Afghan End Game and Pakistan: Opportunities And Challenges

Afghan End Game and Pakistan: Opportunities and Challenges____________________________________ 65 _

AFGHAN END GAME AND PAKISTAN: OPPORTUNITIESAND CHALLENGES

Lt. Gen Syed Athar Ali (Retd.)& Syed Muhammad Ali

Abstract

Afghanistan presents a compelling case study in the discipline of internationalrelations as over the past few centuries, the dynamics of major power rivalries,international systemic changes, geopolitics, energy politics, insurgencies andthe phenomenon of terrorism have not only affected the Afghan society butalso left its lasting imprints on regional and global security. This Research Paper explores the relevance of the structure of Internationalsystem; identifies the stakes and interests of the key international, regionaland local actors in the Afghan End-Game; evaluates the international systemand its relationship with the interests and behaviour of these actors, both inthe inter-regional and intra-regional contexts. In addition, a way forward is recommended to help achieve a viable Afghanstate and a stable society along with defining a stabilizing role, which Pakistancan play in this respect for both itself, this region and towards promotinginternational security. The paper also identifies the opportunities andemerging challenges for local, regional and global players and compares theirconvergences and divergences of interests. Lastly, it also suggests ways of contributing towards the security and stabilityof both the Afghan nation and this volatile region, at a time when major andlong-term shifts are underway in the 21st century political and securityarchitecture of the world.

*Lt.General Syed Athar Ali (Retd.) is a Former Secretary Defence of Pakistan and currently a Ph.D scholar at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

*Syed Muhammad Ali is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Journal Of Contemporary Studies, Vol.1, No.2, Winter2012________________________________________ 66 _

Introduction

Afghanistan has remained significant to some of the majorchanges, which took place in the international politicaland security architecture of both 20th and 21st century.23 years ago, the emergence of uni-polarity frombipolarity had its roots in the asymmetrical warfare,which the Western world waged against the Communistblock for which Afghanistan proved to be the lastfrontier. According to the Structural realism paradigm,in an anarchic international system, it is assumed thatstate is the dominant actor whose means and ends for thepursuit of its national interests are neither moral norimmoral but amoral and driven by the anarchic structureof the international system. This research study willbase its analysis and approach on these assumptions andattempt to study the causes and consequences of policiesand strategies, which various states employ in thepursuit of their national interests in the Context ofAfghanistan. Their ability to achieve these interests isdetermined by their capabilities and relative positionwithin the international system instead of moralconsiderations. Therefore, in the prevailing uni-polarenvironment, based on the logic of structural realism,the analysis in this research paper assumes that theprincipal interest of the super power dominating thecontemporary international system is to preserve thisuni-polarity and prevent the emergence or revival ofpotential challengers.

In this conceptual context, Kenneth Waltz’ threelevels of Analysis provide a useful framework todeconstruct and understand the Afghan imbroglio by


identifying and distinguishing between the interests ofinternational, regional and local actors. Theseinterests are determined by a variety of complex factorsand considerations, some of which are interlinked.1

The key research question of this paper is toidentify the interests of local, regional andinternational actors and identify their convergences anddivergences and based on this conceptual framework,recommend a viable way forward suitable for Afghanistanand the region.

A Security dilemma is posed to the internationalsystem by virtue of its dynamic nature and due to thecompulsion imposed upon a superpower to preserve itsstature as the preeminent actor within the internationalsystem and the aspirations of emerging or regionalplayers to exploit the receding influence of a decliningsuperpower. In this context the political necessities ofthe US are in conflict with the opportunities whichChina, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, which view theemerging Post-2014 political and security architectureof Afghanistan as a long-term opportunity. ThereforeAfghanistan provides a contemporary and compelling casestudy to analyse the relationship between US’s economic,strategic, political, and energy interests and thecontemporary structure of the international system. Inaddition, US represents the leader of the industrializedworld and various scholars and strategists like ColinGray and Bernard Brodie attribute the emergence of thepost-World War II world order as a direct consequence ofthe formidable US industrial capacity. Therefore,securing and sustaining its long-term energy security,represents a goal which is vital to the sustenance ofthe US’ industrial might, technological prowess,military industry, economic progress, its way of life

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, I959), 263.


and its international image as the leader of the freeworld.

In the foreseeable future, various USinternational relations experts perceive China topresent the most likely and most credible challenge tothe US’s pre-eminence in the evolving internationalorder. An economically, politically, diplomatically andstrategically resurgent Russia represents anotherconcern for Washington as it is reasserting itsinfluence if not waging a direct claim over itsperiphery. Moreover, Iran presents the last and theforemost irritant towards virtually ensuring a completecontrol of the Middle Eastern energy resources as wellas the regimes controlling these resources vital to theinterests of the industrialized societies, to the policydictates of Washington. Hence, controlling Afghanistanis key to securing its long-term energy interests,restricting or delaying the emergence of China,containing the resurgence of Russia, neutralizing andisolating Iran besides marginalizing the extremistforces.

Moreover, these international developments cannotbe divorced from the domestic political and economicrealities, which the US is currently facing. Thedwindling public support for sustained military presencein Afghanistan, shaky economy, rising unemployment,Republicans’ criticism and sagging morale of the USpersonnel are important considerations for the Obamaadministration in an election year which he cannotafford to ignore.

Besides, the lack of proportionate long-termcommitment of its allies also constrains the US policyoptions and strategies both in Afghanistan and theregion. Therefore, blaming other allies becomes apolitical compulsion for the US administration ratherthan the reflection of strategic reality. In thisrespect, Pakistan continues to be the principal fall guyof this blame game, despite its unparalleled


contribution in the War on Terror, losses of over 35,000lives of its citizens and soldiers, almost 70 billiondollars worth of damages to its economy, infrastructureand the loss of an entire decade. In case of Pakistan,the apparent and traditional disconnect between long-term national interests and the relatively short termstrategic and economic compulsions of allying itselfwith the preeminent superpower has significantlyconstrained Pakistan’s ability to pursue a foreignpolicy based on domestic popular aspirations and alsopreserve its economic and territorial sovereignty at thesame time. Pakistan’s policies regarding Afghanistan,US, Iran, Russia and terrorism need a detailed criticalanalysis in the above context. This has furtheraggravated the challenges for the Pakistani leadershipin terms of the need to perpetually balance theconflicting demands of a superpower against risingdomestic Anti-American sentiments on the popular level.

Pakistan’s interests and stakes associated withAfghanistan offer both Kabul and Islamabad anunparalleled set of opportunities and challenges, whichif prudently and comprehensively dealt with, couldcontribute towards a peaceful, stable, prosperous andunited Afghanistan, besides securing Pakistan’s longterm national interests, and ensuring stability of theregion. In order to evaluate the role and significanceof each major player in the Afghan-End game, theirinterests and objectives need to be compared with themeans available to them, which is discussed in thefollowing parts of this paper.


Role of Key Players

Extra-Regional Players

According to US Congressional estimates, the UShas spent over 1.25 trillion dollars in the global waron terror, which is approximately twice the total costof 2nd world war borne by the US tax payers2. The SecondWorld War allowed the US and its allies to transform theinternational system from multi-polarity to bipolarity.Whereas, the global war on Terror has accorded the USpolitical legitimacy to preserve international uni-polarity and exploit it for the pursuit of itsgeopolitical, geostrategic and energy interests in Asia.The events of 9/11 provided the US the opportunity toinvade Afghanistan whereas the ideological roots andorigins of Al-Qaeda, the main perpetrators of 9/11 didnot belong to South Asia or for that matter,Afghanistan.

