I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Administrative Law – That branch of modern law under which the executive department of thegovernment acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct ofthe individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community, as under lawsregulating public corporations, business affected with public interest, professions, trade andcalling, rates and prices, laws for the protection of the public health and safety and the promotionof the public convenience and advantage.

Administrative Code of 1987

Sec. 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the “Administrative Code of 1987.”

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as awhole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entitythrough which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines,including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through whichpolitical authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to theautonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay subdivisions or other formsof local government.

(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, asdistinguished from the different forms of local governments.

(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance withthe Constitutions

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including adepartment, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations,or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, thisshall include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of adepartment, regardless of its name or designation.

(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of BookIV, this shall include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given orassigned the rank of a bureau regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case ofdepartment-wide regional offices.

(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functionalunit of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any positionheld or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation.

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within thedepartment framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with someif not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,

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usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions andgovernment-owned or controlled corporations.

(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons,the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board orcouncil.

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives.This term includes the state universities and colleges and then monetary authority of the State.

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock ornon-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental orproprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalitieseither wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of atleast 51% of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations maybe further categorized by the Department of Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and theCommission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers,functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

Sec. 16 Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, orofficers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of theGovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may beauthorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lowerin rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,commissions, or boards.

Kinds of Administrative Law

1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities2. The body of the doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of

determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities3. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities in pursuance of the purposes

for which administrative authorities were created or endowed4. Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities in the settlement of

controversies arising in their particular fields.

The 1987 Administrative Code did not entirely repeal or modify the Revised AdministrativeCode and special legislations because what the 1987 Code repealed or modified are only those“all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with thisCode are hereby repealed or modified accordingly (Sec. 27 Book VII of AC of 1987)

Administrative Codes in question depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause.

2 Administrative Codes

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1. General laws2. Between the codes and special legislations on specific subject matters,

Special legislations will prevail as an exception to the former

Statutory principle: General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable .

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affair of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Presumption: is that special statutes are exceptions to general law because they pertain to a special charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances

Sources of Administrative Law:

1. Constitution2. Statutes creating administrative bodies3. Court decisions interpreting the charters of administrative bodies4. The body of rules, regulations and orders issued by administrative agencies

CASES:

1. Mecano v. COA (Reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses)

F - Mecano  is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. Reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC.

I – WON RAC was repealed by AC 1987?

H – RAC was not repealed by AC 1987. As a gen. rule, the later act is to be construed as acontinuation of, and not substitute for the first act and will continue so for as the two acts arethe same from the time of first enactment. Thus, before there can be a repeal, there must be aclear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogatethe old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.

It is settled that repeal of a statute by implication is not favoured.

It is clear that the earlier law is culled (Cull – select from a group) in a general repeal clause.In the absence of an expressed repeal, there will be an implied repeal only if the later law and theearlier law are clearly and convincingly irreconcilable. However, there is no implied repeal inthis case because the later and earlier laws can be reconciled through a reasonable construction ofa statute.

2. Leveriza . IAC (Contract of Lease)

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F - Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented byCivil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; andContract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.

Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground thatContract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the defendantCAA  and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contractinsofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.

Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legallycancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAAwhich should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado wasineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed by Leveriza inleasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAAfurther asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works andCommunications is not valid.

I - There is no dispute that Contract  A  at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not  said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A

H – YES. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically “forthe purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going inand out of the airport.”

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:

7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in sucheventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, suchtransfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.

Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:

8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.

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It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B)with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in aletter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.

H – Cancellation of contract is valid.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts ofLease for the government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Courtof Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of realproperties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President butbecause the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it, which in this caseis RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of theCAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is onthese properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enterinto, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporationor entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways andeasements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of propertiesacquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of thePresident of the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of suchproviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, thatthe Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications in the execution of Contract “C.”

3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot executewithout approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property owned bythe Republic of the Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code, which provide that Under567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed:(1) by the President of the Philippines, or

(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.

On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to the RP under its administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more particularlySection 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the following powers and duties:xxx xxx xxx

(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airportand all government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of thePhilippines including such power and duties as: … (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts ofany kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold,purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements which may be properor necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real property of the CivilAeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines. …

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There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 isa special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of the lease in Contract “C” is realproperty belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts ofLease for the government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Courtof Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of realproperties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President butbecause the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it, which in this caseis RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of theCAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is onthese properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enterinto, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporationor entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways andeasements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of propertiesacquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of thePresident of the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of suchproviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, thatthe Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications in the execution of Contract “C.”

In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandatesthat general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally beso interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable; thatspecific statute prevails over a general ;  and that where two statutes are of equal theoreticalapplication to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.

3. Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev. Bank Employees (Voluntary Arbitrator)

F - From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company hasviolated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on thesubmission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as VoluntaryArbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its PositionPaper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 noPosition Paper had been filed by LDB. Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitratorrendered a decision disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

I - WON a voluntary arbitrator is an instrumentality

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H - Instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus the term governmental agency or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which the government acts or by which certain government act or function is performed.

Since a voluntary arbitrator performs quasi-judicial functions, he/she does performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code. Thus, he/she falls in the contemplation of the term instrumentality.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that theawards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. 

