εµάς να ψηφίσουµε το πρωτόκολλοχωρίς να διευκρινίζεται από ποιο κονδύλι θα αντληθούναυτά τα χρήµατα. Έχει λεχθεί ότι το ζήτηµα θα λυθείανάλογα µε το που υπάρχουν κονδύλια. Αλλά στοκεφάλαιο εσωτερική βοήθεια δεν υπάρχουν διαθέσιµακονδύλια.

2-076

Καρατζαφέρης (IND/DEM), εξ ονόµατος της οµάδας. Κύριε Πρόεδρε, άκουσα µε προσοχή τον κ. Patten καιτις τοποθετήσεις του.

Κατ' αρχάς, επί της διαδικασίας, δεν είµαι σίγουρος ότινοµιµοποιείται ο κ. Patten να είναι στην αίθουσα,εφόσον η Επιτροπή Prodi, είχε εντολή µέχρι τις 31Οκτωβρίου. Από κει και πέρα όλες οι πράξεις τηςΕπιτροπής Prodi ελέγχονται εάν είναι νόµιµες. Καιπιστεύω ότι θέµα αυτό θα λυθεί στο ∆ικαστήριο τουΛουξεµβούργου.

Ποιος φταίει που δεν είναι ισοµερής η ανάπτυξη τηςΒορείου Κύπρου και της Νοτίου Κύπρου, όταν µάλισταη πλέον εύφορος και η πλέον τουριστική περιοχή είναι ηΒόρειος. Φταίει ο στρατός κατοχής. Όσα χρήµατα καιαν δώσει η Ευρώπη θα πάνε χαµένα, γιατί ο στρατόςκατοχής έχει δηµιουργήσει ένα ασφυκτικό πλαίσιο πουαπαγορεύει την οποιαδήποτε ανάπτυξη. Πρέπει λοιπόννα δούµε τί µπορεί να γίνει, όπως διερωτήθει και ο κ.Επίτροπος. Θα πρέπει να φύγει ο στρατός κατοχής καινα επανέλθει η Κύπρος εκεί που ήταν, µετά από τιςσυµφωνίες της Ζυρίχης και του Λονδίνου που είχευπογράψει και η Αγγλία, της οποίας βεβαίως εξαίρετοτέκνο είναι ο κ. Επίτροπος. Να φύγει ο στρατόςκατοχής, να επανέλθει η ηρεµία στο νησί, ναεφαρµοσθεί το Σύνταγµα του 1960 και αυτοµάτως τότεθα έρθει και η οικονοµική ευηµερία στη Βόρειο Κύπρο.Όσο υπάρχει στρατός κατοχής δεν θα υπάρχει ευηµερία.

Τα χρήµατα θα πάνε χαµένα. Πρέπει λοιπόν νατολµήσουµε και να βρούµε µια ρεαλιστική λύση.

Εάν δεν είχαµε διώξει το Σαντάµ Χουσεΐν από τοΚουβέιτ, θα ενισχύαµε σήµερα οικονοµικά τοκατεχόµενο Κουβέιτ; Εάν δεν είχαµε διώξει τοΜιλόσεβιτς από τη Βοσνία, θα χρηµατοδοτούσαµεσήµερα τον Μιλόσεβιτς; Γιατί λοιπόν δεν κάνουµε τοίδιο και µε την Τουρκία; Πείτε της να φύγει έξω από τονησί για να µπορέσει η Βόρεια Κύπρος να αναπτυχθεί.Κανένας δεν θέλει φτωχούς γείτονες. Και πάνω από όλαδεν θέλουν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι να έχουν φτωχούςγείτονες. Εάν τολµήσετε να διώξετε το στρατό κατοχής -το µόνο στρατό κατοχής που υπάρχει σε ευρωπαϊκήχώρα- αυτοµάτως θα έρθει και η ανάπτυξη.

2-077

Camre (UEN) for gruppen. Hr. formand. Vi vil ogsågerne udtrykke tillid til, at genopbygningsagenturet kanmedvirke til at forbedre den økonomiske og socialesituation i den tyrkiske besættelseszone i det nordligeCypern. Det er vigtigt at minde om baggrunden for dennuværende situation i den nordlige del af Cypern.Baggrunden er den tyrkiske invasion, som fandt sted i1974 og som har betydet, at befolkningen i den nordligedel af Cypern nu befinder sig i en økonomisk og socialsituation, som er klart værre end den før juli 1974.

I den forbindelse må jeg understrege, at denudviklingsindsats der skal gøres, sker - som andreallerede har påpeget - i et samarbejde med regeringen iRepublikken Cypern. Det skal ikke være sådan, at EU nugår ind og yder en støtte som tak til dem, som stemte jatil Koffi Annan-planen, og glemmer dem, der stemte nej.Der er grunde, som efter min mening er dårligt belyst idette Parlament og jeg husker diskussionen med hr.Verheugen under sidste samling omkring helespørgsmålet om Koffi Annan-planen, som var klarturetfærdig, klart uacceptabel for den græsk-cypriotiskebefolkning og som følge deraf også blev forkastet af etmassivt flertal.

Vi kan alle sammen ønske, at der sker en udvikling isituationen, og en væsentlig forudsætning for det ernaturligvis, at den militære besættelse af Nordcypernophører. Vi kan ikke føre forhandlinger, som det måskevil blive besluttet her i december, med den tyrkiskeregering om optagelse i EU, så længe landet har besat endel af et andet europæisk lands territorium. Enhverforhandling må til enhver tid føres med inddragelse afden græsk-cypriotiske befolkning og under forståelse forderes interesse. Det er den græsk-cypriotiske befolkning,som har været taberen siden 1974. Det er dem, der harværet ofre, og de skal ikke straffes ved den indsats, somvi nu fra EU's side bestræber os på for at normaliseresituationen.

2-078

Claeys (NI). Voorzitter, ik was een beetje verbaasdcommissaris Patten te horen zeggen dat het "plan-Annan" een goede basis blijft voor een mogelijkehereniging van Cyprus. Laten we niet vergeten dat inapril van dit jaar een referendum over dat plan isgehouden, en dat het plan daarbij door een overgrote

34 16-11-2004

meerderheid van de Grieks-Cyprioten is weggestemd.Wanneer een referendum wordt gehouden, moet deuitslag ervan worden gerespecteerd. De financiële steunaan het door de Turken bezette deel van het eiland wasalleen voorzien als het "plan-Annan" bij referendum zouworden goedgekeurd. Dat is dus niet gebeurd. De 259miljoen euro die zullen worden toegekend aan hetnoordelijke deel van Cyprus vormen een feitelijkeerkenning van de militaire bezetting van dat gebied doormeer dan 35.000 Turkse militairen. De Europese Unieheeft er blijkbaar geen problemen mee dat eenkandidaat-lidstaat een deel van het grondgebied van eenbestaande lidstaat militair bezet houdt. Niet alleen staanwe op het punt toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkijete beginnen, nu wordt de bezetting van Noord-Cyprusook nog eens financieel beloond. Dit is absurd.

2-079

∆ηµητρακόπουλος (PPE-DE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, νασυγχαρώ κατ' αρχήν την κ. Rothe και φυσικά και τον κ.Samuelsen για τις εκθέσεις τους και να πω ότι εγώ θαασχοληθώ, βεβαίως, περισσότερο µε την έκθεση της κ.Rothe.

Είναι γεγονός ότι η έκθεση, όπως διαµορφώθηκε µετάαπό συζητήσεις και ψηφοφορία στην Επιτροπή Εξωτε-ρικών Υποθέσεων, είναι πάρα πολύ σωστή και ως εκτούτου, η απόφαση που απορρέει από την έκθεσησχετικά µε τη χρηµατοδοτική ενίσχυση για τηνανάπτυξη της Τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας, είναι µιααπόφαση επίσης πάρα πολύ σωστή. Και είναι µιααπόφαση την οποία στηρίζουµε όλοι. Θεωρούµε δηλαδήότι τα ποσά αυτά θα συµβάλουν στη γενικότερηανάπτυξη της Τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας, ούτωςώστε, όταν µε το καλό -κάτι που ευχόµαστε να γίνεισύντοµα- λυθεί το Κυπριακό µε την επανένωση τηςΚύπρου, η κοινότητα των Τουρκοκυπρίων να ευρί-σκεται στα ίδια υψηλά επίπεδα που είναι η Ελληνική.

Θέλω να πω όµως, µιας και υπήρξε τοποθέτηση και απότην πλευρά του Συµβουλίου, ότι ο κανονισµός για τηχρηµατοδοτική ενίσχυση είναι ένα ζήτηµα, ενώ οκανονισµός για τις εµπορικές σχέσεις, είναι ένα άλλο.Και µπορεί µεν να υπάρχει µια λογική στο νασυνδέσουµε τα δύο, αλλά εγώ θα συνιστούσα πολύµεγάλη προσοχή σε ό,τι αφορά το ζήτηµα τουκανονισµού για τις απ' ευθείας εµπορικές σχέσεις. Καιείµαι βέβαιος ότι στις διεργασίες του Συµβουλίου θαυπάρξει αυτή η προσοχή και η λύση η οποία θα δοθεί -όταν δοθεί- θα είναι δίκαιη και σωστή.

Τέλος, δυο λόγια για τον θετικό ρόλο της ΕυρωπαϊκήςΥπηρεσίας Ανασυγκρότησης, η οποία άλλωστεβρίσκεται στη Θεσσαλονίκη, στη χώρα µου θέλω ναεκφράσω εδώ την ελπίδα και την συµφωνία µου στο ναδιαχειρισθεί την οικονοµική βοήθεια προς τουςΤουρκοκυπρίους και ελπίζω βεβαίως ότι η διαχείρισηαυτή θα γίνει µε βάση τους κανονισµούς της Ευρωπαϊ-κής Ένωσης.

2-080

Öger (PSE). Mr President, we are to vote on the reportof my colleague Mrs Rothe regarding the financial

support of Northern Cyprus. This is good news:Northern Cyprus needs this aid.

Over the last few decades events have separated theisland politically and economically. The people ofCyprus suffered immensely from the partition of theisland. All those involved must do their best toovercome the separation. It was the explicit aim of theUnited Nations and the EU that a united Cyprus wouldjoin the European Union on 1 May 2004.

The governments of Northern Cyprus and Turkey havefollowed the steps laid out by the United Nations and theEU. The population of Northern Cyprus hasoverwhelmingly supported the unification of the islandas well as EU accession. A united Cyprus could alreadybe a member of the EU today. Unfortunately, that hasnot yet happened. It is our responsibility to encouragethe two parts of the island to cooperate.

The regulation on financial support that we arediscussing today is the first step. The second step will bethe regulation on special conditions for trade. TheCouncil should finalise that regulation without delay,firstly, to allow for an improvement in economicconditions of Northern Cyprus; and secondly, tofacilitate the rapprochement of the two sides throughtrade. This rapprochement can also support change inboth parts of the island. During the times of the GermanOstpolitik, we called this concept Wandel durchAnnährung.

More steps must follow soon. The ultimate aim must bethe reunification of Cyprus.

2-081

Matsakis (ALDE). Mr President, until 1974 the cityof Famagusta was the centre of economic, social andcultural prosperity for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.Since the Turkish invasion 30 years ago, the city hasremained sealed off by Turkish troops and inaccessibleto its local inhabitants. It has gradually become a ghostcity, with empty streets and derelict buildings.

Amendment 11 aims to help bring this dead city back tolife for the benefit of the many thousands of localinhabitants. The resurrection of the city of Famagustawill also act as a catalyst for the establishment of betterand closer relations between the two communities inCyprus, thus greatly increasing the chances of a speedy,peaceful reunification settlement.

2-082

Özdemir (Verts/ALE). Herr Präsident! Meine sehrverehrten Damen und Herren! Zunächst möchte auch ichden beiden Berichterstattern, Frau Rothe und HerrnSamuelsen, aber auch dem EU-Kommissar und derRatspräsidentschaft für das, was sie heute hiervorgetragen haben, ausdrücklich danken. Ich halte es fürsehr wichtig, die südzypriotische Regierung davon zuüberzeugen, dass die Europäische Union die Ver-sprechen gegenüber dem Norden der Insel einhaltenmuss. Unser Ziel muss daher sein, beides, nämlich denHandel und die Hilfe, gemeinsam zu bewilligen; zur

16-11-2004 35

Not, wenn es nicht anders geht, auch in zwei Teilen,damit die Isolation im Norden der Insel beendet wird.

Und ich möchte diese Gelegenheit nutzen, um an diesüdzypriotische Regierung, aber auch an die Kollegenaus Zypern hier zu appellieren, sich endlich klar dazu zubekennen, ob sie dem Norden der Insel wirklich helfenwollen oder ob es weiterhin so gehen soll, dass man beijeder Gelegenheit Sand ins Getriebe streut. Ich freuemich darüber, dass der griechische Ministerpräsident,Herr Karamanlis, sich neulich ausdrücklich zum Kofi-Annan-Plan auf der Insel bekannt hat.

Der Schluss dieser Debatte hat mir eines gezeigt: Ichhabe das Gefühl, dass die Menschen im Süden der Insel,die für den Kofi-Annan-Plan waren, hier keinenAbgeordneten haben. Deshalb habe ich in dieser Debattebeschlossen, dass ich auch der Abgeordnete derMenschen auf Zypern sein möchte, die im griechischenTeil der Insel für den Kofi-Annan-Plan gestimmt haben.Gerade als Mensch türkischer Herkunft möchte ich dieStimme dieser Menschen sein. Ich wünsche mir, dasswir die Gelegenheit nutzen, um alles in unseren KräftenStehende zu unternehmen, damit die Wiedervereinigungzustande kommt.

2-083

Speroni (IND/DEM). Signor Presidente, onorevolicolleghi, al limite può essere accettabile considerare gliaiuti finanziari alla parte nord di Cipro comeun'elemosina. Tuttavia se li consideriamo come uninvestimento per lo sviluppo, sono soldi buttati dallafinestra. Sono soldi sprecati perché finché perdureràl'occupazione turca di una parte dell´isola, che ormai èparte dell'Unione europea, finché appunto ci saranno letruppe turche nella parte nord di Cipro non ci saràsviluppo. È dimostrato dai fatti, è dimostrato dalla storia:non ci sarà miglioramento delle condizioni economiche.Pertanto ritengo che sarebbe meglio prima far ritirare letruppe turche e dopo intervenire con aiuti finanziari.

2-084

Dillen (NI). Voorzitter, collega's, de frustratie over deverwerping van het 'plan-Annan' door de Grieks-Cyprioten blijft voortduren. Vandaag ziet elkeEuropeaan immers hoe de Unie haar eigen principesverloochent door een niet-Europese staat, in casuTurkije, uitzicht te bieden op toetreding tot de EU,terwijl die staat een deel van het grondgebied van dehuidige lidstaat Cyprus militair bezet houdt. Daarommoest en zou het 'plan-Annan' worden goedgekeurd enwerden de Grieks-Cyprioten van alle kantengeïntimideerd om toch maar op dit halfslachtige voorstelin te gaan. Daarom ook worden de Turks-Cypriotenvandaag zo verwend door de Europese beleidsmakers.Hiermee zetten we de dingen echter op hun kop.

Zonder exhaustief te zijn, wil ik er toch heel kort aanherinneren waarom de Grieks-Cyprioten dit plan hebbenverworpen. Het 'plan-Annan' wettigt immers de Turkseinvasie van 1974 en de oorlogsmisdaden die ermeegepaard gingen. Het Turkse bezettingsleger mag opCyprus blijven en behoudt het recht om militaireoefeningen te houden op Cypriotische bodem. De

militaire grens wordt bestendigd en gewapendegrensposten zullen paspoortcontroles blijven uitvoeren.De Turks-Cyprioten blijven leven onder Turksebezetting. Hun slechte economische toestand moet nietaan een embargo van de Griekse bevolking wordentoegeschreven, maar is veeleer te wijten aan het corrupteTurkse economische systeem ter plaatse. Indien het'plan-Annan' was geratificeerd, dan konden de meer danhonderdduizend Turkse kolonisten die in de nasleep vanoperatie 'Attila' onder druk van de regering in Ankaranaar Cyprus verhuisden om de etnische zuivering verderdoor te voeren, op het eiland blijven.

Financiële steun aan de Turks-Cyprioten, van wie ikoprecht hoop dat ze binnen afzienbare tijd op eenonafhankelijk Cyprus zonder buitenlandse bezetterworden verenigd met de Grieks-Cyprioten, moet daaromworden gekoppeld aan een aantal stringente voorwaar-den. De voornaamste daarvan is het verdwijnen van deTurkse militaire bezetter. De steun mag geenszins alsbeloning gelden voor een politiek correcte stem in eenreferendum.

2-085

Kasoulides (PPE-DE). Mr President, the message thatshould go out from this debate is that not onlyParliament but also the Greek Cypriot Members wish forthe economic development of the Turkish Cypriotcommunity through economic assistance and unhinderedtrade around the world. We are satisfied that therapporteur has introduced a vital amendment, makingsure that EU money will not be used in a way thatimpinges upon individual property rights according tothe relevant decisions of the European Court of HumanRights.

I also welcome the fact that the Council appears ready toreach a consensus on the regulation. I stress theimportance of consensus on the issue of trade, withouttime constraints and on a correct legal basis, as advisedby the legal department of the Council. What is neededis creativity and adherence to the international legalstatus of the Republic of Cyprus, a Member State of theUnion.

I have perceived during this debate that certaincolleagues, in their bona fide efforts to help the TurkishCypriot community, underestimate the importance of themessage that the Greek Cypriots are also in favour ofeconomic development for Turkish Cypriots. This is nota 'zero-sum' game. Following the last referendum, andwith all due respect to the decision of the sovereignpeople, neither Turkey nor Cyprus is discharged from itsresponsibilities to continue searching constructively fora mutually agreed solution. The messages coming fromthis debate build bridges between the two communitiesand do not create unnecessary disputes and confrontationbetween them, and due attention should be paid to them.

2-086

∆ηµητρίου (PPE-DE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κυρίες καικύριοι συνάδελφοι, εµείς η Ελληνοκυπριακή πλευράείµαστε υπέρ της οικονοµικής στήριξης και ενίσχυσηςτων Τουρκοκυπρίων. Είναι συµπατριώτες µας. Η

36 16-11-2004

κυβέρνηση της Κυπριακής ∆ηµοκρατίας έχει από τηναρχή υποστηρίξει την απόφαση για οικονοµική στήριξητων Τουρκοκυπρίων. Πρέπει να επισηµάνω όµως, ότι ηοικονοµική αθλιότητα των συµπατριωτών µας δενοφείλεται στην αποµόνωση εκ µέρους µας, αλλά στηναποµόνωση που επέβαλε η στρατιωτική κατοχή 30 ετώντης Τουρκίας στην Κύπρο.

Πρέπει να πω ότι αυτή η ενέργεια είναι παρεµπίπτουσαενέργεια και ο βασικός στόχος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσηςθα πρέπει να είναι να λύσει το Κυπριακό, να επιφέρειπλήρη εξίσωση, πολιτική και άλλη, µεταξύ τωνΕλληνοκυπρίων και των Τουρκοκυπρίων πολιτών σεόλους τους τοµείς . Αυτός είναι και ο δικός µας στόχος.

Τώρα όσον αφορά το σχέδιο Ανάν, το οποίο πολλοίέχουν θεοποιήσει. Αυτό απορρίφθηκε από τηνπλειοψηφία των Ελληνοκυπρίων διότι πρώτον διαιώνιζετην τουρκική κατοχή, την τουρκική στρατιωτικήπαρουσία στην Κύπρο. ∆εύτερον, δηµιουργούσε ένακλίµα αβεβαιότητας για το µέλλον και, τρίτον, είχεελλείµµατα στον τοµέα των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτωνκαι στη λειτουργικότητα. Αυτό ας µην το ξεχνούµε, καιαυτοί που επικρίνουν την Ελληνοκυπριακή πλευρά γιατη στάση της, γιατί δεν επέκριναν για 30 χρόνια και δενεπικρίνουν και τώρα γι' αυτά που η Τουρκία κάνει στηνΚύπρο; Τη τουρκική κατοχή, την εκδίωξη τωνΕλληνοκυπρίων από τις εστίες τους και τη συνέχισηαυτής της κατάστασης. Την ίδια ευαισθησία πρέπει ναεπιδεικνύουν.