Moreover, the US initial insistence at notdistinguishing between Al-Qaeda’s transnational agendaand Taliban’s local agenda seemed misfit in view of theground realities of Afghanistan. Also, even though theUS resorted to global War on Terror (GWOT) whichnecessitated counter terrorism strategy. In fact itinitially resorted to a large-scale conventional war inAfghanistan including strategic bombing, employment ofcareer battle groups and massive deployment ofconventional forces including those of its allies. Aftergaining foothold in Afghanistan, it again resorted tocounter insurgency (COIN) strategy which was pursued foralmost 10 years and led to huge human rights violationsand civilian causalities which could have been avoidedhad they resorted to a Counter Terrorism (CT) strategyright from the very outset. 2 Syed Muhammad Ali, “The Afghan end-game: Lessons for US strategy,” Strategic Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, 2011.


The incorrect strategy of initially employingconventional warfare and subsequently counter insurgencyapproach led to the large scale destruction of socioeconomic infrastructure, agricultural resource base andmass exodus of skilled man power, strengthened the blackeconomy, narcotics trade and helped the warlords becomethe main political actors in domestic politics ofAfghanistan. This situation raises serious questionsregarding the strategic means employed by the US inAfghanistan during the last 11 years and the actual endsit desires, conducive to its long term nationalinterests in the region. Had it been focused on seekingto crush its former jehadist allies turned terroristsincluding Osama bin Laden; the US and NATO should nothave had an excuse to stay in Afghanistan or even in theregion after the raid conducted by Navy SEALs inAbbottabad on 2 May 2011 after which the US claimed thatOsama bin Laden had been killed.

The above discussion leads us to the need toidentify the US’s actual interest; the pursuit of whichresulted in the large-scale invasion, regime change andsubsequent political, strategic and economic control ofAfghanistan.

US Objectives: A Brief Critical Evaluation

As a sole super power in the current internationalsystem US aspires to dominate the policies and politicsof various regions, particularly those which it views assignificant to its geo-strategic, geopolitical, economic,and energy interests. A long-term stay in Afghanistan andthe domination of Central Asia are all corollaries to themultipurpose US strategies in the region3. It is widelybelieved that while anchored in Afghanistan, with a fewbases in Central Asia, the United States has multiple

3Steve Coll, Ghost Wars; the Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004)


objectives. In the views of various writers and analysts,its long-term agenda includes the containment of Chinathrough multi-pronged approaches, planned to beimplemented through its allies in East Asia, Japan andSouth Korea, given that it already has a sizable numberof its own military forces stationed there. The US ismoving closer towards ASEAN, being part of the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation (TAC)4. It has recently concluded anuclear deal with Vietnam5 and is about to securemilitary bases in the Philippines6. In the context ofthese measures, countering the rise of China is notrestricted to South China Sea and Indian Ocean but alsoinvolved bringing Indian strategic, diplomatic andeconomic influence in Afghanistan as a counter weight toUSA’s peer competitor, China in the region.

In global politics, the US is highly conscious of aresurgent Russia and would take whatever measures itbelieves necessary to contest this power-balancing quest.Certain Russian actions, such as the attack on Georgia in2008, the test firing of long-range intercontinentalballistic missile and a consistent and strong oppositionof the US missile defence shield in the Eastern Europeancountries, use of veto in Syria, criticism of US role inLibyan regime change, expansion of military ties in LatinAmerica and restoration of power projection capabilitiesparticularly the revival of Russian long range strategicbomber patrolling over the Pacific Ocean are tangiblefactors indicative of Russian resurgence, a fact that isof serious concern for the United States7. Putin’s returnto power, growing energy dependence of Western Europe on4Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, Wayne M. Morrison, “US Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)”, Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2009.5SauravJha, “Why a US-Vietnam Nuclear Deal?”,Diplomat, September 15, 2010.6Manuel Mogato, ‘US Military Seeks more Access in Philippines, not Bases’, Reuters, February 2012.7 William J. Lahneman, Military Intervention: Cases in Context in Twenty-First Century (USA:Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2004).

http://the-diplomat.com/2010/09/15/why-a-us-vietnam-nuclear-deal/


Russia, revival of its military industry, and recenteconomic growth have contributed towards a more assertiveRussian foreign policy in international affairs. Thisrevival of diplomatic and strategic competition is amatter of concern for Washington.

Both Russia and China desire that the US shouldleave the region as early as possible. They have evenmade use of the SCO’s forum more than once to pressurizethe US into pulling out. Apart from these, domination, ifnot possession of the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian andCaspian regions have always been an American objective.The US desires to explore and further sell theseresources elsewhere in the world market while denyingaccess to Russia, China or any other potential challengerin the region.

Iran, shares borders with Afghanistan and CentralAsia. The US desires the neutralization of the Iranianrole in Middle Eastern and Central Asia politics as wellas the containment of its ideological influence and itsnuclear programme.

The US and Eurasian Energy Politics

The US role in the Eurasian energy politicsreflects its aspiration to deny access to energyresources to potential challengers and instead divertingthem towards existing or emerging allies. Washingtondesires that neither Russian nor Iranian soil be used toprovide energy corridors from the CARs and the Caspianregions to destined European markets, and elsewhere inthe world. The US prefers using the route from theCentral Asia to Turkey and then on to Europe, as in thecase of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. This crude oilpipeline is 1768 km long and passes through Azerbaijan(Baku), Georgia (Tbilisi) and the Turkish coast (Ceyhan


port) to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea8. For therest of the region, especially India, the US desires apipeline from Central Asia to India via Afghanistan andPakistan. This bypassing strategy is in clash withChinese, Russian and Iranian interests in the region. Regarding Afghanistan, the assessment report of GeneralStanley McChrystal, the former commander of ISAF inAfghanistan in 2009 stated:

“Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict,greater casualties, higher overall costs and ultimately, a critical loss ofpolitical support. Any of these risks in turn, are likely to result inmission failure.”9

At that time, he predicted the failure of the US ledwar in Afghanistan if political reconciliation andintegration of the Taliban were not ensured10. He wasperhaps the only military commander who gave a candidand realistic assessment that there existed a total lackof understanding of the Afghan culture and society onpart of ISAF. While accusing Pakistan of supporting theTaliban, General McChrystal declared the conventionalmodus operandi of dealing with the Afghan imbrogliothrough coalition forces under the US, as part of theproblem, rather than a way out. 11

Therefore, in the Afghan end Game, US is expectedto ensure security of its interests in the form ofretaining military bases and other civil and militaryinstitutions supporting the US interests in the longrun. In addition, the creation of a huge economically

8 Eric Watkins, “BTC Pipeline Throughput Increasing in 2011”, Oil and Gas Journal, 2010.9 COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, General Stanley Mac Crystal, August 30, 2009.10 Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, “General Calls for More US Troops toAvoid Afghan Failure”, New York Times, September 20, 2009. 11 Ibid.


dependent security infrastructure in Afghanistan willkeep it compliant to the long term US interests. From aRealist paradigm, ideological and political differencesnotwithstanding, Iran and the US seem to have a commoninterest in preventing the return to power by Talibanafter the bulk of US forces depart from Afghanistan. Theability of the US to preserve, promote and pursue itslong term regional interests in Afghanistan will dependupon the survival of the political system, governmentstructures and military organization which the US hashelped create during the past 11 years. However, itremains to be seen whether this political system, statestructures and democratization process can survive oncethe bulk of US forces leave Afghanistan and US financialassistance for Afghan government and military graduallyreduces.

Indian role in Afghanistan

India, though non-contiguous to Afghanistan, isbeing cultivated up by the US as an unnatural yet majorplayer in Afghan affairs at the cost of the long termnational interests of immediate neighbours includingPakistan, China, Iran and Russia. According to theFederation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce andIndustry’s 2007 estimates, India constitutes only 5% ofAfghan annual imports and one fifth of Pakistan’sexports to Afghanistan12. In fact, Pakistani exports toAfghanistan are more than the combined total exports ofthe next 3 biggest trading partners of Afghanistan; US,Germany and India. According to independent researchestimates despite the large scale military operations onboth sides of the Durand Line since 9/11, the Pak-Afghanbilateral trade volume has increased over 14 timesduring the past decade. 13

12 Ibid.


Therefore, based on these facts US encouragementof New Delhi to be a major player in the economic andpolitical affairs of Afghanistan is bothdisproportionate and unnatural. In fact, the steady growpattern of the bilateral trade between Afghanistan andPakistan highlights the robustness and strength of thedeep rooted and historical ties between the Pakistaniand Afghan societies, which have not been shaken ordeterred by the disastrous episode of the WOT following9/11.

