Medieval and Early Modern Studies for Central and Eastern Europe, II (2010)

Bogdan-Petru Maleon (Al. I. Cuza University Iasi)

A CROWNING IN CONSTANTINOPLE ON AUGUST, 1ST, 1203 AND ITS SIGNIFICANCES∗

Keywords: imperial ideology, crusade, coronation

The fourth crusade was a turning point in the relations between East and West and one of the great events of the world history, with a generous symbolic load. The conquest of Constantinople produced a veritable reaction during the time, revealed by an impressive number of sources, as the echo of the event was comparable only to the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099. Although the large amount of sources was in advantage of the research, it generated great confusion, due to their contradictory nature. The very important consequences of the crusade and the exceptional volume of information preserved made the events in early 13th century be a constant topic of interest for the modern historiography. Numerous studies were devoted to the causes of the “diverted crusade” and moments that marked its progress, each of those comebacks, including the historiographical effort on the celebration of eight centuries from the conquest of Constantinople, revealing new aspects and meanings1. Among the moments

∗ This work was supported by CNCSIS –UEFISCSU, project number PNII –

IDEI 107/2008, no. 852. 1 Giles Constable, The Historiography of the Crusades, in vol. The Crusades

from the Perspective of Byzantine and the Muslim World, edited by Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, Washington D. C., Dumbarton Oaks Research

40 Bogdan-Petru Maleon consistently taken into account there was also the ceremony of the wandering young Alexios Anghelos’ coronation with the support of his Western allies on August, 1st, 1203. The events prior to that episode are well known, so there is no need for them to be detailed here, as a brief evocation of those able to contribute to the understanding of the proposed topic is sufficient.

In the beginning of this eventful approach it is to be reminded that, during the first three crusades, the mutual hostility between the Westerners and the Eastern peoples deepened, especially since several attempts of restoring the religious unity between 1054 and 1204 had failed2. Moreover, since the mid 11th century, there widened the gap between the rhetoric of Oriental diplomacy, based on the idea of political universality, and the real Byzantine political position in the Christian world3. The tendency of self-valorization was traditionally driven by the imperial political ideology, according to which the ruler in Constantinople was ahead of all other monarchs, who formed the “family of kings”4. The belief in the cultural and political ascendancy remained strong, despite the Manuel I Comnenos (1143-1180)’ policy of co-existence with the Western powers5. During the crusades, a negative image of the crusaders occurred, although in parallel an Library and Collection, 2001, p. 1-22. Michel Balard, Ľhistoriographie occidentale de la quatrième croisade, in vol. Urbs Capta. The Fourth Crusade and its Consequence / La IVe croisade et ses conséquences. Sous la direction ďAngeliki Laiou, Paris, Lethielleux, 2005, p. 161-174.

2 Jonathan Shepard, Aspects of Byzantine Attitudes and Policy towards the West in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries, in BF, XIII, 1988, p. 105-117.

3 Idem, Byzantine Diplomacy, A. D. 800-1204: Means and Ends, in vol. Byzantine Diplomacy. Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March, 1990. Edited by Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin, Belfast, Variorum, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1992, p. 65.

4 Donald M. Nicol, The Byzantine View of Western Europe, in GRBS, 8, 1967, no. 4, p. 319-320.

5 Paul Magdalino, The empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-1180, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 27-108. Manuel I did not unrealistically aim at restoring the mediteranean Empire during Justinian I (527-565)’s ruling, but tried to make the Christian sovereigns conscious of the belonging to the political family led by the Byzantine sovereign (Idem, The Phenomenon of Manuel I Komnenos, in BF, XIII, 1988, p. 181).

A Crowning in Constantinople 41 attitude of admiration for the Latins’ military qualities was shaped6. Simultaneously, in the Western world appeared and were generalized the mental stereotypes regarding Greeks’ cowardice and perfidy7. One may say that these mental developments were caused and also caused a series of events, such as the Venetians’ expulsion by Manuel I’s order, on March, 12th, 11718, and the massacre of Latin population in Constantinople, in April 11829. After being enthroned, Isaac II (1185-1195) focused his efforts to restore the relations with Venice10. The political change in 1195 was but a disaster for the merchants in the city of Saint Mark, although the new emperor Alexios III Anghelos (1195-1203) wanted to keep the appearances in bilateral relations11. A turning point in the relations with the West occurred in 1196, when the ruler in Constantinople had to satisfy the exorbitant cash demands of the German emperor Henry VI (1190-1197) and imposed a highly unpopular taxation12. As a result of this complexity of factors, the collective mind of the crusaders bore the idea that Constantinople was an obstacle on their way to Jerusalem13. In late 12th century, the negative perceptions on the Byzantine political realities were exacerbated by the echo produced by the political turmoil in the Oriental Empire. Thus, the perception of illegitimacy that Westerners

6 Catherine Asdracha, L’image de l’homme occidental à Byzance: le

témoignage de Kinnamos et de Choniatès, in BS, XLIV, 1982, f. 1, p. 34-38. 7 Marc Carrier, L’image du grec selon les chroniqueurs des croisades:

perceptions et réactions face au cérémonial byzantin 1096 à 1204, Université de Sherbrooke, 2000, p. 62.

8 Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice. A study in diplomatic and cultural relations, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 97.

9 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, Pearson Education Limited, 2003, p. 60.

10 Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, p. 114-116. 11 Ibidem, p. 121. 12 Charles M. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West (1180-1204), Harvard

University Press, 1968, p. 189-194. 13 Michel Balard, Un marché à prendre: ľinvasion occidentale, in vol.

Constantinople (1054-1261). Tête de la chrétienté, proie des Latins, capitale grecque. Dirigé par Alain Ducellier et Michel Balard, Paris, Éditions Autrement, 1996, p. 200.

42 Bogdan-Petru Maleon had about the ruling on Bosporus was consolidated with the violent overthrows in the end of the Comnenos’ ruling. The first such an event occurred in September 1183, when the co-emperor Andronicos had Alexios II (1180-1183), the legitimate successor to the throne, strangled14. The excitement caused by this murder was also amplified by the fact that Manuel I’s young son was married to Agnes, Louis VII’s daughter, only 11 years old, who later became wife of Andronicos I (1183-1185), 65 years old15. In Western Europe, this regicide, immediately followed by an unusual matrimonial union, fueled the negative imagery associated with the Byzantine court16. Facing rebellions and external threats, the old emperor ordered executions, blindness and detentions, under any pretext, against the aristocracy and introduced new people in administration17. Thus, an important role in shaping that perception was played by the fact that political violence was resumed after a break of one hundred years and marked all the political changes in the period up to 1204. Other political events that produced a strong echo in the West were the violent overthrow of Andronicos I18 and Isaac II’s blindness by his brother Alexios III19. The impression of instability of the power in Constantinople was also stressed by the lack of succession principles similar to those which, during that period, were leading to the consolidation of hereditary monarchies in the West. The feeling of fragility of the leaders in Constantinople relied also on the fact that Isaac II was unable to impose himself against the aristocracy20, as his reign faced the Comnenos’ riots in the capital and conspiracies of land

14 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 49. 15 Carolina Cupane, La <<guerra civile>> della primavera 1181 nel raccoto

di Niceta Coniate e Eustazio di Tessalonica: Narratologia Historiae Ancilla?, in JÖB, 47, 1997, p. 179-194.

16 Michael Angold, op. cit., p. 61-67. 17 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 54-62. 18 A City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates. Translated by Harry J.