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

4. Iron and Steel Authority v. CA (expropriation proceedings, eminent domain, non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of RP)

F - Iron and Steel Authority (ISA)  was created by P.D. No. 272  in order, generally, to develop andpromote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National DevelopmentCorporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on anexpansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill inIligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by thePresident of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public located inIligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by anon-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina FertilizerCorporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277,  was issued directing the NSC to“negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’spresent occupancy rights on the subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC andprivate respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the dateof LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 andto initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFCrelating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cedethe same to the NSC.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA commenced eminentdomain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City, praying that it be placed in possessionof the property involved upon depositing in court representing ten percent (10%) of the declaredmarket values of that property.

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A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC inpossession and control of the land occupied by MCFC’s fertilizer plant installation.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence ofpetitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment couldbe rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed itsopposition to this motion.

The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal wasanchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that “only natural or juridical persons orentities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case.”Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the sametime, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have ruledthat the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had not yetrested their respective cases.

Hence this Petition for Review.

I - WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

RP is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA,the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, itspowers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government ora distinct unit therein.

Inc. Agency (GOCC, SSS, GSIS, LANDBANK, PUP

1. Look at the charter – is the charter prescribes the government to enter.2. Apply the Corporation Code – Articles of Incorporation3. In the absence look for the Gen. Law

5. Ignacia Balicas v. Fact-Finding and lntelligence Bureau (FFIB) (neglect of duty)\

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F - Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management specialist, monitored theimplementation of the CHS Project Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions inthe ECC. She conducted another monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances,she noted that the project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulatedconditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-up monitoring is proper. It appearedfrom the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by theDENR. Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation wasconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB),which duly filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against severalofficials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR), and the local government of Antipolo. The charge against petitionerinvolved a supposed failure on her part to monitor and inspect the development of CHS, which wasassumed to be her duty as DENR senior environmental management specialist assigned in the provinceof Rizal.For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she monitored the development of CHS as evidenced by 3 monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of the subdivision.

I – WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty

H – The petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitionerIGNACIA BALICAS from office is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners REINSTATEMENT to her positionwith back pay and without loss of seniority rights is hereby ordered.

In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfullyprescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on the specific dutiesof a senior environmental management specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the functionsof the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directlyreports.

The responsibility of monitoring of housing and land development projects is not lodged with theDENR but with the HLURB which is the sole regulatory body for housing and development. Hence thereis no legal basis for a government employee under DENR be held liable for gross neglect of dutypertaining to another agency.

Regulatory Agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer oradjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principalpowers of which are exercised by a collective body such as a commission, board or council.

6. Malaga v. Penachos (Bidding and award of the project)

F – Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against the Chairman and members of the PBAC (Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee) on the ground of their refusal to accept the documentssubmitted without just cause that resulted of not being included in the pre-qualified bidders andunable to participated on the scheduled bidding. Also asking not to grant the awards of the projectpending resolution of their complaint.

I – WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818

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H - Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) as a chartered institution as well as instrumentality is covered by PD 1818.

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within thedepartment framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some ifnot all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usuallythrough a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, andvested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This termincludes the state universities and colleges and then monetary authority of the State.

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is covered by PD 1818. However, it must be notedthat this law was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed byadministrative agencies.

7. Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan (Corrupt Practice of the petitioner as a public officer)

F – Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3 (b) RA 3019 as amended, known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.

The Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Institute, a component of theDOST employed petitioner as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the JICA Bldg. at the DOST Compound Bicutan Taguig.

I – WON the accused is a public officer

H – The accused falls under the non-career service category of CSC pursuance to the definition ofSec. 2 (b) RA 3019 includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporarywhether in the career service and non career service. Hence, he is a public officer.

Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties, not being of aclerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functionsof the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act orperform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes anygovernment employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

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II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Adminstrative Agencies

2003 Bar Exams: Validity of abolition of long-standing Bureau under DILG by the President

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in goodfaith because the president has been granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office and the executive departments to effect economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition of government offices.

1. Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of Commerce(PCC), appointed by the President of the Philippines (Pres. Marcos) on July 17, 1974. Duringthe incumbency of petitioner, 2 administrative cases were filed against him for: 1.) illegal useof government vehicles, 2.) misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college,3.) oppression and harassment, 4.) grave misconduct, 5.) nepotism and dishonesty.

Administrative cases were filed with the Office of the President and subsequently referred tothe Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Charges of violation of RA 3019 Sec.3(e), RA 992 Sec. 20-21 and RA 773 Sec. 14 were filed against him in the Office of theTanodbayan. On June 14, 1976, 3 information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graf andCorruption Practices Act (RA 3019) were filed against the Petitioner. The information allegedthat he appropriated for himself a “bahay kubo” which was intended for the college and

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construction materials worth P250,000 more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using adriver of the college as his personal and family driver.

On October 22, 1976, Petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to RA 3019Sec. 13, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer in charge on Nov. 10, 1976 and thenActing President on May 13, 1977.

On April 1, 1978 PD 1341 was issued by Pres. Marcos, converting the PCC into a PUP. Mateocontinued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed ActingPresident and on March 28, 1980 as President for a term of 6 years.

On July 11, 1980 the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitionerof the charges against him and ordered the reinstatement of the latter. By virtue orreinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed toreceive during suspension unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filedagainst him.

Cases filed before the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on the ground that theyhad become moot and academic.

