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African Journalism Studies

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When the subaltern speaks: citizen journalism andgenocide ‘victims’’ voices online

Shepherd Mpofu

To cite this article: Shepherd Mpofu (2015) When the subaltern speaks: citizen journalismand genocide ‘victims’’ voices online, African Journalism Studies, 36:4, 82-101, DOI:10.1080/23743670.2015.1119491

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23743670.2015.1119491

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African Journalism StudiesVolume 36 | Number 4 | 2015pp. 82–101

DOI: 10.1080/23743670.2015.1119491Print ISSN 2374-3670 | Online 2374-3689

© 2015 iMasa

universityof south africa

WHEN THE SUBALTERN SPEAKS: CITIZEN JOURNALISM AND GENOCIDE ‘VICTIMS’’ VOICES ONLINE

Shepherd MpofuDepartment of Communication StudiesUniversity of Johannesburg, South Africasmpofu@uj.ac.za

ABSTRACTUsing qualitative data drawn from newzimbabwe.com and a listserv comprising mostly Ndebele-speaking people of Zimbabwe, this article investigates how the Web 2.0 era has given subaltern voices platforms to discuss issues rendered taboo in authoritarian contexts. The study is anchored on the concept of the subaltern public sphere and the metaphor of the ‘voice’ in cyberspace. The subaltern, as used here, refers to those people who perceive themselves as excluded from mainstream power and economic activities. The study uses online observation and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine how ‘Ndebeles’ discuss the 1980s genocide and how citizen journalism has generally revolutionised their participation in debates silenced by the ruling elite. What strongly comes out from the discussants’ interactions is that the genocide, which has not been addressed since it ‘ended’ with the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, remains contentious as victims have not found closure. The study concludes that Web 2.0 has reconfigured subaltern communities’ engagements with the traumatic genocide.

Keywords: citizen journalism, genocide, public sphere, subaltern, voiceDow

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INTRODUCTIONThis article argues that Web 2.0 has revolutionised participation in salient public discourses of those ostracised Zimbabwean members of society whom Fanon (1969) and Gramsci (1971) have categorised as ‘the wretched of the earth’ or ‘subaltern’ respectively. Mhlanga (2010) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a) have since located Ndebeles as the ‘subaltern’ in Zimbabwe by arguing that they exist on the margins of power and are suppressed by what is seen as a predominantly Shona political system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b). Lindgren (2002, 48) adds that Ndebele-speakers have been excluded from being ‘part of a larger national building project … [with the nation-state] built on Robert Mugabe as father of the nation … Zanu-PF party, and on symbols associated with “Shona”’. Zimbabwe is home to two major ethnic groups: the Shona and Ndebele, who make up around 80 and 14 per cent of the total population respectively (Murray 2010). These are not homogeneous groups. They are composed of sub-ethnic groups characterised by complexities and intra-ethnic tensions (Mpofu 2014a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b).

Of course the Gramscian concept of subalternity is complex and not easy to define or attach to any group. According to Gramsci, when he coined the term it referred to the workers oppressed by Mussolini’s Fascist Party in Italy. The subaltern, in that context, were not uniform. For the present study, the ‘concept of subalternity applies to those groups in society who are lacking autonomous political power’ (Smith 2010, 39), leading to their alienation.

The study focuses on ‘Ndebele voices’ regarding the 1980s genocide. It is problematic to identify these voices as belonging to the Ndebele as, in online discussions, people can appropriate elusive identities for different reasons. For the purposes of this research, while admitting that the fluidity of online identities could be deceptive, I use ‘Ndebele voices’ loosely to refer to those voices that express the predicament of the Ndebele which I, as an insider, have heard offline and could relate to as there are convergences in online and offline discussions. This applies particularly to newzimbabwe.com debates, as voices cannot be ascertained as being from purely Ndebele people, compared to those in the e-mail listserv where people know one another on a first-name basis. I am aware, after observing many online debates, as a Ndebele insider, that there are suspicions that security officers post material pretending to be Ndebele so as to gauge the mood of participants. This research, therefore, is more concerned with the narratives on the genocide that are debated, than with the real identities of the discussants.

Between 1983 and 1987 Zimbabwe was plunged into a violent episode – code-named ‘Gukurahundi’ (the rain that washes away trash after harvest) – which has now been recognised as genocide (Genocide Watch 2010), thus suggesting that it was a crime against humanity and that those responsible should possibly be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). It left an indelible mark in the national memory-scape and its effects ‘influence the current political situation

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and … continue to have far-reaching consequences’ (Lindgren 2002, 48). More than 20 000 mostly Ndebele civilians were killed by the North Korean trained crack military outfit named the Fifth Brigade, informed by the new government’s attempt to quell dissident insurgence in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. As Lindgren (2002, 48) argues, the operation degenerated into an ethnocide as ‘Shona-speaking soldiers were used against Ndebele-speaking civilians’. This unit operated outside the ambit of the official Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and reported directly to then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe. To circumvent further spilling of blood of predominantly ZAPU supporters, Joshua Nkomo was forced into signing a Unity Accord with Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and this led to Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) being swallowed up by Zanu-PF (Kriger 2003).