Magoulias, Wayne State University Press, 1984, IV/II, p. 192. 19 Ibidem, V/III, p. 247-248. 20 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 82.

A Crowning in Constantinople 43 owners in Asia Minor21. In terms of internal Byzantine politics, this situation was explained by the collapse of the power mechanism imposed by the Comnenos emperors22. According to it, the Empire worked for the benefit of the ruling house, its customers and allies. The solidarity within this élite was the essential condition for the effective functioning of the government system23. The emperors’ systematic appeal to their family members to occupy the highest positions in the state was also to be met before Alexios I Comnenos (1081-1118). The last Macedonian emperors, and especially the Ducas family, resorted to this practice. Even earlier, the iconoclastic rulers assigned important posts in the civil administration to their relatives, but did not do it in a systematic manner as the Comnenos used to, and, furthermore, did not invent titles especially for their family members, as the latter did. Under the Comnenos ruling, the monopoly established by the leader clan on military and civilian functions reached the highest level throughout the entire Byzantine history. This political balance was broken shortly after Manuel I’s death, as demonstrated by the events between 1180 and 1185. After a fragile regency and the violent ruling of Andronicos I, the Anghelos were not able to control those in top of the administrative apparatus, while the Byzantine aristocracy developed a tendency of autonomy in relation to the ruling in Constantinople24. In addition, along with Andronicos I’s ascent to the throne, the city’s population strongly reanimated the political scene, recovering its major role of limiting the power of monarchy25. For example, Isaac II seized the power by taking advantage of the Constantinopolitan population’s spontaneous protest

21 Ibidem, p. 84-87. 22 Michael Angold, The road to 1204: the Byzantine background of the

Fourth Crusade, in JMH, 25, 1999, no. 3, p. 259. 23 Ibidem, p. 260. 24 A. P. Kazhdan and Ann Wharton Epstein, Change in Byzantine Culture in

the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, University of California Press, 1985, p. 69-70. 25 Peter Charanis, The Role of the People in the Political Life of the Byzantine

Empire: The Period of the Comneni and the Palaeologi, in BS/EB, 5, 1978, f. 1-2, p. 69-73.

44 Bogdan-Petru Maleon and not as a result of a plot carefully organized by representatives of the elite, and his ruling was possible due to the help of the Latin mercenaries26. During the time, the local separatism fully manifested, both in Europe27, through the founding of the second Bulgarian kingdom28, and in Anatolia29.

During the conflict with Vlachs and Bulgarians, the nobles’ opposition to the imperial ruling increased and the opponents were willing to sustain the sebastocrator Alexios30. In 1195 Isaac II decided to take personal charge of operations in the Balkans, but while he was hunting in Thrace, on the Maritza valley, his opponents entered the camp and proclaimed his brother Alexios III31. The conspirators captured and blinded Isaac II, and imprisoned him in a palace in Constantinople32. The plot was orchestrated by five of the most influential clans of the Empire33, and the change was accepted by the aristocracy and the population in the capital34. The new emperor was able to find supporters among the most powerful families by making matrimonial alliances for which he used his daughters35. However, due to the manner in which he took the throne, Alexios III remained dependent on the aristocrats who had conspired with him. They claimed a broad autonomy in relation to central government, which illustrated the emphasizing trends of the Empire’s enclavization36. Thus, the dissidences during Isaac II’s ruling were replaced with an

26 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204). A Political History,

London and New York, Longman, 1984, p. 269. 27 Rodolphe Guilland, Byzance et les Balkans, sous le regne ďIsaac II Ange

(1185-1195), in “Actes du XIIe Congrès International ďÉtudes Byzantines, Ochride, 10-16 septembre, 1961”, tome II, Beograd, 1964, Kraus Reprint, 1978, p. 125-137.

28 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204), p. 272-275. 29 Ibidem, p. 275-278. 30 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 110-111. 31 Ibidem, p. 112. 32 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204), p. 274. 33 Idem, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 77. 34 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 118. 35 Michael Angold, Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade, in vol.

Urbs Capta, p. 58-59. 36 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 156.

A Crowning in Constantinople 45 emphasis of autonomist typology, which illustrated the reversal system from the Comnenos’ time, when the imperial family was the centripetal factor to ensure cohesion of the state. There added the opposition from those sustaining the Comnenos’ returning, illustrative in this regard being the conspiracy which ended with the execution of the claimant John Comnenos37. It seemed that after the failure of his attempt of taking the power, the position of Isaac II and his son Alexios worsened. The decision of the latter’s escaping to the West was probably taken during that moment, particularly since Isaac II was probably still in touch with his daughter, Eirene, wife of Philip of Swabia38. Under these circumstances it was obvious that Isaac II’s son left Byzantium helped by his Western supporters39. This escape was facilitated by the fact that the young Alexios had been freed from jail by his uncle Alexios III, so as to join him in the campaign against the renegade protostator Manuel Kamytzes. The 17-19 years old prince left the camp and took refuge on a Pisan ship anchored in the Athyra port on the Sea of Marmora, from where he managed to reach Ancona, in autumn of 120140. According to an opinion widely assumed by the historiography, immediately after his arrival in Italy the young claimant had an unsuccessful meeting with Innocent III (1198-1216)41. After that moment, for the last months of the year he stayed at his brother in law’s court, where he met Boniface of Montferrat, the new leader of a crusade, who was preparing the expedition to Egypt42. On this occasion the expedition diversion plan was outlined towards

37 Michael Angold, Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade, p. 60-62. 38 Ibidem, p. 62. 39 Idem, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 40 40 Donald M. Nicol, The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires,

1204 – 61, in Idem, Byzantium: its ecclesiastical history and relations with the Western World. Collected Studies. Preface by Steven Runciman, London, Variorum Reprints, 1972, p. 278.

41 Joseph Gill, S. J., Byzantium and the Papacy (1198-1400), New Brunkwick, New Jersey, 1979, p. 14.

42 Jean Richard, La croisade: ľévolution des conceptions et des stratégies, in Idem, Francs et Orientaux dans le monde des croisades, Variorum, Ashgate Publishing, 2003, p. 14-15.

46 Bogdan-Petru Maleon the capital of the Eastern Christian Empire, in order to give back the throne to the legitimate sovereigns, in exchange for generous financial rewards43. According to J. Folda, the Pope received the young Alexios in audience later on, after the latter had spent the Christmas at his brother in law’s court44. The author related that „perhaps in late February, Alexios went to Rome to seek papal support for the cause of seizing throne of Byzantium. The pope formally refused to help him and Alexios departed”45. Regardless of the punctual development of the events, it should be mentioned that the young wanderer was not the one who allowed the Westerners get involved in the affairs of Byzantium, as the requests for support and mercenaries had been lasting for almost two centuries. However, although the Latins’ intentions to interfere with Byzantine internal politics and even to control the Empire were lasting for over a hundred years, they were not ever given a decisive role in the political succession. Thus, one can say that, through his actions, the claimant gave the maximum dimension of the dependency on the Westerners46.

Even before the young Alexios’ leaving to the West, his uncle tried to win Innocent III on his part, promising the religious union in exchange, but the pontiff cautiously asked for concrete actions in this regard47. The emperor’s strategy was based on the idea that the holder of the Apostolic See was the decisive factor in determining the direction of the expedition. In the summer of 1198 Alexios III sent a letter to Innocent III asking for his support against threats from the West and, in his answer to the emperor and patriarch John X Kamateros (1198-1206), the Roman pontiff showed that “Greek Church should return as daughter to the Church, which is mother and

43 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204), p. 282. 44 J. Folda, The Fourth Crusade. Some Reconsiderations, in BS, XXVI, 1965,

p. 283-285. 45 Ibidem, p. 285-286. 46 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 28-31. 47 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 228-229.