On the strategic plain, Indian military andintelligence agencies presence in Afghanistan poses aserious threat to security of Pakistan. Their covert andclandestine activities in FATA, KPK and Baluchistan area part of their overall strategy of making Pakistan’swestern borders insecure and unstable. This scenariofurther complicates the security dilemma of Pakistan byposing a threat scenario on the western borders as well;thus further accentuating conventional asymmetry betweenIndia and Pakistan on the eastern border. Consequently,it may affect Pakistani nuclear threshold viz a vezIndia in view of the enhanced post 9/11 asymmetriesposing new threats to regional strategic stability. Withregards to its enhanced partnership with the US, Indiais using Afghanistan as a perfect ground for developingsuitable strategic partnership based on convergence ofinterests. With regards to Afghan society, India isenhancing its footprint and vigorously expanding hercultural, political, diplomatic, and military influence,detrimental to Pakistan’s regional and traditionalinterests thereby isolating Islamabad. Besides, the USpromotion of Indian military to train Afghan NationalArmy (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) portraysinsensitivity of the US regarding religious, cultural,ethnic and historical realities of the Afghan society. 13 “Pak-Afghan Trade Discussion Paper,” PILDAT, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/FP/Pak-AfghanTrade-DiscussionPaperDec2011.pdf


Interests of the NATO Allies

NATO’s overall response towards WOT spearheaded bythe US has been mixed. Whereas, diplomatically andpolitically they support the US initiative, however,barring U.K no other NATO ally is proactivelyparticipating in military operations in Afghanistan.Some of them have even declined to take part in theactual combat operations. Their degree of support formilitary operations in Afghanistan has latelytransformed into encouragement of the US to pursuepolitical dialogue and socio-economic approaches towardsafghan stability. Driven by their political compulsionsof maintaining an alliance with the super power insteadof domestic security considerations, some of theEuropean countries have pulled out or reduced theirforces. Besides domestic opposition, economic downturnin most Western countries is also a reason for theirreluctance to invest their taxpayers money in a warthousands of miles away from their homelands and forambiguous US gains. However, protecting the energyroutes and eliminating terrorism could be considered aslong term objectives of the Western Europe for which aprolonged and large scale military presence is notwarranted.

Regional Powers

Iranian Interests

Iran is Afghanistan’s fifth largest tradingpartner. Iran also provides its trade route to Indiantrade with Afghanistan. In 2003, Iran and Afghanistanstruck a deal under which the Afghan businessmen coulduse the Iranian port of Chabahar with the 90% discountin custom and port fees and 50% discount on warehouse


charges as well as transit rights on the Iranian roadnetwork. As per another deal, India obtained similarpreferences from Iran and Afghanistan for Indian goodsthrough Chabahar and Afghanistan to CARs. Due to itstraditional, historical, ethnic and ideological linkagesinside Western Afghanistan, Iran has heavily invested inthe Herat region, building transport infrastructure,electronic media, telecom sector and also laidelectricity transmission lines, linking WesternAfghanistan with the Iranian power grid14. AlthoughTehran deported Afghan refugees and immigrant workers,it has never closed the Iran-Afghan border and remainscritical to the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan. InAugust 2008, the Afghan ring road which connects Delaramto Zeranj on the Afghan-Iran border was completed. Thismajor project was financed and carried out by India. Inaddition, Iran is also building a major rail linkconnecting North Eastern Iran with Herat, which willultimately connect Iran to Tajikistan.

The Iranian interests driving its engagement withAfghanistan are aimed at containment of US influence onthe socio-economic plain, preventing other powers fromexpanding their political interests in Afghanistan,enhancing its ideological agenda, and participating andbenefiting from Central Asian trade and energy markets.Moreover, economic growth in Afghanistan could havepositive implications for Iranian society as it couldencourage many of the almost million strong Afghanrefugees to return from Iran to Afghanistan.

Chinese Interests

China’s interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan arecomplex and multi-dimensional, and are primarily drivenby internal considerations. Currently, China’s leadersare concerned that a significant drop in economic growth14 Moshsen M. Milani, “Iran’s Policy Towards Afghanistan”, Middle East Journal 60, No. 2, 2006, 251.


– a result of the global economic crisis – will lead toincreased levels of unemployment and destabilizinglevels of popular unrest. China’s need to maintaineconomic growth and domestic stability significantlyinfluences its approach towards Afghanistan andPakistan. China certainly does not want to see nuclear-armed Pakistan be overrun by Islamic extremists. Nordoes it want to see a degree of instability in eithercountry that could complicate China’s access to theirresources, markets and transit routes. Additionally, ofparticular concern to Chinese authorities is thepossibility that extremists could migrate fromAfghanistan or Pakistan into China, or that theiractivities could catalyse extremist groups in itsinterior provinces.

Regionally, China sees Afghanistan and Pakistan ascomponents of a broader struggle for dominance overSouth and Central Asia. China’s close relationship withPakistan is largely a check against India’s rise as adominant power in South Asia. From this point of view, astable and friendly Afghanistan gives Pakistan animportant degree of “strategic depth” against India’snuclear capabilities and conventional militarysuperiority. According to this logic, China benefitsfrom an Afghanistan that is stable and friendly toPakistan, because it allows Islamabad to focus on India.Thus, India’s forays into Afghanistan are seen by somein China as designed to achieve four objectives: containPakistan, enhance its own energy security, combatterrorism, and contain China’s development particularlyof its western region, limit its linkages with CentralAsian region and link Indo-Afghan state and societiespolitically, economically, culturally and strategically.

Another key dimension of China’s approach toAfghanistan and Pakistan is Beijing’s perception of theUnited States. Since 2001, the United States has beenprofoundly focused on the “Arc of Instability” from the


Middle East to South Asia, and the ongoing shift ofmilitary resources from Iraq to Afghanistan. In additionto requiring significant amount of policymakers’attention, this focus directly impacts the ability of USleaders to engage in the Asia-Pacific region. Thisfocus, combined with a difficult economic pictureconstraining future defence and international aidbudgets, has necessarily diverted resources and high-level attention away from China and the Asia-Pacific,forcing the US to essentially operate in the region withone hand tied behind its back. Washington’s focuselsewhere, and a relatively stable strategic environmentwith no military threats, reinforces Chinese perceptionsof the current period as a “window of opportunity”allowing China to focus on its own economic growth anddevelopment.

To date, China’s leaders have not commenteddirectly on the implications of the US involvement inextended occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beijingcontinues to view the United States as the world’s mostpowerful nation and China’s most important relationship,and does not want to jeopardize US-Sino relations withunvarnished criticism or harping about the ongoing wars.However, since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,official Chinese media has not hesitated to emphasizeindications of instability, reports of civilian deaths,and questions about US will to preserve stability inAfghanistan and Pakistan. China highlights problems inAfghanistan and Pakistan for several reasons. First,China perceives itself as the leader of the developingworld and is therefore charged with highlighting whatthey see as victims of US hegemony. Second, China seeksto cultivate positive relations with Muslim-majoritycountries for their natural resources, large consumermarkets and their votes in various multilateral fora.