Καταλήγοντας, κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλω να τονίσω ότιστόχος όλων µας πρέπει να είναι η επανένωση τηςΚύπρου. ∆εν έχουµε διαφορές µε τους Τουρκοκυπρίους,διαφορές έχουµε µε την Τουρκία που κατέχει µέρος τουεδάφους της Κυπριακής ∆ηµοκρατίας, µέρος τουευρωπαϊκού εδάφους. ∆ιότι η Κυπριακή ∆ηµοκρατίαείναι πλήρες µέλος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

2-087

Μάτσης (PPE-DE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλω να τονίσωµε έµφαση ότι οι Ελληνοκύπριοι υποστηρίζουν τηνοικονοµική συµπαράσταση προς τους Τουρκοκύπριουςκαι ότι επιδιώκουµε να δούµε το βιοτικό επίπεδο τωνΤουρκοκυπρίων να ανέρχεται στο επίπεδο το δικό µαςτο συντοµότερο δυνατόν. Είναι, όµως, ο τρόπος µε τονοποίο θα δοθεί αυτή η βοήθεια που επιθυµώ νασυζητήσω. Και είναι αυτό το θέµα που θίγω. Και είµαιαπό τους πρωταγωνιστές αυτής της προσπάθειας απόπολλά χρόνια, όχι τώρα. Γι' αυτό και η αναφορά τουΕπιτρόπου, του κ. Patten θίγει βαθύτατα τη δική µου τηνοηµοσύνη, όταν εµφανίζεται ότι δεν αντιλαµβάνεταιαπό πού θα δοθεί αυτή η βοήθεια. Από τη Θέση 3, πουαφορά χώρες που ευρίσκονται εντός της ΕυρωπαϊκήςΈνωσης ή από την Θέση 7 που αφορά προενταξιακέςπορείες χωρών. Αυτή είναι η µεγάλη διαφορά και δενείναι τα έργα που θα γίνουν στην κατεχόµενη Κύπροπου έχουν σηµασία, είναι η η ίδια η Κύπρος. ΟΕπίτροπος όµως αρνείται να αντιληφθεί αυτήν τηνπραγµατικότητα, πράγµα που είναι πολύ σαφές για µαςκαι λυπούµαι διότι κάνει αυτή τη διάκριση.

2-088

Patten, Commission. Mr President, there were one ortwo points made during the debate which I shouldaddress very briefly. I hope that when these debates areheld in future without my attendance they will, if I maysay so, have as broad a base as possible in the points ofview we hear.

I should like to say to Mr Samuelsen that theCommission would be perfectly content to hold a debateon the Western Balkans in December. Mr Duff spokeabout the trade regulation being done within threemonths. Again speaking for myself the Commissionwould be perfectly happy to accommodate thatreasonable request. A couple of other Memberssuggested that we should concentrate our support on oneplace: Famugusta. That would not be sensible. We haveto spread our assistance more generally than that.

I wish to make three other points. First, on the Agencybased in Thessaloniki, I would like without reservationto thank the Greek Government for its hospitality. Itprovided the facilities we have used in Thessaloniki. Itwas an imaginative proposal by the last government,which has been continued by the present one. It hasgiven us a splendid headquarters. Everybody who hasworked in the Agency is grateful for that and certainly,on behalf of the Commission, I am also very grateful.

Second, Mr Lagendijk made the point although he wastoo kind to put it this way that there is a degree ofintellectual incoherence, which I accept, between thepolicy which I have pursued vigorously around theworld of deconcentrating our management of assistanceand what we have been doing in the Western Balkans,which is to establish an agency rather than simplydeconcentrate to our delegations. I have to say to justifythat decision that my main concern particularly giventhe position in the Western Balkans and given theposition in Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and the FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia the position was sodifficult it seemed to me that the most important thingwas delivery of assistance. Since the Agency has been soeffective it was not right to dismantle it and I thought itsensible to continue to use it as our main instrument formanaging assistance. So, I plead guilty to a degree ofintellectual incoherence, but the record of the Agencyhas justified it.

Finally, I do not wish to make my last remarks in thisParliament into the beginning of a hot controversy.However, I would just say to the honourable Memberwho said that he wished Mr Verheugen, mydistinguished colleague, had been able to state theadvantages of the Annan plan more vigorously, that MrVerheugen would have loved to do so, but when he triedin Cyprus, he was stopped. That is a matter of record andwas not the happiest episode in this tale. It would havebeen better all round if during the course of thereferendum campaign he had been able to say in Cypruswhat he believed the advantages of the Annan plan were.It might have been that he would have given a morebalanced view than some of the letters sent out by thegovernment. I very much hope that we can have this

16-11-2004 37

debate in as calm a way as possible. I hope that all sidesof the argument will be heard reasonably.

The one thing I would like to say is that I recognise, asMr Kasoulides said, that there is a genuine commitmenton the part of many honourable Members to thebetterment of everyone who lives on the island. I haveno doubt at all about the honourable Member'scommitment to that and I hope that we see everybodyliving a more prosperous, stable and peaceful life on thatglorious island in the future.

2-089

Předseda. Společná rozprava je uzavřena.

Hlasování se bude konat zítra ve 12:30.

(Zasedání je přerueno v 18:25 a bude pokračovat v21:00)

2-090

PRESIDENZA DELL'ON. MAUROVicepresidente

2-091

10 - Cambiamento climatico

2-092

Presidente. L'ordine del giorno reca la discussionecongiunta sulle dichiarazioni del Consiglio e dellaCommissione relative al cambiamento climatico.

2-093

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, concerning the issueof climate change there are two main areas in which theEU is playing a key role. The first is the implementationand entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. MemberStates and the Commission are currently preparing theEuropean emissions trading system, which is due to belaunched on 1 January 2005.

The second focus of attention is climate policy in thelonger term. In December this year, the Tenth Session ofthe Conference of the Parties to the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change is due totake place in Buenos Aires. One of its tasks will be toassess the results of the Convention over the last tenyears and future trends. A very important result so farhas been the Kyoto Protocol. But the Protocol is only afirst step and CO2 emissions will have to be reducedeven more after 2012.

I should like to convey the Council's thanks for theefforts Parliament has made to persuade Russia tocommit itself to the Kyoto Protocol. The EuropeanUnion welcomed the good news that on 5 NovemberPresident Putin had signed a bill confirming ratificationof the Kyoto Protocol by the Russian Federation. Thatsignature clears the way for the Kyoto Protocol to comeinto force early next year. Once in force, it will legallyoblige countries with binding targets to reducegreenhouse gas emissions to reach these targets by 2012.

The Kyoto Protocol is the main instrument in the globalfight against climate change and a good example of the

effectiveness of global cooperation. Leading byexample, the European Union has passed legislation. Ithas already made these provisions legally binding in theEuropean Union. The entry into force of the KyotoProtocol shows that the EU was right in its earlyimplementation of the obligations then expected.

In spring 2005, the European Council will adopt aposition on the EU's future climate policy. The Heads ofGovernment will consider mid- to long-term emissionreduction strategies and their objectives. The basic aimof long-term EU climate policy is to limit the rise intemperature to a maximum of 2°C above pre-industriallevels. In preparation for that meeting, the EuropeanCommission is currently producing a cost-benefitanalysis taking account of both environmental factorsand competitiveness.

Action on climate change demands the broadest possibleworldwide coalition. I believe that will only be achievedthrough a dialogue between the European Union andother countries. The European Union presidency, in theframework of the troika, is currently implementingaction with key countries all over the world regardingthe forthcoming Conference of Parties to the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change andearly discussions on options for a regime for the periodbeyond 2012.

Members of the European Parliament can also play asignificant part in this process by discussing long-termclimate policy with parliamentarians from countriesoutside the European Union, for example at theforthcoming Tenth Conference of Parties to the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

2-094

Wallström, Commission. Mr President, by now 189countries are party to the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change and I hope they will all turn up for theTenth Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires. Thisevent will also mark the tenth anniversary of the entryinto force of the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change.

The Russian decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol meansthat it will now enter into force, and this will give newimpetus to the discussions during the conference of theparties in Buenos Aires. The Commission has four mainobjectives for COP 10, as it is called. Firstly, to takestock of the work done so far. Secondly, to explain whatthe European Union is doing to address climate change.Thirdly, to advance the discussions on what will happenafter 2012. Fourthly, to contribute towards findingsolutions for the technical issues on the agenda.

The first thing is to take stock of what many parties havealready done to address climate change. This is also anopportunity, especially for developing countries, to beable to explain that many of them have already takenaction and to illustrate the way in which they are the firstones to be affected by climate change. This is importantfor the political debate in general.

38 16-11-2004

The second objective is to explain what the EuropeanUnion is doing through our European Climate ChangeProgramme as well as the emissions trading scheme thatwill start from January 2005. The system will also beofficially presented to all ministers in an event that weare organising in close cooperation with the Dutchpresidency and the Argentine Government.

The third objective will be to begin looking to the future,at the global regime that we will have after 2012, and tohave an exchange of views on the post-2012 framework.Again, this is extremely important in order to involve thedeveloping countries and to show that there is a balancein the kind of actions that we are discussing post-2012.

The fourth and final objective is to resolve some of thevery important technical issues that are still on the COPagenda. In particular, these issues concern topics relatedto developing countries as well as the balance betweenadaptation and mitigation. I understand that severalround-table discussions will be organised during COP10.

The Commission looks forward to working closely withthe Members of the European Parliament who will bepart of the delegation in Buenos Aires. We will ensurefull briefing and also rapid transmission of informationto the Members of the European Parliament and we hopethat you can engage in a lot of outreaching activitiesduring COP 10. Having a strong EU delegation composed of representatives of all the Europeaninstitutions at the COP gives the Union an importantopportunity to encourage the rest of the world to takemore action now in response to the threat of climatechange. With five years' experience of working withMembers of the European Parliament, this has been oneof our definite strengths, and the fact that we have heldjoint press conferences, etc. is a sign of strength andgood cooperation. I hope that we can continue in a goodatmosphere and in close cooperation both at COP 10 andin the future.

2-095

Doyle (PPE-DE), on behalf of the Group. MrPresident, I would like to wish Commissioner Wallströmevery success in her future portfolio. We have enjoyedworking with her over the last five years in theenvironmental portfolio. I would like to thank her for herparticular contribution. My good wishes also go to theDutch presidency as its term comes to an end.

There are those who claim that the Kyoto Protocol to theUN Framework Convention on Climate Change isdestined to fail as the rest of the world waits for thosenations already taking part to fall short of theirobligations and so provide the perfect cover for theirdecision not to participate in the first place. At the half-way point to the 2012 deadline set under the first Kyotocommitment period, the world is engaging in ex postfacto rationalisation, hammering nails in the coffin ofattempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions before weeven enter the second phase of implementation. The 'Itold you so' mentality is one I suggest we cannot afford.

Failure is relative. Failure to meet provisional targets and my own country, Ireland, is currently 16% behindthe target set is very unfortunate. But failure to act atall would be downright catastrophic.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, theIPCC, an international panel of experts which assessesthe scientific, technical, social, and economic aspects ofclimate change estimates that we need to decrease ouremissions of greenhouse gas by 60-80% on 1990 levelsin order for our efforts to make an appreciable differenceto rising global temperatures. I know there is debate inthe scientific community as to whether the models usedby the IPCC stand up, and that debate will continue, butthe majority of people accept the IPCC modelling andthe projections arising from it.

Critics frequently cite the fact that under Kyoto theearth's temperature would only be 0.15°C lower than ifwe do nothing at all. Scepticism and climate change aretwo phenomena that have become so closely interlinkedin the global debate on the future of our planet, that weare in danger of losing sight of the very real steps thathave been taken, under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms,towards setting a framework for future action to controlthe impact of human activities on the earth.

To focus too closely on the negligible quantitative effectof Kyoto, in terms of immediate results of reducing ourgreenhouse gas emissions, however, is to miss the point.Kyoto is only a first step towards addressing globalwarming but it provides a crucial foundation on whichfuture, more comprehensive and effective policies andagreements must be built. It is a prototype for a muchmore far-reaching arrangement than the present one. Thevalue of the Kyoto Protocol is in that it sets a market-based mechanism to translate environmental protectioninto economic terms. It puts a tradable price on globalwarming.

Once properly implemented and extended to include allthe other sectors, Kyoto will provide a flexible, market-based mechanism to spread the burden of paying forglobal warming equitably across all sectors. It wouldprovide a financial incentive for the development ofclean technologies that will safeguard the environmentalheritage of future generations.

In conclusion, the main obstacle at this point isdiplomatic. We must engage in a continuing andvigorous dialogue with our transatlantic partners in theUSA and with Russia where the very name of Kyoto hasbecome discredited. Yes, Kyoto has flaws, but onlythrough working together can these shortcomings beironed out to the benefit of all.

On a European level I welcome the Commission's recentstakeholder consultation and hope that we can make ourvoice heard at the forthcoming COP 10 conference inwhich I will be delighted to participate. It is time tobanish the notion that the future of climate change policyis coterminous with the Kyoto Protocol. The question,and it is an important one, is what comes after Kyoto?

16-11-2004 39

2-096

Corbey (PSE), namens de fractie. Voorzitter,mevrouw de commissaris, het had niet veel gescheeld ofwe hadden dit debat niet met u kunnen voeren, maar metuw opvolger. Ik ben eerlijk gezegd echt blij dat wevandaag uitgerekend met u kunnen spreken over hetklimaatbeleid en de inzet van de EU voor deklimaatconferentie in Buenos Aires in december. Het istoch een mooie afsluiting dat u dit klimaatdossier kuntdoorgeven in de wetenschap dat het Protocol van Kyotoop korte termijn van kracht zal worden, nu het isgeratificeerd door de Russische staatsdoema op 22oktober en door de Russische federatieraad op 27 okto-ber. Inmiddels heeft president Poetin de ratificatiewetondertekend en we wachten op het deponeren van deratificatie bij de secretaris-generaal van de VerenigdeNaties. Negentig dagen nadien kan het Protocol vanKyoto van kracht worden.

Mijn fractie verwelkomt het besluit van president Poetinom samen met de Europese Unie en de andere landenhet broeikasprobleem aan te pakken. Europa en de Euro-pese Commissie hebben een belangrijke rol gespeeld bijhet bereiken van dit resultaat en felicitaties, ook aan uwadres, zijn hier zeker op hun plaats. Het klimaatbeleidkan in Europa op zeer grote steun rekenen. Onze fractieis erg tevreden dat het Europees Parlement en de Raadvan ministers vasthouden aan een ambitieus klimaat-beleid, gericht op het bestrijden van het broeikaseffect.

Met het oog op de klimaatconferentie in Buenos Airesheeft Europa zijn voortrekkersrol bevestigd. Ik ben blijdat Europa opnieuw heeft bevestigd datontwikkelingslanden moeten worden gesteund om zichaan te passen aan de gevolgen van klimaatverandering.Het volstaat niet te zeggen dat we structurele maatre-gelen gaan nemen die op lange termijn effect sorteren.Sommige landen, met name ontwikkelingslanden enkleine landen, worden nu al geconfronteerd met degevolgen van het broeikaseffect en die moeten wordengeholpen.

Mijn fractie is tevreden, maar blijft natuurlijk ookkritisch. Het is goed dat het Parlement en de ministersvan Milieu een ambitieus klimaatbeleid steunen. Het kanechter niet bij mooie woorden en goede bedoelingenblijven. Er moet ook werk worden gemaakt van concretemaatregelen om de uitstoot van broeikasgassen teverminderen. Nederland heeft als voorzitter van deEuropese Unie een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid ommet concrete resultaten te komen. De ideeën van hetvoorzitterschap op milieuterrein klinken goed, maarmoeten wel worden omgezet in resultaten. Daarop zullenwe het Nederlands voorzitterschap aan het eind van hetjaar ook beoordelen. In Buenos Aires zal moeten blijkenof onze mooie woorden ook in internationaal verbandworden uitgesproken en waargemaakt. Ik hoop in iedergeval op een heel goede samenwerking, zowel met hetNederlands voorzitterschap als met de Europese Com-missie, tijdens de COP10 in Buenos Aires.

2-097

Davies (ALDE), on behalf of the Group. Mr President,about two days after the US presidential elections I

turned on my radio at home. I heard one of GeorgeBush's climate change advisers telling us, firstly, thatclimate change was a myth; secondly, that Europeanscientists were all funded by national governments, thatnone could be trusted and only American scientists wereindependent; and, thirdly, that Commissioner Wallströmhad admitted that the whole climate change agenda wasdesigned to ensure that European industry was able tocatch up and additional burdens were imposed onAmerican industry in order to allow this level playingfield to be established. And all that time I thought theCommissioner was out there trying to save the world!

In yesterday's Financial Times I saw that one of MrPutin's advisers, whom we have heard from before, isstill telling us that it is all a myth and global warmingwill be a good thing! It is like old Cold War warriorscoming together again, trying to fight in a more globallywarmed arena.

It is to the Commissioner's credit that we have come thisfar, but we have a very long way to go. We have toensure not only that we implement Kyoto which, as weknow, will do nothing to combat climate change but willsimply slow down the process but also that we involvedeveloping nations, raise the targets and find ways ofchanging public policy in ways that are politicallyacceptable and involve the United States. I do not knowhow far we will get down this road. I hope at least that,in the Commissioner's new role, she will, over the nextfive years, at least have the opportunity to communicatea message of success.

2-098

Hassi (Verts/ALE), ryhmän puolesta. Hyvät kollegat,ensi joulukuussa pidettävä ilmastokokous onhistoriallinen, koska nyt tiedetään, että Kioton sopimustulee voimaan. Mutta on ymmärrettävä, että Kioto onvasta ensimmäinen askel pitkällä tiellä ja nyt on aikavalmistautua seuraaviin päästövähennyksiin. Mukaantarvitaan uusia maita kuten Kiina ja Intia. EU:n tuleekinviipymättä esittää ensinnäkin oma pitkän aikavälinpäästövähennystavoitteensa ja toiseksi oma ehdotuksen-sa kansainvälisten päästövähennysten malliksi.

Jotta voimme estää katastrofiksi kääntyvänilmastomuutoksen, globaalit päästöt on käännettävälaskuun vähintään kahdessakymmenessä vuodessa jateollisuusmaiden on leikattava päästöjään ainakin kuusi-kymmentä prosenttia noin viidessäkymmenessävuodessa. Tämä kuulostaa dramaattiselta, mutta voimmeselvitä pehmeällä muutoksella, jos toimimmejohdonmukaisesti. Vähentämällä päästöjä vajaat kaksiprosenttia joka vuosi saavutamme kuudenkymmenenprosentin vähennyksen viidessäkymmenessä vuodessa.Modernin kestävän teknologian avulla se on mahdollista.

Tarvitaan markkinamekanismeja, jotka suosivatpuhdasta tekniikkaa, kuten energiaverotusta japäästökauppaa, mutta tarvitaan muitakin uusia toimia.Yksi mahdollisuus on arvonlisäveron alentaminenmarkkinoiden energiatehokkaimmilta laitteilta. Tälläkintavoin voidaan saada aikaan yllättävän suuria päästö-

40 16-11-2004

vähennyksiä, jos kuluttajat aina ostopäätöksiätehdessään valitsevat energiatehokkaimman vaihto-ehdon. Eli vielä on aikaa estää pehmein toiminkatastrofaalinen muutos, jos olemme päättäväisiä jajohdonmukaisia ja jos EU säilyttää johtavan asemansakansainvälisessä ilmastopolitiikassa.