Open public deliberations on the genocide have been treated as taboo and criminalised by Zanu-PF almost three decades afterwards (Mpofu 2014b). The Unity Accord was used to silence further deliberations on the issue. The taboo nature of genocide discourses could be illustrated through events that attempted to undo the Gukurahundi secrecy and silence during the recent Government of National Unity (GNU) between Zanu-PF and two formations of opposition parties, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) between 2009 and 2013. The GNU had some resemblance to the Unity Accord. In both instances, the opposition parties invited into the coalition with Zanu-PF were rendered powerless. The GNU was born out of an inconclusive 2009 presidential election. One of the key features of that government was the formation of the Ministry of Healing and Reconciliation. The minister in charge, Mzila-Ndlovu (MDC) was arrested in 2010 for attending a Gukurahundi memorial without police clearance (Mpofu 2014a). Besides, in 2011 the government censored the memorialisation of the genocide by arresting Ndebele artist, Owen Maseko, who had installed a Gukurahundi exhibition at Bulawayo Gallery. Maseko used graffiti, family photographs of relatives who had gone missing or died in the genocide; and some of his paintings featured mine shafts and mass graves where victims were allegedly dumped, in an attempt to provoke debate and national healing (the Guardian, April 4, 2010).

Despite these censorship attempts by the government, those Zimbabweans who have been excluded from the mainstream public sphere or were aggrieved by government injustices have sought alternative spaces to deliberate and express their views online. These alternative spaces are engendered by new media which offer ‘secure’ spaces for deliberation. Access to the Internet currently stands at 34 per cent in Zimbabwe, whose population is said to be around 15 million (Mhlanga and Mpofu 2014, 134). Access has been influenced by cheap Chinese mobile gadgets, a recent reduction in mobile telephony rates and the expansion of the network by the country’s three mobile operators (Mhlanga and Mpofu 2014). Most Zimbabweans

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in the homeland are not online, as their current economic status does not allow for informational investments when they cannot afford basic commodities. Those who are online, especially subaltern Ndebele groups, have taken it upon themselves to speak for those who remain offline.

Debates on Gukurahundi are characterised by controversy in Zimbabwe. The Internet has given Gukurahundi victims an avenue to be heard and, in the process, gain power to speak. This obtains against the backdrop of the assumption that the subaltern is sub-human, powerless and cannot speak, especially in a postcolonial setting where the liberators, activists, politicians and academics have assumed the role of speaking on their behalf. The subaltern is condemned to perpetual silence by these dominant structures of power. The academy can be complicit in silencing the subaltern as well. For example, Vambe (2012) argues that the Zimbabwean genocide has been dealt with, as victims and perpetrators have since moved on with their lives. This simplistic conclusion minimises the magnitude of the dispossession, shame, alienation, pain and loss of those affected. Vambe’s attempt to speak for Ndebeles dovetails with the state’s efforts at silencing genocide debates.

Using qualitative data drawn from online observation and a close analysis of two key platforms – the website, newzimbabwe.com and an e-mail listserv mainly comprising Ndebele-speaking people, this article investigates how Web 2.0 (i.e., digital spaces that emphasise online interactivity, user-generated content, sharing, etc.) has enabled subaltern voices to discuss taboo issues outside the influence of authoritarian systems.

Newzimbabwe.com is one of the pioneering news sites established outside Zimbabwe in 2003. It identifies itself with Zimbabweans’ democratic aspirations, espousing the ‘belief that every … voice deserves to be heard – including those who have forfeited the freedoms of the majority’ (newzimbabwe.com 2003). It is owned by a British-registered company, New Zimbabwe Limited, and Mduduzi Mathuthu is the founding editor of the news website, but he left in 2013 to join the Zimbabwean state-controlled newspaper, the Chronicle, as editor. The website relies on funding from donors and advertising. It has categories such as News, Business, Showbiz, Sports, Opinion and Blogs. It is publicly accessible – with no log-in credentials needed – and allows for reader comments under these categories, thus promoting citizen journalism in line with Carey’s (1997, 12–13) assertions that news media should ‘support the maintenance of a [communicative] public space ... [and] find ways in which the public can address one another’.

The listserv, which has been in existence since the early 2000s, comprises mostly Ndebele-speaking people who know one another’s identities, thus safeguarding their communication from infiltration. It started off with a few people e-mailing each other on issues of interest to Ndebeles and, through snowball additions, the emailing list grew. By virtue of being Ndebele, I was added by one member on a string of emails in 2007, and from there on I was a member of the group. Sometimes the

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members raise suspicions of infiltration by security agents, which sees suspicious e-mail addresses being flagged and removed from the listserv. There is no appointed administrator. The most passionate debates since the researcher joined the group are those concerning marginalisation and Gukurahundi.