A Crowning in Constantinople 47 mistress of all the faithful”48. The patriarch in Constantinople showed the pontiff that the main obstacle in ending the schism was the Roman primacy49. In the autumn of 1202 Alexios III was aware of the danger that the crusaders could have overthrow him and sent an embassy to ask for papal protection. On this occasion he denied his nephew’s rights to the throne, arguing that the Byzantine succession depended on appointing and not on inheritance50. In his response, on November, 16th, 1202 the St. Peter’s successor stated that he would not support the young Alexios, but wanted the union between the churches and the holy places’ liberation be accomplished, meaning exactly what the young wanderer had promised51. The letter the pope sent to the metropolis on the Bosporus was in fact a cunning attempt of blackmail, through which he wanted to obtain from Alexios III the subordination of the Eastern Church to Rome. Although he expressly forbade the crusader army to head to the Byzantine capital, the leader of the Latin Christendom did not want the ruler to find this out, as he sought to use the threat of an attack to obtain the Oriental church’s submission.

The crusaders decided to help the young Alexios after several probing and negotiations in which his brother played a vital role. The main moral argument was that the population in Constantinople wanted to remove the usurper who occupied the throne52. The promises to the crusaders were made in August or September 120253, so that on Alexios’ arrival in the crusader camp at Zara on April, 20th, 1203, the preparations had already been made by the German

48 Joseph Gill S. J., Innocent III and the Greeks: Aggressor or Apostle?, in

Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages, edited by Derek Baker, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1973, p. 95-96.

49 Joseph Gill, S. J., Byzantium and the Papacy (1198-1400), p. 12. 50 Ibidem, p. 15-16. 51 Ibidem, p. 16. 52 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade. The

Conquest of Constantinople. With an essay on primary sources by Alfred J. Andrea, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, p. 83.

53 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 86.

48 Bogdan-Petru Maleon negotiators54. However, the idea of intervening in the succession for the throne in Constantinople was unpopular among the knights, and its assumption would not have been possible without several leaders’ intervention, especially that of Boniface of Montferrat55. This reality was echoed by the contemporary writings, so that, according to Geoffroy of Villehardouin, the decision of helping the young Alexios was taken only in the last moment56. In fact, the Westerners’ interests in Byzantium were far more numerous, and Venice was directly concerned with Genoa’s growing influence in East57. Serenissima consistently pursued its goals, even at the cost of compromising the relations with papacy, as it happened after the diversion at Zara, after which Innocent III refused to revoke the Venetians’ excommunication58. Thus, the Doge Enrico Dandolo’s insistence for accepting the young Alexios’ offer mainly considered Venice protecting its interests threatened by his uncle59. Referring to miles Christi, beyond the temptation of the young Alexios’ promises, the appeal to the Byzantine prince seemed legitimate, both in terms of Christian moral and ethical values of the Western cavalry. The chivalrous honor expressed itself through personal courage in battle and loyalty to the senior. From this point of view, the ideal of chivalry came into conflict with the Byzantine way of being. For Westerners, the disgrace was associated to cowardice and betrayal, sins of which the crusaders accused the Eastern Christians. That explained why the Western chroniclers condemned Alexios II’s assassination by

54 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 88. 55 Ibidem, p. 97-98. 56 Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople. Éditée et traduite par

Edmond Faral, Paris, Société ďÉdition <<Les Belles Lettres>>, 1938, IV, 4/98-99, p. 99-100.

57 Edgar H. McNeal+, The Fourth Crusade, in vol. A History of the Crusades. Kenneth M. Setton, General Editor. Volume II, The Later Crusades, 1189-1311, Edited by Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 169-170.

58 A. J. Andrea, Ilona Motsiff, Pope Innocent III and the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade Army to Zara, in BS, XXXIII, 1972, f. 1, p. 23.

59 Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, p. 133-134.

A Crowning in Constantinople 49 Andronicos I in 1183 and motivated the support for young Alexios by the injustice done by Alexios III to his brother in 119560. Since the chivalric code urged for defending those weak and oppressed, the Byzantine emperor’s mutilation and imprisonment together with his underage son were able to impress61. It must be said that there was a long Byzantine tradition of political mutilations used to punish the emperors overthrown under charges of tyranny and the usurpers, as it was thought that, by provoking them an infirmity, they were permanently removed from the supreme power62. Although the Western Latin civilization did not resort to such practice, it came into contact with it in the Eastern Christian area, and some Westerners even became its victims. Despite that the existence of such episodes was unquestionable, the Westerners’ aversion to this punishment was so great, that there arose a series of legends meant to impress people. The best known of them referred to the mutilation, in 1172, by order of Manuel I Comnenos, of Doge Henrico Dandolo, the envoy of Serenissima to Constantinople, and the alleged story was cleverly speculated by the Venetians in the context of the fourth crusade63.

Arriving in Constantinople, the crusaders found out that the city’s population did not share their enthusiasm for bringing Isaac II’s son on the throne. Although the people wanted to support Alexios III against a rival led by Francs and Venetians, however, they were not

60 Marc Carrier, op. cit., p. 47. 61 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 87. 62 Evelyne Patlagean, Byzance et le blason pénal du corps, in vol. Du

Châtiment dans la cité. Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique. Table ronde organisée par l’École française de Rome avec le concours du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, (Rome 9-11 novembre 1982), École Française de Rome, Palais Farnèse, 1984, p. 405-427; Bogdan-Petru Maleon, Le rôle de la mutilation dans la lutte politique à Byzance. Genèse et évolution jusqu’au XIe siècle. Travaux cu colloque Le corps et ses hypostases en Europe et dans la société roumaine du Moyen Âge à l’époque contemporaine, 1 novembre 2008, Bucarest, coordinateurs: Constanţa Vintilă-Ghiţulescu et Alexandru-Florin Platon, Bucarest, New Europe College, 1010, p. 125-146.

63 Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo & the Rise of Venice, The John Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 63-64.

50 Bogdan-Petru Maleon willing to fight and see their properties threatened64. On this occasion, the people in Constantinople expressed its traditional role in political changes, ceasing to support the one that was not able to provide safety of daily life65. Facing this situation, the ruler flew during the night, taking a large sum of money and the imperial insignia with him. He maintained the control over some provinces and claimed, until 1211, that he was the only sovereign of Romaioi66. After Alexios III’s flight the officials re-enthroned Isaac II, although he was blind and senile67. The Western and Eastern sources related in an opposed manner Isaac II’s retuning to rule the Empire and the young Alexios’ coronation. According to Niketas Choniates, the overthrown emperor, blinded nine years before, was now being released and led by the eunuch Constantine to be enthroned in the Blachernae palace. The author noticed the novelty of this reinstallation in the night of 17 to 18 of July 1203, as the ex-emperor was re-enthroned and “was ordained to oversee all things” although he “was led by the hand to ascend the imperial throne”68. Unlike this narration, George Akropolites depicted Alexios III as the only legitimate ruler and avoided to call Isaac II and his son as emperors69. The most important Western chronicles also reminded the episode of Isaac II’s return on the Byzantine throne, talking about his total restoration, which was seen as a direct result of the crusaders’ actions. The only exception was Geoffroy of Villehardouin, who showed that the former ruler was freed by the population in the capital after Alexios III’s flight and took over the imperial clothes, after which he ascended the throne in the Blachernae

64 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 125. 65 Dion Smythe, Outsiders by Taxis: Perceptions of Non-Conformity in

Eleventh and Twelfth-Century Literature, in BF, XXIV, 1997, p. 244-245. 66 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 130. 67 Donald M. Nicol, The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires,

1204 – 61, p. 282. 68 Choniates, VII, p. 301. 69 George Akropolites, The History. Introduction, translation and commentary

by Ruth Macrides, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 81.