Another key driver of China’s perspective onAfghanistan and Pakistan is concern about ties betweenIslamic militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the


Uyghur Muslim minority population in Xinjiang province.China is concerned that the militant Islamist ideologyin Afghanistan could bleed into China’s Uyghurpopulation and feed what many in Beijing see as aterrorist problem. The difficulty for US policymakers isdistinguishing between terrorist groups and legitimateresistors against the Chinese Communist Party. Chinaclaims that a Uyghur separatist group called the EastTurkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has had contacts withAl Qaeda, and the US has designated ETIM as a terroristorganization. That being said, ETIM’s true size and theaccuracy of its reported connections with Al Qaedaremain unclear.

However, Beijing’s concerns about its Uyghurpopulation and possible connections with extremists inAfghanistan and Pakistan raise questions about China’swillingness to tolerate US military forces in thesecountries as a tool to keep extremist forces pinned downand focused away from China. Chinese strategists areuncomfortable with a large US military presence alongChina’s border, and some analysts have expressed concernthat US bases in the region supporting operations inAfghanistan are part of a strategy to perpetuate USdomination of the region. At the same time, however, theUS presence in Afghanistan prevents Al Qaeda fromfocusing on China and helps suppress Islamist groupsalong China’s periphery.

Russian Interests

Russia does not view the long-term presence ofextra-regional forces in its backyard as conducive toits national interests besides posing serious threats toits former republics15. However, based on its previous

15 M K Bhadrakumar,“Russia Stops US on Road to Afghanistan,“Asia Times, January 27, 2009.


experience in Afghanistan, she is pursuing a cautiousapproach not to get entangled in the internal afghanaffairs, which could prove costly to its own regionalsecurity. Moscow views the existence of extremist forcesin Afghanistan as a threat within its sphere ofinfluence, namely CARs and wants to restrict theextremist forces from expanding their influence in theCARs. Although, Russia views the US and NATO presence inits backward with concern, however, it does not wantthem to immediately depart, leaving behind a powervacuum which could be quickly filled with the resurgenceof Taliban.

Senior officials in Moscow publically support theongoing reconciliatory efforts with Taliban and arecritical of pursuing a military approach towards theAfghan End Game. They also believe that the regionalstakeholders and neighbours can and should play a morepositive, meaningful and constructive role in promotingAfghan and regional stability as compared to extraregional forces, minus India. What could be a matter of concern for Islamabad is thepotential of Russia forming an alliance with Iran andIndia to support and sustain a Northern Alliance ledpower structure in Afghanistan instead of a Pakistansupported Pashtun dominated Afghan political structureafter majority of the US forces pull out.

Although Russia is concerned with the growingIndo-US strategic partnership and the loss of influenceover New Delhi however, it remains to be seen to whatextent Islamabad can translate these Russian concernsinto opportunities.

Local Actors (Afghanistan)

Karzai Administration

It can be safely assumed that the success andsurvival of the Karzai government beyond 2014 will


depend upon its ability to be seen as acceptable tomajor global, regional and local stakeholders at thesame time. Due to the complex, diverse and unique natureof Afghan polity, a strong, stable and unitedAfghanistan is only possible in which the interests andconcerns of all Afghan major tribes, ethnicities andideologies are accepted and accommodated by the centrerather than a strong centre excepting all the politicalstakeholders to submit to its strong will. In essence,Kabul should be seen by all Afghans as accepting theircollective will instead of all Afghans accepting theindividual will of whoever is in power in Kabul. Inaddition, the success and the popularity of anygovernment is directly proportional to its ability toprovide, ensure and implement socio-economic justicebeyond all ethnic, ideological or political divides.

In its own interest the onus is on the Karzaigovernment to expand its engagement and dialogue withall Afghans and their representatives including theestranged Pashtuns to allow the process ofreconciliation and reintegration to move forward andeventually succeed. In the End Game, domestically Afghangovernment will be judged based on the effectiveness ofits security apparatus, its ability to govern, deliverjustice and effectively cope with the rampantcorruption. According to latest United Nations office onDrugs and Crime report Afghanistan produces 93% of theworld’s total heroine, which is a major source ofrevenue for all illegal activities including illegalarms, sustaining war lords and continued instability inthe Afghan society. Taliban

Senior officials of the US administration such asSecretary Clinton and former Secretary Gates admittanceof the US sustained engagement with the Taliban, openingof Taliban’s representative office in Doha, Qatar andpublic reiteration by various key international players


of the significance of peace and reconciliation effortwith the Taliban, the review of U.N’s wanted terroristlist and release of inmates from Guantanamo Bay provethat a substantive diplomatic effort is afoot with theTaliban. The multi-tracked reconciliation process, which isunderway represents the multilateral effort aimed atbringing peace and stability to Afghanistan throughdiplomatic means, an approach that Pakistan recommendedsince 9/11. In the words of a Pakistan former foreignsecretary who has served both in Kabul and Moscow, forthe peace and reconciliation effort to succeed, “A talk-talk rather than talk-fight approach would be moresuitable”16.

The maximalist Taliban position could be to grantthem political recognition internationally; successionof all military operations by foreign forces inAfghanistan; release of all prisoners held at Baghram,Kandahar and other air bases under US/ NATO; and IslamicShari’ah to become the law of the land; and an earliertimeframe for the withdrawal of all foreign forces fromAfghanistan.

Pak-Afghan Correlation: Identifying Opportunities andChallenges

1. Political Dimension

No country has suffered more than Pakistan fromthe Afghan War than Pakistan. The colossal impact on allspheres and walks of life of this long-drawn warfare,has left a disturbing and deep imprint on not just theeconomic, social, political but also the culturalaspects of the Pakistani society.

The manner in which the US and ISAF forces usedmassive force to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, not16 An Interview with former Foreign Secretary, Ambassador Tanvir Ahmad Khan, conducted in Islamabad on April 1, 2012.


only led to the migration of Afghani people to Pakistan,putting additional pressure on its reeling economy butalso created a major wave of anti-American sentiment onthe societal level, creating additional challenges forthe Pakistani government to maintain a stable alliancewith the US against terrorism.

The war against terrorism, as per the USCongressional estimates, became overwhelmingly unpopularamong the Pakistani nation, and led to the rise ofReligious parties like MMA in the KPK province, whichgot into power riding this popular anti-Americansentiment. This created further difficulties for thegovernment in Islamabad to cooperate with the US as itwas seen as an unpopular policy and further isolated theliberal forces within the Pakistani society as they wereincreasingly seen as pro-US among the conservativesegments of society and media.

Another new development was the rise of privatemedia after the 9/11 incident, in the form of largenumber of new TV channels, which helped create a newpopular culture of accountability and transparency andopen public debates on national and regional securityissues, leading to additional pressures on thegovernment regarding the exact details and nature ofPak-US cooperation in the War on Terror.

A major political dilemma was posed by conflictinglocal aspirations and international expectations to notjust the President Musharraf’s government but also thecurrent government. Moreover, the effort by thegovernment to build a broad-based national consensusagainst terrorism was not very successful and limited tomedia interactions and public statements of theleadership. Had a broad-based political strategy towardsnational consensus building against terrorism succeeded,the terrorists would have been politically, socially andeconomically isolated and the political fallout and costto the state and the society would have been much lower.


Such an approach would also have reduced the gulfbetween the right and left leaning segments of thesociety, further enhancing the national unity andtherefore, the national resolve against Pakistan’senemies, both at state and sub-state levels.

2. Security Dimension

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan facedthe gravest situation ever to its security when itsarmed forces were deployed simultaneously on both theeastern and western borders. Whilst the stand-off wasunderway as a consequence of one of the largest everIndian armed forces deployments on the Pakistani bordersafter the Brasstacks in 1986-87, Pakistan also had tomove large number of its forces on the western borders,in support of its commitment to the war on terror. Thisaccentuated its asymmetry viz a viz the Indian forces toan unprecedented levels. Pakistan lost over 35, 000lives of its citizens including 11,612 soldiers and alsocreated an environment, which was not conducive toinvestment, economic growth and normal businessactivity. This also aggravated the unemployment andgeneral discontent of the society towards thegovernment. Role of non-state actors and terroristsincreased and expanded and led to almost 300 suicideattacks since 2002.