In both newzimbabwe.com and the e-mail listserv discussions, my role was that of an insider-researcher. According to Innes (2009) and Jenkins (2000), an insider-researcher conducts research in their home community – a space they are familiar with. In my case I share the same language, ethnicity and experiences of genocide as most Ndebele people who comment on these digital platforms. The challenge of this type of research is that it is difficult to be objective. I believe I have managed to remain fairly objective and keep a critical distance from the discourses exchanged in the course of this study. The strengths of this approach, nonetheless, include easy access to the broader community and an understanding of debates or experiences that concern this home community. The study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA), ‘a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (Van Dijk 2003, 353). The article analyses reader comments on newzimbabwe.com as well as communication in the e-mail listserv. Attention is focused on how Ndebeles as a subaltern group use new media to resist those forms of political power and social structures which they deem oppressive to their existence, by discussing the silenced debates on the genocide.

To gather material for analysis, key terms such as ‘genocide’ and ‘Gukurahundi’ were entered into the search bar of newzimbabwe.com, and the relevant articles (in some cases news articles whose focus was not genocide, had related material coming up under discussions, and these were also taken into consideration) and readers’ comments were collected and analysed. The genocide has become an explanatory frame for anything perceived to marginalise the Ndebele. I conveniently sampled about 20 articles between 2003 and 2014, which helped demonstrate the assumption of voice by the subaltern. In online extracts used for this study, newzimbabwe.com discussants used pseudonyms for fear of being tracked by the intelligence services.

E-mails from the listserv were conveniently selected from a sample of 66 e-mails (exchanged between March and June 2010), which were debating plans by North Korea to visit Zimbabwe for a pre-2010 World Cup soccer tournament training camp. For the e-mail listerv I had to formulate pseudonyms to protect discussants’ anonymity, since in the listserv discussions they use their authentic identities. Zimbabwe’s Interception of Communications Act sanctions government to snoop into citizens’ online activities. In 2011, Vikas Muvhudzi was arrested under this law after posting a comment on Morgan Tsvangirai’s Facebook wall expressing his admiration for the Egyptian uprising and suggesting that where a people are united they can defeat dictators (Mpofu 2014a). Understandably, most discussants would therefore rather practise self-censorship for their own safety.

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The rest of the article unfolds as follows: first I examine the concept of citizen journalism as participatory journalism, then I investigate the theoretical framing of this study before discussing the findings. Here, three themes emerged: 1) ethnic particularism; 2) remembering, forgiving and forgetting; and 3) alienation, justice and closure. This demonstrates the importance of new media in the creation, transmission and archiving of collective memories and how online debates establish ‘archival formations that feed into social practice … memory and spheres of moral engagement’ (Ashuri 2011, 14). The article concludes by way of reflecting on the research as a whole, and what new media mean to those subaltern voices constrained by the political elite.

CITIZEN JOURNALISM AS PARTICIPATORY JOURNALISMCitizen journalism is a slippery and hotly contested concept (Allan 2009; Goode 2009). There are disagreements about its form, origins and future. The concept does not have ‘completely settled boundaries’ (Goode 2009, 1288) in terms of definitions. What is more important, though, is that citizen journalism ‘appeared to capture something of the countervailing ethos of the ordinary person’s capacity to bear witness’ (Allan 2009, 18). Gillmor (2006) adopts a broader scope in defining citizen journalism, compared to Holton et al. (2013): while Gillmor views citizen journalism as encompassing listservs, user-generated content (USG), responses to online stories, retweeting and sharing, blogging, tagging, mobile connected cameras, peer-to-peer sharing of files and many more, for Holton et al. (2013, 721–722) citizen journalism is a sub-category of USG and represents a journalistic effort ‘in which citizens play an active role in reporting, analysis, or distribution of news’ without the interference of professional journalists.

For the purposes of this study, citizen journalism can be defined in broader terms as done by Gillmor (2006), and this takes into account the configurations of newzimbabwe.com and the e-mail listserv. To be precise, citizen journalism is that form of storytelling which moves from seeing journalism not as a lecture but as a conversation (Marchionni 2013), where ‘everyday people’ (Allan 2009, 30) assume power to take charge and be influential in telling their stories from their own perspectives, through blogs, reader comments, e-mail listservs, etc. Newzimbabwe.com allows readers to post comments which, to a certain extent, demonstrate the understanding the readers have of issues and their interest in adding certain dimensions/debates that the story may have neglected. These comments are usually not subjected to the rigors of quality which are so characteristic of traditional journalism (e.g., objectivity and verification).

Citizen journalism is not without its problems, as it is ‘caught up in concerns around authenticity, credibility and controversy’ (Banda 2009, 26) where unethical

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or false reports may be posted by anonymous writers to engender hatred, spark outrage or stir up protest. While anonymity or the use of pseudonyms is crucial in cases where citizen journalists’ security might be compromised, some scholars argue that people hide behind false identities in order to post malicious comments which demonstrate a lack of civility (McElroy 2013). As Reich (2011) argues, in some instances the intellectual level of comments is lowered or users cannot own up and be responsible for their opinions.