A Crowning in Constantinople 51 palace70. However, according to Robert of Clari, the crusaders released the former ruler and his wife, after which he and his son were given two thrones of gold, while Isaac II took the imperial throne71. In Devastatio Constantinopolitana there was a version similar to the last one, stating that the detention place was even the Blachernae palace72. By contrast, the Novgorod Chronicle offered a different perspective, showing that when young Alexios re-entered the city, he removed his father from the throne and became emperor himself. The Russian source even claimed that he would have asked his father: “You are blind, how can you rule? I am the emperor”. According to this source, contemporary to the events, from his monastic confinement Isaac II was only able to lament the fate of the city, the lost throne, the robbed monasteries and the gold promised to the crusaders73. This text offered an interpretation in agreement with the political practices accepted by the entire Orthodox world, according to which a blind person could not have been emperor74. The same reason was to be invoked in a short time also by the Latins, who considered Isaac II disqualified for the throne, which made them ask the power only for Alexios75. For the population in Constantinople, Isaac II’s restoration and the young Alexios’ coronation with the crusaders’ support did not mean the decay of the city, in terms of collective mentality, as these events were rather perceived as a regime change, especially since in the history of Byzantium the rulers frequently used the army to accede to the

70 Villehardouin, VI, 3/182, p. 185. 71 Robert de Clari, La conquête de Constantinople. Traduction par Pierre

Charlot, Paris, E. De Boccard, 1939, LII p. 114-115. 72 Devastatio Constantinopolitana, in Contemporary Sources for the Fourth

Crusade by Alfred J. Andrea with contributions by Brett E. Whalen, Brill, 2000, p. 217.

73 Sylvain Patri, La relation russe de la quatrième criosade, in Byz, LVIII, 1988, p. 485 [5]. Vezi şi Jared Gordon, The Novgorod Account of the Fourth Crusade, in Byz, XLIII, 1973, p. 302.

74 Donald M. Nicol, The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires, 1204 – 61, p. 282.

75 Charles M. Brand, op. cit., p. 241.

52 Bogdan-Petru Maleon throne76. It should be noted here that, between the imposition on the throne of Isaac I Comnenos (1057-1059) by the military forces77 and that of Alexios I Comnenos, the number of the mercenaries used in such situations substantially increased78, but it never depended exclusively on them, as it happened in the summer of 1203. To the crusaders, the restoration of the former emperor was likely to jeopardize the agreement with the claimant Alexios, so that they asked for his coronation as co-emperor and acceptance of his previous promises79. Although the old sovereign knew that the commitments assumed by his son to the Westerners could not be accomplished, he confirmed them80. The Westerners, however, were vital interested in the prince they sustained gaining the top position in the hierarchy of imperial power, which was a guarantee that his promises were to be fulfilled. Thus, after his coronation, the crusaders tended to ignore Isaac II, taking their favorite as the only emperor81. It was possible that Alexios himself to have been planned, on long term, the seizing of the whole power, based on the idea that the blindness mutilation permanently removed his father from the throne. An immediate removal of the first sovereign in the Anghelos family was not, however, in the benefit of the young imperial scion, as the population in the capital, who returned to the forefront of the power, preferred the restoration of a ruler who had suffered the worst possible mutilation, rather than a solution imposed by the Latins. At that moment, the wandering prince had two ways of succeeding to the throne: his father making him co-ruler, so that after his death to become emperor, or taking the whole power, and after that to gain recognition from the

76 Taxiarchis G. Kolias, Military Aspects of the Conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders, in Urbs Capta, p. 137.

77 J. Shepard, Isaac Comnenus’ Coronation Day, in BS, XXXVIII, 1977, p. 22-30.

78 Ferdinand Chalandon, Les Comnène. Etudes sur l’Empire Byzantin aux XIe et XIIe siècles. Alexis Ier Comnène (1081-1118), Paris, A. Picard et Fils, 1900, p. 45-50; See also Élisabeth Malamut, Alexis Ier Comnène, Paris, Ellipses, 2007.

79 Michael Angold, Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade, p. 64. 80 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 133. 81 Ibidem, p. 136.

A Crowning in Constantinople 53 constitutional factors82. The second way was riskier, due to the Byzantine aversion towards the forces standing behind him, so that the claimant option was to choose the solution that gave enough time to gain the confidence of his subjects.

The manner in which the Byzantine rituals that marked the access to the imperial throne took place offered valuable suggestions on the relations between the sovereigns who simultaneously ruled the Empire. Based on these general elements, the present analysis aims at emphasizing the place reserved for the two Anghelos in the coronation ceremony and in the imperial government. Like the ordainment, the crowning was a unique act, unrepeatable, since the power conferred by it was inalienable, which explained the fear for the return of former emperors. Those who managed to return on the throne were considered to have received supernatural support, their success proving that their temporary removal was an act of usurpation. Thus, one can understand why, when not physically removed, the overthrown sovereigns were mutilated or confined in monasteries, both situations being equivalent to social death83. An exception was the case of the emperor Justinian II (685-695, 705-711), who, in early 8th century, returned to lead the Empire, after which he had escaped from his Crimean exile and took refuge to Chazari, then to Bulgarians, who helped him84. He was not re-crowned85, as the repetition of the ritual was not proved even for other emperors, i.e. Constantine V, who

82 Rosemary Morris, Succession and usurpation: politics and rhetoric in the

late tenth century, in vol. New Constantines. The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th Centuries, “Papers from the Twenty-Sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, St. Andrews, March 1992”. Edited by Paul Magdalino, Aldershot, Variorum, 1994, p. 202.

83 Panayotis Yannopoulos, Le couronnement de ľempereur à Byzance: rituel et fond institutionel, in Byz, LXI, 1991, f. 1, p. 81.

84 Constance Head, On the date of Justinian II’s Restoration, in Byz, XXXIX, 1969, p. 104-107.

85 Idem, Justinian II of Byzantium, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, p. 114-115.

54 Bogdan-Petru Maleon temporarily lost the control over the capital86. Before 1204 there was actually no duplication of the coronation ritual, as it was thought that the gesture was unique and the divine delegation, perpetual. Only after 1204 its repetition was required, but only as a result of several major crises disturbing the life of the Byzantine State. A first case of this kind was that of Theodor I Lascaris (1204-1222), who was first crowned as despot, after which he received the imperial crown from the hands of the patriarch of Nicaea, on April 6th, 120887. Michael VIII was proclaimed only once, on January, 1st, 1259, but was twice crowned as emperor by the patriarch Arsenios (1254-1259; 1261-1265), the first time in Nicaea, in 1259 and then in Constantinople, in September-October 126188. Thus, the aim was to restore the ritual in Hagia Sophia, in the recovered Constantinople, for which he considered himself as New Constantine89. The claimant John Cantacuzenos was proclaimed at Didymoteicho and then crowned at Adrianople by the patriarch of Jerusalem, which required the resumption of the ceremony in the capital after the association with his son in law, John V Palaeologos (1341-1391), when he became emperor John VI (1347-1354)90. All these repetitions were, in fact, the expression of the desire to preserve the tradition intact, as the coronations not in compliance with all the traditions, were considered as temporary.