Moot and Academic - An action is considered moot when it is no longer presents a justiciablecontroversy because the issues involving have become academic or deed as when subsequent eventshave undertaken the position and the court has nothing left to resolve.

On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for execution of judgment;particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of President of PUP and thepayment of his salaries and benefits during the period of suspension. Motion was granted.However, Pres. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting President of PUP following theexpiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente who had succeeded Dr. Mateo.

In his return, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner asPresident of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult thePresident of the Philippines. Petitioner assumed the Office of the President of PUP.

On May 18, 1992, People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionassailing the writ of execution before CA. CA issued a temporary restraining order, enjoiningthe petitioner to cease and desist from acting as President of PUP.

On July 15, 1992, the 7th Division of CA rendered decision and set aside the writ of executionrendered by the trial court payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner was disallowed.Hence, petition before SC

Issue: W/N PD 1314 which converted the PCC into PUP, did not abolish the PCC

Held: Petitioner argues that PD 1314 did not abolish PCC, and PUP is merely continuation of theexistence of the PCC and could be reinstated to his former position.

PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the former PCC into PUP. What took place was achange in academic status of the education institution not in its corporate life.

As petitioner correctly points out when the purpose is to abolish a department or an officeor an organization and to replace it with another one, lawmaking authority says so.

But the reinstatement of Petitioner could not be ordered because PD 1437 had been promulgatedfixing the term of the office of the President of the State Universities and Colleges into 6years, renewable for another 6 years and authorizing the President of the Philippines toterminate the terms of incumbent who were not re-appointed.

Ruling: CA decision modified by setting aside the orders of TC with regard to the non paymentof the salaries and benefits which the Petitioner failed to receive during his suspension.

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With the result petitioner’s term was cut short. Hence, the petitioner became entitled onlyto retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay.

2. Viola vs. Alunan, III (Cesar G. Viola, Chairman, Brgy. 167 Zone 15 Dist. II Mla. vs. Rafael Alunan III, Sec. of DILG)

Facts: Petitioner brought an action against Respondent, Alex David, President/Secretary Generalof the National Liga ng mga Barangay, and Leonardo Angat, President of the City of Manila Ligang mga Barangay to RESTRAIN them from carrying out the election for the questioned positions.

Local and National Liga – 1.) President, 2.) Executive Vice-President, 3.) 1st VP, 4.) 2nd VP, 5.) 3rd VP, 6.) Auditor, 7.) 5 Directors

Contention: Petitioners contention is that the positions in question are in excess of thoseprovided in the Local Government Code (RA7160) Section 493 of which mentions as electivepositions only those of Presidentt, Vice-President, and 5 members of Board of Directors in eachchapter at the Municipality, City, Provincial, Metropolitan Political Subdivisions and NationalLevels.

Issue: W/N additional positions have been created without authority of law according to Petitioner?

Held: Contention is untenable. Creation of these positions was actually made in the constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay w/c was adopted by the 1st Barangay NationalAssembly on Jan. 11, 1994.

The creation of additional positions in the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters isauthorized by the LGC pursuant to Sec. 493 “The board shall create such other positions as itmay deem necessary for the management of the chapter”.

Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chaptersbut to the board of the Liga at the National Level as well.

The creation by the board of the National Liga of the positions of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd VP wasintended to provide uniform officers for the national chapters.

Additional positions to be created pursuant to Sec. 493 of LGC need not be limited to theappointive positions because management positions are not necessarily limited to appointivepositions.

Ruling: Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED.

3. Louis “Barok” Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission

Facts: Petitioners raised in Court that EO 1 which created the PTC should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions.

The petitioners alleged contention: that EO 1 violates separation of powers as itencroaches the power of congress to create Public Office and appropriate funds for itsoperation.

Petitioners: They also asserted the fact that the role of the President in the 1987Constitution does not include the power to create an entirely / new public office.

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Respondents contested that EO 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create PublicOffice because the President’s executive power and control necessarily includes the inherentpower to conduct investigation to ensure laws are faithfully executed.

Issue: 1. Does EO 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operationof Public Office?

2. Whether it violates the equal protection clause?

Held: There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress toappropriate funds. Because “whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of thePresident will the very source of the funds for the commission”. And thus be subject toauditing rules and regulations.

The Chief Executive power to create Ad Hoc investigating Committee is valid. Having beenconstitutionality granted full control of the Executive Department, which respondents belong.The legality of investigation is sustained. However, Petitioners contend that EO 1 violated theequal protection clause because it does not apply to all members of the same class such intentof focusing only in previous administration as the sole subject of PTC. It must be cover alladministrations previous to that former Pres. Arroyo.

Ruling: Petition Granted. EO 1 declared unconstitutional insofar it is violative of the equal protection clause.

4. Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin of Energy Regulatory Commission

Facts: RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted on June 8,2009 and took effect on June 26, 2009. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB(Energy Regulatory Board) and creation of ERC (Energy Regulatory Commission).

At the time of filing the petition, the ERC was composed of:

1. Commissioner Fe Barin2. Dept. Commissioners Carlos Alindada, Leticia Ibay, Oliver Butalid and Mary Anne Colayco Commissioners assumed office on Aug. 15, 2009

Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portionof the guidelines reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERCemployees vis-à-vis Civil Service rules.

Nov. 5, 2005, KERB sent a letter to the commissioners stating their objection to thecommissioner’s stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletoryapplication in the selection and placement of the ERC employees.