2-099

Sjöstedt (GUE/NGL) för gruppen. NärKyotoprotokollet nu kan träda i kraft så är det viktigt attse framåt vad vi kan göra efter 2012 med klimatarbetet.De åtaganden som finns i Kyotoprokollet är som vi allavet helt otillräckliga på längre sikt.

Inte minst är det viktigt att vi får en diskussion med destora utvecklingsländerna, som Indien och Kina, om attäven de måste godta bindande åtaganden om att reducerasina utsläpp framöver, utsläpp som idag ökar väldigtfort. För att det ska bli möjligt tror jag att det är viktigtatt tala i termer av rättvist miljöutrymme på längre sikt,och att den enda rimliga långsiktiga fördelningen avrätten att släppa ut är den som räknas per världsmed-borgare. Det är den rimliga målsättningen på mycketlång sikt.

Det amerikanska presidentvalet är naturligtvis ettallvarligt bakslag i det internationella miljöarbetet ochUSA lär uppträda som en global anarkist på miljö-området även de kommande fyra åren. Vi har inte tid attvänta på amerikanerna, men vi vet att den dagenkommer då de av både ekonomiska och ekologiska skältvingas att ansluta sig till detta arbete. Då är det viktigtatt det är ett starkt och fungerande arbete som de ärvälkomna till.

Jag skulle vilja använda mina sista sekunder till att tackadig, Margot, för det arbete du gjort under dessa fem årmed miljöfrågor. Det är inte lätt att vara miljökom-missionär i EU. Jag är säker på att det finns motståndarebåde utom och ibland kanske även inom EU-kommissionen, men jag är övertygad om att du har gjortdetta arbete så bra som det någonsin är möjligt och fördet är du värd allt tack.

2-100

Blokland (IND/DEM), namens de fractie. Voorzitter,het is bijna zeven jaar geleden dat in Kyoto hetbefaamde protocol werd opgesteld, en zeer binnenkortzal het eindelijk in werking treden door de ratificatiedoor Rusland. Dat is goed nieuws, niet alleen voordegenen die gevochten hebben voor dit protocol, zoals u,mevrouw Wallström, maar ook voor degenen diedagelijks de gevolgen van klimaatverandering ervaren.Het is in ieder geval een hartelijke felicitatie waard.Voorzitter, Kyoto is een goede eerste stap naar een betermilieu, maar we zijn er nog lang niet. Ik wil daaromRaad en Commissie oproepen om in Buenos Airessamen met het Europees Parlement te laten zien dat deEU niet alleen een sterke economie wil hebben maar ookeen sterk milieubeleid. Er valt nog veel te verbeteren aandit protocol, bijvoorbeeld het toevoegen vanvliegtuigemissies. Ook het draagvlak kan verderverbreed worden. Daar kan, mevrouw Wallström, uwnieuwe portefeuille toe bijdragen. De EU kan zich

daarvoor inzetten. Meer landen betrekken bij ditprotocol betekent ook een betere controle van dewereldwijde emissies. 55% van de emissies van bijlage1-landen zijn nu afgedekt, laten we hard werken aan deresterende 45%.

2-101

Gutiérrez-Cortines (PPE-DE). Señor Presidente,quiero hablar del cambio climático, pero sobre todo delinforme de la Agencia Europea de Medio Ambiente, quehace dos meses publicó un diagnóstico de futuro yseñala que las zonas de mayor riesgo, las que más van asufrir el cambio climático, son las del Mediterráneo.

Me parece muy grave que hasta ahora esto no se hayadicho en voz alta. Creo que es esencial insistir en queson las zonas del Mediterráneo las que van a sufrir másel aumento de la temperatura, con los importantísimosriesgos para la salud que eso supone; las que van a sufrirmás la escasez de agua, de falta de pluviometría; deincremento de la desertificación, de avance del desierto;de baja de la productividad. Estas zonas estánrecibiendo, además, una inmigración del sufrimiento, dela miseria y del hambre. Tenemos el deber de prestarlesayuda.

Desde aquí pido que Europa se alinee claramente enestrategias contra la desertificación y en una política deadaptación al cambio climático, como recomienda laAgencia. Hemos de realizar políticas adaptables, comoindica el desarrollo sostenible. Necesitamos estrategiasintegradas, estudios y una investigación mucho más afondo sobre los problemas que se avecinan.

La Organización de Naciones Unidas, que ha puesto enmarcha un proceso de lucha contra la desertificación deEuropa, está casi muda. Por tanto, reclamo una políticamediterránea, una política en el fondo del equilibriosocial y una política de futuro más activa.

2-102

Sornosa Martínez (PSE). Señor Presidente, señoraComisaria, aunque la felicito por su nuevaresponsabilidad,y me alegro mucho de que esté ustedaquí esta noche en el debate sobre el cambio climático.

La estrategia de la Unión Europea para la Conferenciade Buenos Aires sobre el Cambio Climático esrealmente de mucho interés. La Unión Europea debemantener su liderazgo y, además, aprovechar éste paranegociar, con el fin de que aumente el número de paísesque suscriban en el futuro el Protocolo de Kyoto.Considero que es muy necesario trabajar para que seincluyan en el segundo período de compromisos losdebates iniciados en Milán, con el fin de incorporar lasemisiones de los vuelos y del transporte marítimo, eincluso que se avance en algún compromiso global paradisminuir las emisiones por el tráfico de personas ymercancías por vía terrestre, que es en este momento ungran problema respecto a la contaminación atmosférica.

Además, la Comisión debería pensar en elaborar unmayor número de medidas en materia de rendimientoenergético y también en más fuentes de energías

16-11-2004 41

renovables porque, tal y como usted afirmó, señoraWallström, el 26 de agosto pasado, si todos los poderespúblicos de la Unión Europea se pasaran a la energíaecológica, se dejarían de producir 62 millones detoneladas de CO2, lo que permitiría cumplir con el 18 %de los compromisos de Kyoto en materia de reducciónde emisiones. Además, creo que el mercado necesitasignos claros y mantenidos para la promoción deenergías renovables y de eficiencia energética.

Por todo ello, creo, señora Comisaria, que sería positivoque la Comisión impulsara alguna propuesta en elsentido de aumentar las medidas en materia derendimiento energético y promoción de energías alterna-tivas para el segundo período, y realizar propuestas esotra forma también de mantener el liderazgo en la UniónEuropea.

2-103

Schlyter (Verts/ALE). Vi ser redan i dag effekterna:Glaciärer försvinner, Arktis smälter bort, vi får kortarevintrar, fler stormar, naturkatastrofer ochmiljöflyktingar. I slutet av punkt 2 i resolutionen står detatt alla världsmedborgare långsiktigt måste få sammautsläppskvoter. Denna enskilda mening ställer stora kravpå oss att vidta drastiska åtgärder och minska vårautsläpp. Vi stjäl inte bara olja från framtida genera-tioners förråd, utan även från jordens fattiga.

När vi i dag diskuterar klimatfrågan kan vi ha ettfemårigt tidsperspektiv till nästa val och undvika att fattasvåra beslut, men EU parlamentet, kommissionen ochrådet måste tillsammans kollektivt blicka bortomåtervalshorisonten och våga fatta beslut som radikaltminskar utsläppen. Annars begår vi brott motmänskligheten och jorden och riskerar att hamna idomstolen i Haag på vår ålders höst, evigt dömda avframtida generationer. Om inte Haag redan ligger undervatten då förstås.

2-104

Verges (GUE/NGL). Monsieur le Président, avec leschangements climatiques, l'humanité se trouveconfrontée à un enjeu de civilisation, puisque c'est dumaintien des espèces et des grands équilibres naturelsqu'il s'agit. Cela appelle une vision renouvelée de nosconceptions du progrès et du développement.

Ce problème dominera de plus en plus l'existencecommune des hommes au cours du présent siècle. Lamultiplication des phénomènes climatiques extrêmesconfirme que les effets du réchauffement planétaire sontdéjà entrés en action. Des changements profonds sontdésormais inéluctables.

Si l'Union européenne semble résolue à atteindre lesobjectifs du Protocole de Kyoto, en revanche, tout resteà faire pour préparer les populations à affronter lesmutations qui s'annoncent pour maintenant. Ladéfinition et la mise en uvre d'une véritable politiqued'adaptation sont urgentes, elles sont incontournables.

Nous devons tirer les conséquences politiques du travaildes scientifiques et, notamment, du rapport de l'Agence

européenne de l'environnement, qui détaille les multiplesimpacts du réchauffement climatique en Europe laquelle,faut-il le rappeler, est certes le plus petit des continentsdu monde, mais aussi celui qui a le plus grand nombrede façades maritimes. Déjà, à l'initiative de l'Observa-toire national français sur les effets du réchauffementclimatique, observatoire que je préside, les 155 régionspériphériques maritimes d'Europe et de Méditerranée ontdécidé de se réunir en 2005, à Marseille, pour débattrede cet enjeu de l'adaptation.

Nous comptons sur le soutien de la Commission danscette démarche, laquelle peut contribuer à l'élaborationd'une véritable stratégie européenne pour l'adaptationaux changements climatiques actuels. Ce volet, devenuindispensable dans le programme d'action communau-taire sur les changements climatiques, mérite aujourd'huid'être amplifié.

2-105

De Rossa (PSE). Mr President, we need cleanerenergy and more efficient technologies and, in order toachieve that, we need incentives negative incentives, ifyou like such as a carbon tax.

Ireland is currently 25% in excess of its targets and yet,a couple of months ago, the then Minister of Financeannounced that he was abandoning a commitment tointroduce a carbon tax. The day after tomorrow, theformer Minister of Finance, Mr McCreevy, will besitting on those benches beside you, Mrs Wallström, incharge of the internal market. What confidence can wehave that the Commission will ensure that all MemberStates will comply and fulfil the commitments made inrelation to reducing carbon? It has been estimated that100 of the largest companies in Ireland will exceed thecurrent emission rates between 2005 and 2007. Ireland islosing ground in this battle in relation to climate change.

It will be the Irish taxpayers who will pay the penalties!The companies who are currently pleading that they willbe uncompetitive if they have to invest in order to createclean energy and more efficient technologies are theones who escape scot-free! I appeal to the Commissionand to the Council to insist that the Irish Governmentreverse its decision to abandon the carbon tax.

2-106

Nicolaï, Council. Mr President, I shall be very brief. Ithank Members of Parliament for their contributions andI agree with most of the remarks that were made. It isimportant to be aware that Parliament, the Commissionand Council share almost the same views on thisimportant issue. We indeed have to fight againstscepticism, we have to look beyond 2012 and perhapswe do not agree with everybody in the world. But atleast we agree on the main paths of the whole discussionhere in Parliament with the Commission and theCouncil. It is very important that we continue the stepswe have already taken.

2-107

Wallström, Commission. Mr President, I wish tobegin by thanking Members for their kind words and

42 16-11-2004

their cooperation over the years. I hope to continue tofollow this discussion, because this concerns not onlythe environment but also our survival on this planet andthe economic and social consequences that affect usnow. Thus, in the years to come, I hope to support andbe involved in the initiatives to tackle climate changetaken by the Barroso Commission.

I recall that we very rarely get reports from the PacificOcean the vast expanse of water that covers one thirdof this planet but where the effects of climate changeare already affecting people living in small island states.It must be said that during all the debates on climatechange over the past five years the speeches byrepresentatives from the small island states have beenthe most impressive, because they can tell us theirpersonal stories of how this affected their lives and thepossibilities to continue to live on these small islands.

A lot of people would say that the Kyoto Protocol didnot work, that it was flawed, and they would mention itsnegative aspects. It is not perfect, but what is thealternative to that one international legal framework,which has now been negotiated for ten years? Should wetry to become involved in bilateral contacts between onestate and another? To solve a global problem we need atruly global solution and framework. I have tried to turnit around and say that it is an ingenious protocol,because it combines sound science and the way theUnited Nations has put together the IntergovernmentalPanel for Climate Change is unprecedented. Of courseindividual scientists will question the whole thing thatis their job! However, the fact remains that we have anin-depth knowledge of the problem. With sound science,we have common but differentiated responsibilities,meaning that the rich countries those who emit eight oreighty times as much pollution the poor countries do have a certain responsibility. But we involve them all.India and China sit at the same table as the richcountries, so we are able to talk to them and discusswhat will happen after 2012. It also means that we haveaccess to the so-called flexible mechanisms, meaningthat we will do things in a cost-effective way. We willinvolve and mobilise different actors and use marketforces for the good of the environment. That is why it isingenious. We will have to revise it and work andchange it for many years to come, but it is the one gamethere is in town in combating climate change. That iswhy I am also proud of the role the European Union hasplayed over the years and I hope will continue to play. Itis so important. For once we can show the rest of theworld that sustainable development is possible; that wecan find cost-effective means and measures and that weare willing to cooperate with each other.

Thanks to the European Parliament we have a veryambitious climate-change policy. I hope that willcontinue with your help. I wish your delegation and ourEU delegation to COP 10 in Buenos Aires all the best.

2-108

Presidente. In conclusione del dibattito ho ricevutouna proposta di risoluzione della Commissione perl'ambiente e la sanità pubblica e la sicurezza alimentare.1

Dichiaro quindi chiusa la discussione.

La votazione si svolgerà domani, mercoledì, alle ore12.30.

DICHIARAZIONE SCRITTA (ARTICOLO 142)

2-109

Aylward (UEN) in writing. I want to commend Mr.Putin. The Kyoto Protocol is off life-support because theRussian Federation ratified it. The country with thehighest levels of pollution the United States- refuses toconsider the global need for their ratification of theKyoto Protocol. I am deeply concerned that the UnitedStates has chosen to tackle this climate change issuethrough unilateral activities. Climate change needs to bedealt with as a global problem.

If carbon dioxide is not reduced, the Arctic ice coverwill disappear. This is particularly going to affect thequality of life of those living in coastal regions and onisland communities. That is a scientific fact, not apassionate policy comment on my part.

Ireland is much more energy efficient than a decade ago.I encourage other Member States to follow suit.Tackling climate change was never labelled as beingeasy. But complacency in dealing with it, is worse.

My duty as a MEP, is to stress the necessity of climatechange protection to: the people we represent, our EUcounterparts and our international partners. I urge theremaining countries that have not made their globalcommitment to combating climate change, to do so, viathe Kyoto Protocol.

2-110

11 - Imballaggi e i rifiuti di imballaggio

2-111

Presidente. L'ordine del giorno reca la relazioneCorbey (A6-0027/2004) sulla proposta di direttiva delParlamento europeo e del Consiglio che modifica ladirettiva 94/62/CE sugli imballaggi e i rifiuti di imbal-laggi.

2-112

Wallström, Commission. Mr President, in 2001 a totalof 65 million tonnes of packaging waste was generatedin the 15 old Member States of the European Union.That corresponds to around 17% of municipal solidwaste and 3% of the total waste generation by weight.Of these 65 million tonnes, 34 million tonnes 53% were recycled, and 60% was recovered or incineratedwith energy recovery.

1 Proposta di risoluzione: vedasi processo verbale

16-11-2004 43

Our information gives good reason to assume that in2002 not a single target out of the 75 different targetsapplying to Member States was missed. This is a successmany would not have believed in even a few years ago.Therefore the Community has built on this success andadopted new and higher targets earlier this year.

The new Member States started later in setting up theirown recycling schemes. They have nevertheless madesignificant progress towards fulfilling their target underthe old packaging directive at the end of the transitionperiods agreed in the Accession Treaty. For proceduralreasons, a deadline for the targets of the revisedpackaging directive could not be set within that directiveand this proposal was therefore necessary. TheCommission believes that setting this deadline for thenew Member States is a matter in which Parliamentneeds to be fully involved. We therefore consider thatthe appropriate legal procedure is codecision on thebasis of Article 95.

We can also understand, however, that the new MemberStates want to have legal security as soon as possible.They should be able to transpose the targets of therevision directive and the deadline under the presentproposal at the same time. The deadline therefore needsto be agreed before the transposition deadline for targetsexpires in August 2005 and I hope that the efforts madeto reach an agreement at first reading will be successful.

The Commission has proposed a deadline of 2012 for allnew Member States. This should allow discussion inParliament and Council to start from an equal basis.However, I can also accept limited postponement forsome of the countries concerned.

I am also aware that many Members of Parliament wishto extend possibilities for Member States to encouragere-use systems. This is an important subject and theCommission agreed to study options during the lastrevision of the packaging directive. However, getting theright balance between encouraging re-use and preservingthe internal market is also not easy. I think, therefore,that we should wait for the outcome of the two ongoingstudies and discuss this issue on the basis of a report thatthe Commission will present to Parliament and theCouncil in 2005. However, if Parliament wishes to pointout the importance of re-use in a recital, as suggested inAmendment 4, that is acceptable to the Commission.

The Commission can accept Amendments 1, 2 and 3 infull, and Amendment 4 in principle.

2-113

Corbey (PSE), Rapporteur. Voorzitter, mevrouw decommissaris en collega's, vanavond staan we hier weervoor verpakkingen. Commissaris Wallström, dit is uwlaatste debat als milieucommissaris. Ik wil u compli-menteren met uw uitstekende werk van de afgelopen vijfjaar, uw grote persoonlijke betrokkenheid en inzet, en ubedanken voor de goede samenwerking die u met onsParlement heeft opgebouwd. U bent een voortreffelijkemilieucommissaris geweest.

Vanavond bespreken we de leftovers van de herzieningvan de verpakkingsrichtlijn. De tien nieuwe landenhebben duidelijke doelstellingen nodig. Recycling enhergebruik kun je niet in één keer vanuit de hoofdstad ofvanuit Brussel afkondigen. Het heeft tijd nodig ommensen te overtuigen om systemen op te zetten. Daaromlijkt het mij het beste de data aan te houden die door denieuwe lidstaten zelf zijn voorgesteld. Ik ben natuurlijkook nagegaan hoe collega's uit de nieuwe landenhierover denken en daaruit zijn geen andere visiesvoortgekomen, vandaar mijn voorstel voor amendement3.

Ik ben het met de Commissie eens dat we dit dossier zosnel mogelijk moeten afronden en dat we moetenproberen zo snel mogelijk politieke duidelijkheid tescheppen voor de nieuwe lidstaten.

Voorzitter en commissaris, de verpakkingsrichtlijn is aaneen fundamentele herziening toe. Een van de crucialepunten is de voortdurende spanning tussen enerzijds hethandhaven van de interne markt en anderzijds hetbeschermen van het milieu. Dat leidt in een aantalgevallen tot onduidelijkheid en tot slepende procedures.Duidelijkheid moet er komen, zowel voor producentenals voor consumenten. De Europese Commissie stelt opgrond van de verpakkingsrichtlijn, die ook voor hetmilieu is bedoeld, een aantal hergebruiksystemen inEuropa ter discussie. Mevrouw de commissaris, ik vinddat heel teleurstellend en heb besloten om dezeherziening aan te grijpen.

In amendement 4 stel ik namens mijn fractie voor in derichtlijn op te nemen dat lidstaten hergebruik vanverpakkingsmateriaal kunnen aanmoedigen. Lidstatenkunnen nieuwe systemen voor hergebruik vanverpakkingsmateriaal invoeren of bestaande systemenhandhaven als deze een milieuvoordeel opleveren invergelijking met recycling of terugwinning vanverpakkingsmateriaal. Dit amendement, overigens eenoverweging, zegt niet dat lidstaten hergebruik móetenaanmoedigen. Het stelt dat lidstaten hergebruik kunnenbevorderen, mits - en dit is belangrijk - dat gebeurt inovereenstemming met het Verdrag en het de internemarkt niet verstoort.