Citizen journalism in dictatorial contexts tends to arouse much interest, as people engage in topics that are otherwise silenced in public media. In Burkina Faso, for instance, the powers-that-be monitor the online activities of citizens and give ‘regular reprimands’ (Frère 2014, 237) to deviant voices. Frère (ibid.) has emphasised the importance of citizen journalism, observing that ‘online debates have even influenced the political decision-making process’. Elsewhere, Spitulnik (2002, 177) suggests that these under-researched alternative communicative spaces – what she calls ‘small media’ – are integral in Africa, as many people do not necessarily rely on polarised mainstream media for their informational needs. The formal media ‘are still not wholly free’ and remain subject to political or economic interests, hence ‘everyday people’ tend to rely on rumours, graffiti, listservs, pamphlets, jokes and slogans. Spitulnik (ibid, 185) suggests that these small media usually carry sensitive political discussions, hence as the current research suggests, some resort to being enclaved for strategic purposes. The following section discusses two distinct characteristics of subaltern public spheres.

SUBALTERN PUBLIC SPHERES: THE ‘VOICE’ IN CYBERSPACESubaltern public spheres have been instrumental in undermining oppressive regimes’ control of the media and public debate (Spitulnik 2002). The notion of a subaltern public sphere derives from Habermas (1962, 1989). Despite its relevance, Habermas’ exclusion of ‘irrational’ voices from the public sphere is problematic. As Papachirissi (2004, 259) puts it, debate needs to be ‘robust and heated’, characterised by ‘anarchy, individuality and disagreement rather than rational accord lead[ing] to true democratic emancipation’ (2000, 9).

Fraser (1992) conceptualised the subaltern public sphere by focusing on women as the subaltern class in society. This suits the current research and applies to newzimbabwe.com and the listserv in many respects, in that it departs from the mainstream Habermasian public sphere which served the bourgeoisie. Both are alternative to the mainstream public spheres in terms of organisation and subject matter (Atton 2002), and being non-conformist. The service these platforms offer the community differs from that of the mainstream, as they allow the subaltern to participate and, significantly, their content rails against hegemonic discourses. They

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bring on board a multiplicity of voices advocating dissimilar issues, yet they have a dual characteristic of functioning ‘as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment ... [and] as bases and training grounds for agitation activities directed towards wider publics’ (Fraser 1992, 124).

To survive the dominant ‘social pressures, legal restrictions, and other challenges from dominant publics and the state’ (Squires 2002, 457), subaltern public spheres usually adopt three basic forms of existence: the enclave, the counter-public and the satellite. In this study, newzimbabwe.com and the e-mail listserv could be labelled as counter-public and enclaved public spheres respectively. Counter-publics operate in the open and on the sidelines of traditional public spheres. Some counter-publics that are denied self-expression or entry into public spheres are compelled to enclave themselves ‘to survive or avoid sanctions, while internally producing lively debate and planning’ (ibid, 448). There are criticisms that enclaved public spheres are exclusive and tend to fail to engage with the broader public spheres. While this is a valid concern, it is important to note that enclaved public spheres are used for clandestine planning, which often leads to offline activities (see Spitulnik 2002; Squires 2002). Both subaltern public spheres afford the subaltern a voice, in different ways.

The process of acquiring a voice where there is official silencing by the state could be empowering, therapeutic and humanising. Silencing not only demarcates discursive boundaries but also delegitimises the actions, aspirations and voices of the subaltern. In cyberspace these ostracised communities have found an avenue for self-expression through unique voices produced with the help of technology. The metaphor of voice in online deliberations is similar to having a place at a round table discussion, or having an opportunity to air one’s views (Dutta and Mahuya 2010). In this study the use of Web 2.0 by subaltern groups disrupts Zanu-PF’s silences, suppression of memory and secrecy on and about the Gukurahundi genocide.

As Mitra (2001, 29) notes, this ‘heteroglossic and hyperconnected’ subaltern voice ‘has the potential of producing a call to the dominant as a moral obligation to acknowledge’. Failure to recognise this voice may lead to a crisis, culminating in recognition of the subaltern’s predicament by international bodies which might assist or form alliances. The relationship between empowerment and voice cannot be overemphasised, especially when the previously silenced subaltern gain a voice and agency to speak. The subaltern public spheres hosted by the Internet have become fora where these voices are concretised, sometimes leading to offline activities.

Discussions on the genocide suggest that victims make links between genocide and the perceived marginalisation and underdevelopment of the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. This has been used to explain, via a regime of narratives contested between ‘official and subaltern voices’ (Bakhtin 2010), the desperate circumstances victims find themselves in, almost 30 years later. Sometimes the political elite respond to issues raised on the counter-public spheres through official media. Yet

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subaltern voices are not homogenous, they are uncoordinated, operating at different locations and times, and even do not share similar ideologies (Gramsci 1971).