Contention:

KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERB’s character, it merelychanged the ERB name to ERC and expanded functions and objectives.

Commissioner Barin replied to KERB, the creation of a placement committee is no longernecessary because there is already a prescribed set of guidelines for recruitment ofpersonnel.

KERB filed a petition to enjoin Termination of Petitioners ERB employees

Issue: 1. W/N Sec. 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional?

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2. W/N Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees.

Held:

All laws enjoy the presumption of Constitutionality. To justify the nullification of law,there must be a clear and convincing breach of the constitution.

Power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. “The power to create anoffice carries with it the power to abolish. Pres. Aquino, then exercisingly her legislativepowers, created the ERB by issuing EO 172 on May 8, 1987.

The question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which

are intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.

Ruling: Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure DOES NOT arise in theabolition of an office.

There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak.

Petition is DISMISSED.

5. Commission on Human Rights Employees Association vs. Commission on Human Rights

Facts: On Feb. 14, 1998, Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General AppropriationsAct of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to all constitutional officersenjoying fiscal autonomy.

Last portion of Art. 33 covers the appropriations of CHR.

CHR, through its Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recina and other Commissioners promulgatedresolution No A98-047 adopting an updating and reclassification scheme among selected positionsin the Commission.

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of 10 additional plantilla positions

1. Director IV – salary grade 28 for the CARAGA Region Office2. 4 Security Officer II – salary grade 153. 5 Process Servers – salary grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners

By virtue of Resolution No A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body toprovide additional source of funding, for said staffing modification . among the positionscollapsed were:

1. Atty. III2. 4 Atty. IV3. Chemist III4. 3 Special Investigator I5. Clerk III6. Accounting Clerk II

CHR forwarded said staffing position and upgrading scheme to the DBM, but DBM Sec. BenjaminDiokno denied the request on the ground that “Being a member of the fiscal autonomy, group does

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not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions withoutapproval of DBM.

This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than theone previously denied.

In light of DBM’s disapproval, the CSC-NCR Office, through a Memorandum, recommended the CSC –Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected. CHREA, requested the CSC-CentralOffice to affirm the recommendation of CSC-Regional Office.

CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authoritymandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well ascreation of positions.

CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-RegionalOffice.

CHREA filed Motion for Reconsideration but CSC-Central Office denied, CHREA elevated it to CAwhich affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office. (Rule in favor of Central Office)

Petition before SC.

Issue: Can the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions which approval of DBM?

Held:

Contention: Petitioners contention that CA gravely erred when it held that under 1987 Constitution, the CHR enjoys Fiscal Autonomy. And it includes the action taken by it in collapsing, upgrading and reclassification of positions.

Respondent CHR said that petitioner has no locus standi because no official written record inthe commission recognizing the petitioner as bona fide organization of its employees nor thereis anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial Sachez Jr., has the authority tosue the CHR.

CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, creating andcollapsing plantilla schemes without approval of DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.

SC: Proper Party is one who has sustained an injury as a result of the act complaint of. Here, petitioner, which consist of rank and file employees of respondent CHR protests that the upgrading, reclassification and collapsing of positions benefited only select few in the upper level position in the commission. This sufficiently meet the injury test.

The regulatory power of DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but injurisprudence as well. DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation andPOSITION CLASSIFICATION of the National Government (RAC of 1987 Sec. 3 Chapter I Title 17).

The approval of DBM must first sought prior to implementation of any or upgrading ofpositions in government.

From the 1987 Consti. and the Administrative Code, it is clear that CHR is not among theclass of Constitutional Commissions, NOR enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Fiscal Autonomy – freedom from outside control and limitations, it is a constitutional grant,not obtainable by membership.

CHR is not a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy.

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Salary Standardization law, for this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power toadminister the salary standardization law.

Ruling: Petition GRANTED, decision of CA reversed and set aside.

Reorganization of Administrative Agencies a. Definition of Reorganizationb. President’s power to reorganize; basisc. Power of other agencies to reorganize; limitations

Reorganization – is the process of restructuring the bureaucracy’s organizational and functional setup, to make it more viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and to make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law.

- Is a means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish offices which t may do so directly or indirectly by authorizing an executive department or agency to reorganize its office.

The President can also abolish a long standing bureau in the DILG provided it is done in good faith because the president has been granted the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of his office and the executive departments to effect economy and promote efficiency and the power includes the abolition of government offices.

1. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary

Facts: Petitioner represented by Rep. Muji S. Hataman, Respondent is Hon. Eduardo Ermita, andthe Secretary of Agrarian Reform Hon. Rene Villa.

Petitioner (AMIN) assail the constitutionality of EO 364 and 379 both issued in 2004, thepresent petition for certiorari and prohibition EO 364 issued by GMA on Sept. 27, 2004 whichtransforming the DAR into Dept. of Land Reform (DLR).

EO 379 amending EO 364 which states that National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)shall be attached agency of the DLR

Contention:

Petitioner contends that 2 Presidential issuances are unconstitutional for violating:

1. Principle of Separation of Powers.2. Constitutional scheme and policies for Agrarian Reform.3. Constitutionality right of the people in reasonable participation in decision making

including through adequate consultation.

Issue: W/N EO 364 and EO 379N is unconstitutional? Is the reorganization valid?