Mevrouw de commissaris, u heeft gezegd dat u ditamendement kunt aanvaarden en ik heb begrepen dat hetbij de Raad ook geen grote weerstand oproept. Het isvoor mij dan ook onbegrijpelijk dat zelfs hiertegenbezwaren zijn bij de collega's van de EVP en bij deEuropese verpakkingsindustrie. De opstelling van deEVP en de industrie is ronduit verbijsterend als we detoestand van het milieu en de natuur goed tot ons latendoordringen.

Onlangs werd het vervolg gepubliceerd op het verslagvan de club van Rome. Dit nieuw verslag concludeertdat de grenzen van duurzame ontwikkeling in zichtkomen. Als we niet zuinig en zorgvuldig met natuurlijkehulpbronnen zoals water en energie omspringen, danbotsen twee werelden, de wereld van de natuur en dewereld van de menselijke beschaving. We zijn er

44 16-11-2004

onvoldoende in geslaagd om duurzame ontwikkeling teintegreren in onze productie en in onsconsumptiegedrag. Het is duidelijk dat we een omslagmoeten maken. Hergebruik van materialen en het zuinigen zorgvuldig omspringen met natuurlijke hulpbronnenzijn van levensbelang. Ook dat is de achtergrond vanamendement 4.

Een verpakkingsindustrie die zichzelf verzet tegen demogelijkheid om binnen de grenzen van de internemarkt hergebruik aan te moedigen, staat met de rug naarde toekomst. De Europese industrie moet in 2010 demeest concurrende economie ter wereld zijn. Dat vraagtom ondernemingen die de maatschappelijke werkelijk-heid kunnen inschatten. Dat vraagt om ondernemingendie van duurzaamheid een handelsmerk kunnen maken,ondernemingen die inzien dat burgers en consumentenzich zorgen maken over de toekomst van de planeet enbereid zijn hun bijdrage te leveren.

Natuurlijk heeft de industrie gelijk als ze zegt dathergebruik geen dekmantel voor protectionisme magzijn. Hergebruik mag geen excuus zijn om buitenlandseaanbieders dwars te zitten. Hergebruik is ook niet in allesituaties beter voor het milieu en er is geen reden omhergebruik verplicht te stellen. Hergebruik heeft echterwel een belangrijke functie, namelijk mensen ervandoordringen dat we zuinig moeten zijn met de natuur enmet materialen.

Een nieuwe stap in de richting van dewegwerpmaatschappij is het laatste waarop we zitten tewachten. Een stap die overigens ook niet wordtgewaardeerd door de burger, want weggooien is in deogen van veel mensen gewoon zonde, zonde van hetflesje, zonde van het blikje en zonde van het materiaal.Morgen bespreekt dit Parlement ook het verslag Kokover de uitvoering van de Lissabon-strategie. Wim Kokconstateert dat dit lovenswaardige streven naar eenduurzame samenleving, waarin mens, milieu en markt inbalans zijn, niet uit de verf komt wegens een gebrek aanpolitieke wil. Hij concludeert echter niet dat we deLissabon-strategie maar in de afvalbak moeten gooien enik ben het met hem eens. We moeten er werk van makenen politieke wil tonen.

In al zijn bescheidenheid geeft dit verpakkingsdossier umorgen de gelegenheid om uw politieke wil te tonen.Niet alleen kunnen we ons uitspreken in de resolutieover wat allemaal moet gaan gebeuren, we kunnen onstegelijkertijd uitspreken voor een concrete duurzametoevoeging aan de verpakkingsrichtlijn.

Ik roep alle collega's op morgen kleur te bekennen. Uheeft de keuze: een stem voor een Europa dat naar eenduurzame samenleving streeft en daarnaar handelt of eenstem voor een Europa dat mooie woorden spreekt overduurzame ontwikkeling en de Lissabon-strategie, maarniet de kracht of de durf heeft die te ondersteunen metdaadkracht.

Commissaris Wallström, communicatie is uw nieuwehoofdtaak in de Europese Commissie. U heeft gezegd

van plan te zijn de boodschap van duurzameontwikkeling te blijven uitdragen en te blijven promoten.Daarin steun ik u van harte en daarin wens ik u veelsucces toe. Ik hoop dat u na de stemming over deverpakkingsrichtlijn morgen de pers erop kunt wijzendat Europa niet alleen spreekt over duurzaamheid, maarer ook naar handelt.

2-114

Ayuso González (PPE-DE), en nombre del Grupo. Señor Presidente, Señorías, señora Comisaria, estapropuesta que nos ha presentado la Comisión es,simplemente, para establecer los plazos de cumplimientopor parte de los nuevos Estados miembros de losobjetivos de la directiva que aprobamos el año pasado.

Durante la tramitación de la modificación de la Directivade envases, de la que también fue ponente la señoraCorbey, se planteó el problema de qué hacer con losnuevos Estados miembros que no estaban incluidos enlos objetivos de la Directiva.

Los nuevos Estados miembros ya negociaron con laComisión unos períodos transitorios más o menoslargos, según las condiciones en que estaban ellos parapoder cumplir o no estos objetivos, porque, realmente,para muchos países estos objetivos son muy ambiciososy nada fáciles de cumplir. Estos plazos se recogieron enel Considerando 6 de la modificación de la directiva quese hizo el año pasado.

Estoy de acuerdo con el informe tal y como ha sidoaprobado en la Comisión de Medio Ambiente, SaludPública y Seguridad Alimentaria, y en su enmienda 3 laponente ha sustituido la fecha que proponía la Comisión,una misma fecha para todos que, como usted bien sabe,es el año 2012, por la que ya habían negociado losEstados miembros. Que no coinciden pero, realmente,cada Estado miembro tiene sus peculiaridades, susproblemas y sabe perfectamente cuándo puede o nocumplir estos objetivos. De nada nos vale hacer unalegislación que es imposible de cumplir. Esta propuestaera para acoger a los Estados miembros en los objetivosde la Directiva de envases.

Por ese motivo, estoy en contra de la nueva enmienda 4que pretende introducir un nuevo considerando sobre elsistema de reutilización, que da la impresión de que sequiere aprovechar algo para meter otra cosa. No es elmomento. No estoy en contra de los sistemas dereutilización, ni nadie puede estar en contra. Pero no esel sitio para poner esta enmienda. Ni es el momento ni ellugar, y más, cuando en el artículo 5 de esta directiva yase permite que los Estados miembros puedan impulsarlos métodos de reutilización siempre que estén deacuerdo con los Tratados.

Considero prematuro abrir este debate cuando en juniode 2005 la Comisión deberá presentar al Parlamento y alConsejo un informe sobre la aplicación de la directiva,su impacto en el medio ambiente y el funcionamientodel mercado exterior. Este informe deberá tratar, entreotros temas, del fomento de la reutilización y, en

16-11-2004 45

particular, de la comparación de los costes y beneficiosde la reutilización y el reciclado.

Hasta el momento no se han encontrado razones nimedioambientales ni económicas para favorecer un tipode envase sobre otro. Lo más importante que yo queríadecir es que estoy en contra de la enmienda 4.

2-115

Drčar Murko (v imenu skupine). Gospodpredsedujoči, kolegi. Cilji na področju ravnanja zodpadki, h katerim so se zavezale nove drave članicemed pristopnimi pogajanji, za večino niso preprosti. Tovelja tudi za različne vrste odpadne embalae, po direkti-vi Evropske unije iz leta 1994.Vse nove drave članice so zaprosile za odobritevprehodnih obdobij. Kot vemo, je bila med pristopnimipogajanji direktiva novelirana, standardi ravnanja zodpadki pa so se e povečali.Da bi ostali na področju tega, kar je mogoče uresničiti,je bilo logično, da so morale nove drave dobiti nova,podaljana prehodna obdobja. Danes govorimo prav oteh obdobjih.Nove drave zdaj vzpostavljajo svoje sisteme ravnanja zodpadno embalao in prihodnja tri leta bodo v tempogledu ključna. Sistemi naj bi bili visoki, ekolokistandardi pa tudi uresničljivi in ekonomsko sprejemljivi.Nove drave pri tem zdruujejo svoje dosedanje izkunjein se v okviru zakonodajnih monosti zgledujejo poizkunjah drugih. Tako po "primerih najbolje prakse",ki jih elijo ponoviti, kot tudi po neuspelih eksperi-mentih, ki se jim elijo izogniti.V vsakem primeru bodo poskuale povezati različnemetode in vplivati na proizvajalce, da bi bil embalanimaterial funkcionalen, hkrati pa varen in sprejemljiv zapotronike.Metoda ponovne uporabe embalae, ki jo omenja člen 5prvotne direktive, je ena od metod, ki jo elimoupotevati. Moja drava, to je Slovenija, denimo podpirametodo ponovne uporabe, ko je ta smiselna, tako izokoljskega kot ekonomskega staliča.Vendar pa ni bilo mogoče prezreti, da je bila razlagačlena 5 prvotne direktive predmet tevilnih pritob intudi sodnih postopkov.Tako Parlament kot Svet sta pozvala Komisijo, najpripravi poročilo, katerega smo ga danes sliali, ki bopreverilo različne vidike vplivov na okolje in notranjitrg.V nai politični skupini smo zadovoljni s podaljanimiroki, ki jih za nove drave vzpostavlja predlog revidiranedirektive. Ob upotevanju vseh elementov pa smo prilido sklepa, da je smiselno, če se besedilo omeji na svojprvotni namen in vanj ne vključujemo ničesar, kar je ev procesu razvoja oziroma je e predmet strokovnihanaliz in potekajočega postopka na Evropskem sodiču.Hvala.

2-116

Lucas (Verts/ALE), on behalf of the Group. MrPresident, I should like to add my thanks to Commis-sioner Wallström for all her work as EnvironmentCommissioner. I know we are going to miss her verymuch and would like to extend our thanks to her. Ishould also like to thank Mrs Corbey for her report. This

is a very important subject, which makes a realdifference to our environment. It is an issue thatconstituents feel extremely strongly about.

There are two key issues in Mrs Corbey's report. Firstlythe dates. I understand very well why the rapporteur isproposing slightly later dates than the Commission. OurGroup, the Verts/ALE, can certainly go along with that,with the proviso that we believe we need to be verycareful that these compliance time gaps between olderand newer Member States begin to start closingafterwards. As we have seen before, these gaps have insome cases actually got wider over time, so we need tomake sure that over time they begin to close. Onbalance, however, we can accept the amendment.

Another key issue is Amendment 4, to which many otherspeakers have referred. We have great sympathy withwhat Mrs Corbey is trying to achieve with thisamendment. The rapporteur is trying to safeguard Dutchnational provisions on re-usable packaging. I wouldpoint out that at first reading, Green amendments wereaimed specifically at enabling national re-use schemes toproceed, but on that occasion we unfortunately did notsecure a big enough majority to get that through.

The Greens strongly support re-use as an important wayto reduce the environmental impact of packaging, but weshare the reservations expressed by others about tryingto tackle that in this directive by amending a recital. Weappreciate the motivation, but we do not think this is theright place to do that. We are not sure anyway how anamendment will support the Dutch case, since it does notamend the current legislation. We are not convinced thatthis recital would have an impact on the Netherlands,since this legislation appears to be much more applicableto the ten new Member States than to the 'old' MemberStates. Even if it were applicable, I am not sure howmuch further forward it would take us. The maindifference between what we already have in Directive94/62/EC on re-use and what the rapporteur would liketo introduce is a slight reinforcement of the level ofencouragement to re-use. But given that the amendmentis just to a recital, I do not see how it really strengthensthe existing legal possibility.

I strongly urge that we use all our efforts to promote re-use over recycling and recovery when we come to thefull review of the packaging directive next year. I lookforward to a strong Commission proposal next summer.That will be the right time to ensure that we give re-usethe priority it deserves.

2-117

de Brún (GUE/NGL), on behalf of the Group. - (Thespeaker spoke in Irish)...The revised packaging andpackaging waste directive marks another important steptowards strategies and policies that focus on wasteminimisation, recovery, reuse and recycling. In both theNorth and South of Ireland, similar directives are havinga positive impact and changing both governmentpractice and public mindsets with respect to domesticand commercial waste management. Much work remains

46 16-11-2004

to be done, but we now have many good examples tolearn from, including innovative ideas on reuse.

I also wish to stress the importance of deadlines forensuring that Member States reach the targets agreed bythe EU, and this includes deadlines for the newestMember States. At local government level in Ireland wehave directives which show that recycling brings with itthe notion of local authorities, from Belfast to Dublin,actively pursuing new forms of waste management,while at the same time government departments havebeen moved to concentrate their efforts as a result ofthese directives.

It is important, however, that those countries whichjoined the European Union in June 2004 are treatedfairly. I therefore support Mrs Corbey and theCommittee on the Environment, Public Health and FoodSafety with respect to the amendments on this point.This is not about delay: it is about clarity, effectivenessand fairness. We need deadlines, but we also need clarityand fairness for all. On that basis the original agreementon dates should stand. It is also extremely important forus to ensure that countries can pursue policies on reuseand that we do not close down any possibilities in thisrespect.

(The speaker spoke in Irish)

2-118

Allister (NI). Mr President, in noting the delay in theimplementation of the packaging waste directive that theaccession states are to be allowed, I wish to say that,from our experience in Northern Ireland, they arefortunate to escape its requirements for several years.Under this directive, draconian regulations have beenimposed on Northern Ireland. We now have theludicrous requirement that a DIY retailer, for example,who buys in packaged goods and sells them on, isrequired to make returns detailing the net weight of thepackaging of all such goods passing through hisbusiness, even though he never opens or discards any ofthe packaging. He is then liable to what amounts to awaste tax for merely handling the goods and, in addition,has to waste time and effort on trying to assess theweight of the packaging. I am therefore glad that theaccession states are being spared this lunacy.

I note with some surprise that the Republic of Ireland,although a long-established EU Member State, has alsobeen permitted to defer full compliance until thebeginning of 2012. Sadly, the United Kingdom did notseek equal derogation, so we are beset with the foolishregulations I have described.

I am also somewhat surprised that the last speaker seemsignorant of the fact that there are different provisions inthe Republic of Ireland and that it has been granted anextension and deferment until the end of 2011. Perhapsif she concentrated more on the documents, rather thanspeaking in a language that no one cares to understand,she might not have made such a fundamental mistake.

2-119

Jackson (PPE-DE). Mr President, to follow on fromwhat my two colleagues have just said, I took part in theadoption of this directive with Mrs Corbey and others.We were certainly under the impression that the datesmentioned in the preamble to the directive, as it wasfinally adopted, were the dates that would apply to theaccession states. I therefore have some questions for theCommissioner. It is very nice to see her here for whatmust be one of her last debates as EnvironmentCommissioner.

First of all, have the accession states requested theseearlier dates? They are embarrassingly close to the Irishdates. Ireland, as we know, has been looking at thislegislation for many years and has done absolutelynothing about it. Were these earlier dates that theCommission is proposing actually requested by the newMember States? If not, on what basis have they beendecided?

Second, are they based on any cost impact assessment?There must be some additional cost between the datesthat the new Member States wanted and the dates theCommission is proposing.

I believe that these dates show the way in which theCommission operates. It sees much of this legislation asaspirational. As my colleague Mr Allister has said, wesee it as legal texts that are put into operation. If we arenot very careful, we will find a mass of used packagingbeing exported from the European Union to China andelsewhere in order to escape this situation. So could weplease have those answers from the Commission?

2-120

Doyle (PPE-DE). Mr President, I have been provokedby several speakers but I will not be deterred from whatI have to say.

The key to achieving our ambitions in the area of therecycling and recovery of packaging waste is settingattainable targets based on realistic expectations. Thereis no point in setting a deadline that cannot be achievedand triggering the inevitable infringement procedures.As Mrs Corbey rightly points out in her report and Ithank her for her work it is only fair and equitable thatthe same approach be taken with regard to ourcolleagues in the new Member States, as was indicted tothem during the accession negotiations.

Shifting the finishing line and imposing onerous timeconstraints at this stage would display a lack of goodfaith on our part as it unscrambles the hard-won result ofthe final trialogue on the revised directive earlier thisyear, as outlined in recital 6 to that directive, which Iunderstood to list, for each new Member State, the daterelating to the derogation.

Our debate should focus not on argument abouttimetables, but on the reduction of the overall level ofpackaging and packaging waste through recycling andrecovery. I would like to emphasise that the derogationsin question are from the timetable and not from the

16-11-2004 47

substantive targets. This is an important distinctionwhich demonstrates that we are not supporting ashirking of responsibilities.

In advance of the Commission's report on theimplementation of the original directive next June, I canreport that a sensible policy of realistic derogation hasalready proved a success in my own country, and I hopeMrs Jackson will take note of what I am about to say.We have a specific problem of demographics, geographyand lack of infrastructure, and no indigenous packagingindustry, with 80% of our packaged goods beingimported. Ireland has no energy recovery or incinerationfacilities so all our targets have to be met throughrecycling alone. However, we have seen the rate ofrecycling of packaging waste increase steadily from93 000 tonnes in 1998 to just over 414 000 tonnes in2003. This represents over 45% of the packaging wasteon the Irish market, all of which would previously havegone to landfill. We have achieved our 2001 target ofrecycling 25% of packaging and we are well on our wayto achieving the 2005 target of a 50% recycling ratethanks to proper, sensible timelines and derogations.

There has been a clear shift in the public mindset inrelation to recycling in Ireland. 61% of adults visit theirlocal Bring Centre at least once a month, as opposed toonly 25% in 1998. Bringing about this change has taken and will continue to take time, effort and investment,a fact that is reflected in the 2011-2012 timetable set inthe revised packaging directive for Greece, Portugal andIreland. I was the author of that particular amendmentand I thank my colleagues for their support. The sametype of derogation and the same argument should applyto our colleagues in the new Member States.

Our quest for better regulation as a Parliament must startwith enforceable legislation. If we are to setunreasonable objectives for recycling and recovery ofpackaging waste which take no account of capacityconstraints, we might just as well get it over with now,book our slot in advance at the ECJ for non-implementation and spare the Commission a waste ofenvelopes on letters of formal notice and reasonedopinions under the infringement procedure laid down inArticle 226 of the Treaty.

I would like to put on record my disappointment at MrAllister's comment on Mrs de Brún speaking a language'no one cares to understand'. It may well not be the timeor place to speak in Irish, but I do not think thatderogatory and disparaging remarks about anyone'slanguage, albeit a minority language, have any place inthis House and I take exception to them.

2-121

Korhola (PPE-DE). Arvoisa puhemies, haluanensinnäkin kiittää esittelijää mittavasta työstä tässätärkeässä ja mielipiteitä herättävässä pakkausjätedirekti-ivissä. Euroopan laajennuttua olemme nyt tilanteessa,jossa yhtenäisen lainsäädännön saavuttamiseksi asetetutyhteiset tavoitteet ovat erityisen tiukat juuri uusillejäsenvaltioille, ehkä tiukemmat kuin koskaan ennen.

Tässä mielessä ehdotus pakkausjätedirektiiviksi ei olepoikkeuksellinen.

Tämän direktiivin voimaan saattamisen lähtökohtanatulee olla mahdollisimman hyvin toimiviensisämarkkinoiden takaaminen ilman riskiä vääristymiin.Tämä on helpommin sanottu kuin tehty. Sisämarkkina-alue on laajentunut, samoin maiden lähtötasoissa onkenties enemmän eroja kuin koskaan aiemmin. Komis-sion ehdotus pakkausjätedirektiiviin perustuviahyödyntämis- ja kierrätystavoitteita koskevan yhteisentakarajan asettamiseksi joulukuuhun 2012 uusillejäsenmaille on perusteltavissa, jotta markkinat saataisiinyhteneväisiksi mahdollisimman pian.

Ehdotus ei kuitenkaan ole ongelmaton. Sen tähdenvoikin olla järkevää olla kauaskatseinen ja takarajaaasetettaessa ottaa paremmin huomioon uusien maidenlähtötasot. Näin vältämme asetettujen ehtojen rikkomi-sesta aiheutuvat mahdolliset kiusalliset jälkiseuraukset jaasetamme samalla Euroopan yhtenäisyyden nytkäsittelyssä olevien markkinoiden yhtenäisyyden edelle.