Besides, hundreds of drone attacks as well as airand ground violations carried out by the US and NATOforces over the territory of Pakistan, the attack on OBLcompound in Abbottabad, attack on Pakistani militarypost at Salala, and shooting of Pakistani citizens by aUS national claiming to be a diplomat are but a fewevents which raise serious security concerns not only atthe political and strategic leadership levels but alsotranslate into large scale hostile public sentiment andraise serious questions regarding the real motives ofextra-regional forces based in Afghanistan. Although


Pakistan has taken extensive measures to ensure thesafety and security of its strategic installations andassets, the presence of extra regional forces inneighbouring Afghanistan and their incursions into thePakistani territory heighten the threat perception ofPakistan. Based on extensive research, the Bureau ofInvestigative Journalism discovered that as a directconsequence of the drone attacks on Pakistan up to 2764civilians including 160 children17.

Estimated Total Deaths from US Drone Strikes inPakistan, 2004 - 2012

Timeline Deaths (high)2012* 842011 5362010 9932009 7252008 3142004-2007 112Total 2,764

*Through March 13, 2012

Due to their extensive use, Pakistan’sconventional capabilities, weapon systems and aircraft’sservice life were significantly reduced. The onlynotable addition to Pakistan’s conventional weaponsystem during the last 11 years was the acquisition of18 F-16 block 52 fighter aircraft equipped with BVRcapability. This aircraft was procured with only partial

17 Counter Terrorism Strategy Initiative, “The year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012”, New America Foundation, March 2012.


US funding and the rest of the cost was met withPakistan’s own resources.

Washington seeks a long-term strategic partnershipwith New Delhi as a regional counter to China. In thiscontext, Pakistan’s traditional reliance over the US andits security concerns vis a vis India have beensubordinated to the US attempt to prop up India as amajor regional power. In effect, this has aggravatedPakistan security dilemma vis a vis India in which thesole super power is increasingly allying itself with theIndian quest to emerge as a regional hegemon. Post 9/11developments such as the 123 Agreement, US assistancefor the Indian ABM Programme, frequent joint militaryexercises, the recent attempt by the Obamaadministration to accommodate India into MTCR, AustraliaGroup, Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Groupfurther strengthen the above mentioned concerns inPakistan.

Members of the parliamentary committee on NationalSecurity unanimously agreed to include 2 clauses intoits draft report about not allowing foreign securitycontractors to conduct covert operations on Pakistanisoil and also not allowing its bases to any foreignnation, especially to the US.

Insecurity and instability in Pakistani borderregion (FATA) has aggravated due to the prevailingsecurity situation across the border in Afghanistan. Theporous nature of over 2600 kilometres long border,presence of 3 million Afghan refugees inside Pakistanand the ineffective border control system in Afghanistanpose a serious security threat to Pakistan by allowingunrestricted movement of terrorists and theirsympathizers inside Pakistani territory. Despite itsbest efforts, Pakistan could not restrict the crossborder movement of terrorists due to non reciprocityfrom the Afghan side, cannot ensure an effective controlon cross border movement. Pakistan’s commitment to checkthe border crossing can be gauged by measures such as


fencing of selected routes, installation of biometricsystem, and surveillance equipment along the border, andthe border defence system of 821 posts as against 112posts by the ISAF and ANA.

Besides physical damage, the psychological imprintof WOT has also affected all segments of Pakistanisociety leading to poor attention towards human rightsissues, civil liberties, and psychological trauma ofthousands of families, in short a general sense ofinsecurity has gripped the entire nation which hasseriously undermined the general quality of life andcharacter of the nation.

3. Socio-Cultural Dimension

At the societal level, polarization, intoleranceand increasing use of violence is a reflection ofgrowing lack of trust between state and society andvarious schools of thoughts, thus weakening the nationalcohesion. The role of media has also been quite damagingto the national morale and the national imageinternationally due to the manner in which it portraysthe phenomenon of terrorism. The weakening of statecontrol over media after 9/11 has allowed the TVchannels to focus on more controversial issues thancredible and professional reporting of eventscontributing to a chaotic situation.

Negative perceptions created by national as wellas international media have severely damaged the imageof Pakistani nation internationally. However, thisnegative perception has been further reinforced by theextremist ideas displayed by certain individualsincluding some expatriates in different parts of theworld.

Unchecked poppy cultivation in Afghanistan anddrug trafficking has also affected the Pakistani societyin a major manner. According to the figures quoted by


the DG Anti Narcotics Force, currently Pakistan hasalmost 4-5 million drug addicts.

The numbers of terrorist attacks, sectarianviolence and suicide bombings on business centres andreligious gatherings have enormously increased after9/11 and subsequent investigations have revealed that alarge number of suicide bombers were recruited from theAfghan refugee camps or were Afghan Nationals.

4. Economic Dimension

Since 9/11, Pakistan economy has been undertremendous pressure as a direct consequence of WOT asper official estimates the nation has suffered aneconomic loss of up to 70 billion dollars. Consequently,progress on welfare and development works has beenseverely affected. Besides, natural calamities likeearthquake of 2005 and devastating floods of 2010 addedto the miseries and further weakening of the economy.IDPs of Swat and Malakand as well as South Waziristanalso added to the financial burden of the nationalexchequer. Financial cost of security measuresundertaken at various tiers both in public and privatesectors in terms of security equipment, weapons,vehicles, infrastructure and employment of personnel asguards has not been estimated but appears to becolossal. Following tables evaluates the Annual GDPgrowth rates, Annual Inflation rates and Foreign DirectInvestment rates during Pakistan’s association with theGlobal War on Terror18:

18 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon. “Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security.” Brookings Institute, 2012, 15-18.


Table: Annual Real GDP Growth Rate

Table: Annual Inflation19

19 Ibid.

Timeline Annual GDP Growth Rate(%)

1991-2000 3.92001 2.02002 3.22003 4.92004 7.42005 7.72006 6.12007 5.62008 2.02009 2.02010 3.02011 4.0

Timeline Annual Inflation (%)2000 3.62001 4.42002 3.52003 3.12004 4.62005 9.32006 7.92007 7.82008 12.02009 20.82010 11.72011 16.0


Table: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Pakistan, 2001 through 201120

The rising inflation rates, lack of investment inindustrial and public sectors, translates into dwindlingemployment opportunities, which further exacerbate crimerate, insecurity and raises the cost of doing businessin Pakistan, shying away potential investors. Despite Pakistan’s unparalleled contribution inthe GWOT, despite numerous requests by Islamabad,Washington has not increased the export quota for thePakistani textile goods. Moreover, the 750 million USdollars, which were committed by the US administrationfor developing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)in FATA, as means to encourage the tribal youth tocontribute and benefit from mainstream participation inthe socio-economic development for both his communityand locality, have not been honoured.

In addition, the Coalition Support Funds (CSF)essentially represent the reimbursements of theexpenditures undertaken by the defence forces of20 Ibid.

Timeline FDI in Total ($US)1995 7231996 9221997 7161998 5061999 5232000 3082001 3832002 8232003 5342004 1,1182005 2,2012006 4,2732007 5,5902008 5,4382009 2,382


Pakistan, as part of their contribution towards the waron terror and do not constitute a US military assistanceprogramme for Pakistan, as wrongly perceived in themainstream media. This issue also highlights the trustdeficit, long delays and bureaucratic problems, whichfurther add to the troubles of this difficult strategicrelationship between the US and Pakistan.