Held: The issued on the transformation of DAR into DLR became moot and academic because by virtue of EO 456 which issued on Aug. 23, 2005, DLR having reverted into its former name.

OSG on behalf of Respondent concedes that AMIN has a legal standing to file suit as member ofCongress.

Petitioner averred that Executive which injures the institution of Congress which can bequestioned by a member of Congress, and Powers of Congress are impaired.

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Co Petitioner Mamalo Descendants Organization Inc. (MDOI) alleges that it is concerned withthe negative impact of NCIP becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing ofAncestral Domain claims filed with its members.

MDOI raises no transcendental importance to relate to the merits of petition because of lackof any other party with more direct and specific interest in the question raised.

AMIN contends that since DAR, NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,merged not by mere executive orders and reorganization of these administrative agencies shouldbe the subject of statutes.

The Constitution confers, by EXPRESS provision, the power of control over executive departments,bureaus and offices in the President alone.

Pres. Justifies an executive action to carry out re-organization measures under broad authority of law.

Pursuant to AC of 1987 Sec. 39, states that: The President shall have continuing authorityto re-organize the administrative structure of the Office of the Pres. And he may take the ffactions:

“Transfer agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as wellas transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.”

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

2. Drianita Bagaoisan vs. National Tobacco Administration represented by Antonio De Guzman and Perlita Baula

Facts: President ERAP issued on Sept. 1998 EO 29 entitled “Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) a government agency under the Department of Agriculture (DA).

Order was followed by EO 36 amending EO 29 by increasing from 400 to not exceeding 75 the positions affected thereby.

In compliance therewith, NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Patter (OSSP) which was submitted to the Office of the Pres.

On Nov. 11, 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA, Batac (Petitioners) filed a letter appeal with CSC and sought the assistance in recalling OSSP.

On Dec. 4, 1998, OSSP was approved by DBM subject to certain revisions.

On June 10, 1999, petitioners, all occupying different position of NTA Office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their employment effective 30 days from receipt thereof.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before RTC of Batac Ilocos Norte. The RTC ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP positions similar to their respective former assignments.

Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by NTA was denied by RTC, then NTA filed on appeal withCA, and CA reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the TC.

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Petitioners, elevated the matter to SC; SC denied for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error of CA, MR denied. Petitioners submitted a “Motion to admit Petition for en banc resolution.”

Issue: Whether NTA may be re-organized by an executive fiat, not by legislative action

Held:

Contention:

Petitioners contention, re-organization through the issuance of EO cannot be done without thebenefit of due deliberation, debate and discussion of members of both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines.

A public office is either created by the constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Where the office was created by Congress, it may be abolished by them. The EXCEPTION, is as faras bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department, the Pres. Power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office and grant him the broad authority to carry out re-organization measures.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

3. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs. Civil Service Commission and Violeta Garcia

Facts: In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529 which she appointed under permanent status up to Sept. 1984

She was for 2 years designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan by virtue of EO 649 which authorized the restricting of the Land Registration Commission to NLTDRA.

Petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on Oct. 1, 1984 under Temporary status for not being a member of the Bar.

She appealed to Sec. of Justice but her request was denied; MR was denied as well.

Petitioner was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment was renewed in 1985.

In Memorandum dated Oct. 30, 1986, minister and now Secretary of Justice notified petitioner of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground she was “receiving bribe money”.

Appeal to Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred to appeal to the Merit System Protection Board which denied on the ground that termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. MR DENIED.

However, in Resolution dated June 30, 1988, the CSC directed Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II because the new requirement of BAR membership would not apply to her but only to filling up of vacant lawyer position on after Feb. 9, 1981. Since she had been holding the position from 1977-1984, she would not be affected by EO 649.

NALTDRA filed present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution of the CSC.

Contention:

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Sec. 8 and 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in LRC and transferred to NALTDRA and Garcia is not a member of the Bar and she cannot be reinstated.

Issue: W/N Membership of the Bar is the qualification requirement for appointment of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO 649?

Held: EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It abolished all thepositions and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.

Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in LRC are deemed“NON-EXISTENT.” After Abolition, there is No Occupant, No Tenure to Speak.

Its requirement of BAR membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is valid reorganizationmeasure. A reorganization carried in good faith for the purpose to make bureaucracy moreefficient.

4. Eliseo Sinon vs. Civil Service Commission, Dept. of Agriculture Re-organization Appeals Boardand Juana Banan

Facts: Prior to re-organization of then Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Private Respondent Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer of Region II, Cagayan.

Petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied position of Fisheries Extension Specialist II in BFAR in thesame region. However, the re-organization of the MAF into Department of Agriculture with the issuance of EO 116 called for the evaluation of 29 positions of Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) in Region II, Cagayan. Petitioner is included but Banan is excluded.

Thus, Respondent Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of qualifications. And was re-evaluated. And Sinon was displaced by Banan and the resolution was approved by Sec. of Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez.

However, on Aug. 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II Cagayan as approved by the Regional Director Gumersindo Lasam on the basis of 1st evaluation.

Thus, Sinon filed an appeal to CSC, then DARAB Resolution Set Aside. Banan filed an MR whichshe pitted her qualifications against Sinon. And granted Banan’s MR.

Sinon filed MR, but CSC denied it. Hence, Petition before SC to assailed the resolution of CSC.

Issue: W/N CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the rating orqualification of petitioner.