ETHNIC PARTICULARISM IN ONLINE MEDIA NARRATIVESFrom the empirical data gathered from online interactions, the selected digital platforms have been crucial in exposing the feelings of the subaltern. What is clear from the interactions is that government silence is viewed as a form of violence, as victims link it with genocide, stifling development and their treatment as second-class citizens. Moreover, these interactions and perceptions have solidified Ndebele ethnic particularism and feelings of alienation, while politicising Ndebele ethnic identity (Msindo 2012). The genocide, one discussant argues in the listserv, was carried out

for the benefit of their (Shona) children and posterity … to give their children … life chances and a clear social, economic and political pedestal … most Shona people [are] very urgy when one discusses Gukurahundi ... It is a clear sign that they benefitted … while Matabeleland continues to be pillaged… (BKSM 08.04.2010)1

BKSM thus alerts his community of their existence at the periphery of power and economy. Another issue that makes the Ndebele feel alienated, has to do with political power configurations both at the running of the state and in opposition politics. For instance, it is believed that Ndebele people are not meant to be leaders of the country and the best they could do is to deputise a Shona leader (Mpofu 2011, 2014a), as has been the case since Joshua Nkomo’s vice-presidency to Mugabe after the signing of the Unity Accord. The same seems to replicate itself in opposition politics, as exemplified by the Newzimbabwe.com story where Tsvangirai is quoted as asserting that Welshman Ncube, a Ndebele and MDC leader, ‘leads a regional party’ leading to Masithandaneni.

The leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai was attained on tribalism after the majority of Shonas rejected the presidency of … Gibson Sibanda on grounds that he came from the minority. (Newzimbabwe.com 05.08.2011)

Responding to the same story, Zhiii truth07 states:

Tsvangirai ... [W]e have not forgotten how he neglected to appoint anyone from this [Matabeleland] region to the cabinet [during the GNU]. We are cognizant of his total lack of commitment to development in this region. He only comes here for our anti-ZANU-PF votes and then insults us by offering ZANU-PF amnesty for Gukurahundi, the very reason we never vote ZANU-PF. (ibid.)

The above propagates the myth that Shona opposition leaders do not care about the predicament of Matabeleland, whose people do not have access to leadership.

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The Ndebele participate in politics on a significant level, as voters. Development, political power allocation and Gukurahundi are intertwined in these discussions. Listserv and newzimbabwe.com debates seem to converge on the theme of ethnic particularism and the alienation of the Ndebele, thus proving that the sentiments raised resonate with other people across multiple platforms.

Ndebeles argue that they belong to the mythic Mthwakazi state (Moyo 2009), a precolonial state comprising the Midlands and Matabeleland regions. They appropriate narrow Ndebele identities and broader ‘Zimbabwean’ identities when it best suits their strategic purposes. The following listserv thread and a comment from Its obvious_mani, illustrate this:

… everybody knows Korea trained those butcher men who killed thousands of our people and that can be proven. (ATSH 09.04.2010)

The natural resource that was depleted first, were our people … the specially trained Brigade was ordered to decimate … as we continue to mourn our loved ones and the continuous torment we have of waiting for the return of those who disappeared cannot be healed by the government’s insulting gesture. (BKSM 16.05.2010)

Tsvangirai will be another dictator. We need our independence in Matabeleland; nothing short of true freedom will satisfy and appease us. We owe it to our children to liberate the country that was colonized by Cecil John Rhodes and handed over to Mugabe to continue his apartheid on us, and kill us left right and center. (Newzimbabwe.com 05.08.2011)

Deictic expression or first-person plural pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’, according to Wodak et al. (2009, 45) are used by speakers to ‘verbally annex and usurp ... [and unite] a speaker … and his audience into a single “community sharing a common destiny” by letting fall into oblivion all differences’. The subaltern use memory and history as a site of resistance against the powerful state. Sharing memories has the effect of coercing others into a ‘we-group’ of those at the mercy of the villainous Zanu-PF.

ONLINE ENGAGEMENTS ON REMEMBERING, FORGIVING AND FORGETTING Failure to address the genocide and in so doing encourage closure has left some memories fresh in the minds of the victims. These memories are shared on digital platforms to create new alliances and assert identities (Spitulnik 2002). In an opinion article in newzimbabwe.com, Jethro Mpofu argues that Gukurahundi will never be forgiven:

… or forgotten either by the victims or by all men and women in the globe who oppose crimes against humanity ... because the perpetrators have not apologized … shown any remorse … they have displayed arrogance and defensiveness that stinks .... They have no single measure of regret … the victims of the genocide are still suffering the effects of the mass human slaughter … there are hundreds of thousands of young people who have failed to attend

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school or get formal employment, because they have no birth certificates and no national registration cards, as a result of their parents being killed and buried without burial orders and death certificates during the period of the massacres ... so they cross the Limpopo river, daily, challenging crocodiles, some of them being killed, as they go seeking general hand employment in South Africa. These victims of the genocide amount to more than two million Zimbabweans, surviving as undeclared economic refugees in South Africa. Gukurahundi … was … a properly planned military incident. (Mpofu 11.12.09, newzimbabwe.com)

The above points to the fact that digital platforms have become new repositories and archives of memories. The platforms have made it safer and possible for people to amplify their hitherto suppressed voices, and to debate sensitive issues which rarely receive attention in the mainstream media. Issues of forgiveness are also discussed on these digital platforms. In 2011, newzimbabwe.com ran a story suggesting that Perence Shiri, the then commander of the Fifth Brigade, had repented of his role in the genocide. Readers were concerned and some felt there was a way in which his remorse could be demonstrated. For example, Umfundisi commented thus:

… repentance demands confession. Prove yourself, stand up and own up … and face the people you wronged and ask for forgiveness. Don’t do it from the office, but come down to us, face us, plead with us. Come let us reason together. (09.09.2011)

Besides discussants trying to offer solutions (i.e., to allow for repentance/dialogue or to punish those responsible), Joe Rug suggests the following:

He deserves to die & nothing more … has blood on his hands just like his master (Mugabe). A bullet in his head will justify the role he played in Gukurahundi massacres ... Lybia is a good lesson for all to see but these myopic minded politicians pretend they are in a world of their own. Such arrogance will do you no good. (ibid.)