86 Stephen Gero, Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Constantine V with

particular attention to the Oriental Sources, Louvain, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 1977, p. 20.

87 Michael Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile. Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204-1261), Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 13.

88 Albert Failler, La proclamation impériale de Michel VIII et ďAndronic II, in REB, 44, 1986, p. 238-242.

89 Alice-Mary Talbot, The Restauration of Constantinople under Michael VIII, in DOP, 47, 1993, p. 260; Dimiter Angelov, Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204-1330, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 42-45.

90 Donald M. Nicol, The Reluctant Emperor. A biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and monk, c. 1295-1383, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 87.

A Crowning in Constantinople 55

The young Alexios Anghelos’ ascension must be looked at, both in terms of the traditional model, standardized described in the ceremonial literature, and the specific context of that political moment. From this point of view, it was suggestive that comparing the Book of Ceremonies to the concrete manner in which the access to the throne took place, Averil Cameron noticed: “A particular dissonance between the world of imperial ceremony and that of real life arose over the matter of imperial succession, where the theory that emperors were divinely elected and protected by God coexist with a situation in which there was in fact no constitutional procedure for choosing an emperor”91. According to the Byzantine political conception, the emperors were chosen by God, through the senate, army and people92. Those three constitutional factors were not supposed always to work together, as only two of them were sufficient93. The elective procedures were set off when the necessary arrangements had not been done, so that the new emperor be appointed before the death of the present sovereign. The agreement of the elective factors was mandatory before the coronation, even when it was only a mere confirmation of the present Emperor’s will94. The proclamation was a definitive act, by which a candidate was given the status of emperor, and the co-emperors had to be also proclaimed, after which the validation was accomplished by the cheers of the population in the capital. The sovereigns always tried to ensure succession in their families, but did not succeed until the 8th century95. Since the 10th century, with the imposition of the porphyrogenesis principle, only

91 Averil Cameron, The construction of court ritual: the Byzantine Book of Ceremonies, in vol. Rituals of Royalty. Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, edited by David Cannadine and Simon Price, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 124.

92 Milton V. Anastos, Vox populi voluntas Dei and the election of Byzantine Emperor, in Idem, Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History, London, Variorum Reprints, 1979, p. 181-182.

93 Ibidem, p. 182-183. 94 Ibidem, p. 183-184. 95 Peter Schreiner, Réflexions sur la famille imperiale à Byzance (VIIIe-Xe

siècles), in Byz, LXI, 1991, f. 1, p. 184.

56 Bogdan-Petru Maleon belonging to the ruling family conferred imperial aspirations96. After building a perspective of dynastic succession during the Comnenos, emperor’s children alone could become his co-rulers and successors, thus ignoring the principle of primogeniture97. However, the emperor associated his son when his position was strengthened enough to prevent the opposition from the people, notables and the patriarch.

Thus, the coronation did not give certain prerogatives, but attested a power and confirmed a function under divine protection, which in Byzantium was the ultimate form of legitimacy. That was because the rituals had a fundamental ideological importance in relation to the imperial function, and coronation was a much ritualized moment98. When the power was taken after a military stroke, its beneficiary could not have exercised the prerogatives of supreme power only by controlling the palace, treasure or Varangian guard, since the crowning was essential to legitimate a sovereign99. The importance of this ritual derived from the idea that God crowned every main emperor or co-ruler100. Thus, obtaining the legitimacy was inseparable from patriarchal coronation, although the old Roman method of proclamation was still the standard procedure for obtaining the power, and this ritual only had to confirm it101. While traditionally the proclamation was essential to accede to the throne, the Church gradually assumed itself an increasingly important role through the coronation, and during the last part of the Empire’s existence, the religious ritual became important and the patriarch of Constantinople

96 Ibidem, p. 186-187. 97 Alain Ducellier, La drame de Byzance. Idéal et échec ďune société

chrétienne, Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1976, p. 158-159. 98 Dean A. Miller, The Emperor and Ritual: Magic and Harmony, in BS/EB,

6, 1979, f. 1-2, p. 192. 99 Panayotis Yannopoulos, op. cit., p. 73. 100 Milton V. Anastos, op. cit., p. 199. 101 John Meyendorff, Ideological crises (1071 to 1261), in “XVe Congrès

International des Études byzantines” (Rapports et Co-Rapports), IV Pensée, philosophie, histoire des idées, 1. Crises idéologique, Athènes, 1976, p. 8.

A Crowning in Constantinople 57 gained the monopoly of its commission102. In time, it was settled that, in his absence, no one was to be accepted as basileus103, since it was considered that the patriarch only was able to mediate the transmission of power104. However, the religious crowning was never a decisive element for the ascension to the throne, although it gained a key role in legitimating the new emperors also in popular consciousness105. The religious coronation was also essential for the ascension to the throne of a co-emperor, but this time the head of the Church had a different role106. Thus, while in the main emperor’s coronation the patriarch made the actual crowning and the praying by which he showed that the new ruler had been chosen by divine will107, the junior was crowned by the emperor while the patriarch uttered the prayer108. When crowning the co-emperor, the patriarch transmitted the main emperor the imperial insignia, consisting in the imperial mantle, fibula and ceremonial crown, which the latter gave to his co-ruler109. While the Book of Ceremonies showed that the senior emperor put the crown on the head of the appointed co-ruler, thus making the actual coronation110, a later source on the Byzantine Aulic ceremony, assigned to Pseudo-Codinos, claimed that the emperor and

102 Konstantinos G. Pitsakis, Sainteté et empire. A propos de la saiteté

impériale: formes de saiteté <<ďoffice>> et la saiteté collective dans ľEmpire ďOrient?, in “Bizantinistica”, serie seconda, III, 2001, p. 158.

103 Peter Charanis, Coronation and its Constitutional Significance in the Later Roman Empire, in Byz, XV, 1940-1941, p. 54.

104 Ibidem, p. 56. 105 Konstantinos G. Pitsakis, op. cit., p. 158. 106 Peter Charanis, Coronation and its Constitutional Significance in the

Later Roman Empire, p. 56. 107 On the emperor’s coronation, see George P. Majeska, The Emperor in His

Church: Imperial Ritual in the Church of St. Sophia, in vol. Byzantine Court Culture from 829 ton 1204, edited by Henry Maguire, Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington, D. C., 1997, p. 1-11.

108 Miguel Arranz S. J., Couronnement royal et autres promotions de cour, in OCP, 56, 1990, f. I, see, particularly, “Couronnement des princes et de la reine”, p. 98.