Held:

Contention:

Petitioners argued that CSC revoked the appointment that the petitioner received early andwhich deemed permanent by virtue of the approval of the Regional Director of the Dept. ofAgriculture.

CSC departed from its power which is limited only to “REVIEW” and hence encroached upon theappointing power exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.

Under RA 6656 Sec. 6, In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall beappointed in any re-organization, there shall be created a placement committee in eachdepartment or agency to assist the appointing authority in placement of personnel.

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Placement committee was charged with the duty of exercising the discretionary functions as the appointing authority.

Purposes of Re-organization – is the process of restructuring the bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set-up to make it more viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorizedby law.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

5. Luis B. Domingo vs. DBP and CSC

Facts: Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status from Feb. 1979 to Dec. 1986.

On Dec. 3, 1986 EO 81, the Revised Charter of IBP was passed authorizing the re-organizationof DBP. Pursuant to the Executive Order, DBP issued Board Resolution allowing the issuance ofTemporary Appointments to DBP Personnel in order to fully implement the re-organization. SuchTemporary Appointments issued had max. period of 12 months.

Petitioner was issued a Temporary Appointment on Jan. 2, 1987 for a period of 1 year whichwas renewed for another period up to Nov. 30, 1988.

A Memorandum issued by the Final Review Committee, Petitioner got a performance rating of“Below Average” by reason of which his appointment was made lapse.

Petitioner, together with certain Evangeline Javier filed with CSC a joint verified complaintagainst DBP for illegal dismissal. Complainants alleged that dismissal constitute violation ofCivil Service Law against issuance of Temporary Appointments to permanent employees, as well asof their right to Security of Tenure and due process.

On Nov. 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the re-appointment of Mr. Domingor andMs. Javier as Senior Training and Career Development Officer and Research Officer or any suchequivalent rank under staffing pattern of DBP.

DBP filed a MR, then CSC issued resolution setting aside its previous resolution andaffirming the separation of Petitioner. Hence, Petition before SC.

Issue: Does the validity of the re-organization implemented by DBP violates petitioners right to Security of Tenure?

Held: Petitioner contends that government re-organization to terminate the services of government employees cannot be valid ground pursuant to the ruling of Dario vs. Mison.

Petitioner also maintains that average and below average efficiency ratings are not valid grounds for his Termination from Service.

He also contends that he should be afforded a day in court pursuant to the requirements of procedural due process.

1. Re-organization is recognized a valid ground for separation of Civil Service Employees,subject “ONLY” to the condition it be done in good faith.

Constitution and Sec. 33 and 34 of EO 81 and Sec. 9 of RA 6656 states that “all those notappointed in the implementation of said re-organization shall be deemed separated fromservice.”

2. Appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to the Merit and Fitness requiring Public Officers and Employees to serve with the highest degree.

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3. There is no violation of due process even no hearing was conducted as long as the party wasgiven a chance to present his evidence and defend himself.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

6. Aida D. Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, Hon. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Hon. Salvador Enriquez, Jr.

Facts: Aida Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for Career Executive Service Eligibility and a CESO Rank.

On Aug. 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility and on Sept. 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

However, on Oct. 1, 1993, Respondent CSC passed resolution abolishing the Career Executive Service Board and turn it to Office for Career Executive Service of CSC.

The said resolution became an impediment to the appointment of the Petitioners as Civil SERvice Officer, Rank IV. Petitioner filed a petition to annul the Resolution of CSC.

Issue: Whether CSC has the power to abolish the Career Executive Service Board?

Held: Petitioner contends that CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished the CESB, an office create by law.

CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it legally authorized the transfer of Public Money.

Respondent contends that the integration of the CESB into the CSC is authorized by lawpursuant to Sec. 12(1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of 1987 Admin. Code.

CESB was created by PD 1 on Sept. 1, 1974. Therefore, CESB was created by law, it can onlybe abolish by the legislature. Creation and Abolition of Public Officer is primarily alegislative function.

Legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of CESB.

CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity.

On the contrary, Legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CSB.

Commission’s power to re-organza is limited to offices under its control.

The essential autonomous character of CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent commission.

Attachment – purpose is inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy program and coordination.

Ruling: Petition GRANTED.

Reason / purposes for creating administrative agencies

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Common types of administrative agencies

III. POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Legislative, Judiciary, Executive – are the separation of powers and the system of checks andbalances among them.

- While one branch is not to invade the domain of the other, no one branch can act withoutany participation or check from the other branches which the Constitution recognizes andpermits.

- Administrative falls to Executive Department

2 Most Important Powers

1. Quasi-legislatve or rule-making power – promulgate IRR- The authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules

and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislativepolicy.

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power – interpret and apply such regulations- Power to a wit of execution for the enforcement of decision- The power of the administrative authorities to make determination of facts in the

performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the factso found.

Ministerial duty – is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise ofdiscretion in its performance.

Discretionary duty – is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment.

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations:

1. Legislative Rule – designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the detailsthereof; it is in the nature of subordinate legislation.

a. Supplementary Regulation – intended to fill in the details of the law and “to makeexplicit what is only general” (IRR of Labor Code)

b. Contingent Regulation – issued to enforce or suspend the operation of a law, after theascertainment by the administrative agency of existence of a particular contingency.