Pakistan also continues to suffer as a result ofthe US strategy to isolate Iran. Its energy needs have been further aggravated by the sustained USpressure not to allow Pakistan to procure gas supplyfrom Iran. In contrast, the US has repeatedly encouragedIslamabad to procure natural gas from Central Asianrepublics instead of Iran. According to a research studycarried out by the School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS) of the US Johns Hopkins University,Washington, DC, “the Central Asian Republics hold reserves of naturalgas, oil and potential hydroelectricity which will be sold at prices five timeshigher to South Asia than to Russia.”21

The much talked about Kerry Luger Bill, instead ofbuilding trust and confidence between the two key alliesagainst terrorism, has unfortunately become the symbolof distrust and lack of serious commitment on the partof the US to consider the genuine concerns and problemswhich Pakistan faces due to its role in the GWOT.

Offering the shortest and most direct route tooutside world markets through its ports, Pakistanhistorically has remained the largest trade partner ofAfghanistan, a reality which has not changed after 9/11US invasion of Afghanistan.

21 “Afghan Policy Paper,“ Johns Hopkins University. Accessed on 01 April 2012, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Pappas%20Afghan%20Policy%20Paper%20v5.1.pdf

http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Pappas%20Afghan%20Policy%20Paper%20v5.1.pdf



Of all the regional neighbours, due to varioushistorical, geographical, cultural and other factors,Pakistan enjoys the biggest economic leverage overAfghanistan, not merely in monetary terms but also interms of being the largest provider of its basic needs,which the land-locked country of Afghanistan and itssociety survives on. Moreover, Afghanistan alsorepresents Pakistan’s second biggest export market afterthe US, constituting 11 percent of its export revenuesand more than the combined exports of India, China andIran.

The 8th Session of Pak-Afghan Economic Commission(JEC), which was held on 16-17th January, 2012 inIslamabad, provides an institutional mechanism forstreamlining the economic ties between the twocountries, has resolved to enhance the current US $ 2.5billion annual bilateral trade volume between Pakistanand Afghanistan to 5 Billion US dollars over the next 3years.

In fact, Afghanistan imports five times morecommodities from Pakistan as compared to India, whichfurther signifies the limited commercial and economiccontribution, which India has or can make to the Afghanneeds.

According to a Johns Hopkins University research study:

‘After 2001, the new government in Kabul pivoted away fromdependence on Pakistan towards closer relations with Iran and India,who had previously sponsored the Northern Alliance. Pakistan beganto fear India’s expanded diplomatic and development efforts inAfghanistan as cover for Indian intelligence operations directedagainst Pakistan.22

22 “Afghan Policy Paper,“ Johns Hopkins University. Accessed on 01 April 2012, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Pappas%20Afghan%20Policy%20Paper%20v5.1.pdf




Despite our continued economic sufferings due to theWar on Terror, Pakistan has committed over 330 MillionsUS dollars for development and reconstruction inAfghanistan. This amount is being spent on projects likeTorkham-Jalalabad Road, Jinnah Hospital in Kabul,Nishtar Kidney Centre in Jalalabad, EngineeringUniversity in Balkh and various faculties in variousAfghan universities across the country. Moreover,Pakistan has offered two thousand scholarships to Afghanstudents for education in Pakistani academicinstitutions. Currently, more than Six thousand Afghanstudents are studying in various Pakistani colleges anduniversities.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement(APTTA), which was signed in Kabul on 28th October, 2010and came into force from 12th June, 2011 is an importantbilateral trade related arrangement between the twocountries, which Islamabad aims to extend beyondAfghanistan into Central Asian Republics.

Pakistan’s Role in Peace and Stability in Afghanistan:The Way Forward

Major Decisions Need Major Analysis: Developing aComprehensive Policy Mechanism

The current policy review that Pakistan isundertaking viz a viz the US, particularly in thecontext of its cooperation on WOT indicates Islamabad’saim to do a comprehensive cost benefit analysis of thispartnership. However, this policy review which isunderway regarding the ‘Afghan End Game’ would have beenmore timely and more appropriate when the Afghan gamestarted after the 9/11 by allowing all existing andpotential allies of the US to be consulted in terms of


identification of common, realistic strategic objectiveswithin a viable timeframe not to mention a clearlyarticulated exist-strategy. Such an approach would havealso allowed the US and its allies closer collaborationat all levels of political, strategic, operational andtactical levels, minimized casualties and would haveallowed a clearly rationalized and united war effortfrom the very beginning.

However, instead of building a comprehensivestrategy in collaboration with all its allies, Pakistancame under an unprecedented US pressure after 9/11 tochange its policy towards Afghanistan. Some US expertshave even stated that the US approach was less like thatof a long-standing ally and seemed more like a case ofcoercive diplomacy23. Hence, faced with an overtcompellence to its security interests from its premierally, Pakistan’s responses were not based on acomprehensive multi-institutional review of its long-term national interests in the changing geo-strategicand geo-political environment and reflect realization ofIslamabad’s immediate need to secure its survival,traditional security interests and also to sustain a co-operative equation with the only superpower in theexisting international system in an environment of uni-polarity. Nevertheless, a foreign and security policybased on comprehensive institutional inputs from allinstitutions relevant to Pakistan’s traditional and non-traditional security, sovereignty, economic progress andeven human rights considerations and civil libertiesshould have been taken into consideration before takingan international position, to allow it to be sustainableboth internally and externally, in times of economic andpolitical difficulties.

Pakistan’s Afghan policy highlights some of thefundamental systemic flaws in the national policymakingmechanism. Both Kashmir and Afghanistan policy23 Liam Collins, “United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11: A Case Study in Coercive Diplomacy”, (New Jersey: Princeton, 2008), 2.


approaches indicate that decisions are taken byindividuals without taking institutions on board, whichnot only render these decisions unpopular within theinstitution and among the general public but alsoisolates the individuals taking these decisions bothfrom their own institutions and the nation. This alsocreates difficulties in the implementation of thesedecisions, no matter how sincerely or quickly they arearrived at. Most decisions related to securitycooperation between Pakistan and the US have notinvolved a system of national consensus building throughan open and broad based national discourse involving allsegments of the society, their representatives, keystakeholders and opinion makers. This issue alsocontributes towards growing anti-American sentiments atPakistani societal and individual levels, which makespursuing these policies more difficult and unpopular forstate and its institutions particularly during times ofeconomic and political difficulties. This approach alsocreates a deficit of trust between the government andthe nation due to the lack of transparency in thepolicy-making mechanism, detrimental to the long-termviability of both the government and the state.

This analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in thestrategic culture of Pakistan in which ironically wehave no clearly defined or operational institutionalpolicy-making mechanism for our national security policyas such. Over the past 65 years, the policy-makingsystem has perhaps not recovered from its colonialroots, executive-dominated traditions and bureaucraticpractices. Therefore, evolving a fresh environment offree debate, intellectual input, and academic discourseis essential to mitigate the existing impediments in acomprehensive, broad based egalitarian policymakingconsistent with 21st century challenges that thePakistani state and society currently faces or is likelyto face in future. The need to review and revise the


fundamental policymaking mechanism and organizationalbehaviour is far more important than a change in anyparticular policy like that towards Afghanistan or onWar on terror. The absence of national security policyand its necessary comprehensive institutional mechanism,prevents our stance towards national and internationalsecurity issues to be coherent and well-coordinated oreven sustainable when faced with intense internal orexternal pressures or coercion.

Moreover, our national policy towards GWOT aughtto consider the following factors before taking aposition and aligning itself with extra-regional forcesin Afghanistan: Pakistan’s red lines of cooperation inthe war in Afghanistan should not have been restrictedto territorial sovereignty and foreign troops on itssoil but also needed to incorporate identification of aspecific timeframe, a comprehensive formula for thesharing of financial and operational costs, and limitson acceptable damage to its socio-economicinfrastructure. In addition, the objectives of themilitary campaign must have been clearly identified,discussed and institutionalized to ensure sustainedfocus, realistic appreciation, strict compliance by bothparties, facilitate cooperation, minimize mutualmisperceptions, and reduce and equitably share costs ofthe joint war effort. Ten years down the line we arecomplaining about the loss to Pakistan’s economy worthapproximately 70 billion US dollars. A realisticassessment of such projected losses should have beenfactored into our initial decision, negotiations andwhatever eventual agreement which was necessary, beforetaking the decision to join the GWOT.