109 Panayotis Yannopoulos, op. cit., p. 78. 110 Milton V. Anastos, op. cit., p. 200.

58 Bogdan-Petru Maleon patriarch together put the crown on the head of the associated ruler111. Although divergent, the mentioned narrations did not contradict each other, as the two versions most likely depicted the developments in relations between the Empire and Sacerdocy during the 10th-14th centuries. The fact that the coronation of a co-opted emperor was performed by his senior colleague was not an argument for the non-ecclesiastical nature of coronation, as it did not diminish the role of the patriarch, because the entire ceremony was a religious one and the head of the Byzantine Church had blessed the crown before the ceremony112. Whatever the details of the ritual, it was clear that only through the patriarch the divine grace was to be granted to the one chosen by God113. Thus, the procedure of crowning a co-emperor was based on the principle that the emperor on the throne was the only holder of sovereignty and had the right to give it to his successor, but only as an expression of Christ’s will, which was the ultimate source of power. From the perspective of the Church, the religious coronation had to maintain the Orthodox tradition and ecclesiastical privileges114, and a guarantee in this regard was the oath that the candidate made115. From this point of view, it should be noted that John X Kamateros accepted Alexios IV’s coronation, although he promised to obey the Eastern Church to the Roman See. Traditionally, the assistance at the crowning was made of officials, notables and militaries, namely the main representatives of electoral instances. The presence of the crusaders at Alexios Anghelos’ coronation on August, 1st, 1203, suggested that they assumed themselves a position of decision116. According to Byzantine political concepts, they were only mere

111 Ibidem, p. 200, n. 53. 112 Peter Charanis, Coronation and its Constitutional Significance in the

Later Roman Empire, p. 55-56. 113 Panayotis Yannopoulos, op. cit., p. 89. 114 Peter Charanis, Coronation and its Constitutional Significance in the

Later Roman Empire, p. 56. 115 Ibidem, p. 58-60. 116 On the crusaders claiming the crown, see Jean Longnon, Les compagnons

de Villehardouin. Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1978.

A Crowning in Constantinople 59 mercenaries and it was simply inconceivable for them to have replaced the constitutional mechanism of legitimating the emperor.

Both emperors and their associates were called basileus, but their rights differed117. The co-rulers became single emperors when the main sovereigns died, without any further institutional procedure, unlike those who seized the power and had to obtain the agreement of the constitutional factors118. As a rule, the emperor associated his son at the zenith of his reign, when his position was strengthened enough to prevent the opposition from the people, notables and the patriarch. The procedure required that he be validated by the acclamations of the population in the capital and the army, even if the military factor was not involved in taking the decision119. Before being deposed and blinded, Isaac II had not had the time to crown his son, so that young Alexios was perceived as usurper by many Byzantines. That was because his father no longer possessed the qualities by virtue of which an emperor could have appointed a successor, as his blindness was associated with the lack of being right. As a result of the hostile atmosphere in the capital, Alexios IV’s proclamation occurred de facto in the crusaders’ camp, contrary to the traditional constitutional practices. Moreover, according to Niketas Choniates, the Latin allies of young Alexios forced the willingness of the emperor, and the agreement of the population in the capital to crown him120. Among the Western chroniclers, the most unequivocally was Robert of Clari, who stated that the barons asked Isaac II acknowledge the commitments assumed by his son and fix a day for his coronation121. Other Western

117 Jeane-Marie Sansterre, À propos des titres ďempereur et de roi dans le

haut Moyen Âge, in Byz, LXI, 1991, p. 91. 118 Panayotis Yannopoulos, op. cit., p. 71. (The difference between a co-

emperor and an usurper was that “Le premier était déjà empereur légitime et il devait devenir effectif, tandis que le second étant déjà effectif devait être légitime”, p. 74).

119 Miguel Arranz S. J., op. cit., p. 125. 120 Choniates, VII, p. 302. 121 Clari, LVI, p. 120-121.

60 Bogdan-Petru Maleon sources also, like Devastatio Constantinopolitana122, Chronicle of Ralph of Coggeshall123 or Chronicle of Alberic of Trois Fontaines124 concisely confirmed this mechanism of decision. Only the diplomat Geoffrey of Villehardouin claimed that the young prince was welcomed by the population of Constantinople125, and the coronation was the expression of an agreement between Isaac II and the crusaders126. Summarizing these data, one may say that the young Alexios could not have claimed the conquest of power, since he had no chance to be validated later by the Byzantine representative instances, as he was only to rely on the shaky legitimacy offered by the association with his helpless father. This new situation given, one can question whether the presence of the Western knights as a decision factor at the young Alexios’ coronation could have led to some changes in the ceremony. The main change could have taken place in the ritual of anointing. On the moment of its bringing in Byzantium there are divergent views in the modern historiography. According to Georg Ostrogorsky, anointing with oil was not part of the coronation ceremony in Byzantium before 1204, when it emerged as a gesture of imitation of the Latin emperors in Constantinople. The narrations on this ritual in the Byzantine sources for the period prior to the fourth crusade were either metaphorical or transferred to a far before reality127. After this point of view occurred, Donald M. Nicol

122 Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, p. 217. 123 Ibidem, p. 284. 124 Ibidem, p. 300. 125 Villehardouin, VI, 3/190, p. 193. 126 Ibidem, 193, p. 197. 127 Georg Ostrogorsky, Zur Kaisersalbung and Schilderhebung im

spätbyzantinischen Krönungszeremoniell, in Idem, Zur Byzantinischen Geschichte, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstsdt, 1973, p. 142-152. This opinion was also agreed by other historians, like John Meyendorff, according to whom in 1208 Theodore I Lascaris was anointed with holy chrism at Nicaea, by the patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos (1208-1214), a ritual that “was probably introduced in emulation of the Latin emperors of Constantinople” (Ideological crises, p. 8-9). For Gilbert Dagron, the first emperor at Nicaea “fut peut-être le premier qui s’accompagna ďune onction pratiquée par le patriarche avec le saint chrême au

A Crowning in Constantinople 61 opposed it, claiming that the emperors in the Comnenos dynasty were much more willing to adopt this practice, than those in Nicaea. One can hardly imagine that the latter would have agreed to a political ritual specific for those they considered as their main rivals. According to the author, in the 12th century there was adopted the anointing with holy myron, which was applied only on the head in a cross form, assigning a deeply religious content to the coronation ritual128. The imperial anointing in Byzantium was inspired by the David model, given the privileged place of the Judean king within the concept on imperial power129. In light of these findings, one can say that the crusaders’ attending Alexios IV’s coronation gave them the opportunity to adopt several elements of the Byzantine ceremony, which they were to use in enthroning Baudouin of Flandre in Constantinople, rather than to influence the manner of crowning the emperors130.

After the ascension to the throne on August, 1st Alexios IV did everything possible to honor his obligations to the Westerners, beginning with the payment of a first rata of 100.000 marks of the promised amount. As the rest of the money could not have been gathered, the Latins agreed to wait until September, 29th, the feast of St. Michael catholic131. Only their presence gave the young emperor confidence in his ruling, as he only possessed Constantinople, while Alexios III set in Trace132. The Westerners supported Alexios IV in his actions in Europe, but in Asia Minor there continued the process of autonomy of several aristocrats. An example in this regard was Philadelphia, where Ioan Comnenos Vatatzes stood up against

myron, préparé solennellement le jeudi saint, trois jours avant” (Empereur et prêtre. Etude sur le “césaropapisme” byzantin, Paris, Èditions Gallimard, 1996, p. 282).

128 Donald M. Nicol, Kaisersalbung. The Unction of Emperors in Late Byzantine Coronation Ritual, in BMGS, 2, 1976, p. 41-52.

129 Christopher Walter, The Significance of Unction in Byzantine Iconography, in BMGS, 2, 1976, p. 53-66.

130 Marc Carrier, op. cit., p. 139-140. 131 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204), p. 293-294. 132 Ibidem, p. 294.