Direktiivin käsittelyn yhteydessä on ollut paljon puhettamyös pakkausjätteen kierrätyksestä ja uudelleenkäytöstä.Uudelleenkäytön ekologista arvoa ei tule kiistää. Onkuitenkin huomattava, että uudelleen käytettävienpakkausten ympäristöystävällisyys ei ole aina suoraanperusteltavissa. Lyhyillä kuljetusmatkoilla ne varmasti-kin ovat parempia, mutta ongelmia syntyy silloin, kunkullakin tuottajalla on omat pakkauksensa ja sisäisetvälimatkat Euroopan markkinoilla ovat pitkiä. Hyväesimerkki on eteläisten maiden hedelmien kuljettaminenPohjoismaihin, jolloin uudelleen käytettävien pakkaus-ten takaisinkuljetus ei lainkaan edistäisi kestävääkehitystä. Esimerkiksi pahvilaatikot kerätään jakierrätetään usein paikallisesti, joten suuri määrä turhiakuljetuksia jää pois. Uudelleenkäytettävien pakkaustensuosiminen ympäristöstä välittämättä olisi tekopyhääekologiaa. Nyt käsiteltävän mietinnön kannalta onkinhyvä, että direktiivin yhtenäistä soveltamistavoitetta eiturhaan vaaranneta epämääräisillä kansallisilla pakkaus-ten uudelleenkäyttöjärjestelmillä.

2-122

Presidente. Prima di dare la parola al commissarioWallström, ricordo ai colleghi che hanno intesoavvalersi di lingue non ufficiali dell'Unione che questaistituzione rispetta profondamente la loro decisione, fanel contempo presente per decisione dell'Ufficio dipresidenza dello scorso 27 ottobre che gli interventi resiin queste lingue non possono essere tradotti econseguentemente non possono essere verbalizzati.Quindi è una libera scelta da parte dei deputati diavvalesri di lingue minoritarie dell'Unione e nello stessotempo ricordiamo che nella Costituzione abbiamo scrittounitas in diveritas, l'unità nella diversità.

2-123

Wallström, Commission. Mr President, honourableMembers, I am sure you will appreciate it if I refrainfrom speaking northern Swedish - if there is such athing.

48 16-11-2004

Firstly, Mrs Jackson, as you know, our proposalsuggests a deadline of 31 December 2012 for all the newMember States. The amendment confirms the deadlinefor seven new Member States, but allows a deadline of2013 for Malta, 2014 for Poland and 2015 for Latvia. Inreply to your question, this reflects the wishes the newMember States expressed to the Commission in theconsultation round in spring 2003. A recital in therevised directive states that the deadline to be agreedshould not be later than those dates. It is also myunderstanding that no agreement was reached inconciliation on a particular date. The recital indicatedspecifically that the decision should be taken on thebasis of requests from the acceding states forderogations, which would not in principle extend beyondthe dates mentioned. So there is nothing to suggest thatthe date could not be earlier. The Commission considersthat this matter should be debated openly, treating allcountries equally. We have no problem in acceptingdifferentiated dates, if that is what Parliament and theCouncil want.

On the costs, we do not anticipate any significantchange. There will be no dramatic change in costs if thedates are changed.

Thank you for this important debate and your valuablecooperation on environmental issues. I hope we willmeet again soon.

2-124

Presidente. Dichiaro chiusa la discussione.

La votazione si svolgerà mercoledì alle ore 12.30.

2-125

12 - Situazione a Cuba

2-126

Presidente. L'ordine del giorno reca la dichiarazionedella Commissione sulla situazione a Cuba.

2-127

Nielson, Commission. Mr President, the EuropeanUnion's relations with Cuba are governed by thecommon position originally adopted by the Council in1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly.The common position advocates a policy of constructiveengagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue withgovernment and civil society with the objective ofencouraging 'a process of transition to pluralistdemocracy and respect for human rights andfundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable econo-mic recovery and improvement in the living standards ofthe Cuban people'. This constructive engagement hasremained our position.

Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in2003, the Union took a series of political measures. InJune 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-levelvisits to reduce the profile of Member States'participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban membersof the peaceful opposition to their national day

celebrations alongside government representatives andto re-evaluate the common position ahead of time.

The most recent re-evaluation of the common position inJune this year re-affirmed the policy of constructiveengagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba.The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance ofpolitical dialogue with the Cuban authorities and hasindicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue whenconditions permit. The European Commission deploresthe Cuban Government's decision to freeze relationswith all embassies of EU Member States that haveinvited dissidents to their national days and with theCommission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusalof direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cubandecisions which impede our development cooperationactivities, the Commission has continued funding actionsby NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO.

In October 2004 the Commission took a decision toprovide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to themost vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charliein Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarianassistance in this context because we would deliverhumanitarian assistance in any case, without anypolitical considerations.

The decision by the Cuban Government to releasecertain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gestureto an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrantfull revocation of the measures decided by the Councilin June last year. The aim continues to be the release ofall political prisoners in Cuba.

The June measures are currently being reviewed by theCouncil. The European Council wishes to stress that theresult of this review has to be consistent with the overallaims of the common position and the human rightspolicy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this couldprovide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EUpolicy towards Cuba, which would be conducive toattaining the objectives of the common position.

Some people have asked whether the delegation inHavana can really function meaningfully in the presentcircumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegationin Havana is essential to carry out the tasks thatParliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Ourpresence in Cuba is more important today than ever. Themain tasks of the delegation are not only to assist withthe implementation of eight programmes and projects,but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cubanauthorities and civil society, to monitor human rightsissues and to protect the trade and investment interests ofMember States. This is a heavy, important, and some-times difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if wewish to promote political and economic improvements inCuba.

All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in ourrelations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lostopportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of theCotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what

16-11-2004 49

happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. Istill find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreementa very meaningful framework for our relations. Itrepresents the basic structure of how we would like toorganise and govern north-south relations. Cubanparticipation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would besubject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement.

I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, butthat also means an open mind inside Cuba.

2-128

Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE-DE), en nombre delGrupo. Señor Presidente, pocos diputados de esteParlamento se habrán esforzado tanto en preservar lacapacidad de diálogo con las autoridades del régimen ycon el pueblo cubano como yo mismo, en mi época depresidente de la comisión competente de este Parlamentopara las relaciones con ese país. Pero el diálogo quenosotros defendemos, en el que creemos y que practi-camos, señor Presidente, no ha sido dinamitado porningún Gobierno de la Unión Europea, ni por OsvaldoPayá, ni por Elisardo Sánchez, ni por Marta BeatrizRoque, sino por la política de fusilamientos, la detenciónde periodistas independientes -como Raúl Rivero, que enestos momentos se está pudriendo en cárceles cubanas,como otros- y la política de detención de pacíficosdisidentes y de militantes de los derechos humanos.

Nuestro Parlamento no puede permanecer sordo, mudo yciego ante estos hechos. La posición común del Consejo,que algunos pretenden infructuosamente modificar -ahítenemos los resultados del cotejo del día de hoy, que sehan saldado con un estrepitoso fracaso para estas tesis dela modificación- solicitando un nuevo informe de losembajadores en La Habana, ha servido, según lo expresaMario Vargas Llosa en un artículo publicado reciente-mente en el diario "El País", para enviar un mensajeclaro a los millones de cubanos que no pueden protestar,votar ni escapar, de que no están solos, de que no hansido abandonados y de que las democracias occidentalesestán con ellos.

¿Qué nos proponen algunos Grupos políticos de esteParlamento en su Resolución, donde ni siquiera semenciona la petición de libertad a los presos políticos?:¿cooperar y dialogar con los verdugos y escarnecer a lasvíctimas?, ¿ser complacientes con los que los oprimen?,¿buscar una política de apaciguamiento y amistad con latiranía?

Señor Presidente, decía Andrei Sajarov, que nos dejó unlegado de integridad moral y un mandato bastantenotable de coexistencia pacífica entre los pueblos, que amenudo las voces que cuentan son las que no se oyen.Señor Presidente, la ausencia forzada en la ceremonia deentrega del Premio Sajarov el año pasado de uno de susmás honrosos galardonados, Osvaldo Payá, constituye elargumento más elocuente de que este Parlamento tieneque prestar su voz a los que, en Cuba y fuera de ella,luchan por su libertad y su dignidad, y que esteParlamento, señor Presidente, tiene que ser, como hasta

ahora, muy firme en la exigencia ineludible de lalibertad.

2-129

Martínez Martínez (PSE), en nombre del Grupo. Señor Presidente, la Unión Europea, en su relación conCuba, como con cualquier otro país del mundo y, enparticular, del mundo en desarrollo, debe perseguir dosobjetivos: uno, contribuir a que les vaya mejor a loscubanos y a las cubanas en todos los sentidos, tambiénen lo que se refiere a las libertades y los derechos huma-nos, aspectos éstos en los que apreciamos seriascarencias, y otro, defender los intereses europeos dedistinto tipo que existan en Cuba.

Ha habido dos características en la política seguida porla Unión Europea con Cuba en los últimos años que hanhecho de aquel país un caso aparte, una excepción, todoello dentro de una dinámica injustificable y que nuncajustificaron los inspiradores de dicha política. Así, contodos los países del mundo, el diálogo y la cooperaciónde la Unión Europea comprenden un capítulo sobre lasituación de los derechos humanos. Es un capítulo de lamayor importancia, pero hay otros. Sólo con Cuba elcapítulo de los derechos humanos se convierte enexclusivo, ocultando cualquier otro de los que deberíanexistir en las relaciones con ese país.

Por otra parte, con todos los países del mundo, eldiálogo y la cooperación de la Unión Europea aspiran asuperar insuficiencias en el terreno de los derechoshumanos. Sólo en el caso de Cuba esas insuficiencias enlos derechos humanos se convierten en cuestión previaque impide diálogo y cooperación.

A estas alturas es obligado hacer una evaluación objetivade esa política, que se ha saldado con un rotundo fracasoen lo que se refiere a sus resultados. Así, es objeti-vamente contrastable que con dicha política no se haproducido ni el más mínimo progreso en lo que respectaa las libertades, ni a los derechos humanos en Cuba.

Y, en otro orden de cosas, esa política ha sido desastrosapara los intereses europeos en Cuba y es denunciada porigual por empresarios, organizaciones no gubernamen-tales, artistas, religiosos, etc. Incluso ha sido desastrosapara el desempeño normal de la actividad de nuestrosrepresentantes diplomáticos en aquel país.

Pero, además, esta política ha puesto en evidencia untotal distanciamiento de nuestras sociedades europeascon sus respectivos Gobiernos nacionales y con la propiaUnión Europea, a cuyas orientaciones no han hecho elmenor caso. De ese modo, distintas iniciativas ignoradasy hasta boicoteadas por instancias oficiales han atraídouna gran participación de artistas, autores, empresarios ociudadanos de nuestros países. Me refiero, por ejemplo,a la bienal de arte, la feria del libro, el festival de ballet ola feria de muestras de La Habana.

El Vicepresidente del Partido Conservador del ReinoUnido, Michael Ancram, estaba estos días en Cubasiguiendo un programa de contactos al más alto nivel. A

50 16-11-2004

él, sin duda, se refería un distinguido colega aquí, que ellunes hablaba de los visitantes a la isla, sin duda a sucorreligionario se refería él en aquel momento con parti-cular agudeza.

Por último, en nuestra opinión, esta política ha costado aEuropa credibilidad en Cuba y en el conjunto deAmérica Latina, al hacernos aparecer comoacompañamiento de las estrategias norteamericanas en laregión.

Nuestra conclusión, tras estas valoraciones, es que lapolítica seguida hasta la fecha por la Unión Europearespecto a Cuba, y que se fundamenta en la posicióncomún y en las medidas, debe ser revisada, racionalizaday puesta al día. Estamos en línea con lo que variosGobiernos de los Estados miembros están planteandoante el propio Consejo Europeo. Insistimos por lodemás, con contundencia, en que el cambio de políticaque preconizamos no sólo no debe suponer renunciaalguna a nuestros objetivos -expuestos al principio de miintervención-, sino que debe ratificarlos y aspirar acontribuir a su realización más eficazmente de lo que hasido el caso hasta la fecha.

Estamos convencidos de que el progreso queperseguimos para los cubanos y para las cubanas y paralos intereses europeos en Cuba se conseguirá másfácilmente mediante el diálogo y una cooperaciónamplios, rigurosos, críticos en todo lo que parezcajustificado, pero sin ninguna hostilidad ni prejuicioprevios. Con ello, además, estaremos actuando respectoa aquel país dentro de la misma lógica con que lohacemos con China, Vietnam, Irán, Israel, Siria, Libia,Guinea Ecuatorial, Sudán o incluso con los EstadosUnidos y con otras cuantas docenas de países en los quedetectamos deficiencias muy serias, en muchos casosbastante más serias que en Cuba, en cuestión delibertades, de derechos humanos y de funcionamientodel Estado de Derecho, pero con los que dialogamos ycooperamos precisamente para ir mejorando cosas queno nos gustan.

Señor Presidente, eso es lo que perseguimos con laresolución presentada por nuestro Grupo y a la que sehan sumado otros de la Cámara.

2-130

Malmström (ALDE) för gruppen. Tack herr talman,herr kommissionär, kära kollegor i denna sena timme!För ganska precis två år sedan gav vi den kubanskedemokratiaktivisten Oswaldo Payá vårt Sacharovpris.Det var den liberala gruppen som hade föreslagit honomför detta pris och han fick det för sin modiga kamp fördemokrati och rättvisa på Kuba. Han mottog det som enrepresentant för alla kubaner från olika partigrupper,kristdemokrater, liberaler, socialdemokrater och andrasom med fredliga medel försöker bana väg för ett nyttKuba utan Castro, vare sig han heter Fidel eller Raoul.

Payá och de andra arbetar för ett Kuba där demokrati,mänskliga rättigheter, pluralism, frihet och rättvisa finnsför alla. Det var inte enkelt att få hit Oswaldo Payá.

Flera gånger försökte den kubanska regimen hindrahonom från att komma, men det lyckades till slut. Tyvärrhar vi inte lyckats få honom att komma tillbaka.

Sedan Oswaldo Payá fick sitt pris har situationen påKuba försämrats. Ett åttiotal demokratiaktivisterarresterades och dömdes efter farsartade rättegångar tillmycket långa fängelsestraff. De sitter nu utspridda överön. De mår dåligt. Det är hemska villkor och de fårmycket sällan träffa sina familjer. Många av dem ärsjuka.

Jag har träffat många av dessa människor. De ärfantastiska, modiga personer som på fredlig väg villupprätta mänsklig värdighet och demokrati för sig självaoch sina landsmän. Men för Castro, diktatorn sommånga i Europa fortfarande romantiserar på ett patetisktsätt, är dessa personer ett livsfarligt hot. Därför skulle detystas, därför har de fängslats. Osvaldo själv är på fri fotoch hans familj trakasseras dagligen.

Situationen på Kuba, en av världens sista kommunistiskadiktaturer, är sämre. Inga framsteg har gjorts sedan rådetskärpte sin så kallade common position. Castro fortsätteratt trilskas. Han tycks vilja isolera landet fullkomligt.Han bojkottar EU och våra medlemsländer precis somkommissionären sa. Flera europeiska parlamentarikerhar nekats inträde i landet, bland annat från mitt landSverige. Just nu diskuterar man om EU ska lätta uppeller ändra sin gemensamma ståndpunkt. Det voremycket olyckligt. Varför ska vi belöna Castro när detinte sker några framsteg vad det gäller mänskligarättigheter? För en gångs skull har EU en konsekventlinje mot en diktatur. Varför ska vi då ändra den?

Oswaldo Payá och de andra dissidenterna vädjar till ossatt stå fast vid de värderingar och den linje vi har. Därförär det viktigt att intensifiera dialogen med dissidenternaoch att stödja en demokratisk övergång så småningom.Vi hedrade Oswaldo Payá och de andra kubanskademokratiaktivisterna här i denna kammare, och det varett långsiktigt åtagande. Vi måste stå upp för demänskliga rättigheterna och med kraft avvisa enförändring av den gemensamma ståndpunkten.Kubanerna har precis som vi rätt till demokrati ochmänskliga rättigheter. Låt oss visa dem vilken sida vistår på.

2-131

Hammerstein Mintz (Verts/ALE), en nombre delGrupo. Señor Presidente, el Grupo Verts/ALE nomatiza su defensa de la libertad de los derechoshumanos. Para nosotros la defensa de todos los derechosde los cubanos es una cuestión clave. Siempre hemospedido la liberación de todos los presos y tambiénpedimos una transición a la democracia de forma clara.

Lo que está en cuestión aquí es cuál es el mejor métodopara empujar a Cuba hacia la democracia; después decuarenta años de embargo, y ahora con las sanciones dela Unión Europea, vemos que este método no es eficaz yque la mejor forma de ayudar a la sociedad cubana no esaislarla, sino tejer unas relaciones cada vez más tupidas

16-11-2004 51

y fuertes con la sociedad civil cubana, ayudar a las ONGen la sociedad. Lo que está en juego aquí es la aperturade la sociedad cubana.

La ayuda a una sociedad que quiere ir hacia lademocracia no se consigue a través del enfrentamientoque sólo busca, con la Resolución del Partido Popular,una ruptura de consecuencias imprevisibles, cuando loque deseamos, como para cualquier parte del mundo, esuna transición pactada, sin violencia y que puedadesembocar en la democracia que todos, y sobre todo elGrupo Verts/ALE, buscamos.

Por eso apoyamos esa Resolución que está a favor de lasociedad cubana y a favor de la democracia.

2-132

Musacchio (GUE/NGL), a nome del gruppo. SignorPresidente, onorevoli colleghi, il nostro rapporto diamicizia con Cuba viene da lontano e continua. Vedete,Cuba rappresenta il tentativo di una piccola isola didecidere della propria esistenza, e di farlo in mododifferente rispetto al grande potere imperiale. A questonoi guardiamo con solidarietà.

Naturalmente, sappiamo anche esprimere, esplicitamentee senza remore, le nostre critiche, come abbiamo fatto efacciamo, ad esempio, rispetto alla pena di morte o adeterminati procedimenti giudiziari. Tuttaviaconsideriamo sbagliato, ingiusto e inaccettabile che cisiano verso Cuba procedimenti punitivi. Cuba subisce dadecenni un blocco economico feroce da partedell'amministrazione statunitense. Francamente non sivede perché l'Europa dovrebbe omologarsi a talicomportamenti. Al contrario, sono proprio le relazioni,gli scambi, il confronto che possono favorire lacomprensione e i miglioramenti.

In America Latina succedono cose importanti, storiche,testimoniate dalle vittorie progressiste in paesi quali ilBrasile, Venezuela, Uruguay. Rispetto alle logiche dellaglobalizzazione liberista e della guerra - oggi abbiamovisto delle immagini terribili - emerge il bisogno diun'altra politica: Cuba fa parte di questa America Latina.A questa America Latina serve il rapporto con l'Europa eall'Europa serve il rapporto con l'America Latina.

Chiediamo la revoca di ogni atto discriminatorio versoCuba, dunque della posizione comune del Consiglio,un'analoga richiesta va rivolta al governonordamericano. Nello stesso tempo chiediamo ilrafforzamento di relazioni libere e feconde.

2-133

Belder (IND/DEM), namens de fractie. Dank u welmijnheer de Voorzitter, de capriolen van Castro zijnonnavolgbaar, letterlijk en figuurlijk, politiek, sociaal-economisch en cultureel. El líder weet niet van wijken.Zijn wil is wet. Vooral de oppositie heeft daar weet van.Het siert de Europese Unie dat ze onafhankelijkeCubaanse geesten wenst te erkennen en te steunen. Ditbeleid staat vandaag echter onder interne druk. Naarverluidt wil met name de Spaanse regering Cubaansedissidenten voortaan in de kou laten staan en Madrid

zoekt daartoe bondgenoten onder de overige lidstaten.Deze treurige ontwikkeling was voor de christelijkevakbondsleider in mijn land, Doekle Terpstra, eenaanleiding om begin deze week een brief te sturen aanhet Nederlands voorzitterschap. Dit schrijven roept deEuropese Unie op geen concessie te doen aan Castro'sdictatuur in ruil voor handelsvoordelen. Van harte schaarik mij achter deze oproep.