A Revised Afghan PolicyAn array of opportunities for a successful

regional framework await us – provided mutual sincerity,cooperation, and commitment prevail – engaging regionaland global stakeholders in efforts to guarantee Afghan


security and to foster regional peace and stability.Notwithstanding the prevailing differences amongstAfghanistan’s neighbors and regional states, there is aneed to capitalize upon shared common interests anddevelop meaningful economic engagement via regional forasuch as the South Asian Association for RegionalCooperation (SAARC), the Economic CooperationOrganization (ECO), Shanghai Corporation Organization(SCO) etc. Limits of Hard Power: A New Afghan Context

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan providespersuasive evidence towards the notion that technologyis not a substitute for knowledge and military power isnot a substitute for understanding a society’s culturewhere large-scale military operations are to beconsidered. In this context, in order for Pakistan topursue and promote its regional and national interestsviz a viz Afghanistan on a long-term basis, a major andcomprehensive policy review is long overdue. Moreimportantly, cooperation with international actorsshould have been based on our long term nationalinterests viz a viz Afghanistan and its people whoseaspirations, sensitivities and affinity with Pakistanination should have dictated our Afghan policy in GWOT. Afresh approach based on realization of both the groundrealities and the prevailing international environmentis mandatory for Islamabad. Pakistan needs to formulateand pursue a soft power-based policy by shifting itsstrategic orientation from its current short-term stateand government centric to a new long-term politico-economic and people centric approach and needs toconvince its major allies to also transform their hard-power centric strategy towards Afghanistan into a soft-power based strategy. The entire war on terror hasdemonstrated the need that terrorism needs to be


countered and eliminated on the societal front ratherthan focusing on a traditional state-to-state context.

Therefore, a major soft power based approach,rooted in a thorough understanding of the diversesensitivities and appreciation of cultural, ideologicaland historical differences in various civilization is afundamental and primary necessity for the internationalcommunity, which needs to be coupled with selective andsurgical use of hard power, instead of the opposite.

In this context, Pakistan, by virtue of itsunique, major and historical relevance to the culture,society, ideology, ethnicity and history of Afghanistan,becomes vital to any soft-power based peace process anda negotiated end-game in Afghanistan.

However, the success of Pakistan’s Afghan EndGame policy depends on the critical question ofIslamabad’s political acceptability to all segments ofAfghan society beyond ethnicity and ideological divide.Consequently, as the core pillar of its future AfghanPolicy, Pakistan should aim to be seen as politically,culturally, ideologically and ethnically tolerant andacceptable to non-Pushtun segments of the Afghan societyas well. In this manner, Pakistan will be viewed as astabilizing force, which could unite the Afghan nationon the basis of peace, stability, economic progress andnon-interference in the political affairs ofAfghanistan. Another core long-term national interestwhich must always be considered during policyformulation regarding this entire region is thatPakistan’s territory and resources should not be madeavailable or used by any power against any other state.

Instead of a hard power based approach, politico-economic strategies must lead the process. Investmentsmade in hard power based structures such as ANA by theUS and ISAF do not reflect realization of the limits ofhard power in the conflict resolution process.Afghanistan’s stabilization requires a holistic,peaceful approach, involving an Afghan-led and Afghan-


owned reconciliation process supported by sustainableeconomic development in collaboration with immediateneighbours and encouraged and understood by extra-regional powers.

The experience of the last two centuries indicatethat the ethnically diverse Afghan society has alwaysbeen a victim of ‘The Great Game’ between emerging anddeclining powers competing for their geo-political, geo-strategic and economic interests in this region. Theinvolvement of additional players culturally,ideologically, and politically alien to the Afghansociety could further undermine the future stability ofthe Afghan state. The encouragement of the US of theIndian involvement in Afghanistan is being viewed withsuspicion by the majority of Afghans and both majorregional players with major stakes in a peacefulAfghanistan, including Pakistan and China. For anysocio-economic and development project to succeed inAfghanistan it should be sensitive to culture, ideologyand diverse ethnic mix of Afghanistan. One of the uniquefeatures of the Afghan society is that its populationshares its history, religion, language, culture, andlifestyle with all its neighbours. Hence, only adelicate balance between the socio-economiccontributions by its politically and culturallyacceptable neighbours could create an unprecedentedsocio-economic and political equilibrium in the Afghansociety.

One of the major reasons behind the lack ofsuccess, acceptability and public support for all majorpowers interfering in Afghanistan over the last 200years has been the same. The British, the Soviets, theAmericans and presently the Indians are not socially,culturally and ideologically acceptable to theconservative and tribal Afghan society deeply consciousof its Muslim identity.


Therefore, any political structure created by sucha culturally and ideologically alien power has neversucceeded and is unlikely to succeed in future as wellbecause it is unacceptable to the majority of Afghanpeople due to differences in the value systems. If theUS and ISAF forces hope to leave an Afghanistan whichcontributes to the international peace and securityrather than harms it, they should engage with andencourage all Afghan neighbours to take the lead instabilizing Afghanistan by creating a broad based andculturally and ideologically acceptable politicalstructure since they understand the dynamics of Afghansociety and polity better than any other state orsociety and have a more dominant stake in evolving apeaceful Afghan society than extra-regional forces. Inaddition, the Afghan society also have deep-rootedcenturies old relations with its neighbouring societieswhich the last 33 years old bloody conflict has notchanged. Its biggest evidence is the fact that duringboth the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the US attacks in2001, majority of the Afghans sought refuge, opportunityand hope in the Pakistani and Iranian societies and notin the western or Indian states.

In a tribal, under-developed but proud societylike Afghanistan, no tribe accepts the monopoly overpower, violence, resources and opportunities by anyother tribe. Therefore, any government or militaryinstitution can only be acceptable and efficient if itis built beyond ethnic biases and allows people of allethnicities and ideologies to tolerate each other,peacefully co-exist and contribute towards the buildingof a peaceful and progressive Afghanistan. In short,creating a political structure acceptable to the solesuper power may serve its short term interests, but byvirtue of being unacceptable and unpopular to the largesegment of the society, could lead to eventually harmingrather that bringing peace and stability to Afghanistanin the longer run.


A New Road Map for Peace: Development and Devolutioninstead of Destruction and Centralized Control

This new approach should aim to stabilizeAfghanistan through development rather than destruction.Therefore, major international powers should devotetheir attention, policies, and resources towardsdevelopment of socio-economic infrastructure compatiblewith the need to encourage economic development ofAfghanistan instead of creating large and unsustainablemilitary structures like ANA with disproportionateethnic mix, which could further aggravate the long-termAfghan instability. In this case, the major portion ofinternational aid and economic assistance should beallocated towards development projects in a balanced,equitable, transparent, just and proportionate basisthroughout all the Afghan provinces instead of beingspent on building large military forces, which in anycase neither the Afghan state can afford in the medium-term nor reflects an ethnic, cultural and ideologicalcomposition acceptable to the majority of Afghansociety.

With this view, it would be useful for bothPakistan and the Afghan Pushtun majority if the Pashtunleaders and representatives are encouraged to engage andimprove their socio-economic relations with other non-Pashtun ethnic communities. In this context, the non-Pushtun elements resident in Pakistan since the 1979Afghan War can play a leading role in not only expandingPakistan’s positive and constructive relevance to Afghandevelopmental process but also help create a broad-based, multi-ethnic yet mutually tolerant and relativelyliberal Afghan society, conscious of the opportunities


that the international phenomenon of globalizationoffers. This could lead to a win-win situation byreducing the trust deficit between Pashtun Afghans andnon-Pashtun Afghans and enhance the socio-politicalstability of Afghanistan.