Kulwant adds:

The only way our country can move forward is having people like these who reform and regret their past deeds and move on with times. I wish the rest will follow suit and Zimbabwe will once again be … for all Zimbabweans. (ibid.)

Discussant Mokoena feels that

every man is capable of repentance … What we wait to see is Shiri’s deeds to the people of the Midlands and Matabeleland we need to hear from his own mouth … he has repented … telling us who gave the orders, who killed who. (ibid.)

Clearly, these forms of citizen journalism foster counter-hegemonic discourses which give the subaltern a voice (Mitra 2001) and, in the process, fill a communicative void in the mainstream public sphere. It is clear the subaltern voices engage and rail against the dominant class which they believe is attempting to extinguish them. Dominant

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discourses seek to mould a nation through silencing ‘divisive’ discourses on the genocide, but citizen journalism has gone one step further, allowing the subaltern to ‘critique state power’ (Spitulnik 2002, 181). This does not suggest that there are no contrary voices which support the regime and oppose what the Ndebele strive for (see Mpofu 2013, 2014a). The two platforms referred to here, give an indication of dissatisfaction with the way in which news media cover issues. Citizen journalists are guided by ‘interpretation and dialogue’, compared to traditional journalism which adheres to journalistic ‘values of verification and objectivity’ (Holton et al. 2013, 724). Moreover, it is these debates that bring out the meaning of memories and landscapes – something which is rarely discussed in formal public spheres. The case of Barbourfields stadium (BF) stands out: ‘we need to act … massive advocacy to register our discontent, and if we can possibly attempt to have them barred from coming to train at BF... we must never lose sight of the fact when ZANU-PF … planned these things… theirs was a project that was designed to impact well into the future’ (BKSM 08.04.2010). ‘Barbourfields is the centre of our resistance – it is symbolic and cannot be tainted’ (Nkululeko Sibanda, commenting on newzimbabwe.com on the proposed visit by the North Koreans). The stadium is a home ground for the Ndebele community-owned Highlanders Football Club, whose matches against teams from Mashonaland are seen as more than games, and rather as contests of ethnic superiority. The stadium is politically and culturally symbolic, as it is where Nkomo used to address Zapu political rallies.

A sense of imagined family/community (Anderson 2006) or ‘group identity’ (Spitulnik 2002, 181) is cultivated through the way people address each other on these platforms, for instance, as bobaba labomama (fathers and mothers), ‘friend’ and mnewethu (brother). Everyone is part of the family unit by virtue of being perceived as Ndebele and subaltern. This extends to sharing the pain of those who died in the genocide. Sibanda buttresses this when he says: ‘[T]he relationship between Zimbabwe and North Korea was cemented by the blood of our kin … this is the best chance in more than 20 years we have had to defend our dead and our blood’ (newzimbabwe.com 2010). Zapu spokesman, Methuseli Moyo, said that

ZAPU feels hosting the national team of a country associated more with the emotive and evil Gukurahundi … than … footballing reputation, has nothing to do with tourism. It is … a glorification of Gukurahundi, and … provocation to the victims of the military operation against unarmed, defenceless and innocent Ndebeles. (ibid.)

Evoking past memories and experiences helps rally the subaltern into remaining firm and focused on their cause to protest against the visit by North Korean dignitaries and, as one respondent hoped, the protests ‘could begin serious dialogue, action and closure to this problem that continues to haunt us’ (BTBN 10.04.2010).

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ONLINE DELIBERATIONS ON ALIENATION, QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND CLOSUREThe genocide ‘not only left deep scars among the victims but also intensified Matabeleland regionalism’ (Muzondidya 2009, 177) as they see themselves as the outside ‘other’ to the nation. The perception above suggests that genocide still benefits Shona ‘children’, and this is instructive. The use of the pronoun ‘they’ conglomerates Shonas and solidifies the myths that as a group they acted in concert and are therefore collectively guilty. Given that the digital platforms under study here offer discussants spaces to articulate issues they would not otherwise publicly express in Zimbabwe, the newzimbabwe.com and e-mail listserv is populated by differing views on Shona culpability, as exemplified by JJ’s response to an article by George Mkhwananzi:

… if Most Shona speaking people were against gukurahundi, then it would have never happened. Everybody knew about gukurahundi because it was on tv, radio and press everyday. (JJ 05.06.2010)

Mugabe is … is a tribalist and most Shonas know that. As we prepare to show the Koreans how evil they were let’s not say amashona (Shonas) because it’s not all of them who are bad. (EFTS 08.04.2010)