2. Interpretative Rule – those which purport to do no more than interpret the statute beingadministered for proper observance by the people (BIR Circulars)

Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations

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1. Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law2. Conform to the standards that the law prescribes3. Must be reasonable4. Must be related solely to carrying into effects the general provision o the law

CASES:

1. Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted tohim by the statute and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

It is beyond the power of the commission to impose because it results in discrimination andviolation of constitutional rights. The results in discrimination and violation of constitutionalrights. The commission’s permission amounted to a prohibition.

2. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez

I – WON the Sec. of Agriculture has the power to remove the directors and officers of a cooperative

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Sec. of Agriculture arrogated unto himselfthe powers of the KBPMBPBM who are authorized to remove the petitioning directors and officers. Hecannot take refuge under Sec. 8 of PD175 which grants him the power to supervise and regulatecooperatives. This section does not give him that right

The administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and thosenecessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Theses powers should be extended by implication beyondwhat may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

3. Sen. Robert Jaworski v. PAGCOR

SAGE

The grant of franchise is stated in a clear and unequivocal language, hence the grantee must abidedby the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its term and conditions.

4. RCPI v. NTC

Doctrine is settled that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to thoseexpressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body.

The EO neither grant the power to impose fines on public utilities which have failed to renderadequate service to its customer nor expanded the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.

5. Matienzo v. Abellera

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In the grant of the authority, there was no mention of time limitation. Hence, to determine whethera board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in thelight of the purposes for which it was created and that which is incidentally necessary for the fullimplementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily,too, where the end is required, the appropriation means are deemed given.

6. Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.

I – WON CDA has adjudicatory powers

It can be gleaned from RA 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrativefunctions which consist of policy making. Registration, fiscal and technical assistance to coop andimplementation of cooperative laws. There was no grant of adjudicatory powers to CDA.

7. LLDA v. CA

Re: Open Dumpsite

I – Does LLDA have the power and authority to issue “ceases and desist order”

H –

While it is fundamental that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly grantedto it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers asare necessarily implied in the exercise of its expressed powers. (toothless paper agency)

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER (RULE MAKING POWER)

§      Legislative power 

Power to make, alter, and repeal laws.§      Doctrine of Separation of Powers   §      Non-delegation of legislative power 

Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anyother body or authority.

§      Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power 

a. Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (tariff rates), Art. IV,Constitution)b.      Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Government Code)c.      Delegation to the peopled.      Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution)e.      Delegation to Administrative Agencies.

Cases:1.  US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908) (criminal case, penalty impose, non-delegation of legislativepower)

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Lesson: Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of thelegislature. 

F – Respondent was charged with a violation of par. 70 and 83 of Circular 397 of the InsularCollector of Customs, published in OG and approved by the Sec. of Finance and Justice. That beingthe capt. of the Lighter Maude he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden inPasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any otherexternal power.

I – WON the penalty for violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands ofthe legislature?

H - Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of thelegislature.  In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. ExcelsiorRedwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penaltyunder statutes authorizing them to do so, the court saying: "Conceding that the legislature could delegate to theplaintiff the authority to make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation ofsuch rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature."

"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority . Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by theconstitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only aright but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment actingimmediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

2.  People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) (Probation, undue delegation of legislative power)

Lesson: Old Probation Law violated the doctrine of non-delegation when it placed the discretion tothe local governments the decision to allocate for the salary of the probation officer.

F – Respondent Judge ad interim of the Branch of CFI, who heard the application of the defendantMariano Cu Unjieng for probation in his criminal case.

I – WON Act 4221 is unconstitutional, as undue delegation of legislative power to the provincialboards of several provinces.

H – Act 4221 is declared unconstitutional and void due to the inequality from unwarranted delegationof legislative power to the provincial boards. Sec. 11 creates a situation in which discriminationand inequality are permitted or allowed such as statute adjudge unconstitutional because of theireffect in operation and denying equal protection of the law.

Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among 3 independentbranches of government. The power to make laws is vested in the legislature. Any attempt todelegate this power is unconstitutional on the principle of “potestas delegate non-delegari potest”(a delegated power cannot be delegated). The rule however is not absolute and inflexible. Anexception sanction by immemorial practice permits delegation to local authorities.

The PA does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise oftheir discretionary power. What is granted is a “roving commission” which enable the provincialboard to exercise arbitrary discretion. By Sec. 11 of Act 4221, the legislature does not seemingly

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in its own authority extend to the benefits of the PA to the provinces but in reality leaves theentire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.

If the provincial does not wish to have the act applied in its province, all that it has to do is todecline the appropriate needed amount for the salary of probation officer. This is a virtualsurrender of legislative power to the provincial board.

The legislature has not made the PA contingent upon specific facts or conditions to be ascertainedby the provincial board. It leaves the operation or non-operation of law upon the provincial board.The Act is unconstitutional.

3.  Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988) (Death and burial benefits of anemployee who is allegedly not an overseas workerbut nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction

Lesson: 2 tests explained. Also, the reason for the delegation.

F – Vitaliano Saco was a Chief Officer of the MV Eastern Polaris who was killed in accident in TokyoJapan. Widow sued for damages under EO 797 and MC 2 of POEA, the latter awarded the sum of 192K forthe death of her husband (180K for death benefit and 12K for burial expenses). The petitionerchallenged the decision of POEA on the ground that no jurisdiction over the case as the deceasedhusband was not an overseas worker.