62 Bogdan-Petru Maleon Andronicos I, as he considered him a tyrant, thus inaugurating an autonomous government between 1182 and 1189133. Isaac II took back the control, for a short period of time, but the revolt of Theodore Mankaphas, a native from Philadelphia, managed to detach the city from the Empire134. In an attempt to control at least the area near the capital, Alexios IV performed with the Westerners an expedition to Thrace, in which he failed to annihilate Alexios III135, but on November, 11th, he organized himself a triumphal entry into Constantinople136. After returning from the Balkan campaign, relations between Alexios IV and the crusaders became distant, especially that the people was more hostile to the Western knights. The young sovereign actually became captive to his allies, who gave him an ultimatum to accomplish his obligations137. Meanwhile, the metropolis on the Bosporus faced a series of confrontations between the Greek majority and the Latin minority138. Under these circumstances, Alexios IV understood that he was not able to fulfill the commitments made to the crusaders and sought for support among the Greeks139.

Another cause of tension between Byzantines and Westerners was represented by the fact that the complicated case of uniting the two Churches was not settled according to the promise the young Alexios, when in exile, made to the Latins. In order to honor previous obligations, after being enthroned, he began the negotiations with the

133 Jean-Claude Cheynet, Philadelphie, un quart de siècle de dissidence, 1182-1206, in Idem, The Byzantine Aristocracy and Its Military Function, Ashgate, Variorum, 2006, p. 40-44.

134 Ibidem, p. 45-50. 135 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 143-144. 136 Ibidem, p. 148. On the manner the military triumph in Byzantium was

organized, see Michael McCormick, Eternal Victory. Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity. Byzantium and the Early Medieval West, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 189-230, and on its route in Constantinople, see Cyril Mango, The Triumphal Way of Constantinople and the Golden Gate, in DOP, 54, 2000, p. 173-186.

137 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 96. 138 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 145-146. 139 Ibidem, p. 152-153.

A Crowning in Constantinople 63 Orthodox clergy to unite with Rome. Achieving this goal was particularly important, because, in pontifical terms, it was the only reason for the diversion of the crusade140. In the letter on August, 5th, 1203 the crusaders and Alexios IV assured Innocent III of their obedience141. In his response, the pontiff showed that the best proof of the sincerity of the promises made by the young emperor and the crusaders was that the patriarch admitted the primacy and supreme teaching office of Roman Church, promised reverence and obedience and requested the pallium from the Apostolic See 142. Alexios IV and patriarch John X announced the submission to the Roman church, but made no effort to impose the Roman doctrine and worship to the people143. In fact, the Byzantines did not want to accept the union even after Alexios IV’s installation and believed that they could have led the traditional politics of delay144. At the same time, Alexios IV’s seizure of ecclesiastical wealth so as to pay the crusaders inflamed the population and increased the aversion towards Latins145. Taking these into account, the young emperor’s failure of attracting public and aristocracy’s support was due to the fact that the Byzantines feared their church’s subordination to the Apostolic See and the costs of the Latin presence146. Thus, the crowning made under the crusaders’ pressure drew the hostility of aristocracy and court, and the religious politics made him unpopular among the masses147. Under these conditions, the population in the capital turned to another government solution, which to meet their expectations148. In late January 1204 the crowd refused to accept the ruling of Anghelos and went to Hagia Sophia to impose its own candidate for the throne, namely the

140 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 95. 141 Joseph Gill, S. J., Byzantium and the Papacy (1198-1400), p. 19. 142 Idem, Innocent III and the Greeks: Aggressor or Apostle?, p. 96. 143 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 141. 144 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 46-47. 145 Ibidem, p. 47. 146 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 110-111. 147 Antonio Carile, Per una storia dell’Impero Latino di Costantinopoli

(1204-1261). Seconda Edizione Ampliata, Bologna, Pàtron Editore, 1978, p. 135. 148 Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire (1025-1204), p. 294.

64 Bogdan-Petru Maleon aristocrat Nikolaos Kanabos149. Alexios IV made a desperate appeal to Boniface of Montferrat, but this last attempt to get the support of the Westerners failed150. Under these circumstances dominated by confusion, the power was taken by Alexios Doukas Mourtzouphlos151, who, on February, 5th, several days after his proclamation and taking over the imperial insignia, was crowned as Alexios V152. On 7th or 8th of February, he met Enrico Dandolo, but refused the latter’s request of fulfilling the promises made by his predecessor, and his restoration153. In fact, the new emperor’s intentions were exactly opposite, so that, after several attempts of poisoning, during the night of 8/9 of February he had Alexios IV strangled and announced his death by natural causes154. He broke this way any collaboration with the crusaders, who considered Alexios V murderer and usurper155. The new emperor failed to make him accepted by all instances and even less by the aristocracy, who felt directly affected by his measures. That was the reason for which on April, 12th or maybe during the night of 13th, in the last moments of independence, the Senate members, among which it may have been the patriarch also, chose Theodore Lascaris as emperor, but he did not have the time to be crowned156.

149 Edgar H. McNeal+, op. cit., p. 181. 150 Donald M. Nicol, The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires,

1204 – 61, p. 284. 151 On his life and career before that moment, see Benjamin Hendrickx,

Corinna Matzukis, Alexios V Doukas Mourtzouphlos: His Life, Reign and Death (?-1204), in Hell, 31, 1979, p. 111-117.

152 Ibidem, p. 119-120. 153 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 168; Benjamin

Hendrickx, Corinna Matzukis, op. cit., p. 123-124. 154 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 169. 155 Benjamin Hendrickx, Corinna Matzukis, op. cit., p. 124-125. An eloquent

expression of this perception is found in Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Paris (The Capture of Constantinople. Edited and translated by Alfred J. Andrea, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, 13, p. 95)

156 Benjamin Hendrickx, Corinna Matzukis, op. cit., p. 127. According to another opinion, the person now chosen to take the power was Constantine Lascaris, Theodor’s elder brother (on the whole historiography of this supposed emperor, see Alexis G. C. Savvides, Constantine XI Lascaris, Uncrowned and Ephemeral <<Basileus of the Rhomaioi>> After the Fall of Constantinople to the Forth

A Crowning in Constantinople 65

The place of Isaac II in the imperial government after August, 1st, 1203 and the way he ended his existence are difficult to be related. After his son was crowned in the presence of the crusade’s leaders, the old basileus faced an ambiguous situation, especially that he did not agree with the Latins’ support to Alexios IV157. Niketas Choniates claimed that during the absence of the young emperor, who was in a campaign in Thrace together with the Western knights, his father tried to erode his image by slandering him, as he felt his intentions of taking the whole power158. From this point of view, it seemed plausible that Isaac II was isolated, once the young emperor arrived in the capital. Although Alexios IV relied on his father’s blindness to totally remove him from the power, he did not have sufficient arguments to claim the position of principal basileus. His ascension to the throne evaded the traditional manner of succession, based essentially on the will of a powerful basileus who designated his successor with agreement of elective forums. In addition, the Balkan expedition had given him no chance of a victory that could symbolically legitimized his reign and his triumphal entry in the capital appeared to have fooled no one. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to believe that he brutally removed his father, since his existence was, paradoxically, the only argument to justify to Byzantines his position on the throne. Many of them probably remembered, how, almost twenty years before, Isaac Anghelos rejected Andronicos I’s tyranny, while his son could not have “praise” himself but with the burden of the Latin army at the gates of the metropolis on the Bosporus. The exact manner of the physical disappearance of the old emperor is impossible to reconstruct, but on identifying the moment when it took place must be stressed, since its

Crusade, in “Byzantiaka”, 7, 1987, p. 143-161). After the abandonment of the capital conquered by the Latins he would have decided to relinquish his imperial title to his brother Theodore, who was proclaimed in 1205 and then crowned by the new patriarch, Michael IV, on Easter Day of 1208 at Nicaea (p. 163).