Tegelijk vraag ik mij richting Raad en Commissie af:bestaat er enige coördinatie tussen het mensen-rechtenbeleid van de Europese Unie en dat van deVerenigde Staten inzake Castro's Cuba? En zo ja, hoedenken zij dat te versterken ?

Tot slot nog een verzoek richting Commissie. Graag zieik als lid van dit huis een alomvattende evaluatie van desituatie op Cuba, inclusief toekomstscenario's van uwzijde tegemoet. Met een officiële delegatie in Havanamoet dat haalbaar zijn.

Mijnheer de Voorzitter, graag sluit ik af met de oproepvan Oswaldo José Payá Sardiñas en dankzij collegaRibeiro e Castro heb ik zojuist de brief gelezen diegericht is aan de Voorzitter van dit huis; deze komt eropneer dat alle regeringen, regionale en internationaleassociaties, respectievelijk instellingen, allereerst amnes-tie moeten eisen voor de politieke gevangenen indien zijwerkelijk normale betrekkingen met Cuba wensen aan tegaan. Er mag vooral geen relatie worden aangegaan diesamengaat met de schending van de rechten van alleCubanen. Ik dank u.

2-134

Battilocchio (NI). Signor presidente, parlo inrappresentanza del nuovo PSI. Il 5 giugno 2003, ilConsiglio ha deciso all'unanimità sanzioni politichecontro il regime cubano, a seguito dell'incriminazione di75 dissidenti e della condanna a morte di tre cittadini chetentavano di fuggire negli USA.

Il fatto purtroppo si inserisce in un quadro generale dicontinue e ripetute violazioni e negazione delle libertàfondamentali a Cuba, come confermato anche di recentedal COLAT. Il regime di Fidel, in forte difficoltà aseguito di crescenti pressioni interne ed internazionali,diviene sempre più opprimente e repressivo, inparticolare nei confronti delle nuove generazioni, chesognano un futuro di libertà, vera democrazia e sviluppo,un orizzonte nuovo ed aperto, incompatibile con l'attualeestablishment.

L'Europa prosegua, dunque, la ferma strada intrapresacon un'attenzione particolare, tuttavia, onde evitare inogni modo ulteriori risvolti negativi per la popolazione,al fine di gettare le basi per un proficuo e rinnovatodialogo senza risentimenti tra il popolo cubano el'Europa nel dopo Castro: amici di Cuba, amici deicubani, nemici di tutti i dittatori.

2-135

Ribeiro e Castro (PPE-DE). Señor Presidente, haypor ahí unas maniobras de Gobiernos y diputadosdifíciles de entender, por dos razones: primero, porque

52 16-11-2004

no son siempre claras y huelen muchas veces acomplicidad. Segundo, porque son maniobras queconfrontan las demandas insistentes, reiteradas,dramáticas, de aquellos que luchan pacíficamente y quesufren en Cuba.

Son maniobras asombrosas y tan propias de un deseo detraición a nuestro Premio Sajarov 2002, que me recordóun poema de una gran señora de la poesía portuguesa,Sofia de Melo Breyner, que falleció hace algunassemanas: "Llanto por el día de hoy". "Nunca lloraremoslos suficiente cuando vemos el gesto creativo serbloqueado. Nunca lloraremos lo suficiente cuandovemos que el que se atreve a luchar es destruido pordesprecios, por insidias, por venenos, y por otrasmaneras que sabemos tan sabias, tan sutiles y tanexpertas que ni siquiera pueden ser bien descritas".

Al referirnos a Cuba y al régimen cubano, hoy y mañanatenemos que preguntarnos: ¿qué Parlamento es éste, unParlamento de la libertad o un Parlamento de larepresión, un Parlamento ciudadano o un Parlamento deltirano? A esto tendremos que contestar.

No hablamos por nosotros, sino en nombre de genteconcreta que lucha y sufre por la libertad y lademocracia. Ésta no es una cuestión partidista; es unacuestión humana y política fundamental para gente deverdad, que allá en Cuba, donde duele, nos mira y nosescucha: Bárbaro Sevilla García, de 22 años, ejecutado;Lorenzo Copello Castillo, de 30 años, ejecutado; JorgeLuis Martínez Izak, de 40 años, ejecutado; VíctorRolando Arroyo Carmona, condenado a 26 años decárcel; Miguel Galbán Gutiérrez, condenado a 26 añosde cárcel; Jorge Vero Castañeda, condenado a 20 añosde cárcel; Pablo Pacheco Ávila, condenado a 20 años decárcel. Señor Presidente, no hay tiempo ahora para leertodos los nombres de las decenas de víctimas del trágicomarzo del años 2003, y de sus familias, amigos ycompañeros. Son tantos que no hay tiempo.

¿Qué quiere decir eso de no tener tiempo paranombrarlos a todos? Quiere decir que no es el momentode cambiar nuestra política europea, sino de que FidelCastro y el régimen cubano cambien la suya. Es eso lonecesario. Primero Amnistía, después diálogo.

2-136

Μπεγλίτης (PSE). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η πρωτοβουλίαγια την υιοθέτηση του ψηφίσµατος από την Ολοµέλειατου Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, που είναι µιαπρωτοβουλία της Σοσιαλιστικής Οµάδας, έρχεται σε µιαιδιαίτερα κρίσιµη περίοδο για τις σχέσεις τηςΕυρωπαϊκής Ένωσης µε την Κούβα, για τον κουβανικόλαό και για το µέλλον της χώρας. Θα πρόσθετα µάλιστακαι για τη συλλογική µας αξιοπιστία ως θεσµικά όργανατης Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Η Κούβα υφίσταται για πολλά χρόνια την απαράδεκτη,µονοµερή και εκδικητική πολιτική της αποµόνωσης, τονεµπορικό και οικονοµικό αποκλεισµό των ΗνωµένωνΠολιτειών, που έχει οδηγήσει τον κουβανικό λαό στηφτώχεια και το καθεστώς στη σκλήρυνση. ∆υστυχώς,

αυτή την αδιέξοδη πολιτική, η οποία χαρακτηρίζεταιαπό την επιλεκτική ευαισθησία στο θέµα τωνανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτων και των δηµοκρατικώνελευθεριών, ακολούθησε και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση µετις αποφάσεις της για την επιβολή κυρώσεων και για τοπάγωµα των επαφών και του διαλόγου. Το αποτέλεσµαήταν ιδιαίτερα αρνητικό σε όλα τα επίπεδα. Οεπιδιωκόµενος σκοπός δεν επιτεύχθηκε, αφού η ίδια ηευρωπαϊκή κοινή γνώµη, οι Μη Κυβερνητικοί Οργα-νισµοί, και επιχειρηµατικοί και πολιτιστικοί φορείςαγνόησαν την επίσηµη πολιτική της ΕυρωπαϊκήςΈνωσης συνεχίζοντας τις επαφές και τη συνεργασία µετη κουβανική κοινωνία.

Πρέπει να είµαστε ειλικρινείς. Η κατάσταση τωνανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτων, του κράτους δικαίου, τωνδηµοκρατικών ελευθεριών στην Κούβα δεν είναι καλή.∆εν αποτελεί όµως, όπως έχει αποδείξει η διεθνήςεµπειρία, αξιόπιστη και αποτελεσµατική πολιτική οαποκλεισµός και η αποµόνωση. Όπου ακολουθήθηκεαυτή η πολιτική, τελικά την πλήρωσε ο λαός.

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και ιδιαίτερα το ΣυµβούλιοΥπουργών οφείλει να επανεξετάσει ριζικά την αδιέξοδηστάση της και να προχωρήσει θαρραλέα στην άµεσηάρση των κυρώσεων και του παγώµατος των σχέσεωνµε την Κούβα. Να προχωρήσει στη θεσµοθέτηση τουπολιτικού διαλόγου, ως διαδικασία προόδου τωνσχέσεων και ως διαδικασία ελέγχου της συµπεριφοράςτων κουβανικών αρχών. Να προχωρήσει στην έναρξηδιαπραγµατεύσεων για τη σύναψη συµφωνίαςσυνεργασίας. Η Κούβα είναι άλλωστε η µόνη χώρα στηΛατινική Αµερική µε την οποία η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωσηδεν έχει ανάλογη συµφωνία. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπήοφείλει επίσης να ενισχύσει τη χρηµατοδότηση τωνπρογραµµάτων στους τοµείς της ανθρωπιστικήςβοήθειας και των υποδοµών. Οι πρόσφατες φυσικέςκαταστροφές έχουν δηµιουργήσει σοβαρά προβλήµαταστον κουβανικό λαό.

Τέλος, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση θα πρέπει να προχωρήσειάµεσα στην απόφασή της για την ένταξη της Κούβαςστη συµφωνία της Κοτουνού στο πλαίσιο των σχέσεωνµε τις χώρες Αφρικής, Καραϊβικής και Ειρηνικού. Οκουβανικός λαός δεν µπορεί να υφίσταται µια διπλήτιµωρία, τόσο από τις Ηνωµένες Πολιτείες όσο και απότην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Αν ο αγώνας για την υπεράσπι-ση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωµάτων και την οικοδόµησηµιας δηµοκρατικής κοινωνίας στην Κούβα, είναιπράγµατι ειλικρινής και όχι προσχηµατικός, τότε ηΕυρωπαϊκή Ένωση οφείλει να ακούσει τη φωνή τηςευρωπαϊκής κοινής γνώµης, των λαών µας και ναπροχωρήσει στην άρση των κυρώσεων και στηνανάπτυξη των σχέσεων και των επαφών µε την Κούβα.

2-137

Guardans Cambó (ALDE). Señor Presidente, haydos hechos que son ciertos: Cuba no tiene libertadpolítica, como tampoco la tenía España cuando, bajo elrégimen de Franco, y con las cárceles llenas de presospolíticos, firmó un acuerdo comercial espectacular conla Unión Europea. Eso es un hecho cierto. Otro hechocierto es que la Unión Europea mantiene una posición

16-11-2004 53

común desde 1996 que no ha producido absolutamenteningún resultado positivo ni ha contribuido para nada amejorar la situación de la isla.

Los discursos de que aquéllos que no estén, por ejemplo,con el Partido Popular Europeo o con el exilio de Miamiestán con Castro, son exactamente el mismo tipo dediscursos que hemos oído desde la Casa Blanca diciendoque aquéllos que ponían matices y peros a la posiciónrespecto de Iraq eran automáticamente aliados de SadamHusein.

Son discursos pobres, vacíos de contenido yabsolutamente ajenos a la realidad política europea, a laforma como en Europa hemos afrontado nuestrasrelaciones con cualquier otro lugar del mundo exceptocon Cuba, donde rechazamos el blanco o negro, undiálogo entre San Miguel y Satán, y nos atenemos a larealidad concreta, a la práctica política, a los cambios enla medida en que se van produciendo. Lo hemos hechocon Libia, con Irán, con Corea. Lo hemos hecho concualquier otro país y queremos que se siga haciendo conCuba.

Nuestra posición de la Unión Europea con Cuba nopuede ser una posición visceral nacida del estómago ydel rechazo que produce en el estómago la realidadpolítica cubana y la persona de Fidel Castro. La políticade la Unión Europea sobre Cuba tiene que nacer de larazón, como ocurre con tantos otros lugares y tiene queatender a la realidad de las necesidades del pueblocubano.

La resolución que se pretende votar mañana, si aparecevotada en su versión original, prohibe al Consejomodificar e incluso reflexionar sobre cuál es la posiciónrespecto de Cuba hasta que se hayan vaciado las cárcelesde Cuba. Ya querríamos que se vaciaran las cárceles deCuba de presos políticos y querríamos libertad políticaen Azerbaiyán y en Ucrania y en Belarús y en Sudán, yen China también. Pero sabemos que eso está lejos delpragmatismo y de la realidad política con la quesabemos actuar desde Europa y que nos ha producidomuchos resultados en muchos lugares del mundo.Querríamos también que si el fanatismo de algunos setransformara en razón pragmática, ello pudiera conducirrealmente a una transición pacífica en Cuba que algunoshacen todo lo posible por llegar a impedir.

2-138

Rizzo (GUE/NGL). Signor Presidente, c'è poco tempoper trattare una vicenda così complessa e ricca comequella di Cuba. Certamente nel poco tempo dobbiamoricordare la battaglia di Davide contro Golia. Labattaglia di un'isola che, da oltre quarant'anni, subisceuna guerra guerreggiata da parte del gigante del mondo:gli Stati Uniti. Ma siamo in Europa, e dobbiamo parlaredell'Europa.

Ritengo giusto che l'Unione europea cambiatteggiamento verso Cuba, perché l'attuale posizione èdel tutto subordinata alle pressioni del governo degliStati Uniti. L'Europa, in questo modo, segnalerebbe

anche la sua indipendenza, la sua autonomia - che nonsignifica scontro con gli Stati Uniti - ma significaappunto autonomia e indipendenza nel giudizio sullevicende internazionali.

Si parla di lotta al terrorismo, di lotta per i diritti umani,ma una domanda ce la vogliamo fare? Perché inqualunque parte del mondo se qualcuno dirotta una naveo un aereo è definito terrorista, mentre se fa la stessacosa a Cuba viene definito difensore della libertà odissidente? Perché ci sono due pesi e due misure quandosi parla di Cuba e quando si parla dell'Iraq? Queste sonole motivazioni per cui - ribadendo che siamo romantici eamiamo le poesie - non avremmo dubbi ad appoggiaretutti gli atti e le risoluzioni a favore di Cuba, del suopopolo e della sua originale rivoluzione.

2-139

Czarnecki, Ryszard (NI). Panie PrzewodniczącyParlamentu, Panie i Panowie, Kuba nie może byćrezerwatem z tabliczką Tu nie przestrzega się prawczłowieka. To nie jest ani folwark zwierzęcy, byużyć tytułu książki George'a Orwella, ani folwark FidelaCastro. Wczoraj w czasie one minute question jeden zkolegów powiedział, że za pieniądze Unii posłowie niepowinni jeździć na Kubę. To nie o to chodzi. Trzebakubańskiemu reżimowi przypominać bez taryfy ulgowejo prawach człowieka i twardo domagać się zwolnieniawięźniów politycznych. Ale nie twórzmy dodatkowychbarier i zasieków. Izolowanie Kuby może sprzyjaćCastro, a nie opozycji. Organizacja Human RightsWatch stwierdza, że ofiarą embarga USA jest nie Castro,a cały naród kubański.

W najbliższą sobotę w Holandii rozpocznie sięZgromadzenie Parlamentarne AKP-Unia Europejska. Wtym kontekście przypomnę, że 77 państw z tego obszaruuważa, że należy rozwijać relacje z Kubą, a nie jeograniczać. Walcząc słusznie o prawa człowieka,walczmy skutecznie. Mając bowiem dobre intencje,broniąc słusznych wartości, możemy niechcącyzaszkodzić narodowi Kuby, a pomóc tym, którzy każąskandować Socjalizm albo śmierć!. Życzę 25ministrom spraw zagranicznych krajów Unii, aby wgrudniu podjęli w sprawie Kuby decyzję zarazemrealistyczną, jak i broniącą praw człowieka.

2-140

Tannock (PPE-DE). Mr President, Cuba hasregrettably failed to make any progress on human rightsin the past year, indeed, since I last spoke on the subject.But it has had the recent good fortune of Mr Zapatero'snew socialist government coming to power in Spain. MrZapatero seems keen to cosy up to Castro, aided andabetted shamefully by the British, Italian and FrenchGovernments, which have decided to try to change thetough policy of ostracising the Castro regime andregularly inviting Cuban dissidents to EU embassyfunctions. This was done last year in protest, after MrCastro imprisoned 75 dissidents and human rightsactivists and executed three ferry highjackers fleeing theisland. Castro has recently expelled visiting EuropeanMPs and NGO workers keen to engage with dissidentsunder the Varela Project.

54 16-11-2004

The role of Prime Minister Blair, as a close friend ofPresident Bush, who is tough on Cuba, is a bit of amystery, unless it is some shabby deal cut over Gibral-tar, which is thankfully off the agenda in Madrid rightnow.

For a long time the Cuban Government has been able toblame all the country's woes on the American embargo.That is why our resolution supports lifting it. I am notsure that will help, as lifting it might relieve theincreasing economic hardship, worsened by Castro'sstupidity in recently banning the dollar for tradingpurposes as a response to tighter travel restrictions bythe US on Cuban exiles visiting their families.

Oswaldo Payá, our Sakarov Prize winner, is still deniedthe right to visit the European Parliament, but he haswritten a letter to President Borrell, urging the EU tostand firm on its common European position for as longas the authorities continue their violations of fundamen-tal rights, which included a disgraceful lack of adequatemedical care for Cuban prisoners.

I applaud the resolve of countries such as the CzechRepublic and Hungary, which have been used to thetyranny of communism and have stood firm on anyrelaxation of the current arrangements. No doubt whenthe ailing tyrant finally passes away many in this Housewill sing his praises as the historic father of the nation,as they have recently done sycophantically on the deathof President Arafat. I, however, will regard the departureof President Castro as a fresh chance to build a prospe-rous and democratic Cuba.

2-141

Evans, Robert (PSE). Mr President, I very muchagree with Commissioner Nielson that 2003 was a sadyear for EU-Cuba relations, and one of lostopportunities. I was in Cuba recently with colleagues onan ad hoc delegation. I saw for myself the enormouspotential of that country a potential unrealised atpresent as a result, among other things, of the USsanctions and the current situation with the EuropeanUnion.

I also agree with Commissioner Nielson that we need aconstructive EU policy towards Cuba. Others in thisHouse do not seem to have been listening. Mr SalafrancaSánchez-Neyra is not listening to me now, but he said afew moments ago that we should stand firm indemanding freedom. Mrs Malmström said that theCubans have a right to democracy. Do they believe thatpeople on this side of the House do not believe in humanrights? They were not listening to Mr Martinez earlieron. We have made it clear that we do believe in humanrights. No one in this House has ever defended the deathpenalty. However, we have to be realistic. After 45years, changes will not come quickly. Some people inthis House will also argue that we should never talk topolitical opponents if we disagree fundamentally withtheir political and military tactics. Where has that evergot anyone? Can anyone think of an example where thathas improved the situation? I think that some people

have a fairly naive understanding of democracy and theway things work. I could respond to Mr Tannock's ratherpathetic remarks, but it belittles this debate to bring in allsorts of other issues when we are talking about Cuba. Iwould remind Mr Tannock and others, when they arelooking for parallels or examples around the world, thatin different circumstances the UK Government never gotanywhere with the Irish situation until we were preparedto enter into very difficult negotiations with our politicalopponents, people with whom we disagreedfundamentally. That is the only way we are going toachieve peace in the Middle East. We have to havedialogue in countries like Cuba. That is why I wouldargue that we need an exchange of ideas in order topromote change.

The present EU policy, founded on the issue of who isinvited to summer parties or not does not help Cubaor Europe, and needs to be changed. I urge Members tothink very carefully and support a sensible and realisticcompromise text that will move the EU forward, willhelp Cuba and will help the world.