POEA was created under EO 797, “to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and toprotect their rights. It vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, includingmoney claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino Contract workers, including seamen”.

MC 2 by POEA prescribed an standard contract to be adopted by foreign and domestic shippingcompanies in hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

I – WON MC 2 is a violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power

Even if there is no expressed provision, delegation can be sustained if the exercise of power ispursuant to the implementation of the purpose for which it is created.

The standard contract is valid for it passed the tests of valid delegation of legislative power.

SC’’s words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation oflegislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the firsttest, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature suchthat when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under thesufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both testsare intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is notallowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularlyapplicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and theirattendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary toentrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisionsof the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribedthereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The

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power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is notunlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the saidauthority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseasFilipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of theGovernment but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the manyinstances when its delegation is permitted.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of thelegislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of societyhas ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislaturecannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has becomenecessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may nothave the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in theparticular fields assigned to them. 

4.  Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995) (Retirement benefit of a government employee)

Lesson: High degree of detail not necessary in a law that delegates power to administrative agenciesto exercise “subordinate legislation.”

F – Petitioner Rabor is a utility worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Entered in theservice at the age of 55. Alma Pagatpatan an official in the Office of the Mayor advised Rabor toapply for his retirement because he had already reached 68 years of age and 7 months, 13 years and 1month of government service. Rabor responded to the advice by exhibiting Cert. of Membership issuedby GSIS Statement at the bottom “service extended to comply 15 year service requirement in order toavail the retirement benefit given to the employees of the Government. The Regional Director respondthat his service is non extendible and the City Mayor furnished the copy of letter to petitioner andadvised him to stop reporting for work.

I – WON Rabor’s employment should be extended

H - SC’s words: Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail inthe statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if thegoverning or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be verylittle need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely theinability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respectof any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making byadministrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is ashowing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to thegeneral purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that isappropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and tothis test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in the present CivilService law - found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987,otherwise known as the     Administrative Code of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service ofretirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutesand not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of manyprovisions of the present civil service law.

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The standards may either be expressed or implied. If the former, non-delegation is easily met. Thestandard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policyand purpose of the act considered as a whole.

The CSC was acting as a central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies,standards and guidelines for efficient, responsible and effective personnel administration of thegovernment. It was also discharging its function of administering the retirement program forgovernment officials and employees and of evaluating qualifications for retirement.

It is difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after anemployee reached the age of 65 years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to theprovisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processesassociated with the ageing of human being are in fact related to efficiency and quality of servicethat may be expected from individual persons.

5. Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel (same with US v Barriascase)

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§      Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agenciesa.     Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies

b.     Kinds of rule-making power1.    Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate legislation)2.    Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute being administered

(interpretative legislation)3 kinds:

  Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law  Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a government agency or

official  Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings3.    Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall go into effect

(contingent legislation)

c.     Reasons for delegation of legislative power

Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led tothe observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegationthe exception.

The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexity of the tast ofgovernment and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problemsdemanding its attention.  The growth of society has ramified its activites and created peculiar andsophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably tocomprehend.  Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.  

d.     What can and cannot be delegatedWhat can be delegated – Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency any legislativepower other than the making, altering or repealing of a law, the determination of legislativepolicies and objectives to be achieved, and the formulation and promulgation of a defined andbinding rule of conduct.  It can delegate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, toissue rules to fill in details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise policepower, and to fix rates.  To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the competence andsufficiency of standard tests.What cannot be delegated – Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits the delegation of that which ispurely legislative in nature.  This consists of the power to make the law, or to determine what thelaw shall be, and to alter or repeal it. 

e.     Test to determine validity of delegation1.      Completeness test – The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the

legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforceit.

2.      Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

Case:

1.          ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise veto on the IRRs ofan administrative agency.

SC’s words: 

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On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) thecompleteness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth thereinthe policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficientstandard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries ofthe delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, thestandard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy andidentify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targetsand the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out thepolicy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generationcapability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) byproviding for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and IncentivesFund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouragingtheir officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing” the delegated power to thePresident to fix revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as theFund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of theirrespective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and CoordinatingCommittee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection ofthe Excess the RevenueTargets

Percent (%) of the ExcessCollection to Accrue to theFund

30% or below – 15%

More than 30% – 15% of the first 30%    plus   20%   of   the    remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when therevenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and theBOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC thedistribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the caseof the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of theBIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted bythe President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on thePresident as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies theconditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target byat least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

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SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers andfunctions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whoserevenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with dueconsideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collectionas provided in the rules andregulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations andcompliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptionsshall apply:

On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for thepurpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio andceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function ofimplementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhanceits understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucraticcompliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c)to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislativeauthority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of publicinterest.  Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be dividedinto three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention toadministrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of theoperation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may requestinformation and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or passresolutions for consideration of the agency involved.

b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking atthe facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The powerof Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21,Article VI,c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversightpower is thru legislative supervision. “Supervision” connotes a continuing and informed awareness onthe part of a congressional committee regardingexecutive operations in a given administrative area.While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions inorder to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize theexercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broadhorizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to theexecutive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity withthose standards.

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In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when itleaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concernedadministrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill updetails (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actualoperation (contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the lawwhich they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rulesand regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have beenwritten in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy thepresumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in anappropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer,may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing thecalculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve ordisapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions ofRA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court bythe Constitution.

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