Conclusion: A Safer Transition of the Internationalsystem towards multi-polarity

An accelerated phenomenon of globalization,growing economic interdependence between the East andthe West for markets and finished products and betweenNorth and South for labour and natural resources and anunprecedented socio-cultural interactions have createdan new environment in the history of the internationalsystem. These circumstances create both new challengesand new opportunities for both the rising, resurgent anddeclining powers within the international system forpreserving world peace despite a changing world order.The growing Sino-US, Sino- European and Indo-US economicties are but a few growing trends which emphasise theincreasing need to promote ideological, cultural andethnic tolerance between different societies.

Afghanistan, therefore, provides a compelling casestudy as an opportunity between Eastern and Westerncivilizations to mutually help develop a stable andpeaceful Afghan society which could allow the US and theWestern Europe to pursue their traditional security andnon-traditional security interests at the same time whenRussia, China, Pakistan, Iran aspire for the sameinterests in this region. In this context, due togeographical and demographical factors, China hasimmense potential to contribute to the economic progressof Afghanistan, which could in return also enhance itsown territorial integrity and political stability inWestern China. A people-centric Approach betweenPakistan and Afghanistan is essential since unlike thetwo states, the Afghan and Pakistani societies have deep


rooted, historical, cultural and economic ties,unaffected by the GWOT. Therefore, a society-basedapproach rather than a state-centric approach is neededto stabilize and harmonize the Afghan society andisolate extremist forces.

Since China has no history of armed conflict withAfghanistan, it is in a unique position to play the roleof the key economic driver of a large scale economicMarshall Plan, which will be acceptable to allethnicities resident in Afghanistan. Moreover, bothPakistan and China, by virtue of geographical contiguityoffer unique economic, logistical, historical,geographical and technological advantages, unavailableto extra-regional powers. Western China is Muslimmajority area in need of economic opportunities andlarge-scale investments by China in Afghanistan andprovision of Chinese Muslim manpower to man theseprojects could not only help stabilize Western ChineseSocio-economic circumstances but also allow a peacefultransition to economic growth within Afghanistan througha regional approach sensitive to ideological andhistorical realities. Since no state and society is moreideologically, culturally, economically and historicallyintegrated with the Afghan society, the internationalactors and powers willing to bring peace and stabilityto Afghanistan should capitalize on the uniqueadvantages which the Pakistani people and societypotentially offer as the preeminent driver of peace,progress and prosperity in this region.

According to a recent State Bank of Pakistanstudy, despite the on going war on terror relatedmilitary operations in the Pak-Afghan border regions,Pakistani exports to Afghanistan are far more than Iranand India and second only to China and maintained ahigher volume despite a government ban on NATO supplies.However, the same official study highlights the risk toPakistani economy potentially losing 2 billion dollars


in export revenue and one of its major export marketsand New Delhi replacing Islamabad, once Pakistan allowsIndia a free-trade corridor to Afghanistan.24

Coping with the socio-economic problems of theAfghan society, China will benefit in a multi-dimensional manner. It could be seen as a stabilizingforce in the region, by building economic and culturalbridges with all ethnicities living in Afghanistan, itcould be viewed as culturally and politically acceptableto all the Afghan neighbours. This could also allow itaccess to various Central Asian markets and expand itspolitical influence in the region. In addition, thiscould eventually lead to building of long-term andsustainable strategic partnerships and alliances.

A proactive Chinese investment plan in Afghanistancould have significant strategic benefits such asallowing it to deepen and enlarge the role of theShanghai Cooperation Organization as a major securityblock, rooted in both non-traditional and traditionalsecurity cooperation between its members, and apotential regional counter weight to the influence andinvasion of extra regional forces. This long-termstrategy could rectify the turbulence, which theinternational order registered during the past 23 yearlong episode of uni-polarity.

Stabilizing Afghanistan by expanding the role ofPakistan, and building a soft power based coalition ofregional partners could contribute meaningfully towardsrestoring bi-polarity in the international system. Thepost-World War II bi-polar international order, despitethe introduction of various nuclear powers prove to be amore delicate, yet more predictable and coherentinternational political structure as compared to thepost Cold War contemporary international system engulfedby proxy wars, low-intensity conflicts, and terrorism.

24 Shahid Iqbal, “Afghanistan Appears Strong Trade Partner”, Dawn, May 1, 2012.


Stabilizing Afghanistan could be the key torectifying the destabilizing trends and implications ofnot just GWOT but could also help restore the essentialingredients of balance of power, strategic stability andreducing the misperceptions and volatility ininternational politics. Lastly it needs to be borne inmind, that to rectify the turbulent and volatile uni-polarity into a more stable and predictable bi-polarity,the onus is on those states which not only have been thevictims of uni-polarity rather than the sole superpower, whose over arching interest in internationalpolitics has been to prevent or delay thistransformation and preserve and optimally benefit fromthe present uni-polarity. This grand-strategy is neitherpermanent not sustainable.

Whilst the Afghan Game is end-Game for some, it isthe beginning of yet another new game in this region.But the lessons of British, Soviet and Americancampaigns in Afghanistan, guide the new players todefine new soft-power-based rules to this game ascompared to the traditional hard power based approach,which was not successful for all three superpowers whichpreviously invaded Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the last frontier of the 20th

century great game, which led to the transformation of abipolar world order into a uni-polar internationalsystem. Pakistan played a pivotal role during the 1950s,1970s, 1980s and once again after the 9/11 incident onbehalf of the Western block in Afghanistan. In 1950s itjoined the Western alliance, in 1970 by bringing Chinaand the US close to each other, it isolated Soviet Unionand during the 1980s it helped win the last battleagainst Communism on behalf of the Western world. InAfter 9/11 Pakistan is once again the frontline ally ofthe Western world against the new threat of terrorismand has borne the most cost. However, in the 21st

century, US attention is being drawn away from South


Asia towards a new power equation, which is evolving inAsia-Pacific, as a consequence of the emergence of Chinaand resurgence of Russia.

In this over-arching context, once again,Afghanistan end-game presents new opportunities toemerging and regional players to shape the internationalsystem to suit their regional and synchronize theirglobal interests. Based on the logic of uni-polarity,the US long-term interest is in preventing or delayingthe rise of China as a challenger to US political,economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacificregion. Therefore, US aims to develop importantstrategic partnership in South Asia, led by India, tocontain, distract and divert the Chinese emergence byisolating it regionally, economically and strategically.This is why Washington is encouraging regionalintegration and improvement of relations between Indiaand Pakistan by expanding political, strategic,technological and economic leverages over both New Delhiand Islamabad and also reducing Chinese leverage overPakistan.

This makes Islamabad a vital player both in termsof future security calculus of South Asia and alsooffers it unique opportunities to improve its relationswith New Delhi and also contribute towards future Afghansecurity and regional stability. History has offeredPakistan yet another chance to either remain passive andsubservient to the international political status-quo orplay a pro-active role in shaping a new securityarchitecture in South Asia, based on the principle ofcollective security of natural partners instead of un-natural partners and also benefit from the opportunitiesthat the Afghan End-Game is providing it for its ownlong-term traditional and non-traditional security. Likethe key role it played during the 1970s in dividing theCommunism Block by bringing China and US closer, anotheropportunity awaits Pakistan to make a leading andmeaningful contribution towards bringing US and China


together in stabilizing Afghanistan. This will benefitboth the US and Chinese regional interests and allowIslamabad to forge not only economic but also developstrategic and geo-political interdependence between anexisting and a rising power. This could have far-reaching implications for preserving the regional andglobal stability and also bridging the deficit of trustand mitigating the global rivalry between Washington andBeijing in an era when the core is returning to Asiafrom Europe after 5 centuries.

Documents

Afghan End Game and Pakistan: Opportunities And Challenges