2-142

Sonik (PPE-DE). Panie Przewodniczący, jawnymnaruszeniem Powszechnej Deklaracji Praw CzłowiekaONZ jest obowiązująca od tego roku na Kubie ustawa,która ogranicza dostęp do internetu. Została uchwalonajako kara dla społeczeństwa za zeszłoroczne wystąpieniagrupy 75 opozycjonistów, którzy walczyli o swobodęwyrażania swoich poglądów. Ustawa zezwala na dostępdo internetu tylko w wybranych przedsiębiorstwach ibiurach rządowych. Warto przypomnieć, że w 2002 rokurząd zakazał powszechnej sprzedaży komputerów.Obecne prawo to kolejne działanie wymierzone wopozycjonistów i niezależnych dziennikarzy. Kuba i jejlewicowi sojusznicy na całym świecie karmią nasnieustannie mitem rewolucyjnego czynu, który obaliłprzed kilkudziesięcioma laty skorumpowane rządyBatisty. Czy w imię tego mitu mamy zamykać oczy napolicyjną rzeczywistość współczesnej Kuby, na więzie-nia, represje i prześladowania za zwykłe przywiązaniedo wolności i do elementarnych swobód obywatelskich?

My obywatele tej części Europy, która przez dziesiątkilat okupowana była przez Moskwę i jej komunisty-cznych sojuszników, wiemy jak wielkie znaczenie mazwykły gest solidarności wolnego świata dla działaczywięzionych i represjonowanych za swoje poglądy. Naszedoświadczenie mówi nam, iż antydemokratyczne reżimyliczą się tylko ze stanowczością i konsekwencją, awszyskie ich wysiłki idą w kierunku złamaniamiędzynarodowej solidarności z obrońcami prawczłowieka. Dlatego nie należy się cofać. Sankcjedyplomatyczne, wsparcie tych, którzy bronią swobódobywatelskich i zabieranie w ich imieniu głosu na forummiędzynarodowym, to jest to, co możemy i powinniśmyuczynić jako kraje Unii Europejskiej, a tym którzybezmyślnie noszą gadżety z wizerunkiem Che Guevary,mogę tylko powiedzieć, żeby dopisali na nich słowaKuba tak, zaczynamy od nowa. Dysydenci oskarżeni ospiskowanie przeciw niepodległości i integralnościterytorialnej państwa, w rzeczywistości zostali uwięzieni

16-11-2004 55

jedynie z powodu pokojowego korzystania ze swoichfundamentalych praw. Warto zauważyć, iż liczba osóbrepresjonowanych zmniejszała się lub rosła w zależnościod nacisków zagranicy lub od interesów międzyna-rodowych Fidela Castro. Obecna eskalacja działań jestkrokiem wstecz w zakresie ochrony praw człowieka naKubie. Dlatego sprawą pierwszorzędnej wagi jestpotwierdzenie międzynarodowego poparcia dlakubańskich demokratów i utrzymanie sankcji dyploma-tycznych wobec reżimu.

2-143

Zani (PSE). Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, datempo a Cuba c'è un clima di attesa. Si accentuano lepressioni dall'esterno, mentre all'interno si registra unpeggioramento relativo della libertà di espressione e piùin generale dei diritti umani.

In questa situazione, l'Unione europea deve assumereuna posizione chiara, senza attendere ulteriori eventi. Perquale prospettiva si muove l'Europa? È giustochiederselo, poiché vi è chi auspica, in particolare negliStati Uniti, un crollo traumatico del regime entro unavisione egemonica, sostanzialmente invariata dall'instau-razione dell'embargo ad oggi.

Nel contempo, devo dire che non si comprende quale siaoggi una visione dinamica del futuro della proprianazione da parte delle classi dirigenti cubane dopo lafine della guerra fredda. Tutto sommato si avverte unostallo, generato da un immobilismo politico sia internoche internazionale. In questa situazione ritengo chel'Unione non possa semplicemente trincerarsi dietro laquestione dei diritti umani, o peggio accodarsi a chi liusa come un grimaldello politico.

Si potrebbe dimostrare, con dovizia di esempi, che ciòche vale per Cuba non vale in egual misura per moltialtri paesi. Il caso recente del vertice Unione europea -ASEAN, con la piena partecipazione della Birmania,riassume esemplarmente il doppio standard in vigore suidiritti umani.

Proprio oggi, in quest'aula, il commissario Patten aproposito dell'embargo sulle armi nei confronti dellaCina ha affermato che la Commissione non ha maiinstaurato un rapporto diretto tra l'eventuale revocadell'embargo e la politica dei diritti umani. Chiarendo,tuttavia, giustamente che ulteriori passi avanti nel campodei diritti umani avrebbero potuto agevolare unarevisione dell'atteggiamento europeo.

Bene! Non vedo perché lo stesso atteggiamentopragmatico, basato su un approccio positivo incentivante- e non semplicemente sanzionatorio e punitivo - nondebba essere applicato anche a Cuba. Nell'epoca dellaglobalizzazione, contribuire a rompere l'isolamento diCuba a partire da una più forte cooperazione economicanon mancherebbe, come sappiamo e come l'esperienzainsegna, di avere ripercussioni positive sulla sua politicainterna, proprio a partire dai diritti umani. Solo chiguarda al futuro con gli occhi del passato, pregustando

vendette ideologiche, può ignorare questa sempliceverità.

C'è quindi bisogno per l'Unione europea di un cambio dipasso. Ci vuole più immaginazione e ci vuole una nuovae autonoma politica verso Cuba. Va aperta una fase piùavanzata e serrata di dialogo politico e di cooperazione,che coinvolga pienamente oltre alle autorità di governoanche alla società civile in tutte le sue componenti.Bisogna aprire la strada ad una transizione pacifica epattuita verso un'evoluzione pienamente democratica epluralistica, affermare l'idea di una via cubana allademocrazia. Questi devono essere ora gli obiettividell'Unione europea.

2-144

López-Istúriz White (PPE-DE). Señor Presidente, alos hechos ya denunciados ayer por mí en este mismoPleno, es decir, las oscuras maniobras de pasillo delGobierno español para rebajar las sanciones impuestaspor la Unión Europea al régimen de Castro, se unen hoylas manipulaciones informativas sobre el resultado de lareunión del Comité del Consejo de la Unión Europeasobre América Latina, la cual no ha rebajado en ningúnmomento las sanciones impuestas al régimen en el año2003.

Dichas sanciones - se lo recuerdo a algún colegadespistado- no fueron implementadas por las "hordas"del Partido Popular Europeo, sino durante la Presidenciadel Gobierno socialista griego de la Unión.

¿Qué ha hecho durante este último año el régimen deCastro para beneficiarse de tan inesperado y generosobalón de oxígeno? La respuesta es sencilla: nada. O, másbien, encarcelar y torturar a más opositores y aislar aúnmás a la población cubana, alejándola de nuestro sueño:una Cuba libre y democrática.

Yo no pienso renunciar a ese sueño y sé que numerososmiembros de otros grupos de este Parlamento, incluidoel socialista, tampoco lo harán. Este Parlamento ha sidosiempre modelo y vanguardia en la defensa de losderechos humanos y en estos días críticos debedemostrar que no unirá su suerte a la de un corruptodictador en franca decadencia ni se dejará llevar por elcolaboracionismo de algunos de los miembros quesiempre han sido instrumentalizados por la dictadura.

Hoy deben triunfar el modelo democrático deconvivencia en la isla y la esperanza en una transiciónpolítica pacífica que darán a Cuba y a su pueblo el prota-gonismo que siempre mereció en la esfera internacional.Para conseguir tal fin, son requisitos imprescindibles laliberación inmediata de todos los presos políticos y deconciencia existentes en las cárceles castristas, el ceseinmediato de torturas y ejecuciones de miembros de ladisidencia, el diálogo libre entre todas las partes y elreconocimiento, por parte del régimen, de que quien estáaislado es él mismo, no las valerosas gentes del pueblocubano que claman por su libertad.

56 16-11-2004

Ruego a todos mis colegas diputados que sueñenconmigo por este fin y espero que todos despertemospronto en una Cuba libre y dueña de su destino.

2-145

Yáñez-Barnuevo García (PSE). Señor Presidente,siempre me ha sorprendido que se utilice Cuba comoarma arrojadiza de unos contra otros, según el colorideológico de cada cual, y sólo para consumo interno delas respectivas opiniones públicas de los paíseseuropeos, especialmente en mi país, España.

¿No podríamos aprovechar -veo que no- estaoportunidad para pensar juntos sólo en el pueblo cubano,en su presente y su futuro, dejando de lado la excesivaideologización y el uso partidista del tema?

¿A qué aspira el pueblo cubano? Creo que todosestaremos de acuerdo en que aspira a superar lastremendas insuficiencias que sufre tanto en el terrenoeconómico como en el campo de las libertades, losderechos civiles, sociales y políticos. Creo que aspira atener esperanza en un futuro mejor, a que más tempranoque tarde pueda comenzar una transición democráticaordenada y pacífica que suponga la reconciliación detodos los cubanos, los que viven en Cuba y los que vivenen el exilio. Creo que desea que los europeos no nospeleemos -como estamos haciendo esta noche aquí- sinoque unidos les ayudemos lo mejor que podamos, porquedeben ser ellos los protagonistas del futuro y nonosotros.

Señor Presidente, nuestras diferencias hoy se refieren ala posición común adoptada por la Unión Europea en1996. Algunos Gobiernos y algunos diputados proponenaquí reformarla; otros proponen que no se mueva ni unacoma, pero ni una ni otra posición es ilegítima, y cadauna es argumentable, y no supone que unos estén delacayos de los Estados Unidos ni otros de cómplices deFidel Castro. Dejemos ese tipo de argumentos, como heoído en la intervención anterior.

Creo que después de ocho años, la posición comúnmerece una reflexión y una reforma posible peroconsensuada, con un acuerdo muy amplio prácticamenteunánime en el Consejo, que permita explorar posicionesnuevas en relación con Cuba que sean más eficaces, peroque no sirva en absoluto de balón de oxígeno a ladictadura cubana y que no sirva, ni muchos menos, dedesautorización a los disidentes o a la oposición o a lospresos políticos, muchos de los cuales están sufriendosituaciones lamentables en las cárceles.

Si la gran mayoría de esta Asamblea está convencida deque en Cuba existe una dictadura totalitaria y un pueblooprimido que merece nuestra ayuda y si coincidimos enla necesidad de que termine el nocivo embargonorteamericano y creemos que el diálogo entreGobiernos es un instrumento válido, ¿por qué va aresultar tan difícil ponernos de acuerdo para articularuna política sobre Cuba? Pero, como ustedescomprenderán, soy bastante escéptico, visto lo visto enel debate de esta noche.

2-146

Morgan (PSE). Mr President, the Cuban politicalsystem is unique in the world. We, as a parliament,absolutely condemn the human rights situation in thecountry and the lack of free speech. However, that is notto say that the situation is all bad. On a recent visit to thecountry we found that schools, where there is a ratio of15 pupils to one teacher, are the envy of Europe. Thehumanitarian work of educating doctors to transformhealth services in developing countries is not a case oftalking about solidarity with Africa, but acting onsolidarity with Africa.

Today, however, relations between the EU and Cuba areat an all-time low. There has been no high-level contactbetween the governments of the EU and Cuba for over ayear. The situation came about as a result of the EUpursuing sanctions against Cuba for a crackdown ondissidents in 2003. The sanctions came in the form of aninvitation to Cuban dissidents to attend Member States'national day celebrations, alongside governmentrepresentatives in Cuba. This action clearly infuriatedthe Cubans. They were the ones who cut off contact.

My appeal tonight is that we should be consistent in ourapproach to human rights. By all means condemn humanrights violations in Cuba, but do the same in China. Ifyou are to impose these kinds of sanctions on Cuba, thenimpose them on China as well. I feel that the EUstrategy relating to Cuba is to spread an incredibledegree of naivety. Did we really think that we could shiftthe human rights agenda in Cuba by inviting a fewdissidents to a party when 40 years of US embargo havefailed? We need to adopt alternative strategies to pushthe human rights agenda. The current method is notworking.

Mr White argued for the freeing of all dissidents inCuba. What about Spain? Do you want to free alldissidents in Spain as well? I will not be lectured to bythe Spanish PPE on visiting Cuba when the deputyleader of the Conservative Party, Michael Ancram, wasswanning around Havana last week. It is time that youand Mr Tannock got over losing the elections. Get overit and stop imposing your stupid obsessions on the restof the European Parliament!

2-147

El Khadraoui (PSE). Voorzitter, Cuba is blijkbaar eenzeer gevoelig onderwerp, het is ook een heel complexonderwerp, en ik sluit mij natuurlijk aan bij degenen diezeggen dat de Europese Unie, en dit Parlement in hetbijzonder, in heel de wereld moet ijveren voor meerdemocratie en respect voor de mensenrechten, en dat isook in Cuba.

Maar de fundamentele vraag die we ons moeten stellenis hoe we dit het best kunnen bereiken, hoe we het bestde Cubaanse bevolking kunnen helpen. Is het door dedialoog met de Cubaanse autoriteiten en dus met hetovergrote deel van het maatschappelijk middenveld af tewijzen ? Ik denk het niet. En dat is nochtans de realiteitop het terrein vandaag. Er wordt niet meer gepraat metde Europeanen en dus heeft het gemeenschappelijk

16-11-2004 57

standpunt van de Europese Unie geen voldoenderesultaten opgeleverd en een evaluatie dringt zich dusop, een rationele evaluatie en eventueel een aanpassingvan dat gemeenschappelijk standpunt.

Onlangs ben ik met een aantal collega's inderdaad naarCuba gegaan en hebben we daar met onze eigen ogenook een aantal positieve dingen kunnen vaststelleninzake onderwijs bijvoorbeeld, of inzakegezondheidszorg. Laten we hen dit zeggen en laten wehen ook zeggen dat er heel wat zaken zijn in Cuba dieons helemaal niet aanstaan. Maar laten we ten minste dedialoog aangaan, net zoals we dit doen met anderelanden zoals China, Saudi-Arabië of Vietnam.

2-148

Nielson, Commission. Mr President, just one remarkfor the sake of good order. One Member mentioned thatwe should do more on humanitarian aid: this is not partof the political equation. We provide humanitarian aid inreaction to need, and provide it where that need is,without considering politics. This point is veryimportant, and it is important that I take the time torepeat our position. We are in Cuba when needed forhumanitarian reasons, as in all other places includingNorth Korea etc. I am quite sure that this is not up fordiscussion here. I am not saying this because I feel it is areal problem in this House, but because it is importantnever to make that mistake.

I tend to agree with those who have said that thecommon position has not produced any results. Theproblem is, however, what other instruments areavailable that will produce results? It is not easy and therisk of being disappointed is always present. As I see itthere is an ongoing struggle between hardliners andmore constructive, open-minded people in the leadershipin Havana. This moves back and forth in anunpredictable manner and is a reaction both to internalevents and a reaction to the pressure from Cuba's bigneighbour.

There is a need to do more than putting our rhetoric onautopilot referring to basic principles of human rightsand so on. I do not think this discussion is necessary inParliament. I do not see this Parliament as a place wherewe should have a discussion for or against human rights.This really is not the place. If we are serious about it wehave to be pragmatic. The other approach is the easy oneand we have to get into the game, we have to get closerto the real politics of change and progress in Cuba ifpossible. Nobody can give any guarantees. In 2003 Iattempted to see what could be done and I wasdisappointed. However, this was a reaction resulting, inmy view, from the very unpredictable inner circles inHavana.

Another frustration that we run into in Europe again andagain is that, whenever it is attractive to do so, it is afashion in Cuba to put us in the same category as the US.It makes it very easy even convenient for hardlinersin Havana to do this, supporting their view driven byparanoia that the whole world is against them. This is

wrong, Europe is not against Cuba and definitely notagainst the Cubans. We do not like the regime, we donot like the old fashioned dictatorial way of managing asociety, but we also do not want to be associated withthe way in which the United States conducts itsrelationship with its neighbour.

Europe is different; our thinking concerning Cuba isdifferent and we have to pay some sort of investment tomake this an inescapable reality in the internaldiscussions in Havana. For our part, we have to bewilling to have some element of risk to make itimpossible for the hardliners to portray Europe as ifEurope and the US are the same thing. That is theinvestment we must be courageous, constructive andself-assured enough to make. If we are not ready tomake an investment to create a real basis for a dialogue one that is defined by us and not by a paranoidrepresentation of the way the hardliners in Havana seethe outside world we are only relying on autopilot-defined rhetoric or, in other words, the old commonposition.

We should not make it a straitjacket. Please rememberthat for a number of years the very same commonposition did not prohibit Europe from engaging in abolder, closer and more critical dialogue on humanrights with Cuba. We did that against the samebackground in terms of the common position. Europeaninvestment in the Cuban economy also grew remarkablywhile we held the same common position. It did notmake investment growth impossible. We should notinterpret it in such a narrow sense that it becomes astraitjacket. In conclusion, there is a need for a moreinnovative approach.

2-149

Presidente. In conclusione della discussione horicevuto quattro proposte di risoluzione.1

Dichiaro chiusa la discussione.

La votazione si svolgerà mercoledì 17 novembre 2004alle 12.30.

2-150

13 - Ordine del giorno della prossima seduta: vedasiprocesso verbale

2-151

14 - Chiusura della seduta

2-152

(La seduta é tolta alle 23.30)

1 Proposte di risoluzione: vedasi processo verbale

CSSeznam zkratek politických skupinPPE-DE Skupina Evropské lidové strany (Krestanských demokratu)

a Evropských demokratuPSE Skupina sociálních demokratu v Evropském parlamentuALDE Skupina Aliance liberálu a demokratu pro EvropuVerts/ALE Skupina Zelených/Evropské svobodné alianceGUE/NGL Skupina konfederace Evropské sjednocené levice a Severské

zelené leviceIND/DEM Skupina nezávislých / demokracieUEN Skupina Unie pro Evropu národuNI Nezarazení poslanci

PROZATÍMNÍ VYDÁNÍV tomto vydání (které je rovněž k dispozici na Internetu – viz poslední strana) je každé vystoupení zaznamenáno v jazyce, ve kterém jej řečník přednesl. Řečníci, kteří si přejí provést opravy ve znění svých vystoupení, mohou do jednoho týdne předat opravy oddělení pro organizaci a průběh zasedání na adresu uvedenou na poslední straně (pro e-mail: predmet = CRE / datum).

DAListe over forkortelserne for de politiske grupperPPE-DE Gruppen for Det Europæiske Folkeparti (Kristelige Demokrater)

og De Europæiske DemokraterPSE De Europæiske Socialdemokraters GruppeALDE Gruppen Alliancen af Liberale og Demokrater for EuropaVerts/ALE Gruppen De Grønne/Den Europæiske Fri AllianceGUE/NGL Den Europæiske Venstrefl øjs Fællesgruppe/Nordisk Grønne VenstreIND/DEM Gruppen for Selvstændighed / DemokratiUEN Gruppen Union for Nationernes EuropaNI Løsgængere

FORELØBIG UDGAVE Denne udgave (fi ndes også på internettet - se sidste side) indeholder samtlige taler på det af taleren anvendte sprog. En endelig udgave off entliggøres senere. Afdelingen for Tilrettelæggelse og Afvikling af Mødeperioden bør inden en uge, på den adresse der er angivet på sidste side, underrettes om de ændringer, som talerne måtte ønske at foretage i deres indlæg (til e-mail: emne = CRE / dato).

DEListe der Abkürzungen der FraktionenPPE-DE Fraktion der Europäischen Volkspartei (Christdemokraten)

und europäischer DemokratenPSE Sozialdemokratische Fraktion im Europäischen ParlamentALDE Fraktion der Allianz der Liberalen und Demokraten für EuropaVerts/ALE Fraktion der Grünen / Freie Europäische AllianzGUE/NGL Konföderale Fraktion der Vereinigten Europäischen Linken/Nordische

Grüne LinkeIND/DEM Fraktion Unabhängigkeit / DemokratieUEN Fraktion Union für das Europa der NationenNI Fraktionslos

VORLÄUFIGE AUSGABEDiese Ausgabe (auch im Internet abrufbar - siehe hintere Umschlagseite) enthält alle Reden in der vom Redner verwendeten Sprache. Eine endgültige Ausgabe wird später veröff entlicht. Etwaige Korrekturen, die die Redner am Text ihrer Reden vorzunehmen wünschen, sollten innerhalb einer Woche der Abteilung Organisation und Ablauf der Tagungen an die auf der Rückseite angegebene Adresse zugesandt werden (für E-Mail: Betreff = CRE / Datum).