The myth that all Shonas were responsible for the genocide is a generalisation used to unify Ndebeles who form an imagined virtual community on these platforms, thus enhancing their subaltern status. It gives them one common enemy and employs collective memories as sites of resistance against perceived Shona hegemony. This amplifies credibility concerns about citizen journalism (Banda 2009; McElroy 2013). The expression of identity through the memorialisation of Gukurahundi calls our attention to the psycho-social state of those who lost loved ones, who are in perpetual mourning and still haunted by their failure to bury their dead. Memories shared online are therapeutic, making the trauma communal and bearable. The graphic descriptions invite those who did not experience the genocide to share their own trauma. Selerud (2009, 18) sums it up thus: ‘The fact that many still suffer from this massacre … makes the task of mourning unfinished. This leads on to the trauma getting passed on to the next generations. The children of the victims identify with them and their parents remind them of this trauma everyday.’ Online interactions are central to the transmission of memories and to connecting individuals with a large group of people (mostly unknown) who share similar burdens.

Another concern for Ndebeles is the need to bring those responsible for the genocide to justice, concomitant with Pajibo’s (2012, 147) assertion that ‘one way in which a post-conflict society can build durable peace is [that] those who bear the greatest responsibility’ for genocide are brought to book. Researchers should not rush ‘towards a definitive conclusion’, but need ‘to leave the door open for modification as new evidence is uncovered’ (Huttenbach 1999, 307).

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Protests against hosting the North Koreans were an attempt to bring the genocide and its accompanying silences to the global stage. The following threads from the discussants are illustrative:

Ours is dealing with our issues and seeks to put them on the global perspective… because the world is looking down South now … we must use it to boost our cause… (BKSM 04.14.2010)

Mugabe and his murderous friends North Koreans care about their diplomatic standing … We are not planning this demonstration to damage their international images because it is already in tatters … we are doing it to demonstrate our feelings to the World … and to put pressure … [to] the World to do something ... We are taking the lead in solving our problems and I am sure the world would help us .... We do not care what Mugabe is going to feel … because he is a Devil … we are doing it for our people … they care. (MNNZ 04.14.2010)

While these demonstrations are taking place … ultimate closure of this chapter in our history is … the delivery of justice in … courts of law be it the ICC or Zim courts. (RKNB 08.04.2010)

These extracts forcefully capture the notion that for a post-conflict society to subsist, there is a need for those responsible to be held accountable. The World Cup and the attention it brought to southern Africa was viewed as an opportunity to give the predicament of the Ndebele a prominent position, by initiating discussions and protests aimed at ‘begin[ning] serious dialogue’. During online discussions, the group raised funds to meet the costs for offline activities, like going to deliver a petition to the GNU representatives and conducting interviews with the media in South Africa, as suggested in the following extract: ‘We have also held some consultations with other groups working on stopping the Koreans from Camping in Matabeleland, particularly Effy Ncube. The latter has already issued a statement on SABC which was aired on Monday news between 7:30-8:00 pm’ (FSLD 10.04.2014).

While ethnic particularism, collective trauma, communality and memory (issues that cohere Ndebeles as the subaltern) cannot be overemphasised, debates were characterised by conflict. Differences and fights broke out; there was a clash of ideas, insults, name-calling, and questionings of discussants’ identities. For instance, BKSM got impatient with one LTIF for coming ‘with your very trivial mind of imagining things that do not exist’ (BKSM 14.05.2010) after the latter had suggested that the forum had ‘juvenile deliquence lokubiza abanye amagama ngoba belemibono ehlukile kulabanye. It’s quite sad really’ (trans: juvenile delinquents with a tendency of calling others names by virtue of expressing differing opinions). In a discussion with one interactant (Omugabe) in newzimbabwe.com on the foreignness of Zimbabweans and the genocide, Yimi engikhulumayo’s contribution to an article on the possibility of a Ndebele president (Mathuthu 2008) helps illustrate conflict:

@Omgabe… stop all this your rant and deceit and idiotic history from this your idiot serial killer Mugabe correct everything not only about the good people Ndebeles fools mazezulu

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ndini [derogatory IsiNdebele term meaning useless Shonas] haaaa mpthuuuuuuuuu (curses). (newzimbabwe.com 23.11.2008)

Contrarian views were more pronounced, couched in such a way that they represented anti-Ndebele voices. The following quotes from newzimbabwe.com in a story by Mathuthu, on the possibilities of Zimbabwe having a Ndebele president, are illustrative:

Ndeveres are not zimbabweans as they say, every time you see a ndebele out of zim they say we are southafricans so why do they need to lead a foreign country. Patriotism first and then be a leader. (Jonah moyo 23.11.2008)

And we have to correct such misrepresentation of CRIMINAL INVASION! Your so-called ‘migration’ takes place when one is INVITED OR ACCEPTED in the space of others. When you are in the space of another UNINVITED to murder, rob, rape, kidnap, enslave, FORCED ASSIMILATION … That we call CRIMINAL INVASION! …We have to accept the fact that Ndebele did INVADE UNPROVOKED! … Therefore Ndebele can’t expect to claim … Zimbabwe. (Omugabe 23.11.2008)

In short, the two quotes argue that Ndebeles do not belong to Zimbabwe, thus justifying their suppressed status as the subaltern. To a certain extent the second quotation seems to justify the genocide, as the Ndebele criminally ‘invaded’ Zimbabwe – the land of the Shona. Some of these extreme sentiments and contradictions that populate especially open public spheres like newzimbabwe.com mirror real-life discourses offline (Spitulnik 2002).