157 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 148. 158 Choniates, VII, p. 304-305.

66 Bogdan-Petru Maleon placement in the progress of the events is of great importance in terms of the discussion on succession to the throne. When Alexios Mourtzouphlos decided the deposition and arrest of Alexios IV, it was obvious that the latter, and not his father, was guilty for the disastrous condition that the Empire was facing. Only the disappearance of Isaac II, however, could have left the way open for another pretender to the throne. The fact that in the meantime, Mourtzouphlos overthrew Nikolaos Kanabos, the crowd’s favorite, whom the patriarch John X Kamateros had refused to crown, was not enough to unlock the constitutional mechanism of succession159. The real reasons for Isaac II’s death are not precisely known, the most plausible alternatives being that the old ruler, already senile, left this world after his son’s arrest, of fright or of old age, although suspicions of assassination can not be excluded160. Regardless of how it took place, most of the researchers recently agree that the death occurred at a time that can not be precisely determined, between late January and 8 February, when Alexios IV was killed161. Terminus ante quem related to Isaac II’s death can be lowered, if the events in this short period of time are to be interpreted in light of the principles governing the succession to the throne in the Byzantine Empire. Isaac II’s condition of restored emperor always remained problematic because of its cecity, but, at the same time, his presence could have been an obstacle for a claimant to become legitimate ruler. For this reason, it can be assumed that the patriarch John X accepted to crown Alexios Mourtzouphlos only after Alexios IV’s deposition and Isaac II’s death. Based on these considerations, the death of the first representatives of Anghelos family who reached the imperial throne can be placed in the period between the removal of his son and Alexios V’s coronation, on February, 5th, 1204162. Another argument for the placement of these

159 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 164. 160 Ibidem. 161 Ibidem; Rudolf Hiestand, Die erste ehe Isaaks II. Angelos und seine

Kinder, in JÖB, 47, 1997, p. 207. 162 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 165.

A Crowning in Constantinople 67 events in an ideological grid is that the new emperor eliminated the ex-emperor in captivity, soon after he met Enrico Dandolo. On that occasion, the Latins confirmed him that for them the only legitimate sovereign was Alexios IV and they were not to accept Alexios V on the Byzantine throne as long as the former was still alive163. Under these circumstances, Alexios V adopted an anti-Latin rhetoric, thereby seeking to build his legitimacy through traditional constitutional factors164. The new emperor was aware that he had not got the power after a victory against the claimant sustained by the Latins, but after a stroke in the palace and thus needed a success against his enemies from outside to be presented as a restorer of the order inside. Isaac II did not appear in the context of these events anymore, suggesting thus that he died before February, 5th.

The crusaders’ main argument when drawing the plan of conquering Constantinople was that the agreement they had with the young Alexios had been broken165. Emblematic in this regard was that, by March 1204, the Latins did not think of conquering the metropolis on the Bosporus, as their main concern was to obtain the necessary resources to continue the expedition to the Holy Land166. Evidence in support of this interpretation was that the document of the split of Byzantine territory, known as Partitio Romaniae, was issued between April, 12th, the day of the Western forces’ entry in the city and May, 9th, when the new Latin emperor in Constantinople was elected167. This time also, the population in the capital did not see the

163 Ibidem, p. 167-169. 164 There had not been any virulent anti-Latin in the past (Benjamin

Hendrickx, Corinna Matzukis, op. cit., p. 117-118), which may conclude that this change of attitude did not make him credible.

165 Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade. Event and Context, p. 98-99. 166 Marco Meschini, The “Four Crusade” of 1204, in The Fourth Crusade:

Event, Aftermath and Perceptions. “Papers from the Sixth Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East”, Istanbul, Turkey, 25-29 August, 2004. Edited by Thomas F. Madden, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008, p. 34-35.

167 Nicolas Oikonomidès, La décomposition de ľEmpire Byzantin a la veille de 1204 et les origines de ľEmpire de Nicée: a propos de la Partitio Romaniae, in “XVe Congrès International ďÉtudes Byzantines”, (Rapports et Co-Rapports), I.

68 Bogdan-Petru Maleon crusaders’ action as an act of conquest, but rather as a change of regime, which mainly explained its lack of appetite for resistance168. Thus, the people in Constantinople did not make the distinction between the previous military strokes and the present conquest, believing that it was only a political change and their goods were not be seriously affected169. That is why on April, 13th, they offered the crown to Boniface of Montferrat, which would have meant a peaceful transfer of power, but he refused the offer, giving thus the signal for devastation170. Alexios V Murzuphlos tried, without much success, to persuade the officials and citizens to resist the Latin invaders171. The usual explanations for the easy obtained success of the Latins referred to the conflict within Constantinople, between mercenary troops and the imperial power172, and the Anghelos’ excessive taxation that deeply troubled the citizens173. This last argument had serious grounds, considering that the tax oppression to which the people in the capital were subjected grew after 1196, as the taxes increased so as Alexios III satisfy Henry VI’s claims and Alexios IV those of the crusaders174. However, the deficiencies of coordinating the defense and tax considerations were not sufficient to explain why the city defense surrendered so easily. Regarding the Byzantine authors, they saw the disaster from the perspective of the Romans and their leaders’ sins175. However, between the summer of 1203 and the spring of the

Histoire, 1. Forces centrifuges et centripètes dans le monde byzantin entre 1071 et 1261, Athènes, 1976, p. 8-11.

168 Taxiarchis G. Kolias, op. cit., p. 137. 169 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, op. cit., p. 187. 170 Ibidem, p. 191-192. 171 Benjamin Hendrickx, Corinna Matzukis, op. cit., p. 125. 172 E. Frances, Sur la conquête de Constantinople par les latins, in BS, XV,

1954, p. 21-22. 173 Michael Angold, Byzantine Politics vis-à-vis the Fourth Crusade, p. 42-

53. 174 E. Frances, op. cit., p. 22-23. 175 R. J. Macrides, From the Komnenoi to the Palaiologoi: imperial models in

decline and exile, in vol. New Constantines. The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th Centuries, “Papers from the Twenty-sixth Spring Symposium of

A Crowning in Constantinople 69 next one, Constantinople was detached from the rest of the Empire, and during this isolation, the population in the city regained its decisive political role. During the 11th century, its position was prominent, but in the time of the Comnenos the city masses disappeared from the stage, so as to return in July-August 1203 and Janury-April 1204176. The decline of Byzantine political balance under the first three Comnenos led to the crisis of legitimacy during the Anghelos ruling and the final collapse in 1204. The immediate causes of this latest disaster consisted in the total lack of popular adherence to the project of imposition of young Alexios Anghelos by the crusaders. Emblematic in this regard was that he lacked the minimal scaffold of supporters which to allow him consolidate the power. From this point of view, the coronation on August 1st, 1203 was the expression of the worst sideslip, meant to cause a huge gap between the ruler and his subjects. Until that moment, the coronation of emperor’s children was part of the succession strategies, and the initiative belonged to the sovereigns on the throne, who had to gain the electoral factors’ agreement. The tradition was now seriously compromised, as Alexios IV was imposed by a force outside of the Empire, and his lack of legitimacy hastened both his end and the Byzantine State’s.

Byzantine Studies, St. Andrews, March 1992”, Edited by Paul Magdalino, Aldershot, Variorum, 1994, p. 269-270.

176 Michael Angold, The road to 1204, p. 276-277.