ETFraktsioonide lühendite nimekiriPPE-DE Euroopa Rahvapartei (Kristlike Demokraatide) ja Euroopa

Demokraatide fraktsioonPSE Euroopa Parlamendi Sotsiaaldemokraatide fraktsioonALDE Euroopa Demokraatide ja Liberaalide Liidu fraktsioonVerts/ALE Roheliste/Euroopa Vabaliidu fraktsioonGUE/NGL Euroopa Ühendatud Vasakpoolsete/ Põhjamaade Roheliste

Vasakpoolsete liitfraktsioonIND/DEM Fraktsioon Iseseisvus / DemokraatiaUEN fraktsioon Liit Rahvusriikide Euroopa eestNI fraktsioonilise kuuluvuseta parlamendiliikmed

ESIALGNE VERSIOONKäesolevas versioonis (mis samuti on saadaval Internetis – vt tagakaant) on kõikide kõnede originaaltekstid. Lõplik versioon on saadaval mõne aja möödudes. Esinejatel, kes soovivad oma kõnedesse sisse viia muudatusi, palutakse muudetud tekstid edastada nädala jooksul istungjärkude korraldamise osakonda tagakaanel toodud aadressil (e-mailile: teema = CRE / kuupäev).

Lista de las siglas de los grupos políticos.PPE-DE Grupo del Partido Popular Europeo (Demócrata-Cristianos)

y de los Demócratas EuropeosPSE Grupo Socialista en el Parlamento Europeo ALDE Grupo de la Alianza de los Liberales y Demócratas por EuropaVerts/ALE Grupo de los Verdes / Alianza Libre Europea GUE/NGL Grupo Confederal de la Izquierda Unitaria Europea / Izquierda Verde NórdicaIND/DEM Grupo Independencia / DemocraciaUEN Grupo Unión por la Europa de las NacionesNI No inscritos

ESEDICIÓN PROVISIONALLa presente edición (disponible también en Internet - véase última página) contiene todas las intervenciones en la lengua usada por el orador. La edición defi nitiva estará disponible posteriormente. Las correcciones que los oradores deseen efectuar en el texto de su intervención deben enviarse a la Unidad de Organización y Desarrollo de las Sesiones en el plazo de una semana a la dirección que fi gura en la última página (para el e-mail: asunto = CRE / fecha).

PROVISIONAL EDITIONThis edition (also available on the Internet - see back cover) contains the original texts of all speeches. A fi nal edition will be available later. Speakers wishing to correct their speeches are requested to send the corrected versions within a week to the Sessions Organisation Division at the address shown on the last page (for e-mail: subject = CRE / date).

ENList of abbreviations denoting political groupsPPE-DE Group of the European Peopleʼs Party (Christian Democrats)

and European DemocratsPSE Socialist Group in the European ParliamentALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for EuropeVerts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free AllianceGUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green LeftIND/DEM Independence / Democracy GroupUEN Union for Europe of the Nations GroupNI Non-attached Members

EDITION PROVISOIREDans la présente édition (disponible également sur Internet - v. dernière page) chaque intervention fi gure dans la langue utilisée par lʼorateur. Une édition défi nitive sera disponible ultérieurement. Les orateurs qui désirent voir apporter des corrections au texte de leur intervention sont priés de transmettre celles-ci à la division Organisation et Déroulement des Sessions dans un délai dʼune semaine à lʼadresse fi gurant en dernière page (pour lʼe-mail: sujet = CRE / date).

FRListe des sigles des groupes politiquesPPE-DE Groupe du Parti populaire européen (Démocrates-chrétiens)

et des Démocrates européensPSE Groupe socialiste au Parlement européenALDE Groupe Alliance des démocrates et des libéraux pour lʼEuropeVerts/ALE Groupe des Verts/Alliance libre européenneGUE/NGL Groupe confédéral de la Gauche unitaire européenne/Gauche verte nordiqueIND/DEM Groupe Indépendance / DémocratieUEN Groupe Union pour lʼEurope des NationsNI Non-inscrits

EDIZIONE PROVVISORIALa presente edizione (disponibile anche su Internet allʼindirizzo indicato allʼultima pagina) contiene tutti i discorsi nella lingua usata dallʼoratore. Lʼedizione defi nitiva sarà pubblicata successivamente. Gli oratori che desiderino rivedere il testo dei loro interventi sono pregati di far pervenire le correzioni entro una settimana alla divisione Organizzazione e svolgimento delle sedute allʼindirizzo indicato allʼultima pagina (per lʼe-mail: oggetto = CRE / data).

ITElenco delle sigle dei gruppi politiciPPE-DE Gruppo del Partito popolare europeo (Democratici-cristiani)

e dei Democratici europeiPSE Gruppo socialista al Parlamento europeoALDE Gruppo dellʼAlleanza dei Liberali e dei Democratici per lʼEuropaVerts/ALE Gruppo Verde/Alleanza libera europeaGUE/NGL Gruppo confederale della Sinistra unitaria europea/Sinistra verde nordicaIND/DEM Gruppo Indipendenza / DemocraziaUEN Gruppo “Unione per lʼEuropa delle nazioni”NI Non iscritti

PAGAIDU VERSIJAŠajā izdevumā (pieejams arī internetā — sk. pēdejo lappusi) ir visas runas oriģinālajā valodā. Galīgā verisija būs pieejama vēlāk. Lūgums runātajiem, kas vēlas labot savas runas, vienas nedēļas laikā nosūtīt izlaboto tekstu uz Sesiju organizēšanas nodaļu uz adresi, kura norādīta pēdēja lappusē (e-mail: temats = CRE / datums).

LVSaraksts ar politisko grupu saīsinājumiemPPE-DE Eiropas Tautas Partijas (Kristigo Demokratu) un

Eiropas Demokratu grupaPSE Socialdemokratu grupa Eiropas ParlamentaALDE Eiropas Liberalu un demokratu apvienibas grupaVerts/ALE Zalo un Eiropas Brivas apvienibas grupaGUE/NGL Eiropas Apvienota kreiso un Ziemelvalstu Zalo kreiso speku konfederala grupaIND/DEM Neatkarïbas / demokrätijas grupaUEN Naciju Eiropas grupaNI Pie politiskajam grupam nepiederošie deputati

ΠΡΟΣΩΡΙΝΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗΗ παρούσα έκδοση (διαθέσιμη και στο Διαδίκτυο - βλ. οπισθόφυλλο) περιέχει τα πρωτότυπα όλων των αγορεύσεων. Η τελική έκδοση θα είναι διαθέσιμη αργότερα. Οι αγορητές που επιθυμούν να επιφέρουν διορθώσεις στις αγορεύσεις τους καλούνται να τις διαβιβάσουν στο Τμήμα Οργάνωσης και Διεξαγωγής των Συνόδων το αργότερο μέσα σε μία εβδομάδα στη διεύθυνση που αναγράφεται στο οπισθόφυλλο (για το e-mail : θέμα = CRE / ημερομηνία).

ELΣυντομογραφίες των πολιτικών ομάδωνPPE-DE Ομάδα του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος

(Χριστιανοδημοκράτες) και των Ευρωπαίων ΔημοκρατώνPSE Σοσιαλιστική Ομάδα στο Ευρωπαϊκό ΚοινοβούλιοALDE Ομάδα της Συμμαχίας Φιλελευθέρων και Δημοκρατών

για την ΕυρώπηVerts/ALE Ομάδα των Πρασίνων / Ευρωπαϊκή Ελεύθερη ΣυμμαχίαGUE/NGL Συνομοσπονδιακή Ομάδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωτικής

Αριστεράς / Αριστερά των Πρασίνων των Βορείων ΧωρώνIND/DEM Ομάδα Ανεξαρτησία / ΔημοκρατίαUEN Ομάδα Ένωση για την Ευρώπη των ΕθνώνNI Μη Εγγεγραμμένοι

EDIZZJONI PROVIŻORJADin l-edizzjoni (li tinstab ukoll fuq l-Internet - ara l-qoxra taʼ wara) fi ha t-testi oriġinali tad-diskorsi kollha. Edizzjoni fi nali tkun disponibli aktar ʻil quddiem. Dawk li jixtiequ jikkoreġu d-diskors tagħhom huma mitluba li jgħaddu, fi żmien ġimgħa, l-verżjonijiet riveduti lid-Diviżjoni għall-Organizzazzjoni tas-Sessonijiet, fl -indirizz indikat fuq il-qoxra taʼ wara (Ghall-email: suggett = CRE / data)..

MTLista taʼ abbrevjazzonijiet taʼ gruppi politiċiPPE-DE Grupp tal-Partit Popolari Ewropew (Demokristjani)

u Demokratici EwropejPSE Grupp Socjalista fi l-Parlament EwropewALDE Grupp taʼ l-Alleanza tal-Liberali u d-Demokratici ghall-EwropaVerts/ALE Grupp tal-Hodor/Alleanza Hielsa EwropeaGUE/NGL Grupp Konfederali tax-Xellug Maghqud Ewropew / Xellug Ahdar NordikuIND/DEM Grupp ghall-Indipendenza / DemokrazijaUEN Grupp taʼ l-Unjoni ghal Ewropa tan-NazzjonijietNI Membri mhux affi ljati

VOORLOPIGE UITGAVEDeze uitgave (ook te vinden op Internet - zie achterkant) omvat alle redevoeringen in de taal waarin zij zijn uitgesproken. Een defi nitieve versie in elk van de offi ciële talen zal later verschijnen. Sprekers die verbeteringen in de tekst van hun redevoeringen wensen aan te brengen, worden verzocht deze binnen een week aan de Afdeling organisatie en verloop der plenaire vergaderingen op het op de achterkant aangegeven adres te doen toekomen (Voor e-mail : onderwerp = CRE / datum).

NLLijst van afkortingen van de fractiesPPE-DE Fractie van de Europese Volkspartij

(Christen-democraten) en Europese DemocratenPSE Sociaal-democratische Fractie in het Europees ParlementALDE Alliantie van Liberalen en Democraten voor Europa fractieVerts/ALE Fractie De Groenen/Vrije Europese AlliantieGUE/NGL Confederale Fractie Europees Unitair Links/Noords Groen LinksIND/DEM Fractie Onafhankelijkheid / DemocratieUEN Fractie Unie voor een Europa van Nationale StatenNI Niet-ingeschrevenen

WYDANIE TYMCZASOWENiniejsze wydanie (dostepne również na stronach internetowych - patrz ostatnia strona) zawiera teksty wszystkich przemówień w językach mówców. Wydanie ostateczne będzie dostępne później. Mówcy, którzy chcieliby wnieść poprawki do tekstu swojego przemówienia, proszeni są o przesłanie poprawek do Wydziału ds. Organizacji i Przebiegu Sesji w terminie jednego tygodnia na adres podany na ostatniej stronie (do e-maila: temat = CRE / data).

PLLista skrótów grup politycznychPPE-DE Grupa Europejskiej Partii Ludowej (Chrzescijanscy Demokraci)

i Europejskich DemokratówPSE Grupa Socjalistyczna w Parlamencie EuropejskimALDE Grupa Porozumienia Liberalów i Demokratów na rzecz EuropyVerts/ALE Grupa Zielonych / Wolne Przymierze EuropejskieGUE/NGL Konfederacyjna Grupa Zjednoczonej Lewicy Europejskiej / Nordycka

Zielona LewicaIND/DEM Grupa Niepodleglość / DemokracjaUEN Grupa Unii na rzecz Europy NarodówNI Niezrzeszeni

NEGALUTINĖ REDAKCIJAŠioje redakcijoje (ją taip pat galima rasti internete – žr. paskutinį puslapį) pateikiami visų pranešimų tekstai originalo kalba. Galutinė redakcija bus paruošta vėliau. Kalbėjusiųjų, norinčių pataisyti savo pranešimus, prašome pateikti pataisytas versijas Sesijų rengimo skyriui paskutiniame puslapyje nurodytu adresu ne vėliau kaip per vieną savaitę (el. paštui: dalykas = CRE / data).

LTFrakcijų pavadinimų sutrumpinimų sąrašasPPE-DE Europos liaudies partijos (krikšcioniu demokratu) ir Europos

demokratu frakcijaPSE Socialistu frakcija Europos ParlamenteALDE Liberalu ir demokratu aljanso už Europa frakcijaVerts/ALE Žaliuju frakcija/Europos laisvasis aljansasGUE/NGL Europos vieninguju kairiuju jungtine frakcija/Šiaures šaliu žalieji kairiejiIND/DEM Nepriklausomybes / demokratijos frakcijaUEN Sajungos už tautu Europa frakcijaNI Nepriklausomi Parlamento nariai

IDEIGLENES KIADÁSA jelen kiadásban (amely az Interneten is hozzáférhető, ld. az utolsó oldalt) minden felszólalás a felszólaló által használt nyelven szerepel. A végleges kiadás elkészítésére később kerül sor. Azok a felszólalók, akik javításokat kívánnak tenni felszólalásuk szövegében, szíveskedjenek a kívánt javításokat egy hetes határidőn belül eljuttatni az Ülésszervezési Osztályhoz, az utolsó oldalon szereplő címre (az email-nek: tárgy = CRE / dátum).

HUA képviselőcsoportok betűszó szerinti listájaPPE-DE az Európai Néppárt (Kereszténydemokraták) és az Európai

Demokraták KépviselocsoportjaPSE az Európai Parlament Szocialista KépviselocsoportjaALDE Liberálisok és Demokraták Szövetsége Európáért KépviselocsoportVerts/ALE a Zöldek/ az Európai Szabad Szövetség KépviselocsoportjaGUE/NGL az Egységes Európai Baloldal/az Északi Zöld Baloldal KépviselocsoportjaIND/DEM Függetlenség / Demokrácia KépviselőcsoportUEN a Nemzetek Európájáért Unió KépviselocsoportjaNI független képviselok

PARLEMENT EUROPÉENSecrétariat général - Organisation et Déroulement des SessionsL-2929 LUXEMBOURG

e-mail : pv-cre@europarl.eu.intInternet : http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary

: http://www4.europarl.eu.int/registre/recherche/RechercheSimplifi ee.cfm (liste des documents - § 1.2.3)Intranet : http://www.europarl.ep.ec/plenary

VÄLIAIKAINEN VERSIOJulkaisu (joka on saatavilla myös Internetissä – katso takakansi) sisältää kaikkien puheiden alkuperäiset versiot. Lopullinen julkaisu ilmestyy myöhemmin. Puhujia, jotka haluavat tehdä korjauksia puheisiinsa, pyydetään toimittamaan korjatut versiot istuntojärjestelyistä ja istuntojen kulusta vastaavalle jaostolle viikon kuluessa takakannessa mainittuun osoitteeseen (sähköpostia varten: asia = CRE / päivämäärä).

FIPoliittisten ryhmien lyhenteetPPE-DE Euroopan kansanpuolueen (kristillisdemokraatit)

ja Euroopan demokraattien ryhmäPSE Euroopan parlamentin sosialidemokraattinen ryhmäALDE Euroopan liberaalidemokraattien liiton ryhmäVerts/ALE Vihreät / Euroopan vapaa allianssi -ryhmäGUE/NGL Euroopan yhtyneen vasemmiston konfederaatioryhmä

/ Pohjoismaiden vihreä vasemmistoIND/DEM Itsenäisyys / demokratia -ryhmäUEN Unioni kansakuntien Euroopan puolesta -ryhmäNI Sitoutumattomat

PRELIMINÄR UTGÅVADenna utgåva (som också fi nns tillgänglig på Internet – se baksidan) innehåller samtliga anföranden på originalspråket. En slutlig version kommer att off entliggöras senare. Talare som önskar justera sina anföranden ombeds skicka den justerade versionen till sessionstjänsten inom en vecka, till adressen på baksidan (för e-post: ärende = CRE / datum).

SVFörteckning över förkortningarna för de politiska gruppernaPPE-DE Gruppen för Europeiska folkpartiet

(kristdemokrater) och EuropademokraterPSE Socialdemokratiska gruppen i EuropaparlamentetALDE Gruppen Alliansen liberaler och demokraters för EuropaVerts/ALE Gruppen De gröna/Europeiska fria alliansenGUE/NGL Gruppen Europeiska enade vänstern /Nordisk grön vänsterIND/DEM Gruppen Självständighet / DemokratiUEN Gruppen Unionen för nationernas EuropaNI Grupplösa

SKZoznam skratiek politických skupín.PPE-DE Skupina Európskej ludovej strany (krestanských demokratov)

a Európskych demokratovPSE Socialistická skupina v Európskom parlamenteALDE Skupina Aliancie liberálov a demokratov za EurópuVerts/ALE Skupina zelených/Európska slobodná alianciaGUE/NGL Konfederatívna skupina Európskej zjednotenej lavice / Nordická zelená lavicaIND/DEM Skupina Nezávislosť / demokraciaUEN Skupina Únie za Európu národovNI nezávislí poslanci

PREDBEŽNÉ VYDANIEV tomto vydaní, ktoré sa nachádza aj na internete (viď poslednú stranu), sú všetky príspevky uvedené v jazyku, v ktorom ich predniesol rečník. Konečné vydanie bude k dispozícii neskôr. Rečníci, ktorí chcú poopraviť texty svojich vystúpení, sa môžu so svojimi pripomienkami obrátiť na oddelenie Organizácia a priebeh rokovaní na adresu uvedenú na poslednej strane, a to v priebehu jedného týždňa od uverejnenia (pre e-mail: predmet = CRE / dátum).

ZAČASNA VERZIJAV začasni verziji (na razpolago tudi na svetovnem spletu - glej hrbtno stran) so govori v jeziku, v katerem je govorec nastopil. Naknadno bo na razpolago tudi končna verzija. Govorci, ki želijo vnesti popravke v besedilo svojega govora, naj jih v roku enega tedna posredujejo službi za pripravo in potek zasedanj na naslov, naveden na hrbtni strani (za elektronsko pošto: zadeva = CRE / datum).

SLSeznam kratic političnih skupinPPE-DE Skupina Evropske ljudske stranke (Kršcanskih demokratov)

in Evropskih demokratovPSE Skupina socialdemokratov v Evropskem parlamentuALDE Skupina zavezništva liberalcev in demokratov za EvropoVerts/ALE Skupina Zelenih/Evropske svobodne zvezeGUE/NGL Konfederalna skupina Evropske združene levice / Zelene nordijske leviceIND/DEM Skupina neodvisnosti / demokracijeUEN Skupina združenje za Evropo narodovNI Samostojni poslanci

EDIÇÃO PROVISÓRIAEsta edição (também disponível na Internet - cf. última página) contém todas as intervenções na língua utilizada pelo respectivo orador. A edição defi nitiva estará disponível ulteriormente. Solicita-se aos oradores que desejem corrigir o texto das respectivas intervenções o favor de transmitirem as correcções, no prazo de uma semana, à divisão “Organização e Desenrolar das Sessões”, para o endereço que fi gura na última página deste caderno (para o e-mail: assunto = CRE / data).

PTLista das siglas dos grupos políticosPPE-DE Grupo do Partido Popular Europeu (Democratas-Cristãos) e

dos Democratas EuropeusPSE Grupo Socialista no Parlamento EuropeuALDE Grupo da Aliança dos Democratas e Liberais pela EuropaVerts/ALE Grupo dos Verdes/Aliança Livre EuropeiaGUE/NGL Grupo Confederal da Esquerda Unitária Europeia / Esquerda Nórdica VerdeIND/DEM Grupo Independência / DemocraciaUEN Grupo União para a Europa das NaçõesNI Não-inscritos