Enclaved public spheres afford subaltern groups spaces to secretly congregate and strategise, regardless of their geographic locations. Members based in the diaspora in the e-mailing listserv sent money to those in Zimbabwe to travel to Harare, meet with officials and present their position as self-appointed representatives of all Ndebele. They petitioned the relevant officials and claimed victory as the North Koreans’ trip was cancelled. As Mitra (2001, 2004) argues, marginal voices in society have the potential to call on the dominant classes, who have the moral responsibility and obligation to recognise them. Failure to respond to these marginal voices creates a ‘crisis of acknowledgement on the part of the dominant’ (Mitra 2001, 29).

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONSThis study has sought to demonstrate how digital platforms, specifically newzimbabwe.com and the e-mail listerv comprising mostly Ndebele participants, have revolutionised subaltern participation in mainstream debates. The findings reveal that the subaltern were able to raise the issue of the genocide without fear, as these platforms were considered safe from government monitoring and control. While in newzimbabwe.com people relied on their pen-names for safety, in the e-mail listserv there seemed to be an understanding that the participants’ identities and relationship

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to the genocide (as victims) provided some form of security. There seemed to be no fear that their emails could end up in the hands of security agents. Besides, the discussions on the two platforms resonated with readers. Being a Ndebele insider, I can add that they largely mirror what Ndebeles and their sympathisers discuss offline. This corroboration gives relevance to citizen journalism as an important tool, especially for the repressed.

Differences in articulation appear, even though they do not take anything away from the discussants’ lived experiences. In newzimbabwe.com some contributions are characterised by incorrect spelling, perhaps a result of low levels of education or maybe due to the hurried nature of the input. In the listserv, however, people seemed to put thought into their writing. This may be because there were not many comments to engage with, or because the group members reflected a certain level of intellectualism. Unlike in newzimbabwe.com, on the listserv people could plan to carry out offline activities and contribute resources towards that. In both instances, to demonstrate and authenticate the insider identity of the discussants, participants use an admixture of English and isiNdebele. These discussions rarely make it to the mainstream media, partly because professional journalists adhere to certain journalistic norms and values in constructing reality, unlike in citizen journalism, where some ‘uninformed and extremist’ (Holton et al. 2013, 722) opinions might be expressed. The state-controlled media, because of their national unification agenda which includes the construction of a Zanu-PF-imagined national identity, avoid contentious aspects like genocide which are viewed as divisive.

This article has demonstrated that alternative digital public spheres are not only fora for discussing trauma and its effects, but are spaces which give the subaltern a voice, and archive and memorialise events, consolidating collective identities in the process. These spaces have empowered previously disempowered members of society to discuss and communally construct history and knowledge from the bottom up, outside of traditional institutions and journalistic practices (Holton et al. 2013) which systematically advance dominant views (Dutta and Pal 2010). The Internet, by giving the marginalised a voice, has transformed ‘mass’ communication from a top-down lecture model into participatory and conversational practices that increase people’s sense of belonging in various ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 2006). This has empowered (and made it possible for) the subaltern to strategise, inform others in the group, build strong bonds from different localities and resist those government programmes they deem to foster interests which are alien to their communities. It remains an area of further inquiry to investigate whether or not those in power take these voices seriously. Suffice it to say that the alternative media have not gone unnoticed by the powerful, as is evident from Mugabe’s statements at the World Summit on the Information Society, in 2003, where he described the Internet as being used by former colonists and some powers as a conduit ‘through which virulent propaganda and misinformation are peddled to de-legitimise our just

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struggles against vestigial colonialism … to weaken national cohesion and efforts at forging a broad Third World front against what patently is a dangerous imperial world order led by warrior states’ (Mugabe 2003).

Again, it is possible for the subaltern to be divided and discordant – speaking with the voice of the oppressor, in some instances, like a demon would in the body of a possessed Pentecostal Christian being cleansed during a prayer service. Far from being homogenous, digital subaltern public spheres are alternative sites of dissent, conflict and crude expressions where, in some cases, irrational views are aired (Mpofu 2014a). But the marginalised, it can be concluded, may use new media to call or speak out, clamour and ‘crystalise their oppositional ideologies and call into question the dominant world view’ (Mitra 2001, 45).

NOTE1. The acronyms here act as pseudonyms meant to protect participants’ identities.

The numbers thereafter represent the dates on which they sent particular emails. In Newzimbabwe.com discussants choose their pseudonyms and these have been used without alterations.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

SHEPHERD MPOFU, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He researches on new media, national identity and popular culture.

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